



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV  
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400  
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4005

November 16, 2006

James J. Sheppard, President and  
Chief Executive Officer  
STP Nuclear Operating Company  
P.O. Box 289  
Wadsworth, TX 77483

SUBJECT: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION - NRC  
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION  
REPORT 05000498,499/2006009

Dear Mr. Sheppard:

On October 5, 2006, the U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed during the exit meeting on July 27, 2006, with Mr. Edward D. Halpin, Vice President, Oversight, and other members of your staff (held onsite), and a telephonic exit on October 5, 2006, with Mr. Scott Head, Manager, Licensing.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the sample selected for review, there were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The team concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution programs. However, NRC's final assessment of the safety conscious work environment at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station is still under NRC review, pending final resolution of a petition pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Linda J. Smith, Chief  
Engineering Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket: 50-498, 499  
License: NPF-76, NPF-80

Enclosure:  
NRC Inspection Report 05000498; 499/2006009  
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc: w/enclosure  
E. D. Halpin  
Site Vice President/  
Plant General Manager  
STP Nuclear Operating Company  
P.O. Box 289  
Wadsworth, TX 77483

S. M. Head, Manager, Licensing  
STP Nuclear Operating Company  
P.O. Box 289, Mail Code: N5014  
Wadsworth, TX 77483

C. Kirksey/C. M. Canady  
City of Austin  
Electric Utility Department  
721 Barton Springs Road  
Austin, TX 78704

J. J. Nesrsta/R. K. Temple  
City Public Service Board  
P.O. Box 1771  
San Antonio, TX 78296

Jack A. Fusco/Michael A. Reed  
Texas Genco, LP  
12301 Kurland Drive  
Houston, TX 77034

Jon C. Wood  
Cox Smith Matthews  
112 E. Pecan, Suite 1800  
San Antonio, TX 78205

A. H. Gutterman, Esq.  
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius  
1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20004

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)  
Records Center  
700 Galleria Parkway SE, Suite 100  
Atlanta, GA 30339

Director, Division of Compliance & Inspection  
Bureau of Radiation Control  
Texas Department of State Health Services  
1100 West 49th Street  
Austin, TX 78756

Brian Almon  
Public Utility Commission  
William B. Travis Building  
P.O. Box 13326  
1701 North Congress Avenue  
Austin, TX 78701-3326

Environmental and Natural  
Resources Policy Director  
P.O. Box 12428  
Austin, TX 78711-3189

Judge, Matagorda County  
Matagorda County Courthouse  
1700 Seventh Street  
Bay City, TX 77414

STP Nuclear Operating Company

-4-

Terry Parks, Chief Inspector  
Texas Department of Licensing  
and Regulation  
Boiler Program  
P.O. Box 12157  
Austin, TX 78711

Susan M. Jablonski  
Office of Permitting, Remediation and Registration  
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality  
MC-122, P.O. Box 13087  
Austin, TX 78711-3087

Ted Enos  
4200 South Hulen  
Suite 630  
Fort Worth, TX 76109

Electronic distribution by RIV:  
 Regional Administrator (**BSM1**)  
 DRP Director (**ATH**)  
 DRS Director (**DDC**)  
 DRS Deputy Director (**RJC1**)  
 Senior Resident Inspector (**JLD5**)  
 Branch Chief, DRP/A (**CEJ1**)  
 Senior Project Engineer, DRP/A (**TRF**)  
 Team Leader, DRP/TSS (**RLN1**)  
 RITS Coordinator (**KEG**)  
 DRS STA (**DAP**)  
 J. Lamb, OEDO RIV Coordinator (**JGL1**)  
**ROPreports**  
 STP Site Secretary (vacant)

SUNSI Review Completed:  y\_\_\_ ADAMS:  Yes  No Initials: \_rva\_\_  
 Publicly Available  Non-Publicly Available  Sensitive  Non-Sensitive

ML063200197

SRI:EB1	RI:EB2	RI:EB2	RI:PBA	C:EB2	C:PBA	C:EB2
RAzua/lmb	DLivermore	SAiferink	JTaylor	LSmith	CJohnson	LSmith
/RA/	/RA/	/RA/	/RA/	/RA/	/RA/	/RA/
8/31/06	8/31/06	8/30/06	8/30/06	9/1/06	10/25/06	11/16/06

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**ENCLOSURE**

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV

Docket.: 50-498, 499  
License: NPF-76, NPF-80  
Report No.: 05000498,499/2006009  
Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company  
Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2  
Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth  
Wadsworth, Texas 77483  
Dates: July 10 through October 5, 2006  
Team Leader: R. Azua, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1  
Inspectors: S. Alferink, Reactor Inspector,  
D. Livermore, Reactor Inspector,  
J. Taylor, Resident Inspector, Project Branch A  
Approved By: Linda Smith, Chief  
Engineering Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Safety

## SUMMARY OF ISSUES

IR 05000498,499/2006009; STP Nuclear Operating Company; on 7/10-10/05/2006; South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2; Biennial inspection of the identification and resolution of problems.

The inspection was conducted by one senior reactor inspector, two reactor inspectors, and a resident inspector.

### Identification and Resolution of Problems

The inspectors reviewed approximately 253 condition reports, 23 work orders, associated root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to assess problem identification and resolution activities. Overall, the team identified that the licensee was effective at identifying problems and putting them into the corrective action program. The licensee's effectiveness at problem identification was evidenced by the relatively few deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period. The licensee effectively used risk in prioritizing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementing corrective actions. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. Licensee audits and assessments were found to be effective and highlighted a similar concern in the root cause area.

Operating experience usage was also found to be effective. Self assessment results adequately identified problems and proposed corrective actions to address these problems. On the basis of interviews conducted during this inspection, the team found that in general workers at the site felt free to input safety findings into the corrective action program, raise nuclear safety concerns to their supervision, bring concerns to the employee concerns program, and bring concerns to the NRC. During interviews, licensee personnel generally expressed confidence that nuclear safety issues that were entered into the corrective action program would be appropriately addressed. However, NRC's final assessment of the safety conscious work environment at is still under NRC review, pending final resolution of 10 CFR 2.206 petition.

During interviews, licensee personnel expressed confidence that nuclear safety issues that were entered into the corrective action program would be appropriately addressed. The inspectors found that the licensee's employee concerns program appropriately identified and adequately addressed nuclear safety concerns. The team concluded that overall a positive safety-conscious work environment existed at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station.

## REPORT DETAILS

### 4 OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

#### 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

The inspectors based the following conclusions, in part, on all issues that were identified in the assessment period, which ranged from January 4, 2005, (the last biennial problem identification and resolution inspection) to July 28, 2006. The issues are divided into two groups. The first group (current issues) included problems identified during the assessment period where at least one performance deficiency occurred during the assessment period. The second group (historical issues) included issues that were identified during the assessment period but all the performance deficiencies occurred outside the assessment period.

##### a. Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

###### (1) Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed items selected across the seven cornerstones to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. Specifically, the inspectors selected and reviewed condition reports that had been issued between January 2005 to July 2006. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of selected systems and equipment, such as the essential cooling water system and essential chillers, to inspect for deficiencies that should have been entered into the corrective action program. The inspectors also observed control room operations and reviewed operator logs, plant tracking logs, and station work orders to ensure conditions adverse to quality were being entered into the corrective action program. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of self assessments, trending reports, system health reports, and various other documents related to the corrective action program.

The inspectors interviewed station personnel, attended condition review committee and corrective action review board meetings, and evaluated corrective action documentation to determine the licensee's threshold for entering problems into their corrective action program.

The inspectors reviewed condition reports, work orders, and operability evaluations to assess the licensee's ability to evaluate the importance of adverse conditions. The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports, apparent and root cause analyses to ascertain whether the licensee properly considered the full extent of causes and conditions, generic implications, common causes, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also attended various meetings to assess the threshold of prioritization and evaluation of issues identified.



The inspectors performed a historical review of condition reports and notifications written over the last 5 years that addressed the essential cooling water system, essential chillers, steam generator and pressurizer power-operated relief valves, control room envelope integrity (tracer gas testing) and the residual heat removal system.

The inspectors reviewed plant records, primarily, condition reports and work orders to verify that corrective actions related to identified problems were developed and implemented, including corrective actions to address common cause or generic concerns. The inspectors sampled specific technical issues to evaluate the adequacy of the licensee's operability determinations.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports that addressed past NRC-identified violations, for each affected cornerstone, to ensure that the corrective actions adequately addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other condition reports, work orders, or tracking programs to ensure that corrective actions were still appropriate and timely.

(2) Assessments

(a) Assessment - Effectiveness of Problem Identification

The inspectors determined that the licensee's problem identification aspect of the corrective action program appeared to be working appropriately. Although two examples (Examples 2 and 3) were noted, during the evaluation period, whereby, the licensee failed to identify conditions to be entered into the corrective action program, the inspectors determined that these were independent and isolated instances. The inspectors found that overall, problems were adequately identified and entered into the corrective action program as evidenced by the relatively few findings identified during the assessment period. The licensee's threshold for entering issues into the corrective action program was appropriately low. The licensee's condition report tracking system's automatic process for identifying and flagging condition reports that appear to indicate a trend, was notable. Routine licensee review of condition reports also were effective in identifying trends. Closed condition reports that were sampled were closed after all corrective actions had been completed. Few examples were found where condition reports were closed to other condition reports.

**Current Issues**

Example 1: The licensee missed several opportunities to identify component cooling water heat exchanger throttle valve degradation. (NRC Inspection Report 05000498;499/2005005)

Example 2: The licensee missed several opportunities to identify the excess power condition. Check Valve CV-0739 was not seated correctly permitting reactor coolant to leak-by past the check valve. This leak-by represented approximately 0.4 megawatts thermal that was not being considered in the calculation of thermal power using the reactor thermal output instruments. Although the initial indications of the possibility of

an overpower condition were available on the control room panel for 31 days (indications of elevated excess letdown heat exchanger temperature while the excess letdown system was not in service). (NRC Inspection Report 05000498;499/2005003)

Example 3: The licensee identified an adverse trend in personnel contamination events in clean areas. This adverse trend was reversed through implementation of improved engineering controls, enhanced training and additional housekeeping hours. The number of clean area personnel contamination events has declined at the site during each of the last five refueling outages. The team determined that this was an improvement in the identification and control of contamination events.

Example 4: The licensee identified an adverse trend in the writing/posting of equipment clearance orders. Enhanced operator training, control of clearance models, creation of permanent clearance writer positions and the creation of procedures for some system restoration steps, are a number of corrective actions currently being implemented to reverse the negative trend. Equipment clearance order program effectiveness is tracked daily, but the effectiveness of corrective actions will not be known until after the next refueling outage because of the amount of data obtained from the numerous system tag outs involved during a refueling.

### **Historical Issues**

Example 1: The licensee failed to identify, evaluate, and promptly correct a degraded bearing condition and lubricating water flow problems on Essential Cooling Water Pump 1B. The degrading condition of Essential Cooling Water Pump 1B was not recognized, although there were several condition reports written for anomalous lube water flow alarms and indications; also, a decreasing trend of lube water flow had existed for over a month before action was taken to evaluate pump operability. (NRC Inspection Report 05000498; 499/2005002)

Example 2: The licensee failed to vent air from Essential Chiller 22C causing the chiller to be inoperable. The air was introduced during routine maintenance performed 10 days earlier. The system was idle during the period and required frequent draining of the expansion tank to clear high level alarms. The frequent alarms and draining of the system were not recognized as abnormal conditions for the state of the system. This resulted in voids in the system. When nitrogen was restored to the expansion tank, tank level went below available indication and makeup water was added to restore level to normal but voids were not removed. (NRC Inspection Report 05000498;499/2005002)

(b) **Assessment - Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues**

The team concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program guidance and NRC requirements. The team found that for the sample of root cause analyses reviewed, that the licensee was generally self critical and exhaustive in its research into the history of significant conditions adverse to quality.

## **Current Issue**

Example: Relief Valve PSV-3100 lifted during the performance of Plant Surveillance Procedure 0PSP03-RH-0009, on March 16, 2004, and again during performance of preventive maintenance Procedure PM IC-2-89001568 on May 2, 2005. Failure to evaluate extent of condition of inadequate letdown system procedures was a cause of the second lifted relief valve incident. (NRC Inspection Report 05000498;499/2005003-01)

### (c) Assessment - Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The effectiveness of identified corrective actions to address adverse conditions was generally adequate. The inspectors reviewed one example, identified by other NRC inspections, where the licensee failed to take prompt corrective actions to resolve long-standing issues and did not evaluate the potential impact of such a delay. Because of the lack of any other examples having been identified during the assessment period, the inspectors determined this to be an isolated instance and, thus, did not indicate an adverse trend.

## **Current Issue**

Example: Condition Report 03-18389 identified that the grade around Manhole B0XYABKEM52 had been raised. This allowed rainwater to enter the manhole as a catch basin for the area. At the time of the 2005 routine NRC maintenance rule inspection, no corrective actions had been taken. When questioned by the inspectors, licensee personnel lowered an instrument through a small opening in the manhole and discovered approximately 4 feet of water. (NRC Inspection Reports 05000498;499/2005004 and 05000498;499/2005005)

### b. Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

#### (1) Inspection Scope

The inspectors examined the licensee's program for reviewing industry operating experience. A number of operating experience notification documents (NRC bulletins, information notices, generic letters, Part 21s, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, etc.), that had been issued during the assessment period, were selected to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for relevance to the facility. The inspectors then examined whether the licensee had entered those items, that had been deemed relevant, into their corrective action program. Finally, the inspectors reviewed a number of significant conditions adverse to quality and conditions adverse to quality to verify if the licensee had appropriately evaluated for industry operating experience.

#### (2) Assessment

Overall, the inspectors determined that the licensee had appropriately evaluated existing industry operating experience for relevance to the facility, and had entered identified

items in the corrective action program. The inspectors found that the licensee had appropriately evaluated for industry operating experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations of significant conditions adverse to quality and conditions adverse to quality. No problems were noted.

c. Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

(1) Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a number of licensee self and independent assessments and audits. These included the licensee's quality independent oversight reports; quality audit reports; executive oversight board exit meeting minutes; corrective action program self assessment; quality department self-assessment; work control self-assessment: work package quality; work control self-assessment: operational challenges; reactor coolant system leakage and primary system integrity self-assessment; and technical training corrective action effectiveness self-assessment.

(2) Assessment

In general, the licensee's self-assessments and audits were consistent with the data collected. Identified issues were appropriately addressed through the licensee's corrective action program. Licensee's proposed corrective actions appeared to be appropriate to resolve identified issues.

d. Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

(1) Inspection Scope

The inspectors interviewed 67 individuals from different departments representing a cross section of functional organizations and supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel. This group included 40 security personnel. These interviews assessed whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety conscious work environment.

While onsite, the inspectors reviewed the results of the "Site Wide Culture Assessment," performed by Management Insight Technologies in May 2005 to determine if any potential on-going concerns with the safety conscious work environment had been identified at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station.

(2) Assessment

Based on interviews, the inspectors concluded that a safety conscious work environment existed at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station. In general, interviewed employees felt free to enter issues into the corrective action program, as well as raise nuclear safety concerns to their supervision, the employee concerns program, and the NRC. During interviews, licensee personnel generally expressed confidence that nuclear safety issues that were entered into the corrective action program would be appropriately addressed. However, NRC's final assessment of the safety conscious work environment at the South Texas Project is still under NRC review,

pending final resolution of a 10 CFR 2.206 petition that was received on May 16, 2006. That petitioned requested the NRC to seek enforcement action in the form of a Demand for Information that would require STP Nuclear Operating Company to provide the NRC with information associated with the safety conscious work environment at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station.:

The 10 CFR 2.206 petition review request was granted because it met the NRC criteria outlined in NRC's Management Directive 8.11. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Division of Operating Reactor Licensing is reviewing the petition. The results of this review are not final.

4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)

(Closed) Licensee Event Report 0500498/2003003-01: Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Indications

On April 12, 2003, boric acid residue was discovered on two bottom mounted instrumentation nozzles of the Unit 1 reactor vessel. The details of this event and the NRC's subsequent dispositioning of the findings were documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000498;499/2003008. The inspectors reviewed the supplement to this licensee event report (0500498/2003003-01) and did not identify any new findings. This supplemental licensee event report is closed.

4OA6 Exit Meeting

On July 27, 2006, the inspectors conducted an exit meeting with Mr. Edward D. Halpin, Vice President, Oversight, and other members of his staff.

On October 5, 2006, the inspectors conducted a telephonic exit meeting with Mr. Scott Head, Manager, Licensing, to discuss the inspection results following interviews with security personnel regarding safety conscious work environment in the security department.

Attachment: Supplemental Information

Supplemental Information

Partial List of Persons Contacted

Licensee

E. Halpin, Vice President, Oversight  
D. Cobb, Manager, Employee Concerns Program  
J. Winters, Manager, System Engineering  
S. Head, Manager, Licensing  
T. Frawley, Manager, Performance Improvement  
R. Aguilera, Supervisor, Radiation Protection  
D. Swett, Supervisor, Radiation Protection  
M. Ruvalcaba, Supervisor, Engineering  
G. Gaytko, Performance Improvement  
R. Savage, Engineer Licensing Staff Specialist, Quality & Licensing  
S. Brown, Concerns Coordinator, Employee Concerns Program  
R. Harris, System Engineer Condition Report HVAC  
M. Chandler, System Engineer RHR  
R. McAnnally, System Engineer RHR  
M. Prinz, System Engineer 480 Vac  
L. Sterling, ECO Coordinator, Operations  
R. Barr, Operations  
J. Milliff, Operations  
B. Sotos, Design Engineering  
K. Taplett, Licensing Engineer, Licensing  
B. Mookhoek, Licensing Engineer, Licensing  
J. Heil, System Engineer - Reactor Coolant System  
D. Klockentage, System Engineer - Main Steam, Extraction Steam Systems

LIST OF ITEMS CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

05000498/2003-03-01	LER	Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Indications (Section 4OA3)
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## Documents Reviewed

In addition to the documents called out in the inspection report, the following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings:

### Procedures

#### Administrative Procedures

STP Reporting Manual, Revision 2, 05/2002  
STI 31751003, RCA-0001, Root Cause Investigator's Manual, Revision 8  
STI 31883386, STP-411, Reporting of Safety Related or Quality Concerns, Revision 3  
STI 31883453, STP-707, Corrective Action Program, Revision 1  
STI 31905869, OPGP04-ZA-0002, Condition Report Engineering Evaluation, Revision 6  
STI 31917489, OPGP03-ZX-002, Condition Reporting Process, Revision 30  
STI 31968537, CAP-0001, Condition Report Classification Guideline, Revision 1  
STI 31970309, OPGP03-ZA-0090, Work Process Program, Revision 31  
STI 31987403, ACE-0001, Apparent Cause Evaluator's Manual, Revision 1  
STI 31997614, Radiation Protection Condition Reporting Guideline, Revision 7  
STI 32002338, OPGP03-ZA-0504, Employee Concerns Program, Revision 11

#### Maintenance Procedures

PM 03000250, Replace NTD Cards, Revision 1, 08/09/2002  
WCG-0001, Work Screening and Processing  
WCG-0002, Work Management Scheduling  
WCG-0008, Preventing Recurring Equipment Problems

#### Surveillance Procedures

0PSP11-ZH-0010, EAB and FHB Adsorbent Test, Revision 16, 01/31/2005  
0PEP05-ZH-0013, HVAC Test and Balance Procedure, Revision 4, 08/16/2004

#### Operations Procedures

0PGP03-ZO-ECO1, Equipment Clearance Order Program, Revision 16  
0PGP03-ZO-ECO1A, Equipment Clearance Order Instructions, Revision 4

#### Engineering Documents

System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, Essential Chillers, 04/07/2006  
System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, Essential Cooling Water, 04/06/2006  
System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, Reactor Coolant, 03/31/2006  
System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, Residual Heat Removal, 03/31/2006  
System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, EAB HVAC, 04/06/2006  
System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, Reactor Coolant System  
System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, Main Steam/Extraction Steam Systems

Work Orders

101429	236293	278154	298381	427265
206399	262961	286429	307438	433789
228252	263754	292700	307275	445840
230326	267135	293162	310464	458200
230327	277281	293581		

Condition Reports

01-11436	03-15587	04-3451	04-12764	05-5740	05-14758
01-14371	03-15720	04-3682	04-13075	05-6547	05-15107
01-14382	03-15972	04-3773	04-13218	05-6891	05-15134
01-16170	03-16392	04-5246	04-13393	05-6936	05-15596
01-19641	03-16610	04-5249	04-13454	05-7139	05-15598
01-19661	03-16892	04-5264	04-13522	05-7162	05-15950
02-1525	03-17283	04-5286	04-13802	05-7187	05-15959
02-2175	03-18103	04-5304	04-13862	05-7198	05-16152
02-2541	03-18545	04-5371	04-13875	05-7718	05-16333
02-2834	03-18867	04-5454	04-14075	05-7882	05-16528
02-4336	03-423	04-5557	04-14455	05-8124	05-16627
02-4562	03-2389	04-5645	04-14465	05-8247	06-122
02-6004	03-5239	04-5962	04-14652	05-8289	06-319
02-6062	03-5872	04-6236	04-14935	05-8716	06-1408
02-7267	03-12081	04-6255	04-15311	05-8941	06-1954
02-7850	03-12230	04-6742	04-15397	05-9131	06-2326
02-9291	03-12561	04-7098	04-15819	05-9491	06-2475
02-10160	03-13102	04-7202	04-16343	05-9575	06-2479
02-12302	03-14440	04-7669	04-16344	05-9635	06-3248
02-12550	03-14810	04-7685	05-229	05-9665	06-3408
02-17481	03-15058	04-8155	05-252	05-9961	06-3595
02-17546	03-15720	04-8283	05-467	05-9978	06-4091
02-17550	03-15972	04-9215	05-940	05-10555	06-4207
02-17825	03-16057	04-9599	05-1197	05-10567	06-4403
02-18840	03-16392	04-10012	05-1823	05-10665	06-4317
02-19092	03-16610	04-10188	05-1927	05-10747	06-4495
02-252	03-16892	04-10403	05-1929	05-11100	06-4528
02-3862	03-17283	04-10419	05-2079	05-11458	06-4695
03-963	03-18103	04-10584	05-2084	05-12000	06-4865
03-3694	03-18867	04-10883	05-2215	05-12089	06-5417
03-3749	04-945	04-11120	05-2442	05-12590	06-5543
03-3929	04-976	04-11127	05-3071	05-12875	06-5741
03-4704	04-1547	04-11136	05-3310	05-12944	06-6351
03-5783	04-1637	04-11274	05-3379	05-13010	06-8293
03-8990	04-1680	04-11323	05-3570	05-13449	06-8431
03-9745	04-2765	04-11428	05-4186	05-13584	06-8910
03-9749	04-3019	04-11518	05-4244	05-13732	06-8940
03-12143	04-3110	04-11654	05-4251	05-14310	06-8945
03-12392	04-3148	04-11733	05-5037	05-14373	06-8970
03-15021	04-3218	04-12381	05-5557	05-14506	06-9147
03-15431	04-3365	04-12719			



Licensee Event Reports (LER)

LER 2003-03-01

Vendor Manuals

Crosby Instruction Manual, "Operation & Maintenance Instructions For Solenoid Power Operated Relief Valve," Revision 4

Assessments and Audits

STPNOC, Site Wide Culture Assessment - May 2005, by Management Insight Technologies

STPNOC, Quality Program Implementation Self-Assessment Report (Conditon Report 03-15961)

STPNOC, Corrective Action Program Self-Assessment Report (Conditon Report 04-10188)

STPNOC, Work Control Self-Assessment Report (Conditon Report 04-10403)

STPNOC, Technical Training Program Focused Self-Assessment (Conditon Report 04-106)

STPNOC, Reactor Coolant System Leakage and Primary System Integrity Self-Assessment

STP Quality Independent Oversight Report 05-01: August 2004 - February 2005 and 1RE12

STP Quality Independent Oversight Report 05-02: April 2005 - September 2005 and 2RE11

STP Quality Independent Oversight Report 06-01: November 2005 - March 2006

STP Executive Oversight Board Exit Meeting Minutes

Root Cause and Apparent Cause Evaluations

Conditon Report 03-1845 Root Cause Investigation

Conditon Report 03-4704 Root Cause Investigation, Revision 1

Conditon Report 04-6255 Apparent Cause Evaluation

Conditon Report 04-7202 Apparent Cause Evaluation

Conditon Report 04-14935 Root Cause Investigation, Revision 3

Conditon Report 05-4244 Apparent Cause Evaluation

Conditon Report 05-9635 Apparent Cause Evaluation, Revision 1

Conditon Report 05-10665 Apparent Cause Evaluation

Conditon Report 05-15959 Root Cause Investigation

Conditon Report 05-1819 Root Cause Investigation

**Information Request 1 - May 2006**  
**South Texas Project Electric Generating Station PIR Inspection**  
**(IP 71152; Inspection Report 50-498/06-09; 50-499/06-09)**

The inspection will cover the period of April 1, 2004 to April 30, 2006. All requested information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. To the extent possible, please provide the information in electronic media in the form of CDs. The agency's document software is Corel Wordperfect 10, Presentations, and Quattro Pro. However, we can also accept Microsoft suite files and Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) text files.

Please provide the following information to the following address by May 26, 2006.

NRC / Region IV  
ATTN: Ray Azua  
611 Ryan Plaza Dr., Suite 400  
Arlington, TX 76011-4005

Note: On summary lists, please include a description of the problem, status, and initiating date.

1. Summary list of all condition reports related to significant conditions adverse to quality that were opened or closed during the period
2. Summary list of all condition reports related to conditions adverse to quality that were opened or closed during the period
3. Summary lists of all condition reports which were up-graded or down-graded during the period
4. A list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll up" one or more smaller issues for the period
5. Summary lists of operator workarounds, engineering review requests and/or operability evaluations, temporary modifications, and control room and safety system deficiencies opened or closed during the period.
6. List of all root cause analyses completed during the period
7. List of root cause analyses planned, but not complete at the end of the period
8. List of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the employee concerns program
9. List of action items generated or addressed by the plant safety review committees during the period
10. All quality assurance audits and surveillances of corrective actions completed during the period
11. All corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-NRC third party assessments completed during the period (do not include INPO assessments)

12. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period and broken down by functional organization
13. Governing procedures/policies/guidelines for:
  - a. Corrective action program/condition reports
  - b. Apparent and root cause evaluation/determinations
  - c. Employee concerns program
14. A listing of all external events evaluated for applicability at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station during the period
15. Condition reports or other actions generated during the period for each of the items below:
  - a. Part 21 reports
  - b. NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, and Generic Letters
  - c. LERs issued by the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station
  - d. NCVs and Violations issued to the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station
16. Security event logs and security incidents during the period
17. Radiation protection event logs during the period
18. Condition reports generated as a result of emergency planning drills and tabletop exercises during the period
19. Current system health reports or similar information during the period
20. Condition reports associated with maintenance preventable functional failures during the period
21. Condition reports associated with adverse trends in equipment, processes, procedures, or programs during the period
22. Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period
23. List of emergency plan exercise and drill deficiencies during the period
24. List of training deficiencies, requests for training improvements, and simulator deficiencies for the period