

- (4) Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source, or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form for sample analysis or instrument calibration or when associated with radioactive apparatus or components;
  - (5) Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by operation of the facility.
3. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter 1: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Section 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

A. Maximum Power Level

Omaha Public Power District is authorized to operate the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1, at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 1500 megawatts thermal (rated power).

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 244, are hereby incorporated in the license. Omaha Public Power District shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

C. Security and Safeguards Contingency Plans

The Omaha Public Power District shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plans, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled: "Fort Calhoun Station Security Plan, Training And Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan" submitted by letter dated October 18, 2004.

# TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

## 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

### 2.4 Containment Cooling

#### Applicability

Applies to the operating status of the containment cooling systems.

#### Objective

To assure operability of equipment required to remove heat from the containment during normal operating and emergency situations.

#### Specifications

##### (1) Minimum Requirements

- a. The reactor shall not be made critical, except for low-temperature physics tests, unless all the following are met:

- i. The following equipment normally associated with diesel-generator DG-1 (4.16-kV bus 1A3 and associated non-automatically transferring 480-Volt bus sections) is operable, except as noted.<sup>(1)</sup>

Raw water pump	AC-10A
Raw water pump	AC-10C
Component cooling water pump	AC-3A
Component cooling water pump	AC-3C
Containment spray pump	SI-3A
Containment air cooling and filtering unit	VA-3A
Containment air cooling unit	VA-7C

- ii. The following equipment normally associated with diesel-generator DG-2 (4.16-kV 1A4 and associated non-automatically transferable 480 Volt bus sections) is operable, except as noted.<sup>(1)</sup>

Raw water pump	AC-10B
Raw water pump	AC-10D
Component cooling water pump	AC-3B
Containment spray pump	SI-3B
Containment air cooling and filtering unit	VA-3B
Containment air cooling unit	VA-7D

- iii. Four component cooling heat exchangers shall be operable.

- iv. All valves, piping and interlocks associated with the above components and required to function during accident conditions are operable.

<sup>(1)</sup> Reactor may be made critical with one inoperable raw water pump. LCO action statements shall apply.

## TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

### 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

#### 2.4 Containment Cooling (Continued)

- b. During power operation one of the components listed in (1)a.i. and ii. may be inoperable. If the inoperable component is not restored to operability within seven days, the reactor shall be placed in hot shutdown condition within 12 hours. If the inoperable component is not restored to operability within an additional 48 hours, the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.
- c. For cases involving Raw Water pump inoperability, if the river water temperature is below 60 degrees Fahrenheit, one Raw Water pump may be inoperable indefinitely without applying any LCO action statement. When the river water temperature is greater than 60 degrees Fahrenheit, an inoperable Raw Water pump shall be restored to operability within 7 days or the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within 12 hours. If the inoperable Raw Water pump is not restored to operability within an additional 48 hours, the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

#### (2) Modification of Minimum Requirements

- a. During power operation, the minimum requirements may be modified to allow a total of two of the components listed in (1)a.i. and ii. to be inoperable at any one time. (This does not include: 1) One Raw Water pump which may be inoperable as described above if the river water temperature is below 60 degrees Fahrenheit or, 2) SI-3A and SI-3B being simultaneously inoperable. Only two raw water pumps may be out of service during power operations. Either containment spray pump, SI-3A or SI-3B, must be operable during power operations.) If the operability of one of the two components is not restored within 24 hours, the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within 12 hours. LCO 2.4(1)b. shall be applied if one of the inoperable components is restored within 24 hours. If the operability of both components is not restored within an additional 48 hours, the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.
- b. During power operation one component cooling heat exchanger may be inoperable. If the operability of the heat exchanger is not restored within 14 days, the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within 12 hours. If two component cooling heat exchangers are inoperable, the reactor shall be placed in hot shutdown condition within 12 hours. If the inoperable heat exchanger(s) is not restored to operability within an additional 48 hours, the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.
- c. Any valves, interlocks and piping directly associated with one of the above components and required to function during accident conditions shall be deemed to be part of that component and shall meet the same requirements as for that component.
- d. Any valve, interlock or piping associated with the containment cooling system which is not included in the above paragraph and which is required

## TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

### 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

#### 2.4 Containment Cooling (Continued)

to function during accident conditions may be inoperable for a period of no more than 24 hours. If operability is not restored within 24 hours, the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within 12 hours.

#### Basis

A full capacity diesel-generator is connected to each of the two engineered safeguards 4.16-kV buses. Three engineered safeguards 480-Volt double-ended load centers are provided; of the six transformers, three are connected to each of the two 4.16-kV buses. Two load centers are operated as two-bus-section units; the third is provided with a center bus manually transferable to either associated end section. The center bus section supplies HPSI Pump SI-2C, CS Pump SI-3C and Charging Pump CH-1C any of which can thus be supplied from either 4.16-kV bus if required (note that CS pump SI-3C is connected to the center bus, however, this pump is available for manual operation only). The containment spray pumps initially take coolant from the safety injection and refueling water (SIRW) tank. Before this supply of water is exhausted (at least 24 minutes)<sup>(2)</sup> the spray system is transferred to the recirculation mode and the pumps take suction from the containment sump. One shutdown cooling heat exchanger is sufficient to satisfy the spray system requirements during the long-term containment cooling period.<sup>(3)</sup> In addition, in the unlikely event of the component cooling water supply being lost, raw water can be utilized for direct cooling of certain engineered safeguard components.<sup>(4)</sup>

The containment spray system is independent from the containment air cooling and filtering unit for the containment cooling function.<sup>(5)</sup> For the limiting Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) scenario, one of the two spray pumps would limit the containment pressure to below the design value without taking credit for the air coolers or the cooling capacity of the safety injection system.<sup>(6) (7)</sup> For the limiting Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) scenario, a heat removal contribution is credited from the air coolers in the mitigation of containment peak pressure.<sup>(7)</sup> Credit is taken for iodine removal by the containment spray system.

The cooling equipment provided to limit the containment pressure following a DBA is divided between the independent power supply systems. The raw water and component cooling water pumps are similarly distributed on the 4.16-kV and 480 Volt buses. In the event of a DBA, loss of normal power sources and failure of one diesel-generator to operate, a minimum of one spray pump, and two air coolers would be connected to the available diesel-generator. This would provide adequate containment cooling equipment to limit the containment pressure below the design value for the limiting one pump, one spray header LOCA event. The limiting MSLB event in which off site power is available, is not affected by the loss of one diesel generator.

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### 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

#### 2.7 Electrical Systems (Continued)

##### Basis

The electrical system equipment is arranged so that no single failure can inactivate enough engineered safeguards to jeopardize the plant safety. The 480 V safeguards are arranged on nine bus sections. The 4.16 kV safeguards are supplied from two buses.

The normal source of auxiliary power with the plant at power for the safeguards buses is from the house service power transformers being fed from the 161 Kv incoming line with on-site emergency power from either one of two diesel generators and off-site standby power via the unit auxiliary transformers.<sup>(1)</sup> The loss of the 161kV incoming line renders the house service transformers (T1A-3 and T1A-4) inoperable in that the transformers cannot supply power to the 4.16kV safeguards buses 1A3 and 1A4. Inoperability of the house service transformer(s) or loss of the 161kV incoming line is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 criteria; however, the NRC will be promptly notified of these events via the NRC Operations Center.

The two emergency diesel generators on site do not require offsite power for start up or operation.

Upon loss of normal and standby power sources, the 4.16 Kv buses 1A3 and 1A4 are energized from the diesel generators. Bus load shedding, transfer to the diesel generator and pickup of critical loads are carried out automatically.<sup>(2)</sup>

When the turbine generator is out of service for an extended period, the generator can be isolated by opening motor operated disconnect switch DS-T1 in the bus between the generator and the main transformer, allowing the main transformer and the unit auxiliary power transformers (T1A-1 and T1A-2) to be returned to service.<sup>(3)</sup> The auxiliary power transformers are not considered inoperable during these normal plant startup/shutdown realignments.

Minimum requirements are implemented prior to raising the RCS temperature above 300°F to assure availability of engineered safety features.

The time allowed to repair an inoperable inverter is based upon engineering judgement, taking into consideration the time required to repair an inverter and the additional risk to which the unit is exposed because of the inverter inoperability. In the event of inverter failure, the load on the inverter is automatically transferred to its safety related bypass source. The associated 120 V a-c instrument bus is considered OPERABLE when it is being powered from its bypass source and during the short time it takes to manually or automatically transfer between sources.

Equipment served by 4.16 kV and 480 V auxiliary buses and MCC's is arranged so that loss of an entire 4.16 kV bus does not compromise safety of the plant during DBA conditions. For example, if 4.16 kV bus 1A3 is lost, two raw water pumps, one low pressure safety injection pump, two high pressure safety injection pumps, one auxiliary feedwater pump, two component cooling water pumps, one containment spray pump and two containment air fans are lost. This leaves two raw water pumps, one low pressure safety injection pump, one high pressure safety injection pump, one component cooling water pump, one containment spray pumps and two containment air fans which is more than sufficient to control containment pressure below the design value during the DBA.