

November 3, 2006

Mr. Russell B. Starkey, Jr.  
Vice President - Operations  
United States Enrichment Corporation  
Two Democracy Center  
6903 Rockledge Drive  
Bethesda, MD 20817

SUBJECT: INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70-7001/2006-203 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATIONS

Dear Mr. Starkey:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a routine, scheduled, and announced criticality safety inspection September 25 through 28, 2006, at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion facility in Paducah, Kentucky. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether activities authorized by your certificate involving special nuclear material were conducted safely and in accordance with regulatory requirements. Throughout the inspection, observations were discussed with your staff. An exit meeting was held on September 28, 2006, and a re-exit telephone conference was held on October 5, 2006, during which inspection observations and findings were discussed with your management and staff.

The inspection, which is described in the enclosure, focused on: (1) the most hazardous activities and plant conditions; (2) the most important controls relied on for safety and their analytical basis; and (3) the principal management measures for ensuring controls are capable, available, and reliable to perform their functions relied on for safety. The inspection consisted of analytical basis review, selective review of related procedures and records, examinations of relevant NCS-related equipment, interviews with NCS engineers and plant personnel, and facility walkdowns to observe plant conditions and activities related to safety basis assumptions and related NCS controls.

Based on the results of the inspection, the NRC has determined that two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations were evaluated in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC's web site at [www.nrc.gov](http://www.nrc.gov); select What We Do, Enforcement, then Enforcement Policy. The violations are being cited in the enclosed Notice of Violations (Notice) as Severity Level IV violations, and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violations are being cited in the Notice because they were identified as a result of an operating event. The first violation being cited as a Severity Level IV violation is the failure to maintain the safe geometry limit of 3.68 inches of water accumulation in the C-310 scale pit. The second violation being cited as a Severity Level IV violation is the failure to report a loss of double contingency to the NRC.

R. B. Starkey, Jr.

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You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice of Violations when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be available in the public electronic reading room of the NRC's Agency-Wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>.

If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Natreon J. Jordan, of my staff, at (301) 415-7648.

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Melanie A. Galloway, Chief  
Technical Support Branch  
Special Projects & Technical  
Support Directorate  
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety  
and Safeguards

Docket No.: 70-7001

Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 70-7001/2006-203

cc: S. Penrod, Paducah General Manager  
S. R. Cowne, Paducah Regulatory Affairs Manager  
W. Jordan, Portsmouth General Manager  
S. A. Toelle, Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, USEC  
R. M. DeVault, Regulatory Oversight Manager, DOE  
G. A. Bazzell, Paducah Facility Representative, DOE  
Janice H. Jasper, State Liaison Officer

R. B. Starkey, Jr.

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**DISTRIBUTION:**

DMartin                      JHenson, RII                      DHartland, RII                      GMorell  
KMcCallie, RII                      MThomas, RII

**\*Please see previous concurrence**

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NAME	NJordan		DMorey		RWray		MGalloway	
DATE	*10/ 20 /06		*10/ 20 /06		*10/ 20 /06		11/ 3 /06	

**OFFICIAL RECORD COPY**

## NOTICE OF VIOLATION

United States Enrichment Corporation  
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant

Docket No. 70-7001  
Certificate No. GDP-1

During a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) routine inspection conducted from September 25 through 28, 2006, two violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with NUREG-1600, "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," the violations are listed below.

1. Certificate Condition Number 9 of Certificate GDP-1 requires the conduct of operations in accordance with the Technical Safety Requirements that are contained in Volume 4, Revision 84 of the Application, dated November 3, 2003, and supplements thereto.

Technical Safety Requirement 3.11.5 requires, in part, that the double contingency principle, as described in the Safety Analysis Report, shall be used as the basis for the design and operation of processes using fissionable materials.

Section 3.2.4 of Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval NCSA-310-004, "Product and Side Withdrawal in the C-310 Building," states, in part, that "The presence of water in the pit with a depth greater than 3.68 inches results in a loss of geometry control in the pit."

Contrary to the above, on September 23, 2006, failure of the scale pit moisture sensor to alarm resulted in water level in the C-310 scale pit reaching 4.375 inches before discovery and therefore to exceeding 3.68 inches.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement VI).

2. Certificate Condition Number 8 requires the conduct of operations in accordance with the statements and representations contained in the Certificate Application through Revision 84, dated November 3, 2003.

Certificate Application Section 6.9 requires, in part, that for operations that comply with the double contingency principle, events involving the violation of the double contingency principle when control is immediately reestablished must be reported to the NRC within 24 hours.

Contrary to the above, on and after September 23, 2006, the certificatee failed to report a loss of double contingency in the C-310 scale pit which resulted from an accumulation of water in the pit in excess of the safe geometry limit relied on for double contingency.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement VI).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, the United States Enrichment Corporation is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555, with copies to the Chief, Technical Support Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear

**Enclosure 1**

Material Safety and Safeguards, Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the certificate should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001.

Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), or from the NRC's Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>, to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld, and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working days.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland

this 3<sup>rd</sup> day of November 2006

**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
**OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS**

Docket No.: 70-7001

Certificate No.: GDP-01

Report No.: 70-7001/2006-203

Certificatee: United States Enrichment Corporation

Location: Paducah, Kentucky

Inspection Dates: September 25 - 28, 2006

Inspectors: Dennis Morey, Senior Criticality Safety Inspector  
Natreon Jordan, Criticality Safety Inspector  
Blake Purnell, Criticality Safety Reviewer

Approved by: Melanie A. Galloway, Chief  
Technical Support Branch  
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety  
and Safeguards, NMSS

**Enclosure 2**

**United States Enrichment Corporation  
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant**

**NRC Inspection Report 70-7001/2006-203**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**Introduction**

Staff of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) performed a routine, scheduled, and announced criticality safety inspection of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in Paducah, Kentucky, from September 25 through 28, 2006. The inspection included an on-site review of certificatee programs dealing with plant operations, the nuclear criticality safety (NCS) program, audits and inspections, and NCS-related corrective actions. The inspection focused on risk-significant fissile material processing activities including those in Buildings C-310, C-333, C-335, C-337, C-360, C-400, C-746-Q1, and C-754.

**Results**

- A Severity Level IV violation was identified regarding the failure to maintain the safe geometry limit in the C-310 scale pit of 3.68 inches.
- A Severity Level IV violation was identified regarding the failure to report a loss of double contingency to the NRC within 24 hours.
- The NCS program as observed was adequate for maintaining acceptable levels of safety.
- Certificatee NCS walkthroughs, assessments, and surveillance were adequate for maintaining acceptable levels of safety.
- No safety concerns were identified during walkdowns of the facility and operations.

## REPORT DETAILS

### 1.0 Summary of Plant Status

U.S. Enrichment Corporation enriches uranium for domestic and international customers at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. In conjunction with routine enrichment activities, the certificatee performs laboratory operations, cleaning and decontamination services, and maintenance and support activities. During the inspection, the certificatee was performing routine enrichment and support operations.

### 2.0 Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (88015)

#### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed nuclear criticality safety (NCS) analyses to determine that criticality safety of risk-significant operations was assured through engineered and administrative controls with adequate safety margin and preparation and review by qualified staff. The inspectors reviewed selected aspects of the following documents:

- NCSE [Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation] -091, "Fissile/Potentially Fissile Waste Container Storage and Handling," Revision 6, dated August 2006
- NCSE-108, "Operation of the Fixed High Efficiency Filter Systems in C-310 and C-360," Revision 0, dated February 2006
- CP4-EG-NS-1101, "Evaluation of Requests For Criticality Safety Approval," Revision 9, dated April 2005
- NCSE-010, "Transport, Handling, and Storage of Fissile/Potentially Fissile Material Samples," Revision 2, dated August 2006
- NCSA [Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval] -GEN-008, "Transport, Handling, and Storage of Fissile/Potentially Fissile Material Samples," dated March 2004
- NCSA WMO-001, "Operation of Temporary Fissile Storage Areas at PGDP," Revision 5, dated July 28, 2006
- NCSE GPS-04, "Repair and Handling of Converters in C-720C," Revision 4, dated August 14, 2003
- DAC [Design Analysis and Calculation] 832-ZA-1280-0042, "Calculations for 5.5-gallon drums, 2.1-gallon drums, and 21-liter Carboy Containers," Revision 3, dated August 11, 2006
- DAC 832-ZA-1280-0001, "5-gallon Waste Drum Storage," dated May 14, 1999

#### b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed NCSAs, NCSEs, and supporting calculations for new, changed, and other selected operations. Within the selected aspects reviewed, the inspectors determined that the analyses were performed by qualified NCS engineers, that independent reviews of the evaluations were completed by qualified NCS engineers, that subcriticality of the systems and operations was assured through appropriate limits on controlled parameters, and that double contingency was assured for each credible accident sequence leading to inadvertent criticality. The inspectors determined that NCS controls for equipment and processes assured the safety of the operations. Nuclear criticality safety analyses and supporting calculations demonstrated adequate identification and control of NCS hazards to assure operations within subcritical limits.



c. Conclusions

The NCS program as observed was adequate for maintaining acceptable levels of safety.

**3.0 Nuclear Criticality Safety Inspections, Audits and Investigations (88015)**

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed records of previously-completed NCS walkthroughs of fissile operations in Buildings C-333, C-310, C-331, C-409, and C-337. The inspectors also reviewed records of the completed NCS group self-assessment of the maintenance program and the Nuclear Safety and Quality (NS&Q) surveillance of the NCS program. The inspectors reviewed selected aspects of the following documents:

- CP4-EG-NS1107, "Nuclear Criticality Safety Oversight Program," Revision 3, dated April 6, 2005
- 06-WS-0002, "C-333 Process Building NCS Walkthrough," dated April 26, 2006
- 06-WS-0003, "NCS Walkthrough for C-310," dated June 23, 2006
- 06-WS-0004, "C-331 Process Building NCS Walkthrough," dated June 9, 2006
- 06-WS-0005, "NCS Walkthrough for C-409," dated June 30, 2006
- 06-WS-007, "C-337 Process Building NCS Walkthrough," dated September 20, 2006
- C31-NCS SA-06-01, "NCS Group Self-Assessment: Maintenance," dated May 12, 2006
- KP-OP-SO6009, NS&Q Surveillance, "Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Program," dated May 5, 2006

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors determined that certificatee NCS engineers observed plant operations to determine adequacy of implementation of NCS requirements and ensured that implementation weaknesses were identified and entered into the corrective action system. The inspectors observed that the certificatee NCS walkthroughs and assessments were conducted within the required time limit and performed in accordance with written procedures. The inspectors noted that the walkthroughs and assessments were performed by NCS engineers who: (1) reviewed NCS issues from previous audits; (2) reviewed the adequacy of control implementation; (3) reviewed plant operations for compliance with certificate requirements, procedures, and postings; and (4) examined equipment and operations to determine that past evaluations remained adequate. The inspectors observed that NCS issues identified in the NS&Q surveillance report as needing corrective action were addressed by the NCS program. No safety concerns were noted regarding certificatee walkthroughs, assessments, and surveillance.

c. Conclusions

Certificatee NCS walkthroughs, assessments, and surveillance were adequate for maintaining acceptable levels of safety.

**4.0 Event Follow-up**

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the certificatee response to an internal event in the C-310 withdrawal area along with the certificatee conclusion on reportability of the event. The inspectors reviewed documents, interviewed operators and engineers, and met with certificatee NCS staff and management to discuss the event.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed a recent event involving rainwater entering the C-310 withdrawal area scale pit. Immediately prior to the inspection, the facility experienced flooding in some operational areas due to heavy rains. As a result of the heavy rains, a drain in the C-310 withdrawal area overflowed, and water entered one of the scale pits. The layout in C-310 is such that the scale pits are located under the floor areas of the withdrawal stations. The criticality safety concern is that uranium hexafluoride ( $UF_6$ ) could be released and accumulate into the scale pit which could, itself, potentially be filled with water beyond a geometrically safe slab-height.

At the time of the event, managers at C-310 directed operators to check the area for water accumulation and, subsequently, an operator noticed water flowing into the scale pit. The sump pump, an uncredited control located in the scale pit, failed to operate on demand as water continued to fill the pit. The certificatee initiated compensatory measures resulting in a portable pump being placed into the pit to drain the water. To alert operators that water was accumulating in the pit, the certificatee relied on a moisture sensor, which lay along the floor of the scale pit. The moisture sensor was a credited control relied upon to ensure ample response time to prohibit the water level in the pit from reaching an unsafe limit. The sensor is designed to alert operators in the event water accumulation in the pit exceeds 2.5 inches. This action limit of 2.5 inches is stated in the NCSE with providing sufficient time for the certificatee to prohibit the water level from reaching the credited safety limit of 3.68 inches. As part of the certificatee's root cause investigation, the sensor was determined to be inoperable and failed to provide the audible alarm that would have alerted operators prior to significant water accumulation in the scale pit. As a result of the failures of credited (moisture sensor) and uncredited (sump pump) controls, water filled the C-310 scale pit beyond the action and safety limits designated in Section 3.2.4 of NCSA-GEN-310-004.

The certificatee relied on two controls to ensure that double contingency was maintained to prevent the upset condition of an unsafe fissile slab in the scale pit. First, the structural integrity of equipment in the withdrawal operation prevents release of fissile material greater than a safe mass into the scale pit. Second, moderation in the scale pit was limited to a safe water slab height of 3.68 inches by the moisture sensor and operator response. Initial certificatee review of the event resulted in the conclusion that the safety limit had not been reached based on a measurement with a mop handle which showed the water level only reached 3.625 inches. The inspectors observed the C-310 scale pit area and noted that the bottom of the pit was sloped. Certificatee staff performed a reevaluation of the pit and determined that the water level had reached 4.375 inches, which was greater than the 3.68 inches limit.

The certificatee contends that the NCSE associated with the C-310 scale pit, NCSE-032, considered two versions of the loss of geometry scenario: (1) the scale pit is filled with water slowly such that the upset condition is not readily observable, and (2) the

scale pit is filled rapidly such that the upset is readily observable. The certificatee asserted that in the readily observable case, the NCSE establishes that the expected rapid response assures that criticality was non-credible and that the severe rainstorm before the event resulting in rapid intrusion of water into the scale pit fell under the readily observable case. The inspectors determined that the NCSE did not clearly distinguish between the two cases, and that the readily observable case would not lead to non-credibility since it relied on an NCS control (structural integrity of equipment). The inspectors concluded that water intrusion into the C-310 scale pit did not have separate controls based on readily observable and non-readily observable cases, but was a single accident sequence protected by double contingency in which one leg of double contingency relied on maintaining the water level in the pit below 3.68 inches. The NCSA associated with the C-310 scale pit, NCSA-310-004, states, in part, that “the presence of water in the pit with a depth greater than 3.68 inches results in a loss of geometry control in the pit.” The inspectors determined that the failure of the moisture sensor led to a loss of moderation control, which constitutes a loss of double contingency. The certificatee’s failure to control moderation by maintaining a safe slab height, and thus, double contingency, is **Violation (VIO) 70-7001/2006-203-01**.

The certificatee also asserted that the event was evaluated based on the as-found conditions which included the fact that only 2 wt% UF<sub>6</sub> was present in the withdrawal area during the event (because only 2 wt% UF<sub>6</sub> was being withdrawn). This led to the certificatee determination that the event was not reportable because, at 2 wt% uranium, the geometry limit in the pit would be greater than 3.68 inches. The inspectors determined that normal operations for the C-310 withdrawal process was limited to 5.5 wt% UF<sub>6</sub> and that any determination of double contingency had to be based on the expected and bounding normal conditions for the area. Certificate Application Section 6.9 requires, in part, that for operations that comply with the double contingency principle, events involving the violation of the double contingency principle when control is immediately reestablished must be reported to the NRC within 24 hours. Contrary to this, the certificatee failed to notify the NRC within 24 hours for an event where double contingency was not maintained. The certificatee’s failure to report a loss of double contingency to the NRC within 24 hours is **VIO 70-7001/2006-203-02**.

c. Conclusions

A Severity Level IV violation was identified regarding the failure to maintain the safe geometry limit in the C-310 scale pit of 3.68 inches. A Severity Level IV violation was identified regarding the failure to report a loss of double contingency to the NRC within 24 hours.

## 5.0 Plant Operations (88015)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to review activities in progress and to determine whether risk-significant fissile material operations were being conducted safely and in accordance with regulatory requirements. The inspectors verified the

adequacy of management measures for assuring the continued availability, reliability, and capability of safety-significant controls relied upon by the certificatee for controlling criticality risks to acceptable levels. The inspectors performed walkdowns of Buildings C-310, C-333, C-335, C-337, C-360, C-400, C-746-Q1, and C-754.

The inspectors reviewed selected aspects of the following documents prior to performing the walkdowns:

- NCSE-091, "Fissile/Potentially Fissile Waste Container Storage and Handling," Revision 6, dated August 2006
- DAC-832-ZA-1280-0042, "Calculations for 5.5-Gallon Drums, 2.1-Gallon Drums, and 21-Liter Carboy Containers," Revision 3, dated August 2006
- DAC 832-ZA-1280-0001, "5 gallon Waste Drum Storage," dated May 14, 1999
- NCSE-108, "Operation of the Fixed High Efficiency Filter Systems in C-310 and C-360," Revision 0, dated February 2006
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- NCSE-010, "Transport, Handling, and Storage of Fissile/Potentially Fissile Material Samples," Revision 2, dated August 2006
- NCSA-GEN-008, "Transport, Handling, and Storage of Fissile/Potentially Fissile Material Samples," dated March 2004

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors verified that controls identified in the NCS analyses reviewed were adequate to assure safety. The cognizant NCS engineers were knowledgeable and able to explain the basis for changes in operations and controls.

c. Conclusions

No safety concerns were identified during walkdowns of the facility and operations.

**6.0 Open Item Followup (88015)**

**IFI 70-7001/2006-201-01**

This item tracks: (1) the certificatee's justification for inclusion of Mixed-Oxide (MOX)-driven benchmarks in the validation reports and establishment of criteria for demonstration of Area of Applicability (AOA) compliance in facility calculations, and (2) the certificatee's development of guidelines which will ensure a consistent minimum level of documentation for verifying the compliance of future facility calculations with the validated AOA. The certificatee had not completed the revision of the validation reports during the current inspection. Therefore, this item remains open.

**IFI 70-7001/2006-201-02**

This item tracks the certificatee's revision of NCSE-091 to include justification for storage of drums of spacing-exempt NCS material next to drums containing potentially better moderators than water. In this inspection, the inspectors determined that

scenarios were analyzed in NCSE-091 that bound actual storage configurations involving drums of spacing-exempt NCS material and drums containing potentially better moderators than water. Therefore, the inspectors determined that the justification was adequate for the storage of spacing-exempt NCS material to be placed next to drums containing potentially better moderators than water (e.g., oil mixtures). This item is closed.

## **7.0 Exit Meeting**

The inspectors communicated the inspection scope and results to members of Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant management and staff throughout the inspection and during an exit meeting on September 28, 2006, and a re-exit telephone conference held on October 5, 2006. Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant management and staff acknowledged and understood the findings as presented.

## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

### 1.0 Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed

#### Items Opened

- VIO 70-7001/2006-203-01** Failure to maintain the safe geometry limit in the C-310 scale pit of 3.68 inches.
- VIO 70-7001/2006-203-02** Failure to report a loss of double contingency to the NRC within 24 hours.

#### Items Closed

- IFI 70-7001/2006-201-02** Tracks the certificatee's revision of NCSE-091 to include justification for storage of drums of spacing-exempt NCS material next to drums containing potentially better moderators than water.

#### Items Discussed

- IFI 70-7001/2006-201-01** Tracks: (1) the certificatee's justification for inclusion of Mixed-Oxide (MOX)-driven benchmarks in the validation reports and establishment of criteria for demonstration of Area of Applicability (AOA) compliance in facility calculations, and (2) the certificatee's development of guidelines which will ensure a consistent minimum level of documentation for verifying the compliance of future facility calculations with the validated AOA.

### 2.0 Inspection Procedures Used

- IP 88015** Headquarters Nuclear Criticality Safety Program

### 3.0 Partial List of Persons Contacted

#### **USEC**

- \*T. Henson                      Manager, Nuclear Criticality Safety
- \*S. Cowne                      Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- \*D. Stadler                     Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- T. Hofer                         Engineer, Nuclear Criticality Safety
- \*J. Lewis                        Manager, Maintenance
- D. Baltimore                  Engineer, Nuclear Criticality Safety
- B. Chenier                      Nuclear Criticality Safety
- \*M. Boren                       Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- \*S. Penrod                      General Manager
- E. Paine                         Manager, Chemical Operations
- \*L. Jackson                     Manager, Operations
- \*K Ahern                         Manager, Production support functional
- \*J. Labarraque                 Manager, Nuclear Safety & Quality
- \*M Keef                         Manager, Plant
- \*C Hicks                         Manager, Scheduling And Planning
- \*R Helme                         Manager, Engineering

## **NRC**

D. Morey	Sr. Criticality Safety Inspector, Headquarters
N. Jordan	Criticality Safety Inspector, Headquarters
B. Purnell	Criticality Safety Reviewer, Headquarters
M. Thomas	Sr. Resident Inspector, RII

All attended the exit meeting on September 28, 2006.

\* Participated in the October 5, 2006.

## **4.0 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations**

ADAMS	Agency-Wide Document Access and Management System
AOA	area of applicability
DAC	design analysis calculation
GDP	gaseous diffusion plant
IFI	inspector follow-up item
IP	inspection procedure
MOX	mixed oxide
NCS	nuclear criticality safety
NCSA	nuclear criticality safety approval
NCSE	nuclear criticality safety evaluation
NRC	U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NS&Q	nuclear safety & quality
PDR	public document room
UF <sub>6</sub>	uranium hexafluoride
USEC	U. S. Enrichment Corporation
VIO	violation