



OCT 02 2006

Technical Specification 6.9.2

LR-N06 - 0405

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, DC 20555

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NO. 2
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311

Subject: Special Report 311/06-002
Main Steam Line Discharge Monitors (R46s) Inoperable
Greater Than Seven (7) Days

This special report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements Salem Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 Action b, and 26. TS 3.3.3.1 requires one main steam line discharge monitor per line to be Operable in Modes 1 – 4. With less than the required detectors operable, Action 26 of Table 3.3-6 requires that within 72 hours the pre-planned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter(s) be initiated, and: (1) either the inoperable channel be restored to Operable within 7 days of the event, or (2) prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days following the event outlining the actions taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to Operable.

On September 19, 2006, plant personnel commenced performance testing of the Chilled Water System in accordance with the Inservice Testing of Chilled Water Valves procedure. At approximately 0205 hours, Salem Unit 2 control room operators entered TS 3.3.3.1 upon isolating the Chilled Water to the main steam line radiation monitors (2R46A-E). Additionally, in accordance with the TS action statement requirements, Radiation Protection personnel were notified of the requirements to establish the pre-planned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameters.

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Subsequently, during the surveillance testing, the Chilled Water outlet check valve 2CH260 failed its performance test. Maintenance personnel opened, inspected and cleaned the valve with a post maintenance test to be performed during system restoration.

Additionally, it was noted that the Chilled Water inlet isolation valve 2CH253 did not close on low Chilled Water system pressure as designed. Investigation and troubleshooting by Maintenance/I&C personnel revealed that a defective pressure switch caused the failure of the 2CH253 valve to fully close. Maintenance/I&C personnel unsuccessfully tried to calibrate the pressure switch and replacement of the switch could not be accomplished because the component was not maintained in inventory. Efforts to obtain a replacement part prior to the seven-day expiration date of the action statement were unsuccessful due to the required lead-time from the vendor.

Currently, PSEG is in process of repairing the subject valves, and it is expected that the TS action statement will be terminated by October 31, 2006.

There was no safety consequences associated with the inoperability of the R46 detectors. The pre-planned alternate of monitoring the appropriate parameter(s) was initiated within 72 hours. Implementation of the pre-planned alternate method of sampling provides reasonable assurance that any increase in activity will not go undetected.

There are no commitments made in this document. Any actions or dates discussed in this submittal represent intended or planned actions. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.

Should there be any questions regarding this matter please contact E. H. Villar 856-339-5456.

Sincerely,



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Salem Site Vice President

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