

R2/E7

## Westinghouse Electric Company Site Capsule

**Site Name:**

Westinghouse Electric Company, L.L.C.  
Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division  
Bluff Road, Columbia, South Carolina

**Site Description:**

The Westinghouse site is located 8 miles southeast of the Columbia city limits. The location is relatively isolated, with no major industrial sites or activities in the surrounding areas.

**Licensee Organization and Staffing:**

See organization charts

**Licensed Activities:**



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**Recent Inspections:**

The NRC held its most recent Licensee Performance Review (LPR) for Westinghouse on March 28, 2002, covering licensed activities for the period January 9, 2000 through December 29, 2001. The review determined that Westinghouse continued to demonstrate an adequate safety performance.

Areas Needing Improvement

Enforcement of management expectations for implementation of safety significant administrative controls in procedures and postings.

Consistency and clarity of procedures for safety related operations and functions

Maintaining current knowledge and controlling movement of special nuclear material through the implementation of the item control program.

Information in this record was deleted  
in accordance with the Freedom of Information  
Act, exemptions 4  
FOIA 2006-0026

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Implementation of the program for transportation of licensed materials, with attention to root causes for prevention of problems to assure the safety of shipped packages.

Maintaining the material condition of operating equipment to prevent failures that cause degradation of radiological and criticality safety controls.

Ensuring staff are given needed safety- related training.

The LPR also identified several challenges that Westinghouse needed to address.

Continue development and implementation of corrective action program

Maintaining contamination control and controlling worker exposures ALARA

Maintain groundwater contamination below licensee action levels.

Ensure the quality of the large number of transportation containers acquired from the Combustion Engineering Facility.

**Exposure and Effluent Data:**

<b>Occupational Exposure</b>	2001	<u>Collective Dose</u> 514.4 person-rem	<u>Maximum TEDE</u> 4.52 rem
	2002 (2002 used the ICRP 68 Model)	103.7 person-rem	1.57 rem
<b>Radioactive Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Releases</b>		<u>Liquid (mCi)</u>	<u>Gaseous(<math>\mu</math>Ci)</u>
	2001	U 63.0	557.6
	2002	U 64.2	556.1
<b>Maximum Offsite Dose due to Gaseous Releases</b>	2001	< 1 mrem	
	2002	< 1 mrem	
<b>Labor/Union Issues</b>	None		
<b>Major Management Changes</b>	4/01 - S. McDonald appointed Manager, Regulatory Affairs replacing D. Goldbach 6/02 - Bob Monley stepped down from the Plant Manager Position into the Production Supervisor position directly under the new Plant Manager. Mark Fecteau became the new Plant Manager.		

## Enforcement (last 2 years):

### Escalated Enforcement

There has been one escalated enforcement case within the last 2 years. In July of 2001, Westinghouse inadvertently transported UNH crystals back to BWXT. The issue involved the falsification of survey documents, which led to the removal of an employee and reduction of use of contractors. A severity level III violation was issued on May 29, 2002.

### Violations (Severity Level IV unless otherwise stated)

01/03 - Weight requirement on NCS posting not observed (IR 2003-01)

12/02 - FNMCP requirements for measuring not observed (IR 2002-205)

06/02 - Spacing of cans not observed in Erbia (IR 2002-206)

06/02 - NCV for by-passing of a safety control (IR 2002-02)

05/02 - Severity Level III - Inadvertent shipment of Uranium Nitrate crystals (UNH) back to BWXT (IR 2002-03)

11/01 - NCV for accidental shipment of a fuel rod (IR 2001-203)

08/01 - Severity Level III - Failure of the criticality safety controls on the ADU process lines (PLC failure) (IR 2001-202)

## Event History:

### Events

- 9/03 - Bulletin 91-01, Loss of criticality controls, the wrong instrument was used to scan lead-filled rods
- 7/15 - Temporary procedure to compact air filter paper NCS function was not reviewed or approved
- 7/03 - Inadvertent pump out to UN Bulk tanks by operator without sampling
- 7/03 - Expired temporary procedures were discovered to have been performed and lacked NCS review
- 4/03 - UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders marked for holding were inadvertently processed
- 3/03 - Plant-wide reduction of forces (~15%) takes effect
- 1/03 - Backflow of material from solvent extraction to unfavorable geometry tanks
- 9/02 - Ductwork containing unanalyzed material stacked improperly
- 9/02 - Material and liquid found in the Scrubber 8A ductwork
- 6/02 - Damp material found in the ventilation filter ductwork housing
- 6/02 - Fire in the ventilation room filter bank (no excessive releases or exposures)

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- 6/02 - Failure to perform a moisture analysis on powder brought into Erbia area, a moderation control area
- 6/02 - Late truck shipment of 3 steel cylinders filled with a total of 5736.9 KG of UF<sub>6</sub>-driver was napping
- 3/02 - Failure to follow procedures led to oil coating the outside of a bulk powder container in the Moderation control area
- 2/02 - Operators failed to follow procedures and used a substitute form that was missing steps for transfers to the UN bulk tanks.
- 1/02 - Roof leak in Erbia area allowed moderation in a moderation control area
- 1/02 - Failure to follow procedures lead to a powder spill into a hood exceeded safe mass
- 10/01- Failure of a shrink wrap seal on a rod shipment allowed pellets to escape from the rod
- 8/01 - Error on Certificate of compliance for the ANF-250 powder/pellet container were found
- 7/01 - Failure to remove material from container for shipment back to BWX-T.

**Future Issues of Interest:**

Westinghouse is planning on converting to a dry vaporization process (instead of steam chests heating the UF<sub>6</sub>)

Westinghouse is also planning on producing BWR fuel (W bought out Hematite a few years ago, Hematite made both BWR and PWR fuel)

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