

## Westinghouse Highlights

R2/E6

<p>Events (91-01 and other issues)</p>	<p><b>Events</b></p> <p>7/01 - Failure to remove material from container for shipment back to BWX-T.              8/01 - Errors found on CoC for the ANF-250 powder/pellet container              10/01- Failure of a shrink wrap seal on a rod shipment allowed pellets to escape              1/02 - Roof leak in Erbia area allowed moderation in a moderation control area              1/02 - Erbia Area roof leak.              1/02 - Powder spill into Erbia granulator hood.              2/02 - Procedure deficiency for UN Bulk tank.              3/02 - Oil on Bulk container              6/02 - Unanalyzed Polypacks in Erbia.              6/02 - Moisture in Dry ventilation system.              9/02 - Wet vent line material accumulation.              9/02 - Improper stacking of ductwork.              4/03- Processing of with-held Cylinders.              7/03- Temporary procedure not reviewed.              7/03- Pump out to the UNBST without sample results.              4/01-9/03- Improper scanning of lead rods.              10/03- Drum loading without scale.              10/03- ADU Dump Hood PLC interface malfunction              1/04- 13 polypacks emptied into bulk container without required visual inspection              3/04- incinerator operated outside safety basis/buildup of material in incinerator              6/04- material accumulation in 55-gallon drum</p> <p><b>Violations (SL IVs unless noted otherwise)</b></p> <p>7/02- VIO 02-202-01: Failure to maintain spacing required for NCS control during floor storage.</p> <p>5/03-VIO 03-201-01: Failure to conspicuously post NCS postings              5/03- VIO 03-201-02: Failure to approve UNH Tank ISA              5/03- VIO 03-201-03: Failure to perform a compliance review for Erbia/blending              1/04- VIO 03-09-01: Failure to follow procedures for pump out of a batch of Uranyl Nitrate.              1/04- VIO 03-09-02: Failure to complete training prior to performing process operations in the ERBIA area.              1/04- VIO 03-203-01: Failure to comply with criticality postings</p>		
<p>Occupational Exposure</p>		<p><u>Collective Dose</u></p>	<p><u>Maximum TEDE</u></p>
	1999 (ICRP 30)	305 person-rem	3.04 rem
	2000 (ICRP 30)	616 person-rem	4.18 rem
	2001 (ICRP 30)	725 person-rem	4.10 rem
	2001 (ICRP 68)	343 person-rem	1.82 rem
	2002 (ICRP 68)	279 person-rem	1.57 rem
	2003 (ICRP 68)	245 person-rem	1.53 rem
<p>Radioactive Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Releases</p>		<p><u>Liquid (mCi)</u></p>	<p><u>Gaseous (<math>\mu</math>Ci)</u></p>
	1999	U 51.0	453
	2000	U 124.0	501
	2001	U 63.0	558
	2002	U 65.0	556
	2003	U 54.5	511
<p>Maximum Offsite Dose due to Gaseous Releases</p>			
	1999	< 1 mrem	
	2000	< 1 mrem	
	2001	< 1 mrem	
	2002	< 1 mrem	
	2003	< 1 mrem	
<p>Labor/Union Issues</p>	None		

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Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 4  
 FOIA-2006-0026

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**Additional Information:***New Programs Developed as a result of problems with adherence to procedures*

1. In 2003, the licensee initiated an enhanced training/requalification program in uranium recovery as a result of process upsets and events in this area. As part of this program, the licensee shutdown uranium recovery in October 2003, and did not restart processing until operators were retrained/requalified on their specific operations. The new training/requalification program consisted of three phases: a written examination on an operator's specific process area, an oral examination board, and an on-the-job demonstration of process knowledge. The enhanced program stressed procedure compliance, understanding the procedures and the process, and the importance of the process safety controls. Operators who did not pass the tests, boards or demonstrations, were allowed additional time to study and prepare for retesting. Operators who could not pass all three phases of the retraining/requalification program would be reassigned. The licensee indicated that new training program will be implemented plant wide.

2. The licensee is trying to improve operation by the implementation of the new Human Performance program and Procedure Improvement and Compliance (PIC) Program, with cognizant licensee managers. Approximately 100 managers and other individuals, who had received specialized training in the PIC Program, would go into the process areas and perform short interviews with operators to determine if procedures were user-friendly, and if the operators understood and were following their procedures. Behavior safety and human performance were also evaluated. The data were collected, trended, and evaluated, to determine where procedure, training, or behavioral enhancements were needed, and to identify good practices. The interviewees remained anonymous to encourage open communications and minimize any fear of reprisal. The program, which was ongoing, was slated to last for 12 weeks. The NRC concluded that the enhanced uranium recovery training/requalification program, the Human Performance Implementation Plan, and the Procedure Improvement and Compliance Programs have strong potentials for improving licensee problems with procedure compliance

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