

Ted Wingfield notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (10-26-03) 7C

The following are my observations/questions of the [REDACTED] interview held on 10-26-03.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	None
Raises concerns for others?	YES	None
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	NO	See Below
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	N/A	Not specifically addressed during interview

#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT

- (p. 7 & 8) "... there have been people who have come to me and said ... 'I have this problem ... do you want to lead up this cause' ... I would ... [they have had] a fear of the possibility that the supervisor being mad, and taking some kind of retribution at some point ... look at it ... if I feel that it is valid, which normally I would ... I would either write the notification, or bring it up to a supervisor, and then write the notification ... [wouldn't] call it frequent, but it has happened"
- (p. 50) "I think people do identify problems ... they bring them up ... they write notifications if there is a safety issue ... [however,] a weakness [is] the experience level of some of our supervision"

#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 9 - 21, 26 - 29) Recounts the issue surrounding elevated off-gas levels at Hope Creek ... procedure said 'do not operate above 75 scfm' yet gave no direction on actions to take if above 75 scfm ... the 75 scfm limit was also mentioned as a design basis in the FSAR (Final Safety Analysis Report) ... NCOs wanted to shut down ... a TARP team was developed to evaluate options ... PSEG essentially 'engineered it away' saying that 75 scfm was the design for each unit in a dual unit site and since Hope Creek Unit 2 was never built, the Hope Creek site could actually go as high as 150 scfm with some compensatory actions ... "the only time that I felt [that we didn't shut the plant down when required] was with the [elevated] off-gas"
 - o TECHNICAL ISSUE - This should be pursued to answer the following questions:
 - Were the proper compensatory actions taken for T.S. radiation monitoring equipment made inoperable by the elevated off-gas flow?
 - Did the extra air flow invalidate the offsite release assumptions referenced in their accident analyses?
 - Does operations routinely defer to engineering for operability calls?
 - Does PSEG have documentation (calculations, 50.59 evaluation for a change to the facility as described in the FSAP, etc.) To support the technical basis for not considering the off-gas radiation monitors inoperable?
- (p. 22 - 24, 32 - 40) Discussed the excessive EDG exhaust leakage issue ... the company industrial safety personnel had not tested for all possible harmful gases being emitted from the diesel ... "there is an LCO time limit, and they wanted to clear it up so that we [could] keep the plant running ... that is part of the business ... there is certainly schedule pressure and production pressure to keep the plant making electricity, because it is a business" ... 3 people got sick (one nearly passed out in his car on the way home and went to the hospital to get check out)

#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

- (p. 44 - 49) Operations management exerted pressure to bypass interlocks to allow transmission switchyard operations to continue to restore grid reliability ... the interlocks were not bypassed ... "but there was certainly a lot of [pressure exerted] to try to get them to bypass the interlocks"

#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

- (p. #) None

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 7C
 FOIA 2005-6194

R-120

Ted Wingfield notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (10-26-03) 7C

#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 22 - 24, 32 - 40) Discussed the excessive EDG exhaust leakage issue ... the company industrial safety personnel had not tested for all possible harmful gases being emitted from the diesel ... "there is an LCO time limit, and they wanted to clear it up so that we [could] keep the plant running ... that is part of the business ... there is certainly schedule pressure and production pressure to keep the plant making electricity, because it is a business" ... 3 people got sick (one nearly passed out in his car on the way home and went to the hospital to get check out)
- (p. 44 - 49) Operations management exerted pressure to bypass interlocks to allow transmission switchyard operations to continue to restore grid reliability ... the interlocks were not bypassed ... "but there was certainly a lot of [pressure exerted] to try to get them to bypass the interlocks"

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

- (p. 53) Discusses the low-power operations power excursion that occurred during a test while a bolt was stuck in the seat of a bypass valve ... "they didn't go over the termination criteria"
- (p. 55 & 56) Believes the concept of risk management has replacement conservative decision making