

Ted Wingfield notes/comments on the [redacted] interview (11-7-03) TC

The following are my observations/questions of the [redacted] interview held on 11-7-03.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	
Raises concerns for others?	N/A	Not addressed in interview
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	YES	But, he did mention that there may be a tendency by some to not report lower level issues due to a sense that 'they're not going to do anything anyway' (Page 22)
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	YES	Considers the handling of [redacted] (and others) as a potential sign of how management has retaliated against someone who raises concerns (page 43 through 45)

- Page 4 - "... the culture that we're in here ... not a conservative one"
- Page 5 - "... then at some point ... a year and a half, two years ago [2001/mid-2002] ... we started taking a bad approach to the way we operated ... gradual change ... A lot of it has to do with money ... not fixing the equipment ... [a lot of compensatory actions to make up for not fixing things]"
- Page 6 - EDG air start system compressor problems ... NEED TO ENSURE THIS IS LOOKED AT DURING ROP INSPECTIONS
- Page 7 - "... we're supposed to protect the health and safety of the public. And I think we do pretty good at that"
- Page 7 through 9 - SW 20 repair ... describes how he believes the process broke down ... equipment conditionally-released following 'most' of the work ... communication failure(s) ... large service water valve destroyed ... no personnel injuries / near miss ... notification was written but not designated as significant ... [redacted] 'championed' the issue until it was elevated
- Page 10 through 14 - Recounts the issue surrounding the near miss of issuing a tag-out for the 2B EDG that included a tag for the control power to the 2A EDG by mistake ... NEOs discovered the error ... Issue raised to supervision and the discrepancy was corrected, however, ... "notification was generated but the notification didn't really address the level of concern ... made a Level 3 ... I just don't think they [supervision] were taking ownership"
- Page 14 & 15 - Briefly touches on the MS 42 steam leak issue [redacted]. "... senior management does preach to us take the conservative approach ... I don't know that that's ... really taken to heart ... sometimes we push the limit" ... Indicative of the 'megawatt mentality' and non-conservative decision making
- Page 16 & 17 - Mentions the 14 BF 19 valve issue as another example of "non-conservative approach to operation"
- Page 18 - "We're very weak in carrying out ... corrective actions"
- Page 20 - Mentions a tag-out of a diesel driven fire pump that did not include a vent or drain as an example of 'sloppy' operations ... concedes that when identified, the errors are corrected
- Page 21 - "... little near misses or little things that aren't always captured ... with a notification ... more so they are now. I will say that. We do capture more than we used to"
- Page 22 - Affirms that he expects that people will raise issues/take the right action/make corrections, however, he acknowledges that "there's maybe a reluctance on some people's part to report things ... lack of concern ... 'they're not going to fix it anyway' ..."

Information in this record was deleted
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Act, exemptions TC
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E-135

Ted Wingfield notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (11-7-03) 7C

- Page 23 - Affirms that "no one I know that wouldn't raise an issue [related to safety components]"
- Page 24 - "Some procedures you sometimes have to work around a little bit." This may be an indicator that the culture at the site does not place significant importance on following procedure (DURING 2004 ROP INSPECTIONS, WE SHOULD ENSURE THAT THIS MENTALITY DOES NOT TRANSLATE TO 'LEGAL' OPERATION OF THE PLANT, I.E. TECH. SPEC., EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES ... MAYBE SOMETHING FOR DRS-OPERATIONS TO LOOK AT IN THE OPERATOR LICENSING ARENA)
- Page 25 - Believes administrative procedures receive the least amount of attention
- Page 25 & 26 - Reaffirms that he believes people would most likely raise issues when warranted
- Page 26 through 31 - Discussion about how [REDACTED] may be experiencing 'chilling behavior' from operations management
- Page 31 through 33 - Talks about the lack of rigor for enforcing independence when performing/directing 'Independent Verification' (IV). IS INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION DETAILED IN THE LAW SOMEWHERE (I.E. AS PART OF THE REQUIREMENT TO HAVE QUALITY ASSURANCE AND VERIFICATION PROGRAMS) ... CAN THIS (IF DISCOVERED OR OBSERVED) BE A SOURCE OF A VIOLATION?
- Page 33 & 34 - Talks about the emphasis on production ... more prevalent in some supervisors
- Page 36 - With respect to nuclear safety concerns "... I feel very comfortable raising it and I believe that it would be acted upon"
- Page 37 - "... I just emphasize that the environment that we're in is, there's almost a cowboy mentality ... I place a lot of that upon [REDACTED] because of the way we've been operating over the past year and-a-half or so"
- Page 38 & 39 - Talks about not fixing equipment ... believes that some of the Shift Managers and Control Room Supervisors are also frustrated with the 'state of fixing things/equipment'
- Page 40 & 41 - Talks about ineffectiveness of corrective actions related to EDG Starting Air Systems
- Page 41 & 42 - Seems optimistic about the future given the new (returning) management of [REDACTED]
- Page 43 through 45 - Identifies [REDACTED] at the center of an accusation of harassment by [REDACTED] (relates to a containment entry event) that was determined to be unsubstantiated by PSEG