

Reviewer Harold Eichenholz notes/comments on the [redacted] interview (10-29-03)

7c

The following are my observations/questions of the [redacted] interview on 10-29-03.

| ASSESSMENT QUESTION | YES/NO | AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.) |
|---|--------|---|
| Subject will raise concerns and has done so? | Yes | Doesn't bother him what people think of him |
| Subject would raise concerns if necessary? | Yes | His management tells them - if you have an issue bring it up |
| Subject raises concerns for others, why? | Yes | Union steward and acts for those that either do not want to deal with concern or bring it up, or don't want to be identified with concern |
| Subject won't raise concerns- Why? | Yes | Most try to fix concerns in-house first so that the NRC would not need to be involved |
| Do others raise concerns? | Yes | But concern is that people that raise concerns do not feel that they are being heard. |
| Others don't or hesitate to raise questions? | Yes | Some are uncomfortable, but it is nota pervasive problem |
| Someone has experienced retaliation for raising concerns? | No | |

Bins for Issues:

- #1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT
- #2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES
- #3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES
- #4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES
- #5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT

- (p. 54 - 59) The safety culture at Salem reflects managers, and to a lesser degree peers, looking down on people that raise issues. Interviewee believes that Shift Managers take direction from above that they are not comfortable with because they have to. The interviewee also thinks that his particular Shift Manager has had his job threatened for backing up the NEOs and therefore was taken off shift for several weeks to get "reprogrammed.". This Shift Manager has stated on several occasions that his crew gets him in trouble all the time. The interviewee believes the problem resides with a couple of [redacted] at is no longer on-site. Believes on specific operator is harassed by his supervisors ... "they hound him hard" ... because he raises issues.

#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 12 - 17) Discusses the Salem Unit 1 Feed Regulating Valve (BF19) equipment problem that occurred in mid October 2003 that required a plant shutdown. The valve appeared to be stuck and the interviewee indicated that no actions were taken for many hours, including entering Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 and sending someone to attempt to free up the valve to figure out that the valve was mechanically stuck (said the situation was hokey - it took way longer than it should have in his opinion). The sticking of the valve appears to be a recurring plant equipment problem in which the normal response by plant operators is to send a maintenance person to free up the valve (spraying on lubricant and striking valve components with a mallet). The failure of the valve results in entry into TS 3.0.3 which would require a plant shutdown.
- (p. 28 - 34) Feed Pump steam admission (MS 42) valve bonnet steam leak which should have required a plant shutdown to close the valve (operators would not go near valve because leak was so bad and they couldn't determine where the leak was coming from - p. 20). An [redacted] went to valve, without operators, and shut the valve (without consideration for the need of a steam rescue should conditions worsen). The thought process that went into the decision to close the valve and the manner in which it was done was a "megawatt mentality." (Interviewee only has second hand knowledge of issue)

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FOIA 2005-0194

12-128

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- (p 43 - 46) Salem grassing event in March 03 - Unit 2 was taken off and Unit 1 50% power. The interviewee thought that the Shift Manager was getting pressure from above him to keep the units on-line because he looked uncomfortable.

#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

- (p. 34 -40) Deferral of 5 or 10 yr. inspection interval for bolts for at least one outage, possibly two (Summer 2001 or 2002, but possibly Fall 2003). Halfway through the 18-month cycle they found a lot of boron and degraded bolts. Operability determination was required to see if the bolts holding the RHR heat exchanger head were good enough to hold while bolts were replaced one at a time. Deferral of inspection was due to wanting to hold outage schedule to 19 days. Bolting condition could have been found during the outage if the inspection was conducted. Interviewee was unaware if the inspection was a specific NRC ISI or IST requirement or if the deferral was NRC approved or not. But, he was aware that the responsible engineer was angry about the inspection being deferred, about the identification of wastage on some bolts and about the removal of the inspection from the outage schedule.

#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

- (p. 62 - 69) In last 1.5 years had escalating battle between workers and management - thinks it started when INPO gave them a three ratings. Management will not take accountability for deficient processes like work controls - an absolutely horrendous process that results in 17% wrench time. The issues with work control has been an ongoing problem for years and they can't seem to get a handle on it. Also, there is a concern by workers that there is mismanagement in not fixing broken primary system equipment ... For instance, the Salem Unit 2 (fall 2003) outage schedule had the 'scoped' primary system work completing in 28 days and the secondary work completing in 42 days while numerous pieces of primary plant equipment were documented with deficiencies ... Management's answers to the questions raised by workers (in reference to the issue of inactive/minimal primary system work scope) did not seem credible ... "We wanted to make sure we could do these shorter outages"
- (p. 73 - 77) NEOs concern about being heard. It's the screaming and yelling, the tit-for-tat stuff that is all adding up into "white noise". NEOs are concerned about how do you make sure that what really needs to be heard gets heard and continue to believe that their attempts to continue to be heard are still being treated by management as white noise. Most NEOs feel they are white noise - except for a few that are good at jumping up and down. About a year ago the management and union held fairly regular scheduled meetings and were doing ok for awhile, but in the last 6-months things have gotten really bad. No sense in doing them because they are not productive - not getting anything done. The current situation is that NEOs believe there are some issues with the plant as well as some issues with the workforce. Basically the workforce doesn't trust the management at all ... in anything (running the plant nor dealing with personnel issues between the company and union). While this environment may be making some people uncomfortable about raising nuclear safety or personal safety issues, he believes that those who tend to raise issues will continue to do so.

#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 28 - 34) Feed Pump steam admission (MS 42) valve bonnet leak - efforts to close valve were done without proper consideration for steam rescue should conditions deteriorate as part of valve manipulation. (Interviewee only has second hand knowledge of issue)

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

- (p. 19 - 28) Discussed the potential issue of event notifications "disappearing" ... Interviewee has had difficulty in locating them in system (example 201-63-897, MS-42 valve bonnet leak in Sept. 02, found only one notification when he knew that three had been written) ... believes that a sensitive CR written against a supervisor for not paying attention to safety processes (heat stress and ALARA) was changed to prevent access unless you had the right level of authority ... not sure if notifications are disappearing. Discussed the practice of changing information on notifications already in the system - believes it is not being done with malicious intent ... that it is most likely people trying to help by providing additional information.
- (p. 46 - 48, 70 - 72) Continuously having problems with charging pumps and room coolers due to bio-fouling. The bio-fouling causes routine entry into charging system Tech. Specs. to allow cleaning of the lube oil coolers and is a routine challenge to safety-related equipment and room coolers. A lot of people working on the issue and trying to fix the problem ... it is a top priority. The service water system is one of their hardest challenged systems. The feed pumps and air compressors have fouling of their coolers more frequently than used to.
- (p. 51 - 53) Record retention concern raised by interviewee in June or July of 2003 that is currently being reviewed by his organization. Concern involves not keeping Q-based records, and therefore not being able to prove that required activities are being accomplished.