

Gil Johnson notes/comments on the [redacted] interview (10/09/2003)

The following are my observations/questions on the [redacted] interview (10/09/2003)

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ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	I recessed SORC to find out what was going on [reactivity issue]; I would have taken it up the chain or to the NRC (5)
Raises concerns for others?	N/A	Not Discussed
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	YES/NO	I believe they will bring the nuclear safety issue to the table (1) I don't know if it was a lack of recognition or unwillingness to acknowledge [reactivity issue]; [redacted] was involved and had full knowledge; I don't know [If there was inhibition] (2) You do that once or twice [public inquisition] and they aren't going to speak up again; the whole SORC stalled out; This could be a chilling effect (6)
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	YES	That's probably why I don't have a job: Replace him because he's poison to the organization [redacted] (4)
Technical Issues identified	YES	Stuck bypass valve; replacement gasket for EDG didn't fit (7) Leak on a ASME service water valve (8)
Production over Safety?	YES	There was a lot of challenging from senior management to do it with critical heat; [redacted] says why can't you just start the unit back up; maybe coming above [redacted] schedule took precedence over resolving the equipment issue (3)

- (1) Page 19, lines 9-15
- (2) Page 20 line 25 and page 21 lines 1 & 2; Page 22 lines 18-22; Page 23, lines 1-6
- (3) Page 28, lines 14-16; page 30 lines 21-25 & page 31; Pages 32-35; Page 88, lines 6,7
- (4) Page 29, lines 11-25; Page 50 lines 5-25
- (5) Page 20, lines 14-20; Page 36, lines 3-18; page 57 lines 24, 25 and page 58 lines 1-3
- (6) Page 41, lines 7-22; pages 42 and 43; Page 48, lines 14-25
- (7) Page 32, lines 1-3; page 63 lines 19-25 and page 64 lines 1-14 Pages 65-67
- (8) Pages 80-83

ADDITIONAL INFO (Provided by Ted Wingfield):

- (p. 29) When asked if he thought he had suffered any adverse consequences: "That's probably why I don't have a job ... that's one of [the reasons] ... I'm sure that [refusing to perform a reactor hydro following an outage using 'critical heat'], possibly the reactivity event I brought to light ... issue associated with restarting the unit [while a BPV was stuck open]
- (p. 29 - 41) Discussed the push to start up Hope Creek following the stuck BPV issue ... "went beyond questioning and challenging. I was more like interrogation ... I was there when we were trying to close that valve ... listened to it, and it was coming up against a hard mechanical stop, and they knew there was a problem ... did considerable testing ... Monday ... the valve did go closed ... I was asked [by [redacted]] why we couldn't just restart the unit [because it was not a safety related valve and was working fine at the time] ... a lot of discussion, challenging, and consternation ... [redacted]

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was challenging [REDACTED] in an intimidating manner ... to me the questioning was out of line ... you do that once or twice, and those individuals aren't going to speak up again ... a number of instances where ... individuals basically clammed up"

- (p. 38) With respect to "production over safety" - "... if your looking at promoting conservative decision making ... operating these places safely, I would have expected senior management would have [embraced the concept of not restarting Hope Creek] until we completely understood what the problems and issues were"
- (p. 40) Indication of operational decision making power being subverted by senior management - he talks about being in the control room on several occasions to "make sure that the appropriate decisions were being made in those control rooms"