

**Greg Bowman notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (#1: 10-06-03)**

The following are my observations/questions of the [REDACTED] interview 10-06-03. 7C

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	None
Raises concerns for others?	YES	None
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	YES	None
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	NO	None

**Bins for Issues:**

- #1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT
- #2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES
- #3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES
- #4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES
- #5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES
- OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

**#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT**

- (p. 4 - 6) When asked if he was surprised that the SCWE was being investigated at Salem & Hope Creek he replied: "Very much so ... if you would have approached me a couple of years ago, I would not have been too surprised. The environment ... was very negative ... people didn't value one another very well ... not all that friendly ... opposed to change ... any kind of discussion ... would [be taken] very personally ... usually not in a positive type of direction ... late 1990s ... that's been a primary objective of [me], [REDACTED] ... to try to improve the culture and the atmosphere ... yes I'm surprised because there's a whole lot of indicators ... all were telling us ... on a macro level that it [the work environment] was becoming more generous ... people interacted more professionally ... that came out loud and clear in the last Gallup Poll survey we did in the fourth quarter of 2002"

**#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES**

- (p. 16 - 19) Says that following deregulation, it became more difficult to obtain funding and that they have had to put in more effort to prove that any expense is necessary. Says it can be easier to obtain funding for projects if the cost is spread out ... "more toward stretching things out, making it go a little longer and willing to take a little more risk."
- (p. 21) He doesn't believe that the pressure of deregulation would effect operators and their conservatism. "I'd have no reason to believe that if the situation required something to be done, they [operators] would do it for the right reasons."
- (p. 33) [REDACTED] was usually never judgmental and simply [espoused] the position of I expect you to do what's right, go do it and if we have problems with that, we'll have discussions [about it] later, but shut down the plant if that's what you [have] to do."
- (p. 41 - 45) Following an outage for repairs on a turbine bypass valve at Hope Creek, PSEG senior management made a point of informing the interviewee of how much the outage (which ran longer than projected) cost the company. [REDACTED] stated that he did not take this as criticism for the decision to shut down, but rather "education."
- (p. 63) On [REDACTED] taking over as [REDACTED] "The only changes I saw was ... more education. We're getting far more education on what's happening in the market. What is the market doing? What's the market expecting from us? What's Wall Street demanding from us and how do we play into that picture?"

Information in this record was deleted  
in accordance with the Freedom of Information  
Act, exemptions 7C  
FOIA- 2005-0194

R-11

Greg Bowman notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (#1: 10-06-03) 7c

#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

- (p. 10 - 11) Says that management put no unnecessary schedule pressure on people. However, during many assessments following events or problems, those responsible claim they felt pressure, but were unable to state why they felt that way. "The general outcome I found from many people when we'd have events ... they thought they were under some sort of pressure in order to get something done. We asked well, where did it come from? Well, it's what I thought. Did someone tell you that? Well, not exactly. Well, did they or didn't they? No, [they did not]."

#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

- NONE

#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 13 - 14) Discusses industrial safety concerns felt by equipment operators. Says that "... they were very concerned about some of the plant material condition and chemistry and in some of the systems that they had to take rounds on that there were too many things that kept them from being able to do the job effectively and, quite frankly, they thought they could get hurt physically."

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

- (p. 55 - 57) Discusses an issue where another manager [REDACTED] inappropriately N/A'd a step in the startup procedure. The step called for a containment walkdown by the [REDACTED] prior to mode change. "... I'm pretty opinionated and ... matter of fact on things and in this particular case, I was pretty vocal with [REDACTED] and with others who had participated either actively or directly or indirectly, that not seeing the value behind it [the walkdown] was just a tragedy in my mind and that I had made it clear to [REDACTED] and others, through [REDACTED] that I was very dissatisfied with his decision making and all those who allowed it to get to the point of not being done."
- (p. 60) "... I think people didn't recognize or understand what [REDACTED] was doing, but I think as [REDACTED] left, people now saw the value in [what [REDACTED] was doing] and I had gotten comments that they wished [REDACTED] was back at times to reinforce some of [the] vision and values."
- (p. 64) Concerning pressure to keep the plant running from managers above him: "I don't have any influence from the guys above me on day to day operations in any way, shape, or fashion. On the contrary, they leave it up to me 100% to make decisions and I believe they're hoping that, you know, I will manage both parts of it. I will manage the nuclear side and be able to in doing so give them results on the revenue side."
- (p. 70 - 74) "... If you could classify the whole site as a person, as a patient, it's like a patient that has some sort of psychiatric disorder - that's probably a little bit strong, but a need to feel that they're valuable. It's so powerful that even when it's getting reinforced, they don't believe it." [REDACTED] goes on to say that everyone at Salem/Hope Creek, at all levels, has very low self-esteem and are constantly "twisting things in a negative way ..."

**Greg Bowman notes/comments on the [redacted] interview (#2) (03-24-04)** 7C

The following are my observations/questions of the [redacted] Timothy O'Connor (former VP of Operations) interview (#2) 03-24-04.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	None
Raises concerns for others?	N/A	Not specifically addressed.
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	YES	None
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	NO	See amplification below (related to Kymn Harvin).

**Bins for Issues:**

- #1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT
- #2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES
- #3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES
- #4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES
- #5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES
- OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

**#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT**

- (p. 63) Discussing the decision to eliminate Kymn Harvin's position, [redacted] states that the decision was based solely on the results they were getting for the money. "Are they giving us what we think we are paying for and, if not, we make the hard decision of whether or not we continue that or don't continue it and [we didn't view] this person ... that much differently than GAP International ... did not continue their services in 2003 either"

**#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES**

- (p. 102 - 105) The interviewee discussed the decision-making following the stuck open BPV (whether or not to take the plant to cold shutdown). He stated that Operations, in particular the [redacted], may have been left out of the loop in the decision-making process. He stated that when he learned this, he called the meeting between managers to decide on a course of action. He also stated that in spite of other people's assertion that the meeting was over three hours long, it was actually only around 45 minutes.
- (p. 106 - 111, 121) The interviewee stated that during the meeting to decide on whether or not to cool down the plant following the stuck open BPV, he took the position of arguing for plant startup to stimulate discussion and make sure everyone knew their position "... it is my job - I need to make sure it is clear to you [that] it is my job to ask questions from every possible front. Why is it the right thing? Why is it the wrong thing? Why is it okay to start up? Why is it not okay to start up?" However, when asked if he pushed operations to start up the unit or if the meeting was longer than 45 minutes, the interviewee stated "that isn't true at all."
- (p. 145 - 146) The interviewee stated that during the stuck BPV problem, he discussed the issue with PSEG management [redacted] but felt no undue pressure from him to keep the unit operating. "You could translate that [having to call [redacted]s] ... being held [accountable] to be prudent with the company's resources, but it is not an accountability that I am afraid of or that ... I [don't] cringe because I have to answer to somebody"
- (p. 149 - 151) The interviewee gave another example of where he argued to keep the unit shutdown in spite of Operations pushing to start the unit back up. The example involved a problem with the seal purge lines to the Recirc pumps. In relation to the issue, the interviewee stated: "We are going to fix the equipment and if we are going to stay down longer, we are going to stay down longer and we stayed down another day and a half to go fix those things under complete disagreement with some of the operators, including some of the people that reported directly to me."

**#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES**

- (p. 158 - 159) The interviewee discussed some of his interactions with PSEG management [redacted]. Stated that in the past he'd had interactions where [redacted] was disappointed that his expectations weren't met: "It was the fact that we would make commitments and we wouldn't be able to fulfill them and that is what he was saying. Why is it so difficult for you and others to be able to tell me one thing and then you can't deliver on it?" He stated that these types of questions covered various commitments, including startup dates, budget targets, and project end dates. However, he also stated that he didn't feel the pressure was unwarranted, and he only saw those types of questions if they had "fumbled the ball" and the situation was preventable.

Greg Bowman notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (#2) (03-24-04) 7e

#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

- (p. 87 - 89) The interviewee discusses conflicts between labor and management following a series of human performance issues (including an injury, several LCO entries, and a scram). The interviewee made a presentation to the maintenance department attributing these problems to carelessness and threatening to fire five or six of the people involved. [REDACTED] and I were under a great deal of pressure from the Union because as any time you take five or six Union employees that are five, ten, or fifteen years with the company and are telling the Union that these potential five or six people may not have employment, that has a tendency of creating a lot of contentiousness in the air."
- (p. 94) Following [REDACTED] threat" to fire the Union employees responsible for the issues addressed above, there was significant divisiveness between the Union and management ... "the Union pulled out of all involvement type of things that you typically would see, writing tags, participating in outage planning, recruitment initiatives, anything like that, the Union's position at that point was we are no longer a participant in anything other than just doing our job classification until these issues are resolved."

#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

- NONE

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

- (p. 90 - 91) The interviewee states that Salem/Hope Creek has a long history of poor performance and attributes this to plant personnel (particularly first line supervisors ) not aggressively addressing problems when they come up. The plant has a tendency of "overlooking it, has a tendency of justifying that, well, he meant well and this is just one time."

**Greg Bowman notes/comments on the [redacted] interview (#3) (03-25-04)**

7C

The following are my observations/questions of the [redacted] interview (#3) 03-25-04.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	None
Raises concerns for others?	N/A	Not specifically addressed.
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	YES	See amplification below.
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	NO	See amplification below (related to Kymn Harvin).

**Bins for Issues:**

#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT

#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES

#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT

- (p. 234 - 236) The interviewers played a recorded conversation made by Kymn Harvin between [redacted] and [redacted]. On the recording, [redacted] discusses a conversation she had with [redacted] shortly before her termination: "I talked to him about what I am doing over here, about all of the issues, how scared people are. They think we are making bad nuclear safety decisions. He said that is a bunch of bullshit and then he picks up the phone after I leave and call [redacted] and says I want her out of here. What does that tell you?" [redacted] response: "I had a sense that what she did talk to about with [redacted] ... is that some of the cultural issues were continuing to occur in [her] mind ... and I had conversations about cultural issues as not being nuclear safety issues but being performance issues that the management team was working ... to improve ... she told me on a regular basis what kinds of conversations and content ... that she had expressed cultural issues and [redacted] said [they were] not nuclear safety [related] and she thought [they were] ... I said [redacted] not being fully engaged in doing his leadership job] is not a nuclear safety issue ... that is a standards issue ... an accountability issue with [redacted] and with his supervisors' ... [she] was unable to give me any specific event or equipment issue that was a nuclear safety concern improperly dealt with] ... It was just a feeling that she had because of ... emotions of people she was interacting with"
- (p. 351) In discussing the decision to eliminate Kymn Harvin's position, the interviewee states: "I knew of nothing or any kind of influence that would suggest in any way that this position elimination or decision that her time was up was the result of some sort of response to information she was providing that was in a nuclear safety space."

#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 172 - 174, 182) Stated that the root cause of the issues surrounding the decision making following the stuck BPV were related to lack of communication between Ops and the rest of the organization. He stated that following the event a thorough root cause evaluation was conducted to determine where they had shortcomings. He said they looked at "both the technical aspects, the decision making aspects, command and control aspects and cultural aspects."
- (p. 187) The interviewee gave an example (related to a problem with a Recirc pump seal) where he was alone in arguing that the plant should be shut down. He cited this as an example of an issue where he was arguing for plant shut down (as opposed to the BPV issue). "We had a difference in philosophy between my management team and myself in that concept [the risk significance of a potential seal purge system failure] ... In the previous week we fixed the Recirc seal and stayed down two additional days to resolve the seal purge system and I will tell you that I was alone in that decision making as well."
- (p. 189, 196 - 197) Following a forced outage, the interviewee prepared a presentation on the plant's performance for [redacted] let me know that he was not happy about some of our performance and he told me the consequences of some of our performance issues in financial terms." He stated several other times throughout the interview that [redacted] and others in PSEG senior management let Salem/HC managers know the financial importance of keeping the plants running.
- (p. 296) "You asked me if anyone put pressure on me to say you have to do something and bring this plant back. I would say no ... The only pressure that there was was self-imposed pressure by me and the people around me."

## Greg Bowman notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (#3) (03-25-04)

- (p. 359 - 363) Following an issue where the plant was brought to full power with an incorrect valve lineup (not caught by the operators), [REDACTED] met with plant personnel (Salem and Hope Creek) and told them that they don't have the authority to make changes in plant power (except in the case of an imminent significant concern requiring the operators to take immediate actions). In other cases, he expected a management review to be conducted. "I think they [the SROs] took that as a challenge to their manhood because they heard [REDACTED] say that they are not in charge of the plant and there was the perception potentially that they couldn't exercise their license responsibilities"

### #3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

- (p. 198 - 199) In discussing the effect of deregulation, the interviewee states, "It puts more focus on that efficiency and how that can influence the outcome of not the plan but the outcome of the company." He also said that he doesn't believe that safety decisions are made based on cost.
- (p. 305 - 308) In a tape recorded conversation with Kymn Harvin, the interviewee discusses the effect of deregulation: "The very thing that it was intended to do was to be a rival entity and it ends up causing people to make a poor decision because of economics and it ends up being economically not viable anymore." He went on to state that issues with safety related components still get resolved, but other things require more justification and sometimes are not fixed.

### #4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

- (p. 380 - 381) Discussed the issue where an [REDACTED] personally [REDACTED] to prevent the unit from being shut down. "One of the [REDACTED] had said that the work practice and implementation by a senior manager, [REDACTED] was completely inappropriate." The Union's concern was that management was conducting Union work and that the work was done unsafely.

### #5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 382) The interviewee discusses some on the Union's concerns about industrial safety issues related to the [REDACTED] in the feed system. "That was one theme and it had to do with the use of ladders and fall protection and that kind of stuff and the information that I had heard was that the work was done off the ladder without proper fall protection and there was some shimmying on the pipe to get to this particular valve. Whether that is true or untrue, I don't know. That is just what I've heard and so that was viewed as setting the wrong example or the wrong standard for industrial safety."

### OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

- (p. 180 - 181) Stated that he was very concerned about the issues that developed following the stuck BPV. "In addition to not only generating a site root cause, I also called Hub Miller directly on Wednesday or Thursday of that week and alerted him of what we thought we were discovering and my disappointment of the whole set of things that occurred." He said that he also called the VP and Assistance Director of INPO to solicit their assistance. Used these examples to show that he took the event seriously and was committed to fixing the root and contributing causes.
- (p. 185 - 186, 195) "One of our shortcomings at our power plant has been ineffective troubleshooting and root cause determinations that we have a tendency of finding the first simplistic thing, going after it, and then finding out it was the wrong thing and that we iterate the problem solving and we find ourselves in event situations." He went on to state that the concern over coming to an erroneous conclusion on the cause of the BPV failure was the main reason they delayed cooling down.
- (p. 244 - 246, 269 - 270) Discussed changes in management of the site. "When the decision was made that [REDACTED] was going to retire, very subtly at the same time was a change in the reporting relationship that was going forward. No longer would the [REDACTED] report directly to the [REDACTED]. Now, he was going to report to the [REDACTED]. That was [REDACTED]. It became very clear by their conversations with us that they were very dissatisfied with some of the things that we were doing, thought we had in some cases mismanaged some resources and they were skeptical about the kind of things we were doing." Also went on to express concern that they might have difficulty working with [REDACTED] because he has a financial background and little nuclear experience.