

**Randy Blough's notes/comments on the [redacted] interview (12/31/03)**

7C

The following are my observations/questions on the [redacted] interview (12/31/03)

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	Examples or descriptions (Page 10)
Raises concerns for others?	YES	Examples or descriptions (Page ##) In general, for members of his shift. (Pg 134)
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	YES (pg 9)	Examples or descriptions (Page 9) SM's and SRO are good at questioning incoming proposals (pg 51-52)
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?  SM got mediocre appraisal in CY2002 and no raise; thanks it relates to his getting emotional when he raises issues; not claiming discrimination (pg 134-140)		Examples or descriptions (Page ##)
Technical Issues identified  1. Rationalize too long about operating w/degraded equipment (pp 18)          2. Steam leak isolated by [redacted] (pg 101-132)		Examples or descriptions (Page ##)  1. S/W underground leak a couple years back: used op det to go on for weeks until leak was sealed. Dec 2000 or 2001 (pp 18-35) Everybody (SM on down) was saying this was wrong (pg 29), "crazy" [redacted] agreed (pg 30) [redacted] to whom SM pled with; no knowledge of implication of higher mgt, but thinks it was ultimately [redacted] decision (pg 33). <b>[NOTES: We should ask [redacted] about this incident.]</b>  2. [redacted] probably violated conduct of ops procedure; definitely obviated shift mgr control, communicated vaguely (at best) about intent (pg 118-120) <b>[NOTES: We should see if that's covered in the post-event critique (ref pg 131)]</b>
Production over Safety?  1. Perception below shift mgr (SM) level, that more sr mgt says one thing and does another, regarding "safety first" philosophy (pg 14)  2. Decisions have been made that could be perceived as "production over safety" (pg 14); organizations ineptitude at addressing issues contributes; they fester (pg 31)  3. For a time under [redacted] there was more of a "prove it's inop" push from Sr mgt than, "prove it's operable". Prompted SMs to meet with [redacted] didn't get the message. Now, under new mgmt, it seems to be going back to the other way (pg 53-61)  4. Sr mgt typically the same or less conservative than SMs, never more conservative (pg 71-74)		Examples or descriptions (Page ##)  1. SW underground leak (pg 18-29), esp pg 29 & 30. [redacted] thought it was unsafe (pg 30)  2A. Poor equipment reliability (pg 15& pg 149) ineffective CA in resolving long term issues.  2B. Grassing issue has gone 20 years (pg 40-45): raises questions about their ability.  3A. [redacted] criticized SM for calling SW loop inop (failed ST, check valve eventually replaced in the night without consulting licensing, getting consensus; but the SW was clearly inop (pg 56-60). [redacted] took heat from above. Early 2002  3B. Sr mgt criticized [redacted] for the tripping unit during, degrading condition (grassing); message can affect safety culture and future decisions on shift (pg 68-71)  3C. [redacted] defended SM against a complaint from Trng Dept when unit was kept online after loss of circulators. Although SM still believes that keeping unit online was the correct decision in this specific case, items 3A, 3B, & 3C collectively created a perception that senior management will always support decisions that keep plants online. (Pg 69-72)

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 7C  
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### • Other comments or observations

1. Spring 2003 - He and his crew were applauded by Sr Mgt (esp [REDACTED]), for taking unit off promptly when grassing worsened (pp 36-38)
2. Spring 2002? [REDACTED] supported his decision to take unit offline during grassing (pp 38-43)
3. Too soon to tell if new mgt will be more conservative. [REDACTED]'s focal point (pg 75)
4. [REDACTED] position has always been weak at Salem (pg 82). [REDACTED] was superfluous (pg 83-84)
5. Poor equipment reliability stemming from ineffective maintenance and lack of mgt tools, and continuity, mgt turnover. (pg 88-90)
6. Thinks FRV, BF19 was handled ok, operability decisions slowed by "inefficiency: (but this [REDACTED] wasn't onshift during the actual decision (pp 90-94)
7. Outage Mgt [REDACTED] once pushed for S/U and low power testing with out normal gland seals but this was resolved appropriately and without undue pressure.
8. [REDACTED] was onshift when [REDACTED] isolated [REDACTED] (pg 101-132)
9. CR operators had been worried about plant conditions and were relieved when [REDACTED] isolated steam leak (pg 121-122)
10. [REDACTED] opines that the union inflated the issue of [REDACTED] actions to isolate steam leak because they don't like [REDACTED] (pg 124 & 112). [REDACTED] accepts some responsibility for not questioning [REDACTED] more about [REDACTED] intent (pg 129-130)
11. SCWE surveys by PSEG - results not fed back to staff (pg 141-143).

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