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Impromptu Conversation with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] PSEG Nuclear on March 28, 2003
approximately 5:45 p.m. as I was exiting the plant on
my last day at PSEG Nuclear (on way to my exit
interview with HR)

[REDACTED] And it is just the way it kinda seems to always get. I don't know why.

Harvin: Yep.

[REDACTED] We kill people. This place kills people.

Harvin: What do you mean?

[REDACTED] It burns them out. We burn people out. You can just see the life sucked out of some of the people...people who come in here energized, I mean they were excited, they are here to conquer the world, and you watch them and in a matter of six months from the time they come through the gate their shoulders are dropped down, they are just....I don't know...

Harvin: Why do you think that is?

[REDACTED] Cause we never do what we say we're going to do. That's another story. That's true, yeah? We have so many priorities...if I was king of the world here, I would try to narrow our priorities down, we have so many things going on at once in our efforts to catch up that we become so fragmented

R-26

Harvin: Right.

[REDACTED] And we miss (inaudible)

Harvin: You have a unique advantage from the safety perspective. Are we getting better?

[REDACTED] Uh...better and worse. Better in that we have less injuries. Worse in that they are more severe.

Harvin: Right.

[REDACTED] (inaudible)OSHA rate...we've had more near-death injuries in the last three years...

Harvin: We've had more near-death injuries in the last three years...

[REDACTED] Yeah, we put a guy in ICU...

Harvin: Yeah, I know that. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]...he was worse.....a guy in Maintenance....inaudible...we hurt [REDACTED]....

Harvin: What's up? Why?

[REDACTED] I don't know.

10

Harvin: Some guys expressed to me their concern about you know production vs. safety.

[REDACTED] I can't believe that. I know that pressure is still on...but come on we've got a 16% wrench time. No most of the time I think we are fairly conservative.

Harvin: Well, that's good.

[REDACTED] But there are some days where we've made mistakes. We've made huge mistakes. You know [REDACTED]

Harvin: Yeah.

[REDACTED] So, (inaudible) do you know the [REDACTED] story? Well, [REDACTED] is the [REDACTED]. And uh they bring in a new procedure they want him to sign off on to do turbine trip testing. The new procedure doesn't seem right and he won't sign off to approve it. He refuses to do it once and they send him packing. They come back...

Harvin: Who is they?

[REDACTED] They is the senior management at the time which was a guy by the name of [REDACTED]

Harvin: [REDACTED] Never heard that name.

[REDACTED] Yeah, well, [REDACTED] basically they pulled [REDACTED]

72

[REDACTED] for being um...less than cooperative since he said it wasn't safe. They got somebody else to sign the procedure, they took the procedure out and first time they did it, that's when they blew the turbine off the roof.

Harvin: Ah...you're kidding!

[REDACTED] golden here. Who knows where he will work but he will always work here. (Laugh)

Harvin: Because?

[REDACTED] Because theythat was a big NRC thing so you had a guy, a licensed guy, he reviews a procedure, he says its unsafe, you pull his access, notify us that you pulled his license, suspended it, and the thing that he was saying was unsafe...

Harvin: Happened.

[REDACTED]: Happened.

Harvin: Did the NRC ever find out?

[REDACTED] Yeah. Yes.

Harvin: They know his story?

[REDACTED] Yes, oh yes. We have another guy in that same timeframe that was [inaudible... [REDACTED]] which was the same guy...Where are you going? Who had a similar circumstance...I believe he was a whistleblower....so we have...that's what upsets the NRC...we have a history of poor management pressuring people in other and middle management positions to do the wrong thing. And that's why the Union guys will tell you that...they know these stories...I was in the Union, I heard all the stories and went, 'You've got to be kidding me!' And they were going on. So that stuff doesn't die. All those Union guys...even me...we are all still here.

Harvin: How about recently? Any of this stuff from recent?

[REDACTED] No, I haven't heard anything recently. Some days I feel that we have to take the power plant back from the Union. We just let them drive us rather than us steer the ship...and that drives me insane, but...I don't know.

Harvin: Hmm. I want to avoid ...(inaudible) someone getting killed here.

[REDACTED] No one should ever get killed here.

Harvin: The way you're saying it we're closer than we've ever been.

[REDACTED] Yeah, and that's complacency. The people who are having these problems. [REDACTED] is not a new guy, he's a [REDACTED]

year guy [REDACTED] is not a new guy, he's a 15 year guy. Um...we seem to have lost our edge by just another day at work.

Harvin: So are we intervening? Are we...What are we....We can't let it go that way, right? Gotta reverse the trend.

[REDACTED] I would tell you we're intervening, the organization I am responsible for (goes on for about two minutes....)

[REDACTED] We blew Bravo Diesel. That's a prime example of we didn't listen. We blew it...everybody. [REDACTED] blew it, Safety blew it, I had some things, I blew it. We hit a point in uh right about the time the guys got hurt and that's a whole 'nother story cause their story is not very believable, but that doesn't match up...but there was still stuff going on. You know, prior to that time, when all that garbage went down, we were running the diesel and we had our readings and everything was okay. What changed was we had the same reading and a fire alarm came in. And that was telling us that there was, besides exhaust fumes, there was particulate in the air. Now the guys are getting watery eyes...that's particulate, and we started getting signs, but you know what? We'd been running the diesel doing samples for almost a year...(inaudible) complacency.

Harvin: There really was a problem and we didn't recognize it?

[REDACTED]: Oh yeah.

Harvin: And the measurements show that right?

[REDACTED]: Guilty...this one is guilty. You can rationalize it all you want and you can go okay it wasn't that bad, but guilty.

Harvin: I heard about the guy.. [REDACTED] right?...who fell asleep on the drive home and he thought it was from the fumes.

[REDACTED]: Right. That's what will...that's from not getting things done. That's from so many priorities. I love charts and graphs, they help me out, but when I sit there and watch the guy who is next to me, spends 40 hours a week trying to maintain charts and graphs and doesn't touch anybody in the group and his mission is safety we are wasting his time. There's got to be a better way to do whatever he's doing.

Harvin: Do you speak up about that?

[REDACTED]: Yes.

Harvin: And what happened?

[REDACTED]: These are important indicators so that the whole business can tell what's going on. OK...I don't know...I know how they affect me. They do nothing for me. I don't know, maybe it is that important to [REDACTED] or that important to [REDACTED] or somebody how they get their Maintenance guys to

see the picture, that it's that important, but I just sit there and I go, 'There's a lot better things we could be doing with an FTE (Full Time Equivalent).' There's a ton of things that I don't do and charts and graphs is one of them. I'd love to have them, I only have like three of them, because they are the ones I went 'These are really important', not 20.

Harvin: Yeah, the feedback we get is that's a lot of what we do...low value work. Not all the...

[REDACTED] People. Where'd you say the power was? People.

Harvin: People.

[REDACTED] You have to go out, and you have to touch 'em, you have to hug 'em, you have to love 'em, you got to motivate 'em, you got to keep 'em moving. I haven't seen a chart that motivates anybody. It helps to let someone up the chain understand what's going on maybe, but it doesn't really help anybody.

My perspective of the world....

Harvin: All the best. Look forward to seeing you. Thank you.