

Binning Of Salem/Hope Creek SCWE Issues (SORTED BY BINS ONLY)

The objective of this binning is to establish the preliminary significance of issues that have been raised from a Salem/Hope Creek allegation (fall 2003) or that were identified during interviews conducted to assess this allegation.

LEGEND

S - Specific Incident	G - General
GMLC - General Management / Leadership / Communication	NCD - Non-Conservative Decision Making
FIR - Problem Identification & Resolution Deficiency	EPE - Excessive Production Emphasis
	ESP - Excessive Schedule Pressure

PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "... we have a very apathetic work environment ... they're in a hurry to get the job done." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/29/03, p. 133 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Hope Creek has ... an unhealthy safety conscious work environment." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/29/03, p. 133 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management is perceived as responding negatively when issues are raised (types of 'negative' responses: inequitable distribution of work, negative performance appraisals, withholding of pay raises, etc.) 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/22/03, (#1) p. 20, 23 & 47 ○ [REDACTED] 11/07/03, p. 26 - 31 ○ [REDACTED] 11/06/03, p. 47 & 48 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expresses lack of confidence in the notification process ... "if I write something up, I should have confidence that it works through the process and I really don't." 	P	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/06/03, (#2) p. 14 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "... every time I try to bring something up [to management, I] have to pound it into their head ... you have to almost shame them into doing something and write them up so many times or reinforce that you have to do this or email their boss or email them and cc their boss to force their end to do the right thing. They tend to take it personal and make my life difficult. And other people see that, and therefore, it intimidates them from putting themselves in the same position I'm in. That's the point I feel is the safety aspect, that people don't want to get involved. It's easier just to stay out of it because there won't be any retaliation." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/06/03, (#2) p. 23 & 24 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brings issues to management on behalf of someone else ... "a lot of people come to me with their issues ... I'd say, 'did you do anything?' [then that person says] 'Well, no, I'm not going to do anything about it. I don't want to write it up, I don't want to be the one who did that.' So, I'm the one who does that ... they don't want to be me" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/06/03, (#2) p. 26 & 27 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explains difficulties with particular managers after raising numerous issues [REDACTED] and how his schedule was changed which affected him by losing ~ 4 hours of overtime. It appears he was singled out. 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/06/03, (#2) p. 33 - 41, 48 & 49 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [REDACTED] ... they beat him into the ground ... used to want to do the right thing ... said he's tired of standing up in the meetings alone ... when you're the lone wolf out there and it's going to affect your [willingness to] raise [issues]" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/06/03, (#2) p. 77 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Operators say 'I'm not going to tell management about that ... Why should I bring it up if they're not going to do anything about it' that kind of attitude" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/07/03, (#2) p. 15 & 16 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment believed to be intentionally cumbersome to discourage the identification and resolution of issues 	P	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/22/03, (#1) p. 20 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stated he was reluctant to use the Employee Concerns Program because he was not sure that they could protect his identity. Someone from the ECP told him that based on the issue he raises, it wouldn't be hard for management to figure out who had initiated the complaint. 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/07/04, p. 134 & 135 		

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PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The safety culture at Salem reflects managers, and to a lesser degree peers, looking down on people that raise issues. Interviewee believes that Shift Managers take direction from above that they are not comfortable with because they have to. The interviewee also thinks that his particular Shift Manager has had his job threatened for backing up the NEOs and therefore was taken off shift for several weeks to get "reprogrammed.". This Shift Manager has stated on several occasions that his crew gets him in trouble all the time. The interviewee believes the problem resides with a couple of AOMs, the current General Manager (new position), and a director that is no longer on-site. Believes on specific operator is harassed by his supervisors ... "they found him hard" ... because he raises issues. 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/29/03, p. 54 - 59 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Stated that he didn't think there were any long-term negative impacts on his career from raising safety issues. "Not lately, anyway. As a matter of fact, lately everybody that I work with has a good working relationship. During the time I was raising concerns to the NRC resident Inspector I didn't hear anything [negative] directly." Stated that he may have been treated differently by management because he raised concerns (although not overtly) 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/07/04, p. 101 - 103 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "We bring up concerns ... we say we have a concern ... have notes that you knew about it before" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/07/03, (#2) p. 11 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Comfortable with ability to raise concerns to management and receive responses to that (but not always the way you want it) ... other personnel feel the same way 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/21/04, p. 12 & 13 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Management is perceived as responding negatively when issues are raised (types of 'negative' responses: inequitable distribution of work, negative performance appraisals, withholding of pay raises, etc.) 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/23/03, p. 62 - 63 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "My comfort level hasn't changed. I never had a problem with backing down from anything whether I got pressure or not. I never felt pressured. But whether I had gotten any pressure or not, I would continue to raise issues." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 32 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "The [REDACTED] right now, [REDACTED] who was acting [REDACTED] some of the notifications that I have written have caused him a lot of pain. But even with that, he sent a message through my shift manager to tell me to keep writing them. In that situation, at least with him, he has encouraged me." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 109 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses CRS's reluctance to bring up issues due to fear of retaliation. "He was basically talking about the political ramifications if he wrote it up. He knew that if I brought up the concern there wouldn't be any. As a union guy, there wouldn't be any effects on me. Whereas if he brought it up and actually put the problem out in writing, there are certain things they could do to him." Also gives example of a CRS who used to raise issues and no longer raises as many. "I think he got hammered from his evaluations. I think he's gone a few years without a pay raise. That got to the point where it's starting to hit home. It's starting to hit his wallet. He's starting to tone it down a bit." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 63 - 68 		

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... there have been people who have come to me and said ... 'I have this problem ... do you want to lead up this cause' ... I would ... [they have had] a fear of the possibility that the supervisor being mad, and taking some kind of retribution at some point ... look at it ... if I feel that it is valid, which normally I would ... I would either write the notification, or bring it up to a supervisor, and then write the notification ... [wouldn't] call it frequent, but it has happened" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/26/03, p. 7 & 8 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I think people do identify problems ... they bring them up ... they write notifications if there is a safety issue ... [however,] a weakness [is] the experience level of some of our supervision" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/26/03, p. 50 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● [redacted] operates the TARP team leader ("I can't believe you're even thinking about shutting down the unit. You just need to be getting some \$&%!# air compressors in here, and keep the units on line") in front of the rest of the TARP team ... "He lit off on me like a Roman candle ... didn't change my course of action ... when he came out in the hallway, I said ... I'm going to run this the way, as a nuclear professional I've been trained to run [it] ... or you can get somebody else to do it" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 12/2/03, p. 14 - 27 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... I probably have received negative ... performance appraisals as a result of the way I vocalize concerns ... not that I raise those concerns but the way I raise them ... my performance appraisal last year led to pretty much a zero pay raise for the year ... [not challenged] ... it's ... a catch-22 ... If it says right in [the] appraisal that [I'm] argumentative ... [contentious, I can't be contentious about my performance appraisal] ... I mildly voiced my disappointment and went on" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 12/31/03, p. 134 - 140 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Recounts the interaction between [redacted] and members of Operations management about the number of Circulating Water Pumps required for start-up ... he and [redacted] were favoring waiting until more Circ Water pumps were available ... [redacted] left because of frustration, and I left [to oversee/push the return of the 4th Circ Pump] [redacted] was really the decision-maker" ...he categorized the input from [redacted] to be "a fairly persuasive argument" - the availability of any number of circulators above the absolute minimum required made the decision a management decision NOT a safety decision "... he [redacted] certainly applied pressure ... the term 'holding the plant hostage' was used, which is a catch phrase for ops isn't being reasonable ... [redacted] left over frustration because] he did not feel like he was being listened to ... [redacted] ... there may have been a sense of pressure being applied by [redacted] but he believes [redacted] was leaning in the same direction (allowing the startup with <4 circulators) 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 12/16/03, p. 37 - 53 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● On people subjected to forms of retaliation ... "a leadership coach" ... people were in for her ... she had the ear of senior management ... if you didn't have the right attitude ... you wouldn't be a shift manager for very long ... she never threatened my job specifically ... [through [redacted] I heard that] she basically said ... 'you guys tow the line or I'll get somebody who will' ... it was behaving in accordance with their [vision] ... had nothing to do with conservative vs. non-conservative operations ... I certainly wouldn't have bad-mouthed senior management in front of her ... it could be career-ending" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 12/16/03, p. 126 - 130 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses difficulties in raising concerns with the former [redacted] The interviewee stated: "...there was a lot of discussion about the sanity of [redacted] I'll say [redacted] as the [redacted] So I'll say maybe there was some reluctance to go to him because of the path the conversation might take." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 3/09/04, p. 30 & 31 		

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PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "██████████ was ██████████, and he would use that to his advantage, I'd say, and you know, almost as a presence. He's probably - what, ██████████ or so? It wasn't uncommon that, for example, if I was in a meeting and he was coming in, that, you know, he would pump and slap you on the back harder than most people would...So I can see how people could take that, interpret that as, you know, someone trying to influence them by his presence." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ██████████ 3/09/04, p. 150 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... with some types of verbal responses ... people were decreased in value ... [and therefore may be] reluctant to speak ... when a person is yelled at, screamed at, belittled ... they would feel reluctant to say anything after awhile ... In the 1998, 1999 time frame ... I think that the people ... are broken in spirit [because of their treatment and are not] inclined to bring anything up ... there [were] VPs, superintendents, [and] managers, all levels that had that style ... I think that style was expected ... Intimidation tactics" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ██████████ 2/13/04, p. 15 - 19 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● With respect to the NRC's January 28th letter to PSEG and the interviewee's statement that he was surprised by the assertion that people may not be bringing up reactor safety concerns: the interviewee believes that people could have been intimidated from bringing up other concerns but not reactor safety concerns ... "reactor safety is [the] prime mission. There's no choice. You have to bring it up ... [so the working environment should not have had an impact] we had so many avenues to bring that type of issue up ... don't have to go ... up through the management chain" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ██████████ 2/13/04, p. 38 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I'm not aware of any time where I thought that there was an environment where employees didn't have that freedom [to raise safety concerns]. And none of them ever expressed to me that they [felt they did not have] the freedom to ... express themselves." He went on the mention that significantly more concerns are raised by NCOs and equipment operators, who are "more passionate" about their issues than the supervisors. 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ██████████ 2/20/04, p. 15 & 16 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... sometimes I'm not sure that the CRSs are as free to express what their opinions are because they're a member of the management team." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ██████████ 2/20/04, p. 21 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● When discussing an issue where the plant computer was lost, the interviewee stated that the CRS originally wanted to lower power. He changed his position after the SM ██████████ convinced him to maintain power. "Perhaps he wasn't comfortable with it, but this goes back to whether the CRSs are free to bring up concerns, right? Perhaps he wasn't comfortable with the order and he didn't want to give it, but he felt that that's what I expected and he didn't feel free to express it." 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ██████████ 2/20/04, p. 33 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interviewee stated that he and others might be unwilling to raise concerns because management was unwilling to listen to them. "... part of the reason I might be reluctant to raise a concern is because I don't believe that the management that I have was willing to listen and understand the concern that I had." He said that this was most evident when it comes to fixing non-Tech. Spec. equipment problems (he gave the example of a safety-related control room chiller that has been broken/degraded for the an extended period of time). 	G	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ██████████ 2/20/04, p. 60 - 62 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● When asked if he feared reprisal for his comments during the OI interview and PSEG SCWE review, the interviewee stated, "Do I have concerns that there might be repercussions? Yes. Did I have concerns then? Yes." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ██████████ 2/20/04, p. 125 - 127 		

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The interviewee expressed concerns over the effectiveness of the SCWE review done by PSEG. In particular, he was concerned that because of the way the questions were set up/worded, there may not be corroboration for many of the issues, and they would subsequently be ignored by PSEG. "[I was concerned that the] company attorneys were going to in the end boil it down to there's no evidence, therefore there's no issue." 	G	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/20/04, p. 128 - 131 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When asked if he was aware of anyone afraid to come forward for fear of reprisal, the interviewee stated that raising concerns can cause the perception that an employee is not "with the program ... I mean, if I express some concern and I'm perceived as not being with the program, is anybody going to come back and fire me? No. Are they going to demote me? Not likely ... However, do I think that there's a possibility that as a result of it I wouldn't be considered for future promotions? Absolutely I think that's true. I would not be considered for future promotions." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/20/04, p. 171 - 174 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [REDACTED] 		7D
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [REDACTED] 		7D
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/23/03, p. 33 - 38 		

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PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT	<u>Issue Type</u>	<u>Root Cause</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discussed the push to start up Hope Creek following the stuck BPV issue ... "went beyond questioning and challenging. It was more like interrogation ... I was there when we were trying to close that valve ... listened to it, and it was coming up against a hard mechanical stop, and they knew there was a problem ... did considerable testing ... Monday ... the valve did go closed ... I was asked [redacted] why we couldn't just restart the unit [because it was not a safety related valve and was working fine at the time] ... a lot of discussion, challenging, and consternation ... [redacted] was challenging [redacted] in an intimidating manner ... to me the questioning was out of line ... you do that once or twice, and those individuals aren't going to speak up again ... a number of instances where ... individuals basically clammed up" 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/09/03, p. 29 41 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The following comments were made in reference to one specific senior manager [redacted]: "His engagement in understanding what we are doing was relatively high (p. 12) ... He can be very blunt and he can be very asserting but that was his management style (p. 16) ... I think that his methodology ... may have caused the rest of the people more discomfort (p. 17) ... I think he wanted to understand what we were doing [after the BPV went closed] with the asset (p. 20) ... the way he talks to people ... I see it now as potentially challenging and stifling (p. 28) ... [It never came to mind before] ... what impact they [Senior Management] have on a safety conscious work environment (p. 48 & 49) ... his loud challenging voice and the words that he used ... could very easily train you to keep your mouth shut (p. 49) ... I didn't think it [a meeting [redacted] office to discuss the decision to cool down and repair the BPV or not, caused a 3 to 4 hour delay in cooling down the plant] was a good meeting ... I can't tell you I wasn't sweating and challenged during that meeting. I was. (p. 49) ... that is the kind of thing [redacted] conduct at the meeting] that can be stifling ... for people to speak up and identify issues ... I think that his management style would be counter to what we want to achieve here with our safety conscious work environment (p. 50) ... I don't think he directed me to do anything" (p. 71) ... The former [redacted] had a management style that had a stifling effect. (p. 75) 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 3/02/04, p. 12 - 75 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... I was not in denial about the issue [a damaged safety conscious work environment] as much as other people in the organization ... [if we were to be] branded [within] the industry [as having a] chilling atmosphere ... those words strike fear in me that an organization would have a chilling effect on its employees when they don't address issues" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 3/02/04, p. 116 - 118 		
A		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I would say [that the atmosphere for raising concerns at the site is] neutral, depending upon the concern. Some are addressed expeditiously and some are not." Equipment issues are handled better than personnel or procedural issues. 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 2/27/04, p. 9 & 10 		

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A

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Stated that he was not aware of any issues that, once raised to the management level, were not acted on. However, he did state that, in some cases, issues that were raised may not have been handled in a timely manner, in particular prior to 2001. In discussing one example of this, the interviewee stated, "... [the fact that he [REDACTED] kept after [the issue] tells me he felt comfortable coming forward. He just was not comfortable with the ... rate at which things were being performed ... at the time he was very emotional with regard to what he felt was a lack of concern with his issue." 	G	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/12/04, p. 9 - 11, 15 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interviewee stated that some of the former senior managers, [REDACTED] in particular, promoted an environment that discouraged people from raising concerns. "In the past, I've been in meetings where I felt some of my senior management team were out of line with regard to the way they spoke to individuals ... If an individual is [subjected to] a verbal attack like that, how often or how free does he feel going in there and telling this guy something is wrong because he knows that's not what he wants to hear." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/12/04, p. 19 - 20 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I had [a good working] relationship with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ... worked for [them] directly over the years ... could pretty much raise concerns ... prior to that, with [REDACTED] no [I could not raise issues comfortably]" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/13/04, p. 21 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Believes people are more comfortable bringing up issues to all levels of management 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 12/17/03, p. 8, 19 - 27 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "Workers that work for me generally will ... raise concerns, questions about ... industrial, radiological, and nuclear safety" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 10 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I have never been in a situation where I have recommended, for instance, that something should be declared inoperable, and I've had somebody above me override that decision." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 39 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● SM Meeting with [REDACTED] - "I basically said, 'Bullshit. That's not the way you approach operability determinations.'" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 87 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I don't see any differences in people's ability or how they bring issues to the table ... I get issues brought up to me by my equipment operators, by the NCOs, and ... if I don't give them satisfactory results, they continue on [to bring the issue up to those higher in the management chain]" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 12/16/03, p. 6-7 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I've never had an issue with personally raising a safety concern" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/16/04, p. 8 		

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Binning Of Salem/Hope Creek SCWE Issues (SORTED BY BINS ONLY)

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PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When asked if he was surprised that the SCWE was being investigated at Salem & Hope Creek he replied: "Very much so ... if you would have approached me a couple of years ago, I would not have been too surprised. The environment ... was very negative ... people didn't value one another very well ... not all that friendly ... opposed to change ... any kind of discussion ... would [be taken] very personally ... usually not in a positive type of direction ... late 1990s ... that's been a primary objective of mine ... to try to improve the culture and the atmosphere ... yes I'm surprised because there's a whole lot of indicators ... all were telling us ... on a macro level that it [the work environment] was becoming more generous ... people interacted more professionally ... that came out loud and clear in the last Gallup Poll survey we did in the fourth quarter of 2002" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/06/03, (#1) p. 4 - 6 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussing the decision to eliminate Kymn Harvin's position, [REDACTED] states that the decision was based solely on the results they were getting for the money. "Are they giving us what we think we are paying for and, if not, we make the hard decision of whether or not we continue that or don't continue it and [we didn't view] this person ... that much differently than GAP International ... did not continue their services in 2003 either" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/24/04, (#2) p. 63 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The interviewers played a recorded conversation made by Kymn Harvin between [REDACTED] and her. On the recording, she discusses a conversation she had with [REDACTED] shortly before her termination: "I talked to him about what I am doing over here, about all of the issues, how scared people are. They think we are making bad nuclear safety decisions. He said that is a bunch of bullshit and then he picks up the phone after I leave and calls [REDACTED] [and says I want her out of here. What does that tell you?" ... [REDACTED] response: "I had a sense that what she did talk to about with [REDACTED] ... is that some of the cultural issues were continuing to occur in [her] mind ... [REDACTED] and I had conversations about cultural issues as not being nuclear safety issues but being performance issues that the management team was working ... to improve ... she told me on a regular basis what kinds of conversations and content ... that she had expressed cultural issues and [REDACTED] said [they were] not nuclear safety [related] and she thought [they were] ... I said [REDACTED] not being fully engaged in doing his leadership job] is not a nuclear safety issue ... that is a standards issue ... an accountability issue with [REDACTED] and with his supervisors' ... [she was unable to give me any specific event or equipment issue that was a nuclear safety concern improperly dealt with] ... It was just a feeling that she had because of ... emotions of people she was interacting with" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/25/04, (#3) p. 234 - 236 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In discussing the decision to eliminate Kymn Harvin's position, the interviewee states: "I knew of nothing or any kind of influence that would suggest in any way that this position elimination or decision that her time was up was the result of some sort of response to information she was providing that was in a nuclear safety space." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/25/04, (#3) p. 351 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Management people are fearful of raising issues for their jobs, because ... [they don't] know who's next to go [in the next round of layoffs] ... fear of bringing issues to their leaders in fear of retribution for their jobs ... that's not conducive to [a] safety conscious work environment" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/13/03, p. 56 - 63 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A PSEG supervisor told an employee "If you bring that up as a safety issue, I'm going to discipline you" ... went immediately "up the chain of command" ... a high level manager was initially contacted and took no action ... at a higher level word got sent back "down the chain of command" to admonish the supervisor for making that statement 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/13/03, p. 45 - 52 		

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PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Several people are not willing to continue to bring these issues (falsification of records - premature closeout of corrective maintenance work packages) up again for fear of losing their jobs ... "They have [raised] these issues before and they [have been] pushed and there's nobody backing them up, telling them it's wrong to [prematurely] close the packages ... They're afraid that if they don't do it they are going to lose their jobs" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#1) p. 13 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● An individual raised an issue about service water valves being installed incorrectly (therefore would not operate as designed) and was told not to write a notification about it. Maintenance management finally agreed to the writing of a notification only after the individual got Operations and QA personnel involved in his chain of command. 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#1) p. 15 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "Nobody believes in the employee concerns program there ... [as a result of the inability to maintain confidentiality as well as the inadequacy of results]" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#1) p. 18 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "One Salem supervisor, [REDACTED] was terminated for [doing the same sort of things that past and current maintenance superintendents have endorsed/promoted/ordered ... things like] not having correct paper work ... missing steps, signatures, sign offs, [etc.]" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#1) p. 29 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "Bringing up issues ... the recirc pump ... the diesels ... [inaccurate] procedures ... the [broken] work management process ... the [inaccuracy] of work orders and spare parts [resulted in my being viewed a 'non-team player' and therefore attributed to my leaving]" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#2) p. 60 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The individual had a concern which somebody took that to mean that he was positioning himself (with a 'protective lawsuit') during the time of the reorganization. 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#2) p. 66 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Several people were raised concerns or pushed issues lost their jobs also. 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#2) p. 69 - 74 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "[In] my opinion, the [corrective] actions are ineffective and added to the human performance and the chilling effect that you're seeing." 	P	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#2) p. 78 & 79 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Identified an issue where Hope Creek experienced an unexplained power increase during the shutdown following the stuck Bypass Valve. While not personally involved in the issue, the interviewee stated that the crew didn't readily inform management or write a notification. He implied that this may be due to plant "cultural issues" - specifically people were afraid of the repercussions of informing management. 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 41 - 51 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "When you can't trust the people in charge, it doesn't make a difference whether it's a safety issue ... a family issue ... a compensation issue ... an "oh, by the way" issue ... you are not going to speak up" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/26/04, (#1) p. 55 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses the removal of [REDACTED] and how he would challenge the system. "Personally I think he got forced out because they didn't want that challenge anymore." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/26/04, (#1) p. 70 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "It seems like people got cut off at the knees for not fully [toeing the company line] every minute of every day." 	G	GMLC

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PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT	<u>Issue Type</u>	<u>Root Cause</u>
o [REDACTED] 2/26/04, (#1) p. 95		
• Discusses the reorganization in the fall of 2003. Individual feels that he was displaced from his position partly due to raising an issue concerning resources for performing a PM during a Nuclear Review Board (NRB) meeting. About one month after the meeting the individual was rotated ... "People know me. They know what I stand for and everything right? So they say "Gee, look at him. He opened his mouth and got chopped off at the knees." (p.105 line 21) The environment is set so people would be less willing to raise concerns ... "It sets up an atmosphere where people think twice before they even say something ..." (p. 107 line 8)	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 2/26/04, (#1) p. 102 - 107		

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES	<u>Issue Type</u>	<u>Root Cause</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An [redacted] closed a Main Feedwater Pump Steam Isolation Valve without authorization from the Control Room ... This was contrary to the Operating shift's intent to take the Main turbine offline to address a 20 foot steam plume from the affected valve ... Could be considered a violation of the Conduct of Operations procedure which prohibits operation of equipment without the operating shift's knowledge/permission 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/23/03, p. 56 - 58 ○ [redacted] 11/7/03, p. 14 & 15 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The 24 Steam Generator Feed Regulating Valve (FRV), 24BF19, failed to respond ... The NCOs, and at least one Senior Reactor Operator (SRO), on shift believed the valve was mechanically bound ... Management didn't want to declare the valve mechanically bound and therefore inoperable because that would require a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. shutdown ... Management elected to pursue a controls failure ... Shutdown delayed for about 36 hours 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/23/03, p. 7 - 29 ○ [redacted] 11/7/03, p. 16 & 17 ○ [redacted] 11/6/03, p. 49 - 53 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With respect to pressure to get done: "Is there something about the tagging process at Hope Creek to make some challenges to do the right thing? ... You're always in a hurry. ... they said no time pressure ... but then they're paging, are you done yet?" 	G	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/29/03, p. 64 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The operations department operates outside of established processes (i.e. cleaning condenser waterboxes) because of a 'just fix it and get the unit(s) back up to full power' mentality ... An [redacted] used a metal bar to pry a Circulating Water Pump breaker into its cubicle in facilitation of a rapid return of the pump to support return to full power 	G	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/22/03, (#1) p. 25 - 31, 33 - 37 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overheard a member of Operations Management saying that he did not receive a raise at the end of 2003 after numerous instances of voicing an opinion in contrast to the 'production mentality' ... its built into their compensation package 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/22/03, (#1) p. 23 & 47 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Made an emergent change to the plant startup procedure to remove the restriction that the steam dumps be operated in automatic ... Conducted emergent training to extra NCOs and required them to control Reactor temperature and pressure (which affects reactivity) in manual instead of fixing the system to operate in automatic as designed 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/23/03, p. 40 - 48 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identified the Hope Creek issue where procedures called for certain actions (possibly including reducing power) for increased off-gas system flow, but rather than take those actions, Engineering evaluated the condition to allow continued operation. Stated that they were running for "a long time" with elevated off-gas flow before the situation was resolved. The concern was more focused on actions that require supervisor concurrence, rather than immediate actions. 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 1/07/04, p. 18 - 20, 26 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussed an issue where, while raising power, the plant lost the Core Monitoring System and CRIDS. Those systems were required to operate at post-uprate power. The NCO, CRS, and STA concurred that the correct action was to reduce power to the pre-uprate level until the CMS was fixed. The OS entered the CR and overrode their decision. The interviewee stated that Engineering later did an evaluation to prove they hadn't violated their power limit. "...I got told not to do something that was conservative decision-making." The procedure was later revised to direct reducing power (p. 52). Said he felt that he needed permission to take a conservative action (not consistent with their previous training) (p. 67). 	S	NCD

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
o Kretzer, T., 1/07/04, p. 32 - 44, 52, 67		
• Discusses the Salem Unit 1 Feed Regulating Valve (BF19) equipment problem that occurred in mid October 2003 that required a plant shutdown. The valve appeared to be stuck and the interviewee indicated that no actions were taken for many hours, including entering Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 and sending someone to attempt to free up the valve to figure out that the valve was mechanically stuck (said the situation was hokey - it took way longer than it should have in his opinion). The sticking of the valve appears to be a recurring plant equipment problem in which the normal response by plant operators is to send a maintenance person to free up the valve (spraying on lubricant and striking valve components with a mallet). The failure of the valve results in entry into TS 3.0.3 which would require a plant shutdown.	S	NCD
o [REDACTED] 10/29/03, p. 12 - 17		
• Feed Pump steam admission (MS 42) valve bonnet steam leak which should have required a plant shutdown to close the valve (operators would not go near valve because leak was so bad and they couldn't determine where the leak was coming from - p. 20). An [REDACTED] and the Work Control Supervisor went to valve, without operators, and shut the valve (without consideration for the need of a steam rescue should conditions worsen). The thought process that went into the decision to close the valve and the manner in which it was done was a "megawatt mentality." (Interviewee only has second hand knowledge of issue)	S	EPE
o [REDACTED] 10/29/03, p. 28 - 34		
• Salem grassing event in March 03 - Unit 2 was taken off and Unit 1 50% power. The interviewee thought that the Shift Manager was getting pressure from above him to keep the units on-line because he looked uncomfortable	S	EPE
o [REDACTED] 0/29/03, p. 43 - 46		
• Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) were opened late during the startup following the 'hurricane-salting' shutdown	S	EPE
o [REDACTED] 10/23/03, p. 32 - 40		
• Steam leak ... hours and hours spent trying to figure out how to keep the unit alive; group bus experiencing shorts from the condensed steam; waited until the place couldn't be safely shutdown	S	EPE
o [REDACTED], 11/07/03, (#2) p. 23 & 24		
• They have had NEOs operating the components required to synchronize and load the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) rather than fixing the problem causing the proceduralized workaround	S	PIR
o [REDACTED], 10/22/03, p. 13		
• Continual problems with switchgear room ventilation resulting in high differential pressures across doors could impact accessibility to safety-related component areas in the event of a fire or other transient/event	S	PIR
o [REDACTED] 10/22/03, p. 17 & 18		
• Multiple EDG governor replacements without finding and fixing the root cause of the failure ... engineering has been more involved in this lately	S	PIR
o [REDACTED] 10/22/03, p. 20		
• Boric Acid Transfer Pump boron-leakage (resulting in bolt corrosion) identified by NEOs long before (4/5 years) it became an 'Industry Issue' and management did nothing	S	PIR
o [REDACTED] 10/22/03, p. 23		
• 'Taking the easy/cheapest way out' - (1) Multiple Boric Acid Transfer Pump boron-corroded bolt replacements and (2) Multiple Charging Pump cooler cleanings expected during the 'grassing season' versus modification	S	PIR
o [REDACTED], 10/22/03, p. 24 - 26		

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Starting surveillances just before end of shift causing a hastened/lower quality turnover <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/6/03, p. 26, 27, 29 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Performing the 24 hour EDG surveillance just prior to beginning EDG overhauls only gives confidence that it would have worked in the past and should work for the next day or less. Taking the EDG apart for the overhaul negates the test that was just completed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/07/03, (#2) p. 18 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Performing a service water surveillance test that involves flow measurements supporting operability that did not take into account leakage past a boundary valve. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/07/03, (#2) p. 20 & 21 	S	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dropped license because he felt the OS's were hesitant to take conservative action because it would affect their pay. Wanted to operate @ 98% to ensure they were not exceeding 100% when we lost CMS computer and had to rely on nuclear instruments which can have 5% error ... OS not willing to do that and felt OS treated them differently after that ... Discusses safety aspects of instrument operation ... Management issues orders that if you lose CSM, reduce power by 2% vindicating allegor ... New rules issued that reduced authority of NCO to make operation decisions believed related to INPO like other plants for consistency making reactor operators feel like no longer in charge. Other similar problems, but 2% issue was worst nightmare <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/21/04, p. 15 - 32 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Above field supervisor, pay, bonuses based on power production. Since deregulation, pay based on reactor power performance. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/21/04, p. 51, 53 - 59 	G	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Production pressure is excessive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/21/04, p. 99 	G	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● BF-19s using a sledge hammer to operate ... "the mentality is don't shut down, stall, do whatever you can to fix it without shutting down." <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/07/03, (#2) p. 26 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The 24 Steam Generator Feed Regulating Valve (FRV), 24BF19, failed to respond ... The NCOs, and at least one Senior Reactor Operator (SRO), on shift believed the valve was mechanically bound ... Management didn't want to declare the valve mechanically bound and therefore inoperable because that would require a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. shutdown ... Management elected to pursue a controls failure ... Shutdown delayed for about 36 hours <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/23/03, p. 6 - 11 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Recounts the issue surrounding elevated off-gas levels at Hope Creek ... procedure said 'do not operate above 75 scfm' yet gave no direction on actions to take if above 75 scfm ... the 75 scfm limit was also mentioned as a design basis in the FSAR (Final Safety Analysis Report) ... NCOs wanted to shut down ... a TARP team was developed to evaluate options ... PSEG essentially 'engineered it away' saying that 75 scfm was the design for each unit in a dual unit site and since Hope Creek Unit 2 was never built, the Hope Creek site could actually go as high as 150 scfm with some compensatory actions ... "the only time that I felt [that we didn't shut the plant down when required] was with the [elevated] off-gas" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/26/03, p. 9 - 21, 26 - 29 	S	NCD

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discussed the excessive EDG exhaust leakage issue ... the company industrial safety personnel had not tested for all possible harmful gases being emitted from the diesel ... "there is an LCO time limit, and they wanted to clear it up so that we [could] keep the plant running ... that is part of the business ... there is certainly schedule pressure and production pressure to keep the plant making electricity, because it is a business" ... 3 people got sick (one nearly passed out in his car on the way home and went to the hospital to get check out) 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/26/03, p. 22 - 24, 32 - 40 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses an issue where management knew about an EHC leak prior to startup that resulted in having to scram the Reactor seven days later. Also describes initial scram (due to a hurricane 9/03) as preventable and a result of not making repairs to an in-feed breaker that had a known degraded condition for over a year. 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 37 - 42 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "Yes, we hear about safety all the time...But a lot of the times I think it's safety is number one as long as it doesn't impact schedule, if it doesn't impact generation. If something has to give, it tends to be on safety. That's the impression that most of us have." 	G	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 74 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... In the [REDACTED] years, it was ... run it until it breaks and somebody shuts you down ... [with] [REDACTED] if it's broken, let's fix it ... [I don't think [REDACTED] wanted to be [effective at fixing things.] It's cheaper to run. It's easy to run. 'Hey, I'll explain why it broke later' ... production over all else" 	G	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/15/04, p. 25 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A lot of cost pressures to keep the units operating contributes to the shift in safe operating philosophy away from one of "safety first" 	G	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/15/04, p. 101 & 102 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Off-Gas flow just took put past the FSAR limits. Engineering given time to evaluate the issue vice taking action (i.e S/D). [REDACTED] interpretation of the correct action to take would have been to S/D the unit and search for the cause. Turned out to be a condenser leak 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/15/04, p. 103 - 109 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Recent decision not reduce power to remove a reactor feed pump from service that had high vibration, as directed in the procedure, exemplifies management's emphasis of production over safety. The decision was made to allow engineering an opportunity to evaluate the condition prior to taking action in accordance with the procedure. (The plant would have had to go down to 95 % power to take the pump out and evaluate/fix it.) 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/15/04, p. 113 & 114 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I've seen in the last year or two a [greater] emphasis on engineering evaluation ... I get the impression that they [managers] are driven in the direction that would maintain the plant running. 	G	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/15/04, p. 127 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses corrective action process. "Based on some of the other things I have seen, there's probably not going to be a resolution to it. You almost get apathetic to where you feel you are wasting your time.....Once you put in a notification to try and go through and track, all the numbers change...Then you find out that basically your notification got closed out with no corrective action, no activity taken. So you get frustrated." 	P	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 104 - 105 		

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Binning Of Salem/Hope Creek SCWE Issues (SORTED BY BINS ONLY)

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LEGEND

S - Specific Incident	G - General
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	ESP - Excessive Schedule Pressure

PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [REDACTED] berates the TARP team leader ("I can't believe you're even thinking about shutting down the unit. You just need to be getting some \$&%!# air compressors in here, and keep the units on line") in front of the rest of the TARP team ... "He lit off on me like a Roman candle ... didn't change my course of action ... when he came out in the hallway, I said ... I'm going to run this the way, as a nuclear professional I've been trained to run [it] ... or you can get somebody else to do it" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 12/2/03, p. 14 - 27 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An [REDACTED] closed a Main Feedwater Pump Steam Isolation Valve without authorization from the Control Room. This was contrary to the Operating shift's intent to take the Main turbine offline to address a 20 foot steam plume from the affected valve. 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 12/17/03, p. 84 - 92 (considers the fallout from this to be the result of a personal vendetta against [REDACTED]) 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 12/31/03, p. 101 - 132 (also believes that the fallout from this to be the result of a personal vendetta by Union personnel against [REDACTED]) 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussion about [REDACTED] isolating the steam leak ... "that was brought up immediately as an example of non-conservative decision making ... I think it was more a case where [REDACTED] would not have sent somebody else into the position to isolate the steam leak ... I see [REDACTED] as the kind of guy that he would be hesitant to send other people and take risks he would not himself take ... [REDACTED] [the on duty shift manager] had looked at it and thought he was just going to shut the plant down ... walked away after looking at the leak, saying, 'no it's too big ... we're just going to have to shut down and isolate the other mains' ... [REDACTED] looks at it, says ... 'let me see if I can get to the valve' ... [he is able to get to the valve], looks around, doesn't see anybody, and isolates it." ... the steam was affecting components in the area like secondary switch gear (of which provided power to the Reactor Coolant Pumps) ... it was a fairly large steam plume ... he talked with [REDACTED] about it later ... "the gist of it was that he [REDACTED] felt he could safely get to the valve ... I think he was thinking the way to stabilize the plant and to stop this condition is to close the valve" 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 12/16/03, p. 67 - 77 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Salem startup in progress with generator complications causing delays greater than a week ... Site management directs pursuit of bringing the plant up as far as possible to make up for the lost time ... vacuum was established and the plant was heated up to about 100# with the turbine & generator uncoupled and using a special substance to seal the turbine glands (gland sealing steam not in service and using a packing/stuffing material to prevent air in-leakage allowing establishment of vacuum conditions in the main condenser) ... senior management [REDACTED] was pushing to perform reactor power physics testing (potentially directed from [REDACTED]) ... in arguing for the conservative approach "I erased his [REDACTED] whiteboard and [said] 'let me work from the augmented inspection team backwards' ... going to remove decay heat from the plant ... with two systems [in manual] not in the normal configuration ... because [someone doesn't] control the system right, you cool down a little bit ... [cause] the reactor to go more critical ... or super critical ... go up into the power range and have a reactivity event ... talked about verbally to me at my appraisal ... that stand for safety cost me in my career at PSEG" 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 12/2/03, p. 27 - 43 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 12/16/03, p. 85 - 90 ("... no I wasn't comfortable with it") 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Startup after a failed pressurizer spray valve & subsequent reactor trip was directed without understanding the cause of the trip ... "Typically, the understanding of that whole thing would have occurred before the plant would start up [REDACTED] was applying significant pressure to get the unit started back up, and later admitted to the fact that he started the reactor up with really no understanding of what occurred at the event ... then a whole bunch of new learnings came out the next week after the root cause was done" 	S	EPE

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
o [REDACTED] 12/2/03, p. 77 - 82		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <p>March 2003 stuck Bypass Valve (BPV) Issue: Was very "uncomfortable" with the way the problem was handled ... The shutdown to fix a Reactor Recirc Pump seal ... during startup following the outage ... they synched the generator to the grid, raised load on the turbine and one of the BPVs did not go full closed as expected ... some troubleshooting Friday night into Saturday morning ... "When we went through it (stuck B/P valve problem) I was very uncomfortable with it ... (Reducing pressure while critical) had not been done at Hope Creek before ... There was a lot of frustration in that training...In those couple of hours Saturday night ... So there was a certain amount of time pressure to achieve this thing (fix B/P valve problem) Sunday night ... It wasn't a validation and it should have been...still hashing things out...weren't sure which way we were to go ... So the time pressure...was that we had to get through it...relieve the other crew at midnight ... I said 'Unless we can come to some consensus as to what we are doing...find someone else to take the watch' ... I don't think that thing would happen again...had a plan not fully baked ... We felt we had responded the way we were trained and we did a good job ... I'm sure [REDACTED] felt the same...this thing was scheduled for Sunday...we needed to do what we could ... I don't think it had anything to do with production, absolutely not"</p> 	S	NCD
o [REDACTED] 1/16/04, p. 42 - 86		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <p>March 2003 stuck Bypass Valve (BPV) Issue: The shutdown to fix a Reactor Recirc Pump seal ... during startup following the outage ... they synched the generator to the grid, raised load on the turbine and one of the BPVs did not go full closed as expected ... some troubleshooting Friday night into Saturday morning ... "determined that it looked like the valve may be mechanically bound" ... Saturday [REDACTED] leaving [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to act in his place ... "decisions were made to shut the unit down and place it in a condition (break vacuum) [to repair the valve]" ... shutdown and repair plan developed Saturday and Sunday (including new procedures, training, SORC on Sunday night, etc.) while maintaining the unit at ~20% power ... shutdown commenced Sunday night ... early Monday morning they tripped the main turbine and the valve went full closed ... "seemed to fix itself" ... questions were raised [around day by from [REDACTED] ... do we need to continue shutting [cooling] down to fix the valve given that the valve" ... the cooldown was delayed ... "the length of time that was taken to make what ... seemed like a very black and white decision ... caused some angst"</p> 	S	NCD
o [REDACTED] 9/25/03, p. 40 - 56		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <p>Discussed the push to start up Hope Creek following the stuck BPV issue ... "I was there when we were trying to close that valve ... listened to it, and it was coming up against a hard mechanical stop, and they knew there was a problem ... did considerable testing ... Monday ... the valve did go closed ... I was asked [by [REDACTED] why we couldn't just restart the unit [because it was not a safety related valve and was working fine at the time] ... a lot of discussion, challenging, and consternation"</p> 	S	NCD
o [REDACTED] 10/09/03, p. 29 41		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <p>"We were not going to start the unit up until we understood what the problem was with the BP valve ... I think he [REDACTED] needed the data to support [and explain the reasoning for not restarting the unit with the BPV in question] to corporate ... [I did not, at any time, get the impression that [REDACTED] was pressuring for the start up] ... what surprised me was that [the discussion] ... utilized 4 hours of ... critical path time ... It was clear to me that he [REDACTED] had to provide an explanation of what we were doing to the unit to corporate PSEG ... I don't remember where the notion of starting the plant back up came from ... but someone did [vocalize it], and it really caught me off guard ... [You can relieve me and have someone else start the unit up] ... I did say that [to [REDACTED] ... [when [REDACTED] canvassed the group], I don't remember anyone saying that we should start up ... everybody was aligned with that viewpoint (to shutdown) ... I don't know if that was based on the strength of my justification"</p> 	S	NCD

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
o [REDACTED] 3/02/04, p. 7, 14, 22, 23, 56, 66 & 68		
• "... I was comfortable that the [diesel with extensive exhaust leaks] was operable and would perform its intended function ... and I didn't think [it] had risen [to a level requiring us to] shut the facility down ... in hindsight ... [remaining at power without correcting the condition of the diesel] was not a good decision"	S	EPE
o [REDACTED] 3/02/04, p. 37 & 38		
• "The two times that I remember being in challenging situations [i.e. uncomfortable with the position being advocated for the company, were] the [stuck] bypass valve and the diesel [with the excessive exhaust leak]"	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 3/02/04, p. 44		
• There were no examples showing where senior operations management [REDACTED] challenged the operators to be more conservative.	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 3/02/04, p. 46		
• The previous senior operations manager was the decision maker in the process (i.e. making day-to-day decisions on what to do with the plant) ... "that is not the place for [the] decision making to take place" ... the new senior management style is one that makes the Shift Managers the decision makers ... "[current senior operations management] never tells me what to do ... he asks what am I going to do ... [then] did you think about this ... did you think about that ... [I factor his questions] into my decision [and then let him know what, if any, changes I've made to my plan] ... I don't think [REDACTED] was going to make me start up [during the stuck BPV issue] ... the position I took was solidly justified ... I threw my job behind it to support my conviction ... I was not going to start the unit up as [a] senior licensed individual at Hope Creek"	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 3/02/04, p. 70 & 72		
• New senior operations management is operating in a more safety conscious conservative manner ... "the current organization gives you the wherewithal to make a decision and make comparisons ... it is OK to come down 5% and take the Bravo feed pump out and then figure out [if] you have a problem ... it is easier to make the 'gray' decisions [now] because providing your justification is not a problem [any more] because you almost don't have to do it ... the [REDACTED] conversations are gentle but probing ... made a significant [positive] impact within weeks of arriving	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 3/02/04, p. 76 - 81		
• The following relate to operating Hope Creek at off gas flows greater than "procedurally allowed":	S	NCD
o "What we did was rationalize [that because everything was operating correctly at the moment, we were justified in giving] engineering time to tell us [that it was indeed okay]"		
o "It took us two days to change the procedure ... to operate above 75 CFM ... not the way to do business"		
o "... we would rationalize our decisions to provide justification that we were comfortable with ... that is not the kind of procedural use ... message [we want to send to] the operators"		
o "I believe solidly that we have gotten away from that behavior mode"		
- [REDACTED] 3/02/04, p. 98 - 105		
• The work groups that have the most issues are those people with jobs closest to "production" (p. 120)	G	EPE
o [REDACTED] 3/02/04, p. 120		

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES		Issue Type	Root Cause
•	Discussed the issue where the plant computer was lost, removing the primary indication of reactor power. The RO was "very vocal about the recommendation to lower power because his most accurate indication of power was gone." The [redacted] who was the shift manager at the time, decided to keep the plant at its current power level and use other, less accurate indications of power. The RO went away from the situation upset that a non-conservative decision had been made.	S	NCD
○	[redacted] 2/20/04, p. 18 - 28		
•	The interviewee stated that he believes the plant is moving in a direction toward making more conservative decisions. He gave the example of a steam leak from the turbine in late 2003 where the decision was made to shut down the plant rather than try to fix the leak on-line. "I don't know that we've had a similar decision to make in the past, but I'm not sure that in the past we would have made the same decision."	G	NCD
○	[redacted] 2/20/04, p. 51 & 52		
•	Concerning operability calls, the interviewee discussed an issue where a crew identified a jacket water leak on one of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). The leak was in excess of the limit given in a past operability evaluation, so the EDG was declared inoperable. Management feedback was that before a component is declared inoperable "we needed to make sure that we fully engage the rest of the organization to figure out every possible alternative instead of just saying it's inoperable." This feedback was from [redacted] and [redacted]. This clearly put pressure on the SMs to assume a component is operable until there was extensive proof that it was inoperable. The interviewee discussed the impact of the above feedback. He stated that recently he had to make an operability call on a degraded rod block monitor. "And based on the jacket water incident ... okay, I shouldn't make that decision myself. I ought to have engineering come in and make the evaluation for me." The SM later received feedback from the [redacted] that the RBM should have been declared inoperable sooner.	S	ND
○	[redacted] 2/20/04, p. 74 - 86		
•	During maintenance on a 500 kV breaker in the switchyard, the load dispatcher contacted the control room to reduce reactive loading and power for grid stability concerns. After the crew began lowering power, the [redacted] called from the switchyard and directed the crew to stop lowering power, because the breaker would be restored soon. The interviewee felt this was inappropriate, because "the training [I] received in the past [emphasized that] when the electric system operator gives me direction, I'm to follow that direction because the electric system operator is trying to protect the integrity of the grid."	G	EPE
○	[redacted] 2/20/04, p. 95 - 97		
•	The interviewee discusses an issue where the plant was in a T.S. Action Statement that required them to be in hot shutdown within six hours (related to the EDG jacket water leak). The crew was about to commence shutting down, when the [redacted] pushed them to keep the unit at current power and continue to try to fix the EDG. The interviewee was concerned that he would not have enough time to safely shutdown the unit if they were delayed. "I was in a room with [redacted] and [redacted] as [redacted] was trying to [convince] me [that shutting down] was inappropriate and [that] I didn't need to move the plant yet when my control room crew was saying we need to move the plant so we can get to where we need to go, meet the tech spec and not challenge ourselves by making a mistake by having too much time pressure ..." He also stated the [redacted] actually attempted to delay and distract him from taking the actions he felt were appropriate.	S	NCD
○	[redacted] 2/20/04, p. 101 - 104		

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Following the stuck open BPV, the operating crew was attempting to depressurize the plant so the valve could be repaired, when [redacted] called the control room and directed the shift manager to stop the depressurization. The interviewee stated that he was informed that order came from [redacted] through [redacted]. The interviewee felt there was often pressure from senior management, who may not have a full understanding of the situation, to keep the plant at power. 	S	EPE
○ [redacted] 2/20/04, p. 113 - 117		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Outage management wrote a notification listing the concerns that operations management was making overly conservative decisions costing the company productivity. The interviewee mentioned that the Shift Managers at the time took exception to this message. The interviewee noted that it certainly seemed unusual that the corrective action process was used in this venue. (Spring 2002 time frame) 	G	EPE
○ [redacted] 1/22/04, p. 43 - 53		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The [redacted] pushed for a procedure change after a diesel generator service water test indicated an anomaly in flow-rate. The procedure change was intended to remove the requirement for a given flow rate during a periodic flush of piping. The issue was resolved apparently when the SW valve was repaired. The interviewee had stated he was uncomfortable at the time with the [redacted] pushing in that direction at the time because he felt the push was to find a way to ignore an apparent problem with the system. 	S	EPE
○ [redacted] 1/22/04, p. 106		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interviewee categorized production pressure as excessive at times, and he felt that he had less decision making authority than he had at a previous job at [redacted]. He did indicate, however, that the difference could be related to the change away from the "rate-based" regulatory model days. 	G	GMLC
○ [redacted] 1/22/04, p. 126		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I would say that when I became shift manager [in 2001] we were very [lethargic]. In other words, we allowed a lot of things not to be fixed. We accepted them ... Over the last 12 to 18 months, at least, specifically the last six months that mind set is rapidly becoming history with regard to fixing the plant, bringing up concerns, and those type of things." 	G	PIR
○ [redacted] 2/12/04, p. 16		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses concerns that were raised during a startup at the end of RFO-11, where the #3 BPV oscillated. The operating crew had concerns with continuing the startup. "We called the [redacted] in and we were basically overruled. He said, "I want the unit synched ... I felt we proceeded without what I would consider good engineering justification ... the unit [was] synched properly [to the grid without incident] ... they gave us justification later but I found out it was [merely a] theory. [redacted] 2/12/04, p. 19 - 20 	S	EPE
○ [redacted] 2/12/04, p. 26 - 37		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interviewee discussed an issue where off-gas flow rate increased above the licensee's administrative limits due to a leak, but the unit was not shutdown. "What I remember on my shift was [that] the NCOs were a little bit concerned. They didn't feel the [engineering] evaluation was complete ... they basically felt that we were keeping the unit online to make money." 	S	EPE
○ [redacted] 2/12/04, p. 66 - 68		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discussed the licensee's actions related to increased drywell floor drain leakage. As with the off-gas flow increase, the licensee exceeded their administrative limit but rather than shut the unit down, they raised the limit. "We kept raising that value when we had [a know] issue with the Recirc [Pump] seal [leak]. We kept raising it and raising it when we might shut the unit down." 	S	EPE
○ [redacted] 2/12/04, p. 73 - 75		

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES	<u>Issue Type</u>	<u>Root Cause</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "We're also in this competitive business to make money. If you owned this business, would you [require someone] to go in there twice a shift and monitor something or would you shut the unit off to fix it? The decision is sometimes based on economics, but if safety comes into play, the decision should always be conservative [including taking the] unit off line if you have to, to fix [the problem]." 	G	EPE
○ [REDACTED] 2/12/04, p. 108 & 109		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interviewee stated that following identification of a 150 drop per minute jacket water leak from one of the EDGs, he declared the EDG inoperable (based on a past evaluation that gave a limit of 150 dpm for operability). He stated that his decision to declare the EDG inoperable was criticized by his management because he didn't get engineering involved to re-analyze the allowed leak rate. The interviewee used this as an example to show that engineering will at times generate any number you want to prevent the plant from having to be shutdown. This is also an example of where upper management's expectation is to assume a piece of equipment is operable until engineering comes in and proves that it's inoperable. 	S	EPE
○ [REDACTED] 2/12/04, p. 75 - 79		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interviewee discusses problems with procurement of parts for work. The plant has a policy of not keeping spare parts (even critical parts) at the plant, and instead ordering them when they break. "I can take you in the control room right now and show you two extremely [important degraded pieces of equipment] that if we could get spare parts we could fix them but we don't have the parts yet. We had a battery room duct heater that burned up on us. We had to manufacture a brand new one. That's taken weeks and weeks and weeks." 	S	GMLC
○ [REDACTED] 2/12/04, p. 118 & 119		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Upper management non-conservatively delayed (while awaiting an engineering evaluation) the start of a Technical Specification required shutdown at Hope Creek due to an inoperable Diesel Generator. 	S	NCD
○ [REDACTED] 9/25/03, p. 62 - 88		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Concern that the plant operators were in a position where if operability of a piece of equipment was in question, it was assumed operable until proven inoperable. The interviewee stated that, while this was not the philosophy in Ops, they were being pushed that way. 	G	NCD
○ [REDACTED] 3/09/04, p. 135 & 136		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discussed an issue where the shift manager had to convince senior plant management to shut the plant down to correct arcing and sparking in the switchyard. The shift manager didn't feel he was getting any support in the decision making process because it involving taking the plant offline. 	S	EPE
○ [REDACTED] 3/09/04, p. 164 - 168		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Senior management criticized [REDACTED] for the tripping unit during, degrading condition (grassing); message can affect safety culture and future decisions on shift 	S	GMLC
○ [REDACTED] 12/31/03, p. 68 - 71		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Service Water underground leak was accepted and "worked-around" far longer than most of the Operations personnel thought was appropriate ... questionable operability ... non-conservative approach to operations 	S	PIR
○ [REDACTED] 12/31/03, p. 18 - 35		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... after this management change-out, the questions were more along the lines of production pretty much at all costs ... 'What can we do?' 'Is there a way around this requirement?' ... consistent ... shocking" 	G	EPE
○ [REDACTED] 12/2/03, P. 4 - 6		

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
<div style="position: absolute; top: 10px; right: 10px; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">7D</div>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... If your looking at promoting conservative decision making ... operating these places safely, I would have expected senior management would have [embraced the concept of not restarting Hope Creek] until we completely understood what the problems and issues were" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted], 10/09/03, p. 38 	G	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● [redacted] criticized SM for calling SW loop inop (failed ST, check valve eventually replaced in the night without consulting licensing) getting consensus; but the SW was clearly inoperable. Early 2002 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 12/31/03, p. 56 - 60 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● [redacted] defended SM against a complaint from Training Dept when unit was kept online after loss of circulators. Although SM still believes that keeping unit online was the correct decision in this specific case ... created a perception that senior management will always support decisions that keep plants online. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 12/31/03, p. 69 - 72 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Recounts the SJ valve issue that was delaying continuation of a startup following a refuel outage ... needed to conduct some testing to determine which set of valves was leaking ... [redacted] had taken the position to NOT perform the testing ... "we're going to figure out a way to engineer it away [and the real force behind the decision] I believe it was [redacted] ... I suspected [redacted] talked to him and expressed his opinion on the matter ... I thought we were playing with something that could turn into a tech spec violation ... [redacted] basically said he was making the decision ... [redacted] clearly was a representative of his bosses. That was my opinion ... he reflected their views ... he [redacted] was typically a representative of the senior management" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 12/16/03, p. 54 - 66, 119 - 121, 140, 141 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses the stuck BF-19 (Steam Generator Feed Regulating Valve) issue ... It happened on night shift and he was the Shift manager for day shift ... believed that night shift was mistaken in thinking that it was a controller problem ... "[around 3pm] we've done what we can do to confirm or deny it's a control problem. It really appears that there is something preventing this valv from closing ... The time of discovery is now. We're calling this inoperable ... [we got to a pre-determined point in the troubleshooting procedure where it would more definitively indicate that the problem was valve-related NOT controls-related and then declared the valve inoperable] ... we started shutting down ..." <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 2/16/03, p. 101 - 116 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Speaking of the situation where operators have continually "managed" a problem with oil level fluctuations in a safety-related control room chiller for at least 18 months and repairs are scheduled for Oct 2004 (8 more months) - "...it has frustrated a lot of operators. Do I think the decision is the right decision to manage this equipment? Yes, I do." 	S	PIR

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 56		
● Relaying second/third hand information that previous [REDACTED] promoted a non-conservative approach toward operability determinations - "Gee, I went to my interview with [REDACTED] and, boy, this is what he said about operability determinations. And that doesn't seem right to me."	G	NCD
○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 63		
● Recounted how [REDACTED] relayed [REDACTED] operability determination philosophy at a Shift Manager's meeting - "it sounded to me as though we — the approach was one of ... justifying why something was operable versus determining that it is operable. And there's a big difference between those things."	G	NCD
○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 86 - 88		
● Fall 2003, High vibration alarm on reactor feed pump, SM directed remaining at full power based on verbal input from engineering, in violation of alarm procedure - "I've got engineering, through several communications, saying we don't believe this pump is in jeopardy. Yet I still have a procedure that has these words in it, and this is presenting a challenge for the shift."	S	NCD
○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 107		
○ [REDACTED] 1/16/04, p. 127		
● "the point is that rather than ... doing the hit on the head, you know, you guys were bad and didn't follow procedure, the approach has been, what can we as operators do better, or do differently, to head off this type of situation through the way we monitor the equipment?"	G	GMLC
○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 116		
● Recounted an incident where the RO's probably think that a Production-Over-Safety decision was made upon the loss of some rod position and other indications ... RO reported that multiple rods were indicating that they were drifting in ... all other indications APRMs, LPRMs, Turbine 1 st stage pressure, etc. were indicating that the rods were not actually moving ... the majority of RO's on shift wanted to back down in power while the electronic failure was being investigated ... shift manager and control room supervisor	S	EPE
○ [REDACTED] 1/16/04, p. 112 - 116		
● "... we had said we were going to wait for five circulators: let's wait, let's get the fifth circulator back, and start the plant up ... [REDACTED] [was] asking us to do something that ... is different than what our [SORC] plan was ... it was an unusual phone call, the [REDACTED] through the shift manager ... discussing how to change the plan ... [REDACTED] position [startup with four circulators] was ... that was his decision to make, and there was contention about that."	S	EPE
○ [REDACTED] 3/10/04, p. 16 - 31		
● EDG Jacket Water leak event - shutdown action statement - technical adequacy of the operability determination was OK but the Shift manager at the time was unhappy with the condition of the EDG and the amount of help provided on them on the mid shift.	S	NCD
○ [REDACTED] 2/05/04, p. 33-46, 92-93, 104		
● The SRO discussed an event with the off-gas system and a procedure that stated "Do not operate above 75 SCFM" and indicated that it was philosophically okay to evaluate the design basis of the limit contained in the procedure and stay at full power instead of reducing power to get within the procedural limit.	S	NCD
○ [REDACTED] 2/05/04, p. 101 - 103		

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES	<u>Issue Type</u>	<u>Root Cause</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Individual perceives the current senior management improving equipment reliability ... focusing the organization on fixing things right the first time ... [during the last outage] "what I saw in the last outage that we did was thatthere was a lot more emphasis on fixing the plant as opposed to can we start up now and fix it in the next refuel outage and avoidextending our forced outage time". 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/05/04, p. 67 & 68 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I think we were focused on safety ... fixing the plant ... team work" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/13/04, p. 18 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interviewee believes there was never a situation where there was a concern that was elevated and didn't get handled appropriately ... "[no concerns with safe plant operation] it is in my backyard" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/13/04, p. 21 & 22 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I would say that the safety conscious work environment and the importance of placing nuclear safety and industrial safety and radiological safety over production, that has always ... been clearly communicated, and I would say communicated on a regular basis, too" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/05/04, p. 122 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I can't think of any - any specific circumstance where the final decision was, in my opinion, the wrong decision." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 53 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I have never been in a situation where I have recommended, for instance, that something should be declared inoperable, and I've had somebody above me override that decision." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 39 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● When asked whether she thought putting up with an exhaust leak on the emergency diesel for an entire operating cycle, including a 3 to 4 week refueling outage, was a case of production over safety, she stated, "No. No, I did not." 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 35 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... never have I felt that I was being coerced or directed to operate the plant in what I thought was an unsafe manner" 	G	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 12/31/03, p. 14 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Spring of 2003, crew experienced extremely heavy grassing and manually tripped Salem Unit 2. The crew was "praised" for taking the conservative action ... "applauded and recognized for taking appropriate [action] ... Got a trip to the Blue Rocks game or something for the whole crew ... from [REDACTED]" 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 12/31/03, p. 36 & 37 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "It's obvious to me that with these forced outages ... is really upper management saying 'Hey, let's get this stuff fixed. We're not going to settle for this stuff anymore' ... we're fixing other things too ... going to cold shutdown ... going into the drywell ... [addressing] the root causes ... so [these failures don't] happen again ... fixing it right" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/16/04, p. 19 - 30 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Taped conversation between Kim Harvin and [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] refers to the 4 hour debate over shutting down to fix the turbine bypass valve recalls [REDACTED] saying - "... You don't understand the economics of the decision to turn the plant off and fix the valve" ... [REDACTED] continued, saying "the fact that we were even there means we don't come from safety" ... referred to Hope Creek as "... dangerous" and "... yes, I meant that from a nuclear safety standpoint" 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/06/03, (#1) p. 83, 96, 97, 103 & 104 		

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PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES		<u>Issue Type</u>	<u>Root Cause</u>
•	Says that following deregulation, it became more difficult to obtain funding and that they have had to put in more effort to prove that any expense is necessary. Says it can be easier to obtain funding for projects if the cost is spread out ... "more toward stretching things out, making it go a little longer and willing to take a little more risk."	G	GMLC
○	[REDACTED] 10/06/03, (#1) p. 16 - 19		
•	He doesn't believe that the pressure of deregulation would effect operators and their conservatism. "I'd have no reason to believe that if the situation required something to be done, they [operators] would do it for the right reasons."	G	GMLC
○	[REDACTED] 10/06/03, (#1) p. 21		
•	[REDACTED] was usually never judgmental and simply [espoused] the position of I expect you to do what's right, go do it and if we have problems with that, we'll have discussions [about it] later, but shut down the plant if that's what you [have] to do."	G	GMLC
○	[REDACTED] 10/06/03, (#1) p. 33		
•	Following an outage for repairs on a turbine bypass valve at Hope Creek, PSEG senior management made a point of informing the interviewee of how much the outage (which ran longer than projected) cost the company. [REDACTED] stated that he did not take this as criticism for the decision to shut down, but rather "education."	S	EPE
○	[REDACTED] 10/06/03, (#1) p. 41 - 45		
•	On [REDACTED] taking over as [REDACTED] "The only changes I saw was ... more education. We're getting far more education on what's happening in the market. What is the market doing? What's the market expecting from us? What's Wall Street demanding from us and how do we play into that picture?"	G	GMLC
○	[REDACTED] 10/06/03, (#1) p. 63		
•	The interviewee discussed the decision-making following the stuck open BPV (whether or not to take the plant to cold shutdown). He stated that Operations, in particular the [REDACTED] may have been left out of the loop in the decision-making process. He stated that when he learned this, he called the meeting between managers to decide on a course of action. He also stated that in spite of other people's assertion that the meeting was over three hours long, it was actually only around 45 minutes.	S	GMLC
○	[REDACTED] 3/24/04, (#2) p. 102 - 105		
•	The interviewee stated that during the meeting to decide on whether or not to cool down the plant following the stuck open BPV, he took the position of arguing for plant startup to stimulate discussion and make sure everyone knew their position "... it is my job - I need to make sure it is clear to you [that] it is my job to ask questions from every possible front. Why is it the right thing? Why is it the wrong thing? Why is it okay to start up? Why is it not okay to start up?" However, when asked if he pushed operations to start up the unit or if the meeting was longer than 45 minutes, the interviewee stated "that isn't true at all."	S	NCD
○	[REDACTED] 3/24/04, (#2) p. 106 - 111, 121		
•	The interviewee stated that during the stuck BPV problem, he discussed the issue with PSEG management [REDACTED] but felt no undue pressure from him to keep the unit operating. "You could translate that [having to call [REDACTED] is] ... being held [accountable] to be prudent with the company's resources, but it is not an accountability that I am afraid of or that ... I [don't] cringe because I have to answer to somebody"	S	EPE
○	[REDACTED] 3/24/04, (#2) p. 145 & 146		

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<u>PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES</u>	<u>Issue Type</u>	<u>Root Cause</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The interviewee gave another example of where he argued to keep the unit shutdown in spite of Operations pushing to start the unit back up. The example involved a problem with the seal purge lines to the Recirc pumps. In relation to the issue, the interviewee stated: "We are going to fix the equipment and if we are going to stay down longer, we are going to stay down longer and we stayed down another day and a half to go fix those things under complete disagreement with some of the operators, including some of the people that reported directly to me." 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/24/04, (#2) p. 149 - 151 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stated that the root cause of the issues surrounding the decision making following the stuck BPV were related to lack of communication between Ops and the rest of the organization. He stated that following the event a thorough root cause evaluation was conducted to determine where they had shortcomings. He said they looked at "both the technical aspects, the decision making aspects, command and control aspects and cultural aspects." 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/25/04, (#3) p. 172 - 174, 182 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The interviewee gave an example (related to a problem with a Recirc pump seal) where he was alone in arguing that the plant should be shut down. He cited this as an example of an issue where he was arguing for plant shut down (as opposed to the BPV issue). "We had a difference in philosophy between my management team and myself in that concept [the risk significance of a potential seal purge system failure] ... In the previous week we fixed the Recirc seal and stayed down two additional days to resolve the seal purge system and I will tell you that I was alone in that decision making as well." 	G	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/25/04, (#3) p. 187 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Following a forced outage, the interviewee prepared a presentation on the plant's performance for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] let me know that he was not happy about some of our performance and he told me the consequences of some of our performance issues in financial terms." He stated several other times throughout the interview that [REDACTED] and others in PSEG senior management let Salem/HC managers know the financial importance of keeping the plants running. 	G	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/25/04, (#3) p. 189, 196 & 197 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "You asked me if anyone put pressure on me to say you have to do something and bring this plant back. I would say no ... The only pressure that there was was self-imposed pressure by me and the people around me." 	G	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/25/04, (#3) p. 296 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Following an issue where the plant was brought to full power with an incorrect valve lineup (not caught by the operators), [REDACTED] met with plant personnel (Salem and Hope Creek) and told them that they don't have the authority to make changes in plant power (except in the case of an imminent significant concern requiring the operators to take immediate actions). In other cases, he expected a management review to be conducted. "I think they [the SROs] took that as a challenge to their manhood because they heard [REDACTED] say that they are not in charge of the plant and there was the perception potentially that they couldn't exercise their license responsibilities" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/25/04, (#3) p. 359 - 363 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • April 7th, 1994 - had both feed pumps in manual and both Feed Regulating Valves (FRVs: BF-19s) in manual and still keeping the unit on 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/22/03, p. 10 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nuclear safety issues are handled immediately 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/23/03, No Transcript - From the investigator's summary of notes taken during the interview 		

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<u>PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES</u>	<u>Issue Type</u>	<u>Root Cause</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses safety concerns raised during turbine building chiller maintenance ... "I think ... the financial pressures and limitations with the contractor may have, for the moment, outweighed some of the safety aspects of the job." 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/26/04, (#1) p. 188 - 191 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "I will tell you that there were valves ... that were not installed correctly ... Operations accepted [these SJ valves] even though they were installed incorrectly and wouldn't operate as designed" 	S	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#1) p. 15 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● With respect to the Hope Creek "B" Recirc Pump Issue (tolerance / alignment problem that manifested itself via high vibration that was 'corrected' by machining and repositioning the vibration indication equipment effectively 'masking' the problem), a level 1 notification with a root cause was initiated. The recommendation (from site engineering, maintenance, and FlowServe - an external vendor) was to do maintenance on the pump internals during the next refueling outage to resolve the issue. Management viewed this as a business decision rather than a safety issue and corrective actions were scheduled beyond the next refueling outage. 	S	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#2) p. 2 - 5 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The Salem unit 1 turbo charger failed because PMs were not done ... "two people ... manager and superintendent [that signed deferrals for the Pms for] ... almost three years ... [and a deferral required] operations or engineering concurrence" 	S	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#2) p. 20 - 22 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "When I first got there the [stack of] PM deferrals ... was unbelievably huge ... just [couldn't] support [the PM work] with all the corrective maintenance ... [the PM program started to improve] about a year and 1/2 ago" 	P	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#2) p. 22 & 23 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The practice of adding new notifications to existing work packages creates the potential for items to be overlooked and inadequately planned. One diesel work package had over 30 notifications attached to it ... "that's how half the stuff gets missed ... [which results in the work order add-ons not getting] properly planned" 	P	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#2) p. 43 - 48 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses an issue related to testing of the SJ-12 valve. Says he felt the plant was not in compliance with Technical Specification (T.S.) requirements for zero leakage past the valve, and that required testing was not performed. He also stated that pressure came for [REDACTED] to continue on without conducting the testing. 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 25 - 31 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discussed the issue where [REDACTED] forced an extended debate on whether or not to complete the shutdown & cool down of Hope Creek following the stuck BPV. Most or all other plant personnel felt the decision to shutdown & cool down should have been straightforward. "I felt that his [REDACTED] approach was on the edge ... I did not feel that he went over the edge, but he did push it to the edge." 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 61 & 62 		

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SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● During the recent Salem Unit 2 outage, a SW valve was stroked to allow system fill prior to setting the torque and limit switches ... This was done to save time on the outage schedule <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/7/03, p. 7 - 9 	S	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "Procedures aren't a hundred percent right now ... you don't see any gain in correcting a problem, [you] see gain in getting the work done. Post-job briefs are pretty much non-existent ... the drive to get the schedule done, to meet the schedule ... I mean, that's the number one thing ... you say safety is the number one priority ... you can't, if you did everything totally 100% or as safe as you could, you wouldn't be in business." <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/06/03, (#2) p. 24 & 25 	S	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Attempted to start the 22 Auxiliary Feed Pump on a dead bus. Crew lost focus of the evolutions and failed to restore the 2B bus before the pump start attempt ... "it was the pressure to get something done ... it seems like they were going out of the schedule to get something back." <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/06/03, (#2) p. 69 - 74 	S	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Reckless pursuit of pressurization of Service Water piping during a Bay #4 restoration following an outage <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/6/03, p. 40 - 46 	S	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Some problem repair delayed (putting things off) because of time or cost of reduction of power level. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/21/04, p. 62 	G	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Deferral of 5 or 10 yr. inspection interval for bolts for at least one outage, possibly two (Summer 2001 or 2002, but possibly Fall 2003). Halfway through the 18-month cycle they found a lot of boron and degraded bolts. Operability determination was required to see if the bolts holding the RHR heat exchanger head were good enough to hold while bolts were replaced one at a time. Deferral of inspection was due to wanting to hold outage schedule to 19 days. Bolting condition could have been found during the outage if the inspection was conducted. Interviewee was unaware if the inspection was a specific NRC ISI or IST requirement or if the deferral was NRC approved or not. But, he was aware that the responsible engineer was angry about the inspection being deferred, about the identification of wastage on some bolts and about the removal of the inspection from the outage schedule. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/29/03, p. 34 - 40 	S	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Operations management exerted pressure to bypass interlocks to allow transmission switchyard operations to continue to restore grid reliability ... the interlocks were not bypassed ... "but there was certainly a lot of [pressure exerted] to try to get them to bypass the interlocks" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/26/04, p. 44 - 49 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Outage pressure issue. "I think time ran a little short on the I&C work....they tried to do both of them at the same time and ended up getting an automatic initiation of SLCS. Now, because there was portions of it that were isolated, we ended up firing the squib valve which had to be replaced and we also broke a section of pipe." <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 17 	S	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses outage scheduling. "Well, they actually look at it like we want a 16 day outage or we want an 18 day outage....It seems like the outage duration is set ahead of time. And then you have to try and make the work fit in." <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 43 - 45 	G	ESP

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SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "There [have] been start-ups where the [redacted] the [redacted], and the [redacted] would all be standing in the back of the control room in the shift manager's office. We used to call them the Sopranos. It seemed like every time these guys would come in, they would start pushing hard on the CRS." 	G	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 1/22/04, p. 71 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discussed a startup with 4 of 6 Circ Water pumps available; he thought there was about a 50/50 split among those on the call, but he was the Shift Manager, agreed with the startup, was not pressured into it, didn't consider it a safety issue ... discussed that he believed the argument between [redacted] and [redacted] got pretty heated, so much so that [redacted] left the conference call at one point 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 12/16/03, p. 18 - 39 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... after this management change-out [1997/1998 time frame], the questions were more along the lines of production pretty much at all costs ... 'What can we do?' 'Is there a way around this requirement?' ... consistent ... shocking" 	G	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 12/2/03, p. 4 - 6 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● During development of the procedure to shutdown the unit with a stuck open BPV, there was no separate verification/validation step for the procedure (as you would normally expect to see). Instead the crew that was going to be performing the evolution completed a combination practice run and verification/validation in the simulator. 	S	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 2/12/04, p. 63 - 65 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "But I have never had the sense that it was production over - over repairs. I think there's an inefficiency in our ability to define and implement repairs." 	G	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 2/2/04, p. 60 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discussing effects of deregulation on staff perceptions that market forces require quicker repairs - "it was a matter of getting folks educated and talking to the PJM. And all the right answers came back. You know, you guys, we're not in a grid emergency. Take the time that you need." 	G	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 2/2/04, p. 138 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses an issue related to stroke time testing the reactor head vents in preparation for startup and problems with the test procedure. The crew was having difficulty with performing the test as required by the procedure, and a senior manager [redacted] entered the control room and pushed for making an on-the-spot procedure change to allow completion of the test (not allowed by plant instructions). The interviewee stated the senior manager's goal was to continue the plant startup. 	S	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 3/09/04, p. 32 - 43, 45 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discussed another test procedure associated with measuring leakage back from the RCS to the Boron Injection Tank (through check valves). Suspected flashing in the lines prevented quantifying the leak rate. Test performance was not a T.S. requirement, but there is a T.S. leak limit. "Then there was some discussion about re-performance of the test, and how we were going to do the test. And there was some reluctance on [redacted] part in our discussions then to even perform the test, that we weren't required [by T.S.] to do the test, that it was a performance test [required by plant procedures, but not T.S.]." 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 3/09/04, p. 47 - 55, 60 		

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Binning Of Salem/Hope Creek SCWE Issues (SORTED BY BINS ONLY)

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<u>SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES</u>	<u>Issue Type</u>	<u>Root Cause</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • During dilution to the reactor coolant system for startup, the samples did not agree with the calculations. Outage management believed that the operating shift should continue diluting and stay within the schedule while operations management wanted to discontinue the dilution process until they could determine why there was a discrepancy. Delaying the dilution activity was the right thing to do in the interviewee's opinion because it was a reactivity issue. Ultimately, they understood the problem and fixed the discrepancies prior to continuing. (2001 time frame) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 39 	S	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was no emphasis by management to lower the corrective maintenance backlog 'haphazardly' ... just to get the numbers down ... "[the] directive was its not fixed until it works per design ... driven into us. It's not fixed until it works on demand for the operator ... we had plenty of resources" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/13/04, p. 30 	G	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (p. 10 - 11) Says that management put no unnecessary schedule pressure on people. However, during many assessments following events or problems, those responsible claim they felt pressure, but were unable to state why they felt that way. "The general outcome I found from many people when we'd have events ... they thought they were under some sort of pressure in order to get something done. We asked well, where did it come from? Well, it's what I thought. Did someone tell you that? Well, not exactly. Well, did they or didn't they? No, [they did not]." <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/06/03, (#1) p. 63 	G	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The interviewee discussed some of his interactions with PSEG management. [REDACTED] Stated that in the past he'd had interactions where [REDACTED] was disappointed that his expectations weren't met: "It was the fact that we would make commitments and we wouldn't be able to fulfill them and that is what he was saying. Why is it so difficult for you and others to be able to tell me one thing and then you can't deliver on it?" He stated that these types of questions covered various commitments, including startup dates, budget targets, and project end dates. However, he also stated that he didn't feel the pressure was unwarranted, and he only saw those types of questions if they had "fumbled the ball" and the situation was preventable. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/24/04, (#2) p. 158 & 159 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In discussing the effect of deregulation, the interviewee states, "It puts more focus on that efficiency and how that can influence the outcome of not the plan but the outcome of the company." He also said that he doesn't believe that safety decisions are made based on cost. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/25/04, (#3) p. 198 & 199 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In a tape recorded conversation with Kymn Harvin, the interviewee discusses the effect of deregulation: "The very thing that it was intended to do was to be a rival entity and it ends up causing people to make a poor decision because of economics and it ends up being economically not viable anymore." He went on to state that issues with safety related components still get resolved, but other things require more justification and sometimes are not fixed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/25/04, (#3) p. 305 - 308 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service water valve destruction during premature motor operator actuation during system fill ... scheduling pressure to get the header filled ... someone in the Outage Group made the decision ... done to save time on the outage schedule. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/13/03, p. 42 	S	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "There is no one from the management side, even union labor force, that wants to say 'I'm the reason the job got held up'" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/22/03, p. 22 	G	ESP

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SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Since September of 2003, work packages were being closed without the work being done to reduce the corrective maintenance backlog. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] to close out work packages on more than one occasion. 	S	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#1) p. 9 - 11 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The Hope Creek "B" recirc. pump had a tolerance / alignment problem that manifested itself via high vibration that was 'corrected' by machining and repositioning the vibration indication equipment effectively 'masking' the problem. The condition is still believed to have not been properly addressed (i.e. correcting the root cause of the mis-alignment) to date. 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#1) p. 38 - 62 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● There was "great pressure to get the work backlog down, just get it killed, just get the work done" 	G	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#2) p. 51 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses reluctance to aggressively work issues ... "We've gotten to the point where everybody is so afraid of getting their heads chopped off at anything, well, you want to be foolproof" ... "People aren't going to get back in the game if they think they are going to get hatched first time they make a mistake." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/26/04, (#1) p. 147 - 150 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "We are always in a reactionary mode." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/26/04, (#1) p. 165 		

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<u>LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES</u>	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● [REDACTED] fired because [REDACTED] wanted to show the union that management is running the station and not the union ... The [REDACTED] was reinstated after arbitration <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/23/03, p. 71 - 74 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Issued a tag-out for the 2B EDG that included a tag for the control power to the 2A EDG by mistake ... NEOs discovered the error ... Issue raised to supervision and the discrepancy was corrected ... A notification was generated but not believed to adequately address the level of concern ... Made a Level 3 ... Supervision was viewed as not taking ownership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/7/03, p. 10 - 14 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● General sense of non-conservative decision making due to production emphasis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/22/03, p. 7 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 'Work Environment' Surveys - They conduct surveys and interpret the results to justify whatever they (mgt.) want ... Have not seen a lot of correction come from the surveys ... Management hasn't listened to what union members have said before <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/22/03, (#1) p. 8 & 43 ○ [REDACTED] 10/22/03, p. 29 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In the last 1.5 years, there has been an escalating battle between workers and management ... interviewee thinks it started when INPO gave PSEG a three ratings. Management will not take accountability for deficient processes like work controls - an absolutely horrendous process that results in 17% wrench time. The issues with work control has been an ongoing problem for years and they can't seem to get a handle on it. Also, there is a concern by workers that there is mismanagement in not fixing broken primary system equipment ... For instance, the Salem Unit 2 (fall 2003) outage schedule had the 'scoped' primary system work completing in 28 days and the secondary work completing in 42 days while numerous pieces of primary plant equipment were documented with deficiencies ... Management's answers to the questions raised by workers (in reference to the issue of inactive/minimal primary system work scope) did not seem credible ... "We wanted to make sure we could do these shorter outages" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/29/03, p. 62 - 69 	G	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● NEOs concern about being heard. It's the screaming and yelling, the tit-for-tat stuff that is all adding up into "white noise". NEOs are concerned about how do you make sure that what really needs to be heard gets heard and continue to believe that their attempts to continue to be heard are still being treated by management as white noise. Most NEOs feel they are white noise - except for a few that are good at jumping up and down. About a year ago the management and union held fairly regular scheduled meetings and were doing ok for awhile, but in the last 6-months things have gotten really bad. No sense in doing them because they are not productive - not getting anything done. The current situation is that NEOs believe there are some issues with the plant as well as some issues with the workforce. Basically the workforce doesn't trust the management at all ... in anything (running the plant nor dealing with personnel issues between the company and union). While this environment may be making some people uncomfortable about raising nuclear safety or personal safety issues, he believes that those who tend to raise issues will continue to do so. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/29/03, p. 73 - 77 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... I deal strictly with my immediate supervision ... there's no need to go any higher because of the change ... I don't have a whole lot of respect for anybody higher than my supervision anymore ... I have been lied to a lot. I've brought up various issues that have seen brick walls ... has gotten better ... still a lot of guys ... will cut corners [on industrial safety] ... I have lost a lot of confidence in the upper management ..." <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/22/03, p. 32 & 33 	G	GMLC

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LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES	<u>Issue Type</u>	<u>Root Cause</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of management doing union employee work ... Closing a Feed Water Pump Steam Isolation valve ... using a metal bar to pry a Circulating Water Pump breaker into its cubicle ... manipulating a Pressurizer valve ... Ops Supervisor manipulating an instrument nitrogen system pressure controller 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/22/03, (#1) p. 25 - 31 ○ [redacted] 10/23/03, p. 55, 56 - 58, 59, 60 - 65 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With respect to retribution: "Did you catch any heat for bringing that issue to [management's] attention? Oh yes. ... I was confronted in the Ready Room by the person I was supposed ... to work with that evening ... I was told that he was not going to work with me, he did not feel comfortable with me ... if he messed up, I would rat him out." 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/29/03, p. 60 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussion about equipment being out of the correct position during a second verification for an equipment tag-out: "... I was given a list ... to verify that it was in the procedural correct position. ... I found it in the incorrect position because it had a red tag on it. ... the expectation amongst my peers was to call and get support on the way to cover it up. Because a person is going to get a significant riff. ... I called the supervisor ... the guy who got in trouble was [redacted] ... he's on some kind of probation ..." 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/29/03, p. 54 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Once decisions or issues are raised above the level of the CRS/NCO, the results and basis are not conveyed to the person that identified the concern. "I swear I can't figure out, once it leaves the NCO, the CRS, once it goes above that level, I have no idea who makes decisions on what's important and what isn't." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 1/07/04, p. 13 & 14 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "I think PSEG as a whole thinks of me no more than they think of a stapler. And when the stapler breaks, they'll throw it away in a heartbeat and not think anything of it. It has a lot to do with local management." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] /07/04, p. 105 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "... [the situation between the operators and Shift Managers was viewed as 'us against them'] ... I don't know why that occurred ... The management team that was there before the previous regime was very well liked and very well respected ... something occurred [during the previous regime] where the trust level went south" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 1/21/04, p. 48 & 49 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People skills and technology skills lacking in many supervisors, need more experienced people (not just young people) who can jump in for unusual operations problems. Arbitrary assignment of lead personnel. 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 1/21/04, p. 74 - 95 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [redacted] fired because [redacted] wanted to show the union that management is running the station and not the union. The [redacted] was reinstated after arbitration. 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/23/03, p. 59 - 62 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discusses management of PI's. "It's like my RCIC system is not looking good for the maintenance rule. So I want to do as little outage time on that as I can to bring my maintenance rule time, my outage time down and get me back into a nice looking figure. So they are managing the Indicator instead of managing the performance of it." 	G	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 1/22/04, p. 78 - 81 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "... he [redacted] has impressed me so far" 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] R., 1/15/04, p. 24 		

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LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES	<u>Issue Type</u>	<u>Root Cause</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Some SRO supervisors have expressed that "they need to keep [certain union people] in the union because they [the union guys] are people that do bring up concerns ... because [the supervisors] have to be careful of what they say ... [union members] are not intimidated ... they [are protected from adverse consequences]." Management people who express concerns are viewed as not being "team players." 	G	GMLC
○ [REDACTED] 1/15/04, p. 164 - 168		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... any event that occurred in the plant ... 20/20 hindsight ... take your best shot at doing the right thing, but if it wasn't exactly what [REDACTED] wanted ... very abrupt and scream and yell ... berate individuals ... in front of the management team ... particularly harsh ... would that have affected me in raising a concern? No, but could it have affected somebody else? Yes ... If you ... kept your head down, you got less of a chance of getting your head knocked off ... any viewpoint ... a different viewpoint especially" 	G	GMLC
○ [REDACTED] 12/2/03, p. 83 - 85		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "But, the evolution of ultimately making the decision to run the [emergency diesel] engine, to declare it operable, with operators wearing self contained breathing apparatus, did cause some - some very, very significant rifts between different parts of the organization." 	S	NCD
○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 35		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... I graduated top of my class in mechanical engineering. I have a [REDACTED] ... Do I feel that I was heard by my management team at the end? ABSOLUTELY NOT. They could care less what opinion I had on nuclear power and nuclear safety" 	G	GMLC
○ [REDACTED] 12/2/03, p. 106		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interviewee was the shift manager involved in the cooldown following the stuck open BPV. He said that he was told at 1600 to report to the simulator in two hours with two NCOs, a CRS, and an STA. He said that the verification/validation of the procedure had not been done and was combined with the crew practice run. The interviewee stated that at the time, his crew expressed concerns that they were being rushed into the procedure. He went on to say that he felt there was no one in Operations management with whom he could discuss the concern. "I don't believe it would have been supported to put the evolution at risk in order to rigorously adhere to [our] process." 	S	EPE
○ [REDACTED] 2/20/04, p. 139 - 147		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interviewee was asked to be the test engineer for the startup following RFO 11. He was asked at 0800 to have the IPTe paperwork ready for the evolution at 1100. "And I talked to [REDACTED] and said I'm not going to be ready at 1100. I said I can't follow the process and meet the parts of it and be ready by 1100. [REDACTED] told him "We need to be ready by 1100. That's when the evolution is going to happen." The interviewee pointed out that the startup had been planned for a long time, and there was "no effort prior to that morning to get it ready." 	S	EPE
○ [REDACTED] 2/20/04, p. 155 & 156		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interviewee discusses another instance where [REDACTED] put pressure on the operators to move faster than they felt comfortable. The operators were preparing to roll the main turbine, and told [REDACTED] they would be ready by 0900. "And he [REDACTED] said you need to be ready to roll at 0700 ... [even though] we were telling him this is how long it [takes if done] within the balance of the procedures and standards that we have." 	S	ESP
○ [REDACTED] 2/20/04, p. 157		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In spite of past problems with management rushing operating crews, the interviewee states that "I think if I were to say that this is what it takes for me to do a job in accordance with the standards I believe the new management team would be supportive of me taking the time I needed to do it safely the first time." 	G	ESP

nc

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LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
o [REDACTED] 2/20/04, p. 164		
• Identified issues where union personnel refused to enter items into the corrective action program because "it was not in their job specifications." He identified that in some cases people may be reluctant to use the corrective action program because of lack of familiarity with the system (they don't know how to enter issues).	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 3/09/04, p. 23 - 25		
• Following a simulator session where the interviewee and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were both observing [REDACTED] told the interviewee that "I think you should fire the CRS" (In spite of the fact that the individual passed the scenario). [REDACTED] basis was that "the NCO looked more professional than the CRS - nothing to do with the guys performance, it was all based on appearance...it looked like it had been awhile since he's had a haircut...and his clothes didn't look like they'd been ironed." [REDACTED] accused the interviewee of "being a mouse" for not wanting to fire the CRS.	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 3/09/04, p. 121 & 122		
• During another discussion with [REDACTED] the interviewee stated that "... [REDACTED] directed me once again to fire somebody. He didn't care who, 'Just fire somebody,' to create a burning platform." The focus was on firing someone from management (rather than union) to help increase leadership in Ops.	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 3/09/04, p. 123 - 126		
• "...I see that with [REDACTED] coming back as the [REDACTED] as probably one of the major changes, is that I can see and I can sense that the bond or the relationship between bargaining unit personnel and management personnel is improving..."	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 3/09/04, p. 174		
• "... the perception at the plant ... equipment operators, the technicians, the union personnel, that senior management just gives lip service to safety because of the way operations are conducted"	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 12/31/03, p. 14		
• For a time under [REDACTED] there was more of a "prove it's inop" push from Sr mgt than, "prove it's operable". Prompted SMs to meet with [REDACTED] didn't get the message. Now, under new mgt, it seems to be going back to the other way	G	NCD
o [REDACTED] 12/31/03, p. 53 - 61		
• Apparent communication problem between management and labor - "So there's a frustration where somebody repeatedly tags the same piece of equipment [diesel jacket water pump] several times to fix what one would think would be an easy thing to fix."	G	PIR
o [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 45		
• Describing [REDACTED] - "I have never had any reason to question his integrity. He was one of the most operational savvy people I have ever known. You know, he just had- he had a strong plant instinct." "He was very effective at getting things done, getting people to do things. But as far as understanding how to operate a power plant, he - he really did not have that operator - that instinct on how to safely operate a power plant."	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 89		
• Believes the relationship between management and the equipment operators has been deteriorating for the last couple of years and has gotten even worse in the last 6 or 8 months ... animosity in light of hirings and people coming back to work	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 12/16/03, p. 9 & 10		
• "there are situations where operators ...[have to] babysit certain equipment because we have not been able to schedule a window to do the necessary repairs on it."	G	PIR

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LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
o [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 54		
• Related an instance where work sequence was appropriate but reasoning not communicated from outage management to workers - "I think there's [still] a gap between ... the union workers ... and management."	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 149, 150		
• Stated that the stuck open BPV power excursion that took place during the shutdown caused "a lot of damage [to union] - management relations when it was all said and done." He also stated that the RO who was on shift that night wasn't in the training for the shutdown, and was disqualified following the event. He implied that the whole evolution was not well planned or thought out ... "It was obvious to me at the time that there was a fundamental knowledge breakdown with regard to taking pressure down with the bypass valves."	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 2/12/04, p. 56 - 58		
• The interviewee mentioned some union concerns related to wearing SCBAs when running one of the EDGs due to exhaust leaks. "It was hard to convince various people within the bargaining unit that we were concerned about their safety. We were going to fix the diesel ... No, we didn't make them go in with SCBAs. Yes, site protection had data that supported that the environment wouldn't kill you, those type of things ... The outfall was [that] management doesn't care about personal safety ..." The interviewee stated that this issue caused a lot of concern among union membership and leadership.	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 2/12/04, p. 96 & 97		
• "Sj" Check valve testing concerns resulted in the [REDACTED] not effectively communicating his discussions with Engineering and may have affected some people in that they did not believe he would pursue their concerns appropriately. The interviewee indicated that the Shift Manager may have felt an aversion since that time to dealing with the [REDACTED] ... but he did not believe he would be affected in continuing to bring up safety issues. (Summer 2001 time frame)	S	NCD
o [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 21		
• The interviewee indicated his belief that the [REDACTED] was trying to influence operability decisions even though he didn't have a license. The transcript covered a few instances where the interviewee felt this had been the case. The interviewee did not indicate that he believed any of the issues would be current safety issues. When the above concern was taken to a meeting between the Shift Managers and Senior Operations Management ... addressing the feeling that there was inappropriate intervention of senior management in operability calls, the senior management said the shift managers as acting like "victims." The interviewee did not completely understand why they would have used that term. (Spring 2002 time frame)	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 1/22/04, p. 57, 66 & 67		
• Indication of operational decision making power being subverted by senior management - he talks about being in the control room on several occasions to "make sure that the appropriate decisions were being made in those control rooms"	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 10/09/03, p. 40		
• "... some people in management think that [industrial] safety is being used as a weapon ... by the union"	G	GMLC

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Binning Of Salem/Hope Creek SCWE Issues (SORTED BY BINS ONLY)

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LEGEND

S - Specific Incident	G - General
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	ESP - Excessive Schedule Pressure

LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
o [REDACTED] 12/16/03, p. 10		
• "... example where I think that ... unethically, [Industrial] safety was used to create an advantage ... a feedwater leak [low-level contaminated water] ... trying to get the leak isolated ... everyone was soaked by the end of the day ... [the [REDACTED] came forward and requested that some members be allowed to leave early with pay] ... I said 'Well, this isn't a night we can do that. We need to keep working' ... [after that exchange] there became a safety issue ... health effects of the water ... it only became an issue after I tell the guys to go back to work" ... when queried about the safety issue, the workers deny that it came from them and say "the union told us not to do it"	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 12/16/03, p. 12 - 15		
• Workers bring up issues (Industrial safety related) in order to delay work and cause problems ... "I just feel that [the safety issues] were used as political weapons as opposed to trying to make sure the job was safe"	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 12/16/03, p. 17 - 20		
• Discussion about a [REDACTED] using time while on duty performing investigations of issues brought to him by other members instead of doing his assigned tasks.	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 12/16/03, p. 23 - 32		
• "Well, firing [REDACTED] probably was the biggest incendiary device ... I'd categorize it as an integrity issue more than anything else. But it was about a fitness for duty thing"	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 12/16/03, p. 34		
• "...a number of them [union workers] come up and say 'Well, as long as [REDACTED] is in position, I don't see things getting better'"	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 12/16/03, p. 147		
• "... a lot of management have been abusive and unkind ... [there have been] days like 'Black Friday' ... [1997 time frame] ... [they] came in and let a whole bunch of people go [without] warning ... just escorted off site by security"	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 2/13/04, p. 18		
• "I think our problem was more productivity and labor issues ... I did a study [and found that] direct work was down around 12% wrench time ... issued a number of PMs ... was unbearable ... that were not necessary"	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 2/13/04, p. 30 & 31		
• "... the relationship [between labor and management] was poor ... a lot of turmoil ... [caused by the way they treated people] ... the biggest problem was how people felt about coming to work each day"	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 2/13/04, p. 31 - 36		
• Discusses issues with the corrective action program. "The biggest weakness I've seen is not a failure to identify an issue. It's to properly document the issue." Stated that people were reluctant to write notifications (CRs) and would routinely discuss issues with supervisors before entering it into the corrective action program.	P	PIR
o [REDACTED] 3/09/04, p. 19 - 22, 27		
• Information from the previous licensee investigation into the EDG exhaust leak issue found that management was split on considering employee refusal to work in the diesel room as insubordination. Although the interviewee did not recollect it, the previous information documents that he had discussions with [REDACTED] about 'insubordination' ([REDACTED] supporting it) ... "Trying to accomplish something with a hammer is never the right way to do it ... telling someone to do something because they will be insubordinate ... is not a win-win situation ... that clearly indicates that we [REDACTED] had a conversation of insubordination with employees"	S	GMLC

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LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
o [REDACTED] 3/02/04, p. 40 - 48		
• "To be engaged in that type of explanation [justifying why the unit should stay shutdown and continue to cooled down with a [REDACTED] was abnormal"	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 3/02/04, p. 54		
• The interviewee discusses conflicts between labor and management following a series of human performance issues (including an injury, several LCO entries, and a scram). The interviewee made a presentation to the maintenance department attributing these problems to carelessness and threatening to fire five or six of the people involved. [REDACTED] and I were under a great deal of pressure from the Union because as any time you take five or six Union employees that are five, ten, or fifteen years with the company and are telling the Union that these potential five or six people may not have employment, that has a tendency of creating a lot of contentiousness in the air."	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 3/24/04, (#2) p. 87 - 89		
• Following [REDACTED] threat" to fire the Union employees responsible for the issues addressed above, there was significant divisiveness between the Union and management ... "the Union pulled out of all involvement type of things that you typically would see, writing tags, participating in outage planning, recruitment initiatives, anything like that, the Union's position at that point was we are no longer a participant in anything other than just doing our job classification until these issues are resolved."	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 3/24/04, (#2) p. 94		
• Discussed the issue where an [REDACTED] personally isolated a steam leak to prevent the unit from being shut down. "One of the [REDACTED] had said that the work practice and implementation by a senior manager/[REDACTED] was completely inappropriate." The Union's concern was that management was conducting Union work and that the work was done unsafely.	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] /25/04, (#3) p. 380 & 381		
• Effects of a lingering fear or reprisal/termination exists due to several people having stories like the following: A manager came to a supervisor with an employee who was being removed from engineering and requested that the supervisor use him in his scheduler group. The individual was performing well when the manager came back to the supervisor and requested that he tell the individual that his position was being eliminated when the positions were actually being expanded. When the supervisor refused to submit the letter to the individual because the supervisor believed it "was not true," the manager gave the supervisor a letter to the same effect. (Summary: THE PROCESS AT PSEG IS TO MOVE UNDESIRABLE PEOPLE AROUND, THEN ELIMINATE THEIR POSITIONS TO "GET RID OF THEM." ALSO - ANY DEFIANCE OF SUPERIORS IS GROUNDS FOR "ELIMINATION."	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 11/12/03, p. 131 - 135		
• Supervisors' & Managers' jobs were threatened if they failed to reduce the corrective maintenance backlog, overtime, lost-time accidents, safety incidents, and human performance incidents.	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#1) p. 12		
• "... I get the impression that [workers] really don't care anymore. They're fed up with the five-year management teams coming in shaking up the world, changing policies and philosophies, and [the workers] feel as though they're not listened to ... [across the board]"	G	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 11/13/03, p. 5		
• Threats and intimidation used against an individual for responding to a request by a shift manager	S	GMLC
o [REDACTED] 11/13/03, p. 10 - 14		

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LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Indication of the disorganization within management - An individual had, simultaneously, 2 supervisors, 3 other people who give him direction ... Another person (whom he had never received any direction from) gave him his annual performance review (the written evaluation of which written by the person being evaluated) 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/13/03, p. 30 & 31 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Example of a "self-censorship" effect given of Radiation Protection personnel not including information necessary for changes to the Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) because of their perception of being "beaten up" at the Site Operations Review Committee (SORC). 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/12/03, p. 21 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses unpaid overtime "They will tell you to get your butt in here to do something but I don't think they appreciate it at all" 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/26/04, (#1) p. 53 & 54 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discussed IPTE shutdown to repair bypass valve and the 'Monday Morning Quarter Backing' of [REDACTED] ... "I think our operations staff right now in some aspects are afraid to almost operate the plant because of some of these types of issues." 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/26/04, (#1) p. 126 - 128 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● They indicated that surveys (Gallup & Internal), done from 2000 through 2002, showed a "downturn" in results and that the downturn was attributable to "union issues during the period" (including the termination of an employee) 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/14/03, p. 2 (of Investigator summary of interview) 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● There has been a lot of talk about improvement following recent management changes, however, the effects have not been seen in the field with respect to equipment issues. 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/23/03, No Transcript - From the investigator's summary of notes taken during the interview 		

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<u>INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES</u>	<u>Issue Type</u>	<u>Root Cause</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An [redacted] climbed to an elevated Main Feedwater Pump Steam Isolation Valve without authorization from or notification of the Control Room to close it to isolate a 20 foot steam plume <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/23/03, p. 56 - 58 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussion about EDG manifold leaks and an unsafe atmosphere: "... it was an unsafe work environment ... from an industrial safety standpoint ..." the concern was raised and nothing was done until several other iterations of NEOs going out to the EDG room while the EDG was running and getting sick from the exhaust fumes ... only then did the station management pay attention and take actions to protect the workers (or at least address the concerns) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/29/03, p. 124 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An [redacted] used a metal bar to pry a Circulating Water Pump breaker into its energized cubicle <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/22/03, (#1) p. 25 - 31, 33 - 37 ○ [redacted] 10/23/03, p. 59 & 60 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Had to threaten OSHA involvement to affect resolution on a fan with exposed fan blades <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted], 10/22/03, (#1) p. 18 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feed Pump steam admission (MS 42) valve bonnet leak - efforts to close valve were done without proper consideration for steam rescue should conditions deteriorate as part of valve manipulation. (Interviewee only has second hand knowledge of issue) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/29/03, p. 28 - 34 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • While a maintenance supervisor racked a breaker in, electrical safety precautions and approved methods were not used ... "took a [pry bar], pried the switch in the cubicle with no fire retardant clothing ... and it [the breaker] went right in." <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 11/06/03, (#2) p. 46 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussed the excessive EDG exhaust leakage issue ... the company industrial safety personnel had not tested for all possible harmful gases being emitted from the diesel ... "there is an LCO time limit, and they wanted to clear it up so that we [could] keep the plant running ... that is part of the business ... there is certainly schedule pressure and production pressure to keep the plant making electricity, because it is a business" ... 3 people got sick (one nearly passed out in his car on the way home and went to the hospital to get check out) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/26/03, p. 22 - 24, 32 - 40 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operations management exerted pressure to bypass interlocks to allow transmission switchyard operations to continue to restore grid reliability ... the interlocks were not bypassed ... "but there was certainly a lot of [pressure exerted] to try to get them to bypass the interlocks" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 10/26/03, p. 44 - 49 	S	EPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The situation with the CO leak in the Hope Creek 'B' Diesel room "was handled very poorly ... we dropped one guy. He came out and threw up, fell down. And before the guy got to the hospital, they started running it again ... a couple of weeks later ... ran it again, one of the supervisors [observing the run locally, passed out driving home in his car and originally attributed it to the EDG] ... [then] later on ... [claimed that it] could have been ... working nights ... blah, blah, blah" ... After they had two (one potential) industrial safety incidents they required workers to wear SCUBA during runs. It was fixed for months. Length of time may have been based on production (72 hour LCO not met and S/D action statement) ... Seems to have been many safety meetings, lots of discussion and precautions taking while the leak was active (i.e. scuba and CO monitoring during runs) ... Did eventually fix it within a 36 hour window (on-line) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [redacted] 1/15/04, p. 8 - 19 	S	GMLC

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INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Reactor Feed Pump turbine inlet valve steam leak ... "Big steam leak. Going to have to shut the unit down. You need to come in ... got into the plant and was told ... everything's fine. We got the valve shut ... lagging blown all the way across the turbine building ... I've seen steam leaks that scared me that threw a lot less stuff around ... 20 [to] 30 ft. steam plume ... never a TARP report ... TARP didn't exist ... operators had said that the decision was made to shut the unit down ... shift manager making preparations to shut the unit down ... [redacted] went to talk to the [redacted] [redacted] climbed the ladder and shut the valve [while the NEOs had said they would not shut it because they view it as unsafe/life-threatening ... the response I got [after confronting the [redacted]] was totally unacceptable. It was ... 'so what' ..." Site guidance dictates that management individuals are not supposed to operate equipment ... "In an emergency, it's allowable, but the way this unfolded, it really wasn't like an emergency" 	S	EPE
○ [redacted] 12/2/03, p. 48 - 56		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● During the recent Salem Unit 2 outage, a SW valve was stroked to allow system fill prior to setting the torque and limit switches. This was done to save time on the outage schedule. The valve destroyed itself when stroked remotely. Could have caused serious personnel injury if someone had been in the vicinity at the time of the failure. 	S	ESP
○ [redacted] 12/23/03, p. 37 - 39		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Incident (~2000 time frame) where there was a complete loss of station air during scheduled maintenance. Temporary backup diesel air compressors were placed in service but only maintained the air header pressure at ~89# which very near the ~85# or ~87# level requiring a manual reactor trip per Abnormal Operating procedures. The 1st diesel compressor was shut down in an attempt to refuel it but the header pressure degraded too quickly. The decision was made (before the management team was consulted) to refuel the compressors while running with the Fire Company standing by as a precaution 	S	NCD
○ [redacted] 12/2/03, p. 9 - 12		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses an industrial safety issue brought up by an operator. There is steel plating in the service water intake area that operators have to walk on. The operator was concerned that, because of the corrosive environment, the steel plating may have lost thickness and not be safe to walk on. The interviewee restricted access to deck plate until it was evaluated. He felt this was a conservative decision, but the only feedback he received was that he should have contacted other members of plant organization. 	S	PIR
○ [redacted] 2/20/04, p. 218 & 219		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... some people in management think that [industrial] safety is being used as a weapon ... by the union" 	G	GMLC
○ [redacted] 12/16/03, p. 10		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... example where I think that ... unethically, [industrial] safety was used to create an advantage ... a feedwater leak [low-level contaminated water] ... trying to get the leak isolated ... everyone was soaked by the end of the day ... [the [redacted]] came forward and requested that some members be allowed to leave early with pay] ... I said 'Well, this isn't a night we can do that. We need to keep working' ... [after that exchange] there became a safety issue ... health effects of the water ... it only became an issue after I tell the guys to go back to work" ... when queried about the safety issue, the workers deny that it came from them and say "the union told us not to do it" 	S	GMLC
○ [redacted] 12/16/03, p. 12 - 15		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Workers bring up issues (industrial safety related) in order to delay work and cause problems ... "I just feel that [the safety issues] were used as political weapons as opposed to trying to make sure the job was safe" 	G	GMLC
○ [redacted] 12/16/03, p. 17 - 20		

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INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "But, the evolution of ultimately making the decision to run the [emergency diesel] engine, to declare it operable, with operators wearing self contained breathing apparatus, did cause some – some very, very significant rifts between different parts of the organization." 	S	NCD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/2/04, p. 35 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "... everything was safety. Safety is number one" 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/13/04, p. 14 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● With respect to a personnel safety concern in 2003, associated with some valve work and multiple injuries or near misses ... "I had no issue with the resolution of the concern or how it was handled" 	S	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/13/04, p. 22 & 23 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discusses industrial safety concerns felt by equipment operators. Says that "... they were very concerned about some of the plant material condition and chemistry and in some of the systems that they had to take rounds on that there were too many things that kept them from being able to do the job effectively and, quite frankly, they thought they could get hurt physically." 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/06/03, (#1) p. 13 & 14 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The following relate to the issue of diesel exhaust fumes in the "B" Diesel Generator Room: 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ "What is it I need to do for you to feel comfortable and safe?" ... In the "B" Diesel Generator Room 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ "... the safety department [said the atmosphere in the EDG room had] not reached any threshold that jeopardized ... health and safety ... the bargaining unit said we don't care, [the fumes are] making us ill" 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ "was before we utilized the safety issues resolution process ... [which has become] a very effective way to resolve those issues" 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/02/04, p. 37 - 48 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interviewee discusses an incident in early 2000 where a worker was almost killed in an accident. While moving a service water sluice gate with a large tool (and using a garbage can as a prop), the worker fell and the tool hit him in the head. The paging system in the service water structure had recently been fixed following a period where it had routinely failed to function. He was able to use the paging system to call for help, but if he hadn't, "everybody pretty much agrees he wouldn't have made it." According to the interviewee, "that made us understand that our safety, our personal safety was not where it needed to be so we took a giant step forward there with regard to individual personal safety on the job." 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/12/04, p. 9, 100 & 101 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interviewee mentioned some union concerns related to wearing SCBAs when running one of the EDGs due to exhaust leaks. "It was hard to convince various people within the bargaining unit that we were concerned about their safety. We were going to fix the diesel ... No, we didn't make them go in with SCBAs. Yes, site protection had data that supported that the environment wouldn't kill you, those type of things ... The outfall was [that] management doesn't care about personal safety ..." 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 2/12/04, p. 96 & 97 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Safety is the number one priority in the plant. I believe that 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/16/04, p. 18 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A building operator got hurt two years ago and the other operators said "We're not going to put up with this stuff." Since that time it has become a more safety conscious work environment 	G	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/16/04, p. 22 		

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INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The 'B' diesel was leaking carbon monoxide for several months. The situation was getting progressively worse with each surveillance test they did. It got to a point where the Safety Department told the Operations department that if the next diesel surveillance, scheduled for March 2003, was going to require that the equipment operators be in SCBAs. 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/06/03, (#1) p. 32 - 36 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discussing the leaking manifold on the 'B' diesel ... "It's like keeping your car running and in the garage" 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 1/07/04, (#2) p. 66 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interviewee discusses some on the Union's concerns about industrial safety issues related to the [REDACTED] isolating a steam leak in the feed system. "That was one theme and it had to do with the use of ladders and fall protection and that kind of stuff and the information that I had heard was that the work was done off the ladder without proper fall protection and there was some shimmying on the pipe to get to this particular valve. Whether that is true or untrue, I don't know. That is just what I've heard and so that was viewed as setting the wrong example or the wrong standard for industrial safety." 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 3/25/04, (#3) p. 382 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Restart pressure exerted to fix a valve by flashlight vs. correcting the lighting deficiency ... the situation was eventually resolved by using temporary lighting 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/21/03, p. 53 - 60, 64 - 65 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● During the recent Salem Unit 2 outage, a SW valve was stroked to allow system fill prior to setting the torque and limit switches. This was done to save time on the outage schedule. The valve destroyed itself when stroked remotely. Could have caused serious personnel injury if someone had been in the vicinity at the time of the failure. 	S	ESP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 11/13/03, p. 42 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Managements de-emphasis of industrial safety is evident in the backlog of ~400 industrial safety notifications in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) ... some small ... some huge 	S	PIR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/23/03, No Transcript - From the investigator's summary of notes taken during the interview 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Funding for safety is fixed and limited ... industrial safety issues are prioritized and not addressed as quickly as nuclear safety concerns ... personal safety issues do not get addressed as quickly as operability issues 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/23/03, No Transcript - From the investigator's summary of notes taken during the interview 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● With respect to the EDG with a leaky exhaust creating an unacceptable breathing atmosphere in the EDG room, the interviewee perceived that [REDACTED] was only concerned about the Technical Specifications, not the OSHA requirements. 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/23/03, No Transcript - From the investigator's summary of notes taken during the interview 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Comments made (by [REDACTED] to the [REDACTED] and operators at that time indicated that he [REDACTED] considered refusal to work on the EDG (because of any industrial safety concerns) to be insubordination. 	S	GMLC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [REDACTED] 10/23/03, No Transcript - From the investigator's summary of notes taken during the interview 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Supervisors' & Managers' jobs were threatened if they failed to reduce the corrective maintenance backlog, overtime, lost-time accidents, safety incidents, and human performance incidents. 	S	GMLC

Binning Of Salem/Hope Creek SCWE Issues (SORTED BY BINS ONLY)

The objective of this binning is to establish the preliminary significance of issues that have been raised from a Salem/Hope Creek allegation (fall 2003) or that were identified during interviews conducted to assess this allegation.

LEGEND

S - Specific Incident	G - General
GMLC - General Management / Leadership / Communication	NCD - Non-Conservative Decision Making
PIR - Problem Identification & Resolution Deficiency	EPE - Excessive Production Emphasis
	ESP - Excessive Schedule Pressure

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES	Issue Type	Root Cause
○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#1) p. 12		
● Discussed human performance issues in which errors of omission existed where work activities and their associated tagging activities were not tied together. This presented a significant risk of personnel injury and the identifying maintenance individuals were afraid to report the errors for fear of retaliation ... "we're going to get in trouble, that's all that ever happens"	S	GMLC
○ [REDACTED] 1/27/04, (#2) p. 80 - 85		

nc