

From: David Vito *ry*
To: A. Randolph Blough; Daniel Holody; Eugene Cobey; Jeffrey Teator; Karl Farrar;
Leanne Harrison; Raymond Lorson
Date: 10/15/04 9:51AM
Subject: ARB form from 10/14/04 discussion re: HC SCWE issues following 10/10 event

- SENSITIVE ALLEGATION INFORMATION -
PROTECT ACCORDINGLY -

See attached final ARB sheet for RI-2003-A-0110.

T-225

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 7C
FOIA- 2005194

ALLEGATION REVIEW BOARD DISPOSITION RECORD

Allegation No.: RI-2003-A-0110
Site/Facility: Salem/Hope Creek
ARB Date: 10/14/2004

Branch Chief (AOC): Cobey
Acknowledged: Yes
Confidentiality Granted: No

Issue discussed: Comments from allegor (and others) with regard to continuing SCWE problems evidenced in aftermath of 10/10/04 Hope Creek steam leak. See NOTES section for detail regarding comments provided.

Allegor contacted prior to referral to licensee? No

ALLEGATION REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS

Attendees: Chair - Blough Branch Chief (AOC) - Cobey SAC - Vito, Harrison OI Rep. - Teator RI Counsel - Farrar Others - Holody, Lorson, HQ - Collins, Miller, Persensky, Jarriel, Goodman

DISPOSITION ACTIONS:

- 1) Status letter to allegor. Technical issues referenced in Notifications related to the event are issues that are to be assessed by the Special Inspection Team - issues will be discussed with involved personnel. Regarding the "Soft"/SCWE issues, reaffirm NRC's 7/30/04 conclusions that there are problems in this area, highlighted by work management problems. NRC acknowledges that progress in this area will be slow and deliberate, and that it is not uncommon for there to be continuing SCWE-related issues and continued skepticism in this area, at this early stage. Make reference to [redacted] phone call to [redacted] (see Action #2 below).

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Regarding assertions that others want to talk to NRC or that others may feel harassed and intimidated, inform allegor that it is our preference that they contact us directly.

Status letter to respond to questions from allegor regarding comparison of HPCI complications from the recent HC event, to past HPCI/SSDI findings. DRS (Lorson) to provide responses to questions (see Action #3 below).

OI investigations for allegor's H&I and [redacted] are still ongoing.

Responsible Person: SAC
Closure Documentation: _____

ECD: 11/12/04
Completed: _____

- 2) R. Blough to contact [redacted] by phone. To discuss fact that aftermath of HC event likely has and will present challenges in the SCWE area and that this will be an opportunity for the licensee to show how they take SCWE into account in response to such an event. R. Blough to summarize results of phone call (e-mail) for inclusion in allegation file.

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Responsible Person: Blough
Closure Documentation: _____

ECD: 10/18/04
Completed: _____

- 3) DRS to provide input to status letter regarding comparison of HPCI complications from the recent HC event, to past HPCI/SSDI findings.

ARB MINUTES ARE REVIEWED AND APPROVED AT THE ARB

Responsible Person: Lorson
 Closure Documentation: _____

ECD: 11/5/2004
 Completed: _____

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ASSESSMENT: Continuing SCWE issues

NOTES: Time line of recent info received in response to HC event on 10/10/04:

- 10/12/04 - Alleger e-mail to R. Blough ("Warning sign") - concerned about ongoing problems @ PSEG as a result of HC pipe break. A "concerned employee" informed alleger that they question PSEG's efforts to get at extent-of-condition. A Notification was written 3-weeks earlier about the same problem. NRC shouldn't let PSEG restart plant. JK
- 10/13/04 - R. Blough e-mail response to alleger. NRC has been following event since 2:35 p.m. occurrence. Inspection team being formed - focus on event review, operational performance, extent-of-condition. Safety systems worked - line that failed was at a lower energy than line in the Japanese event.
- 10/13/04 - Alleger e-mail to R. Blough - attached text of Notification 20206978. Added 4:47 p.m. personal comments, i.e., a number of workers feel plant isn't being operated safely, person who wrote Notification does so fearing his own career, NRC should immediately interview this person.
- 10/13/04 - Anonymous call to HQ Ops Officer. NRC should look at Notification 20206978. 8:42 p.m. Caller fears that person who wrote Notification could lose their job. Caller will call the NRC if that happens.
- 10/14/04 - Alleger e-mail to R. Blough, G. Cobey, NJDEP. Alleger has received several 9:57 a.m. phone calls from workers about aftermath of HC event. Asserted comments: PSEG is minimizing seriousness of event; many systems didn't work as designed - HPCI, RCIC, RV level control; "near fuel exposure and quite scary"; worker who wrote 20206978 has been "buried"; workers "on duty" (for event) are anxious to be interviewed, event could have cause serious injury or fatality, plant should not be restarted. JK
- 10/14/04 - J. Schoppy NRC internal e-mail. Responds to alleger's e-mail comment re: threat of personal injury
- 10/14/04 - Alleger provided G. Cobey copy of 20206978 w/intial PSEG management ??? p.m. assessment. Cover sheet w/questions:
- Was a thorough PMT done of HPCI following change in orivfice and setpoint data?
 - Was a 50.59 evaluation done?
 - If all this was done during hte LCO window that existed on 7/298/04, why didn't HPCI operate as designed on 10/10/04?
 - If this wasn't done, had HPCI been operable since 7/29/04?

Distribution: Panel Attendees, Regional Counsel, OI, Responsible Individuals (original to SAC)

ARB MINUTES ARE REVIEWED AND APPROVED AT THE ARB