

Greg Bowman notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (03-09-04) 7C

The following are my observations/questions of the [REDACTED] interview 03-09-04.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	See below
Raises concerns for others?	N/A	Not specifically addressed during interview
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	N/A	Not specifically addressed during interview
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	YES	See below (mainly pressure/did not mention any negative job actions).

Bins for Issues:

- #1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT
- #2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES
- #3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES
- #4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES
- #5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES
- OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT

- (p. 30 - 31) Discusses difficulties in raising concerns with the former [REDACTED]. The interviewee stated: "...there was a lot of discussion about the sanity of [REDACTED] I'll say, [REDACTED] So I'll say maybe there was some reluctance to go to him because of the path the conversation might take."

#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 135 - 136) Concern that the plant operators were in a position where is operability of a piece of equipment was in questioned, it was assumed operable until proven inoperable. The interviewee stated that, while this was not the philosophy in Ops, they were being pushed that way.
- (p. 164 - 168) Discussed an issue where the shift manager had to convince senior plant management to shut the plant down to correct arcing and sparking in the switchyard. The shift manager didn't feel he was getting any support in the decision making process because it involving taking the plant offline.

#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

- (p. 32 - 43, 45) Discusses an issue related to stroke time testing the reactor head vents in preparation for startup and problems with the test procedure. The crew was having difficulty with performing the test as required by the procedure, and a senior manager [REDACTED] entered the control room and pushed for making an on-the-spot procedure change to allow completion of the test (not allowed by plant instructions). The interviewee stated the senior manager's goal was to continue the plant startup.
- (p. 47 - 55, 60) Discussed another test procedure associated with measuring leakage back from the RCS to the Boron Injection Tank (through check valves). Suspected flashing in the lines prevented quantifying the leak rate. Test performance was not a T.S. requirement, but there is a T.S. leak limit. "Then there was some discussion about re-performance of the test, and how we were going to do the test. And there was some reluctance of [REDACTED] part in our discussions then to even perform the test, that we weren't required [by T.S.] to do the test, that it was a performance test [required by plant procedures, but not T.S.]."
- (p. 63 - 72) During transition from Mode 5 to Mode 4, the operators identified a leak on 14 fan coolant unit ("potential containment integrity issue"). The operators delayed the startup for a period (around an hour) while they assembled a team to investigate the leakage. After holding the startup for about an hour, the [REDACTED] entered the control room and asked the interviewee who was "holding my plant hostage." The interviewee felt pressured for stopping the startup for a concern he had.

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 2x
FOIA- 2005-194

T-105

Greg Bowman notes/comments on the [REDACTED] Interview (03-09-04)

7C

- (p. 79 - 90) Discussed startup in spring of 2003 following a grassing event. Operations was concerned that because of reduced circulator availability, there was an increased likelihood of a plant transient (if any other circulators were lost). Operators favored waiting to restore additional circulators prior to plant startup, but were pressured by senior management. According to the interviewee, the discussion became heated and [REDACTED] threatened or challenged his manhood." There was another reference to senior management accusing Ops of "holding the plant hostage."

#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

- (p. 23 - 25) Identified issues where union personnel refused to enter items into the corrective action program because "it was not in their job specifications." He identified that in some cases people may be reluctant to use the corrective action program because of lack of familiarity with the system (they don't know how to enter issues).
- (p. 121 - 122) Following a simulator session where the interviewee and [REDACTED] were both observing, [REDACTED] told the interviewee that "I think you should fire the CRS (in spite of the fact that the individual passed the scenario) [REDACTED] basis was that "the NCC looked more professional than the CRS - nothing to do with the guys performance, it was all based on appearance...it looked like it had been awhile since he's had a haircut...and his clothes didn't look like they'd been ironed." [REDACTED] accused the interviewee of "being a mouse" for not wanting to fire the [REDACTED]."
- (p. 123 - 126) During another discussion with [REDACTED] the interviewee stated that "... [REDACTED] directed me once again to fire somebody. He didn't care who, "Just fire somebody," to create a burning platform." The focus was on firing someone from management (rather than union) to help increase leadership in Ops.
- (p. 174) "...I see that with [REDACTED] coming back as the [REDACTED] as probably one of the major changes, is that I can see and I can sense that the bond or the relationship between bargaining unit personnel and management personnel is improving..."

#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

- NONE

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

- (p. 19 - 22, 27) Discusses issues with the corrective action program. "The biggest weakness I've seen is not a failure to identify an issue. It's to properly document the issue." Stated that people were reluctant to write notifications (CRs) and would routinely discuss issues with supervisors before entering it into the corrective action program.
- (p. 117) Discusses the fact that during the startup following the spring 2003 grassing event, the Senior VP overrode several levels in the organization by dealing directly with the shift manager. Specific concern was "the pressure that the shift manager may feel, based on the fact that the Senior VP is on the phone call, discussing the plant direction that's going to be taken."
- (p. 150) "... [REDACTED] was a big guy, and he would use that to his advantage, I'd say, and you know, almost as a presence. He's probably - what, [REDACTED] or so? It wasn't uncommon that, for example, if I was in a meeting and he was coming in, that, you know, he would pump and slap you on the back harder than most people would...So I can see how people could take that, interpret that as, you know, someone trying to influence them by his presence."