

Greg Bowman notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (02-20-04) 7C

The following are my observations/questions of the [REDACTED] interview 02-20-04.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	See amplification below.
Raises concerns for others?	N/A	Not specifically addressed.
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	YES	See amplification below.
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	NO	See amplification below.

Bins for Issues:

#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT

#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES

#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT

- (p. 15 - 16) "I'm not aware of any time where I thought that there was an environment where employees didn't have that freedom [to raise safety concerns]. And none of them ever expressed to me that they [felt they did not have] the freedom to ... express themselves." He went on to mention that significantly more concerns are raised by NCOs and equipment operators, who are "more passionate" about their issues than the supervisors.
- (p. 21) "... sometimes I'm not sure that the CRSs are as free to express what their opinions are because they're a member of the management team."
- (p. 33) When discussing an issue where the plant computer was lost, the interviewee stated that the CRS originally wanted to lower power. He changed his position after the SM (the interviewee) convinced him to maintain power. "Perhaps he wasn't comfortable with it, but this goes back to whether the CRSs are free to bring up concerns, right? Perhaps he wasn't comfortable with the order and he didn't want to give it, but he felt that that's what I expected and he didn't feel free to express it."
- (p. 60 - 62) The interviewee stated that he and others might be unwilling to raise concerns because management was unwilling to listen to them. "... part of the reason I might be reluctant to raise a concern is because I don't believe that the management that I have was willing to listen and understand the concern that I had." He said that this was most evident when it comes to fixing non-Tech. Spec. equipment problems (he gave the example of a safety-related control room chiller that has been broken/degraded for the an extended period of time).
- (p. 125 - 127) When asked if he feared reprisal for his comments during the OI interview and PSEG SCWE review, the interviewee stated, "Do I have concerns that there might be repercussions? Yes. Did I have concerns then? Yes."
- (p. 128 - 131) The interviewee expressed concerns over the effectiveness of the SCWE review done by PSEG. In particular, he was concerned that because of the way the questions were set up/worded, there may not be corroboration for many of the issues, and they would subsequently be ignored by PSEG. "[I was concerned that the] company attorneys were going to in the end boil it down to there's no evidence, therefore there's no issue."
- (p. 171 - 174) When asked if he was aware of anyone afraid to come forward for fear of reprisal, the interviewee stated that raising concerns can cause the perception that an employee is not "with the program ... I mean, if I express some concern and I'm perceived as not being with the program, is anybody going to come back and fire me? No. Are they going to demote me? Not likely ... However, do I think that there's a possibility that as a result of it I wouldn't be considered for future promotions? Absolutely I think that's true. I would not be considered for future promotions."

#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 18 - 28) Discussed the issue where the plant computer was lost, removing the primary indication of reactor power. The RO was "very vocal about the recommendation to lower power because his most accurate indication of power was gone." The interviewee, who was the shift manager at the time, decided to keep the plant at its current power level and use other, less accurate indications of power. The RO went away from the situation upset that a non-conservative decision had been made.

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- (p. 51 - 52) The interviewee stated that he believes the plant is moving in a direction toward making more conservative decisions. He gave the example of a steam leak from the turbine in late 2003 where the decision was made to shut down the plant rather than try to fix the leak on-line. "I don't know that we've had a similar decision to make in the past, but I'm not sure that in the past we would have made the same decision."
- (p. 74 - 86) Concerning operability calls, the interviewee discussed an issue where a crew identified a jacket water leak on one of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). The leak was in excess of the limit given in a past operability evaluation, so the EDG was declared inoperable. Management feedback was that before a component is declared inoperable "we needed to make sure that we fully engage the rest of the organization to figure out every possible alternative instead of just saying it's inoperable." This feedback was from [REDACTED]. This clearly put pressure on the SMs to assume a component is operable until there was extensive proof that it was inoperable. The interviewee discussed the impact of the above feedback. He stated that recently he had to make an operability call on a degraded rod block monitor. "And based on the jacket water incident ... okay, I shouldn't make that decision myself. I ought to have engineering come in and make the evaluation for me." The SM later received feedback from [REDACTED] that the RBM should have been declared inoperable sooner.
- (p. 95 - 97) During maintenance on a 500 kV breaker in the switchyard, the load dispatcher contacted the control room to reduce reactive loading and power for grid stability concerns. After the crew began lowering power, the [REDACTED] called from the switchyard and directed the crew to stop lowering power, because the breaker would be restored soon. The interviewee felt this was inappropriate, because "the training [I] received in the past [emphasized that] when the electric system operator gives me direction, I'm to follow that direction because the electric system operator is trying to protect the integrity of the grid."
- (p. 101 - 104) The interviewee discusses an issue where the plant was in a T.S. Action Statement that required them to be in hot shutdown within six hours (related to the EDG jacket water leak). The crew was about to commence shutting down, when the [REDACTED] pushed them to keep the unit at current power and continue to try to fix the EDG. The interviewee was concerned that he would not have enough time to safely shutdown the unit if they were delayed. "I was in a room with [REDACTED] was trying to [convince] me [that shutting down] was inappropriate and [that] I didn't need to move the plant yet when my control room crew was saying we need to move the plant so we can get to where we need to go, meet the tech spec and not challenge ourselves by making a mistake by having too much time pressure ..." He also stated the [REDACTED] actually attempted to delay and distract him from taking the actions he felt were appropriate.
- (p. 113 - 117) Following the stuck open BPV, the operating crew was attempting to depressurize the plant so the valve could be repaired, when [REDACTED] called the control room and directed the shift manager to stop the depressurization. The interviewee stated that he was informed that order came from [REDACTED]. The interviewee felt there was often pressure from senior management, who may not have a full understanding of the situation, to keep the plant at power.

#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

- (p. 139 - 147) The interviewee was the shift manager involved in the cooldown following the stuck open BPV. He said that he was told at 1600 to report to the simulator in two hours with two NCOs, a CRS, and an STA. He said that the verification/validation of the procedure had not been done and was combined with the crew practice run. The interviewee stated that at the time, his crew expressed concerns that they were being rushed into the procedure. He went on to say that he felt there was no one in Operations management with whom he could discuss the concern. "I don't believe it would have been supported to put the evolution at risk in order to rigorously adhere to [our] process."
- (p. 155 - 156) The interviewee was asked to be the test engineer for the startup following RFO 11. He was asked at 0800 to have the IPTE paperwork ready for the evolution at 1100. "And I talked to [REDACTED] and said I'm not going to be ready at 1100. I said I can't follow the process and meet the parts of it and be ready by 1100. [REDACTED] told him "We need to be ready by 1100. That's when the evolution is going to happen." The interviewee pointed out that the startup had been planned for a long time, and there was "no effort prior to that morning to get it ready."
- (p. 157) The interviewee discusses another instance where [REDACTED] put pressure on the operators to move faster than they felt comfortable. The operators were preparing to roll the main turbine, and told [REDACTED] they would be ready by 0900. "And he [REDACTED] said you need to be ready to roll at 0700 ... [even though] we were telling him this is how long it [takes if done] within the balance of the procedures and standards that we have."
- (p. 164) In spite of past problems with management rushing operating crews, the interviewee states that "I think if I were to say that this is what it takes for me to do a job in accordance with the standards I believe the new management team would be supportive of me taking the time I needed to do it safely the first time."

#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

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- NONE

#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 218 - 219) Discusses an industrial safety issue brought up by an operator. There is steel plating in the service water intake area that operators have to walk on. The operator was concerned that, because of the corrosive environment, the steel plating may have lost thickness and not be safe to walk on. The interviewee restricted access to deck plate until it was evaluated. He felt this was a conservative decision, but the only feedback he received was that he should have contacted other members of plant organization.

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

- (p. 45) The interviewee stated that in an Operations management meeting following the issue with the loss of the plant computer, it was discussed that management needs to be more compromising in similar situations. He used the example of a recent increase in shift manning as an example of where management has compromised in an effort to make work easier for the operators and improve relationships between different layers of management on site.
- (p. 65 - 68) The interviewee discussed Hope Creek's practice of having shift managers develop "start-up affirmations" in the middle to end of the outage. This is a list of items that the SMs believe need to be fixed before the outage is over. He stated that the SMs never got any feedback on the items they listed, and items on the list are not always fixed. Additionally, because the lists are developed late in the outage, there is a good chance there wouldn't be time to fix something significant if it was identified.
- (p. 207 - 209) Discussed an issue in the 1989/1990 timeframe where there was a discrepancy regarding lubrication of motor operated valves in the steam tunnel. These were T.S. required, safety-related valves but the plant's position was that lubrication was not required. The planner actually quit over the issue.
- (p. 211 - 213) Discussed an issue in the 1987 timeframe where a containment isolation valve was not properly leak tested. The valve was disassembled, and on reassembly it was placed directly back on its seat to help make it pass the test. The interviewee was concerned that if the valve was opened and then reclosed, it wouldn't realign in the same way it was following reassembly. Additionally, workers put Vaseline on the seat to make it leak tight.
- (p. 217) "Rarely, this is important here, very important ... Rarely, if ever, have I made an operational decision that someone told me was the right decision. When I shut down the unit that day [following the EDG jacket water leak], when [REDACTED] said don't shut it down, it was the right decision. Right? No one has told me it was the right decision. No one."