

**Herb Williams notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (1-29-04)**

7C

The following are my observations/questions of the [REDACTED] interview held on 1-29-04.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	See below
Raises concerns for others?	YES	Earlier Interview
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	NO	See Below
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	YES	See Below

**Bins for Issues:**

- #1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT
- #2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES
- #3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES
- #4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES
- #5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES
- OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

**#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT**

- (p.60) "Bringing up issues ... the recirc pump ... the diesels ... [inaccurate] procedures ... the [broken] work management process ... the [inaccuracy] of work orders and spare parts [resulted in my being viewed a 'non-team player' and therefore attributed to my leaving]"
- (p. 66) The individual had a concern which somebody took that to mean that he was positioning himself (with a 'protective lawsuit') during the time of the reorganization.
- (p. 69 - 74) Several people were raised concerns or pushed issues lost their jobs also.
- (p. 78 & 79) "[In] my opinion, the [corrective] actions are ineffective and added to the human performance and the chilling effect that you're seeing."

**#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES**

- (p. 2 - 5) With respect to the Hope Creek "B" Recirc Pump issue (tolerance / alignment problem that manifested itself via high vibration that was 'corrected' by machining and repositioning the vibration indication equipment effectively 'masking' the problem), a level 1 notification with a root cause was initiated. The recommendation (from site engineering, maintenance, and FlowServe - an external vendor) was to do maintenance on the pump Internals during the next refueling outage to resolve the issue. Management viewed this as a business decision rather than a safety issue and corrective actions were scheduled beyond the next refueling outage.
- (p. 20 - 22) The Salem unit 1 turbo charger failed because PMs were not done ... "two people ... manager and superintendent [that signed deferrals for the Pms for] ... almost three years ... [and a deferral required] operations or engineering concurrence"
- (p. 22 & 23) "When I first got there the [stack of] PM deferrals ... was unbelievably huge ... just [couldn't] support [the PM work] with all the corrective maintenance ... [the PM program started to improve] about a year and 1/2 ago"
- (p. 43 - 48) The practice of adding new notifications to existing work packages creates the potential for items to be overlooked and inadequately planned. One diesel work package had over 30 notifications attached to it ... "that's how half the stuff gets missed ... [which results in the work order add-ons not getting] properly planned"

**#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES**

- (p. 51) There was "great pressure to get the work backlog down, just get it killed, just get the work done"

**#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES**

- NONE

**#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES**

- (p. 80 - 85) Discussed human performance issues in which errors of omission existed where work activities and their associated tagging activities were not tied together. This presented a significant risk of personnel injury and the identifying maintenance individuals were afraid to report the errors for fear of retaliation ... "we're going to get in trouble, information never shared"

Information never shared was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 7C  
 FOIA- 2005-194

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**OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS**

- (p. 25 - 33) Tax implications and financial pressures have resulted in a significant push for inventory reduction which has subsequently resulted in problems with getting and maintaining proper spare parts for PMs and CMs. Numerous notifications have been written documenting the lack of spare parts for critical safety equipment, etc.
- (p. 35 - ) A level-1 notification was written to document that "the work control process was broken ... planning system that addressed critical issues didn't address parts. The work scope never stayed stable ... was never defined prior entering critical windows ... within two or three weeks my level-1 was downgraded to a level-2 and then to a level-3 ... [and] I was told that I was being vindictive on the planning and work control organization"
- (p. 78) Technical issue summary: (1) Handling of the Hope Creek 'B' Recirc Pump, (2) work/package closeout sequence on safety relief valves, and (3) management of the on-line maintenance work control process.