

**Greg Bowman notes/comments on the [redacted] interview (01-07-04)** 7C

The following are my observations/questions of the [redacted] interview 01-07-04.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	See below
Raises concerns for others?	YES	None
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	N/A	Not specifically addressed during interview
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	NO	None

**Bins for Issues:**

- #1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT
- #2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES
- #3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES
- #4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES
- #5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES
- OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

**#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT**

- (p. 44 - 47, 50 - 51) The plant lost the Core Monitoring System and CRIDS ... the NCO, CRS, and STA concurred that the correct action was to reduce power to the pre-uprate level until the CMS was fixed ... OS overrode and directed that the operators not reduce power, the interviewee stated that he wrote a notification describing the issue and the procedures that were violated. Later, the OS approached him and tried to get him to "change my whole process" and revise the notification.
- (p. 54 - 55) Initiated a notification related to failure to reduce power following loss of the CMS and CRIDS. Stated that he spent a lot of time pushing to get the issue resolved. Eventually, "...my thought process was that I have [redacted] and I have a house, and I say "I guess it's not going anywhere anyway, what's the use of me pushing it any further?" So I stopped."
- (p. 101 - 103) Stated that he didn't think there were any long-term negative impacts on his career from raising safety issues. "Not lately, anyway. As a matter of fact, lately everybody that I work with has a good working relationship. During the time I was raising concerns to the NRC resident inspector I didn't hear anything [negative] directly." Stated that he may have been treated differently by management because he raised concerns (although not overtly).
- (p. 134 - 135) Stated he was reluctant to use the Employee Concerns Program because he was not sure that they could protect his identity. Someone from the ECP told him that based on the issue he raises, it wouldn't be hard for management to figure out who had initiated the complaint.

**#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES**

- (p. 18 - 20, 26) Identified an issue where the plant's procedures called for certain actions (possibly including reducing power) for increased off-gas system flow, but rather than take those actions, Engineering evaluated the condition to allow continued operation. Stated that they were running for "a long time" with elevated off-gas flow before the situation was resolved. The concern was more focused on actions that require supervisor concurrence, rather than immediate actions.
- (p. 32 - 44, 52) Discussed an issue where, while raising power, the plant lost the Core Monitoring System and CRIDS. Those systems were required to operate at post-uprate power. The NCO, CRS, and STA concurred that the correct action was to reduce power to the pre-uprate level until the CMS was fixed. The OS entered the CR and overrode their decision. The interviewee stated that Engineering later did an evaluation to prove they hadn't violated their power limit. "...I got told not to do something that was conservative decision-making." The procedure was later revised to direct reducing power (p. 52). Said he felt that he needed permission to take a conservative action (not consistent with their previous training) (p. 67).

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Act, exemptions 7C  
FOIA- 2005-194

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#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

- NONE

#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

- (p. 13 - 14) Once decisions or issues are raised above the level of the CRS/NCO, the results and basis are not conveyed to the person that identified the concern. "I swear I can't figure out, once it leaves the NCO, the CRS, once it goes above that level, I have no idea who makes decisions on what's important and what isn't."
- (p. 88 - 96) Discussed an issues where another NCO was walked off-site (suspended) because he refused to look at the Plant Historian (computer data system) while he was standing watch and monitoring the plant (at the controls). Stated that he didn't feel comfortable using the Plant Historian while at the controls. "...they wanted him to look at that, and he basically refused. And they took him off-site, and he finally got his job back, you know, after months. So that was very, very intimidating."
- (p. 105) "I think PSEG as a whole thinks of me no more than they think of a stapler. And when the stapler breaks, they'll throw it away in a heartbeat and not think anything of it. It has a lot to do with local management."
- (p. 123 - 126) Discussed an issue where an RO made an error during a reactivity manipulation. He felt the company treated the RO too harshly - "it looked to me as if the company wanted to break him before they brought him back in."

#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

- NONE

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

- (p. 21) Perceived that management changes procedures out of convenience. "Me as an operator, midnight shift, I've got procedures that tell me what to do, and I should do that. I shouldn't be challenged days or weeks later that I was wrong."
- (p. 57, 96 - 97) Says the plant is good at handling issues that are "black and white," but not good at conservatively dealing with gray issues. "If it's black and white, we're usually pretty good at it. I mean, it has to be really black and white. If it isn't and we have to start thinking, then it seems that a lot of times we just don't do what we need to do."