



U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

3.5.1.2 INTERNALLY-GENERATED MISSILES (INSIDE CONTAINMENT)

REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES

Primary - Organization responsible for the review of the mechanical effects of missiles on structures, systems, and components

Secondary - None

I. AREAS OF REVIEW

All structures, systems, and components (SSCs) (inside containment) are to be protected from internally-generated missiles to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 4 requirements. This includes all SSCs within the containment and the containment itself. The review includes internally-generated missiles from component overspeed failures, missiles that could originate from high-energy fluid system failures, and missiles caused by or as a consequence of gravitational effects.

The review includes identification, functional operations and performance requirements for all SSCs (inside containment), necessary for the safe shutdown of the reactor facility and the failure of SSCs that could cause a significant release of radioactivity. The review also includes adequacy of methods of protection from internally-generated missiles for all SSCs necessary to perform functions required to attain and maintain a safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Rev. 3 - [Month] 2007

USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

This Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, has been prepared to establish criteria that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants intends to use in evaluating whether an applicant/licensee meets the NRC's regulations. The Standard Review Plan is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide an acceptable method of complying with the NRC regulations.

The standard review plan sections are numbered in accordance with corresponding sections in the Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)." Not all sections of the standard format have a corresponding review plan section. The SRP sections applicable to a combined license application for a new light-water reactor (LWR) will be based on Regulatory Guide 1.206, "Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)," until the SRP itself is updated.

These documents are made available to the public as part of the NRC's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Individual sections of NUREG-0800 will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information and experience. Comments may be submitted electronically by email to NRR_SRP@nrc.gov.

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The specific areas of review are as follow:

1. Protection from internally-generated missiles including identification of structures, systems or portions of systems, components and the methods of protection provided. Determination of the potential of pressurized components and systems for generating missiles such as valve bonnets and hardware-retaining bolts, relief valve parts, instrument wells and reactor vessel seal rings (PWR). Determination of the potential of high-speed rotating machinery for generating missiles from component overspeed or such failures as the pump itself (from seizure), pump or component parts, and rotating segments (e.g., impellers and fan blades).
2. Internal missile effects on nonsafety-related SSCs in areas with safety-related SSCs if the failure of the nonsafety-related SSCs could affect an intended safety function of the safety-related SSCs.
3. Plausible secondary missiles generated as a result of impact with primary missiles.
4. Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC). For design certification (DC) and combined license (COL) reviews, the applicant's proposed information on the ITAAC associated with the SSCs related to this Standard Review Plan (SRP) section is reviewed in accordance with SRP Section 14.3, "Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria - Design Certification." The staff recognizes that the review of ITAAC is performed after review of the rest of this portion of the application against acceptance criteria contained in this SRP section. Furthermore, the ITAAC are reviewed to assure that all SSCs in this area of review are identified and addressed as appropriate in accordance with SRP Section 14.3.
5. COL Action Items and Certification Requirements and Restrictions. COL action items may be identified in the NRC staff's final safety evaluation report (FSER) for each certified design to identify information that COL applicants must address in the application. Additionally, DCs contain requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements) that COL applicants must address in the application. For COL applications referencing a DC, the review performed under this SRP section includes information provided in response to COL action items and certification requirements and restrictions pertaining to this SRP section, as identified in the FSER for the referenced certified design.

Review Interfaces

The listed SRP sections interface with this section as follows:

1. Review of the acceptability of the analytical procedures and criteria for structures or barriers that protect the containment structure and liner, essential systems, and safety-related components from internally-generated missiles as described in SRP section 3.5.3. The results of this review can be utilized to complete the overall evaluation of the protection against internally-generated missiles.
2. Review of dynamic effects associated with the postulated rupture of piping inside the containment as described in SRP section 3.6.2. Typically included in SRP Section 3.6.2

is the review of any high-energy line spatial separation analyses by an applicant. The results of this review can be utilized to complete the overall evaluation of the protection against internally-generated missiles.

The specific acceptance criteria and review procedures are contained in the referenced SRP sections.

II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

Requirements

Acceptance criteria are based on meeting the relevant requirements of the following Commission regulations:

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 as it relates to the design of the SSCs important to safety if the design affords protection from the internally generated missile that may result from equipment failure.
2. 10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(vi), as it relates to ITAAC (for design certification) sufficient to assure that the SSCs in this area of review will operate in accordance with the certification.
3. 10 CFR 52.97(b)(1), as it relates to ITAAC (for combined licenses) sufficient to assure that the SSCs in this area of review have been constructed and will be operated in conformity with the license and the Commission's regulations.

SRP Acceptance Criteria

Specific SRP acceptance criteria acceptable to meet the relevant requirements of the NRC's regulations identified above are as follows for the review described in Subsection I of this SRP section. The SRP is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide acceptable methods of compliance with the NRC regulations.

The design of the SSCs important to safety is acceptable if the integrated design affords protection from the internally generated missiles (inside containment) that may result from equipment failure, in order to maintain their safety functions in accordance with GDC 4.

1. The applicant's statistical significance of an identified missile can be evaluated by a probability analysis. The statistical significance for a potential missile is determined by calculating the probability of missile occurrence. If this probability is less than 10^{-7} per year, the missile is not considered significant. If the probability of occurrence is greater than 10^{-7} per year, the probability that it will impact a significant target is determined. If the product of these two probabilities is less than 10^{-7} per year, the missile is not considered significant. If the product is greater than 10^{-7} per year, the probability of significant damage is determined. If the combined probability (product of all three) is

less than 10^{-7} per year, the missile is not considered significant. If the combined probability is greater than 10^{-7} per year, missile protection of SSCs important to safety, and of nonsafety-related SSCs whose failure could affect an intended safety function of the safety related SSCs, should be provided by one or more of the six methods listed below.

2. The missile protection for SSCs important to safety is adequate if provided by one or more of the following methods: (1) locating the system or component in a missile-proof structure, (2) separating redundant systems or components for the missile path or range, (3) providing shields and barriers for systems and components, (4) designing the equipment to withstand the impact of the most damaging missile, (5) providing design features to prevent the generation of missiles, or (6) orienting missile sources to prevent missiles from striking equipment important to safety.

In summary, an Safety Analyses Report (SAR) statement that SSCs important to safety will be afforded protection by locating them in individual missile-proof structures, physically separating redundant systems or system components, or providing special protective shields or barriers is an acceptable method to meet this criterion.

Technical Rationale

The technical rationale for application of these requirements and/or SRP acceptance criteria to the areas of review addressed by this SRP section is discussed in the following paragraphs:

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 establishes requirements for the ability of SSCs important to safety to be protected from dynamic effects, including the effects of internally-generated missiles. Equipment inside the containment like pressurized components, high-energy piping, and rotating equipment all have a potential for generating credible missiles. An internally-generated missile has a dynamic effect and its impact on SSCs important to safety must be evaluated to ensure that they are protected adequately and will be capable of performing their safety functions. Protecting SSCs important to safety from the adverse effects of internally-generated missiles prevents both failure of systems required for safe shutdown of the reactor facility and significant uncontrolled release of radioactivity.

III. REVIEW PROCEDURES

The reviewer will select and emphasize material from the procedures described below, as may be appropriate for a particular case.

For each area of review specified in subsection I of this SRP section, the review procedure is identified below. These review procedures are based on the identified SRP acceptance criteria. For deviations from these specific acceptance criteria, the staff should review the applicant's evaluation of how the proposed alternatives to the SRP criteria provide an acceptable method of complying with the relevant NRC requirements identified in subsection II.

The review procedures below are used during the review to determine whether the design criteria and bases and the design in the SAR meets the acceptance criteria in subsection II of this SRP section.

1. The first objective in the review of SSCs requiring protection against internally-generated missiles is to determine whether the equipment is needed to perform a safety function. Some structures and systems are designed as safety-related in their entirety, others have safety-related portions, and others are not needed for safety. To determine the safety category, the SSCs are evaluated for their functions in achieving safe reactor shutdown conditions, preventing significant uncontrolled release of radioactivity, preventing accidents, or mitigating their consequences. The reviewer evaluates such input as required for completion of this review. SSCs that perform safety functions (inside containment) or by their failure could have adverse effects on safety functions should be protected from the effects of internally-generated missiles.
2. A review is conducted of the information provided in the SAR related to SSCs design bases and criteria, the listing of plausible primary and secondary missiles, damage to or failure of SSCs important to safety as a result of missile impingement, and missile protection capability. The reviewer may use failure mode and effect analyses and the results of reviews by other branches in evaluating SSCs to identify those requiring protection from internally-generated missiles, the origins of possible missiles, and the adequacy of the protection.
3. The reviewer determines whether controls ensure that unsecured maintenance equipment, including that required for maintenance and that undergoing maintenance, will be removed from containment prior to operation, moved to a location where it is not a potential hazard to SSCs important to safety, or seismically restrained to prevent it from becoming a missile.
4. The reviewer determines whether the separation analysis can demonstrate adequate protection for SSCs important to safety from missiles which may be generated inside the containment. The reviewer should utilize the results of any high-energy line separation analysis review in this evaluation. If an applicant uses spatial separation as adequate protection from missiles inside the containment, that evaluation should be consistent with the applicant's use of spatial separation for high-energy line breaks. If damage can occur to only one division of safety-related systems, the requirement for separation of redundant equipment is met. If more than one division can be damaged by high-energy piping, then barriers, shields, and enclosures must be utilized to protect SSCs important to safety.
5. For reviews of DC and COL applications under 10 CFR Part 52, the reviewer should follow the above procedures to verify that the design set forth in the safety analysis report and, if applicable, site interface requirements meet the acceptance criteria. For DC applications, the reviewer should identify necessary COL action items. With respect to COL applications, the scope of the review is dependent on whether the COL applicant references a DC, an early site permit, or other NRC-approved material, applications, and/or reports.

After this review, SRP Section 14.3 should be followed for the review of Tier I information for the design, including the postulated site parameters, interface criteria, and ITAAC.

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

The reviewer verifies that the applicant has provided sufficient information and that the review and calculations (if applicable) support conclusions of the following type to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report. The reviewer also states the bases for those conclusions.

The review of possible effects of internally-generated missiles (inside containment) included SSCs whose failure could prevent safe shutdown of the plant or result in significant uncontrolled release of radioactivity. After review of the applicant's design bases and criteria for the SSCs important to safety necessary to maintain a safe plant shutdown, the staff concludes that the SSCs to be protected from internally-generated missiles (inside containment) meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 requirements for protection of SSCs important to safety, since the applicant:

1. Has used methods for identifying potential sources of internal missiles and for demonstrating the adequacy of the protection provided which have been reviewed and found acceptable by the staff in this application or in previous applications;
2. Has shown that the functions of SSCs important to safety will be protected from internally-generated missiles (inside containment) by locating the systems or components in individual missile-proof structures, providing adequate physical separation for redundant systems or components of the system, or providing special protective shields or barriers; and
3. Has shown that controls ensure that all unsecured maintenance equipment inside containment, including equipment required for maintenance and that undergoing maintenance, will not generate a potential missile hazard.

For DC and COL reviews, the findings will also summarize (to the extent that the review is not discussed in other safety evaluation report sections) the staff's evaluation of the ITAAC, including design acceptance criteria, as applicable, and interface requirements and combined license action items relevant to this SRP section.

V. IMPLEMENTATION

The staff will use this SRP section in performing safety evaluations of DC applications and license applications submitted by applicants pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52 or 10 CFR Part 50 respectively. Except when the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the staff will use the method described herein to evaluate conformance with Commission regulations.

The provisions of this SRP section apply to reviews of applications docketed six months or more after the date of issuance of this SRP section, unless superseded by a later revision.

VI. REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases."
2. NRC Inspection Manual Chapter IMC-2504, "Construction Inspection Program - Non-ITAAC Inspections," issued April 25, 2006.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

The information collections contained in the draft Standard Review Plan are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, which were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0011 and 3150-0151.

PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.

SRP Section 3.5.1.2
Description of Changes

This SRP section affirms the technical accuracy and adequacy of the guidance previously provided in Draft Revision 3, dated April 1996, of this SRP section. See ADAMS accession number ML052070372.

In addition this SRP section was administratively updated in accordance with NRR Office Instruction, LIC-200, Revision 1, "Standard Review Plan (SRP) Process." The revision also adds standard paragraphs to extend application of the updated SRP section to prospective submittals by applicants pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52.

The technical changes are incorporated in Revision 3, dated [Month] 2007:

Review Responsibilities - Reflects changes in review branches resulting from reorganization and branch consolidation. Change is reflected throughout the SRP.

I. AREAS OF REVIEW

[Description of changes to Subsection I of this SRP Section]

II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

[Description of changes to Subsection I of this SRP Section]

III. REVIEW PROCEDURES

[Description of changes to Subsection II of this SRP Section]

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

[Description of changes to Subsection III of this SRP Section]

V. IMPLEMENTATION

[Description of changes to Subsection V of this SRP Section]

VI. REFERENCES

[Description of changes to Subsection VI of this SRP Section]