

Salem/Hope Creek Allegation Background/Chronology

Issue/Event Date	Description
<p>Spring 2001</p> <p>7c</p>	<p>In the Spring 2001 outage, a Salem Unit 1 reactor trip was caused by a main generator current transformer failure. The [redacted] told operations that they needed to get the reactor started up by a particular date or their NRC performance indicator was going to "go white." [redacted] allegedly harassed operations daily by asking day "when are you going to start the plant". Operations then told [redacted] they would start up when they thought they were within a day of putting steam into the main turbine. Although [redacted] insisted that operations should start up the reactor with the MSIVs shut, operations refused to do so because it was contrary to their safety analysis:</p>
<p>Spring 2002</p>	<p>Salem grassing approach (i.e., heroic efforts) deviated from expected approach/lessons learned from 1994 grassing [redacted]. This concern relates to a decision to keep one of the Salem unit's on during a period of heavy grassing. Interviews have suggested that this may have been done for one day, but when it occurred on a second day the unit was taken off-line.</p>
<p>Sept. 24th, 2002</p>	<p>Based on the size and location of a significant steam leak (20' to 40' plume from the bonnet of a Feed Water Pump steam admission valve), the [redacted] agreed with the shift operators that the plant should be shut down to affect repairs. [redacted] left to speak with "upper management" and, upon his return, subsequently [redacted] which isolated the steam leak avoiding a shut down. [redacted] ECP confidential report substantiates allegation, Third Step Grievance [redacted] without regard to his own personal safety, without a Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO), and without the permission/knowledge of control room personnel).</p>
<p>Fall 2002</p> <p>10/11/02</p> <p>10/12/02</p> <p>10/13/02</p> <p>10/14/02</p> <p>10/15/02</p> <p>10/16/02</p> <p>10/17/02</p> <p>10/18/02</p> <p>10/19/02</p> <p>10/20/02</p> <p>10/21/02</p> <p>10/22/02</p> <p>10/23/02</p> <p>10/24/02</p> <p>10/25/02</p> <p>10/26/02</p> <p>10/27/02</p> <p>10/28/02</p> <p>10/29/02</p> <p>10/30/02</p> <p>10/31/02</p>	<p>Manager [redacted] directed an [redacted] to NA a startup checklist step. [redacted] tried to have [redacted] fired but was unsuccessful. Information received indicates this alleged activity may have actually occurred when [redacted] directed [redacted] to "NA" a surveillance step for the Reactor Vessel Vent valves when a single valve indicated dual indication during this routine stroking evolution. [redacted] was allegedly told by the Operation Crew that they would not "NA" the step. Earlier information from interviews suggested that the concern involved "NA-ing" a second verification containment walkdown to be done by a [redacted] level person step. This step was added to the SU procedure as a lessons learned from the Davis-Besse issue. According to [redacted] this walkdown was actually done by himself and [redacted] and startup was delayed by a day because of leaks that they found from some SG wet layup level indication valves. So, the step was actually completed contrary to the allegor's assertion.</p>
<p>Nov. 2002</p>	<p>Higher Tritium sample concentration in Spring 2003 - "a serious issue that had to be handled with kid gloves to keep us [PSEG] out of trouble [redacted]</p>
<p>March 17th, 2003</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hope Creek Reactivity Event - Manipulation of Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC) system caused an unanticipated rise in reactor power 6 ½ % to 13 % ... not discovered until Wednesday (3/19/03). 2. Entering a planned shutdown to repair 3 technical/mechanical failures (late Sunday / early Monday morning). 3. Monday morning (0800) Turbine Bypass Valve (TBV) stuck open (47%). TBV closed fully during subsequent testing. [redacted] argued with [redacted] and [redacted] about whether or not a shut down was required. The concern here was between [redacted] and his department heads. He apparently "harassed" (from interviews with [redacted] them for 4 hours on why a shutdown to repair the TBV was necessary when all of the department heads believed that shutting down was a "no brainer". Although non-conservative decision making is a possible root cause, there was no TS violation. 4. Heated discussions about the duration of the forced outage.

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June 17 th , 2003	Hope Creek - EDG leakage exceeds LCO time; pressure to avoid shutdown [redacted] directed operator [redacted] to not shutdown; shutdown commenced within acceptable time frame and met regulations. There was time pressure to delay the shutdown as long as possible to allow engineering time to come up with an adequate operability justification . Although non-conservative decision making was a possible root cause, there was no TS violation. The HC RIs were fully engaged with the issue as it unfolded.
Sept. 3 rd &4 th , 2003	Initial allegation contact between RI-2003-A-0110 allegor & Dave Vito.
Sept. 5 th , 2003	Allegor informed of right to file a discrimination complaint with the Dept. of Labor (DOL).
Sept. 9 th , 2003	Initial recorded interview with allegor & 1 st Allegation Review Board (ARB).
Sept./Oct. 2003	PSEG decision making process relative to #14 Steam Generator (SG) Feed Regulating Valve (FRV) believed to be stuck at 74% open . This concern related primarily to the timing of a decision to enter TS 3.0.3 . An NEO and RO have asserted that it should not have taken 12 hours to enter 3.0.3. However, once the licensee's troubleshooting plan showed that FRV was stuck they immediately entered the LCO and followed the SD requirements. Although non-conservative decision making was a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.
Sept. 29 th , 2003	Allegor filed civil discrimination law suit against PSEG in Morris County, N.J.
Sept. 30 th , 2003	Allegor sends a letter, via email, to the NRC, Region I, Regional Administrator indicating that the former [redacted] thought that issues at the site "aren't going to be brought up ... just like Davis-Besse."
Oct. 2 nd , 2003	2 nd ARB
Oct. 9 th , 2003	More email received from allegor.
Oct. 11 th , 2003	More email received from allegor.
Oct. 16 th , 2003	Certified acknowledgment letter sent.
Oct. 28 th , 2003	3 rd ARB
Nov. 7 th , 2003	4 th ARB
Not Specified	Excessive use of temporary tags
Not Specified	Salem 2 In-service Inspection (ISI) relief request re: piping UT (coverup?)
Not Specified	Hope Creek offgas issue after [redacted] took over. Rad safety concerns expressed but not resolved
Not Specified	Hope Creek employee allegedly asked to modify a Notification re: "in-leakage"