[redacted] August 2000 ex 7c

SMS meeting to discuss ODs -

late 2001 loss of Station air

(1) Salem startup in progress - generator complications causing a one week delay. Heat-up with goop in turbine seals. [redacted] wanted to perform physics testing

Mgmt contact during 9/03 hurricane

Service Water underground leak

Startup from trip of current transformer.

SJ valve issue - Summer 2001

7c

(2) [redacted] criticized SM for calling SW loop inop

(3) Green - White

(4) Holding plant hostage

(5) Hurricane 9/03

Op - inop at end

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 7C 7D
FOIA- 2005-194

X-10

[redacted] ex 7c

A.

SEP 9
10:20 a.m.

- CHANGE MGMT FOR SAP
- MAR 1996 SAP IMPLEMENTATION
- ON LOAN FROM BUSINESS INTEGRATION IN NEWARK
- WORKED W/ BUSINESS PROCESS INTEGRATION TEAM
- REPORTED TO [redacted] IN CORPORATE
- TRANSFERRED TO NUCLEAR B/C SHE SAW A SITE W/ FEAR OF RETALITATION - NOT CONSISTENT W/ PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE

x 7c

- [redacted] WAS TO FOCUS ON PEOPLE
- [redacted] HAD A VERY INTIMIDATING TYPE OF LEADERSHIP
- [redacted] RETIRED
  - OTHER PEOPLE BROUGHT IN WITH OTHER STYLES OF LEADERSHIP
- WHEN DID JOB RESPONSIBILITY CHANGE??
  ONGOING EVOLUTION - DON'T RECALL A SPECIFIC MOMENT IN TIME - EVOLUTION BEGAN TAKING PLACE MAR 1996 → FORWARD

(1)

ex 7c 'FALL 1996 - [redacted] REQUESTED [redacted] TO WORK ON A HOMAN PERT AGENT w/ [redacted]

SHIFTED GEARS AFTER [redacted] RESIGNATION

[redacted] THEN SPONSORED HOMAN PERT INITIATIVE

** [redacted] **
↳ EXTERNAL

SHE INITIALLY SPOKE w/ [redacted] ABOUT HER CONCERNS.

EXAMPLES OF FEAR & INTIMIDATION??
ASS CHEWING
ASS KICKING
HIGH LEVEL EXECUTIVES COULD YELL

[redacted]
• [redacted] - DIRECTOR

- DON'T RECALL SPECIFIC ISSUES.
- LOT OF CONTENTION BETWEEN UNION & MGMT.

RECALL ANY SPECIFIC PLANT TYPE ISSUES??

(2)

- # OF MEETINGS LED BY [redacted] & [redacted] WHERE MGMT TEAM WHERE IF ANSWERS WERE NOT CORRECTED - PEOPLE WERE DRESSED DOWN.

ex 7c

- HOW DID HUMAN PERF INITIATIVE GO W/ [redacted]??
  - TRAINED GROUP OF 40 PEOPLE - BREAKTHRU SPONSORS.

- HOW DID IMPROVEMENT MANIFEST ITSELF??
  - CORPORATE SURVEYS
  - REPEATED GALLUP 212 SURVEY EVERY YEAR
  - PEOPLE ISSUES WERE GETTING MUCH MORE ATTENTION
  - UNION/MGMT ISSUES BEING RESOLVED

→ PEAKED IMPROVEMENT WAS IN MID 2002

- [redacted] DECLINE AFTER WANO EVALUATION IN SUMMER OF 2002

- → THINGS IN [WANO 3] [HYMNS] VIEW VIEW SHOWED A SHARP DECLINE

etc.

(3)

[redacted] ATTITUDE ABOUT WORKERS SHIFTED TO NEGATIVE AFTER [LOAD SHED]

- WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN WORK ENVIRONMENT??

[redacted] BROUGHT IN SUMMER OF 2000 — STRONG COMMITMENT TO GROW-MEN PARTNERSHIP — DEFINITELY CONTRIBUTED TO PEOPLE BEING HEARD MORE.

[redacted] } HELPED BRING ABOUT CULTURAL CHANGES THAT IMPROVED OUTAGES.

- [KIMMY] ROLE WAS TO BE A COACH TO THE LEADERSHIP TEAMS

- SIMILAR TYPE LEADERS ON SAME SIDE???

SALEM OUTAGE FALL OF 1999 BEST OUTAGE EVER

(4)

QUESTIONABLE PROGRESS WAS SO NEW THAT IF IT COULD BE SUSTAINED PLANT PERF - ACTUAL NUMBERS TRACKED CLOSER TO A 3

Ex 7c [redacted] BECAME VERY DISTANT, INVISIBLE [redacted] & [redacted] WERE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO MAKE CHANGE HAPPEN -

- UNION BECAME DISHEARTENED AFTER MOLAR TURNED AFTER [WANO 3]

NOT AS MUCH CONTACT W/ [redacted] [redacted] WAS ALSO MORE INVISIBLE.

→ [redacted] - & [redacted] WERE AT ODDS -

WHO WAS MORE THE CHAMPION OF PLANT SAFETY??

[redacted] BY FAR

OUTAGE @ SALEM

ISSUE ON RESTART

SRO ON DUTY WAS TOLD TO N/A A LINE IN PROCEDURE -

(5)

b7c

- [redacted] DIRECTED THE SRO - TO N/A STEP

[redacted] THOUGHT

SPECIFICS ABOUT STEP N/A'D

UNIT DID START UP

⇒ TALK TO [redacted]

DID LICENSEE CONDUCT INVESTIGATION OF THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE

→ SUPPOSEDLY A NOTIFICATION WAS WRITTEN

USED AS AN EXAMPLE FOR MGMT NOT SUPPORTING THE RIGHT THING.

- SHIFT OPERATORS PERCEIVED IT AS A DIRECT ORDER.

(6)

IS THIS FIRST EXAMPLE OF PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY??

ex 7c

THIS ISSUE BRINGS TO HEAD OF RIFTS

SRO's

Ops supt's - All from Science

[redacted] [redacted]

SINCE [KYMN] QUIT CONFIDED THAT DOES NOT TRUST [redacted] &

[redacted]

[redacted] - ON DUTY

WHEN [redacted] CLOSED VALVE

EARLY 2002

[redacted]

[redacted] - VOICED SPECIFIC CONCERNS re RIFT

[redacted]

[redacted]

DEFINITELY

7

ex 7c

[redacted]

ANOTHER OTHER INCIDENT BESIDES STEAM SUPPLY VALVE

"OTHER PEOPLE KEEPING NOTES"

[redacted]

e-MAILS - 12 FILES ATTACHED
SAFETY CONCERNS NOT ADDRESSED

NUCLEAR CRAFT OPERATOR

[redacted]

- EXTENSIVE FILES ON ISSUES.
WOULD SPEAK ONLY UNDER SUBPOENA BCE
SHE WAS AFRAID FOR HER JOB.

TALK TO [redacted]
ONLY RECENTLY DID SHE HEAR FROM
H.Q. SHIFT MANAGERS ABOUT
DISTRUST TOWARDS LEADERSHIP.

(8)

ex 7c COPY OF E-MAIL WAS GIVEN TO [redacted] - QUESTIONS ABOUT QA INSPECTORS NOT IN FIELD.

[redacted] RESPONSE - "YEAH I HAVE HEARD THIS, NOTHING NEW HEAR."

[redacted] RESPONSE SEEMED TO BE NEO'S ARE THE PROBLEM.

SPOKE TO [redacted] re: E-MAIL [redacted] FROM EC investigated

E-MAIL WAS FROM 9/25

[redacted] ALSO BELIEVED VALVE WAS UNSAFE TO SHUT MANUALLY.

IPR2 VALVE INCIDENT

[redacted] THREATENED MEDIA PUBLICITY IF TECHS WERE NOT RE-HIRED.

ISSUE WAS TOO SEVERE DISCIPLINE -

ex 7c

(9)

FIRING OF [redacted] regarding [redacted]

→ [redacted] - CALLED [redacted] @ HOME.

ECP SURVEY - COMMENTS WERE FORWARDED TO [KYMN], BY [redacted] NAMED [redacted]

TALK TO [redacted]

SWITCHED POSITIONS IN CY 2002

APRIL 2002 GALLUP - THESE RESULTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN PUBLISHED.

SURVEY: CIRCUMPLEX - HUMAN SYNERGISTICS

SURVEY [redacted] ⇒ KISS UP/ KICK DOWN CULTURE

NO WORTHY RESPONSE TO THIS -

[redacted]

(10)

Ex 7c

- HOPE CREEK OPS WAS ONE OF THE HEAVIEST
- RP - [redacted] - JOB ELIMINATED

MOST UNHEALTHY
- SALEM OPS
- SITEWIDE MAINTENANCE
- CHEMISTRY.
- ENGINEERING - [redacted] TALKED TO [redacted] OVER NUCLEAR CAPACITY ISSUE

CHILLED ENVIRONMENT IN WAY [redacted] WAS HANDLED

[redacted] CONFIDED IN [redacted] REGARDING TOLS

A PUBLIC FALLING OUT OF FAVOR

(11)

A RECENT EXAMPLE OF RIFT
RESULTS

HQ SRO'S HAVE DIVIDED LOYALTIES
- LICENSE
- PRODUCTION

SEP 3-3

SR MGMT WENT - INTO ~~[illegible]~~ -
S.M. BELIEVES HE DID NOT
HAVE POWER OR AUTHORITY
TO STOP EVEN THOUGH HE BELIEVES
IT WAS ILL CONCEIVED.
[redacted]

WHO EVER INVOLVED: (SR MGMT)

- [redacted]
- [redacted] ABOUT HOW THIS WAS HANDLED

72 HR LCO A OR B EDG

TROUBLES END OF LCO WINDOW [redacted]
[redacted] WANTED TO COMMENCE EDG.
[redacted] DID NOT.
[redacted] COMMENCED

ex 7 –

(12)

s/D.

[redacted] CONFIDED W

x [KYMN.] x

[redacted] PROVIDED DIRECTION – NOT AN ORDER

[redacted] WAS CONCERNED THAT PRODUCTION WAS OCCURRING OVER SAFETY

UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE [redacted] AS A PUPPET OF [redacted] &

[redacted]

WAS ANY DISCIPLINARY ACTION TAKEN AGAINST [redacted] NOT AWARE

[redacted] TOLD KYMN THAT "WE WERE DANGEROUS & IF NRC KNEW WHAT WERE DOING WOULD TAKE KEYS AWAY."

REVENUES WERE ABOUT $3M/DAY – A PROBLEM W/ A BYPASS VALVE closing – should valve be fixed OR NOT??

(13)

BELIEVED VALVE WENT CLOSED?

→ CALLS CAME IN TO [redacted] - TO KEEP UNIT ON LINE.

[redacted] MADE THE CALL.

[redacted] RETIREMENT WAS ANNOUNCED

[redacted] IS NOW TALKING TO

4-6 HRS DEBATE BETWEEN LICENSED OPERATORS & CORPORATE ABOUT WHY NOT S/U UNIT.

FROM [redacted] & [redacted] $3M/DAY - DEBATE WAS SO INTENSE.

[redacted] CAME TO [KYMN]

WHO ARE THE PLAYERS??

[redacted]

NOT [redacted] WERE ON PHONE.

[redacted] PROBABLY [redacted].

HIGHEST LEVELS OF ORGANIZATION WERE DEBATING W/ SRO'S

GUYS W/ LICENSES THOUGHT SENIOR MGMT WAS OUT TO LUNCH

(14)

IN THE END, OPERATORS WERE SATISFIED W/ DECISION THAT WAS MADE.

ex 7c

2 DAYS AFTER THIS [KYMN] SPOKE 3 OR 4 HOURS W/ [redacted]

[redacted] WAS BESIDE HIMSELF W/ PRESSURE HE RECEIVED FROM [redacted] ie [redacted]. [KYMN] HAD BEEN A COFIDANT BEFORE. [KYMN] HAD NEVER HEARD THIS FROM [redacted] BEFORE.

OTHER EXAMPLES WHERE PRESSURE WAS EXERTED??

NO - B/C OF TIMELINE [redacted] WAS NOT YET IN POWER.

I WOULD NOT RAISE A SAFETY ISSUE?

[redacted] MADE IT CLEAR TO [KYMN] THAT HE WOULD NOT GO TO [redacted] OR [redacted] ON THE BPV ISSUE.

100's OF people from tech, operators ie, SITE UP

(15)

IN GENERAL ITS THE PERSON W/ THE CONCERN HAS THE PROBLEM.

"I NEVER SAW ANYTHING BE DONE W/ ECP RESULTS."

DO EMPLOYEE'S FEEL THAT ECP IS A LEGITIMATE VEHICLE TO ANSWER CONCERNS - "NO."

ET 7c

AFTER PEOPLE MEET W/ NRC/INPO/etc.

REQUIRED TO DEBRIEF W/ PSEG MGMT.

TALK TO [redacted] NOTIFICATION REVISION

[redacted] CONVERSATION ON

MGMT IS INTO DAMAGE CONTROL

OF HOURS SPENT

SPECIFICALLY - DON'T FOCUS ON SH MGMT.

(16)

SALEM NEO's are angry, frustrated, disbelief. Their view is that management does not care.

Pleaded w/ them to do the right thing. → F/U QUESTION.

RT 7c

Fear was more of a theme w/ SRO's vs union.

HOW DID OPS MGMT receive message regarding NEO disconsent "YOU BOUGHT THEIR STORY??"

[redacted]

UNSAFE IS BOTH INDUSTRIAL & NUCLEAR

[redacted]

@ SALEM CONCERN IS WITH ALL OPERATORS. SRO/RO/UNION [redacted] WAS ALSO OUTSPOKEN

HC { [redacted]

(17)

ex 7c

TRITIUM [redacted] IS WAY HIGHER THAN WE THOUGHT THAT WOULD BE - "THIS COULD DO US IN" -

EARLY APRIL TIME FRAME.

GLASSING

COMMITTED AS AN ORGANIZATION TO NOT HAVE HERCULEAN EFFORTS. COUNTER TO PREVIOUS STANDARDS.

→ April 3, 2003. DUPLICATE ~~OF~~ April 7, 1994.
I DON'T HAVE THE CONFIDENCE THAT WE CAN AVERT A NUCLEAR SAFETY ISSUE.

GOOD TROOPER MENTALITY.

---

(1) "PSEG DESTROYS UNFAVORABLE DOCUMENT"

ECP FOLLOWUP. [redacted] - SPOKE @ LENGTH REGARDING THE SJC MANAGEMENT EVENT "OFF THE RECORD."

(18)

NOT A SINGLE UNION PERSON

INVESTIGATION IS A WHITEWASH OF THE REAL ISSUES.

bx 7c

(2) [redacted] NOTIFICATION REVISION

(3) [redacted] HAS EXAMPLES.

[redacted]

GET IN SAY AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE

"HE DOES NOT FEAR FOR SAFETY OF PLANT"

PLANT IS SO WELL DESIGNED IT CAN PROTECT ITSELF FROM US.

PLANT ITSELF IS THE FINAL SAFEGUARD.

(19)

"HE IS THE WHINER & ONE OF OUR WEAKER OS'S."

100% [redacted] DECISION –
STRICTLY B/C OF #'S &

- KNOCK DOWN – DRAG OUT w/ UNION
- & EVEN A DETRIMENT TO
- UNION

[redacted]

POINT SYSTEM – FOR REORG

- [redacted]
- CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT FOR DISCRIMINATORY FIRING

9/9/03 – Int. w/ PSEG Ind.

Change in Mgmt

ex 7c

→ Salem Sept 2002 Event | HC Forced Outage | HC EDG SID

→ [redacted]

→ [redacted] → reported to [redacted]

→ expectations on site → integrate SAP system

→ worked w/ Business Process Team

→ SEWE issues (in 96) → fear, intimidation, feelings of

→ use SAP to work on workplace issues

→ (How being treated was inconsistent w/ Excellence

→ [redacted] Brought in 96?)

→ 96 → reason for environment Salem coming out of restart [redacted] leader team

→ 1st couple of years made strides [redacted] retired

→ evolution in job functions

→ 96' worked w/ [redacted] → HPI; → began in fall of 1996

shifted gears after [redacted] resigned

→ 96' environment → fear, intimidation → being in meetings

what was said; Nuclear is a "hell-hole";

→ Shared concerns w/ [redacted] ; in 96; no ones ear; concerns previously documented; accepted request to be there full time

Ex 7c

→ ↳ ex of fear & intimidation (96)

- people yell & curse a various people in meetings

→ [redacted] → ↳ director

↳ plant perf issues ; letting "union run show"

96 meetings

→ [redacted] Mtgs w/ MGMT Team (tech issues discussed & if wrong ans → dressed down)

↳ Public humiliation → no specifics

minutes for monthly leadership mtgs

['96' Work Environment Toxic; moved up to destructive] → middle stage | made progress since '96'.

↑ last summer 2002 WAVO' audit

→ How was improvement measured!!?

↳ employee surveys; Gallup QIC Survey (people ~~[illegible]~~ issues getting attention)

→ [redacted] peaked in mid-2002 (as good as it got)

→ WANO gave [redacted] a 3 → dramatic negative shift in leadership, culture

→ got dangerous ; around time of 3 → [redacted] became better

this year

→ W/E got better

(Bucked by [redacted] ✓
outages engaging worker; sprinted Hancock)

Cultural step changes during outages (Coach to leadership team)

IR13 outage @ Salem (building workplace fall ~~97 or 98~~ 99)

~~→ lesser grade~~

→ INPO Sustainable Perf. Concern
→ actual Plant Perf. closer to a 3

→

[redacted] seem distinct in 2002 after INPO 3 — ex 4 proprietary

[redacted] pressured to make change happen

do what it took to get results ← → results and plant perf

ex 7c

→ need union guys to get INPO mark & then "put screws to the Union"

ee 7c

→ [redacted] because distant;

→ [redacted] not visible

→ [redacted] made dramatic/negative changes

infighting between [redacted]

fought about tech issues / leadership issues → ops metality

[redacted] was more champion of Plant Safety

→ outage [redacted] in CRO Salem

issue over starting up plant

Why didn't trust senior mgmt

SRO told to NIA a line in procedure & [redacted] went baltistic

2002

thought [redacted] was inppt

never heard that was wrong

not to be perceived as going orders

would be possible to find

[redacted] talk to about NIA of step

Notified written

ex7c

Big Rift between Salem Operators & Senior Mgmt

→ growing distrust

quasi licensee → report feeling pressured to make non-conservative decisions

→ [redacted] views operators as the Problem.

→ & vise versa

rift potentially dangerous.

→ Talk w/ Shift Managers

→ each one can tell you what it's like

→ .

meeting when [redacted] early in 2002

don't trust (1) Senior mgmt decision making

[redacted] does not trust [redacted] wrt to Safety

[redacted] [redacted] closed VW to isolate steam leak

[redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted]

→ concerns about rift

[redacted]

resigned [illegible]

had disagreement w/ Nelson

[redacted]

ex 7c

Close unsafe to close

[redacted] at end of rope

Shutting Steam Valve

Not to delay w/ mass concerns

Production over Safety

[redacted]

- Satan
- Dirty of Operator
- Cale

Stop contractor selves

Keeping track of issues

[redacted]

12 files attached w/ safety concerns that have not been addressed

Maint Issues

NEO

Copy to [redacted]

What was [illegible] of.

nothing new here

[redacted] r [illegible] that Salem NEO's were a problem

[redacted] has extensive fills of all the issues

corrective action process

only speak under supervision

Talk to [redacted]

SM's @ HC reg / distrust of decision matrix

; Took e-mail to [redacted]

↳ would take care of it; bring in employee concerns to investigate

interviewed NEO's on [redacted] shift

all safety concerns expressed & other than [redacted] shifts

→ why unsafe to close; → (industrial safety)
→ shutdplant down to isolate leak

[redacted] plant SLD

[redacted] shifted to thinking union was the problem

– Pro-VW incident → tech performed work improperly
techs fired; brought back; media publicity picketing
→ against [redacted] through was appropriate
→ workers made a mistake discipline too severe
→ supervisor fired

Firing of [redacted]

↳ no going for a FFD call; attention a meeting on day off → reinstated w/ [redacted]

selected randomly

Stuff to conflict

[redacted] → Survey results → [redacted]

[redacted] → 22 yrs no longer has a job; → consensus brought to him

→ other Surveys Gallop Q12

→ [Kiss Up–Kick Down Culture]

external survey

to Kiss

to subordinates

↳ ACT like this [redacted] wouldn't act like.

~~[illegible]~~ "Destruction Culture"

↳ HC ops healthcare → worked hand on W/E issues

[redacted] Had a Strong-Culture

↳ Job eliminated

Salem OPs MGR revolving door;

Bad Culture → Salem OP's; Maint, Chemistry;

ex 7c

→ inner circle @ fossil.

[redacted] → reportedly went to [redacted] d was denoted; left to work at fossil; chilled work environment; don't know issue; 2001 timeframe told that by [redacted]

→ [redacted]

Could have been possible – devisiveness had → LCO's honoring license responsibility or follow senior mgmt; Second guessing themselves;

→ guys on front lines to be fully engaged w/o attention on "heat"; divided loyalties.

→ cite recent ex @ Hope Creek

Hope Creek → SIC mgmt event; did not have power or authority to stop evolution; violated [redacted] → [redacted] [redacted]

→ another incident @ HC → 7.2 hr LCO A or B [redacted] not a direct order

EDG Jacket Water leak @ end of window; wanted to commence @ s/p. → directed not to

[redacted]

HC SID Event

→ Putting licensed operators where have to defy upper mgmt to do right thing

→ Direction not to initiate SID per LCO statement; [redacted]; production over safety; [redacted]

↳ agent

↳ Don't know of any adverse action

→ Forced outage @ HC (Mid March 2003)

↳ Bypass VW → we were dangerous & NRC would take keys away

[redacted] said we are dangerous → deviation should take keys away

[redacted] Planned outage → Forced outage (~3 M/day)

↓ get out back ups + rating

4-6 hrs debate between operators [redacted]

↳ vs-corporate

Bypass Valve — Problem w/ it closing; concern about what to do extend outages or Fix valve; VW went closed calls to [redacted]; keep unit online to fix VW — [redacted]

→ Power Shift to [redacted] instead of [redacted]

ex 7c

Players in Debate [redacted]

VW went short

4-6 hr debate → over the phone

→ Actions of [redacted] scared daylight out of People → [redacted]

in the end the plant was SID and valve was fixed;

reference → 3-4 hr chat w/ [redacted]

↳ beside himself about what to do reg. Pressure from [redacted]

→ what to do ↑ →

Level of Pressure as a mech later

[redacted] reports to [redacted] vs [redacted]

No mayor

Attitudes → [illegible]

ex 7c

→ Positions could not get filled;
→ rapid fire power change
→ [redacted] made it clear that wouldn't go to
[redacted] about incidents

→ ↳ Hundreds of People in 6 years (to [redacted])

feels powerless
to raise concerns

↳ "Perception is the person w/ concern is the problem"

[redacted] → ~~Afr~~
Afraid to raise concerns.
- Union guys

Nuclear Safety Events probable →

→ don't be afraid to speak up.
→ [redacted] Changing out [redacted]; this
→ Employee Concerns → reports to [redacted]
↳ Poor track record of resolving concerns

ex 7c

Debrief People = [illegible] by night,

thought [illegible]

[illegible] to tell us

Different

[redacted] - wrote a notification

asked to [illegible] had notification

Shorter after [illegible] left

3rd of April

Practice of de-briefing → no complaints → normal practice

often done intersectly

Focus on inspection

What [illegible] we do to minimize events to head off @ pass.

[redacted]

ex 7c

→ Meet w/ Crew w/o. SM

↳ Union → anger, disbelief – to lack of attention (MGMT DOESN'T CARE)

SALEM

- Pleading not to do anything unsafe
- Pay attention
- reported to OPS MGMT → (they "played" you)
- Plea help us occur as something other than whistle noise; NEO's on [redacted]

→ Salem NEO's

- asked to do anything unsafe.
- → [redacted] → Number of issues →

SR-O's → [redacted]

- Concern about speaking out includes SM's
- [redacted] → [redacted] risk to speak up about safety issues

[redacted]

[redacted]

ex 7c

Asked to leave Mtg

↳ Spring of 2001

→ Spoke w/ [redacted]

→

Tritium - higher than expected ; could do us in

↳ (April 2003 - [redacted]

Grassing Event - called to go to mtg to have 3 techs @ intake structure (April 3, 2003)

Good "Trooper" Mentality

→ Notifications not written

→ Steam VW Closure → (could not find any notifications)

→ list of safety issues [redacted]

[redacted]

→ Behaviors reverting back → acting as if fearful

ex 7c

→ Dct of last fall.

[redacted] → r/r notification

→ Winston | Stawn brought into interview
long portions were "off the record"
off the record → no interviewees felt free to come w/ ecp's

↑ No union people interviewed

→ Give answer looking for

Consider invest. to be a whitewash

→

[redacted] (last fall) – things have a way of disappearing → reason's why (cited two examples)

[redacted] as an interviewee

↳ got in, say little & get out as soon as possible

didn't occur in a safe environment

↳ not conducive to speaking up or speaking out

ex 7c

Thorough

↳

Grassin Issue

↳ [redacted] speaking up against

→ Why are we doing

↳

[redacted] easy to build a case; "prime plants so well designed can protect us from ourselves"

→ May 2002 Mtg w/ [redacted]

↳ then for several mos. not monthly meetings

Sept 24; Salem NEO's hot bed.

→

[redacted] of Point System [redacted] → Close action [illegible]

[redacted]

① Overall, a very strong case for 50.7 violation. This would allow us to put on docket under SCWE. We've long suspected a common-theme in this cross-cutting area but have not been able to build the case. This would be one huge datapoint!

② This sounds like [redacted] issue that he believes was one of the big straws (haystacks) that broke the camel's back. End result: [redacted] saw PSEG nuclear management as they really were, had a hard time living with himself because of what management did or failed to do, and also was retaliated against for speaking out.

(3) I'm not sure what this list of notifications represents. Yes, we acknowledge that PSEG employees enter issues with potential safety significance into their corrective action process. However, if this is a list of "stuff" that management directed closed without action taken to address concerns, then we have reason to be concerned for these technical issues and must thoroughly scrub the list. A more damning list would be a list of those safety concerns that are <u>not</u> in the corrective action system but should

(4) Sounds familiar. I believe I was on military leave at the time. [redacted] would have more details. This concern for a lengthly delay in deciding what to do for a BPV problem is troubling in that #3 BPV problems contributed to a huge reactivity manipulation event during this forced outage shutdown just days before. I recall that senior management severely chastised the operating shift for their slight hesitation in tripping the unit when power went from ~6% → 13% due to a BPV glitch.

(5) See (3) above

(6) Not sure why this was included in package. You could read between the lines and see "management is more focused on production / schedule than safety (personal & nuclear). It looks like notifications were written to document conditions adverse to quality. I recall that the NRB blasted management because the same outage issues recurred and management did not seem actively engaged.

e+ fc

(7) You can always count on [redacted] to tell it like it is.

(8) sounds like the fall of 1991 and the high particulate turbine blading (turbine [illegible] [illegible] during over speed testing) ≡ AIT

(9) Hope Creek B EDG exhaust leaks. First manifested itself in July 2002. Operators needed to wear SCBAs during monthly ST. PSEG finally addresses in March 03 forced outage. (HUB is well aware of this "success" story.)

et al

(10) You gotta love [redacted]

(11) The devil is in the details!

(12) Hmm sharing this [redacted] gem with HUB.

(13) Sounds like how our SACA process used to work. Sometimes there is not better indicator than the "gut feeling" from those experienced folks at the top.

(14) Dated info (1991) hard to see the tie

(15) Connection? Is this a process improvement recommended by Allegro, that is still in draft?

(16) Looks like typical [redacted] jargon. unless you read real fine between the lines, I don't see "produce electricity no matter how unsafe"

(17) Relates to (4) above. BPV issue.

(18) Can't share concerns with management → sounds like a chilling effect has indeed set in → actually it sounds like winter at the north pole!

(19) Seems to contain our support Sec. 7

(20) Recommended reading for this

DETAILS REGARDING [redacted] DIRECTION 7C
1) DID [redacted] AGREE w/ IT?

ANY EXAMPLES WHERE PEOPLE HAVE NOT SPOKEN UP?

WHO WAS SALEM OPS SUPT THAT WAS INFURIATED ABOUT GRASSING STRATEGY?? WHO RESPONDED "IT DOESN'T MATTER."

DETAILS ON EMPLOYEE VOICED SAFETY ISSUES /C: OFFGAS TROUBLESHOOTING? WHAT WERE THE? WHO WOULD KNOW??

SEP 24th INCIDENT -
WHAT IS REALLY @ ISSUE?
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6/17 HC EDG JACKET WATER ISSUE, WAS [redacted] ON BOARD OR ONLY FOLLOWING ORDERS???
- WHO WAS 2ND SRO THAT INSTRUCTED

- EVIDENCE THAT TERMINATION DATE WAS MOVED UP???

- EXAMPLES/ EVIDENCE OF DESTROYED DOCUMENTS??? SPECIFICS..

9/2001 → POINT BLANK STATED CONCERN & IN SUBSEQUENT ONE ON ONE MEETING

INCREASING RISK RELATED TO ALIENATION, POOR MORALE & LACK OF EMPOWERMENT

ESPECIALLY SALEM NEO'S.. / Frustration
ANY EXAMPLES???

e-MAIL MESSAGES FROM SALEM EMPLOYEES -

W/O 3/17 ⇒ NUMEROUS HIGH
LVL MGMT SPEAK
CONCERNS → WHO WAS IN
CHARGE - HOW THE DECISIONS
WERE MADE

⇒ "EXPRESSED FEAR ABOUT
DOING SO"

Salem/HC SCWE Issues Timeline

97/98 Concerns on work environment began when entire senior leadership team was changed out. Previous questioning of operators on "safety and how to run a power (property" were changed and refocused on to "Is there a way around this requirement"? a shocking change [redacted]

7c

July 5, 1999 [redacted] starts at PSEG as [redacted] Late 2000/Early 2001 picked up maint responsibilities. In November 2002 name [redacted]. which included, Ops, Maint & Work Mgmt. [redacted]

8/20/99

Aug ~~2000~~ 1999 [redacted] told a large group of Salem/HC SROs that they needed his permission to raise power. Later, this was interpreted as needing sr mgmt approval to lower power [redacted]

2001/2002 Salem SJ Value Issue - needed to run leak testing to identify which set of SJ values were leaking during startup from a refueling outage [redacted] was trying to figure out a way to NOT do the testing. Some suspicion that [redacted] was behind the issue. Another example where [redacted] represented Sr mgmt [redacted]

Late 2001 Salem Severe degradation of station air Two of Three compressors initially OOS. The third trips. Started diesel backup compressors [redacted] (weekend sr mgmt contact) berates TARP team leader and says "get some $&%!# air compressors on-site and keep the unit on-line" Caused a chilling effect to all those that [redacted]

Salem/HC SCWE Issue Timeline

2002 Salem 1-2 CW Grassing Issues - Heated debate about how many circ pumps (circulators) needed for startup started up w/ 4 instead of 6 [redacted] argued with [redacted] that a minimum of four was needed to startup safely. [redacted] said OK to startup with less than 4. - holding plant hostage" [redacted] later walked out of discussion pod. [redacted] started up with 3 circ pumps [redacted]

Summer 2002 Salem Met Tower lost power - Temporary EDG transported to the site to restore power. Big push to do it in a hurry to avoid NRC reporting. Did not follow temp mod procedure. Did paperwork after the fact [redacted]

Sept 2002 Salem FW Steam Leak - Steam leak on inlet to Main FW Pump Turbine (MS42). [redacted] was alleged to have isolated the leak w/out permission of the [redacted] Some discussion with Senior mgmt prior to actions being taken [redacted]

2002/2003 HC Prevention of Overpower event - HC control room lost cross flow indication (computer) of reactor power. Ops (ROs & CRS) wanted to lower power below 3293 MWth (old 100% power value) because operation up to 3339 MWth (new 100% power value) was deemed non-conservative [redacted] (SM) contravened before power decrease could be affected.

Salem / HC SCWE Issues Timeline

March 2003 HC TBV Issue – (3/12 or 3/13) HC began forced outage to repair / address 3 issues - 'B' EDG exhaust leak, 'M' SRV tailpipe leakage, and a 'B' reactor recirc seal leak. Jobs went well. During startup, after gen synched to grid, #2 TBV would not go closed (~48% open). Operators said valve not operable, and Discussed with [redacted] on Friday night (3/15). Planned testing with GE on Saturday (3/16) to see if problem was electrical hydraulic [redacted] discussed how to SD plant w/o a fast cooldown with [redacted] & maybe 10 other people. [redacted] wanted to change procedure & train on change, simultaneously said he'd need 24 hrs to implement in a planned fashion. Completed procedure & training (Some crew members not happy). Did evolution on Sunday night (3/17). Two overpower events initiated. The first was mmr. about 1%. The second almost caused a scram from 6-7% to 13-14%. Scram at 15%. Central problem attributed to using the TBV bypass jack (man control). Later, when unit was scrammed #2 TBV went shut. Big discussion (& very long) on why HC needed to go cold since problem apparently fixed itself. Big debate between [redacted] and [redacted] said if you su unit it will be w/o him as [redacted] Put job on the line for safety. [redacted]

March 2003 HC Reactivity Mgmt – (3/17) Overpower event not discussed with SR mgmt because of [redacted] grilling [redacted] on #2 TBV on morn of 3/18 (Mon). [redacted] discovered during a Wed SRC mtg (3/[illegible]). Reported to [redacted] and INPO. [redacted] condemned operator actions and made all HC operators (SRO) justify why they should be allowed to continue to operate [redacted]

Salem/HC SCWE Issues Timeline

June 2003 HC EDG Intercooler Leak – Leak discovered on HC EDG from intercooler pump. Repair attempts failed and a shutdown was commenced after leakage could not be stopped. Shutdown was aborted at 42% power when engineering changed design basis of system to allow ~~a~~ coping time of 1 day instead of 7 days which increased the allowed leakage by a factor of 7. [redacted] called this an abysmal failure of engineering to understand the design basis of the system. The [redacted] felt [redacted] was unduly influencing the time to begin the shutdown. He was viewed as acting as [redacted] agent. [redacted]

Other General Concerns

- General intimidating approach in dealing with people by yelling and screaming at them may have caused others to fear raising issues, i.e. "a chilling effect"

e^+ λc

DETAILS REGARDING [redacted] DIRECTION
1) DID [redacted] AGREE w/ IT?

ANY EXAMPLES WHERE PEOPLE HAVE NOT SPOKEN UP?

WHO WAS SALEM OPS SUPT THAT WAS INFURIATED ABOUT GRASSING STRATEGY??
WHO RESPONDED "IT DOESN'T MATTER."

DETAILS ON EMPLOYEE VOICED SAFETY ISSUES re: OFFGAS TROUBLESHOOTING?
WHAT WERE THE?
WHO WOULD KNOW??

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Issue – Do these 4 men explicitly say production overrides safety

Hub – wants the question posed:
Was there corporate pressure that caused the plant to be run in order to increase productivity at the cost of ignoring safety?

ex 7c

Who – [redacted] – causing all the trouble

[Kynn Harvey (KH)] – [Mgr Cultural Transformation] – [fired 3/28/04]

Fossil – to run like the fossil companies, only based on profit + money, numbers

Search – "production over safety"
- "pressure"
- "corporate pressure"
- "safety"
- "production"
- "productivity"
- "chain of command"

Find Questions!

[redacted]
"Enterprise"
"Corporate"

Asked the question:

[redacted]

* look for the question, too.
→ look for the dollar amt
Oct. 2003 w/ TO around 44–48
turbin bypass valve
Hope Creek 100% PSEG
Salem 50% PSEG, 50% Exelon
more legal in A 40–

(3) too many grey haired peo around here

(1) appealed perf rating
no response

(4) indiv's whose leadership was challenged ~~Rod 82~~

(2) sent another letter - didn't respond in timeframes specified

(5) INPO deal
bunch of bunk [redacted]
↳ none of this adds up

(6) his email gets auto-archived → by-pass valve

[redacted] - position $111,000 base

expenses when in town	signing	
interim expenses	relocation	+
expenses from SC	cell phone	+
	car	
	expense acct.	
	conferences	

25

[redacted]

Dr. Kymn Harvin
title + address

70 ↑

[redacted]

exact title

I would have resigned
what really bothered me SR
Officer, Steward of Industry, restart the unit vs CD Mal w/out [redacted] issue

Valve mech bound
would not close
had Rx mgt event
Scrammed the unit
Find out what happend to
by pass valve
(non SRel component)

Badgered [redacted]
[redacted] in on it
Berating
Didn't know where it was coming from
direction

Lots of hidd'n ~~jute~~ jewels
Only takes someone to take charge

line of ?ing totally
out of line

Hydro w/
cut heat

It is not the
appropriate f
Safe things
to do