

DOCKET NO.

70-139

File 4

ENGELHARD INDUSTRIES, INC.


D. E. MAKEPEACE DIVISION

PINE & DUNHAM STREETS
ATTLEBORO, MASS.

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March 1, 1961



U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Division of Licensing and Regulation
Germantown, Maryland

ATTENTION: Mr. J. C. Delaney Chief,
Nuclear Materials Section

REFERENCE: Docket 70-139; SNM-185

SUBJECT: Request for Amendment to Store PRDC Core Subassemblies.

Gentlemen:

It has become necessary, in the course of producing PRDC core subassemblies, to set up temporary storage facilities for 39 of these units. This situation has arisen due to unforeseen delays in the procurement and installation of a fixture for grinding colmonoy pads on wrapper tubes. The fixture is expected to be in operation by the first week of April, at which time, stored subassemblies will be ground and packaged for shipment to PRDC.

It is anticipated that storage of the core subassemblies will be done in the following manner:

Fifteen subassemblies will be packed in always safe shipping containers which will be placed in a locked metal storage building under Security surveillance. These containers hold one unit each, at a 14" center to center separation from adjacent units, and have previously been approved for shipment. A drawing of the container (No. 543A1) is enclosed.

The remainder, or 24 core subassemblies, will be stored in a room which will be constructed adjacent to our assembly area. This storage room will be 8 ft. wide, 20 ft. long, and 10 ft. high, with a sloping, watertight ceiling. A sketch showing the construction and relative location of the room is attached for reference (SK-86).

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Core subassemblies will be stored in a vertical position on wall racks, 12 on each side of the room. Spacing of these units will be 19" center to center with 14" at each end. A drawing which shows the construction and layout of the wall racks (SK-87) is enclosed. The wall racks will be identical to present blanket storage racks except for spacing, and angle iron floor guides. They will also have barrier rods which must be removed prior to insertion of cores into the rack. This is to avoid the possibility of inadvertently placing a core on the transport truck closer than 14" to one which is already in position on the rack.

There are two doors at opposite ends of the room, one of which will be permanently locked. The other door will provide the only entrance to the storage room and will be unlocked only with the prior approval of Criticality Control personnel. No more than one core subassembly will ever be outside the rack at any time.

A transport truck (Ref. Sketch No. SK-88) will be used for all movements of cores into and out of storage. Angle irons will be set on the floor in an inverted "V" position in order to prevent the possibility of a unit in transport from coming closer than 14" to any hanging unit. All transportation will be done with units in a vertical position.

Criticality criteria which have been used to derive spacing requirements were taken from Exhibit 8 To Application For Special Nuclear Materials And Source Materials License Submitted By Power Reactor Development Co., copies of which are attached. This lists minimum spacing of 14" center to center as effectively isolating each core subassembly under either full or partial flooding conditions. The multiplication factor for an infinite array would, therefore, be essentially the same as for an individual core which is approximately 0.6. We propose to store core subassemblies on 19" centers which is even more conservative with respect to the above data.

A tight administrative control will be enforced over all movement of material into or out of the core storage room. Prior approval of any anticipated movement must be obtained by the area supervisor from Criticality Control personnel. No more than one core subassembly will be in transit at any time. In addition, only one core is allowed in each of the

Mr. J. C. Delaney Chief,
Nuclear Materials Section

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three clean rooms for processing. A red light system is in operation which indicates the presence of an enriched core in a particular room. When the red light is on, no enriched material is allowed to enter the room.

We trust that sufficient information has been provided to grant approval of this request. Should further information be required, do not hesitate to call the writer by collect telephone. Your earliest possible attention to this matter is requested, since any lengthy delay will seriously disrupt our production schedule.


Very truly yours,

Norton M. Weiss

Norton M. Weiss
Health & Safety Manager

NMW/sl

Attachments (5)





- Offices


G-2	G-1	ITEM NO.	DRAWING NO.	DESCRIPTION	PROJECT NO.	USED ON ASS'Y
TOLERANCES UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED DECIMAL ± .005 FRACTIONAL ± 1/64" ANGULAR ± 1/2° BREAK ALL SHARP EDGES REMOVE ALL BURRS		APPROVED		DATE	FINISH & SPECIFICATION	
		DRAWN	A. J. Pa	2-28-61	MATERIAL SPECIFICATION	
		CHECKED	R. Ware	3-1-61		
		APPROVED	H.M. Weiss	3-1-61		
ENGELHARD INDUSTRIES, INC. D. E. MAKEPEACE DIVISION ATTLEBORO, MASS.				SCALE	SIZE	DRAWING NO.
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
CHG. LET.	DESCRIPTION	DATE	BY	APP.	CHG. NO.
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typical Detail "A"
from all walls



Top View Of Wall Storage Racks Showing Angle Iron Floor Guides




Angle iron guides to prevent truck carrying core from coming within minimum distance of any other core.

Q-2	Q-1	ITEM NO.	DRAWING NO.	DESCRIPTION	PROJECT NO.	USED ON ASS'Y
TOLERANCES UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED		APPROVED	DATE	FINISH & SPECIFICATION	TITLE	
DECIMAL	± .005	DRAWN	A. J. P. 2-28-61	MATERIAL & SPECIFICATION	Detail of Storage Racks For FRDC Core Subassemblies	
FRACTIONAL	± 1/64"	CHECKED	R. Ware 3-1-61			
ANGULAR	± 1/2°	APPROVED	H. M. Wales 3-1-61			
BREAK ALL SHARP EDGES REMOVE ALL BURRS		ENGELHARD INDUSTRIES, INC. D. E. MAKEPEACE DIVISION ATTLEBORO, MASS.		SCALE	SIZE	DRAWING NO.
				~	A	Sk-87
						REV.

70-139

QTS. LKT.	DESCRIPTION	DATE	BY	APP.	QTS. NO.
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G-2 QUANTITY	G-1 ITEM NO.	DRAWING NO.	DESCRIPTION		PROJECT NO.	USED ON ASS'Y
TOLERANCES UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED		APPROVED	DATE	FINISH & SPECIFICATION	TITLE	
DECIMAL	± .005	A. J. P.	2-28-61	MATERIAL & SPECIFICATION	Transport Truck For PRDC Core and Blanket Subassembly.	
FRACTIONAL	± 1/64"	R. Ware	3-1-61			
ANGULAR	± 1/4°	H. M. Weiss	2-1-61			
BREAK ALL SHARP EDGES REMOVE ALL BURRS		ENGELHARD INDUSTRIES, INC. D. E. MAKEPEACE DIVISION ATTLEBORO, MASS.		SCALE ~	SIZE A	DRAWING NO. SE-88
						REV.

JOURNAL NO. 20-139
 2/2/61

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3-1-61)*

EXHIBIT 9 TO APPLICATION FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR
MATERIALS AND SOURCE MATERIALS LICENSE
BY POWER REACTOR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY



Criticality Considerations

A. Summary

The design of the fuel storage area is such as to assure a substantially subcritical configuration either when the area is dry or in the event of partial or complete flooding. The flooded condition dictates the spacing requirement since, at any given spacing, a flooded array of highly enriched metallic uranium is more reactive than a dry array. A 14-inch center-to-center square pitch was selected because this spacing in water effectively isolates each subassembly; i. e., the multiplication factor for an infinite array is essentially the same as that for a single subassembly and equal in this case to approximately 0.6. Under dry conditions the multiplication factor for an infinite array with 14-inch spacing is approximately 0.2. At intermediate levels of flooding the array is also substantially subcritical, with the multiplication factor varying from 0.2 to 0.6 as the level is raised.

B. Dry Storage

Each core subassembly for the Enrico Fermi reactor has a central 144-pin section containing 19.16 kg of uranium - 10 w/o molybdenum alloy. The uranium component of this alloy is enriched to 23.6 percent and each subassembly therefore contains 4.90 kg of U-235. In the reactor, these subassemblies will be placed immediately adjacent to each other in approximately cylindrical geometry.

The enriched uranium core will be surrounded by depleted uranium axial and radial blankets and the void regions will be filled with sodium coolant. Multigroup diffusion theory calculations of this configuration predict that approximately 91 of the enriched uranium containing subassemblies will have to be loaded in the central region in order to achieve criticality. If the sodium coolant is removed, approximately 15 additional core subassemblies are needed to achieve criticality since sodium increases reactivity in the neutron spectrum of the reactor.

The calculations referred to above have been verified by a critical experiment carried out in the EPR-III facility of Argonne National Laboratory at Arco, Idaho. Calculated and experimental values for critical mass agreed within three percent.

As a check on dry storage criticality, two calculations have been made. The first of these calculations was done to obtain the multiplication of a single subassembly in air, assuming however that the subassembly was infinitely long. This calculation was done by Los Alamos for PRDC as a part of a series of special criticality calculations. Using the S_2 method, k was found to be about 0.2. The second calculation was done by APDA to obtain the multiplication of an infinite array of subassemblies stored on 14-inch centers. This was a multigroup, diffusion theory, homogeneous calculation, which gave a k equal to 0.1. This result is less than the correct value because homogenizing such a widely spaced array does not account for self-multiplication of individual subassemblies. The result, however, does show that leakage from the array is very high so that individual units are effectively isolated from each other. The multiplication

factor for the array is then approximately the same as that of a single sub-assembly which, because of the assumed infinite length, is conservatively estimated by the Los Alamos calculation to be 0.2.

These calculations together with the results of the critical experiment show, if dry storage only was considered, that a separation of only a few inches would be sufficient to assure subcriticality of 200 subassemblies.

C. Flooded Storage

Fuel subassemblies for the Enrico Fermi reactor are highly enriched since a fast reactor is unmoderated. At optimum spacing in water, far less than a normal core loading of subassemblies would be needed to form a critical array. As a first precaution, all storage and handling of fresh fuel will be done dry with every effort made to prevent fuel from becoming immersed in water. All handling of fresh fuel to be stored will be done singly, all shipment or storage will be with a minimum of 14-inch center-to-center spacing.

The storage area using 14-inch center-to-center tubes to hold subassemblies is substantially subcritical when flooded with water. On Figure 1 attached is a summary of calculated data obtained for Enrico Fermi core subassemblies spaced in water in square lattices of different pitch. The points shown were obtained by the use of 2-dimensional, 3-group, diffusion theory calculations using the PDQ code on an IBM-704 computer. Constants needed for the calculation were obtained by the method outlined by R. W. Deutsch.* The

*R. W. Deutsch, "Computing Three-Group Constants for Neutron Diffusion," *Nucleonics* 15:1, 47-51, January, 1957.

results of these calculations agree with information given in various AEC documents, **in that units separated from each other by one foot of water are shown to be effectively isolated from each other; i. e., the multiplication for an infinite array with center-to-center spacing equal or greater than 12 inches is essentially the same as that of a single subassembly.

D. Partially Flooded Condition

In the case of partial flooding, direct calculational evidence that the multiplication will not increase above 0.6 is very difficult to obtain. A direct calculation would require the use of 3-dimensional geometry to adequately describe the flux shape and multigroup methods to describe the spectral variation from one region to the other. In situations such as this where k need not be known accurately, the usual practice in reactor theory is to compute a simple problem which is known to be more reactive than the complex one, and/or to resort to experimental measurements.

For the particular geometry involved here, it is very difficult to define a simple problem which is known to be a little more reactive than the actual problem to be solved. Our most reliable information thus must be obtained from experiments and from the interpretation of these experiments by people closely associated with this type of work.

Babcock & Wilcox Company has performed many critical experiments in their facilities at Lynchburg, Virginia, and they have given PRDC the results

**See, for example, TID-7019, Guide to Shipment of U-235 Enriched Uranium Material, p. 10

of two water height experiments which were performed in connection with their thermal reactor design work. Data from these experiments are plotted in Figures 2 and 3 for Cores I and II as described in Table I.

Core I had a metal to water ratio of 1.119 and was undermoderated. Core II had a metal to water ratio of 0.48 and was somewhat overmoderated. The PRDC storage facility, when flooded, is more overmoderated than Core II. Note that, with 80 cm of fuel above the water level, the reflector savings due to dry fuel is 9.5 cm in the case of the undermoderated core, and 6.2 cm in the case of the overmoderated core. Eighty cm of fuel is more than the full length of Enrico Fermi Reactor fuel pins and in both experiments there was more U-235 per linear inch of height than will be the case with Enrico Fermi Reactor fuel stored on 14-inch centers. Based on these experiments it is seen for Fermi subassemblies that with any available dry fuel above a flooded level the reflector savings would be significantly less than 6.2 cm. Therefore, the facility is most critical, having an effective multiplication of 0.6, when completely flooded.

In Figure 1, k is equal to 0.62 for a spacing of 10.65 inches. The k of 0.62 was obtained assuming an axial buckling of 0.00164 cm^{-2} corresponding to the Fermi fuel length of 77.5 cm. When B^2 was reduced to zero, thus assuming no end leakage, k increased only a very small amount, to 0.64. Very large reflector savings thus have little influence on the multiplication of well-spaced arrays.

Referring again to Figures 2 and 3 note that the absolute value of the slope of the curves is very much less than 1 and is smaller in Figure 3 (the

overmoderated case) than in Figure 2. Thus, at all water levels, bare fuel above the core is worth less in reactivity than is the same height of fuel plus water, so that k continually decreases as the water level is lowered. Since the PRDC storage spacing has even less U-235 per linear inch of height than was present in either of these experiments, k will similarly reduce in value as the water level is lowered.

In the absence of water flooding, there is no moderator present in the fuel region of the PRDC storage facility. PRDC is not aware of any reactor or criticality experiment in which reactivity has increased as a result of lowering the moderator level about solid fuel which is otherwise unmoderated.

E. Blanket Subassemblies

Blanket subassemblies are made of uranium depleted to 0.36 percent U-235. Criticality is not possible either dry or in water, regardless of how many or in what geometry they are stored.

TABLE I
PHYSICAL DATA

	<u>Core 1</u>	<u>Core 2</u>
<u>Pin Lattice</u>		
Pin pitch (square), in.	.3805	.4810
Pin O.D., in.	.3120	.3090
Clad thickness, in.	.0190	.0340 (1)
Pellet diameter, in.	.2740	.2340
Pellet density, gm/cm ³	8.20	8.45
Metal-to-water	1,119	.480
N ₀₂ /N ₂₅	25.8	25.14
Fuel length, in.	49	60
K infinite	1.15(effective)	1.287
Clad Material	22-304	Al-25
Pellet Composition	(ThO ₂ , UO ₂ - U ₃ O ₈)	
<u>Core</u>		
Radius, in.	18.8	24.27 (2)
Control rods	21	None
Can (Al) thickness, in.	.1875	None

(1) Nominal 3.5 mill air gap

(2) In Core 2 experiments the core radius was varied for criticality