

[redacted] #2 TRAN INDEX

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5- TARP report of 2/25/03 operability issue regarding hope creek "B" diesel exhaust fumes.

11 Hope Creek bypass valve issue 3/03 - talks of tech issue (a trouble shooting procedure tech staff uses to ID potentials causes of a problem) dated 3/13/03 where turbine bypass valve is stuck at 38%. [redacted] says that valve closure problem was first ID at 2154 hours on 3/14 - go to tech issue fact sheet. Plant was not shut down until 1824 hours on 3/16/03. His recollection that [redacted] meeting took place on afternoon of 3/15 (Saturday). Says plant was within 6 or 7% of having to shut down - says by Saturday he and others felt there was compelling evidence that they needed to shut down the reactor. [redacted] does not recall [redacted] going thru and discussing the tech issue/causes on the tech issues document in a systematic manner during meeting. Says plant was not at point then that they were required by regs or admin procedures to shutdown. Says decision had been made Saturday night to shutdown - scheduled just in time training for operators on how that was going to be done with the valve stuck. Later sat. evening [redacted] led a conference call after exploring all other avenues/causes and then [redacted] was in agreement with shutdown. Planned Outage Report from "B" Recirc pump seal replacement dated 4/25/03 attributes "management team failed to determine who was responsible to make final decision on some issues and achieve alignment on the decision. . . ."

22- 35 -- reactivity event root cause report # 70030270 - says the transient was not brought to the attention/communicated to sr. mgmt until 2 days following the transient and not communicated to the [redacted] until the next day - and priority and significance was raised by [redacted] - say [redacted] did right thing in doing that. He does not recall the basis for why the operators did not inform their management of this event - **MAYBE NRC STAFF NEEDS TO REVIEW THE INCIDENT TO DETERMINE IF THERE WERE ANY VIOLATIONS OF REGS???** SAYS [redacted] WAS THE [redacted] THAT NIGHT = LEAD ON [redacted]

36 - ON SALEM SHUTDOWN CS ISSUE - DOES NOT RECALL CONCERNS OF GOING FROM GREEN TO WHITE IF PLANT NOT TURNED BACK ON WITHIN A PERIOD OF TIME.

37 - Salem SJ Valves - no first hand or relevant info

40 - Salem 10/03 BF-19 Valve issue - says took just a shift to make decision on what to do

44 - [redacted] steam valve issue - no specific info

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46 - water coming out of ground on intake pipe issue -

54 - since new management group took over.

8/2000 lightening strike which effected Hope Creek [redacted] held meeting to discuss the event and used words "You don't get it." In essence [redacted] told licensed operators that they didn't have the authority to raise power - that was management's responsibility. Corrective action from event was the TARP process. Not long after it was instituted - the Effect of the TARP process was disempowerment of the operators - who never felt good about that and who never came to terms with it. Says this undercurrent was present in some of contentious meeting over years - like the [redacted] turbine bypass valve meeting. Lead to the VP having to make the decisions. The undercurrent dawned in 8/00 and evolved into the turbine bypass valve type issues. Cites how they dealt with BF-19 issue (which he felt was good) as a difference from how they used to deal with issues i.e. turbine bypass valve issue.

More on TARP - going from 1 fire to another - not a well performing site - and because going from 1 fire to another - 'you can never ground the site on the programs and processes needed to move forward in a systematic and controlled fashion . . .'"and the disempowerment or disengagement tends to feed on itself at that point." "so I will just wait for the VP to make the decision on the shutdown." Another problem /cause - didn't have plant mangers then either= difference between then and current - Also cites lack of system engineering role then contributed - and now that role/group has been reinstated. Calls TARP process a "Band-Aid" for not having whose accountable for plant or whose accountable for maintenance or ops. . . " . . . if you have somebody who is accountable and they DO GET IT" = PRIMARY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEN AND TODAY UNDER NEW LEADERSHIP. Not perfect - still have a long way to go - but are on the right track.

66 - cannot point to an example of corporate management [redacted] putting undue business pressures on the plant. Cannot say why he mentioned "corporate" in his [taped] conversation by HARVIN. Post INPO 3 meeting with sr mgmt [redacted] said to group he wanted good operating facility at sale/hope creek - did not take it at all that he was directing peak capacity eve though plant may not be able to support that. [redacted] NEVER got that impression that [redacted] was placing undue pressure on site to keep plant running. If there is a physical challenge to the plant - corporate will give you what you need - but "then hit what you say you are going to hit."

74 - says [redacted] involvement in Hurricane Isabel electrical arcing in switchyard issue was not inappropriate - says how this was handled is example of good vs. bad - in how old v.s. new functions. [redacted] had earlier said - the unit is going to have a strong likelihood of tripping that night - there were follow up discussions on who was resp for cost of clean-up plant or corporate but that night [redacted] makes decision to shut down - **CONFLICT WITH OTHER TESTIMONY OBTAINED BY OI -**

82 - changes since new mgmt on board - thinks it is getting progressively better e.g. Now have plant managers, moving away from TARP process, having accountability, ability to make decisions at right level of mgmt., system engineering reconstituted, and engineers aren't being drawn in to fire drills like they used too, starting to see some benefits in this new thought process in PM and corrective action programs. [REDACTED] new mind set = ownership of plants - but plant and equipment still not running as well as want - and have much work to do.

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[REDACTED] - no expereice with [REDACTED] similar to taht with [REDACTED] on turbine bypass valve meeting. Says [REDACTED] is beginning to uderstand his role as [REDACTED] (in new mgmt team and style)

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[REDACTED] - really hands offbut holds you accountable in a positive way - he has empowered plant managers and shift managersto make decisions as opposed to "you don't get it" - says [REDACTED] mgmt style is "very refreshing"

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General feeling -WORK ENVIRONMENT HAS IMPROVED SINCE NEW MGMT TEAM HAS COME ON BOARD - FOR REASONS DISCUSSED IN INTERVIEW - I.E. PEOPLE BEING EMPOWERED, BRINGING SYSTEMS ENG. BACK, NAMING PLANT MANAGERS

HIS PERSPECTIVE IS THAT SR. MGMT HAVING DIRECT INPUT INTO PLANT OPERATING DDECISION BEGAN WITH 8/2000 [REDACTED] MEETING

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SAYS TARP PROCEDURE NOW USED SPARINGLY - WAS SCALED BACK BY PROCEDURE.