



NRC FORM 699 (9-2003)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION	DATE 06/20/2006
CONVERSATION RECORD			TIME 1:30pm
NAME OF PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU Donald Warren		TELEPHONE NO.	TYPE OF CONVERSATION <input type="checkbox"/> VISIT <input type="checkbox"/> CONFERENCE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONE <input type="checkbox"/> INCOMING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OUTGOING
ORGANIZATION Public Stakeholder			
SUBJECT Response to questions from Oyster Creek 2005 Annual Assessment Public Meeting on April 24, 2006.			
SUMMARY (Continues on Page 2)			
BACKGROUND During the Oyster Creek 2005 Annual Assessment public meeting on April 24, 2006 a public stakeholder (Donald Warren) provided the NRC 13 questions concerning a variety of issues including, the reactor vessel (core shroud), harden vent, spent fuel pool, thermolag 330, drywell liner/"sand bed region", tritium, and cooling towers. The Senior Resident Inspector (Marc S. Ferdas) committed to provide Mr. Warren a response to his questions. On May 23, 2006, Mr. Warren sent an email to Mr. Ferdas inquiring about the answers to his questions, and he provided some clarifying information to his original questions. In addition, Mr. Warren sent the Senior Resident Inspector an email on May 26, 2006, which contained three additional questions concerning Oyster Creek's plant shutdown due to a tube leak in the steam packing exhauster on May 5, 2006.			
CONVERSATION RECORD I contacted Mr. Warren at his home on June 20, 2006, in order to provide him with responses to his questions. Mr. Warren included Mr. Bill Costanzo in our conversation by performing a "3-way" call. The following information was provided on the topics listed above.			
CORE SHROUD: In 1994 Oyster Creek identified 2 core shroud horizontal cracks similar to that found by other BWR plants throughout the world. A repair was performed in 1994, which involved in stalling 10 "tie-rods" around the core shroud. Periodic inspections are performed on internal reactor vessel components, including the "tie-rods" in accordance with industry guidance. It should be noted that approximately a dozen plants worldwide have installed the "tie-rod" repair method to mitigate this issue.			
HARDEN VENT: A harden vent was installed at Oyster Creek as a result of NRC generic letter 89-16, and provides a means to performed a controlled depressurization of containment during a severe accident if long term decay heat removal capability was lost and overpressurization of containment was occurring. Containment would be vented through a harden vent to the main stack which would provide an elevated and monitored release. The information from instruments in the stack would be utilized to perform dose calculations.			
Continue on Page 2			
ACTION REQUIRED Provide a response to the additional questions asked by Mr. Warren.			
NAME OF PERSON DOCUMENTING CONVERSATION Marc S. Ferdas		SIGNATURE 	DATE 7/7/07
ACTION TAKEN No additional actions, see above for details.			
TITLE OF PERSON TAKING ACTION Senior Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek		SIGNATURE OF PERSON TAKING ACTION 	DATE 7/7/07

CONVERSATION RECORD (Continued)**SUMMARY (Continue on Page 3)**

Emergency operating procedures (EOPs) would direct use of the harden vent and the NRC would be monitoring plant conditions and AmerGen's actions if this was to occur. Fitzpatrick did not install a harden vent because they were able to utilize existing piping at their plant and this was reviewed by the NRC.

SPENT FUEL VUNERABILITY: There has been no provisions to enclose the spent fuel pool at Oyster Creek or any other nuclear facility with a reinforced concrete containment building if one does not exist. The NRC, other federal agencies, and licensees have taken and continue to take extensive actions to enhance protection and mitigating strategies.

THERMOLAG 330: Oyster Creek replaced thermolag 330 fire wrap with a different fire barrier material or determined that thermolag was no longer required in some areas of the plant. These changes were made between 1999 and 2001 in response to industry issues and NRC generic letter communications. The NRC performed fire protection inspections in 2002 and 2005 and did not identify any issues with Oyster Creek's passive fire barriers.

DRYWELL LINER: I was not able to provide information to Mr. Warren concerning his questions on this topic because the NRC's reviews on this are still in progress.

TRITIUM: Due to recent discoveries of inadvertent discharges of tritium to the environment, an assessment at all Exelon/AmerGen plants is being performed by the company. The review includes an assessment of systems that handle tritium. As part of the assessment, Exelon/AmerGen is performing groundwater and surface water sampling. The sampling includes beta and gamma emitters. In addition, the NRC in March 2006 created a task force to examine this issue. The task force is comprised of experts from the NRC's regional and headquarter offices. The task force will issue a written report summarizing their findings later this year. Additional information on the task force and tritium can be found at www.nrc.gov.

COOLING TOWER: The draft supplement to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement will address the issue of a closed cooling cycle (i.e., cooling tower). This document will be issued shortly and will be discussed at a public meeting on July 12, 2006 in Toms River, NJ.

STEAM PACKING EXHAUSTER: A tube failure in the steam packing exhauster resulted in a 50-60 gpm leak in May 2006. The leakage was all collected into the Oyster Creek floor drain system which is routed to the Radwaste system where it is processed and returned back to the plant's condensate system. At all time leakage was controlled and none of the leakage entered the groundwater. In order to stop the leak the steam exhauster needed to be removed from service and that can only be done when the turbine is removed from service.

At the conclusion of our discussion, Mr. Warren asked additional questions. I stated that I would have to get back to him after I had time to research the answers. The following questions were provided:

1. How long has ground water been the source of drywell liner corrosion?
2. What measures have been taken to mitigate the corrosive effects of groundwater intrusion to the impeded region of the drywell?
3. Above the impeded region of the drywell does Oyster Creek have cracks?
4. Does the core shroud have vertical and diagonal cracks since the rods installed?

Mrs. Justine DeVries, Office Assistant - Oyster Creek was also present when I discussed the response to Mr Warren's questions.

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