

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.  
Millstone Power Station  
Rope Ferry Road  
Waterford, CT 06385



**Dominion™**

JUN 30 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attention: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555


Serial No. 06-513  
MPS Lic/GJC R0  
Docket No. 50-336  
License No. DPR-65

**DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.**  
**MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2**  
**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2006-005-00**  
**INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF 'A' MOTOR DRIVEN**  
**AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP**

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2006-005-00, documenting an event that occurred at Millstone Power Station Unit 2, on May 2, 2006. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), as an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. David W. Dodson at (860) 447-1791, extension 2346.

Very truly yours,

  
J. Alan Price  
Site Vice President - Millstone

JE22

Attachments: 1

Commitments made in this letter: None.

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415

Mr. V. Nerses  
Senior Project Manager  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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Mr. S. M. Schneider  
NRC Senior Resident Inspector  
Millstone Power Station

**Attachment 1**

**Licensee Event Report 2006-005-00**  
**Inadvertent Actuation of 'A' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump**

**Millstone Power Station Unit 2**  
**Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC)**

<b>NRC FORM 366</b> (6-2004)	<b>U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION</b>	<b>APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104</b>	<b>EXPIRES 06/30/2007</b>
<b>LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)</b> (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)			
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.			

<b>1. FACILITY NAME</b> Millstone Power Station - Unit 2	<b>2. DOCKET NUMBER</b> 05000336	<b>3. PAGE</b> 1 OF 3
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**4. TITLE**  
Inadvertent Actuation of 'A' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
05	02	2006	2006 - 005 - 00			06	30	2006	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

<b>9. OPERATING MODE</b>	1	<b>11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)</b>								
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)					
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)					
<b>10. POWER LEVEL</b>		100		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)			
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)					
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER					
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A					
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)						
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)						
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						

**12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER**

<b>NAME</b> David W. Dodson, Supervisor Nuclear Station Licensing	<b>TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)</b> 860-447-1791
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**13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT**

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

<b>14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED</b>				<b>15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE</b>		
<input type="checkbox"/>	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO			

**16. ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On May 2, 2006 at approximately 1430, with Millstone Power Station Unit 2 at 100% power, the 'A' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump automatically started during restoration following surveillance testing. The operators immediately realized that this was an unexpected response and secured the pump. Since the input parameters for the initiation of automatic auxiliary feed (i.e., steam generator level and pressurizer pressure), were within the normal ranges, the start signal for the 'A' MDAFW pump was not valid.

The actuation of the 'A' MDAFW pump is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

The cause of this event was personnel error, I&C technicians did not ensure proper procedure place keeping protocol was followed and inadvertently skipped two steps in the procedure.

There were no safety consequences associated with this event.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Millstone Power Station - Unit 2	05000336	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		2006	-- 005 --	00	

**NARRATIVE** (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

1. Event Description

Millstone Power Station (MPS) Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System [BA] consists of two Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) Pumps [P] and a Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump [P]. All of the pumps provide feedwater to both of the Steam Generators (SG) [AB]. The normal use of the AFW System is to supply feedwater during plant startups until main feedwater is available. The system also provides for decay heat removal until the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is placed on Shutdown Cooling. During power operations, the AFW System is aligned for automatic start of the MDAFW Pumps on either low SG level or high Pressurizer (PZR) [AB] pressure.

On May 2, 2006 at approximately 1430, with MPS Unit 2 at 100% power, the 'A' MDAFW pump started after the pump control switch was placed in the 'Normal' position following surveillance testing by Instrument & Controls (I&C) personnel.

The I&C surveillance was being performed to satisfy the monthly Engineering Safety Features (ESF) Channel Functional Test requirements identified in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.1, Table 4.3-2 for AFW (for SG Low Level and Automatic Actuation Logic) and SG Blowdown (for SG Low Level). In addition, this testing satisfies the monthly Reactor Protection (RPS) Channel Functional Test requirements identified in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.3.1.1.1, Table 4.3-1 for SG Water Level – Low.

The event occurred during the performance of the 'Time Delay Relay Test' section of the surveillance. This section verifies that after receiving a start signal from the system logic, the time delay relays initiate a signal to start the 'A'/B' MDAFW pumps after approximately 3 minutes and 25 seconds. During this relay testing I&C personnel failed to remove a jumper as required by the surveillance procedure. This resulted in the 'A' MDAFW pump starting as soon as the operator restored the pump control switch to the 'Normal' position following completion of testing. The operators immediately realized that this was an unexpected response and secured the pump. Since the input parameters for the initiation of automatic auxiliary feedwater (i.e., SG level and PZR pressure), were within the normal ranges, the start signal for the 'A' MDAFW pump was not valid.

The actuation of the 'A' MDAFW pump is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

2. Cause

The cause of this event was personnel error in that the I&C technician did not adequately adhere to the requirements of a Continuous Use procedure as defined by the Dominion administrative procedure on procedure adherence and usage. This allowed the technician to miss two restoration steps in the surveillance procedure resulting in the inadvertent start of the 'A' MDAFW pump.

3. Assessment of Safety Consequences

The AFW System is normally used to supply feedwater during plant startups until main feedwater is available. The system also provides for decay heat removal until the RCS is placed on Shutdown Cooling. During power operations, the AFW System is aligned for automatic initiation on either low SG level or high PZR pressure. The AFW Pumps pump cold water into the SG from the condensate storage tank (CST). This could have lowered reactor coolant temperatures, causing a corresponding drop in PZR level and pressure. Additionally, the cooler RCS water could have added positive reactivity to the core, potentially causing a power excursion, however the operators immediately realized what had occurred and secured the pump within 30 seconds of the pump start. Therefore, there were no safety consequences associated with this event.

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**NARRATIVE** (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

4. Corrective Action

Corrective actions are being taken in accordance with the station's corrective action program.

5. Previous Occurrences

None

Energy Industry Identification System (EIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].