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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ORIGINAL

Title: Interview of [redacted]

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: [redacted]

Date: Tuesday, December 16, 2003

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW

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IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.

[redacted] : 1-2003-051F

(CLOSED) :

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Tuesday, December 16, 2003

[redacted]

The above-entitled interview was conducted at 9:40 a.m.

BEFORE:

Special Agent EILEEN NEFF, NRC/RI/OI

Sr. Special Agent JEFFREY TEATOR, NRC/RI/OI

1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2 (9:40 a.m.)

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is
4 December 16, 2003. The time is approximately
5 9:40 a.m.

6 Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff,
7 U.S. NRC, Region I, Office of Investigations. Also
8 present from the same office is Senior Special Agent
9 Jeffrey Teator.

10 This interview is going to be conducted
11 with [redacted] currently
12 employed as a [redacted] by PSEG Nuclear at the
13 Salem facility.

14 The interview is taking place at
15 [redacted]

16 And, [redacted] we talked about before going on
17 the record the purpose of this interview today is just
18 part of an inquiry that the region is conducting into
19 concerns that have been raised regarding the safety
20 conscious work environment at Salem and Hope Creek.

21 [redacted] Okay.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: My understanding is
23 that your work experience at the site is limited to
24 Salem. We'll be pretty much sticking to the Salem
25 site.

1 [redacted] That's correct.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. I also

3 explained to you that you are not the subject. You're

4 being approached as -- more or less as a witness to

5 the work environment based on your experience there.

6 Not only are you not the subject, there are no

7 specific violations associated with the safety

8 conscious work environment issues that we're looking

9 at.

10 [redacted] Okay.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Before we go into any

12 questioning, what I'd like to do is place you under

13 oath. If you would raise your right hand, please. Do

14 you swear that the testimony you are about to provide

15 is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

16 truth, so help you God?

17 [redacted] I do.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Could you

19 provide some background information for the record,

20 some identifying information such as your date of

21 birth and Social Security Number?

22 [redacted]

23

24

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And education

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1 background?

2 [redacted]

3 [redacted]

4 [redacted]

5 [redacted]

6 [redacted]

7 [redacted]

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When did you start at

9 [redacted]

10 [redacted] It would have been [redacted]

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted]

12 [redacted]

13 [redacted]

14 [redacted]

15 [redacted]

16 [redacted]

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And in [redacted]

18 then?

19 [redacted]

20 [redacted]

21 [redacted]

22 [redacted]

23 [redacted]

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When did you

25 become a [redacted]

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1 [redacted] It would have been the
2 summer three years ago, so it would have been the
3 summer of [redacted]
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: (Inaudible)
5 SRO?
6 [redacted] Yes.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
8 [redacted]
9 [redacted]
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Your management
12 structure back at -- when you came on board in [redacted]
13 [redacted]
14 [redacted] Can you recall?
15 [redacted] The first one I recall is
16 [redacted] I believe he became [redacted]
17 shortly after -- oh, no, no, I'm sorry. It was [redacted]
18 [redacted] I guess was the [redacted] He
19 moved up. [redacted] at that
20 point, and then we've gone through a succession of ops
21 managers since. I believe it goes something like --
22 let's see, it was -- it was [redacted]
23 [redacted] Oh, I'm
24 sorry, [redacted] I think or --
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Might have been

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1 [redacted]

2 [redacted] I think it was -- yeah,

3 [redacted] Who's after

4 [redacted]

5 [redacted]

6 [redacted] He's a relatively new arrival.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So there was at least

8 five up until --

9 [redacted] Yeah, that I can --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- [redacted]

11 [redacted] -- that I can -- that I can

12 recall. A portion of that time I was in license

13 class.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And how about

15 AOMs?

16 [redacted] We've had quite a few of

17 those. The structure has changed several times. It's

18 really -- the people I can think of is -- do you mean

19 there has -- there has been at times three AOMs.

20 There is currently --

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

22 [redacted] -- [redacted] When there

23 were -- among the [redacted] are -- [redacted] at

24 times. [redacted] was an [redacted] at a point,

25 although I think the title was actually different

70

there, because he was quite a while ago.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this specifically for the operating shifts?

[redacted] The operating shift ones that I recall are [redacted] Those are the ones that come to mind.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted] is in place now.

[redacted] Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What about in terms of [redacted] - you know, your peers? Were you seeing as much change at your peer level, too?

[redacted] Well, yeah. Actually, the -- I've been in position three and a half years approximately. And I -- among the [redacted] on shift, I've probably been on shift longer than anyone except for [redacted] who has been on shift for like [redacted] So that gives you a relative timeline.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It goes from 16 down to three and a half?

[redacted] To three and a half.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then, less than that.

[redacted] Well, [redacted] was within

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a month of becoming a [redacted] so he might be -- you know, three -- whatever I am minus a month.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[redacted] There's --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He's close to your --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Same --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- experience?

[redacted] Yeah. [redacted] He came from [redacted] He was an RO there. And then behind us are [redacted] who became [redacted]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So the real length of experience is with [redacted] then.

[redacted] Yeah. I mean, he's got more experience as [redacted] than probably almost anybody I've run into in the industry.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What we're interested in talking about is what I explained to you -- is the safety conscious work environment. That's kind of a broad concept and a title that -- you may be thinking of issues that don't necessarily fall under -- you know, get titled that all the time.

[redacted] Sure.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What we're
2 considering as part of that are the ability for
3 individuals to raise concerns of a nuclear safety
4 nature, their ability to do so without fear of
5 retaliation, and the response to the concerns that
6 they get when -- if and when a concern is raised.
7 And also, for someone at your level, we're
8 also interested in the decisionmaking that goes on
9 primarily about, you know, plant operations.
10 [redacted] Sure.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In considering that,
12 have you seen any changes in what we'll term the
13 safety conscious work environment from the time that
14 you started -- let's go back the three and a half
15 years as the [redacted] Have you seen any changes
16 in the work environment in that timeframe until now?
17 [redacted] Well, the biggest change
18 I've seen in that time period is the relationship
19 between the -- primarily equipment operators and
20 management has deteriorated. I think there is -- it's
21 not a very good relationship. I think it has gotten
22 -- it has actually gotten worse over the last six or
23 eight months in light of, you know, hirings and people
24 coming back to work, and things like that. There's
25 some animosity there.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When did you see it
2 start to deteriorate?
3 [redacted] Probably two or three years
4 -- probably a couple years ago, I'm guessing. I mean,
5 the -- I mean, my -- my perception is I'm sure
6 significantly different than the equipment operators,
7 but the -- part of my perception and my biggest worry
8 is that lots of people will -- some people in
9 management think that safety is being used as a
10 weapon.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: By the union?
12 [redacted] By the union. And I've got
13 some -- some absolute examples of it. And my fear is
14 not that, because, you know what? They can use it as
15 a weapon, and we'll deal with that as -- as it comes.
16 But that somewhere along the line somebody is going to
17 make a decision saying, well, that's just another
18 example of them beating us over the head with safety,
19 and they make the wrong choice.
20 You know, they say -- they say, oh,
21 there's ulterior motives here. And my supervisor
22 says, "Ah, you know, I disagree with you. You're just
23 -- you're just beating me over the head with safety."
24 And he makes the wrong choice because of it. I think
25 that's the real organizational risk.

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have you seen
2 an example where that happened?
3 [redacted] No, I haven't, because I
4 talk to my guys about it a lot. I mean, my -- and
5 I've got -- I've got actually some -- some pretty
6 level-headed fellows on my shift. But nobody can say
7 that it doesn't color their opinions somewhat or color
8 their actions, because, you know, if you're -- one
9 thing you're thinking is, boy, I wonder what this guy
10 is angling at.
11 You're not thinking, geez, you know, this
12 guy is -- this guy has got -- let me look into it.
13 You know, if your first response is, geez, let me look
14 into this, I assume this is a valid concern.
15 Then you're coming from not a very good
16 place, and that's -- that's my primary concern, that
17 management allows themselves to be put in that
18 position. They make wrong assumptions, and then
19 something -- something unfortunate happens, and it's
20 -- it's certainly a potential.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have you had
22 situations where your management has thought that way
23 -- you know, this is just another union, the way the
24 union is trying to get at us?
25 [redacted] Well, I --

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That kind of
2 seems like what you were hinting at?
3 [redacted] Yeah. I --
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That was the --
5 [redacted] I've got examples where I
6 think that was -- it was used, I would say,
7 unethically, safety was used to create an advantage.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: By the union.
9 [redacted] By the union. By the union
10 or by union --
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What kind of
12 issues are you talking about?
13 [redacted] Let's see, the first month
14 I was in position -- so this was over three years ago
15 -- we had a feedwater leak. And the feedwater leak
16 was on the turbine-building roof. It had water with
17 hydrazone in it, and it was going at I'm guessing
18 hundreds of gallons a minute. You know, we're on the
19 order of 100 gallons a minute into the storm drain
20 system.
21 We stabilized the plant low in power, and,
22 you know, late in shift, you know, the shift -- the
23 crew is working very hard to get this under control,
24 get everything stabilized. And it was pretty hair
25 actually stabilizing the unit where we wanted it.

But it came down to the point where the leak was still not isolated. The valve was up there, it was still leaking, and we had to get -- send people up there to isolate the leak. We had already tried several times. There was probably 100-degree water up there spraying on the roof, and we're trying to get the leak isolated.

I had been up in the water; so had a number of my supervisors and a lot of the workers. So pretty much everybody was soaked by the end of the day.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Clean water or contaminated?

[redacted] No, it was clean. It was -- it was feedwater, but it had hydrazone in it, like five or ten parts per billion. Low levels, but stuff that we didn't want to release to the environment.

So we're trying to get this leak isolated, and then the steward on my shift comes up and we're doing tagging associated with getting the leak isolated. And he basically says, "Hey, we worked really hard tonight. I'd like to -- I'd like to just -- you know, we're all wet. We'd rather just not work the last hour of shift." You know, it was like an hour and a half before the end of shift. "We'd like

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1 to just stop," you know, and I said, "Well, this isn't
2 a night we can do that. We need you to keep working
3 and keep -- keep tagging."
4 And there became a safety issue that the
5 -- that they didn't know what was -- the health
6 effects of the hydrazone-laden water, which is true.
7 So what I -- the way I handled it was, okay, we'll
8 call a safety committee together, we'll handle the
9 safety -- so this leak is ongoing for this whole
10 period of time.
11 Ideally, you can go up there with two
12 supervisors and we isolate. And about that time the
13 safety committee says, "Hey, you just need rain gear."
14 Now, there could have been a health effect
15 there. I wouldn't send anybody into an environment
16 that I was concerned about, but we're talking five ppm
17 that, you know, we've been in all night.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You knew that
19 going in.
20 [redacted] Right. And it only became
21 an issue after I tell the guys to go back to work, we
22 really can't take the last hour off, because we've
23 worked really hard.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was the
25 [redacted] that came to you with that request?

1 [redacted]

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

3 [redacted] And then, when I go to the

4 guys, I heard this safety concern. So I go out and

5 talk to the workers that we're asking to do this, and

6 I say, "Hey, what's the concern?" And they're like,

7 "Hey, we don't have a concern." I go, "What do you

8 mean?" "The union told us not to do it."

9 I said, "What do you mean?" And they said

10 -- they said, "There's a concern, and we shouldn't --

11 we shouldn't go up there. I'm sorry." They

12 apologized to me. It was like, hey, I've got to --

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. They've

14 got to do it; they're union people.

15 [redacted] That's certainly their

16 perspective. I said, "Okay. I'm not going to put you

17 in that position, but we'll get to the bottom of it."

18 So we started this safety thing. And the whole thing

19 is?

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can we take a quick

21 break?

22 [redacted] Okay. I'm releasing

23 hydrazone water above the --

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Excuse me.

25 (Whereupon, the proceedings in the

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1 foregoing matter went off the record
2 briefly.)
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- and then
4 I'll follow up.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's approximately
6 9:57.
7 [redacted] I mean, it's too
8 conservative, right, I don't want to put my people at
9 risk, at least not unreasonable risk. There's risk
10 associated with operating a powerplant.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
12 [redacted] But then again I've got a
13 responsibility to the environment, and I'm
14 releasing --
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.
16 [redacted] And I think they ended up
17 releasing -- it was something like a 250,000 gallon
18 release to the environment that went on several hours
19 longer than it absolutely had to, because of this
20 issue. And that was -- and that was my -- you know,
21 I was like (inaudible).
22 You can talk safety, but the timing is
23 what it was. If they had called up the first time and
24 said, "Hey, we didn't understand about the -- don't
25 know about this hydrazone," I go, "Hey, good point.

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1 We're not going to send you up there until it's, you
2 know, resolved." But, you know, it wasn't -- that
3 wasn't the case, so that was -- that was like my first
4 month in the position. So that kind of left a bad
5 taste in my mouth.
6 But it's been relatively uneventful up
7 until the time -- well, the most recent one I can
8 think of was a number of guys were asked to come back
9 to shift from training. They clearly didn't want --
10 the union did not like the fact that they were brought
11 back from training.
12 So when they got -- got to the shift to
13 help the shift out -- so they were in the plant to do
14 some training and they said, "Hey, if you're done with
15 your training, go help the shift out." They go to the
16 shift, and [redacted]
17 and they started throwing up safety issues.
18 Well, that's a confined space, and, you
19 know, it had never been a confined space before. This
20 is an issue that was brought up during our previous
21 week of training. I talked to the safety rep and
22 said, "Hey, you know, they kind of have a different
23 opinion or a different definition of confined space.
24 We've got some spaces out there in the plant. Are you
25 going to address this?" And the safety guy says,

1 "Yeah, I'll take care of that."

2 Well, then he -- the next week he goes to

3 the plant when he's assigned to the plant and says,

4 "No, we can't" -- you know, he waits until after the

5 brief is done and says -- they're sending him out and

6 the plant says, "Oh, can't do that. That's a confined

7 space."

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When did this

9 happen?

10 [redacted] This happened, I don't

11 know, the summer.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Of this year?

13 [redacted] Yeah, of this year. So --

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And who was involved

15 in that? Was it --

16 [redacted]

17 [redacted] And I -- you know, the truth of the matter

18 is I didn't disagree with him doing that, but his --

19 part of his job function is resolving it ahead of

20 time. He told me a week before that he would resolve

21 this issue, and he waits until he's going out into the

22 field to basically throw it as a -- okay, now you deal

23 with it, you know. And, you know -- 7C

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that done on the

25 same day that they were pulled out of training and

placed --

[redacted] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- on shift?

[redacted] It was done that afternoon.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[redacted] So effectively they got no work done. It was only like an hour and a half they were going to help the shift out. So after they -- you know, there were enough of these -- you know, that kind of issue brought up, but basically nothing got done, and all it did is frustrate the on-duty shift manager and, you know -- and I had talked -- and it was frustrating because I had talked to him the day before.

I go, "Hey, look, I know this is not popular, but, hey, you know, just go down there and chip in for -- for -- you know, for the rest of the afternoon." You know, maybe we -- you know, we'll call an early day on the end of the week, and, you know, the union wanted to make a point that --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Well, you've talked about -- you've given us two examples of the union guys raising safety issues which you feel were somewhat unethical.

[redacted] Right. You know, in both

1 case, though, I don't feel that the safety issues
2 themselves were really wrong.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
4 [redacted] I just feel that they were
5 -- they were used as political weapons as opposed to,
6 you know, trying to make sure the job was safe.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: To stop
8 working.
9 [redacted] Right.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They were legitimate,
11 but it was the timing.
12 [redacted] Right. Right. Absolutely.
13 And what I'm afraid of is if somebody says --
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
15 [redacted] -- same situation, right?
16 "Hey, I think that's a confined space." The guy goes,
17 "Oh. It's you again, and you're raising this -- this
18 concern."
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Has that
20 happened?
21 [redacted] Not to my knowledge.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
23 [redacted] Not to my knowledge. But
24 -- and if it did, I think that would be a big problem.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It could. Some

of (inaudible).

[redacted] Right, exactly. I mean, and you could -- the fact of the matter is you can put people at risk and not injure them. All right. You can be putting them at risk and not injure them. No harm, no foul, right?

But the truth of the matter is I don't want my supervisors coloring their safety decisions on shenanigans -- for lack of a better word -- that are being -- being played with, you know.

But no, to reiterate, I don't know of that happening, and I don't know if any of my supervisors would, you know, make a decision that would put somebody at physical risk.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Let me ask you this question before Eileen goes on to something else. You indicated that your management knows that you're being interviewed by OI today?

[redacted] Yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is that correct?

[redacted] Yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And who did you talk to again? Who did you --

[redacted] I talked to [redacted]

1 and then I was at a grievance response with [redacted]
2 [redacted] And the grievance is associated with raising
3 concerns, actually -- and I'd be happy to give you
4 whatever documentation on that if you want. But the
5 grievance and -- he said, you know, that this
6 investigation was ongoing. I said, "I know. I
7 realize that. And I just was asked to be
8 interviewed." And he said, "Okay," you know, that was
9 his --
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did [redacted]
11 approach you and ask you if you were being
12 interviewed, or did you --
13 [redacted] No, I offered -- I offered
14 that up to him. I just -- it was a surprise to me
15 that I would be interviewed, so I asked him, I said,
16 "Is this something that we expected? Is ops
17 management, you know, being asked?" And he said
18 you're the first that he -- he was aware of. You
19 know, I was the first that he was aware of.
20 And he said -- he said the resident had
21 been given a list of names, and maybe they're starting
22 to work their way through the list of names.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you given
24 any direction how you should respond to questions we
25 ask?

1 [redacted] No.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Any type of

3 coaching?

4 [redacted] No.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Prepping?

6 [redacted] No.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you have a

8 group meeting with any of your other shift managers to

9 talk about this investigation?

10 [redacted] No. No.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. You

12 mentioned something about the grievance.

13 [redacted] Right.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What is that?

15 [redacted] Well, I mean, timing is

16 poor, but basically it amounts to this. [redacted]

17 on several occasions -- in fact, since his last

18 appraisal he was talked to about this. He'll take it

19 upon himself to do what I would consider

20 investigations.

21 You know, if he hears about somebody else

22 doing, you know, something, he won't raise the concern

23 to management, but he'll look into it. And he'll be

24 on a duty station, but he'll be looking into

25 something. In this particular case, he was the

1 primary watch, so his watch would have been in the ops
2 building.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
4 [redacted] The secondary watch raised
5 a concern to him over prereqs that were signed off and
6 a procedure. One safety -- you know, wasn't a safety
7 significance to it. It's just, hey, technically,
8 should he -- should it be signed off? Should -- how
9 should it be documented? That kind of thing. Really
10 had very little impact on the actual completion of the
11 task.
12 But it looks like they're trying to
13 collect data that -- you know, that this -- this sign
14 up which we have (inaudible) all our procedures is --
15 is poorly implemented.
16 So it gets to [redacted] is
17 walking around with a copy of the procedure in the
18 control room and asking questions. The supervisor
19 says, "What are you doing?" and he says, "Nothing."
20 And then the supervisor gets agitated,
21 comes in and talks to me, I said -- I said, you know,
22 "Let me talk to him." I said, "This is" -- he said,
23 "This is exactly what I talked to him about on his
24 appraisal. You know, if he's got concerns, raise
25 them, with whatever means he wants. But don't --

1 don't just walk around, do an investigation, and not
2 tell anybody what you're doing, especially if you've
3 got an assigned duty somewhere else."
4 So I sat down with him and talked to him
5 about it. I said, "Hey, look, you know, we want you
6 to raise concerns," and I used those words. "We need
7 to do some coaching if you're going to -- if you're
8 going to use your time away from your watch station to
9 perform impromptu investigations. That's not your
10 job. Raise the concerns however you want. You know
11 -- you know, no -- write a notification, tell your
12 supervisor, tell somebody else" --
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Put it in
14 process.
15 [redacted] Put it in process.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
17 [redacted] But I don't -- I don't want
18 you, you know, taking time away from your duty station
19 and making my -- my supervisor feel like, you know,
20 geez, you know, what's he investigating on me now?
21 And he -- my supervisor was pretty agitated by it.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was the
23 supervisor?
24 [redacted] And it's
25 happened to him before with this same individual. Now

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1 [redacted] side of it is, "Hey, people bring me
2 concerns. I don't want to go off half-cocked, so I
3 look into them." I said, "That's fine." I said, "But
4 tell us what you're doing. And if we think it's
5 worthwhile, we'll give you the nod. If not, just put
6 it in the system and let the system work."
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So he grieved
8 your coaching of him?
9 [redacted] He grieved my coaching,
10 primarily that I put it in his file.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. You gave
12 him a letter?
13 [redacted] No. I just documented the
14 conversation I had with him. I gave coaching, which
15 is -- which is not discipline. It's just, hey, you
16 know, I'm giving you some feedback on how you're
17 behaving. You know, I felt like it undermined the
18 supervisors and, you know, there's other ways to raise
19 -- raise the concerns.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So he grieved
21 to the union on that?
22 [redacted] He brought a grievance --
23 oh, yes -- associated with that.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And how did his
25 talk about our investigation come up as part of that?

1 [redacted] Well, it -- he basically in
2 the grievance said that, you know, I was discouraging
3 him from raising concerns. And actually, I've got a
4 copy upstairs of the response if you want it -- of the
5 response to the grievance.
6 And the response to the grievance says,
7 "No, I'm not -- I'm not" -- you know, first of all,
8 when he raised it, it says, "Hey, you know, I'm being"
9 -- he said, "I was being harassed, and that I'm being
10 discouraged from raising concerns." I said, "Oh,
11 that's a big deal." I brought it right to our -- to
12 our employee concerns guys, [redacted]
13 I brought it right over to him, I said,
14 "Hey, this is the grievance. This is the coaching I
15 gave him." I go, "Am I out of line?" I said,
16 "Because if I am, I want to tell the guy right away
17 and make things right." And he looked at it, and he
18 gave me his opinion on it, and then we sent it over to
19 -- to the legal guys and said, "Hey, you know, are we
20 putting our -- you know, am I putting the company at
21 risk by coaching somebody on this?"
22 Because I know right -- it's a fine line
23 between regulating somebody's -- where they're
24 spending their time of the day, and, you know, am I
25 discouraging them from raising concerns. So I knew it

1 was kind of a hot potato.

2 So that goes through the first step of the

3 grievance response, which, like I said, I can provide

4 for you is -- is given to him that basically says,

5 "No, we want you to raise concerns via whatever

6 mechanism you want, but it doesn't mean that you're

7 paid to do, you know, investigations and formal

8 (inaudible).

9 That goes --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So [redacted] and legal

11 took the same position? Did they support --

12 [redacted] Yeah, they supported --

13 they said -- they said that seems reasonable, it seems

14 like a reasonable measured response to his activity.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was this decision to

16 coach -- was this made by you?

17 [redacted] Yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you alone? Or

19 did you have input from anywhere else?

20 [redacted] I talked to the [redacted]

21 within several hours of it. I don't know if I talked

22 to him before or after it, but he was aware within an

23 hour or two of me coaching him, because -- mostly

24 because I felt like knowing [redacted] his

25 propensity, he kind of goes to the [redacted] when

he's got issues.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That would be [redacted] then?

[redacted] Yes. So [redacted] was aware of it. I don't think [redacted] was onsite that day. I'm not positive. But he was aware of it the next time I saw him, so --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[redacted] -- talked to [redacted] So that gets us to the point where [redacted] gets a second step grievance. [redacted] basically says, "Hey, I want this to go away. We've got this investigation going on, and I want this grievance to go -- you know, basically make it go away. And so what I want to do is just pull it out of his file."

And I said, "I disagree." I said that the actions he was taking weren't -- I mean, specifically, if you look at contractually, in the contract it says that you will perform union investigations. I wouldn't say this is a union investigation he was doing because it was associated with operational activities.

But he won't do union investigations without management approval. You know, somebody is, you know, taking time away from your duties without --

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: (Inaudible)
2 job.
3 [redacted] Right. So I used the same
4 kind of logic. I go, "Look, I'm not saying don't do
5 it. Just tell -- be up front and tell the supervisor
6 what you're doing." He -- but the supervisor -- if
7 you ever talk to him -- very direct, [redacted]
8 not -- and he'll tell you exactly what he's saying.
9 I said, "Look, this guy is a direct guy.
10 Give him the same -- same respect. Be direct with
11 him. Say hey, look, I've got a concern about how you
12 signed off this step, not a safety issue, but, you
13 know, how to do this." And then let him deal with it.
14 And if you don't like his response -- this is what I
15 told him, "If you don't like his response, you come to
16 me. And if you don't like my response, you go to my
17 boss," and any other way you want. And that's where
18 the open door policy comes in.
19 But if you don't give them an opportunity
20 to broach the issue, then it kind of undermines him
21 for you to be going around investigating. You know,
22 so that was my -- my coaching and my request to him.
23 We're still in the process of discussing how we're
24 going to handle the second step.
25 But kind of similar discussion of what we

1 were previously holding, the fact that things are
2 going on that are coloring people's decisions. And I
3 think this is a -- it was a reasonable and measured
4 response to this guy's behavior. He doesn't want it
5 in his file, and we're considering pulling it out of
6 his file, which personally I don't really support, but
7 we'll see.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you saying that
9 that's in part due to what's going on, the things that
10 are going on, that that related in part to this
11 inquiry?
12 [redacted] Well, it --
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted] didn't
14 want it in his file?
15 [redacted] I think in -- well,
16 actually, yeah, he said that in light of, you know,
17 recent things, he said that, you know, that was just
18 -- and he also, I think more strongly than that, he
19 felt that, you know, he said I -- he didn't feel that
20 it would hold up going forward to arbitration. And I
21 said, "Well, I respectfully disagree." TC
22 I said -- I said, "This is something I
23 doubt that you go to arbitration," but he said, "Well,
24 you know, it's" -- he wanted to make sure he both got
25 -- he both got the message that we want his concerns,

1 but he also got the message that we don't want him
2 performing impromptu investigations of the
3 supervision.
4 So how he gets to that point, he wants to
5 make -- he's the new guy in a position, and he's
6 trying to make a relationship with the union. So he's
7 trying to -- he's trying to basically get to the point
8 where they are happy, but they also get the message.
9 And I can understand that.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.
11 [redacted] So he may pull the words
12 out.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. When we were
14 asking -- I was asking you before about any changes
15 that you noted since you've been on as a [redacted]
16 [redacted], and you went immediately to this -- the union
17 management issue. I wanted to ask you, what do you
18 attribute that to? Did you see changes from one
19 direction or the other, or --
20 [redacted] Well --
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- what does that
22 come from?
23 [redacted] I'm not sure I'd attribute
24 it to -- to some strong personalities in the union.
25 There are also some very strong personalities in

1 management that are trying to make some changes that
2 are not popular.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What kind of changes?
4 [redacted] Just efficiency kind of
5 things, like how you handle overtime, how you call
6 overtime, how many operators you need on a shift, you
7 know, do you can those -- the NCOs to relieve inside
8 the control room. You know, all things that, you
9 know, you're comparing your organization with, you
10 know, benchmarks, and you say, you know, we're kind
11 of --
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Try and be more
13 efficient.
14 [redacted]: Right. Right. We're kind
15 of out of line on this one, and it -- it does affect
16 people's pocketbooks ultimately.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Staffing changes that
18 affect their pay.
19 [redacted] Correct.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What about
21 anything else?
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about at --
23 [redacted] Well, firing [redacted]
24 probably was the biggest incendiary device, the thing
25 that was done.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He was fired -- if I'm -- if I'm accurate, it was a fitness for duty issue, and he was later reinstated or --

[redacted] Yeah. I'd categorize it as an integrity issue more than anything else. But it was about a fitness for duty thing, so --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about at your level, though. Maybe not just between NEOs and management, but changes in what you see and the way people react at your level. And the SROs -- they're considered management at the site I guess. They're not union people.

[redacted]: Hmm. I don't know. The SROs -- more was expected of the SROs over the last few years. Coming out of the extended outage -- and I was not -- I did not work here prior to the extended outage of both units. But apparently the NCOs did much more. The SROs were more supervisors, did less signing off of procedures.

There was basically a decision made that, hey, we want the -- we want the supervisor's fingers in the procedures. Fingers -- you know, actually doing -- being task-oriented less than supervisors. It wasn't what I was used to when I came here, but,

you know, you do what the status quo is.

We're moving kind of -- we're kind of doing a gradual shift to try to get the CRSs to be more -- more supervisory nature, less -- less, you know, hey, I'm signing off the prereqs of a procedure. Here, I'm going to brief you on this procedure, go do it. Letting the NCOs who are certainly capable of doing that --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The reactor operators.

[redacted] Right.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. What about from like a work environment perspective, though? People at your level and the SRO level. I think that's kind of what we want to get into.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. And when you -- we were asking about whether you observed any changes, consider in the work environment but at your level. One thing you mentioned was the union management issues. Did you see changes in other ways?

[redacted] Hmm. No. I mean, I certainly -- I certainly had some disagreements with management along the way -- you know, decisions that were made, things like that. But most of those disagreements were not in the -- they were in the

1 (inaudible) and conservative ops envelope, were we
2 going to operate, you know.
3 I'm thinking you have to be here, and it's
4 a management -- you know, if you're within your
5 license and within -- within, you know, reasonable
6 reliability standards, you've got a pretty wide
7 envelope. Most of my disagreements were, hey, we're
8 in that envelope where we're going to operate.
9 And I -- and I've argued, you know, the
10 more conservative, and I've argued the less
11 conservative from time to time. But we've had --
12 we've had issues where we were starting up with how
13 many circulators we want. We had a grassy season. We
14 had units shut down because of our circulators. And
15 it really comes down to you need like one circulator
16 to start the plant up. Probably not the best thing to
17 do, presumably then to -- you know, find your MS-10s,
18 and --
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's when the
20 plant was up, there was a grassy --
21 [redacted] Right. Well, actually, it
22 was up, and then it -- Unit 2 was down. We were
23 deciding -- we had said, "Hey, we want this many
24 circulators to start up." But, really, you need one,
25 and what it was coming down to is how many did we want

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for defense in depth.

And we had said we wanted four, I mean, reliably, and then we said, you know, we're going to get one back in a couple of hours, let's go anyway. So we started out with three.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So where were you on that equation? Were you on the more conservative side?

[redacted] On that particular one, I was on the more conservative side. I said, you know, if you draw a line in the sand that says, you know, four is what we want, I said four is what we should have.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[redacted] And there was -- there was very lively discussion --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[redacted] -- it could be with senior management associated with that, and --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, let's talk about who. Let's rewind.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you say "we," who are you --

[redacted] That particular discussion involved me, [redacted] -- I don't want to say

anybody that wasn't there. There -- I wasn't on shift, so the [redacted] -- and I'm trying to remember who that was. I think it was [redacted] was on the phone with us, and there might have -- there was probably a couple other people involved.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Who was on what side here?

[redacted] Well, me and [redacted] thought that we should -- we should hold the line and wait until we got more circulators back before starting -- starting the plant up.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What was [redacted] title at that point?

[redacted] He was the [redacted]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was he the license holder for the shift then?

[redacted] Do you mean was he the [redacted]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[redacted] No, I think it was [redacted] -- I think it was [redacted] for that shift.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what was his position on that --

[redacted] He was the [redacted]

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No, I mean his
2 position on this issue.
3 [redacted] He was on the fence, and I
4 think he supported -- it's kind of hard to say. I
5 think he -- he basically could have been -- he said --
6 you know, he could go either way. He didn't feel real
7 strongly one way or another as far as I could tell.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what was the
9 input from [redacted]
10 [redacted] His input was, is this a
11 management -- is this a safety decision or a
12 management decision was the kind -- the way he was
13 approaching it. And basically what it came down to
14 was, well, it's a safety management decision. It's
15 like how much safety do we want to go forward.
16 And my thinking was, hey, we should not go
17 forward without having (inaudible) that we will not
18 have to go back. In other words, we -- we -- I don't
19 have any problem with moving the plant forward.
20 If you go there and you've got enough
21 defense in depth that, you know, hey, something fails,
22 or a couple of things fail, whatever you -- based on
23 equipment reliability, you have a number of failures
24 that you think are reasonably possible, and you can
25 still keep the plant where you're moving it to, and

1 that was my position.

2 The decision I think on that issue was

3 that they'd move forward with -- with one fewer

4 circulators than I wanted.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They were both

6 forward three.

7 [redacted] Right. I think that was --

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: One was going

9 to come up, is that what --

10 [redacted] What?

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: One was going

12 to come up soon --

13 [redacted] Right. One was going to

14 come up, and I -- and I told [redacted] in this

15 case, I go, "Look," I go, "I will personally go out

16 and make sure the circulator comes back in the

17 earliest possible time. But let's just hold the plant

18 for it." And he said, "Well, you know, basically the

19 decision was made." It's like, hey, you know -- and

20 the on-duty shift manager went along with this.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The question

22 here is: who made that decision? And if it's

23 [redacted] why is he doing it?

24 [redacted] Well, I think the [redacted]

25 [redacted] made it.

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [redacted]

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted]

3 [redacted] I think he -- at that

4 point, [redacted] left because of frustration, and

5 I left because I was going to go get the (inaudible)

6 back, thinking that we were going to wait for the

7 circulator to come back. I went and, you know, worked

8 at getting this, you know, maintenance moving on the

9 circulator and getting them the support they needed.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

11 [redacted] And it turned out that they

12 started moving forward with the startup.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which after you

14 and [redacted] left -- I know I'm laughing, but it seems

15 like after the opposition left --

16 [redacted] I don't know if it wasn't

17 a fait accompli at that point anyway. I mean, I don't

18 think -- like I said, [redacted] who was really the

19 decisionmaker, that's his unit.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

21 [redacted] Right. He was the

22 decisionmaker. He was on the fence. He was getting

23 -- he was getting people saying that this was the

24 right decision. He was getting other people saying

25 this was the right decision. And then he had to make

1 the decision, and --

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Wa[redacted]

3 out of line in his persuasion of people during these

4 discussions on that? This is an opinion question.

5 But, I mean, did he cross the line there on what he

6 was trying to put forward?

7 [redacted] I didn't agree with his

8 position. I mean, I did not agree with his position.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What was his --

10 [redacted] I don't think -- I don't

11 think his position was the wrong -- I don't think it

12 was wrong. I just don't think it was in my comfort

13 zone.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What reasons

15 was he getting for his position?

16 [redacted] Basically saying -- and

17 it's actually a fairly persuasive argument. It's

18 like, hey, how many circulators do you need to start

19 up? You know, the answer is a very low number. How

20 many -- so any number above that is -- we're in the

21 conservative ops space, and we're making a management

22 decision. It's not a plant safety decision. It's a

23 management decision, and --

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You saw that it's

25 different. You saw that -- you thought that was

safety and management.

[redacted] Well, right. And I've got a philosophy of operating the unit that you don't set the unit at a place that you can't have some defense in depth.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[redacted] The fact that -- actually, I'm fairly proud of the cultural change that has happened, and this is a different event altogether. But last year we had a shutdown going into this outage due to circulators. And the on-duty shift managers and the AOMs and the ops managers continued to move the unit down right offline ahead of being forced to, which is the behavior that got us into the April 7th event.

So, and that's -- it's a safe philosophy to come from. If you are in a position where, hey, a circulator can go away and you're not going to have to necessarily move the plant, that's a good place to be.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[redacted] So the whole -- the way it went last spring when we had our heavy grassy spring --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[redacted] -- actually, just an

unprecedented grassing --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. That's what we've heard.

[redacted] -- we -- we had like five of the top ten grassing measurement days in our history. We did not have a situation where all of the circulators went away, or we -- we did not have the unit where it needed to be ahead of it needing to be there.

We moved it down 85 percent, and when we didn't get circulators back in time we moved it down further. But we didn't go up to 100 percent even though we got circulators back.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[redacted] We kept -- we -- and we ultimately ended up walking the unit down to the point where, hey, if we get down to this many circulators, we're going to move it down to here because we can -- we'll have a little defense in depth here.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. You're talking about a different incident here now.

[redacted] Well, actually, it was leading into the shutdown --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[redacted] -- that we're coming out

of.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's go back to the initial discussion we were having about [redacted] you, [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And I -- my mistake. I think I --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We want to finish that.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And then we'll move on.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Sorry about that. What you were saying was from where [redacted] was coming from, you needed the one circulator -- circulator to be where you were, and it was safe to have less than the four. So he was seeing it --

[redacted]: Sure.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- as a management decision.

[redacted] Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there more to it than that? Did he articulate more than that during this discussion?

[redacted] Well, he certainly applied

1 pressure, and there was -- he clearly did not agree
2 with the decision that was being made.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When you say
4 "he applied pressure," what did he do? What did he
5 say?
6 [redacted] I think the term "holding
7 the plant hostage" was used, which is -- which is a
8 catch phrase for ops isn't being reasonable, ops
9 making unreasonable demands.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He used the phrase.
11 [redacted] I believe so. I'm not
12 positive.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This is [redacted]
14 [redacted] Yes. If he did not use the
15 phrase, he used words to that effect. But that --
16 that is consistent with what he was saying. He's
17 like, hey, it's a management decision. Why are you
18 asking for the world? You know, I'm not going to give
19 you the world -- what has --
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And holding the plant
21 hostage on this management decision.
22 [redacted] Right. What -- I mean,
23 what is a reasonable -- what is reasonable? And there
24 was disagreement over what reasonable was.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had indicated
2 that [redacted] left over frustration. What
3 specifically caused that? Was there some sort of
4 turning point where --
5 [redacted] He didn't think we were
6 communicating. There was a phone -- it was a phone
7 conversation with [redacted] and he did not feel
8 that he was being listened to. That was my take on
9 it. He felt that he -- he verbalized his opinion, and
10 it was not -- not given value.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How long did the
12 conversation last?
13 [redacted] Twenty minutes, half an
14 hour.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Total from -- from
16 the time that the four of you were present, him on the
17 phone, [redacted] on the phone, and you,
18 [redacted] there.
19 [redacted] It's pretty vague at this
20 point. But, yeah, it might have been 15 minutes, you
21 know. I don't have a real clear idea of how long it
22 was. It was -- it was a phone conversation in the
23 control room with the doors closed, with some people
24 on the phone, and, like I said, a bunch of people and
25 a couple of them I don't actually -- I'd throw some

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1 names out there, but I'm not sure that they were
2 there.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let me ask you
4 this. If [redacted], what was
5 your --
6 [redacted] I was like an extra guy
7 that was just there to help. During shutdowns we
8 would bring in extra people.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Just --
10 [redacted] So I was not in the
11 decisionmaking at all.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have
13 conversations with [redacted] about this
14 decision?
15 [redacted] Yeah. Yeah, we did. I
16 mean, he -- he -- my recollection is that he said, you
17 know, he wanted us basically to -- he was comfortable
18 moving forward is what he gave -- he gave me the sense
19 that he was comfortable with moving the unit forward.
20 And he was the decisionmaker, I said, "Okay."
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he give you any
22 indication that [redacted] comments pressured him in
23 any way?
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: To doing
25 something he didn't want to do or didn't feel was

1 right.

2 [redacted] No. I -- I mean, we were

3 all trying to persuade each other. So pressure and

4 persuasion is -- certainly, I've got to believe he was

5 persuaded.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [redacted] has

7 got the power here, though, from his position.

8 [redacted] Oh, certainly. Certainly.

9 He's certainly a -- he was the [redacted]

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

11 [redacted] I can't speak for [redacted]

12 Obviously, it was apparent to me from the beginning,

13 though, that [redacted] was more of -- well, more of a, hey,

14 we could start it with three, and I -- I'm saying

15 three, maybe it was four, maybe it was five, I'm not

16 sure. But, hey, maybe we can start it with three

17 mind-set out of the gate.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So he differed

19 with you right from the beginning.

20 [redacted] I think he was -- he was

21 more accepting of that, you know. His comfort zone

22 was a little bit wider than mine, I should say. So it

23 was apparent to me at that -- I think we all went into

24 that room having our own opinion of, hey, what the

25 right -- you know, what the right line in the sand is,

1 what the right, you know, requirements to put on
2 ourselves was. And, you know, we -- I put out as
3 strongly as I could, you know, what my opinion was,
4 and at the end of it, you know --
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In the end
6 there was no license violation or tech spec violation.
7 [redacted] No. No.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You just needed
9 one, and you had one.
10 [redacted] Well, I mean, for license
11 you -- I don't think technically you need any. You
12 could probably go up -- start up on your MS-10s, which
13 are your steam belts. I don't think that would be an
14 unacceptable choice, but -- but -- so from that
15 perspective, you know, it's -- you know, four is --
16 having four times as many circulators as you need
17 enough?
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
19 [redacted] Is three -- right, is three
20 enough? So, I mean, it was -- it was -- like I said,
21 it was a rather -- a rather strong -- strong
22 discussion. But, I mean, from both sides -- I mean,
23 I --
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is there
25 another issue like that?

1 [redacted] Another issue.

2 (End of Tape 1, Side A. Beginning of Tape 1, Side B.)

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're beginning

4 Side B -- it's approximately 10:32 a.m. -- after just

5 a brief break.

6 On the grassing issue, had [redacted]

7 not been on the telephone and the discussion been

8 among the three of you, how long would the

9 conversation have lasted? Or do you think the

10 decision would have been made?

11 [redacted] I don't think it would have

12 been as lengthy, because we wouldn't have had a strong

13 opinion -- as strong or persuasive an opinion on the

14 other side of the argument. So the decision might

15 have been -- might have been different, and certainly

16 this wouldn't have been as protracted.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And we were

18 talking about kind of what you portrayed that you're

19 in an area -- a gray area, your comfort level being on

20 one side and that particular issue somebody else's

21 comfort level was on the other side of it.

22 [redacted] And I'm not trying to

23 portray myself as the guy that always is on that side

24 of the argument, because there's not --

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's fine.

1 [redacted] -- there's times when I'm
2 on the other side saying, you know, it's a management
3 decision, and it's not reasonable to ask for the
4 world, because it --
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And let's talk
6 about that. Let's go into both aspects of it -- areas
7 where that has happened -- again, where you're over
8 here, and then there's some senior management
9 intervention on -- or difference of opinion, and then
10 we'll go the other way and capture all of it.
11 [redacted] All right.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you think of
13 anything in that area, conservative thinking, where
14 you had that difference of opinion again?
15 [redacted] There was one about an SJ
16 -- there's two -- two sets of two valves in the
17 series. I believe this is Unit 2, SJ-4, 5, 12, and
18 13. They're injection valves.
19 And we've since redesigned them, so that
20 you don't need to have these valves closed or -- sorry
21 -- open. So we -- at the time we were checking on
22 them, we couldn't tell -- we -- the way these check
23 valves from the RCS leak back, you -- you have to
24 measure several valves at a time, and you get a
25 number.

The tech specs between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are different on how much leakage you're allowed to have. But we got some significant leakage on one set of these valves, and could not determine which valve it was from without some additional testing.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[redacted] Now, my opinion was I had some evidence that said I had some significant leakage. In other words, it was more than one gpm, which could (inaudible).

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. If it was all from one valve.

[redacted] My perspective was we -- we'd go and do the required testing, even if it takes some significant effort. This decision -- [redacted] and I were of this - [redacted] at the time.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What is the timeframe that we're looking at here?

[redacted] This was probably two years ago. [redacted] was the [redacted], and he agreed with me. We went into a meeting thinking that we were going to try to figure out how to do this testing, to determine it.

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I came in on a day off to try to -- you

1 know, to -- because I had been on through the weekend
2 where this issue came up. So I came in like a -- it
3 was like a Monday. We went into the meeting, and then
4 apparently [redacted] had been talked to that we
5 weren't going to test -- he's -- he came into that
6 meeting saying we weren't going to test them, and that
7 surprised me at the meeting.
8 I thought we were at a meeting, and so did
9 -- I think it was [redacted] was the engineering rep.
10 [redacted] was there, [redacted] and a number of
11 other people. We came -- I thought the meeting was
12 they were going to figure out how to test this valve.
13 And we don't have a test procedure written for it,
14 because we just didn't proceed as confluence of
15 events. 7C
16 We tried to make operability calls, use
17 9118 that says, hey, you kind of measure the timeframe
18 based on, you know, the timeframe of the tech spec
19 that you'd have to assume it was inoperable. So I
20 said, you know, it's something we should get on
21 relatively quickly. We should figure out where we
22 are, at least do some research on it.
23 So I thought we were going to go in this
24 meeting to make a decision -- make a technical plan to
25 test -- test, and then basically I came into the

meeting, and basically it was -- that was not what the meeting was about. The meeting was about we're not going to test, and we're going to -- we're going to figure out a way to engineer it away.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was on the -- this is [redacted] proffering that position. Who was on his side of the equation there?

[redacted] I believe it was [redacted]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you -- can you place everybody who was at that meeting?

[redacted] No. Absolutely not. I can certainly place some of the key players -- myself and [redacted] Like I said, there was -- [redacted] was the [redacted] I was the [redacted] over the weekend that came in, because I knew as much as anybody on it.

[redacted] I am almost positive was there. [redacted] who is a [redacted] was there.

I mean, my logic went something like this. I've got data that says I had leakage. You don't know which valve it's from, don't know which valve to call inoperable, don't know how to even determine which valve would be inoperable. Got an action that says isolated, you know --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's the

action from [redacted] we're going to isolate it?

[redacted] No, no, no. That's --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh.

[redacted] -- the action -- tech spec actions.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[redacted] If you have a leaking containment isolation check valve --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's prescribed.

[redacted] -- you prescribe -- you isolate it. And I said we should at least be taking continuous action to resolve the issue, and I thought the resolution was going to be do some kind of testing and isolate it.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But it went the other way.

[redacted] Yeah, it did. And I was surprised.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What were the justifications or the reasons given for what you're calling engineering it away?

[redacted]: You know, I -- it's been so long ago, I think what it came down to is there are a number of valves that are required to be open in accident conditions. So it makes very little sense

that they isolate during an accident --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Close.

[redacted] -- close and hold, because you'd be injecting via that path. I think they -- I think we -- we reengineered the valve some. I'm sure it's all documented. [redacted] even went -- if he's still -- he's [redacted] here shortly. They did some analysis, some evaluation that says, hey, this is -- this is okay and why.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And was licensing in on this?

[redacted]: Yeah. Yeah, it was.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [redacted]

[redacted]: Yeah, I'm pretty sure he was -- he was aware. Yeah. I mean, there was somebody there from Licensing. I don't recall who.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Now, would this testing that you and [redacted] -- that was the path you thought was going to be taken, would that testing have caused the plant to come down to do that testing?

[redacted] Well, I don't -- I mean, I think we were talking about hooking up a hydraulic pump. It wasn't risk-free stuff. We were talking about hooking up hydraulic pumps to -- to (inaudible) break things.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Would the testing have required the plant to come offline?

[redacted] No, I don't think so.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[redacted] I think the only thing it could have required is you could have said, yeah, this valve is leaking, and it's leaking this much.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You've got to call in op.

[redacted] And then you call in op, and then you bring the plant down because you -- you need that -- you need those injection (inaudible).

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So losing one of those valves would cause the plant to -- to come down?

[redacted] Well, it -- I guess it depends which check valve. There are some single check valves in the lines. You know, like one check valve goes to four. You know, those kinds of things, depending on what was leaking.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But you didn't know.

[redacted] We didn't know.

7C

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. And to follow up on Eileen's question, what was -- was

1 [redacted]

2 [redacted] Well, that was what was --

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- leading --

4 [redacted] -- that's what kind of

5 upset me on that -- that particular occurrence -- was

6 he was with us all week, and we were making the

7 decisions, hey, what are we going to do? Trying to

8 get our brains around it was -- it was a relatively

9 complex technical issue.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It sounds like

11 it is.

12 [redacted]: And we were going into,

13 hey, you know what are we going to do to test this?

14 What is our responsibility here? And I thought at the

15 end of Sunday that we'd kind of come to a meeting of

16 the minds that, hey, we're going to figure out how to

17 test this. We're going to have a meeting first thing

18 tomorrow morning. [redacted] can you come in? Yeah, I'll

19 come in, and we'll -- we'll figure out a way to make

20 it happen.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And ([redacted]) was on

22 board with that?

23 [redacted]: Yes. I believe he was. He

24 changed the way he --

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was [redacted] at

1 the meeting on Monday morning?

2 [redacted] I believe he came at the

3 end.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know why

5 [redacted] did the 180?

6 [redacted] I don't know why for sure.

7 I suspect --

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What do you

9 suspect?

10 [redacted] I suspect [redacted] talked to him

11 and expressed his opinion on the matter.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know

13 what [redacted] opinion was? Had he -- had you heard that

14 through the weekend, what [redacted] opinion, your

15 position was on that? It sounds like he was involved

16 in this.

17 [redacted] I don't know how I -- I

18 knew it, and I'm not sure if I'm speaking -- I'm

19 taking a guess here. But I'm fairly confident that

20 [redacted] spoke with [redacted] you know, in the interim,

21 and then [redacted] changed his opinion. So --

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that a tech

23 spec violation in your opinion? I know they probably

24 had to have some kind of justification for what they

25 did.

1 [redacted] Well, if it was -- it was
2 -- if it was, I wouldn't have -- I wouldn't have sat
3 by. At the time --
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's fair.
5 [redacted] -- I -- I thought it was --
6 we -- we were playing with something that could be --
7 that could turn into a tech spec violation. I mean,
8 it -- you're responsible for testing your equipment.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
10 [redacted] If you have a concern about
11 the condition of your equipment, you're responsible
12 for ensuring that you know the condition of it, and
13 then you can justify its operability or inoperability.
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
15 [redacted] My opinion was that the
16 responsible thing to do was to test it. I was not on
17 shift when that decision was made. But the [redacted]
18 [redacted] at the time was [redacted] and I
19 thought he was of the same position as I was.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was he at the
21 Monday meeting?
22 [redacted] He was at the Monday
23 meeting, and he and I both -- were both rather taken
24 aback by the -- by the results. And basically [redacted]
25 took it upon himself -- he basically said he was

making the decision. And I don't know what -- I know that [redacted] had words with [redacted] after the meeting. I went back and tried to have words with him.

But my -- my main concern was, you know, if we're going to a meeting -- his [redacted] and that if we have a meeting of the minds beforehand, so that we could -- you know, we can have a united front, we don't waste people's time. I went into that meeting, and I felt like I had two choices. I could go along or just keep quiet, or I could in a public setting defy the [redacted]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [redacted]

[redacted] Right. And at that point I -- I just -- well, I was quiet, and I talked with him outside the meeting and expressed my displeasure about how the meeting went.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What did you say? How did he respond to that?

[redacted] He says that he thinks he -- you know, he basically thought that the problem was that it's a technical engineering issue, and he'll get Licensing and Engineering to resolve it.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So he gave you an impression that's what [redacted] wanted? Did he say that?

1 [redacted] I don't think he -- I don't
2 recall him saying that.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But that differed
5 from where he was just the day before.
6 [redacted] Significantly, yes.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you need a break
8 or --
9 [redacted] No, I'm fine.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
11 [redacted] I'm just going to stand up
12 for a minute.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted] -- had
14 you seen that happen before where he -- he would take
15 -- is that normal for him or is that -- that was
16 normal for him?
17 [redacted] He was a --
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you shake your
19 head, I have to --
20 [redacted] I mean, he --
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- I have to describe
22 it.
23 [redacted] What?
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It won't be picked up
25 on the recorder. You're nodding your head, but --

7C

1 [redacted]: Yes, I am. I -- nice guy,
2 not a very strong personality. I mean, I'm used to --
3 most operators have fairly strong views. I mean,
4 right or -- we may be wrong, but we're never in doubt.
5 You know, the -- those kind of people, right? But [redacted]
6 -- [redacted] was a -- [redacted] clearly was a representative of
7 his bosses. That was my opinion.
8 I mean, he reflected -- he reflected their
9 views and would -- did not hesitate to change his
10 views to reflect their views. If, you know, we'd talk
11 to him about one thing, he would change -- he'd
12 reflect --
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So he wasn't a part
14 of this united front that you're talking about. If
15 Operations was on board with one idea here, he would
16 -- he flipped to the senior management position.
17 [redacted] He typically was -- he was
18 typically a representative of the senior management.
19 He was not -- he was not one of the --
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You're talking
21 about [redacted] Is that what you're talking about?
22 When you say senior management --
23 [redacted] Well, he was the -- he was
24 the most senior decisionmaker, I would say, in the ops
25 chain. I mean, he's (inaudible), although titles

7C

1 changed over the last several years, but --

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But there

3 wouldn't have been anybody between [redacted] and

4 [redacted] I wouldn't think.

5 [redacted] No, there wouldn't -- would

6 not have been.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You put a timeframe

9 on this as about two years ago. Do you think it was

10 late 2001, or was it later than that?

11 [redacted] I think it was -- you know

12 what? I don't recall. I think it was -- I think it

13 was in wintertime, early 2000.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Does it help if you

15 think -- [redacted] left that position. Can you put it

16 in timeframe to -- how much longer did he work there?

17 [redacted] Six months maybe before he

18 left.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: About six months

20 before he retired.

21 [redacted] He -- [redacted] would remember,

22 and [redacted] is -- [redacted] in onsite again as a [redacted]

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [redacted] is

25 back onsite as a [redacted] Okay.

[redacted] Well, he lives up in [redacted].

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about -- this was the second issue that you portrayed in this decisionmaking, in the gray area.

[redacted] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Does anything else come to mind?

[redacted] No, not really. I know that there was a lot of discussion and scuttlebutt going around about [redacted] decision to isolate a steam leak. That was -- that was brought up like immediately as a -- an example of for -- or non-conservative decisionmaking, although not being there to see the steam leak I think it was more a case where [redacted] would not have sent somebody else into the position to isolate the steam leak. Shutting the plant down would not have isolated the steam leak directly.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It would not have?

[redacted] No.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[redacted] The main steam isolating, which is a pretty traumatic event, to the primary and

the secondary would have. So you would have had to trip main steam line isolate, which I think --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: (Inaudible) safety injection.

[redacted] I'm not sure, but -- but pretty -- what his choice was is he had to put the plant through an extremely big transient or -- and that takes some personal risk, and I -- and I -- and he looks up and he thinks he can, you know, get to the valve and do it safely, and he did without burning himself.

That was -- that was raised as an example of non-conservative decisionmaking on [redacted] part. Not having been there to see the steam leak, I really can't make a call what kind of risk he was taking. I -- [redacted] wants to go home just like the rest of us. I see [redacted] as the kind of guy that he would be hesitant to send other people and take risks he would not himself take.

So I think it was more or less a case of, hey, this was on the fence. I'll go and not put somebody else (inaudible).

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's pretty unusual for someone his level to go into the plant and manipulate quick like that.

1 [redacted] Yeah, it is.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right?

3 [redacted] Yeah, it is, and I don't

4 think he did it lightly. But --

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He did it.

6 [redacted] -- he did it. I mean,

7 that's what I hear an awful lot of witness

8 (inaudible), but that's certainly what I hear.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When you say

10 someone raised as an example of non-conservative

11 decisionmaking --

12 [redacted] Well --

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- what were

14 you referring to?

15 [redacted] Well, I heard that, you

16 know, the equipment operators had concerns of, hey,

17 why would you take it upon yourself to close a valve

18 in the plant.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And at that point,

21 he's the -- he's the [redacted]

22 [redacted]

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What would have been

24 the input from the [redacted] Who is the [redacted]

25 [redacted] on there?

1 [redacted] I believe. I
2 think [redacted] had looked at it and thought he was just
3 going to shut the plant down. I think that was [redacted]
4 opinion. I think [redacted] had walked away from the valve
5 thinking, you know what, we just need to shut down.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So he had three
7 choices -- shut the plant down, isolate the main steam
8 line --
9 [redacted] Well, I think that you shut
10 down and isolate main steam.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Come together, okay.
12 [redacted] Right.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
14 [redacted] Or --
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Manipulate the valve.
16 [redacted] -- manipulate the valve.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. [redacted] went
18 the other way, then.
19 [redacted] Well, [redacted] I think --
20 from what I understand -- and like I said, I'm
21 definitely a third party here --
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.
23 [redacted] -- because this was
24 discussed at length. You know, hey, you know, are --
25 you know, are -- are we behaving poorly here? You

1 know, should we have done something different? And it
2 was just, you know, I think every shift had
3 discussions about the chain of events to -- you know,
4 to discuss (inaudible), you know, the whys and
5 wherefores and how you guys feel about it.
6 But what I understand is [redacted] -- and this
7 is from discussions with [redacted] actually -- [redacted] had
8 walked away after looking at the leak, saying, "No.
9 It's too big. Don't feel comfortable sending one of
10 my guys up there to isolate it. We're just going to
11 have to shut down and isolate the other mains."
12 I think [redacted] -- from what I understand is
13 [redacted] in parallel, you know -- [redacted] is walking away,
14 [redacted] you know, comes up, looks at it, says, "Yes, I
15 think (inaudible) somebody else here. Let me see if
16 I can get to the valve." Goes up there and gets to
17 the valve, looks around, doesn't see anybody, and
18 isolates it. Something along those lines. So --
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That is really
20 -- I'm sorry. I mean, that -- reason to do that would
21 be to keep the plant up.
22 [redacted] Well, it's also to isolate
23 a leak.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
25 [redacted] I mean, the risk -- [redacted]

I think, thinking also was that shutting the valve won't isolate the leak.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[redacted] felt that shutting the valve would isolate the leak.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And he was right.

[redacted] And he was right.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[redacted] If your opinion is that, hey, shutting the valve may or may not isolate the leak, why would you send somebody into a risky situation if you didn't think it would even have an effect anyway. The decision there is -- the equation is pretty -- pretty one-sided.

7C

If your equation is I'm almost positive if I can get to that valve it will stop the leak and stop this steam -- this steam from getting into my space -- and I think they were getting like electrical grounds, and things like that. So it was having an effect on plant equipment, you know, because it was -- you know, the switch gear -- the secondary switch gear is out there, which powers the RCPs and all kinds of other things.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The understanding is

it was a fairly large flume --

[redacted] Yes, it was --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- the leak.

[redacted] It was very large flume, but apparently once -- like lots of steam flume. Apparently, on one side of the valve it was large. The other side of the valve it wasn't, you know, where the handwheel was. So large flume going that way. Yeah, you've got steam around you. He felt that he could -- he could get it closed.

And, I mean, [redacted] could -- I'm sure can tell you exactly what was going through his mind, but my -- my opinion is that he might have hesitated sending somebody else up to do it, but would -- would -- since it was one of those (inaudible) situations, but he said that, you know, I think he would have been more apt to put himself in that situation.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you become aware at any point that anybody else weighed in on his decision? Was that his decision to manipulate the valve, or did he have additional --

[redacted] I don't know. Like I said, I think -- I think [redacted] had kind of just, you know, said, "Okay. Well, you know, it's time to just do -- do the other -- option A, shut the plant down, isolate

7C

1 it" -- you know, the remote valves.

2 I don't know if they had discussions.

3 Didn't know if [redacted] told [redacted] "Hey, I'm shutting down

4 the plant," and [redacted] went out there and was --

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You didn't know what

6 happened?

7 [redacted] No, no. Don't know

8 exactly. And the timing is everything, right? If [redacted]

9 says, "Okay, I'm going to shut down a plant," walks

10 off, doesn't talk to [redacted] comes up and says,

11 "Hey, I can get to it," goes up and shuts it, says,

12 "Hey, man, I shut the valve." "You did?" I don't

13 know what the timing was like.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you talk to

15 [redacted] after the event about why he did what he did?

16 Did you talk to him?

17 [redacted] Yeah, on a number of

18 occasions. I don't know how much detail I got into,

19 but basically his -- the gist of it was that he felt

20 he could safely get to the valve.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he --

22 [redacted] The valve could be safely

23 reached, and there was some urgency to get it closed.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he give you 7C

25 any indication that he was getting his direction from

1 [redacted] on that issue?

2 [redacted]: No. I -- I hadn't heard

3 that.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I don't

5 know.

6 [redacted] No.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm asking you.

8 [redacted] No, I -- I don't think so.

9 I think [redacted] -- I've always said that at a powerplant

10 where you've got a system that is leaking, you don't

11 need a procedure to tell you to close -- isolate the

12 leak. You know, if there's a valve between -- you

13 know, that isolates the leak, you don't need any

14 procedure necessarily to isolate the leak. You -- you

15 do what's responsible. You isolate it, and then you

16 -- and then you use your processes to document it.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

18 [redacted] I think he was thinking,

19 hey, the way to stabilize the plant and to stop this

20 condition is to close the valve.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

22 [redacted] And I think, from what I

23 understand, walked away thinking, hey, you know, the

24 way to do it is to, you know, main steam line isolate.

25 I think that's the way you kind of have to do it.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, if not
2 [redacted] anybody else in senior management? [redacted].
3 [redacted] or anybody else?
4 [redacted] I don't -- like I said, not
5 being there, I -- I have very little knowledge about
6 anything like that. I know that the -- the equipment
7 operator expressed, hey, what kind of pressure is [redacted]
8 under to make this kind of decision?
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
10 [redacted] You know, I don't think
11 [redacted] -- I don't think anybody outside of ops -- my
12 personal opinion is that anybody outside or above him
13 in ops could have forced him, or would have, you know,
14 to -- to make that choice.
15 I think it was a choice that he made at a
16 moment's notice thinking that he had a window of
17 opportunity, and he seized on it. Whether in
18 retrospect he regrets not -- you know, not sending
19 [redacted] up, whether he regrets not -- I mean, [redacted] can
20 speak to those. I don't think anybody was saying, you
21 know, [redacted] you'd better get up there and isolate
22 that leak." You know, I wouldn't -- I may have
23 disagreed with management, but I've never seen that
24 kind of behavior.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

TC

1 [redacted] And certainly keeping the
2 unit -- you know, taking the unit offline to stop the
3 steam leak would have been supported wholeheartedly.
4 I just think in this case [redacted] felt that the best way
5 and the most direct way to stabilize the plant was to
6 shut a valve, which certainly put the plant through
7 much less trauma, although it put himself at some risk
8 to do.
9 How much risk? Hey, your guess is as good
10 as mine. I wasn't there.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. What
13 about any other incidents that come to mind where the
14 perception could have been left in somebody's mind
15 that, you know, you're pushing conservative
16 decisionmaking into the non-conservative edge.
17 [redacted] That -- I don't -- not much
18 comes to mind. I mean, those are the only ones that
19 stick out in my mind.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let me ask you this.
21 You made a statement before about having a meeting,
22 and I'm trying to quote it as closely as I can, so
23 that you're more or less on the same page, and that
24 you had a unified front -- the shift managers, the
25 operating shift managers were trying to present a

unified front.

[redacted]: Which topic are you talking about?

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You were talking about that -- it came up when you were talking about the valve and testing the valves.

[redacted] Oh. Well --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Under [redacted] and your concerns on that.

[redacted] Well, I mean, if you go into -- that's more or less just a -- just I didn't mean it that, hey, you know, we're all going to get -- I think if we're going into a meeting, we shouldn't be -- necessarily be in a position to -- if we go into a meeting, it's a waste of everybody's time if you're making decisions whether the meeting should even be taking place. And that was my -- that was what I was getting at.

Effectively, [redacted] came in with his decision made that, hey, this meeting we're having right now really doesn't need to happen. And I went in there thinking, hey, this meeting here has a purpose, and we're driving towards that purpose. And it -- it was a dysfunctional meeting.

7C

If he had sat down with me beforehand and

said, "Hey, I don't think we need this meeting because XYZ," I would agree or disagree with him in private, and then we could have cancelled the meeting or had it. I don't see any reason to call a bunch of people in the first thing on Monday morning to have a -- you know, a critical, very important meeting, and then -- and then, you know, by the way say, "Hey, you know, we were wrong."

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You came in on your day off for that.

[redacted] Right. Right. So --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in terms of meetings where shift managers wanted to get together to decide issues, had it happened before where it was necessary to -- to have a meeting in terms of where you wanted to be in the face of management's instructions? Can you recall other situations where -- where the shift managers were concerned enough that they wanted to get unified on the position they were going to take in regard to specific direction?

[redacted] No. I mean, the grassing is the closest thing I can come to. We had had shift manager meetings, which are just periodic meetings we have with the ops manager present and the AOMs present, and we -- and we discuss philosophy. You

TC

1 know, hey, where do we want to move the units?

2 You know, where I was talking about, hey,

3 what should be our strategy -- our strategy for

4 operating the plant. You know, if you get down to

5 this many circulators, where should the unit be power-

6 wise? So it's mostly a -- what I would call table-

7 topping a strategy session. You know, hey, this is --

8 this is our philosophy on approaching, you know, loss

9 of circulators. This is our thoughts beyond

10 approaching the loss of vacuum in the face of loss of

11 circulators.

12 Had similar discussions when we had loss

13 of offsite power, exactly how -- how we address them.

14 And, you know, the lessons learned from this --

15 everything -- you go through a complicated electrical

16 transient like that, you get -- you know, something is

17 going to surprise you. I don't know that went away.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

19 [redacted] I didn't know that

20 responded that way. And by having those strategy

21 meetings, some of that information gets disseminated.

22 But I don't think that really is -- it's kind of a

23 different -- I'm not answering your question. The

24 question is basically, did we have strategy sessions

25 about how to manage our managers?

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How to counter -- how to counter direction that caused the shift manager some concern.

[redacted] Well, on the day that [redacted] and I had that meeting with [redacted] I had some discussions with him on most -- mostly like, hey, you know, how could I have been more effective to get an outcome that I -- I could have more easily lived with.

You know, part of my function is not making decisions, but it's influencing others to make the right decision. Are my opinions right? I talked with [redacted] about, you know, hey, what's your input on, you know, how I could be more effective so this doesn't happen again? Because I didn't like the fact that I go into the meeting thinking that we're heading -- heading north, and we're heading south.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What did he say?

[redacted] He -- he was -- I think he was taken aback or surprised as I was. So he was having the same kind of internal conversation himself. I think I walked away from it thinking, well, you know, I've just got to be ready, more ready in the future, that, you know, went out (inaudible), be strong in my opinion and my position.

1 And when I'm an opinion-maker, I've got to
2 be able to -- I have to be a strong personality and
3 hold my ground.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So if the
5 information is reported that there were particular
6 meetings where shift managers got together to discuss
7 how to counter unsafe direction from senior
8 management, is --
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Non-
10 conservative direction.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- non-conservative
12 direction, things of that nature, is anything --
13 [redacted]: I don't know if I -- we --
14 I don't think I'd characterize any meetings we had
15 along those lines, more or less, you know, kind of
16 along the lines of what I was talking with [redacted] -- it
17 like, hey, how can I be more effective in getting --
18 you know, getting my -- my voice heard, my -- my
19 opinion, you know, taken -- taken into account
20 effectively, to get to an outcome I'm more pleased
21 with, and that was really what it came down to.
22 Strategy sessions -- no, nothing comes to
23 mind specifically. I don't know, maybe there were,
24 but I -- I can't think of anything that would be
25 (inaudible) of the strategy against senior management.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What about in
2 terms of what you were asking [redacted] about? Did
3 you get a chance to practice that? Did you have --
4 did you come up against an 180-degree turn or a
5 decision that you had to voice your opinion strongly?
6 [redacted] Well, I thought the circ
7 water was the next thing that came to mind, and it was
8 -- I'm not sure if -- I think [redacted] might have
9 -- might have or was involved in that.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The grassing
11 issue?
12 [redacted] The grassing issue.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
14 [redacted] Right. And --
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was earlier this
16 year, is that right?
17 [redacted] Yeah, I think that was last
18 March.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Spring of this year?
20 [redacted] Yeah, the spring of this
21 year.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So this other
23 issue was --
24 [redacted] Well before that.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- you're thinking

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1 late 2001.

2 [redacted]: Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in 2002?

4 [redacted] Nothing comes to mind.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There is an issue in

6 2002 that we've heard about, and you're at a

7 disadvantage in terms of (inaudible). But I'll try

8 and refresh your recollection. You can tell us if you

9 have --

10 [redacted]: I'd like to tell you you're

11 the first person to ever accuse me of that. Having a

12 disadvantage (inaudible).

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's -- well, we're

14 going back two years or so and some incidents. Coming

15 -- in the spring of 2002, coming out of the Salem

16 outage, there's an issue regarding startup without the

17 generator at full normal.

18 [redacted]: Oh. Starting up without

19 vacuum.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Without vacuum.

21 Systems -- the heat removal systems were not --

22 apparently not normal.

23 [redacted] Well --

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not normal

25 conditions.

1 [redacted] -- we didn't have our gland
2 ceiling steam, but we had vacuum. So effectively we
3 -- I believe we brought the unit to mode 2, I'm
4 thinking. I think we brought it to mode 2, which is,
5 you know, low in the power range.
6 Without gland seal on the shaft of the
7 main turbine, which is usually required to -- to keep
8 vacuum, or once you have air and leakage problems,
9 what they did -- what we did was stuffed packing
10 material under the shafts. Apparently, this has been
11 done elsewhere in the industry. And come up and sit
12 like that.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you the
14 [redacted] when that --
15 [redacted] I was on shift for periods
16 when that was -- when that decision was made.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that a
18 considered way to go?
19 [redacted] Probably not, but you
20 always had your MS-10s. I mean, really, what it got
21 down to is your MS-10s are your atmospheric dumps.
22 Well, it's conservative -- no, it's not the most
23 conservative thing to do. I mean, it's -- but coming
24 out of an outage it does sort out some secondary
25 problems.

1 Was I comfortable with it? No, I wasn't
2 the most comfortable with it, because I had never done
3 it before, and I didn't know it had been done
4 successfully. Did it work? Yes, it worked fine, and
5 -- and it didn't hurt anything by doing it that way.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk
7 about that again. Is that another case where most of
8 the shift people were on your side of the equation and
9 maybe senior management was on the other?
10 (Inaudible.) Is that another example of that or --
11 [redacted] Well, yeah. But I probably
12 would have been on the -- on the don't do it side of
13 the fence, but only out because I've never been there
14 before. It's something I've never done, and there --
15 you know, I -- it wasn't out of a well-reasoned, hey,
16 I don't think this is the right thing to do because of
17 X, Y, and Z. It was, hey, I don't know if this will
18 work, first of all; and, secondly, I'm not sure why
19 we're pushing this hard.
20 So, yeah, if I were to -- if the decision
21 were left up to me, it probably -- probably would have
22 stayed down longer.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Who
24 made the decision to go the way it went?
25 [redacted] I'm thinking it was the [redacted]

1 manager and above, with some input from below. I
2 mean, I don't remember any, you know, concrete
3 decision or concrete conversations on that particular
4 one.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was the [redacted]
6 [redacted] then?
7 [redacted] I think it was [redacted]
8 I think.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Would [redacted]
10 have been in his position then? Or was it somebody
11 else?
12 [redacted] It might have been
13 [redacted]
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
15 [redacted] You know, we -- that was
16 doing something differently. But, you know, we didn't
17 do upfront mid-loops for a while either, and there is
18 risk associated with doing mid-loops at the beginning
19 of outages -- you know, very early in the outage. And
20 we're doing those routinely now.
21 So if [redacted] had his druthers would we do hot
22 -- hot mid-loop for upfront mid-loops? I'm
23 comfortable with them now. Three or four years ago I
24 probably wasn't. Maybe that's the insidious creep of
25 non-conservatism. But we certainly effectively

managed them for a while, and I guess the industry as a whole took a lot of upfront mid-loops.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[redacted] I don't recall any conversations associated with gnashing of teeth or associated with that. I -- I know that there was some angst, because it was just something we had never done before. I would have just -- personally, I would have just as soon sat on the tens.

But that is non-conservative in its own sense, because now you have basically, you know, your tubes between you and the release to environment, and the management didn't want to do that. They wanted to maintain the heat sink to the main condenser. So in a sense, by stuffing the packing, it's more conservative than doing what some plants do, which is just blow your tens to the atmosphere.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was there to gain by doing that -- by packing them?

[redacted] I think what it was is you shake out any problems. You do some -- you do some mode changes that shake out any problems coming up, so you get the plant up to, you know, the -- you know, full power ops, and if there are any problems that you're going to run into, maybe you'll run into them,

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1 and I think that was the thinking.

2 Do I think the risk-benefit is all that

3 great? Nah, probably not. So --

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was --

5 [redacted] - [redacted] might have

6 them. He's the [redacted] He's I think

7 Salem Unit 2 [redacted] but he's -- he's been

8 involved in lots of those. He probably is more

9 involved in the discussions of that kind of nature

10 than I would -- [redacted] I think would -- [redacted]

11 might have been involved. But --

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that, [redacted]

13 [redacted]

14 [redacted] He is now -- he's in the

15 central outage group. I believe he's like [redacted]

16 [redacted]

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted]

18 [redacted]

19 was in the outage group. He's now I believe in

20 engineering, but he was in the outage group, I

21 believe, back in that timeframe. So he might have had

22 some conversations associated with that.

23 It's certainly not the most conservative

24 thing I've ever done, but it certainly isn't the --

25 the risk -- the worst thing that happens is you -- is

1 you damage the shaft. And on your main turbine, if
2 you don't rotate it enough, then that's really -- you
3 know, if we're willing to take a large -- tackle an
4 investment like that, and think we can manage the risk
5 associated with it, well, I guess you can do that.
6 The safety risk to people is probably
7 relatively small. I mean, the worst case is you --
8 you lose vacuum, you reduce power, sit on your tens,
9 or you could just shut the -- shut the reactor down.
10 That's pretty -- pretty straight -- pretty simple from
11 that -- what power level to do, doesn't matter -- if
12 you want to do it or not.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything
14 else on that line?
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Not on that
16 one, but I have -- if we're done with that, I had some
17 -- little bit older.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Go ahead.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Coming out of
20 Salem 1, spring 2001 outage, an issue where you're at
21 power for a very short time, and the generator turbine
22 tripped, the reactor tripped. And I think it was an
23 electrical kind of issue.
24 [redacted] Which unit?
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Salem 1.

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1 [redacted] Unit 1.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The spring of

3 2001 outage.

4 [redacted] Okay.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You're at full

6 power for a very short time, and the reactor -- the

7 generator tripped, the turbine tripped, the reactor

8 tripped. Something about a -- not wanting to start

9 the reactor, but the main steam stopped, shut per the

10 safety analysis. Do you remember that issue?

11 [redacted]: Not wanting to start the

12 reactor, the main steam --

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or you wanted

14 the reactor to -- management wanted the reactor to

15 come back up, but the shift people are saying, "We're

16 not going to do that with the main steam stopped

17 shut," because that was -- you know, the safety

18 analysis wouldn't allow that.

19 [redacted] Yeah. I think I remember

20 some decision on that. I don't think -- did we start

21 up with them? We didn't start up with the main steam

22 line isolation.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No, you didn't.

24 [redacted] Yeah. I remember some

25 discussion on that. To me that's a no-brainer. We --

you know, I wouldn't -- I wouldn't at all support that kind of decision. I don't know --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Tell me what you remember about that issue.

[redacted] Very little. Very little.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why? Because it's so long ago, or because you weren't --

[redacted] No. Because I probably didn't spend much mental energy deciding on it, because to me it was such -- such a wrong thing to do. I think -- I think there was -- there might have been some discussion over, hey, should we start up with the main steam? And I'm not even -- I don't even recall why that discussion was --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So let me ask you, if that discussed occurred --

[redacted] Well --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- where is it coming from?

[redacted] I don't know. Like I said, I have a very vague recollection of it. And like I said, I would not spend a lot of my mental energy trying to decide that, because I do not think that is a response. Starting up -- starting up with maybe the secondary -- that might have been the same part of the

1 discussion with the vacuum. Was that vacuum that
2 was --
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I don't think
4 so. This is the Salem 1 issue. I think the other one
5 you're telling me was a Salem 2 issue.
6 [redacted] Yeah, that's right.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The following year I
8 think, too.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There was an outage
11 in the spring of 2002.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And the point
13 the shift was making that they aren't going to start
14 the reactor until they were -- they were within a day
15 of actually bringing steam into the turbine building,
16 bringing steam into the turbine.
17 [redacted] Yeah, I don't -- I don't
18 see -- there's nothing technically wrong with -- like
19 I said, some plants start up on their atmospheric
20 dumps. That has not been our philosophy. And if
21 we're not going to use the dumps, I mean, it --
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you recall
23 there being some -- some discussion about that issue,
24 about an NRC performance indicator changing if the
25 plant didn't come up within a particular period of

1 time? Do you recall that being talked about at all?
2 I know this is a while ago, but --
3 [redacted] No, I really don't -- this
4 one -- that one I don't have much recollection,
5 period. But no, I don't -- I don't remember any
6 discussion about performance here. We do discuss
7 performance indicators, and we do try to manage them.
8 So, I mean, I'm not saying that that is out of the
9 realm of possibility, but --
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
11 [redacted] -- people do keep an eye
12 out to performance indicators saying, hey, how are we
13 doing against them? Are we making decisions that
14 support keeping the colors --
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
16 [redacted] -- favorable? And it's --
17 I think the NRC wants us to do that to some extent.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I must
19 say I -- you heard my question.
20 [redacted] Yeah. I -- not that I
21 recall --
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
23 [redacted] -- is my answer.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Thank you.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I just want to take

a quick break, okay?

[redacted] Sure.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's about 11:15 a.m. This is -- I'm going to go ahead and end this side B, because it's going to run out in a minute.

So we'll go off the record at 11:15.

(End of Tape 1, Side B. Beginning of Tape 2, Side A.)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's 11:18 a.m.

What we were asking you about were these general situations where -- what's been brought to our attention are situations that caused the damaged work environment, in that particularly things like the -- the steam like, that the perception is that there is -- this is non-conservative, it's a production pressure, and it left that kind of a mark.

[redacted] Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In terms of all that we've discussed so far -- I think we've been through at least four incidents -- is there anything else that comes to your mind along those lines?

[redacted] No, not really. Not really. I mean, a steam -- steam leak was the one that I knew that we had discussed the most, you know, at crew meetings and such, because of the -- because of the perception that was out there on it.

1 Really, of all the things that happened,
2 I really don't think that that -- and [redacted] certainly
3 could speak to this better than anybody -- I don't
4 think that -- I think that was a case of him seeing,
5 you know, what the -- making a decision based on
6 immediate concerns and taking an action.
7 I certainly don't think there's any
8 pressure put on him to do that, and that would be my
9 perception. I don't --
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
11 [redacted] -- is there -- is there
12 pressure to produce electricity? Sure. There is some
13 -- some pressure to produce electricity. Do I agree
14 with all of their decisions? No. Can I live with
15 them? Yes, I pretty much can live with them. There
16 are certain ones I have trouble with living with, but
17 I expressed those to them, you know, privately.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And did you
19 express those to us this morning?
20 [redacted] Yes. Yes.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or no?
22 [redacted] The specific situations
23 that I had the most trouble getting my arms around
24 were the things I spoke with you today about.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about anything

more recently, 2003 issues? We've gone from 2001, 2002, up through the grassing of 2003. But I don't think anything later than that.

[redacted] You know, the only thing to happen that I was involved with -- and it's probably the worst thing that has happened to me in my nuclear career -- is I had a -- one of my workers get -- lose the tips of two of his fingers during a -- replacing a strainer basket, and they turned the (inaudible) point and he -- you know, he wound up getting two of his fingertips crushed.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Fall outage?

[redacted] No, this is -- this is post-outage. I mean, someone on night shift, a weekend I think.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just recently?

[redacted] No. No. This was like going on two years ago.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oh, okay.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Does he still work at the plant?

[redacted] Yes. A guy named [redacted] [redacted] He's a great guy. But, you know, it was -- I think from a safety perspective, that's certainly the -- by far the worst thing that has happened to me.

1 That's the first time any of my guys have gone home in
2 a different condition than they came to work in.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
4 [redacted] Some we've done for 25
5 years and no -- no incident whatsoever, you know, and
6 that happened. So certainly I felt sort of
7 responsible for that, so -- but other than that,
8 nothing -- nothing significant. That particular
9 incident wasn't schedule pressure. It was just I
10 think we were having guys out there doing things, one,
11 that we didn't necessary have to do, and, secondly,
12 you know, there's some personal responsibility being
13 careful when you're doing it.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Personal safety
15 error?
16 [redacted] Yeah. Yeah, in that case.
17 I mean, you do it successfully for 25 years, there's
18 risk involved with things in general, and you can do
19 it for 25 years without anybody getting, you know,
20 right -- one mistake.
21 Now, were we lucky? Yeah, maybe. Maybe
22 we were just being lucky. Certainly, if you look at
23 things in general, and one thing that made great in-
24 roads is our job hazards analysis, which that
25 particular injury precipitated. We do job hazard

1 analyses on a lot of things in operations.

2 I think of all the things done on site,

3 obviously, 16 of our people on site, probably about

4 100 of them on the operating crews, we've probably got

5 60 or 80 percent of the job hazards analysis done

6 within Salem operations. Of all the -- of all the

7 things going on onsite that have risk, 60 percent of

8 the analysis of evolutions are done within Salem

9 operations.

10 And I think there's something like 80

11 people qualified to do these job hazards analyses.

12 Sixty of them are in Salem operations, because we

13 really take it seriously from that perspective, and we

14 really -- really work hard at it. It's unfortunate

15 that something bad has to happen.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Want to get that?

17 [redacted] Not really, but pardon me.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's take a quick

19 break.

20 (Whereupon, the proceedings in the

21 foregoing matter went off the record

22 briefly.)

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on the

24 record. It's approximately 11:24.

25 [redacted] I mean, we've done -- as

1 far as personnel safety, we've worked pretty hard
2 since that injury. There was an injury over at Hope
3 Creek before that where a guy was almost killed.
4 There was a hydraulic, pneumatic thing, and it hit him
5 in the head, and he was -- and he was almost killed.
6 But between those two events, certainly I
7 think Salem I think should be proud of our -- of our
8 personal safety --
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
10 [redacted] -- culture which we've
11 tried to develop. We've come a long way. We've got
12 a ways to go yet. Our use of PPE is -- in the field
13 is still -- as a site is somewhat -- is somewhat
14 lacking. I think it's rarely that I can go out and
15 not find somebody that's not wearing a PPE, which is,
16 you know, your last line of defense. I always
17 (inaudible) mine.
18 But other than that, I think Salem
19 operations has a few things to be proud of as far as
20 personnel safety. It seems like this discussion is
21 more or less along the lines of, you know, management
22 decisions associated with where -- where (inaudible)
23 units and why. So in that realm, yeah, I think
24 they're -- I think we've discussed there's been a
25 couple of issues which -- which there have been

disagreements, which I think are to some extent natural.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There's another issue. It was brought out fairly recently. The BF-19, a stuck BF-19 valve, does that ring a bell?

[redacted] Yeah. I was on shift for that. It happened on a night shift. I was the [redacted]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you just discuss what occurred there?

[redacted] Sure. On night shift they tried to manipulate it. Let's see. Actually, they determined that it wasn't moving. Exactly how do you determine that? I'm not sure if they were doing a partial search on -- the bottom line is they determined that it didn't look like it was moving from its current position.

Got valve engineering involved. They said based on what they're seeing, they think the valve would close, but it's a controller problem. I came in on day shift, and I said, "I'm not absolutely convinced it's a controller problem. We need to run this to ground. But we'll stick with your -- your determination that it's a controller problem because I'm coming in here first thing on day shift, and I'm

-- we're going to make the best decision, you know, we can based on the best possible information."

So at that point, I started keeping a log, which I ended up giving to [redacted] of all the -- you know, at least a number of the meetings we held. And as quickly as we could, got people together, got a troubleshooter together, to go out to determine what the condition of the valve was.

I think really what it comes down to, coming out of night shift, they were mistaken in that they thought it was a controller problem, although that was their best estimate of what -- that was their reasonable --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Could you just explain what would be the difference -- I mean, what -- if it's a controller problem, how does it get handled?

[redacted] Well --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And if it's not, what --

[redacted] Well, if it's a controller problem, and the demand is demand -- it's not responding to demand, well, that's a problem with feeding the steam generators and keeping the unit online. I mean, where you want to -- how you want to

1 handle the unit, which is a lot of what our discussion
2 was. Hey, if we have to move the unit, how are we
3 going to do it with this valve in this condition? So
4 it's a problem from that perspective.
5 But if it'll isolate, it'll meet its
6 design safety function, which is to close on a
7 feedwater isolation signal. So from a tech spec and,
8 you know, well, if there's design function, you're in
9 good shape. So they're thinking, okay, well, it's a
10 controller problem. We've got a -- you've got a plant
11 transient problem here if we have to move the unit for
12 some reason, but we think it's operable, although we
13 still have some troubleshooting to do to refine that
14 position and confirm it.
15 So it came in a day shift. We all kind of
16 said, you know, not convinced, we still need to do
17 some troubleshooting on this. So I guess between 3:00
18 in the morning, it's about time that -- it took us
19 until 3:00 in the afternoon to develop a
20 troubleshooting plan, which, I mean, this is a feed
21 valve to main generator. So --
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: An important
23 valve?
24 [redacted] It's a very important
25 valve. And, I mean, it -- talk about cause a

1 transient. You can cause an overfeed transient, which
2 has some pretty serious repercussions. You can, you
3 know, have an underfeed (inaudible), which has pretty
4 serious functions from a design basis perspective.
5 So, really, what we want to do is put the
6 plant in stable condition, figure out a troubleshoot
7 that we could do without causing a transient, to
8 refine the position and confirm what we've thought to
9 be true, and then take the appropriate actions
10 directed by tech specs.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was your shift
12 allowed to proceed as -- as you wanted it to? Being
13 conservative, reviewing things?
14 [redacted] Well, I mean, I'll tell you
15 my gut feeling coming in on that day was I wasn't
16 convinced it was a control problem.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. But you
18 told --
19 [redacted] But that was a gut feeling.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. But
21 then, you come in with your plan, and you're moving
22 forward through your shift --
23 [redacted] I wasn't happy with the
24 speed at which the troubleshooter was developed.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But (inaudible)
2 that.
3 [redacted] But beyond that, really,
4 what -- the only thing that I wasn't happy with was --
5 was at 3:00 in the afternoon we said, "You know what?
6 We've done what we can do to confirm or deny it's a
7 control problem. It really appears that there is
8 something preventing this valve from closing."
9 Okay. The time of discovery is now.
10 We're calling this inoperable. I forget the exact
11 time, but it was sometime in the early to mid
12 afternoon.
13 We called it inoperable. We called that
14 the time of discovery. In fact, when I was going
15 through the troubleshooting development, I said, "At
16 what point am I going to be able to say this valve is
17 operable is inoperable?" And they said, "At this step
18 right here in this troubleshooter." I said, "Okay.
19 Well, that's our job to get to this step is -- as
20 expeditiously and safely as we can."
21 So we got to that step. We tried -- we
22 tried to do what the step directed, and it didn't
23 work. We said, okay, now -- now it's a valve problem.
24 Something is causing the valve not to go closed, which
25 is its design function. So we started the tech spec

1 clock at that point.

2 Then we started to shut -- then we started

3 shutting down. Now, during the day one additional

4 thing we did is like, hey, we've got this valve that

5 could be stuck. That's one of the possible outcomes.

6 We sent guys out to the simulator to run a shutdown

7 with the valve stuck.

8 So they spent a good part of the morning

9 running it in the simulator to find out how you

10 operate the plant with it stuck, because we didn't --

11 it's not something we train on. It's pretty -- pretty

12 outside our normal thing.

13 So we trained on it, got the guy -- the

14 guys that trained into the shift, got them to tell the

15 shift -- brief the shift on what their results were,

16 and then they were in there for the -- and part of the

17 troubleshooting, we got to the point where it's

18 inoperable.

19 Okay. Well, now we need to figure out

20 where we're going to put the plant and how we're going

21 to get it there, because right now the valve is

22 inoperable, and we've got six hours I think to -- to

23 get it isolated.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who made the

25 call that it was inoperable? Whose decision was that,

1 yours?

2 [redacted] I did. I did.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you get any

4 pushback from [redacted] people at that level?

5 [redacted] Absolutely not.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Okay.

7 All right.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If you weren't happy

9 with the time for the trouble -- troubleshooting on

10 that, where was the delay? Where did you see the

11 delay coming from?

12 [redacted] Our process is not very

13 quick. It's got the 50.59 connotations, and all I can

14 tell you is I'd love to streamline our process, but it

15 -- it errs in the look at -- look at more, analyze

16 more, as opposed to expedience.

17 So the -- we usually get a pretty decent

18 product, although this time I didn't think the

19 troubleshooter was that good.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When you talk

21 about troubleshoot, it's like the plan that was

22 put together.

23 [redacted] The plan. The

24 troubleshooter, I mean, they do the 50.59

25 applicability review. It tells you to do some things

1 and hopefully gets you to where -- the point where,
2 hey, I've got the information I need to make my
3 judgment, you know, make my -- make my call on the
4 valve.
5 We did as well as we could. I think we
6 should expect better of ourselves to get to that
7 point. I would have expected to have been there
8 sometime in the late morning -- you know, been to the
9 point where it's, you know, two or three hours earlier
10 than we were.
11 But, you know, you wait until guys get in,
12 you know, it's 7:00 or 8:00 in the morning, you get
13 guys up, you get them briefed on where the conditions
14 are, they start writing paperwork up, they bring you
15 -- they bring you a rock, you say, "That's the wrong
16 color rock. Go back and -- you have a rock that's a
17 different color." And you do that a couple of times,
18 and the next thing you know it's noon and you haven't
19 gone in the field yet.
20 So it's a question of, you know, how hard
21 do you push to get people in the field? And how much
22 time do you take to make sure that the product and
23 what you're doing is well thought out? Probably here
24 on the -- you know, making sure the cannonball was --
25 because [redacted] used to call it polishing the

1 cannonball, you know. If you're going to shoot the
2 thing, don't spend all your time polishing it. Just
3 shoot it. But --
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was the slowing
5 down or the slowness of that -- of that plan, was it
6 being driven by senior management?
7 [redacted] No.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The slowdown,
9 just to make sure --
10 [redacted] No. Well, I think
11 everybody -- me included -- was intent on whatever
12 we're going to do here, I take an action, I'm going to
13 know what the possible outcomes are and how to respond
14 to those possible outcomes.
15 In other words, you know, hey, if I go
16 down there and bang on the valve with a mallet, a
17 rubber mallet, and the valve goes shut, how are my
18 operators going to respond to that? So I had to have
19 those contingencies all set -- laid out before I did
20 it. I wasn't going to go and do -- and cause a
21 transient.
22 I mean, what -- it was a real possibility
23 knowing in retrospect that it was -- it was FME in the
24 valve. You hit it, and the FME falls out and goes
25 into the steam generator, you know. What happens

then? You know, the valve -- the valve swings around. Now I've got a rattle in my steam generator. Now what do I do?

You know -- or, you know, the valve -- the valve just, you know, fails open or fails closed. My guys -- I -- my expectation as a troubleshooter was that those guys knew, you know, what were the potential repercussions? How? And then my supervisor had them briefed on how to respond to those potentials. That took some time.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And they did do that, didn't they? They went out and struck the valve with --

[redacted] Oh, yeah. Yeah, we did. We did all of those things, which is what they wanted to do first thing in the morning, and I said, "Well, I want something more structured than we're going to go out and beat on the valve."

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So the timing in there was on the prep for what happens if -- if you do that and something dislodged.

[redacted] Well, it was two things. It was getting a troubleshooter that was -- that was in accordance with our procedures and met my needs.

1 And my -- my needs were, you know, I could understand
2 what they were getting at, and it was well reasoned.
3 Some of the -- and like I said, they'd
4 come up with something like, well, this makes no sense
5 here, redo it, bring it back to me, because I wasn't
6 going to send somebody out with a troubleshooter that
7 wasn't going to work.
8 And in parallel with that, I had my
9 supervisor saying, "Okay. Well, this is what I think
10 they're going to bring us. How are you going to
11 respond?" So he's working that troubleshoot, and in
12 parallel we've also got a guy going to the simulator
13 saying, okay, we've got to assist -- let's say it's
14 stuck. How do we shut down the plant like we're going
15 to have to?
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were all of those
17 initiated at the same time, the simulator practice --
18 [redacted] In the morning. Yeah, in
19 the morning timeframe. I mean, it was --
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was day shift
21 for you?
22 [redacted] Yes.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You came on it?
24 [redacted] Yeah. It was day shift.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

1 [redacted] So, I mean, it was -- all
2 of those things were moving forward at the same time.
3 [redacted] you know, asked that I try to
4 keep a rough log of, you know, the meetings that were
5 held, and I gave that to him at the end of the day,
6 because he said, you know, "Hey, down the road if we
7 -- if we get to a point where it's -- you know, we
8 find out it is inoperable down the road" -- and we had
9 this discussion first thing in the morning -- "we're
10 going to have to be able to say, hey, look at all the
11 stuff we did," you know?
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
13 [redacted] Look at how hard we've been
14 working to get to this point. It might look like it
15 took us 12 hours of sitting on our hands to say, you
16 know, it's operable, but really we worked very hard in
17 that 12 hours to get to the point where we made the
18 decision. 7C
19 Like I said, to summarize, I wasn't real
20 happy with the speed at which we got to the point of
21 troubleshooter. It's been my experience that
22 troubleshooters take a lot longer than I -- I like to
23 get to (inaudible). Maybe that's because they --
24 maybe it's because they're slowing me down, you know,
25 because I would say, you know -- I would probably just

do a little bit more without -- maybe not thinking it through all the way. I suppose that's what the process does.

But I think we -- we certainly had continuous activity all day long with -- with, you know, dedicated supervisor, dedicated operators all day long, with guys in the simulator working more or less continuously until we got -- the (inaudible) said, okay, we've now got enough information; it's inoperable.

And then we had a fairly well thought out plan of how to move the unit, although I think once [redacted] took the watch after me, I think there became -- there came out, hey, we think we can try this. They modified the troubleshooter a little bit to try some other things as the unit was coming down, none of which worked. 7C

And so there were some -- I think as they were coming down there were some pauses. But the unit got where it needed to be safely in a controlled manner. And actually, if you think about it, you've got a feed valve stuck open, and you're trying not to overfeed the generator. Stuck open in a position where it competed at full power.

And to shut the unit down and control the

1 feed so that you don't over -- and you control the
2 level in the steam generator, the guys did a really
3 good job. I mean, it was -- it went from the
4 simulator recommendation, the simulator training. We
5 would have ended up tripping at a much higher power
6 level, which would have been more of a transient on
7 the plant. So I think the guys did a good job
8 shutting the unit down.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And it was
10 smart to do that.
11 [redacted] Yeah. [redacted] I think
12 made the recommendation.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It was a very
14 good recommendation.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Thanks for
16 your perspective on that.
17 [redacted] Sure.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's an issue that
19 has been pointed to as one that's a production
20 pressure, in that there was a hesitancy to declare the
21 valve inoperable and to bring the plant into shutdown.
22 But from what you're saying is there was no pressure
23 on you to do that. You had other considerations going
24 on.
25 [redacted] Yeah, I -- I thought -- to

be honest with you --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that was your call, to do it without outside influence.

[redacted]: There was no pressure put on me to call it inoperable or not. But I thought it would have been irresponsible to -- based on the scant information coming from night shift, to make a decision yet. I didn't -- I just didn't have it. And I certainly did not hesitate, once it became apparent that it was. So --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[redacted]: -- like I said, I still don't think that we're -- we're operating as effectively in the creation of troubleshooters as we should be. But that's the best part we could do with our processes as they are now.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Earlier we started talking about this issue, these gray areas where you're on this -- this one side of it, and at certain times management was -- was on another side of that gray area, the less conservative approach. Have you examples where you do flip that? Where you would say that management took the more safety-oriented approach? Can you think of any examples of that?

[redacted] I can't think of specific

1 examples, but I -- I'm sure I've had discussions with
2 both [redacted] where, you know, I
3 was saying, no, I think we -- we can continue to
4 operate this way, or, you know, I feel comfortable
5 with this.
6 And they're like, no, I really don't think
7 that that's the right thing to do. We're going to be
8 a little more conservative than that. So they
9 certainly talked me into a more conservative position.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that's going up to
11 the ops manager level.
12 [redacted] Well, [redacted] level. I mean,
13 you --
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted] level. I'm
15 sorry.
16 [redacted] Usually those decisions get
17 made at our level. I mean, we -- we typically, you
18 know, have those discussions. And if we come to an
19 agreement, I think we're generally in -- in -- you
20 know, enough in the ballpark that we don't get second-
21 guessed. You know, we're -- it's, you know, a
22 conservative decision. It's defensible, and we needed
23 to move forward.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about from
25 senior management? Had you seen the position from

1 senior management being more conservative than that,
2 where you were?
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [redacted]
4 level and --
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted]
6 [redacted]
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. And
8 [redacted] right.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And I guess [redacted]
10 as well as [redacted]
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
12 [redacted] It's not impossible, but
13 nothing comes to mind. I mean, I -- like I said, I've
14 been on both sides of the coin. So it would have been
15 -- nothing comes to mind. Certainly, nothing he did
16 that I remember, because generally if -- if I --
17 although I don't recall situation, I -- if I could
18 make a situation up in my brain, if somebody came up
19 to me and says, "No, I think we really need to be a
20 lot more conservative," I don't usually struggle too
21 much. I say, "Okay. Well, you know what? That's
22 defensible. I'm okay to go in that direction
23 usually." I usually fight harder in the other
24 direction, it seems.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What I'd like

1 to cover now is the issue of raising concerns, and
2 specifically we're talking about concerns of a nuclear
3 safety nature. It doesn't seem that there is any
4 hesitancy on the union's part to bring to your
5 attention industrial safety concerns, it seems.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
7 Personal --
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think you gave two
9 examples -- personal, industrial safety. In the
10 beginning of the interview you gave us some examples
11 of that.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
13 (Inaudible.)
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in terms of
15 operational decisions and those that would affect
16 nuclear safety, is there -- let me ask it from your
17 point of view. Are you comfortable in raising
18 concerns of that nature?
19 [redacted] Yes.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The issue where you
21 described -- where it was yourself and [redacted]
22 took one position, and you went into that meeting and
23 [redacted] had flipped around, and that was
24 involving the -- I think that was a valve issue,
25 wasn't it?

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1 [redacted] SJ-4, 5, 12, and 13, I
2 think.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. And you kind
5 of indicated -- this is what I wanted to follow up on.
6 You were of one mind, you had one position, and you
7 went into the meeting and [redacted] had taken
8 another position. But you didn't -- you didn't raise
9 it to him there, that you --
10 [redacted] Well, I did, but I didn't
11 -- I didn't dig my heels in. I didn't, you know -- I
12 mean, I wasn't confrontational about it. I was like
13 -- you know, I was like I thought he had already made
14 a decision on this and --
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You kind of said you
16 pulled him aside individually.
17 [redacted] Afterwards I pulled him
18 aside and basically said I didn't appreciate being put
19 in that situation. But at the meeting I basically
20 said I -- you know, I expressed that I still think we
21 need to test it reasonably.
22 [redacted] basically said it was his decision,
23 and he was making it, he was making a management
24 decision. And once that was said, to be honest with
25 you, it caught -- it took me aback to the point where

1 I did not go into that meeting, you know, ready to --
2 ready to basically say, well, you know what? This is
3 my position, and I'm sticking to it.
4 I guess I -- I was just taken so aback by
5 it that at that point I just kind of said, "Oh, okay.
6 Well, you're the [redacted]
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that's what
8 prompted you to talk to [redacted] about being more
9 influential I think it was in terms of making those
10 arguments in the future?
11 [redacted] Right.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have that --
13 do you have a comfort level with being able to express
14 concerns? If you had a nuclear safety concern, can
15 you do that with -- with senior management? Your own
16 immediate management and senior management.
17 [redacted] Yeah. Yeah, I think I can.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that something
19 that has always been for you? Has it changed over
20 time, or has it been -- is that consistent since
21 you've been there?
22 [redacted] I'm more comfortable -- I'm
23 more comfortable now than I was in the -- in the
24 recent past.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why is that?

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why?

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Just

3 (inaudible) personnel?

4 [redacted] Yeah, mostly.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is the response

6 different if you raise a concern now?

7 [redacted] Well, I -- I haven't come

8 into that situation yet.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You've got

10 [redacted] back now.

11 [redacted] The proof is in the

12 pudding. But I haven't -- I haven't been put in that

13 position, which says something. And I have not -- if

14 I have found myself in that position, I haven't --

15 since I haven't, I'm just supposing. So I haven't

16 found myself in that position, and I don't expect to.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But your comfort

18 level is in with -- with who you're approaching now as

19 opposed to who you were approaching -- having to

20 approach before?

21 [redacted] I guess that's one way to

22 put it, yeah.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But is that the

24 way you'd put it?

25 [redacted] Yeah. That's the way I'd

7C

1 put it.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who were the

3 individuals that would have given you the most

4 concern?

5 [redacted] Well, I mean, the

6 situations that I mentioned were involving our

7 management and [redacted] So I guess -- I guess

8 that was one of them.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's [redacted]

10 too, or --

11 [redacted]

12 -- I think I said with -- with [redacted] I don't think he

13 was -- he was much more than a reflection of his boss.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted]

15 [redacted] Correct. That's my --

16 that's my perception of him.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anybody else?

18 [redacted] No. No. I mean, to be

19 honest with you, I think my AOMs have always been very

20 receptive to conservative decisions. They will on

21 occasion challenge -- challenge my -- my logic. You

22 know, hey, this is your logic; why is that?

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's to be

24 expected, though, I would think -- to a certain

25 extent.

1 [redacted] I expected it. And it --
2 my opinion has always been -- been to my recollection
3 respected by my direct superiors. So from that
4 perspective, I certainly have no problem, you know,
5 raising concerns to [redacted] and
6 so far to [redacted] And they have always been
7 receptive and --
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What about
9 [redacted] He's in a different position now.
10 [redacted] He's -- I guess he might
11 have been involved in some of those same decisions as
12 [redacted] But it -- they -- it usually comes from
13 a fairly good safety perspective. I mean, I -- I
14 generally found that I agreed with him on most cases.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think that
16 your comfort level is shared by your peers? Let's
17 just address at this point in time. Are the people
18 that you work with comfortable in raising --
19 [redacted] Yeah.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- concerns if they
21 have them?
22 [redacted] My peers or my
23 subordinates?
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No, your peer level.
25 [redacted] My peers? Yeah, I think

1 they share my perspective more or less.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you become aware

3 that they had a hesitancy to raise concerns under [redacted]

4 [redacted]

5 [redacted] No. I mean, like I said,

6 we were dealing with some strong personalities. I

7 think people were aware of -- when confrontations took

8 place, you know, just, you know, heated disagreements,

9 those rumors spread fast, and people discuss them. So

10 those -- those are fairly widely known.

11 But I think we've got enough strong

12 personalities, and I think most -- most people will

13 still raise them and still fight for their position,

14 you know, and argue their position openly. I don't

15 think anybody -- there's no -- the ops managers aren't

16 a shrinking violet, so I don't think there's anybody

17 that's going to, you know, shrink back from raising

18 concerns.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the other part of

20 that is, are people able to raise concerns without

21 fear of retaliation? Is that anything that you've

22 ever become aware of, that somebody has expressed

23 concerns and been retaliated for having done so? I

24 should say retaliated against for having done so.

25 [redacted] Not to my knowledge. I'm

1 not saying that -- there are people that their
2 perceptions are that they are retaliated against.
3 I raised the grievance on [redacted] He
4 thinks that, you know -- that that's a form of
5 retaliation for him raising a concern.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
8 [redacted] I respectfully disagree
9 with him on that. But, you know, that is his
10 perception.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What about
12 people at your level, the [redacted] level? Have
13 any of them ever --
14 [redacted] No, I don't think so.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- felt that
16 some action has been taken against them because
17 they --
18 [redacted] There was a period when
19 there was a -- you know, the only thing that comes to
20 mind is there was a period of time when we had a coach
21 -- a lady that was -- that was a leadership coach, you
22 know, a communication coach. And I'll tell you what,
23 she got a lot of people -- people were in for her --
24 their jobs when she was around.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that?

1 [redacted] Kim Hardin.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And why did that --

3 [redacted] Well, because she had the

4 ear of senior management, and it was felt, whether

5 rightly or wrongly, that if you got out of line, if

6 you didn't have the right attitude, and she -- she,

7 you know, spoke to the right people, that, you know

8 what? You wouldn't be shift manager for very long.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there a basis for

10 that? I mean, did something happen there, or was it

11 a feeling?

12 [redacted] Well, we had some -- we had

13 some meetings that -- and then, one on one and in

14 groups that basically she said, you know, hey, I'm --

15 I'm, you know -- we expect a lot from you guys, and,

16 you know, she never threatened my job specifically.

17 But I know that I talked to [redacted] and she

18 basically said that, you know, hey, you guys -- you

19 guys -- you guys tow the line or, you know, I'll get

20 somebody who will. TC

21 But that's management, you know? If

22 you're not --

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which way was

24 she talking about, tow which line? Being conservative

25 or --

1 [redacted] Well, it wasn't even
2 conservative. It was just -- it was behaving in
3 accordance with their -- which had nothing really to
4 do with conservative ops or non-conservative ops. It
5 just had to do with, you know, relationships and
6 things. It was odd.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was her goal?
8 [redacted] I think her spoken goal was
9 to make us better leaders.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So she had
11 behaviors in mind that would get you there?
12 [redacted] Right.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
14 [redacted] And to be quite honest with
15 you, I had no trouble with her. She gave me some
16 advice. I took some of it. I didn't take others of
17 it. But certainly people were worried, you know, that
18 they -- they'd say the wrong thing around her, and it
19 would get to, you know, the wrong -- the right ears or
20 the wrong ears, whichever you (inaudible), and they
21 wouldn't be in their position very long. That was
22 just -- it was just an odd situation in general.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that's what comes
24 to mind when you're thinking of retaliation.
25 [redacted] Yeah. I mean, and I don't

1 even know if that's -- it's not really retaliation.
2 It has nothing to do with raising concerns or
3 anything. It's just --
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And not operations
5 either so much, right?
6 [redacted] Yeah. Well, I mean, I
7 certainly wouldn't have bad-mouthed senior management
8 in front of her. I mean, but I wouldn't do that in
9 front of almost anybody. So if you did, it could be
10 career-ending, because it would go from, you know,
11 hear ear to, you know, other people's ear, you know.
12 But that was -- that was it. She was,
13 like I said, a leadership coach sort of, but --
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in terms of --
15 you're looking at that as management pressure on do it
16 this way, or potentially --
17 [redacted] Oh, yeah. Right. We want
18 you to be, from their perspective, the best leader you
19 can be. And if you don't want to try to do that,
20 well, then, we'll find somebody who will try to.
21 From other people's perspective, it was,
22 hey, we want you to think like us. And if you don't
23 want to think like us, we'll get somebody to replace
24 you. So --
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

1 [redacted] -- I mean, depending on
2 where your brain is.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Does anything else
4 come to mind in that -- in terms of people being able
5 to raise concerns? Does the environment work to
6 encourage that?
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Encourage that,
8 support that. You've got a change of people now, too.
9 We recognize that.
10 [redacted] Yeah.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But if you
12 could think before and now under the new -- new
13 leadership.
14 [redacted] You know, I -- people hear
15 stories. I don't know. I mean, I hear stories about
16 [redacted] but that's just hearsay. That's just
17 rumors.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: About what?
19 [redacted] Oh, I -- I heard that
20 people -- people, you know, write notifications and
21 he'd read them the riot about it, or some such thing.
22 You know, but --
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did that ever
24 happen to you?
25 [redacted] No. No. But, I mean, I'll

1 tell you, I don't write the notifications the way some
2 people -- some people, they'll write notifications,
3 you know, that -- that imply things that are just, you
4 know, wild exaggerations or, you know, and -- and some
5 people get upset about that. I mean, I would never
6 write a notification that didn't -- wasn't based on
7 fact. So I don't think anybody would ever come to --
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, it should
9 be based on fact, right? I mean, it's --
10 [redacted] Absolutely. I think if
11 you're putting suppositions in a notification, your
12 likelihood of getting an outcome that you desire is
13 much more remote because you end up getting -- and I
14 tell my guys, it's like, you put supposes in there,
15 and people say, well, you know, the supposition is
16 wrong, the whole thing goes away. Or, you know, they
17 throw out --
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.
19 [redacted] ~~SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:~~ -- the baby
20 with the bath water. I go -- I go, can you just stick
21 to the facts? Let them draw their own conclusions,
22 and hopefully it comes to the right -- right decision.
23 People use e-mail -- I mean, my soap box, people use
24 e-mail as a weapon. You know, they say, such and such
25 is wrong, yada, yada, yada, (inaudible), you know, it

1 goes to everybody on site.

2 And I said, you know, hey, you might be

3 right when you do that. What you said in your e-mail

4 might be right, but you just pissed off everybody that

5 would do anything about it. So everybody else is

6 going to say, well, you know, forget you. And I said,

7 you know, if you want that, you know, do it through

8 the right channels, and you're more likely to be

9 successful. But --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The notifications

11 that you had heard that [redacted] responded to,

12 were they of that nature? Were they supposed to be

13 something that was a legitimate concern?

14 [redacted] Like I said, it was a

15 rumor, and that's why I hesitate to even mention it.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oh, okay.

17 [redacted] Because I --

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about timeframe

19 for that? Recently?

20 [redacted] No. I don't know, last

21 year or so. I think I heard it from an [redacted] you know,

22 who says, "Hey, what about this? I heard [redacted] did

23 such and such." You know, it's -- rumors are --

24 rumors are a dime a dozen, and most of them are at

25 best half true.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A Salem [redacted]

2 [redacted] Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just so we don't run

4 into anything that we haven't -- you know, we can

5 clarify as we go through it, because we do talk to a

6 lot of people --

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- what [redacted] was that

9 involving.?

10 [redacted]

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted]

12 [redacted] Yes. He's got -- [redacted]

13 [redacted] so he hears things that -- rumors

14 and things that, you know, we had different channels

15 than [redacted] or the rest of (inaudible). So every once

16 in a while you hear something like -- oh, that sounds

17 interesting, sounds juicy, but --

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Just so

19 there's no dead space, let me take a quick break,

20 because I want to check my notes.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Sure. I think

22 we're almost done.

23 (Whereupon, the proceedings in the

24 foregoing matter went off the record

25 briefly.)

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're back on.
2 It's 12:00.
3 And you just gave us the company -- it's
4 your -- your response or the company response to that
5 grievance filed by [redacted]
6 [redacted] It's the response that I
7 gave to the first-level grievance.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
9 [redacted] That I discussed earlier,
10 which was associated with [redacted] perception
11 that we did not want to hear his concerns and that we
12 were harassing him.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Thank you.
14 I had -- there's one other incident I
15 wanted to mention to you to see if you had any
16 knowledge of this. Apparently, this was sometime in
17 2002. There was some questionable direction to a
18 shift manager to NA a startup checklist. And this was
19 supposed to have come from a manager.
20 Did you hear anything like that? It
21 caused some kind of a problem. Our understanding is
22 it caused some type of a problem in that the
23 instruction was to NA the startup checklist. [redacted]
24 [redacted] responded to that, in that he was -- he was
25 upset by it when he heard about it, and this was

1 supposed to be in 2002.

2 [redacted] Do you know what the

3 startup checklist was?

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I don't have the

5 specific on it. It may have involved -- and I'm not

6 sure if this was the direction to or involved somehow

7 in it -[redacted] Do you recall anything in --

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Something that

9 came out of Davis-Besse, is that where it was?

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Potentially that, and

11 it -- and maybe not. It could have been. Had you

12 heard anything --

13 [redacted] No.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- like that that [redacted]

15 [redacted] responded to? And I believe it could have

16 involved [redacted] It was [redacted]

17 instructions.

18 [redacted] No, not -- not that I

19 recall. Not that I recall. Something seems vaguely

20 familiar, but I -- I certainly -- nothing comes to

21 mind. As you mentioned, I might be memory challenged,

22 but I don't recall --

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It doesn't seem like

24 you had any involvement in something like that first

25 hand?

1 [redacted] Nothing sticks out in my
2 mind. Not that I can remember. I mean, if you have
3 some more particulars, maybe I can -- I could --
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The only other thing
5 I could add to it is, if you can't recall, there was
6 a -- anything specific, it had maybe to do with the --
7 a walkdown prior to startup.
8 [redacted] Oh. Like a containment
9 walkdown?
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Exactly. Do you
11 recall anything like that?
12 [redacted] No. I mean, it --([redacted]
13 [redacted] might -- might recall something along those
14 lines. I mean, you see, NA'ing -- we do NA things.
15 Our procedures allow us to NA things.
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, this is
17 something that apparently caused a reaction, though.
18 The instruction was to NA the step and --
19 [redacted] That sounds so familiar.
20 I'm just trying to --
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- [redacted]
22 reacted to that. And if it had to do with the
23 walkdown and the containment --
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That directly
25 relates to Davis-Besse and --

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. It was an
2 added -- procedures that were added as a result of the
3 Davis-Besse situation.
4 [redacted] It would have been this
5 year?
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: 2002. Nothing is
7 really coming to mind?
8 [redacted] No.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
10 [redacted] Nothing is coming to mind.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Just a couple
13 more things to finish up. We've talked to a lot of
14 people during the course of --
15 [redacted] Sure.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- trying to
17 figure out this work environment, if there's a work
18 environment problem down here. From our questions to
19 you, you probably can figure out we've talked to a lot
20 of people, because of the information we got, some of
21 the detail anyway.
22 What's been told to us is a statement that
23 was provided that you had said something to this
24 effect, maybe in one of these frustrating incidents
25 we've talked about. Like you made a comment --

1 [redacted] On quote?

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I don't

3 know if it's a quote.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: To the effect of.

5 [redacted] All right.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's -- yes, to

7 the effect of like, look, I'm the one who is licensed

8 here, you're not. I'm the one who is responsible. My

9 license is on the line every day. Would you have

10 made --

11 [redacted] Made that to a manager?

12 Made that statement to a manager?

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: A contemporary,

14 shift manager --

15 [redacted] I could see myself

16 discussing incidents like the one with [redacted]

17 you know, separated from the incident with a peer of

18 mine saying, you know, hey, it's our license on the

19 line.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

21 [redacted] We need to be -- if we're

22 going to -- if these decisions are going to be made,

23 we need to either be making them or be, you know, in

24 complete agreement with them. I could see myself

25 saying something like that, yes. Would I -- have I

said that to a manager? I don't think -- I don't think I've said that, you know, hey, it's my license, not yours.

I did have a discussion along those lines with [redacted] following the SJ valve issue, saying, "You know, [redacted] I'm not sure it's appropriate that [redacted] is making this decision when you're the senior license holder." And I said, "I don't know where the lines -- you know, the decisionmaking, you know, drops, you know, whose desk it actually" --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who is responsible.

[redacted] -- responsible --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[redacted] -- but it seemed to me like this a senior license -- a senior license's decision, which was at that time [redacted]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And he had a facility license, [redacted] did?

[redacted] He was the [redacted], which is typically the senior facility license, yeah. So I said -- and I don't -- I still don't know exactly who -- when it gets up into that realm, who was the decisionmaker. I'm think it was [redacted] in that case.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

1 [redacted] And I talked to him about
2 that, and I said it seems to me like he should have a
3 candid discussion with [redacted] and I think he did, about
4 how those decisions get made.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You said you
6 could see yourself making a statement similar to that
7 effect.
8 [redacted] Yeah. Yeah. I certainly
9 had discussions along those lines with other people
10 that -- one thing I --
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: About one of
12 the incidents we've talked about?
13 [redacted] Yeah. I -- to be honest
14 with you, the one about the SJ valves, I at that point
15 kind of changed my mind and said, you know, sometimes
16 I'm going to have to be able to go into these just --
17 these meetings and be willing to say, you know what,
18 put my foot down and say, you know, this meeting is
19 over, and I'm -- [redacted]
20 We're going to come -- come up with a decision I'm
21 going to be able to live with, or we're going to have
22 -- we're going to keep talking.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who would you
24 have had that --
25 [redacted] Well, I was -- when I had

1 discussions along those lines with [redacted] it
2 was about [redacted]
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: About that SJ valve
5 incident?
6 [redacted] Yeah. I mean, I didn't
7 like the position it put me in. It put me in the
8 position -- granted, I wasn't the decisionmaker at
9 that point. I wasn't on shift. I wasn't the guy --
10 but I was, I felt, one of the guys that should have
11 had significant input into this.
12 And like I said, I was mostly taken aback.
13 I wasn't ready -- I didn't go to that meeting, you
14 know, thinking, okay, got my dukes up, I'm ready --
15 ready to put, you know, put my license on the line
16 here, because I didn't think that was in the cards.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They blind-
18 sided you.
19 [redacted] Right.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Would that
21 be --
22 [redacted] Effectively, yes. And I
23 learned something from it. I -- and that's why, when
24 I had the subsequent conversation about circ water, it
25 was like, hey, I'm digging my heels in and I -- you

1 know, and I -- I -- at that point I didn't give in.
2 The decision wasn't mine to make anyway, but --
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No. That was on [redacted]
4 [redacted], right?
5 [redacted] Right. Right. But, you
6 know, I -- it changed -- it changed my thinking
7 slightly, not that I didn't think I would be heard,
8 but I would have to work harder. And I would have to
9 be willing to use tools that I had previously not
10 thought necessary.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you think
12 today with the change of management you still feel
13 that way? Or do you --
14 [redacted] No, I don't.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- (inaudible)
16 like you have to do that.
17 [redacted] I don't think so. I think
18 we're moving the [redacted] but the
19 position. I don't think the position had much value,
20 personally. I've had no -- no problems with [redacted]
21 [redacted] thus far. And [redacted]
22 have always -- always been supportive along those
23 lines.
24 So, you know, I've certainly never been
25 pressured by either one of them, although [redacted]

1 [redacted] will be accused by different people of, you
2 know, being production-oriented. And, you know, he
3 is. But he also -- he also would not sacrifice
4 safety.
5 He might just have a different threshold.
6 He has never -- he has never forced his will on me.
7 He certainly expressed -- expressed his -- you know,
8 he's a very persuasive guy. He's a very smart guy.
9 And he can be very persuasive. But he has never, you
10 know, strong-armed me. So --
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The work
12 environment -- we've talked about it the whole
13 morning, the safety conscious work environment. Do
14 you believe it's a healthy one down there at
15 Artificial Island?
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well --
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or at Salem.
18 You can speak to Salem.
19 [redacted] You know what? I think we
20 have a ways to go on it. I think it's mostly because
21 of the union-management relationship.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because it
23 started out --
24 [redacted] Because we're at odds with
25 each other. And until -- until we're both pulling the

1 rope in the same direction, we're both looking at each
2 other's actions in the light of, okay, how is he
3 trying to screw me?
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: (Inaudible.)
5 [redacted] Yeah, exactly. And it's
6 not -- it's not -- it's not fair on either side.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No.
8 [redacted] You know, that we -- the
9 union guys -- you know, you're trying to take money
10 away from them. I wouldn't expect them to be, you
11 know, saying, "Okay. Yeah, sure. Bring it on. We're
12 all for saving money at my expense." And the
13 management guy shouldn't every time somebody brings up
14 a safety concern think that they can -- this guy is
15 trying to make me look bad, you know. And it just
16 leads to -- that, as far as I'm concerned, is the
17 biggest risk we're running.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.
19 [redacted] If one of my -- one of my
20 supervisors -- of these supervisors or one of the
21 superintendents, you know, colors a good concern in
22 light of -- in light of the relationship we now have
23 between union and management, I think that's really
24 the risk. Not the --
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's something

1 you need to keep your eyes on, then.

2 [redacted] Yeah. It's something we

3 need to focus on. I'm worried about it. And when

4 things like [redacted] grievance come up, I mean,

5 it -- I try to get as much input and as much help as

6 I can to make sure I handle it correctly. I -- and I

7 try to make sure I communicate with my guys, like,

8 hey, we still need to address every issue like it's

9 new and --

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Don't shoot the

11 messenger; address the issue.

12 [redacted] Right. Don't throw out the

13 baby with the bath water. The notification might be

14 written with the intent to make you angry. Don't get

15 angry. Look at -- look at what is underneath that.

16 Maybe there is something in there.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You see that as a

18 concern. Do you think your senior management has the

19 same understanding? Are they -- are they moving in a

20 direction to help correct that situation?

21 (End of Tape 2, Side A. Beginning of Tape 2, Side B.)

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're on

23 Side B. It's approximately 12:11 p.m. We were asking

24 if you're seeing the concern of -- in management

25 looking at the union's issues as maybe not valid, and

the union looking at management as you don't want to do that because you want to save money. And there is this --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's a power struggle.

[redacted] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- starting between them.

[redacted] Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The question is: you're seeing that as an issue. Does senior management see it as an issue?

[redacted] I think so. I think [redacted] sees it as -- as probably one of the major issues.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware of anything that's being done to address it?

[redacted] I know that they are -- yeah, I believe [redacted] is trying to get people in --you know, critical people in small space at the same time and force them to talk it out. I mean, really, what it comes down to is, you know, we fired a guy and that guy is very influential in the union. And the guy that fired -- the guys that fired him are now the [redacted] who was the same position as he was, and the

1 [redacted] and --

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this [redacted]

3 [redacted]

4 [redacted]: Yes.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [redacted] is

7 gone.

8 [redacted] Well, he's the [redacted]

9 [redacted]

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

11 [redacted] So, I mean, he's gone -- he

12 might be out of the reach of [redacted]

13 [redacted] is certainly not. And, I mean, I've had

14 discussions with the union guys, and a number of them

15 come up and say, "Well, as long as [redacted] is in

16 position, I don't see things getting better." You

17 know, bottom line is they're not -- they're going to

18 keep, you know --

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Making the

20 [redacted] issue.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

22 [redacted] Right. Because it --

23 because they -- I think they consider it a win. You

24 know, not only did [redacted] get all of his back

25 pay, but, look, we got the guy fired that fired him.

So as long as that kind of environment is in there, I think --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It poisons the well, right?

[redacted] Yeah, it poisons the well. I'm -- my fear is not so much, you know, hey, go ahead, have your sour grapes, but I'm worried about my people, the guys that handle those concerns mishandling one, because of --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[redacted] -- and I have frequent conversations about it. But I'll tell you, you know, emotions get involved, and it's a potential.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[redacted] And I'm worried -- and that's my major concern.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you have anything else you'd like to add to that?

[redacted] No, I think I've talked for a while.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, we took quite a bit of your time.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, you've got our cards, if you --

[redacted] Yes.

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- if something
2 comes up along the lines of what we talked about, an
3 issue where you --
4 [redacted]N: Do I have your card?
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I did not give you
6 mine.
7 [redacted] Okay.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: An issue you
9 felt that was -- that you need to talk to us about
10 something where it was a non-conservative --
11 [redacted] Certainly.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- please give
13 us a call.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If you want to add or
15 clarify anything, and also if you wanted to reach me
16 for the purpose of transcript review, you could do
17 that.
18 I just have some closing questions for
19 you. Have I or any other NRC representative offered
20 you any promises of reward or threatened you in any
21 manner in exchange for your information today?
22 [redacted] No.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you met with us
24 freely and voluntarily?
25 [redacted] Yes.

7C

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And you don't
2 have anything to add at this point?
3 [redacted] No, not unless you have
4 more questions.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. No, but I
6 thank you for your time. And we took an extensive bit
7 of your time. Thanks very much for that.
8 [redacted] You're very welcome.
9 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of [redacted]

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: [redacted]

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.

Lisa Scriber

Lisa Scriber
Official Transcriber
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