


Official Transcript of Proceedings
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: Interview of 

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F & 

Location: Salem, New Jersey

Date: Friday, February 27, 2004

Work Order No.: NRC-1364

Pages 1-~~177~~
175

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS
INTERVIEW

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IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.

 : 1-2003-051F

(CLOSED) : 

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Friday, February 27, 2004

Resident's Office

Salem - Hope Creek Station

The above-entitled interview was conducted at
9:36 a.m.

BEFORE:

EILEEN NEFF, Special Agent

SCOTT BARBER, Senior Project Engineer

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

9:36 a.m.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is February 27, 2004. The time is approximately 9:36 a.m. Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC, Region 1, Office of Investigations. Also present from Region 1, Division of Reactor Projects is Senior Project Engineer, Scott Barber.

What follows is an interview of [REDACTED] That is spelled [REDACTED] last name, [REDACTED] who is currently employed by PS&G Nuclear as a [REDACTED] at Hope Creek.

The subject of the interview concerns the safety conscious work environment at Salem and Hope Creek and [REDACTED] has been advised that he's being advised as a witness in this matter and there is no potential violation associated with a safety conscious work environment.

The interview, as agreed, is being tape recorded and will be taken under oath. The location of the interview is the Resident's Office, NRC Resident's Office at Salem and Hope Creek.

At this point what I'd like to do is place you under oath, okay?

Would you raise your right hand, please?

1 Do you swear that the testimony you're about to
2 provide is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
3 the truth so help you God?

4 [REDACTED] I do.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Some identifying
6 information, please, date of birth, Social Security
7 Number?

8 [REDACTED] I'm [REDACTED] My
9 date of birth is [REDACTED] That would be [REDACTED] My
10 Social Security Number is [REDACTED]

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Home address,
12 please?

13 [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED]

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And a summary of your
16 education, please?

17 [REDACTED] Currently I'm employed at
18 Hope Creek as a [REDACTED] I qualified
19 there in 19 -- I think it was [REDACTED] I received my
20 license. Before that I was at [REDACTED] for about

21 [REDACTED] And before that I have a degree in
22 [REDACTED]
23 Institute. Prior to that [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED]
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What years was [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] TC

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TC

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TC

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The degree year then was?

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And when you were at what position?

[REDACTED] TC

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TC

MR. BARBER: So you worked at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is that right?

[REDACTED] Yes, [REDACTED] TC years to the

day.

MR. BARBER: Okay, [REDACTED] TC and then

you came to [REDACTED] TC

[REDACTED] TC [REDACTED] TC

MR. BARBER: And did you go right into license class?

[REDACTED] TC I licensed [REDACTED] TC

[REDACTED] I think it was.

MR. BARBER: But I mean did you go right

1 into license class or did you work in the station at
2 all?

3 7C [REDACTED] I worked in the station
4 for approximately six months to satisfy the time at
5 the station. 7C [REDACTED] a boiling water reactor,
6 very similar to Hope Creek. I went into a fast track
7 class in January, a 7-month --

8 MR. BARBER: You said you were an [REDACTED] at

9 [REDACTED] 7C
10 [REDACTED] 7C That's right.

11 MR. BARBER: Were you licensed there too?

12 [REDACTED] 7C Certified.

13 MR. BARBER: Certified.

14 [REDACTED] 7C Company certified. You'll
15 see no examination at your office.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you came to Hope
17 Creek initially in [REDACTED] 7C what were your job
18 assignments then?

19 [REDACTED] 7C Basically just to satisfy
20 my time on station.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: STA type duties?

22 [REDACTED] 7C Some procedure reviews,
23 some 50.59 reviews, taking care of mostly
24 administrative type backlog issues. I did a 3-week
25 review of design basis documentation when Operations

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1 loaned me to Engineering for a period of three weeks
2 to maybe two months, something like that, I think it
3 was.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And then

5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] I think my license came

7 through in [REDACTED] The

8 examination was end of [REDACTED]

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and did that
10 position change at all or were you still on-shift?

11 [REDACTED] No. I'm not off-shift as

12 of January of this year. I reported to a work week
13 assignment, day shift.

14 MR. BARBER: Were you a [REDACTED] all
15 the way through just recently, in the control room the
16 whole time or did you have any other intervening
17 assignments?

18 [REDACTED] Yes, yes. And I don't

19 remember the exact dates. Our last cycle, let me

20 think, it would have been [REDACTED] I went to

21 work in help planning the outage.

22 MR. BARBER: Okay.

23 [REDACTED] Which was in April of

24 [REDACTED]

25 MR. BARBER: Okay.

1 [REDACTED] And then I worked that
2 until the outage and then somewhere around June time
3 frame of last year, came back to my shift, ultimately
4 the same shift I was assigned with.

5 MR. BARBER: That's pretty typical though
6 isn't it, that kind of assignment?

7 [REDACTED] Yes, a five or six month
8 rotation, occasionally off shift to do some sort of
9 outage support or scheduling of planning support for
10 an indeterminate amount of time, as assigned, and then
11 back. I was off long enough to lose my proficiency.
12 I needed to regain that by standing a set of MER
13 (Phonetic) watches before I regained license duty.

14 MR. BARBER: Okay. Very good, thanks.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And in your
16 management chain then, let's go from 1999 to date,
17 when you were on shift, who were you working, assigned
18 with, supervisory-wise?

19 [REDACTED], I reported to [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] at first.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As an [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED] Yes. And then to -- he
23 transitioned off and into a day shift, he became the
24 [REDACTED] and then I
25 went -- oh, I took a day shift job for about six

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1 months to do workweek planning and scheduling. But
 2 five or six months into it a [REDACTED]
 3 resigned from the company and went to [REDACTED]
 4 [REDACTED]. His slot needed to be filled. I
 5 volunteered and was assigned a bravo shift which is
 6 [REDACTED] (Phonetic). I reported to [REDACTED] for --
 7 I'm guessing here -- maybe four or five months where
 8 he went to the Training Center and then [REDACTED]
 9 (Phonetic). I worked for [REDACTED] (Phonetic)
 10 for several months until [REDACTED] was stricken
 11 with [REDACTED]. So he came off of shift and then [REDACTED]
 12 [REDACTED] stepped in and I've worked for [REDACTED] for about
 13 three years.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So the bulk of your
 15 experience on shift as a [REDACTED] would be with [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]
 17 [REDACTED] The bulk of it, yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And right now, who is
 19 in your reporting --

20 [REDACTED] (Inaudible) [REDACTED]
 21 (Phonetic). I report to him. He's the [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]
 23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. I think what
 24 we'll do is -- let me ask you about this. In your
 25 personal experience, we'll ask in terms of raising

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1 concerns, if you had a concern whether it was nuclear
2 safety or industrial safety or radiological safety, in
3 terms of raising concerns and how the concerns are
4 addressed on site, in terms of let's say from 1999
5 forward or well, you're on site in 1997-1998, let's
6 look at the whole experience, okay?

7 How does it work on site? Do you see the
8 raising of concerns and handling of concerns having
9 any particular strengths or particular weaknesses?
10 How would you rate that?

11 [REDACTED] I would say it's neutral,
12 depending on the concern. Some are addressed
13 expeditiously and some are not. I can't think of a
14 specific example on the other side. The ones that
15 come to my attention I am licensed and obligated to
16 take those actions, but I do take that very seriously,
17 are mostly processed or machine RE, those sort of
18 issues.

19 People-wise, sometimes they're not taken
20 quite as seriously.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Processed machinery,
22 you mean equipment failure?

23 [REDACTED] Hardware.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Things are not
25 working the way they should?

[REDACTED] Yes. And/or procedural deficiencies or performance procedural deficiencies. It wasn't performed quite the way the procedure intended or as written. Those are handled usually fairly -- actually fairly is probably not the word.

Well, I don't think they're handled that well.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Equipment performance deficiencies?

[REDACTED] I believe equipment performance issues I think are handled very well and expeditiously as best as we can within running a business. Not everything is going to be worked all the time and not everything will get fixed today.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And has that been your experience throughout since you've been on site?

[REDACTED] Yes, for the most part.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and the kind of concerns that aren't handled, you wouldn't rate as well, what kind of concerns fall into that category?

[REDACTED] The subtler ones, the human performance ones, the ones that are -- things along the lines like well, if I need to get this job done which is always the priority, I have to do these things that may not be in full compliance with the

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1 sequencing of steps or something like that. Although
2 it will meet the intent, will not be done precisely in
3 accordance with the steps of a procedure.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and --

5  And that is acceptable and
6 allowed.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're not in
8 violation of something, is that what you're saying?

9  Correct.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's not quite in
11 accordance with the steps of the procedure.

12  Right.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now wouldn't
14 something like that be done in -- can you think of an
15 example why something would be out of sequence?

16  I can't think of a
17 specific one right off the top of my head, but it
18 would be something in the effect of fixing a boiler
19 house fan or a cooling, an ECCS cooling water
20 function. Now it's a plant-type issue that would --
21 something along the lines that we can't get it out of
22 service without doing step two before step one because
23 of this concern. And that is somewhat typical and
24 that would be acceptable.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Something that

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
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1 presents a safety issue or just an out of procedure?

2  Yes, in my experience, as
3 I look at that for that very question you're asking is
4 is does it make a difference, does it make a nuclear
5 safety difference? No. Then let's go ahead and do it
6 the way you proposed, due to 401.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Now --

8 MR. BARBER: Is that a situation where,
9 for example, it sounds like what you're describing is
10 there's a system procedure that provides a sequence of
11 doing something?

12  ^{7C} Yes.

13 MR. BARBER: And the work group is going
14 to do whatever it is they're doing in accordance with
15 the system procedure. Could they in turn, though,
16 could they go out with the help of planning and what
17 have you in the work week process just instead of
18 working within the bounds of the system procedure,
19 actually write their own little mini procedure as part
20 of their work construction that would align the system
21 and be allowed to do that with having the proper
22 reviews and saying okay, we're going to do it like
23 this, have the proper reviews up front or is that just
24 not the way you process the work?

25  The process is so

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1 encumbered that it's handcuffing. It truly is
2 handcuffing. Some of the issues just certainly have
3 nothing to do without a doubt have nothing to do with
4 a nuclear safety concern. They are so under -- they
5 are so on the bottom of that.

6 Do they have an overall impact on what is
7 the message that's being sent? Well, this particular
8 feed pump lube oil system procedure which has no
9 nuclear concern whatsoever, yes, we can work around
10 this one, but on this diesel or RHR procedure, that
11 would be out of bounds, without a doubt, out of
12 bounds. It would be unacceptable.

13 MR. BARBER: Doesn't your procedure -- you
14 have a procedure that governs procedural adherence,
15 right?

16  Yes.

17 MR. BARBER: And don't you have different
18 categories and with the perception that I would have
19 would be that your safety-related procedures are
20 procedures more for scoring points systems would have
21 more structure and more rigid controls, whereas when
22 you get to balance a plant, if you're working like you
23 said a feed pump lube oil system, you have more
24 latitude. It will say maybe you can do these steps
25 out of sequence or things like that. Do you have that

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1 flexibility inherently or is it more restrictive?

2 [REDACTED] It is inherently --

3 MR. BARBER: In other words, and I don't
4 remember what the categorization is, but there's like
5 different categorizations of procedure adherence and
6 procedure implementation, one is step by step, others
7 can have flexibility. And the presumption is the
8 farther you get away from nuclear safety and more
9 feasibility you have inherently in the way the
10 procedure could be implemented?

11 [REDACTED] Yes. That's true and
12 there is -- and some of them are misqualified into
13 different categories.

14 MR. BARBER: Okay.

15 [REDACTED] Some of them are just
16 plain much more restrictive than they need to be or
17 could be to meet expeditious real business needs.

18 MR. BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] I use the term
20 expeditious, certainly not an emergency, certainly not
21 a -- and again, certainly not a nuclear safety issue.

22 MR. BARBER: Or production issue?

23 [REDACTED] More of a production
24 issue. More of a business need issue. We're asking
25 you to use this procedure or use this mindset here and

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1 use this one over here and could that line get blurry?
2 That's why I'm here. It can get blurry and you're
3 asking the individuals to use the two different
4 standards.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are these concerns
6 that you've had personally or are these concerns that
7 are raised to you to handle?

8  Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you're talking
10 about messages that are sent, are they joint?

11  They're raised for me to
12 handle. I will have an operator in the field trying
13 to do something with a generator support system, like
14 a diesel or an RHR or an ECCS system. Well, I need to
15 open this valve and do this sequence first versus that
16 one. And we'll look at what the category of the
17 procedure is and maybe perhaps find that well, you
18 know what, we have to stop here and do the on-the-spot
19 change and do all of the reviews and it is so
20 encumbering that it would lead to say -- well, you
21 know what, we can wiggle through this wicket as
22 opposed to bringing everything to a stop and taking it
23 through a very encumbering process.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Wiggle through the
25 wicket, meaning change the order and supply, a little

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1 different procedure than would normally what was
2 written?

3 [REDACTED] Yes. Using solid judgment
4 and deciding that it could be done better, but if --
5 in the instance of like a ^{stator} scatter water cooling or a
6 generator oil system, it not going in service means an
7 outage extends and the pressure here is get it done.

8 MR. BARBER: Could one argue that by doing
9 that you're kind of perpetuating the --

10 [REDACTED] Absolutely.

11 MR. BARBER: Maybe poor planning of the
12 job or what have you. You could argue that a proper
13 planning of the job would have anticipated the need to
14 do this.

15 [REDACTED] Absolutely.

16 MR. BARBER: The on-the-spot change should
17 have been done ahead of the actual implementation of
18 the work week?

19 [REDACTED] Or the on-the-spot change
20 should have happened 18 months ago in a previous
21 cycle. Yes, the perpetuation continues. It's an
22 overall environment that with a wink and a smile, this
23 is okay to do that.

24 MR. BARBER: If that occurs and there's a
25 problem, let's say that there's something that's done

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1 out of sequence and it's kind of -- okay, we're going
2 to do it this way because we think it's safe and we
3 don't have a problem and it will facilitate getting
4 whatever the device is repaired or returned to
5 service, and there's a problem with that, who is
6 culpable for the problem? Are you as the supervisor
7 or is the worker, both culpable?

8 [REDACTED] Yes. Yes. There's a
9 negative impact and we are both culpable.

10 MR. BARBER: Has that ever happened to
11 you, have you ever had a situation like that where you
12 made a judgment and there was something --

13 [REDACTED] No, not from me
14 specifically, no. Perhaps I've been lucky. Or maybe
15 I've been lucky, maybe I had the right answer.

16 MR. BARBER: Is this something the
17 environment kind of puts you into? Is this -- are you
18 kind of -- and I don't want to use the word "framed" -
19 - it's really the framework and the environment, the
20 way the work is processed at the station, it just
21 results in this happening?

22 [REDACTED] When I came here from
23 [REDACTED] I mean performance-wise,
24 yes, a station -- this is five years, [REDACTED] years ago
25 -- couldn't hold a candle to coming down here to Hope

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1 Creek and Salem. I left them just a couple of years
2 after being on the watch list, so I knew what that
3 meant.

4 But the standard of procedural compliance
5 there was -- there were no questions asked. It can't
6 be done as written, stop and do an on-the-spot change,
7 but the on-the-spot change process was not as
8 encumbering. It meant that because there was enough
9 people on shift to do the reviews, take their
10 production hat off and put a 50.59 hat on and say this
11 lube oil system over here, this balance of plant
12 standby auxiliary system, whatever it might be. It
13 might be building drains, has no effect on the final
14 safety analysis and the sequence of these steps are an
15 all net gain positive, zero negative. It just makes
16 sense. Perform it. We do the step sequence, we
17 resequence the steps with lineouts and pen and ink and
18 put it into a bin and the process would then make that
19 on-the-spot change become permanent, down the road as
20 procedure writers could work through their backlog.

21 Here, it's -- it is just a nightmare. It
22 brings everything to a stop for hours and hours and
23 hours and hours.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why is that? One
25 part you're talking about is because it's so

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1 complicated to get the on-the-spot change effected.
2 And the other issue you mentioned is there weren't
3 enough people at [REDACTED] Are they just
4 understaffed in order to be able to cover the kinds of
5 things they run into during a typical day? With the
6 people that are on shift who could effect the changes
7 and stop the holdups?

8 [REDACTED] Here, as a first line
9 supervisor, the emphasis is on getting that system in
10 service versus the procedure isn't right. I can't
11 perform it. And if that's my reason for saying I
12 can't do this, the environment is why didn't you see
13 that beforehand? Why didn't you see that in your walk
14 down? Okay, that's a performance issue and yes, I can
15 -- but maybe I didn't have that as an on-shift worker
16 to walk down and see beforehand and now I'm stuck in
17 the production squeeze.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The emphasis being on
19 production?

20 [REDACTED] The emphasis on yes,
21 system restoration and retests and unit back on the
22 line.

23 MR. BARBER: In many cases, we're only
24 talking about on-line maintenance, right?

25 [REDACTED] An outage and on-line.

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1 MR. BARBER: Okay, do you have any
2 pressure when you're doing it on-line?

3 [REDACTED] Typically, on-line for the
4 most part are recurring type system operating
5 procedures, things that are tests, things that are
6 swapping this system for that system. So they have
7 been through many, many iterations and have had
8 opportunities to catch things out of sequence issue or
9 things like that. So those changes can be feed back
10 into a system. You can say you know what, I tried to
11 do this procedure seven years ago and this procedure
12 change went through to make it better and they're
13 always getting scrubbed because they come up, like
14 surveillance tests, you're doing almost the same one
15 every month, some with less frequency, but during the
16 outage it's more times than not when those sort of
17 issues come up.

18 MR. BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] And most of them are, like
20 I say, like in the turbine building and the balance of
21 plan arena, that puts you in a tight bind for getting
22 it done and I might have been the person that had to
23 walk it down. It just didn't happen. The opportunity
24 and the time to be here did not occur.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you're saying the

1 procedural compliance that's gotten around with a wink
2 and a smile --

3 [REDACTED] Yes, so to speak.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Hasn't been of the --
5 to the level where it's affected nuclear safety?

6 [REDACTED] To the best of my judgment
7 and I don't say that as a disclaimer for my actions,
8 to allow such a thing to occur, but to the best of my
9 judgment and knowledge there hasn't been any of those
10 issues that have had to come up with reactivity
11 systems, ECCS systems or ECCS support systems.

12 I have, on occasion, had to stop things
13 and say no, but you get into that environment where at
14 one time with a subordinate, this is okay out here on
15 this oil system out here in a balance of plant space
16 and now he wants to say can I do this with this diesel
17 fuel oil storage tank pump? Well, no, absolutely not.
18 It can't be.

19 So in effect I fostered him to ask that
20 question by --

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

22 [REDACTED] By allowing it to occur
23 out here in a balance of plant space and then I have
24 to say no, that's simply out of bounds.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are your peers in the

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1 same position that you're in? Do you have these
2 discussions with them?

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They feel the same
5 way that if it's seen as okay for the balance of the
6 plant, are they kind of having to defend it when
7 you're not affecting balance of plant, when you're
8 into more safety functions?

9 [REDACTED] I don't think I quite
10 understood that.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are your peers in the
12 same position you're in, the other [REDACTED] Do they see
13 it the way you're saying it, that we've got this
14 attitude toward it for the balance of the plant,
15 because of the emphasis on production and this ability
16 to get around the procedural compliance, are they
17 having to safeguard against that attitude bleeding
18 over into the safety functions?

19 [REDACTED] I think yes. I think each
20 of us in our positions have to continuously try to
21 guard against the blurriness of where does it become
22 a nuclear safety concern? Where does production press
23 up against it? But my job, as I see it, and I always
24 use the analogy of the 747 pilot that the plane just
25 plain cannot take off until every checklist is done,

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1 until the plane is absolutely safe to take off, but
2 yet, the captain of that 747 has somebody standing
3 over him that says your bonus is counting on the on-
4 time arrival of that plane.

5 It's the same way here. It's very similar
6 here. My bonus counts on being an on-time outage
7 execution, but I can't certainly start the reactor up
8 as an obligation of my license until all of the safety
9 systems are absolutely ready and in standby, to the
10 best of my knowledge.

11 And so all my peers are defending the same
12 sort of -- walking that same sort of line of
13 production up against our license and nuclear safety.
14 But I think the production pressure is tight.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You feel it?

16  Yes, I do, in general.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In what other ways is
18 your performance appraisal or your compensation tied
19 to production, if any?

20  You mean generation output
21 is clearly a business goal which most units are in an
22 outage, they start up, they come to 100 percent and
23 that's the best they can do. So any day of the
24 outage, an hour in the outage will clearly affect my
25 compensation, based on generator output alone.

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1 Any day in the outage is, in my position,
2 a business issue, not necessarily a nuclear safety
3 issue, but any day of the outage is free for me in
4 compensation. That's time away from my family and
5 that's a business gripe that I'm sure in the NRC there
6 are times that you work more than you would like and
7 you'd prefer to spend time with your family, but when
8 it goes into an outage into the seventh or eighth week
9 and your family is home saying when is this going to
10 be over, and you know it's going to be, how close --
11 how much closer does that production pressure come
12 closer and closer to the blurring of the safety issue
13 line, both nuclear safety and personal safety?

14 It directly affects my compensation. I
15 look at it this way. I'm compensated, this is me
16 personally, my compensation is a set amount, there's
17 a small bonus based on generator output, but it's the
18 set amount versus the time I'm away from my wife and
19 children, the less time I'm away from them, it's
20 almost like a pay raise, I'm sorry, yes, that's right.
21 The more time I'm with them is clearly a compensation
22 issue and if the outage is going on and on and on and
23 on, the production pressure for me to be here, versus
24 be home gets higher and higher and higher.

25 In my case, and my case being a [REDACTED]

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1 [REDACTED] and in the control room, it's -- I
2 clearly have more job security, so to speak, and I
3 clearly have a better idea of where the line is
4 absolutely black on a nuclear safety concern, on a
5 radiological safety concern. It's very clear with me.
6 But how far out is the defense is on that or a better
7 personal judgment and integrity and how much closer
8 does production come up against that or up against
9 that blurriness or even up near the black and white
10 line of what I deem as nuclear safe or radiologically
11 safe. I can't say that for every first line
12 supervisor that's out there.

13 Do they have the same level of security
14 and the same feeling of security that they could bring
15 up a concern? If I feel this way at times that I
16 cannot bring up issues in the say the fortieth day of
17 an outage, being pressed to come in on a weekend with
18 zero compensation offered, and I can't say hey wait,
19 that's Mother's Day or that's my anniversary, which is
20 clearly the environment that I work in. That would be
21 an acceptable answer.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

23 [REDACTED] If I can't do that, how
24 could I expect a first line maintenance supervisor who
25 may be riding, for business reasons, may be riding a

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1 certain employment line. Maybe he has some
2 availability issues, personal issues. Maybe he hasn't
3 been the best employee and he's out there putting
4 together the high pressure coolant injection pump and
5 he's under a production pressure similar to the one I
6 am. Would he be as strong willed to say no, this is
7 the line and you're up against it? Or is he apt to
8 wink, smile and say we got to get this together?
9 That's the gist, that's essentially the gist of why I
10 come over here because I don't know that everybody at
11 this station has that same, at least in my opinion,
12 the same stability and security that I can speak out
13 against a nuclear radiological or personal safety
14 issue that my other colleagues could.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In the face of
16 production pressures?

17 [REDACTED] Yes.

18 MR. BARBER: Let's talk about the HPSI
19 analogy for a minute.

20 [REDACTED] For a record, I don't know
21 of any problems there, but I'm using the analogy.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But what I understand
23 is you question whether somebody would, given the
24 environment that you're in?

25 [REDACTED] Yes.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't know of any
2 time that that happened?

3  Of course not. I do not.

4 MR. BARBER: That wasn't where I was
5 going. What I wanted to ask you about is you meant
6 that person that made the supervisor -- decides to
7 maybe step out of sequence in work instructions to
8 more quickly repair or put the pump back together.
9 They still ar responsible for the operation of the
10 pump once it goes back into service, so if something
11 is not done properly, the presumption is that it will
12 show up in the post-maintenance testing and
13 surveillance testing?

14  Absolutely.

15 MR. BARBER: So if they take a shortcut,
16 it's going to come back to them.

17  It should.

18 MR. BARBER: Hey, you did this and you
19 didn't follow the procedure, you didn't do this right,
20 you didn't do that right. And as a result, the pump
21 is put through PMT and it's failed. You know?

22  You're right and
23 performance of that post job test should pass or fail
24 and it might not get through the wicket that if it
25 fails, what I'm saying is if I'm under undue personal

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1 employment pressure and an employee is that can't --
2 that the demand is so high on production and get the
3 job done, and then I have to face a look at a
4 condition of a component or look at the condition of
5 the oil or look at the sequence of events of how it
6 gets tested, I would say that person would be
7 sufficiently challenged to not speak up and not get
8 the job done exactly as written.

9 MR. BARBER: Have you ever felt that's
10 happened with any safety-related equipment or anything
11 on that order?

12  I mean there have been
13 challenges by -- one of the -- as her management will
14 talk about and say we've done diesel surveillances and
15 self-contained breathing apparatus, especially in the
16 room of a running engine with an airpack on because it
17 needs to be inspected and that's been well documented
18 and publicized, based on instead of entering the
19 outage LCO and making the repairs on the engine, we
20 would test it and test it and test it, rather than fix
21 it. And that example, that again just sends out the
22 message about the environment. It's not that
23 specific.

24 To me, the specific issue -- I drive a
25 diesel car and I have a garage. I take the

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1 precautions to open up the door and stuff, but I don't
2 go to my car in an air pack to drive it out. I don't
3 believe that those individuals were in any danger of
4 asphyxiation from carbon monoxide whatsoever, but we
5 sent a message, we sent the message to everybody that
6 we're going to run this test this way versus fix it.
7 And that's been a well publicized and documented
8 event.

9 We have started a plant up with -- or
10 we've ended outages, control rod drive mechanisms.
11 We've gone and done this with windows of outages where
12 we say we're going to do this number of control rod
13 drives. And then close up the window without
14 completing them all. Two or three outages ago, we
15 essentially de-scoped from the outage, control rod
16 drives.

17 Now do the control rod drives then pass
18 their scram surveillance, the timing surveillance?
19 Yes, they do. They pass the post-work test. Do they
20 go in fast enough? Yes, they do. They pass the scram
21 time surveillance? Do they move? Yes, they do. Do
22 they satisfy all the IST and post-work tests? Yes.

23 MR. BARBER: Do they stick?

24  Absolutely, yes, they do.
25 They stick. Is that acceptable? Well, yes, it's

1 okay. A business decision was made in the scope of
2 the outage to end that window before all the rods were
3 complete.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Which outage are you
5 talking about here?

6 [REDACTED] That would be two outages
7 ago, last outage after receiving significant feedback
8 from the industry and maybe you folks as well, that
9 all mech. schedules would be changed. All available
10 resources would be put towards that. Two outages ago
11 --

12 MR. BARBER: So you're talking about the
13 fall of 2001?

14 [REDACTED] Two outages ago, I think
15 it was --

16 MR. BARBER: You said spring 2003 was the
17 last you were coming out of, so I'm just going back 18
18 months.

19 [REDACTED] Yes, I think it was. I
20 think it was the September time frame and the one
21 before that was similar. Hope Creek has a -- in that
22 particular issue, Hope Creek has a complicated Hitachi
23 or Toshiba refueling machine that sits underneath the
24 vessel that changes out mechs. We're one of two
25 stations in the country that have it and people that

1 change out control rod drives for a living come from
2 one station to another and when they get here they do
3 not have the same skill set to change out because of
4 this machine that's underneath there. It's supposed
5 to be a Cadillac. It's supposed to be a remote
6 operated set up that was worked from a control room
7 that is remote.

8 So we ask people who work on these
9 stations at Fitzpatrick and Nine Mile and Oyster Creek
10 to come here with a different installation and we
11 always have run up against that. And the machine is
12 in the dry well, so it's not something that can be
13 maintained on-line and tested and stuff until you're
14 into the refueling outage.

15 And we have never budgeted the money to
16 take out, modify or just cut it out and let the
17 refueling people come and do this for a living, bring
18 their tools and do the job as necessary.
19 Consequently, when we schedule the outage up to a
20 certain time of day, there's this many mechs. to do
21 let's say 20 and we say the window will be 10 days or
22 typically we've tried to make it even smaller, 8 days
23 of this and we schedule and say well, because these
24 people who come from another place from Framatome or
25 G.E. under-vessel workers, we can change out a mech.

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1 in a half hour. So we schedule it as such until they
2 get here and realize that they're dealing with this
3 Toshiba machine and it takes eight hours to get one.

4 You get three or four done, three or four
5 mechs. done in five or six days and eventually the
6 window for that starts to close and you don't do the
7 other 15, the rest of them. And before you know that,
8 you have a significant population that do indeed
9 stick.

10 MR. BARBER: Is there any acknowledgement
11 of that as a station problem?

12 [REDACTED]: There currently is.

13 MR. BARBER: Okay.

14 [REDACTED]: There currently is.

15 MR. BARBER: So what's being done to
16 address it?

17 [REDACTED]: What is actually being
18 done, the last outage, the recent one, the commitment
19 was and I don't remember the specific number, but all
20 the ones that were committed to were performed and it
21 was tedious, arduous to do because the cheating
22 (Phonetic) machine challenge still exists, but it
23 appeared to me that for that issue religion had been
24 discovered.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And this time frame

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1 was for what, for that outage, spring 2003?

2 [REDACTED] That's right, spring 2003,
3 April-ish, 2003. We did them all. We did them all.
4 All that were scoped in, but the deficiency is that
5 there's 185 of them and we have not capped out with
6 the industry pace of doing the numbers that are
7 usually done 25 and 30 every outage.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So last outage you
9 did all that you had scheduled. Was it maybe 20 or
10 so?

11 [REDACTED] I think so.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But not as many as
13 you think needed to be done?

14 [REDACTED] Well, as many as -- that
15 characterizes it about right. Not as many as I think
16 needed to be done, but as many as we committed to do
17 and as many as were feasible, given very rigid
18 business constraints.

19 In the past, it would be within all those
20 same very real business constraints because there are
21 only so many of these things existing without spending
22 extraordinary amounts of money to expedite and that
23 sort of thing.

24 So there's only so many that could be
25 done, but in previous outages you would plan to do 20

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1 and you might get 8 and say that's enough, let's get
2 out of this, close up that outage. And move on.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What made it
4 different for spring 2003? You used the word
5 "religion" --

6  We had a -- I can't point
7 specifically to it, but my guess is that it was an
8 outside stakeholder influence, either INPO, the
9 Nuclear Review Board looking at the number of
10 notifications that are written. These are control
11 rods that are exercised every week. So looking at the
12 number, seeing the trend and saying what is your past
13 practice? That past practice has to change. You need
14 a commitment. If you say you're going to do 20, do 20
15 because you'll never get out of this predicament with
16 that sticking and they do. It's known. It's
17 understood and allowed. This is during the start up.
18 They were always meeting their surveillance
19 requirement, as you mentioned, like the HPSI example.
20 Doesn't mean it's post-maintenance tests. They were
21 always meeting that. There was never any challenge to
22 that. But were they allowing the unit to be started
23 up?

24 So maybe it was -- I suspected it was an
25 outside stakeholder, but it might have also been there

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1 was a forced outage shortly following that outage, the
2 outage where we de-scoped a bunch. There was a forced
3 outage following a scram and we had outside
4 stakeholders watch the subsequent start up and there
5 was many, many control rods that stick. And maybe we
6 decided that it's in our best business interests that
7 if we want to start the plan up expeditiously, get
8 back to a business goal, generator on line. These
9 control rods need to be maintained. I'm not exactly
10 sure, but I know that we've definitely changed that
11 mindset for that particular component.

12 MR. BARBER: Have you ever had a problem
13 where you had a control rod stick and it wouldn't move
14 at all, even when you jacked up the dry water pressure
15 on it?

16 [REDACTED]: Oh, several years ago.
17 Six years ago. There was one actually bowed, had a
18 bubble and it was -- actually, just as we were trying
19 to take it out, it was in. We were trying to take it
20 out. It got to a point where it jammed. The control
21 rod was successfully inserted and disarmed and tagged.
22 It actually had a bubble on the side of it.

23 MR. BARBER: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] Upon post inspection. So
25 I don't think it was a mech. issue. It was actually

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1 an immovable or bad rod itself. The mech. itself
2 performed.

3 MR. BARBER: But you could -- how high can
4 you go like up to 400 or --

5 [REDACTED] Five hundred DP, five
6 hundred pounds.

7 MR. BARBER: Do you run out of range on
8 your meter? Isn't there like a little meter and I
9 thought it topped out at 400 pounds. You can go up to
10 whatever the actual indication?

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 MR. BARBER: It's normally plus 260?

13 [REDACTED] Yes. Two hundred sixty
14 pounds greater than reactor pressure.

15 MR. BARBER: So you can go up in 50 pound
16 increments or something like that?

17 [REDACTED] Yes, another 250 pounds.

18 Not looking at the figures right now, it's roughly 500
19 pounds.

20 MR. BARBER: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] And that was consistent
22 with where I came from.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I'm sorry, excuse me.

24 Let me just flip this because we're going to lose it
25 in a minute.

1 [End Tape 1, Side A; Begin Tape 1, Side
2 B.]

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, we're on side
4 B. It's approximately 10:24 a.m.

5 MR. BARBER: We were just talking about
6 the sticking control rods.

7 [REDACTED] So they met their
8 surveillance requirements, movable, provable scram
9 times, but the decision --

10 MR. BARBER: How do you know if a rod is
11 sticking? How do you know it's going to meet the
12 scram time testing?

13 Do you make a presumption back to the last
14 surveillance, successful surveillance test and say oh
15 well, the last one was successful, so therefore we
16 think we're okay?

17 [REDACTED] They're exercised once a
18 week, every week.

19 MR. BARBER: Okay, so you're saying
20 because it's capable of being exercised, even if it
21 sticks, it's trippable? Have you ever gotten in a
22 situation where you felt it wouldn't be trippable?

23 [REDACTED] No, I never have.

24 MR. BARBER: What about the one that had
25 the bow on it?

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1 [REDACTED] It actually had a bubble.

2 MR. BARBER: A bubble.

3 [REDACTED] A bubble on the face plate
4 and it was discovered on the way out and was able to
5 be put back in.

6 MR. BARBER: How was that characterized?
7 How was that left from a tech spec standpoint?

8 It was inserted, it was disabled, but was
9 it considered untrippable, do you recall?

10 [REDACTED] No, I don't believe it was
11 considered untrippable. It was put full in.

12 MR. BARBER: It was, though, right? If it
13 had somehow got past wherever that high spot was?

14 [REDACTED] Oh yeah, it may have then
15 been considered immovable and untrippable which would
16 have resulted in the control rod being inop. and we
17 would had had to do other things like shut the unit
18 down.

19 MR. BARBER: Okay. Did those kinds of
20 things ever come up in discussions, like after the
21 fact when you're sitting there, maybe go in the outage
22 and you go in and look and you find this and then you
23 start thinking of the implications of that. If we had
24 somehow gotten this out a little bit farther, you
25 know, maybe it would have hit a high spot and we

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1 wouldn't have been able to get it inserted past a
2 certain point.

3 Does that --

4  As I recall, I was on
5 shift when we found it. I was under instruction -- I
6 shouldn't have had the soda. I'm belching. I was on-
7 shift that day. It was immediately put in and not
8 messed with any more. Not moved. There was no
9 discussion on raising its drive flow to push it past
10 because of the way it exhibited the sticking. It was
11 stopping in between read switch which left it blank.

12 MR. BARBER: Okay.

13  So not knowing where it
14 was, as I recall, the decision making was or it was
15 moved past that between spot, it went -- we took it
16 back in.

17 MR. BARBER: So did that create problems
18 for reactor engineering?

19  It turns out it was the
20 center rod.

21 MR. BARBER: Oh.

22  We cut the cycle a little
23 lower, but it was symmetrical. It was by happenstance
24 it would be the center rod.

25 MR. BARBER: So you didn't have to insert

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1 the symmetric control rod?

2 [REDACTED] Would we have? I think
3 so. I think so, we would have if needed.

4 MR. BARBER: Okay. All right. Has there
5 been anything else like that that you've been involved
6 with, for example, there was a situation back in March
7 regarding the number two (Inaudible) bypass
8 (Inaudible). Are you familiar with that?

9 [REDACTED] I'm familiar with that.

10 MR. BARBER: Were you involved with that
11 at all?

12 [REDACTED]: No. No. I came in in the
13 aftermath.

14 MR. BARBER: In what aftermath, the week
15 after all the repair --

16 [REDACTED] That was just prior to our
17 outage, so I was in the outage planning. Then during
18 that week the issue was to -- let me make sure I have
19 the calendar right. Roughly around that time we were
20 thinking of getting to the point of where we were
21 going to have a forced outage and when that Sunday
22 night, St. Patrick's Day it was, and the control room
23 staff was trying to do an infrequently performed test
24 revolution and it didn't go right. I wasn't there.
25 It's well publicized and documented. The perception

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1 of the environment at the working level was the crew
2 and individuals, personalities, personnel, people,
3 they took a beating for it.

4 MR. BARBER: Inappropriately or
5 appropriately?

6  I would characterize it as
7 inappropriately, although I think that the people that
8 were trying to handle it at the time were trying to do
9 the right thing, but you can just but help everybody
10 knows everybody. Everybody knows who's there and the
11 fall out is you have this feeling of these people
12 basically in some sort of purgatory for their failure,
13 whereas I'm a control room operator. If my plant
14 management puts me in a box where they're asking me to
15 basically take manual control here and manual control
16 there, the -- I don't want to be there. But if it's
17 where I have to be, that's one thing. But eventually
18 you've got to say here's that black and white line
19 that I was trying to describe that you're asking me to
20 control too many things over what could be in a
21 preferred automatic mode. I would have to say that
22 that would have to come to a stop.

23 MR. BARBER: Than what? Wasn't the
24 problem, the nature of the problem such that the valve
25 was mechanically bound. You were kind of stuck. You

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1 had to -- even if you wanted to do the conservative
2 thing and take the unit off line to find out why it
3 was stuck, you had to take the unit off. You had to
4 start at some high power level and basically get the
5 unit shut down and get the cold shutdown.

6 [REDACTED] Yes.

7 MR. BARBER: So you have to somehow
8 transition. So how do you do it?

9 [REDACTED] At that time though it
10 wasn't understood that the valve was mechanically
11 stuck and in hindsight found that it was absolutely
12 fouled, but during that time, I mean subsequent to
13 that event we did shut down and then came business
14 pressure to go ahead and start back up without even
15 going into it, without even going into the valve
16 chest.

17 MR. BARBER: Where did you hear that from?

18 [REDACTED] From -- it would be
19 hearsay, that it bubbled around, that PS&G power, so
20 what do you mean you're going to shut down and you're
21 going to stay shut down for this long? The valve is
22 closed.

23 MR. BARBER: PS&G power, what's the
24 relationship that you are describing here?

25 [REDACTED] We're nuclear. We're a

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1 piece of power.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Off-site though?

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Off-site influence on
5 that business?

6 [REDACTED] Well, I'm not privy to
7 some of the closed door sessions, but the rumors that
8 abounded that come around that are general consensus
9 on the street were operations said we are going to
10 shut down and we are going to get in there and look at
11 this. I need to know why this valve is not behaving
12 the way it is. Why this reactor pressure control
13 system will not behave.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

15 [REDACTED] And that was (Inaudible)
16 that my [REDACTED] made and he received
17 pushback.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This would be [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]: Yes.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what kind of
22 pushback?

23 [REDACTED] That pump is closed.
24 Problem is done. Let's start back up.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How do you know that

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1 outage group, the people that are leading that --

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were?

3 [REDACTED] May have come from his
4 immediate report which would have been then -- I'm
5 trying to remember the time frame. Oh, that may have
6 been from [REDACTED] (Phonetic). It may have been
7 from [REDACTED] It may have been from even higher
8 than that. I wouldn't know. I just don't. He didn't
9 characterize it. He said "at the time".

10 As I recall the events, he comes out once
11 a week to training, when we're in training.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] He tries to characterize
14 the issue and frame the issue and he characterized the
15 issue as even -- well, how do I say this? He was
16 basically having to somewhat apologize to all of the
17 operating shifts to say that this event was
18 characterized as in some people's mind in error as a
19 failure to scram event. And he was characterizing it
20 as no, it was a poor planning and poor IPTE management
21 event.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That caused the
23 excursion, that aspect of it?

24 [REDACTED] Yes. We basically asked
25 operators to get into too many manual things when we

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1 [REDACTED] had pushback?

2 [REDACTED] He said so in like a crew
3 roll out that he was trying to champion that change
4 and mindset, that he had to somewhat do a little bit
5 of a -- some politically unfavorable decision making
6 and make that stand.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: While the valve in
8 that time frame the valve was closed and he wanted to
9 shut down to see what was the problem with the valve,
10 in that immediate time frame the decision making was
11 he said we have to shut down and he had to champion
12 that in a politically incorrect way.

13 [REDACTED] I think he suffered for
14 it.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's talk about that
16 a little bit further though. In terms of the
17 resistance he was getting, where was that coming from?
18 I know you said PS&G Power. Was there anybody on site
19 that was with him, not with him or supporting him in
20 some way?

21 [REDACTED] That I don't know.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did he indicate?
23 Was he a one man fight here against everybody up from
24 him?

25 [REDACTED] Yes, probably the central

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1 should not have set them up into that spot.

2 MR. BARBER: Was acknowledging that kind
3 of a management failure?

4 [REDACTED] Yes.

5 MR. BARBER: By putting the operators in
6 that position?

7 [REDACTED] Yes, he was. And he
8 further acknowledged that part of the reasons that it
9 may have gotten to the point that certain -- the
10 personalities involved and there are people involved,
11 people we all know that they may have seen that they
12 are being unduly held to their performance or their
13 performance being unduly held to a much higher level
14 of scrutiny was based on some political mistakes that
15 were made. They were off-going shift. He did not
16 notify his next direct report because he was trying to
17 convince the rest of the organization that we're going
18 to shut down.

19 So the event, the on-shift event did not
20 get rolled to his next direct report. I may be wrong,
21 but he was not in the station.

22 MR. BARBER: Are you talking about [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED] Yes. And [REDACTED] did not tell
25 his next person or maybe [REDACTED] did tell [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

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1 didn't tell [REDACTED] I didn't know exactly, but [REDACTED]
2 paraphrased all of this in that training session
3 saying that because I did not follow through and make
4 sure the entire organization knew about this
5 performance event, the performance event became bigger
6 than it probably ever needed to be in terms of
7 politics.

8 So now the -- and I can see how this would
9 occur. When a VP is getting ready to sign off on a
10 plant start up and suddenly he hears about a crew
11 performance event at a table where he's essentially
12 affirming the start up and then basically continues,
13 sort of a persecution of shift. Even when the shift
14 was somewhat we call it being iced, being isolated and
15 trying to do the right things by them and asking them
16 the questions about their decision making and that
17 sort of thing, it's sort of like they became the
18 political ping pong ball between [REDACTED] 7C

19 feelings being hurt by not being told about it. That
20 was the feeling of us in on shift in that envelope of
21 people. They are people's feelings, basically,
22 people's feelings and that to me is that gray area.

23 We're talking about people's feelings of
24 how far out do they want to go when production issues
25 or what not are pressing up against the black line of

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1 challenge. And the boiler doesn't carry it because of
2 some de-reg EPA issue. I'm not -- I don't operate the
3 little boiler, so I don't really know all the details,
4 but it had been de-rated and unable to --

5 MR. BARBER: Are you talking about the
6 aux. port?

7 [REDACTED] An auxiliary boiler.

8 MR. BARBER: Okay.

9 [REDACTED] Supplying steam and seal
10 loads. So you get put in that little predicament of
11 well, shucks, it can't rely on a boiler to do it so we
12 have to rely on the nuclear reactor to do it and
13 thereby we don't want to shut down and allow the
14 vessel to cool down too fast and all of this is
15 because a boiler which is probably on almost every
16 factory station all around our region Dupont has them,
17 they're all over the place. And we can't rely on it
18 to do something for our plant. It's just another
19 example of how we get in those predicaments.

20 MR. BARBER: When you mention there's some
21 EPA type issue, is it strictly that or is there some
22 sort of equipment performance problem also that goes
23 along with EPA issue?

24 [REDACTED] Yes, the boilers overall
25 are somewhat ignored in general. All they normally

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1 provide is building heating steam like any other high
2 school or large college campus. But when they're
3 needed nuclear-wise is during start ups and shut downs
4 and they are not sized with ample capacity to answer
5 that call in any reliable fashion.

6 And they've been somewhat ignored,
7 maintenance wise and the -- I'm not quite exactly sure
8 when it occurred, but during an inspection the EPA
9 said this is the limit that these boilers can go to
10 unless you get additional equipment, scrubbers and
11 that sort of thing. The company chose to live with
12 the derate (Inaudible) and leave them as is.

13 MR. BARBER: When you do a start up today,
14 do they have the ability to provide the steam
15 generator ejectors, the steam seals and all of the
16 hotel loads?

17 [REDACTED] No.

18 MR. BARBER: (Inaudible)

19 [REDACTED] Specifically, I don't
20 know.

21 MR. BARBER: But you don't think they do?

22 [REDACTED] I would say if we had to
23 do the start up today, I'd have to be looking at them
24 very carefully.

25 MR. BARBER: How many are there, one or

1 two?

2  There are three, but that
3 is like a critical piece for a successful start up,
4 that they are up, ready and answer to ready all of the
5 demands.

6 MR. BARBER: So if they were functional
7 and capable of providing those types of loads, this
8 could have been a non-event. It could have been let's
9 shift the air ejectors, let's shift the steam seals
10 over, run mechanical vacuum pumps, whatever and just
11 take the unit off?

12  Yes, and that's been
13 characterized and publicized, but yes. It might have
14 been your agency that brought that to the company's
15 attention.

16 MR. BARBER: So is there any move afoot to
17 try and address the aux. boilers?

18  Not that I'm aware of.
19 No. I don't know. There might be.

20 Had I not been involved in this control
21 rod, I happened to be involved in the last outage as
22 a vessel team lead, I probably would not have known
23 about the commitment to do all that were scoped. Do
24 you know what I'm saying? I would not have been aware
25 of the delta had I not been that closely involved.

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1 There was a conversation I had at one
2 point in the outage where we were really, really
3 stalling, the Toshiba machine was really, really
4 hurting and we're doing one back in 16 hours because
5 it keeps tripping or breaking or something like that.
6 And I'd ask, I think it was 18 upper (Phonetic) scope,
7 and I'm not quite sure, so we were like at number 3 of
8 18 and I was saying to one of the outage managers I
9 see we're at something like 4 of 18, when is this
10 number 18 going to change because I almost expected it
11 to occur, that we would start unscoping and taking
12 them out. That's when he said no, no, we will do them
13 all, as long as it takes.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that?

15 [REDACTED] This is the last outage.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that?

17 [REDACTED] That was [REDACTED]

18 And he says we will do them all and we'll take as long
19 as it takes. And had I not been involved, had I not
20 been there at that particular -- I probably would not
21 have known that the commitment and effort or, the as I
22 describe found religion for this particular item, that
23 it even exists.

24 So I'm saying that because I probably, if
25 there is a commitment on the boilers, I do not know of

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1 it.

2 MR. BARBER: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] There might be.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did they get the 18
5 done in the plan duration or was it --

6 [REDACTED] The duration extended
7 significantly. It did.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For that particular
9 reason or for other reasons? In order to get it done?

10 [REDACTED] I'm sorry?

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The duration was
12 extended, but why? Was it because you had to get the
13 18 rods?

14 [REDACTED] It took longer.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was it for that job,
16 that particular job?

17 [REDACTED] Yes. Yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

19 MR. BARBER: Question on support for the
20 machine itself. If this is an acknowledged
21 reliability problem, then why isn't the station going
22 to Toshiba to demand a fuel rep be set and start
23 working on the machine and basically get the machine
24 in a pristine condition either prior to the outage or
25 during the outage? You said it's inside the dry well,

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1 so you really can't do much.

2  Right.

3 MR. BARBER: But basically, once the dry
4 well is open to get that individual in there and get
5 the machine --

6 : That does get done. We do
7 bring a person in and they put it through its paces
8 and inevitably, it's a complicated robot with many,
9 many over torque switches, very, very sensitive to
10 alignment issues and you're trying to use a robot with
11 video cameras in another control room to line up a
12 machine that manual under vessel jobs, essentially
13 you're trying to fit a 14 piece of pipe into another
14 14 foot piece of pipe into another 14 foot piece of
15 pipe with very tight tolerances. We're trying to do
16 it with a machine with electric servo (Phonetic)
17 motors and what not from a remote control station. We
18 bring the -- the -- as Toshiba only has three. It's
19 my understanding, three of these in the world here and
20 two in Taiwan. So this expert or at least the English
21 speaking expert that knows it, he comes here every
22 outage and he tries to put it through its paces to
23 make sure it's all ready to go and before the mech.
24 window occurs, but inevitably it was not done as the
25 decision, if someone asked me to make the decision, I

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1 said here's the saws all (Phonetic).

2 MR. BARBER: Does he stay for the duration
3 of the outage?

4 [REDACTED] He stays for the duration
5 of the window.

6 MR. BARBER: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] He's the hands on operator
8 that's looking at the cameras and trying to -- he's on
9 a headset with the two people who are underneath the
10 vessel.

11 MR. BARBER: What's his take on the
12 performance of the machine?

13 [REDACTED] I don't know. I really
14 don't.

15 MR. BARBER: Have you ever sat down and
16 talked to him?

17 [REDACTED] No, not -- I've sat down
18 next to him and watch what he's doing on the
19 television screen, but I'm not going to interfere with
20 what he's trying to do with two people in the dose
21 field. The under vessel experts, a craft that come
22 from here to there to there to there, they will all
23 tell us get it out, get it out, pay the money to get
24 it out. They have -- this is their sentiments.

25 They have another job at Oyster Creek or

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1 Nine Mile and they get stuck here for two weeks or for
2 four or five weeks when they should be out of here in
3 two weeks to go take on the other work. But they're
4 essentially stuck behind that machine. It's not
5 something they work with. It's not something they
6 usually have. They have a different (Inaudible), a
7 lot of details that I'm not completely privy to. They
8 hate coming here and they will tell you that. The way
9 Hope Creek is set up for that machine, locks our
10 hands.

11 And if it were not so nuclear and somebody
12 said here's the clout,  here's the magic wand,
13 I would have said here's the saws all (Phonetic) boys.
14 Before you come out of there, you cut that out. And
15 next outage we'll deal with how a new one will go in
16 because it costs us every single time, every single
17 time. And feedback after feedback that I've provided
18 in post-outage has captured that.

19 It's merely a production issue. It's a
20 business issue. It's an outage duration issue. The
21 guys that are going in there, they put them in and
22 change them out. That's how it's looked at. What's
23 not looked at is we're only going to do five because
24 we're locked behind this machine. We tried to do 20,
25 but we're only going to do 5 and that had gone on for

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1 several cycles up until the last one.

2 So we're stuck with those control rods
3 until eventually we catch up. I believe next outage
4 we're going to do more than we ever have and I was
5 telling the fellow that's planning the outage as I'm
6 not doing that piece by saying you need to be
7 religious about not allowing outage group people to
8 tell you, come on, you can do up mech. in four hours,
9 come on, you can do a mech. in three hours, and keep
10 squeezing that down. They will press you to do so and
11 you need to tell them that they'll take as long as it
12 takes and be religious about the number that you stick
13 to as far as pace because they will challenge you to
14 give me a time that I like to hear.

15 MR. BARBER: Is there a potential safety
16 consequence that would come out of doing fewer mechs.
17 than you know doing 5 instead of 20? I mean we know
18 about the rods sticking. Is there something else? Is
19 there a problem with making a rod untrippable or
20 making it more unlikely to be trippable or
21 unscrammable or --

22  You asked it with
23 sufficiently enough words, sufficiently, potentially,
24 maybe, possibly, yes, there is. No doubt about it.
25 Like you said before, in your example, HPSI, does the

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1 post-work test catch it? Yes, it will. If we're
2 maintaining the scram time surveillance, we're
3 maintaining the scram time surveillance and making
4 sure that we stroke and exercise them fully, as often
5 as required.

6 Is there a potential? Well, there always
7 is, right? Is it as small as we can make it? Maybe
8 not as small as possible, but given the business needs
9 and the decision making process that goes into it, and
10 given the specification it's within the requirements.
11 It meets the license, so to speak. Is it as best as
12 it could be or should be? I don't know. Potentially.
13 Maybe. I don't know.

14 MR. BARBER: Let me ask you about a few
15 other incidents that have happened.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I don't want to go on
17 to something new. I just want to go back a little bit
18 before we go ahead.

19 MR. BARBER: Sure.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When we talked about
21 the situation from the power excursion event back in
22 March, and you had indicated ~~_____~~ was of the mind
23 that he was going to be shutting down to check out the
24 stuck valve.

25 ~~_____~~ Yes.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And he addressed the
2 crew later on.

3 [REDACTED] Yes, I diverted there.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A bit of that was
5 having to apologize -- he was apologizing and calling
6 the event not a failure to scram, but a poor planning
7 for the IPT. He was more or less supporting the crew
8 that was on.

9 [REDACTED]: Yes, there was some damage
10 control that goes on between -- there's a lot of team
11 interplay between the different shift teams and then
12 you have four other teams saying what did they do
13 wrong and there are personalities and people's
14 feelings.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What kind of a crew -
16 - was it your crew in particular that he addressed?
17 Did he address each and every crew with this?

18 [REDACTED] I was still training with
19 my particular crew. I was in the [REDACTED] but it
20 was the alpha, my alpha shift crew. ^{TC}

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In the outage?

22 [REDACTED] Yes, and several other
23 support people that go to get their recurring training
24 at the same time.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

1 [REDACTED] It's routine. One day a
2 week, basically around lunch time, he comes out and he
3 goes about an hour and a half, roll out about
4 challenges and issues, both people and mechanical.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And how did he
6 address the aspect of it after the IPT had been
7 performed and he wanted to shut down, tell me what you
8 recall about what he said there?

9 [REDACTED] Like I say, he -- what he
10 was trying to do a bit of political damage control
11 overall to say it is normal for us when we have a
12 performance issue, a human performance issue to set
13 the crew aside, look at remediation aspects, look at
14 the whole thing from beginning to end. Where were
15 they set up to fail? How did we not provide adequate
16 briefing or adequate job scope for the evolution? And
17 he characterized it as, in essence, that overall the
18 organization let those individuals down, basically,
19 kind of let them think that this particular place to
20 be is okay. It's evaluated. We're okay with it,
21 let's proceed, that sort of mindset. And that was
22 probably should have never been the case.

23 The environment --

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you saying he was
25 taking the blame for that himself? Was it at the [REDACTED]

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1 level that the failure --

2 [REDACTED] Oh no. He was mostly
3 saying it was station-wide.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The station?

5 [REDACTED] Yes, yes. The people who
6 wanted to see the repair, which would have been him
7 and his peers and others around, support people. If
8 I had been asked to look in on that IPP, I probably
9 would have had a little piece of it too. Might have
10 been a small piece, maybe not the big picture, I am
11 not sure. He was trying to characterize it in that
12 their performance was not as bad as everybody is
13 saying it is and probably they're all saying it is
14 because of the political reporting relationship that
15 happened during that particular week.

16 [REDACTED] ^{re} was off doing damage control as far as
17 let's fix this valve, let's go after this and get this
18 outage issue and not doing the reporting up on the
19 human performance piece and essentially my assessment
20 is that higher tiers of management say oh wait a
21 minute, we didn't know about this performance piece.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Because they got it
23 quite a bit after the fact?

24 [REDACTED] Their feelings were hurt.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They reacted, what

1 you're thinking is they reacted -- the operators there
2 had an undue reaction because it was a delayed
3 reaction?

4 [REDACTED] That's my feeling. I
5 think the individuals involved, I think that handled
6 a little better and a little smoother, it could have
7 been more positively dispositioned than over
8 reactingly negative.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now what about the
10 aspect where [REDACTED] is discussing the shutdown in
11 this time frame and what he was up against? What do
12 you recall about that?

13 [REDACTED] That there were some
14 people in the central outage group and management that
15 thought it would be okay to go ahead and start back
16 up. The mouths closed. Let's go ahead and do it.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he elaborate on
18 that in terms of people he had discussions with or
19 conversations?

20 [REDACTED] He didn't. The way he
21 characterized it -- what he was trying to tell us was
22 I did not follow up on my piece of notifying
23 management of the performance issue because I was busy
24 with the central outage group convincing them that
25 they needed to open up this chest and look at it. And

1 if it involved taking the unit down to cold shutdown,
2 we will do so. So he implied that he had to champion
3 that.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: With the potential
5 outage?

6 [REDACTED]: And overall plant
7 management. But he didn't say that.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was it senior
9 management or somebody else?

10 [REDACTED]: I don't even know what
11 that line is any more.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Beyond him -- I'll
13 tell you how I'm looking at it and you see if this is
14 where it is. He's [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] was off-site at the
15 time. [REDACTED] is not in the picture in this particular
16 time frame. The next level then would be the [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED] which would be [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED]: Oh, I forgot about him.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So then above -- and
20 he's considered senior management as is [REDACTED] of
21 [REDACTED] So I'm trying to understand
22 when [REDACTED] was busy arguing or discussing how this
23 was going to be addressed, who was he dealing with?

24 [REDACTED]: It was probably as you
25 described, [REDACTED] and those that support having

1 to go into the outage.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But that's an
3 assumption on your part. He didn't state who he was
4 dealing with?

5 [REDACTED] He did not.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then the central
7 outage group at that time, who is that?

8 [REDACTED] I don't recall. They come
9 from all different places, volunteer and come to Hope
10 Creek and set up shop.

11 MR. BARBER: Is that ad hoc group or is
12 that part of the organization?

13 [REDACTED] Originally, it appeared to
14 me to be somewhat ad hoc, but now more and more --
15 Hope Creek has recently had several forced outages, so
16 I've become familiar with some of those people and
17 know them from previous ones. So maybe it had always
18 been there and I just hadn't had to open it up that
19 much. I don't know the answer to your question of
20 what it was back then.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did [REDACTED] say
22 anything further about -- did you get any further
23 information from him regarding his feelings at that
24 particular time with what he was up against? You had
25 mentioned before something about a time frame and

1 apparently that comes into play and he was taking some
2 time to discuss the shutdown as opposed to reporting
3 the power excursion event.

4 What was your understanding of how long
5 the discussions went on? Did he give you any
6 indicators of that?

7 [REDACTED] No, he didn't.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about any other
9 feelings? He's tying it to A didn't get done because
10 I was busy over here, but --

11 [REDACTED] As I recall, the excursion
12 was Sunday night, Monday morning and that operator
13 system was off-going. They come back Thursday or
14 Friday, I cannot recall exactly the schedule, but he
15 was getting the ball moving towards shutting the plant
16 down and it wasn't until Thursday or Friday that
17 senior level management knew that there was an
18 operations performance issue.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: From the prior Sunday
20 night?

21 [REDACTED] Yes. That was a thin
22 rumor. [REDACTED] didn't say that. That --

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: "That" is when they
24 got the specific knowledge?

25 [REDACTED] It was that week's rumor

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
1 going around the station.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall any
3 other comments that he had about -- at the point in
4 time where he was addressing wanting to shut down and
5 what he was dealing with there, do you recall anything
6 else he said about that?


7  Nothing more than what
8 I've described.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're good for a
10 little bit on here.

11 MR. BARBER: I just wanted to ask you
12 about a couple of other issues. One was there was a
13 problem with elevated off gas flow. Are you familiar
14 with that?

15  Yes, somewhat familiar
16 with it.

17 MR. BARBER: Where it actually went above
18 the limit. There was a 75 SCFM limit that was put in
19 procedure and it said do not exceed 75 SCFM, but it
20 didn't -- there wasn't an action to take. It just
21 said don't do it.

22  Yes, and it's in like a
23 note. It's not like an action step. It's sort of in
24 an obscure little place that says to not go there.

25 MR. BARBER: Were you involved with any of

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1 the interplay on what happened with that?

2 [REDACTED] No, I wasn't.

3 MR. BARBER: Do you have any thoughts on
4 it? I mean what would you do if an operator brought
5 you that? If they came up to you and said hey, it
6 says don't exceed 75 or 78 SCFM or we'll shut the unit
7 down or let's take --

8 [REDACTED] I have to default and go
9 to -- because it did not say anything. It just said
10 don't do this. So I didn't know what remediates that
11 issue because it didn't say anything. It didn't say
12 and you need to do this.

13 MR. BARBER: Well, isn't part of the
14 problem with these -- where you have elevated flows
15 you have in-leakage somewhere? Isn't what you're
16 trying to do is try to identify the location and
17 correct it?

18 [REDACTED] Yes. There are procedures
19 to do that, to go about sniffing and finding condenser
20 and leakage and how does it get in there, is it power
21 related? Is it other systems related? It can become
22 an Easter egg hunt going out and checking for the last
23 thing that you did maintenance on, finding a drain
24 valve open or that sort of thing.

25 MR. BARBER: Were you on shift when the

1 leakage was trending upwards?

2 [REDACTED] No. 7c

3 MR. BARBER: Not at all?

4 [REDACTED] No. 7c

5 MR. BARBER: Did this take place over a
6 very short period of time or was it over a protracted
7 period of time?

8 [REDACTED]: That particular -- I
9 wasn't on shift. I don't have a whole lot of
10 knowledge on the off gas issue. It's normally 24 to
11 36 and if it's not, I'm alarmed. When it goes in
12 service, the instrumentation does occasionally spike
13 and stay high and it will come back to something
14 that's normal, down to the 20s and 30s again.

15 MR. BARBER: One thing that strikes me
16 like with this issue and other issues that we've heard
17 about is that the station sees them coming, but for
18 whatever reason doesn't react to them. I mean you
19 have, like you said, a range. It's some value. And
20 you go outside the range and it's solely increasing
21 and it's like something has to happen. A limit has to
22 be exceeded and it's like there's no thought process
23 that says we've got all these operators here. We've
24 got AOMs. We've got shift managers. We've got CRSs.
25 We've got NEOs. They're all out there monitoring

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1 equipment and they find something and for whatever
2 reason, nothing gets done about it, whether it's
3 reported up through the chain or what have you and a
4 limit is exceeded.

5 Then all of a sudden it's this crisis
6 whereas had something been done earlier on as the
7 thing was trending in an adverse direction, whether
8 it's up or down or whatever it is, there's no attempt
9 to try and address it.

10 What's your reaction to something like
11 that? Do you think that's the case?

12 ~~REDACTED~~ I don't think it's always
13 the case. I think there are some issues that may be
14 don't get quite the right characterization or
15 screening level that says this is imperative to do.
16 And others that we over react and perturb our planning
17 efforts or per turn schedule efforts. It takes a
18 while to get to a place where you want to start
19 working something and sometimes we plain over react as
20 opposed to allowing the process and using the process
21 to implement the change. It's a tough seed to kind of
22 navigate. At times we over react and sometimes we
23 don't.

24 That particular one, I can't speak to it
25 that well.

1 MR. BARBER: Have you ever been involved
2 with something like that where you've seen an
3 indication and it looks like it's going awry and it's
4 just okay, let's watch it for a while and see what it
5 does. Now you're watching it and it's continuing to
6 head in an adverse direction. Maybe not quickly, but
7 it's heading that way. And then --

8  I can give you an example
9 of one that occurred, but it's not quite characterized
10 as you said, but it was a vibration probe on the main
11 turbine had shaken loose. The indication in the
12 control room was we were over the trip set point or
13 not the trip set point, but action level or tripping
14 the turbine. It had come up so fast and we were able
15 to be -- the alarm setting is here and here's the trip
16 setting and it occurred so very quickly that in our
17 assessment because it turns out that my particular
18 shift had been there for previous vibration issues and
19 our assessment was there's no way it can go from this
20 many mils (Phonetic) to 20 without blades already
21 flying through the building. It's just got so much
22 inertia, the machine is so very big and heavy, it just
23 cannot move that quick, period. And if it did, it is
24 already broken.

25 MR. BARBER: Okay.

1 [REDACTED] And so it had moved that
2 quick. It wasn't a built in. We were able to see it.
3 Here's the alarm and we watched it and like the very
4 next -- it's a digital grid so it updates, and so it
5 updates in so many seconds. So one update is at the
6 alarm set point and the next update is at the trip set
7 point with nothing else going on in the rest of the
8 train, no other vibe probes and we're validating the
9 instrumentation and then do not take the action
10 because of the other over riding -- other
11 instrumentation saying the machine is either in pieces
12 already or it's a bad probe. It turned out it was
13 loose.

14 MR. BARBER: If it was in pieces you'd
15 also see it in the other --

16 [REDACTED] That's exactly what I'm
17 saying. I would have seen sympathetic vibes on other
18 pieces. There's vibration -- Oak Creek has vibration
19 probes everywhere, not like other stations.

20 MR. BARBER: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] And so we didn't see those
22 sympathetic vibes in another place and [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED] had his hand on the key lock switch. It was
24 -- we were that close and he said [REDACTED] that's the
25 scram set point and you get pumped up. So I didn't

1 want to say anything for -- because I didn't want him
2 getting any more jumpy and we were watching the
3 indication and the other reactor operator said
4 [REDACTED] there's still no other vibes on any of the
5 other bearings. He and I, the guy watching the vibes,
6 he and I had both been in a similar vibration region
7 where there was really a vibration as we moved through
8 a certain loading time on the generator and we knew
9 that it just could not have done it that sudden
10 because we had seen as it builds and it takes time if
11 it's real and he says [REDACTED] there's still no other
12 updates, they're all steady and all I did was -- the
13 man who had his hand on the switch was -- moved my
14 hand oh so suddenly like one more second and then it's
15 update 4 mils (Phonetic) and then it basically
16 steadied out or the probe seeded again or something.
17 We get people out there in the field, careful approach
18 to the spinning machine as usual and sure enough
19 there's the probe dangling in its place. There was a
20 spare one. We hook up and the machine is actually all
21 normal without any excursion.

22 MR. BARBER: That sounds like a success
23 story.

24 [REDACTED]: Yes, I tell that story
25 because it was -- we were ready. We were ready.

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1 Without hesitation, the only hesitation was a
2 validation hesitation.

3 MR. BARBER: That's reasonable, right?

4 ~~REDACTED~~ To me, it was at the time.
5 Two other points going up as well, end of story, no
6 doubt about it. We were going to do what I believe is
7 the absolute right thing to do. That particular
8 evening it didn't line up that way and I'll tell you
9 my heart was bumping, not just because I'm thinking
10 I'm going to go ahead and take the scram, but several
11 hundred thousands of tons of spinning machinery that
12 may be flying all over the building. It wasn't at all
13 under pressure like oh my gosh, I have to remove the
14 unit from service. It wasn't that at all. It was --

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You were afraid of
16 what you might be dealing with?

17 ~~REDACTED~~ Yes, yes. People out
18 there. The station has a history of Salem turbine
19 pieces being found in the parking lot. That's before
20 I got here, but that's the lore you hear and I was
21 actually pumping. I can't think of any other times
22 that we trended to that point.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're just about to
24 run out. I think why don't we just cut this one off
25 right here. It's 11:09 a.m.

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1 [End of Tape 1, Side B; Begin Tape 2, Side
2 A.]

3 MR. BARBER: We were talking about
4 examples where you saw something trend upward and we
5 were kind of close enough in that discussion. Let me
6 move on to a couple of other things.

7 One of the things that the station has
8 just gone through as far as from a period of time is
9 economic deregulation of the industry. When you first
10 got licensed here, you were operating in a regulated
11 environment. You had like a public utility commission
12 that you went to for rate cases and it was a different
13 type of environment.

14 And now it's more competitive, more
15 streamlined, more cost conscious, more production
16 oriented, all those things.

17 What have you noticed at your level in
18 your various positions organizationally as you've
19 transitioned from the regulated environment to the
20 deregulated environment?

21  In that myself, my
22 colleagues and peers at my level that the pressure of
23 production versus overall compensation and I'm not
24 talking about the dollars of my salary. I'm talking
25 about the -- like I mentioned before the time away

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1 from home. If we're in a forced outage for the right
2 reasons, but yet I'm away from home all the time and
3 not being amply compensated for it in comp. time or in
4 a fair dollars and cents salary, the overall pressure
5 is let's get the unit back on the line versus doing
6 the right thing. And that I -- I say all that in it
7 just continues to move closer and closer across what
8 is a very blurry here's nuclear safety, here's
9 production and the line continues to get blurrier and
10 blurrier with that pressure.

11 MR. BARBER: Now you kind of subscribe to
12 the -- one of your points was that you're not getting
13 compensated through comp. time or maybe through
14 salary. If you were getting compensated through comp.
15 time or salary would that make the line less blurrier?

16  I would say it would
17 because some decisions, if we're going to make
18 decisions for business sense, then let's make them all
19 for that same reason and there are many, many times as
20 an individual that I'm simply here for no reason,
21 essentially just being mistreated as an employee. Is
22 that a nuclear safety concern? No, not exactly. But
23 if the pain will stop when the unit is on line, in
24 other words my being here in an uncompensated state,
25 either salaried or comp. days, if that pain will stop

1 roughly the same, about, give or take a couple of
2 dollars.

3 So it's not about how much I get paid over
4 365 days as much as it is about the peaks and valleys
5 that occur in between and the work environment. Not
6 nuclear safety, but the work environment is such that
7 you find out things that you have to come in over the
8 weekend at the last minute.

9 MR. BARBER: How do you find that out? I
10 mean does somebody pick up the phone and call you and
11 say hey can you come in?

12 [REDACTED]: That's part of it.

13 MR. BARBER: Are you allowed to say why?

14 [REDACTED]: No. It's that's simply
15 unacceptable. The work environment is that that is
16 unacceptable and then people, my peers at my level
17 commonly reflect and joke about that.

18 MR. BARBER: Do you ever have a situation
19 where you just don't answer the phone?

20 [REDACTED]: Yes, you hide behind it.
21 You let the answering machine do it. You play these
22 little games that say I don't want to be there for
23 them because they abuse me. It's a big negative and
24 if I'm able to sustain that, or if I'm able to perhaps
25 because of my situation or maybe my character or

1 strength, maybe I'm not. Maybe there are areas where
2 I'm not and I just don't know it. I can't possibly
3 know everything that I'm understanding or not knowing,
4 but I would see where it would be -- in my particular
5 case, I'm rated relatively high among my peers, but I
6 can see where there are some that are not. And when
7 they have pressure from home and their family and they
8 continuously are pressed to either be here and it's
9 never directly. It's never my boss looking at me
10 knowing that he's into me, that he says this is what
11 you need to do for me. It's never quite that way.
12 It's like a little yellow stickie or an e-mail. These
13 are just business relationships that if I could be
14 treated better and it's just as -- it's really so
15 discomfoting and disgruntling.

16 MR. BARBER: Is it a situation where if
17 they need support for some activity, it's we need X
18 number of SROs, is it we just go out to the pool that
19 are out there and we'll get them or is the situation
20 where we have an issue at the plant, let's call
21 everybody at the SRO level that's not working and drag
22 them in?

23  It's both. It's both.
24 There are some that are very discrete, but there are
25 others that you just say why, after the fact that I've

1 been here for 55 hours this week, do they need me this
2 weekend to address this very minor issue, that it's
3 needed for me. It's like an unlimited pool and no one
4 is ever picking up the check for it.

5 MR. BARBER: There's got to be an impact.
6 You're talking about the work environment and we're
7 here to talk about safety conscious work environment.
8 ██████████: That's exactly why I'm
9 here, absolutely.

10 MR. BARBER: That sounds like there's an
11 impact.

12 ██████████: That's what I'm saying.

13 MR. BARBER: You kind of walk this fine
14 line about saying what the impact is, but it doesn't
15 sound like it's a positive impact.

16 ██████████: That's exactly why I'm
17 here. It presses up against it and maybe at times I
18 may or may not be aware of it. And I have a
19 superintendent that is probably here every week for 55
20 to 60 hours. Now maybe that's normal in the agency or
21 the region. It might be. It might be your work
22 environment as well. It might be what everybody works
23 to make the kind of money that they make. But these
24 are the people who are making the nuclear safety
25 decisions.

1 Now is it in compliance with the procedure
2 that says I'll get my manager's concurrence, the
3 nuclear admin. procedure that has the overtime
4 restrictions? Yes, he's in compliance. But he's
5 doing it every week out to the very limit. And so is
6 his colleague and so is the other superintendent.

7 So they naturally then expect the same of
8 their subordinates and I have at times, the March
9 power excursion issue, I was prepping the refuel
10 outage at -- because the refuel outage is about a
11 month away and I can take some of those peaks. I can
12 take those hey, we're in crunch time, the outage needs
13 to be mopped up. I can take those for four or five
14 weeks, who can't.

15 I'm trying not to appear to be the
16 business whiner here, but when it goes on and on, when
17 it's always a 60 hour week, you start to -- and you
18 want the pain to stop, you might be apt to -- you
19 know, I can wiggle through this wicket this way. I
20 can wink and smile at that and what I say and again,
21 it's not a nuclear safety concern, but if I work for
22 a company and its environment treats people in such a
23 way that they can't look them in the eye and treat
24 them with respect and dignity, treat the people that
25 they work with side by side, close with respect and

1 dignity, how can I expect those people to treat
2 processes, procedures, safety rules, nuclear reactor
3 safety, radiological, how can I expect them to treat
4 those processes with any more integrity than they are
5 treated as an individual.

6 I think that line gets very, very wiggling
7 and blurred. I truly do. I can't speak of a specific
8 case, but the pressure is surely there, without a
9 doubt. The work week duration at every nuclear
10 utility, I'm sure it has its peaks and its valleys,
11 but here it is persistent and never ending.

12 I'm a professional. I've got no problem
13 with being a professional. I've got no problem with
14 stepping it up at the times that I need it and coming
15 in for this weekend or that weekend, but not every
16 other one and not every week should I be here for 55
17 plus. I may appear to be venting here.

18 (Laughter.)

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's entirely
20 relevant. What you're saying is entirely relevant.
21 It paints a picture where there would be some concern.
22 You're saying this is being dealt with across the
23 board. It's not just you who is handled this way.
24 It's the way management deals with employees.

25 How about in terms of an impact on having

1 experienced operators going to SRO training? Do
2 people --

3 [REDACTED]: That's unheard of. It's -
4 - at Hope Creek, not a chance.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So they have to bring
6 them in from outside?

7 [REDACTED] Yes. They see the abuse.
8 They see my misery. I don't see it happening. At
9 Salem, it was similar up until recently when
10 essentially they had to give the farm away to get four
11 or five people to step in and take the upgrade, in
12 other words offer them more money.

13 Again, in an annual world, I'm satisfied
14 with my salary. If it were all about salary, I'd be
15 at Limerick tomorrow or I'd be back to [REDACTED] or
16 wherever. I was looking for a job when I found this
17 one. It doesn't bother me having to make change,
18 although some it does and that's why those are
19 personal issues, but the way that your weekends are
20 almost like they're the companies to give and take
21 away. It's a [REDACTED] philosophy. You'll leave when the
22 job is done. So you're apt to want to make the job
23 done.

24 MR. BARBER: What would happen to someone
25 who for instance was never available by phone. It

1 just is a matter of course when the weekends came,
2 they just made it a habit of going to their family's
3 house or physically going out of the area?

4 [REDACTED] That would be negative
5 impact. There would be consequences. I took negative
6 impact for [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] I had
8 [REDACTED] and I had a negative consequence on my
9 annual review.

10 MR. BARBER: What did it say?

11 [REDACTED] Well, the -- it didn't
12 really say anything along those lines. Performance in
13 the Hope Creek operations department isn't measured by
14 performance. It's measured by a popularity contest.
15 And that's fine with me and you bring some of the
16 performance issues up and they load on when they have
17 this little ranking and rating scheme and when you
18 know the rules, you know how to play and you play it
19 well and that's fine.

20 I happened to play it somewhat well, but
21 I did have a [REDACTED] that year which caused me to
22 miss the [REDACTED] and another day later I came back too
23 soon and I missed that day, coupled with a cough
24 earlier in the year. I had [REDACTED]
25 and instead of getting what across the board was a 4

1 to [REDACTED]
 2 Availability was verbally cited to me as my
 3 challenging issue. Message, no is not an answer. Not
 4 being here is not an acceptable answer.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]
 6 related? These were all [REDACTED] related
 7 unavailability?

8 [REDACTED]: Yes. Coupled with that
 9 was a training performance issue. In all fairness to
 10 the company I'll acknowledge that. I missed, I failed X
 11 a job performance measure in my requal. And that cost me
 12 my license bonus for the period of time that I was not
 13 qualified and an additional probably 1 percent. The
 14 two reasons cited when I challenged my superintendent
 15 that this was unacceptable, what I said though is I
 16 had a rock solid year as far as performance with the
 17 exception of the training issue which I remediated
 18 within a week, within four days I turned around and
 19 did -- I'm starting to sound really aggressive.

20 MR. BARBER: No, no. It may be relevant.
 21 It may be part of the environment.

22 [REDACTED] I [REDACTED] my exam on
 23 Thursday. I was supposed to go out in December,
 24 Christmas holidays and I originally asked for a
 25 vacation during the Christmas holidays and the January

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1 previous, I put it in 12 months in advance and it had
2 been turned down late in the year. So I needed to
3 take vacation in order to burn it so I was choosing to
4 take it in the three weeks of December before
5 Christmas. Well, sure enough, the last week in
6 November I ~~failed~~ the requal. So I canceled my
7 vacation so that I could become ~~requalified~~ ~~requalified~~
8 ~~four days~~ later, where some people wait until the
9 training cycle comes around. I did that so that I
10 could stand the watch during Christmas Day because
11 somebody else was taking vacation, the vacation that
12 I couldn't get earlier. And I did all those things.

13 So when I asked my superintendent, how
14 come this is so low, I had a pretty rock solid year
15 except for that December failure. Well, your
16 unavailability was also cited and as a reason and
17 that's going to cost you. And how can that be right
18 for three basically misses. One being a ~~miss~~
19 ~~miss~~ a second being a fallout from that ~~miss~~
20 and the other one, okay I missed a day because I had -
21 - I came into the station, realized I had a fever,
22 called in from the gate and said I'm going back home
23 and it cost me.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Three different days?

25 ~~miss~~ I'm fairly certain it did

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1 come down to three. Three is what puts you on the
2 Valentine's list which is our policy. Three absences
3 puts you on the Valentine's list at which times you're
4 sort of on a probation.

5 MR. BARBER: Isn't a [REDACTED]
6 isn't that somehow like fall in an area where it's --

7 [REDACTED] I didn't question it at
8 the time. Okay, fine, I'm on the Valentine's list.

9 Three months later, I find out I had a raise that was
10 (substandard) But it sends the message. It definitely
11 sends the message and what's fascinating and the data
12 will support this, look at bargaining unit illnesses.
13 They are per the contract. In other words, they take
14 the time off they're allotted. You look at white
15 shirts, massed (Phonetic) employees in my job and
16 you'll see that wow, we're all very, very healthy. We
17 hardly ever miss a day of work. But one of my peers
18 or superintendents, to be out sick is -- it's almost
19 unheard of. They'll come in coughing, fever, that
20 sort of thing because of the demands. It's all very
21 negative. It's all very negative.

22 That's like I said, as an industry, if we
23 don't want to treat the people that are doing it with
24 a certain amount of respect and integrity, how do we
25 expect them to treat procedures, processes, safety

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1 policies with respect and dignity?

2 MR. BARBER: Have you tried to raise any
3 of this with management like outside --

4 [REDACTED] No, no, no, no, no. I
5 don't trust it, honestly. If you're talking about --

6 MR. BARBER: This is in the realm of maybe
7 not nuclear safety, but it is the environment,
8 certainly the work environment.

9 [REDACTED] Yes.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about the issue
11 that has anybody, you or another person come close to
12 raising that issue with management in terms of where
13 you see that pushing people that hard will blur the
14 line. If you want to stop the pain, you just want to
15 get the work done and over with, is that something
16 that would be ever considered to be raised to
17 management?

18 [REDACTED] Not by me anyway.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware that
20 anybody else approached that?

21 [REDACTED] No.

22 MR. BARBER: Do you guys ever talk
23 informally amongst yourselves where you talk about
24 these kinds of issues and just how things --

25 [REDACTED] Among my peers, yes, to

1 pass the time. It's a little bitch session, so to
2 speak. You're just like griping.

3 What business does not have that? I try
4 to say that's a business issue. Well, yeah, who
5 doesn't want more money and less time? Who doesn't?
6 But here, it appears to me that it is so prevalent and
7 so excessive that when -- I'll back up. I read the
8 paper, I saw the letter a month ago. At first, I
9 thought oh boy, [REDACTED] reorg. cost something.
10 There's the price we have to pay.

11 I also know you don't print these things.
12 If this doesn't come out in two weeks and you folks
13 don't say oh, here's a letter in like two weeks time
14 and something had to be on-going. So I start to think
15 about that myself. I started to internalize it and I
16 said you know what, because at first I said no one --
17 there's no nuclear safety concerns there. I'm a
18 [REDACTED] There are none. Because the
19 NRC had a couple of belly achers come to them because
20 they lost their job or their buddy lost their job,
21 that was my first take on it. And then I started to
22 think about it, what does it look like? It looks like
23 control rods being descoped. It looks like starting
24 up the plant without having pressure control valves
25 working the way they want. It looks like that. I

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1 started to think about that and I started to say it
2 looks like not being able to get days off that you
3 would like to have or that you think you earned. It
4 looks like that. Like I said, if you're not going to
5 treat them that way, why would you expect them to
6 treat your policies, procedures and nuclear safety any
7 differently? I couldn't imagine why.

8 Specifically, and I said this to  I
9 said specifically can I tell you if there's a
10 deficiency out there, a standard? I can't. I can
11 just tell you that the pressure on the overall working
12 environment is high production and painful.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware of any
14 other instances akin to the bypass valve incident that
15 we discussed where operations management was under
16 pressure from either senior management or PS&G Power
17 regarding operational decisions?

18  Am I aware of or having
19 lived? I'm aware of rumors, gossip. Back -- I don't
20 remember the specific start up, the specific start up,
21 we have a ramp (Phonetic) bypass valves. One of them
22 is moving, fluttering when it should be stable. And
23 it's not exactly changing reactor pressure, but it's
24 not exactly the way it should be and they should be
25 somewhat steady. Most of the industry has them rock

1 March.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In the March time
3 frame?

4 [REDACTED] I believe.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] being
6 part of operations management, what about other
7 examples involving senior management or PS&G Power?
8 Had you ever heard of anything like that, before or
9 after the bypass --

10 [REDACTED] Nothing specifically that
11 would say contradictory to policy, but contradictory
12 being treated like a human being. The example I would
13 give you is I'm a [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] with the authority to shut the station down
15 and take actions as I need to in accordance to the
16 procedures.

17 If it's today at 11 o'clock and my boss,
18 my superintendent, my second, the very next person in
19 my chain of command have stepped out to go to a
20 meeting, and it's me and two other individuals there,
21 the big one happens, the sun, the moon and the stars
22 and everything are aligned and this is the accident
23 condition that we all train about and at that time one
24 of my reactor operators just plain drops over dead,
25 God forbid, and there it is, I am set with one other

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1 individual and the two of us combined, two human
2 beings have the entire asset in the palm of our hands
3 to decide what we're going to do.

4 Now do I think that the plant is going to
5 shut down and ECCF is going to inject and that there
6 will not be a nuclear safety concern? Absolutely. I
7 believe that it will all be successful. But let's say
8 for whatever reason I do what they do at Three Mile
9 Island and stop a pump when it should have been
10 running, whatever, and here's a corporate asset that
11 just for whatever reason is now in the headlines and
12 huge business impact, huge. With those and orphans,
13 shareholder price, just dropped. But yet, I have one
14 interaction with [REDACTED] One, only one, and
15 that's an e-mail following the power excursion that
16 says draft a letter that tells me how bad you want to
17 keep your job. That just says to me from the delta
18 between here's the person who in the palm of their
19 hand has the corporate asset and here's this [REDACTED] that
20 thinks he can manage by an edict in an e-mail, that
21 just is -- what is that in terms of respect for the
22 person that's holding your asset, your corporate asset
23 right there? It just says no engagement, no
24 alignment. I don't know what he stands for and I only
25 have one data point, only one and that was in the fall

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1 out of that event of the power excursion in March.
2 Because of these performance issues I need all senior
3 reactor operators and all reactor operators to
4 document what -- and these are all the management
5 speaking -- what changes in behavior and performance
6 are you going to do to ensure that this event doesn't
7 happen? But just in a letter tell me how much you
8 want to keep your job? That really was the pressure,
9 the perceived perception as I see it is reality.

10 MR. BARBER: Was there backlash from the
11 operators because of that?

12 [REDACTED]: Oh no, we in line
13 complied. You mean --

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You wrote the letter?

15 [REDACTED]: Oh yes, I wrote a nice,
16 flowery letter saying I will gladly fall on my sword
17 for everything you could possibly find fault with me
18 in every way. The union did not -- they did not
19 provide any such --

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were they asked to?

21 [REDACTED]: Yes. Actually, they were
22 directed to. They weren't asked. I was probably
23 asked. The message probably said please provide this.
24 The message received was you have no other choice.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But the same message

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1 went to the union and the union declined to respond?

2 [REDACTED] Yes.

3 MR. BARBER: Do you know if there was any
4 repercussions or ramifications of that, of the union's
5 blanket refusal to respond to it?

6 [REDACTED] No.

7 MR. BARBER: So really what you're talking
8 about is the NCOs were silent on the response and all
9 the --

10 [REDACTED]: Right.

11 MR. BARBER: Basically, at one level said
12 no way. SROs all responded --


13 [REDACTED]: You betcha. Absolutely.
14 The prevalent attitude is -- it is such -- the
15 hypocrisy is just incredible. Today is Friday. The
16 example I will give you we're having a forced outage
17 this weekend, for whatever the issue is, whatever the
18 technical reason it. Maybe it's not even a forced
19 outage, it's just that we have to take a system out.
20 Our management, my ops management will say okay, we
21 need to get some manning in order. Let's look at our
22 roster. Out comes a roster, okay. We can have
23 [REDACTED] some in on Saturday. We can have [REDACTED] come in
24 on Friday night and okay, [REDACTED] come in on
25 Saturday. It is not -- it just isn't [REDACTED]

1 Saturday, we're going to have this outage, we need
2 some manning, will you be able to assist us? It's
3 more like here's the yellow stickie, you need to let
4 me know if you can't come in Saturday. The message is
5 the same and again, I'm a professional and I know I
6 need to pitch in and help out where it's needed, but
7 it's in the delivery.

8 So as an example, he looks at the roster
9 list and he goes to the IBEW list and it's as by
10 seniority and there's a compensation in there as well,
11 an hourly wage and he says to operator XYZ, hey, I
12 need to man for this outage, are you available and can
13 you come in?

14 In other words, do you want to come in for
15 the money? Do you want to give up time from your
16 family or the time not here to come in? He might say,
17 nope, no thank you, I'll decline. Okay, he declines
18 and he moves on down the list and picks the person who
19 eventually -- and the list is done by --

20 MR. BARBER: Seniority?

21  Not by seniority but by
22 hours. In other words, the people who work the most
23 are at the bottom of the list, so the people who work
24 less, equitable distribution is the key.

25 MR. BARBER: Okay, okay.

1 [REDACTED] He might say no and he
2 moves on down the list and he gets another person to
3 say no. And the conclusion that's drawn from hearing
4 nos until he gets to the person who says yes, is you
5 know what, operation 1, 2 and 3, they did not want to
6 sacrifice time from family to come in and collect the
7 king's money. They just chose not to take the money.
8 They would prefer to do other things. That's just a
9 straight forward decision. I'll pass on it. He asks
10 me or another massed (Phonetic) associate, we need
11 your help this Saturday and I say no, essentially he's
12 asked me the same question he asked him, but the
13 conclusion he asks me is oh, not a team player. And
14 I'll pay. My perception is I will pay for that. And
15 I will -- it will show up in a negative review as not
16 being available for the needs of the station.

17 MR. BARBER: Are these the kind of things
18 that you expect to share maybe next week when you have
19 that discussion?

20 [REDACTED] Yes.

21 MR. BARBER: Is this the kind of thing
22 that you think you'll get, you'll be able to bring up?

23 [REDACTED] Actually, I'm still
24 undecided on that to be honest with you. In all
25 honesty, I don't know.

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1 MR. BARBER: Okay.

2 [REDACTED] I don't know the
3 environment there and I don't know how you'd possibly
4 loosen me up enough to talk this much.

5 (Laughter.)

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I still have to get
7 to one thing I have. I don't know if we have a direct
8 answer to this. What I'm looking for is that incident
9 regarding the bypass valve, is that unique in your
10 mind? Had you ever had associated with that there was
11 pressure from PS&G Power on the station to make an
12 operational decision in one direction against where
13 ops management would have put the unit?

14 [REDACTED] I'm certain there are
15 other times. I just may not be aware of them.

16 Besides the overall environment of let's
17 get on-line, no. I can't think of another --

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You talk a lot about
19 the production part, where it comes from --

20 [REDACTED] I can't think of another
21 specific time where --

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: On an operational
23 decision, was there input that was looked at by ops
24 management as wrong or inappropriate or something they
25 had to argue with?

1 [REDACTED] Like I mentioned,
2 descoping control, you mean as far as from outside of
3 the fence?

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

5 [REDACTED] I can't think of another
6 time. Inside the fence like outage management as far
7 as like saying we're not going to exercise all these
8 control rods, we're only going to exercise a
9 population, this is in a forced outage system. We're
10 only going to exercise a population because it takes
11 time, that does occur. That occurs.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But nothing else
13 along the lines of this incident in March?

14 [REDACTED] No. And maybe it's just
15 because I'm unaware of them.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I wanted to also ask
17 you before we were talking about your concern, your
18 specific concern regarding the way you were treated as
19 a massed (Phonetic) associate on site and you see that
20 as potentially having on the safety conscious work
21 environment, and you said you would not raise that
22 concern and you looked like that's just not going to
23 happen.

24 Why wouldn't you raise a concern like
25 that?

1 [REDACTED]: I can't say no the
2 opportunity to come in and help the team.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Team player?

4 [REDACTED]: Yes, not a team player,
5 squeaky wheel, nope, we've got to handle him again.
6 It's the same sort of feedback that if I had given a
7 subordinate would be deemed as unacceptable. When a
8 subordinate comes to me and says hey, I want to go do
9 -- they don't usually say "I want to go do this job
10 and this is the problem." What they usually say is
11 hey, I can't do this job this way because I need a
12 ladder and a safety guide to help me. If I get him
13 kind of like these, in any body language whatsoever
14 that says oh, gosh, you're bringing me your problems,
15 that's absolutely unacceptable and I try to make sure
16 that that never comes out, that it always comes out
17 like excellent catch. We can work that. We can do
18 that. Let's see what we can find out to fix that.

19 It's almost the same over riding
20 environment, don't bring me your problems. You're a
21 massed (Phonetic) associate, handle it. That's my
22 perception.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You want to be seen
24 as a team player, so you don't pay for it down the
25 line?

1 [REDACTED] Absolutely, absolutely.
2 It is just that -- I'm sure I'm not alone. It's just
3 that much pressure.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's hold right
5 there. I'll take a quick break. It's 11:46.

6 (Off the record.)

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, we're back on
8 the record. It's approximately 1:07 p.m. Pretty much
9 where we left off, just before we broke for lunch was
10 you were summarizing some of your points about
11 management interactions and their approach and how you
12 would or wouldn't approach them with concerns. You
13 basically were talking team player and if you're not
14 seen as a team player, then you might feel that down
15 the line.

16 And you put it in pretty concrete terms in
17 terms of pay raises and bonuses and so forth. And
18 then we had asked you at that point to -- I think in
19 terms of technical incidents, we pretty much are done,
20 but we wanted to hear a little more from you. You had
21 a couple more issues I think you wanted to raise.

22 [REDACTED] Yes. Even as recent as
23 the last (Inaudible) outage, there's the four source
24 strength detectors at this station. Some stations
25 have the entire start up range, start up source and

1 intermediate. Therefore, the license allows us to
2 start up with one of them, inoperable. And we had one
3 that was indeed some times inoperable. The period in
4 the year which integrates the rate, would occasionally
5 spike and come into an alarm. And due to the low
6 population of counts, it's just noise alone could do
7 that in the low end when you're in the 10 to 15
8 counts. So if you've got 20, just the rate itself
9 would bring an alarm.

10 Well, our ^{TK} plant management ^X I believe it
11 was ~~██████████~~ said we won't start up the plant with
12 any inoperable SR. We will not do that. That's our
13 stand. That's our -- we will not be pushed back from
14 there. Well, this delta ^SXRM was not going to be fixed
15 either. So -- and it would only do this on occasion
16 from noise, either in the building, noise in the
17 circuit, that sort of thing and in essence, the SRM
18 remained inoperable until we basically put down on
19 paper that it was operable, but degraded which is by
20 procedure is what we allow.

21 And I struggled with that when at times
22 one of the first things that some people actually
23 proposed to do was to disable a period alarm. At Hope
24 Creek, with all of its digital technology as being
25 somewhat newer than most, does not have all four

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1 instruments period in the front.

2 The four instruments, alpha, bravo,
3 charlie, delta, delta happened to be the culprit.
4 Alpha and bravo, period, is in the front panel in
5 front of the control room operator. Delta is not. So
6 someone had in their mind that why we do not use that
7 indication, because it's not readily readable, it's
8 something in the back panel you would see.

9 Let's disable the alarm. And that way the
10 SRM would remain operable, but since you don't see the
11 indication, there might not -- maybe there's no use
12 for it and we'll live without the alarm.

13 This is the sort of questions that you
14 have to defend because management politically wants to
15 make the stand that we're not going to start up
16 without an SRM, but we will do it if it's degraded.
17 In other words, here, provide this piece of paper so
18 that we can get out of the outage and approve it and
19 then again, get out of the outage means the pain
20 stops, the time you're here, the time you're away from
21 home.

22 And those sort of issues that come up,
23 that's kind of how they're presented. And I pushed
24 back and I said wait a minute, that simply is not
25 allowed. The source range monitor is an instrument

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1 all itself and both those functions, counting rates
2 and counting period are required for operability.

3 I questioned the colleague of mine who was
4 tasked with -- he and I were to review this and I said
5 that is so far out of bounds. Where is this coming
6 from? He says well, it's coming from [REDACTED] asked us
7 to look at it. [REDACTED] He was our
8 [REDACTED] at the time and I think he was provided
9 that from somewhere else, hey, can we do this?

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: From what level was
11 the suggestion coming? Was it from management or from
12 operator level?

13 [REDACTED] I think it was from outage
14 group management. We have to start the plant up, but
15 we're not going to do it with this constraint. And
16 the constraint was unjustified.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you know whose
18 idea it was?

19 [REDACTED] No, not specifically.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But you think it was
21 funneled over to [REDACTED] and it was sent to two
22 CRSSs, you and --

23 [REDACTED] Yes, myself and an [REDACTED]

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was the [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED]

1 stand up in sort of a political correct way and say we
2 won't start up the plant with an inoperable SRM, but
3 we'll say we will start up the plant with a degraded
4 SRM.

5 In other words, step in and say you know
6 what, we will and it will be my decision to start up
7 the plant with an inoperable SRM and we will proceed
8 and I will be accountable for that decision.

9 MR. BARBER: But you would be allowed to
10 do that by tech specs.

11 [REDACTED] Absolutely. It is
12 allowed. And is it the best way? No. Is this SRM
13 going to be corrected in the next outage? Yes. It's
14 in scope to be done.

15 MR. BARBER: What's going to be done to
16 it?

17 [REDACTED] It will be pulled out and
18 we're also bringing in a vendor that's going to do
19 some electronic noise surveys. I believe it's
20 building noise that comes from the drawer and end,
21 coax. cable type induced noise.

22 MR. BARBER: (Inaudible)

23 [REDACTED] Yes.

24 MR. BARBER: It is.

25 [REDACTED] Yes.

1 MR. BARBER: (Inaudible)

2 [REDACTED] It continued. They
3 watched it. It's been known, this particular SRM is
4 a known one.

5 MR. BARBER: Has there been any attempt to
6 try and correlate the spikes when the spikes occur
7 with other in-plant changes whether it be process
8 changes or sump pump starts?

9 [REDACTED] Sump pumps, yes.

10 MR. BARBER: Has there been? Where you
11 actually sit down with either an alarm printer and
12 just go through all the --

13 [REDACTED] That's been done.

14 MR. BARBER: And there's nothing that's
15 correlated?

16 [REDACTED] Nothing that is --

17 MR. BARBER: Definitive.

18 [REDACTED] Yes. You know, the source
19 range monitors, they can see almost anything in the
20 way of electronic noise in the building if they're not
21 shielded 100 percent perfect. They can almost see any
22 control signal if they're in the vicinity of it. And
23 so we're going to try to find that the next outage.
24 In fact, those preps are on-going to get someone in --
25 when are they coming? It's in the very near future,

1 four or five weeks away.

2 MR. BARBER: Okay.

3 ~~REDACTED~~ Not waiting until the
4 outage to bring a vendor in and I don't know exactly
5 what they have. I'm not an INC circuits expert. But
6 I'm sure it's some sort of meter that will be able to
7 tell stray signals and they'll probably run it along
8 the entire cable, cable tray, etcetera and into the
9 drawer, trying to find where that is.

10 So that's on-going. The hypocrisy that I
11 struggle with is let's not make this facetious stand
12 when, in fact, you're not going to fix what is
13 sometimes not working quite right. And that's just an
14 example of the press of that slight pressure, you
15 know. After you review this and get this paper in --
16 [End Tape 2, Side A; Begin Tape 2, Side B.]

17 MR. BARBER: Is it possible that the
18 reason that management said what they said is that
19 they really want more of an effort to fix it? Is that
20 a possibility, that you had a new manager on site.
21 He's disappointed in the performance he has to run and
22 really in saying what he said his intention wasn't to
23 point at something three years from now as part of his
24 track record. His intention was to say, tell the
25 station he wants it fixed and to tell engineering to

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1 get on the horn and we'll get to work maintenance or
2 an INC, go out and work this and fix it. Is it
3 possible that that was the intention? Or do you think
4 it was nothing more than what you're suggesting?

5  It's possible. Yes, it's
6 possible. That does not appear to me to be the -- I
7 mean, no. I would think that if you wanted to get it
8 fixed you'd want to get it fix. I've been in rooms
9 numbers of times where we sit in conferences and
10 listen to equipment challenges come up and there's
11 that one lonely sole person in the corner of the room
12 that will say something like well, why don't we just
13 fix it? And everybody goes, yeah, why don't we just
14 fix it? Why don't we just fix it? In this case, you
15 can't get at it.

16 MR. BARBER: This isn't the first time
17 it's come up?

18  No. No.

19 MR. BARBER: Maybe the first time for this
20 plant manager, but previous plant managers and ops
21 managers and AOMs and OSs and CRSs have seen this
22 before?

23  Yes. Oh yeah. It's not
24 spiking now, make it operable.

25 MR. BARBER: And how should he do it? How

1 should the effort be portrayed to actually get the
2 organization to want to repair it as opposed to
3 dismiss it?

4  Well, I would -- you're
5 asking me how should I tell a manager to project that
6 from a solid business sense or maybe from a solid
7 integrity sense. Step up and say this particular
8 start up is going to go on with that one inop. I'm
9 not going to go try and find somebody to wiggle and
10 document and find me some warm, fuzzy place so that I
11 can start the unit up. Stand up and say in this case
12 it's not what I want.

13 I would prefer them all to be perfect, but
14 in this case, since it involves opening up the vessel
15 to change and replace or extensive trouble shooting
16 with the noise finder or the circuit finder, we're not
17 going to proceed that way, one way or another. Either
18 say we're going to start up at 3 out of 4 and be
19 accountable for doing so, but let's not push it down
20 to a lower level and say I need you people to find me
21 a way to start up by saying they're all four are good.
22 That's how I perceive it.

23 MR. BARBER: Okay.

24  That was just a month ago.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So on the prior

1 startups with this inoperable, was it deemed operable?

2 [REDACTED] No, we'd keep it
3 inoperable and start up the plant.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But it was still
5 termed inoperable?

6 [REDACTED] Yes.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So prior to this last
8 one that involved [REDACTED], was it done the way --

9 [REDACTED] It was always operable,
10 but degraded.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Always operable, but
12 degraded?

13 [REDACTED] Yes.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So where you object
15 to this one is that the stand was taken we're not
16 going to go forward with an inoperable SRM, but then
17 you had to maneuver to call it operable?

18 [REDACTED] Yes, exactly. Exactly.
19 No physical maintenance was done. The condition still
20 exists.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So the only
22 difference was in that they were not going to start it
23 up with it inop., but nothing changed in terms of the
24 pieces of equipment status?

25 [REDACTED] So then in the aggregate,

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
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1 let's say now one does break, one absolutely does
2 break, we could then say okay, well, as a business
3 decision, I'll back away from my previous stand and we
4 will start up with three out of four. In the
5 meantime, one of those three is the one that is the
6 degraded condition. It's operable, but degraded. And
7 I just -- I think that's -- to me that just smells and
8 stinks of let's make this stand because it looks good
9 and I would contend that if the other one did indeed
10 break, that given our management structure, we would
11 proceed. We would proceed with the plant start.

12 MR. BARBER: Were you actually in that
13 circumstance or something very similar to that in
14 September, in light of the hurricane? You had the D
15 that was spiking and the charlie or both spiking, 6 of
16 8 IRMs were operable, 2 were inop. and I don't know 12
17 or 16 inputs, LPR inputs weren't working properly for
18 the APRMs?

19  You've reviewed the
20 numbers. I don't recall specifically, but that seems
21 to be about right.

22 MR. BARBER: There were five control rods
23 having excessive rod speeds?

24 : Five? There might have
25 been. I recall there being three or four.

1 MR. BARBER: The point I'm trying to make
2 is you don't need to know all of the numbers. It's
3 just --

4 [REDACTED] Yes, I recall that.

5 MR. BARBER: -- the impact. Because it's
6 not like okay, it's this problem and this problem by
7 itself, it's this problem, that problem, that problem,
8 fast control rods, you know, a series of other minor
9 deficiencies in the balance of the plant that have the
10 potential impact you don't even control the start.

11 [REDACTED] Right. On the aggregate,
12 they all add up to a lot.

13 MR. BARBER: Right.

14 [REDACTED] The fast control rods,
15 definitely, definitely a result of the sins of the
16 past that I described as far as not maintaining max in
17 a steady, repetitive, predictive maintenance schedule.
18 The Toshiba machine not being taken out. The decision
19 not being made to spend the money and modify the
20 plant. For that maintenance item, that's what it is.
21 It's used once every 18 months to change out the drive
22 mechs.

23 And the decision to not do that has
24 continued to haunt and haunt and haunt. And I would
25 suspect after this next outage because of the

1 religion, I'm making these mechs change out and we see
2 what it really takes in the scheme of time for the
3 outage. That Toshiba machine will probably be cut out
4 before they close the door. Someone will decide
5 that's enough. I've had enough.

6 MR. BARBER: You're in a position to
7 provide some type of replacement at the time or do you
8 want to like go into the next outage and have the --
9 be part of the upfront mod?

10 [REDACTED]: That's a business
11 decision, isn't it?

12 MR. BARBER: If you were the decision
13 maker, what would you do?

14 [REDACTED] I said that before. If I
15 were the decision maker, I would have sent with those
16 under vessel guys their last time jump in. Here's
17 three Saws All. Bring all the parts out when you come
18 out. That's metaphorically speaking. I would demand
19 that engineering provide me a way to get to that
20 point, you know. What can be retired in place, as is?
21 Is really is nothing more than a maintenance tool. If
22 there are some under vessel considerations for what is
23 under there, but other stations have vendors bring
24 that stuff in and do it with their tools and what not.
25 In some respects it's not much unlike my bringing a

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1 tool cart in there.

2 It's a little more extravagant, but what
3 I'm saying is it's a maintenance tool. I would demand
4 of them to say that's it, you get this to a point
5 where I can call it retired in place. We'll work for
6 18 months on what's going to go in its place.

7 That is seriously impacting, it seriously
8 impacts outage duration. It seriously impacts on-line
9 reactivity risks.

10 MR. BARBER: How many people are aware of
11 that as an issue the way you are?

12 [REDACTED] Probably -- in my last
13 outage feedback, I highlighted as a major paragraph to
14 my chain, so it would be [REDACTED]
15 (Phonetic), just about everybody that's in the outage,
16 you know, that's involved in it. Because we
17 recognized we're watching it. We see -- 12 hours go
18 by and you don't have one mech. changeout. Everybody
19 knows it. Everybody knows what the issue is.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How many days did
21 that add to the outage from where you were planned to
22 where you ended up?

23 [REDACTED] Well, outage days are
24 fuzzy. You know once a major job slips for whatever
25 reason, that becomes an umbrella for entire other jobs


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1 to kind of huddle under. That's characteristically
2 speaking.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's a
4 reason to extend here than other things slide in?

5  Well, not slide in. How
6 do I -- how can I characterize it? The whole outage
7 is like some very large multi-discipline, many, many
8 people try to get a lot of things done. But let's say
9 as example the turbine job, it becomes public that the
10 turbine job is a week behind, well, it's funny.
11 People do the amount of work that is necessary for the
12 job to get done in the time that is allotted. And
13 suddenly another next window will grow out to meet the
14 end of that other window.

15 It's just a -- what is that? The
16 Parkinson's rules that say you never have enough room
17 in your house. There's always too much furniture even
18 if you moved in there without a pot or a chair. You
19 fill it eventually and then you want a bigger place.
20 The job will take the amount of time allotted. If
21 there's a major issue that pushes out, so does
22 everything else and sometimes in an outage the mech.
23 window hides underneath something else, hides behind
24 a who knows, something that's going on up above,
25 internal vessel inspections and those sort of things
that may be lagging for some reason. Or the turbine

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1 being up there, being critical path.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you just don't
3 know how long it took to actually do the 18 mechs. and
4 what amount of time was attributed to that?

5 [REDACTED] Back then, actually, I
6 don't have the exact dates, but I would say it was
7 three or four days. It pushed long enough that its
8 window was exceeded in that Hope Creek has never
9 performed control rod exchanges at the top and mechs
10 from underneath at the same time. That's always been
11 a clear delineation between the windows. And the
12 reason for that is if you do, you run the chance that
13 in a self-verification check, I can be down below
14 pulling the flange off, while somebody above is at the
15 same place, pulling the control rod out. The result
16 is a hole in the vessel.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

18 [REDACTED] That can't be stopped
19 until the one person puts the one thing down, the
20 other person puts the thing up. We have never done
21 that. This last outage to meet that window, to meet
22 the commitment to change all, we did that.

23 Now --

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How was that
25 coordinated?

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1 [REDACTED]: What's that?

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How was that
3 coordinated?

4 [REDACTED] In the middle of the
5 outage, that decision was made to do so at the point
6 of contact to do so, within a week, develop an
7 infrequently performed test, revolution to incorporate
8 that the guidelines for operations to drain the vessel
9 and those operations with potential to drain the
10 vessel and a series of checks and independent checks
11 and other stations do do this. I'm just saying it's
12 a delta between us and past practice and today.

13 Other stations use a set of rigorous
14 checks and independently verify that they're on the
15 right control rod before it comes out and that
16 underneath it's the same rigor as applied that they're
17 on the right flange before it comes down. Then
18 there's other checks that go on as well.

19 The people that do it for a living say
20 physically, it's very, very difficult to lift a
21 control rod up out of its hole when it has that whole
22 head of water holding it in place. It's similar to
23 trying to pull the rubber tub plunger out of your --
24 out of the bottom of your bathtub when the tub is
25 full, it's difficult. It's very similar there in that

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1 they can't necessarily move it.

2 And the people underneath, when they start
3 to back off the flange, they do it systematically such
4 that the flange is always in place and all they really
5 have to do is tighten it up if they get excessive
6 water and they measure that and they do it for a
7 living, so they know what kind of water flow says
8 we're on the wrong place or we are in the right place.
9 It can be -- it can go from trickles to what seems
10 like steady to what you and I would say oh, my gosh,
11 that's not right and they finish the job. Because
12 they know the amount they believe is too much. But
13 it's essentially, it puts a hole roughly that big in
14 the bottom.

15 So we decided that we would let the
16 windows overlap for the first time ever to do the
17 number of mechs that we said we would do. We believe
18 that we looked at all the risk and we believe we took
19 into consideration the rest of the industry practices
20 as far as verifying and double check, but it's a
21 delta. It's definitely a difference between this one
22 and the previous one. And again, because the Toshiba
23 machine and the lack of wanting to spend the money on
24 either getting it out or getting something new or
25 allowing it to be changed.

1 What's another question you had there on
2 that?

3 Oh, you asked me how many people know.
4 It's widely known. It's widely known to bring it on
5 as far as --

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The Saws Alls?

7 [REDACTED] Well, that's -- that would
8 be my fix if I were empowered because I would say --
9 because see, then you're forced. You're absolutely
10 forced. When you get out in there and you say okay,
11 now bring me the expertise to do what I need, come the
12 next time. Because what we will end up doing is
13 running this next outage with that machine, the
14 installed machine and all of its problems. Oh yeah,
15 we'll have a contingency plan to bring in the vendor
16 and all that. But it involves under the vessel -- it
17 involves people going into a very cramped space, a
18 very difficult space to get to to begin with and it's
19 very arduous. It takes time. And again, there will
20 be pressure to get it done.

21 I would be so delighted if it would just
22 come out and then say we'll figure it out. We have 18
23 months and a definite commitment to change it. And to
24 mean that as the only way we'll ever get off that
25 rate, the rate of being able to stay up with control

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1 rod maintenance, that issue.

2 Oh, we were talking SRMs and you were
3 talking aggregate about September outage. There was
4 many, there were three or four -- I didn't remember
5 five, but if you say so, I won't disagree. It was
6 more than one. Control rods that were mostly too
7 fast. In other words, they're sloppy. Their rings
8 need to be replaced or not working as they should.
9 There's this book I call inoperable -- operable, but
10 degraded.

11 There's a number of -- the book is this
12 big and it's filled with deficiencies that we've done,
13 we've looked at and we've occasionally even looked at
14 the overall aggregate of all of those things together
15 and how they combine together and how much margin are
16 they looking at.

17 I think we're trying to keep that in the
18 forefront that that is a list that is too big. They
19 were trying to work that down, but some of them --
20 they're bothersome like control rods that don't move
21 like they should.

22 Excuse me.

23 (Pause.)

24 What subject did I start with? I don't
25 want to repeat myself.

1 MR. BARBER: Was there anything else on
2 your list that you wanted to go over? I think you
3 said --

4 ~~_____~~ Coming out of the bypass
5 valve event in the power excursion that occurred
6 there, the widespread thinking was that the shift
7 should not have been controlling pressure with the
8 bypass valve jack which essentially is in the HC
9 control system that allows reactor pressure to bleed
10 to the condenser.

11 Consequently, they came out with a
12 temporary standing order or a procedure change in a
13 standing order that says use of the bypass valve jack
14 is not authorized. And the reasons for that are it's
15 essentially manually controlling ^RPV pressure and then
16 the subsequent controlling of reactivity that occurs
17 with that that's widely understood and by licensed
18 operators far and wide in the boiling water reactor
19 world.

20 So in so doing, they're currently and I
21 would want to look at the procedure to be sure, but as
22 it stands now, in a start up from an ambient
23 condition, there is -- because our EHC system, it
24 controls, bottoms out at 150 pounds. That's where
25 automatic takes over. There's no way of controlling

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1 it between zero and 150.

2 Our procedure says start up the reactor,
3 start up the plant. Pressurize, close the vents and
4 when you get a positive indication of pressure and
5 that is about it. It doesn't -- the next time it
6 mentions pressure, actually there are two other places
7 it mentions it. Continue heat up at a rate of no
8 greater than 90 degrees an hour and that 150 pounds to
9 ensure the bypass valves open and control the PV
10 pressure.

11 In essence, there's no other place in the
12 procedures that say control reactor pressure this way
13 while you're doing start up. And there's no way that
14 says to or what to use. So the bypass valve, the jack
15 which was the way that was done before was a knowledge
16 base or skill based --

17 MR. BARBER: Method?

18  Method of controlling our
19 PV pressure. It's not in the procedure. You just
20 knew that you need to balance heat loads versus
21 critical heat. And you did that by using the bypass
22 jack. A throttle-able valve designed and installed
23 for that. That tool or that method was eliminated out
24 of the fallout of the power excursion in March. So
25 now there is no way. There's no prescribed way.

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1 There never actually was but one of the ways is gone
2 or at least one of the knowledge base and skills ways
3 was removed. It was just not authorized.

4 So consequently in September, we're asking
5 the station, the operators to start up the plant and
6 they have to pause the start up while reactor pressure
7 is about 130 pounds after a forced outage. Moderator
8 continues to warm up because of decay heat during a
9 short forced outage and while they pause on drawing
10 control rods, while they pause, the moderator
11 continues to heat up and the reactor goes critical,
12 primarily because there's no way of controlling
13 pressure between zero and 150.

14 MR. BARBER: Why again did they pause?

15 [REDACTED]: They paused because RCSI
16 was not in standby. RCSI needs to be in standby and
17 operable by 150. It was 130 and still not yet there.
18 RPV pressure is about 130 pounds.

19 RCSI was not quite -- there was steam
20 inlet pressure indicator. The valves -- the bypass
21 valves around the isolation valve was open, so it's
22 pressing up all that pipe through a smaller bypass
23 valve and a steam inlet pressure just did not come on
24 scale. It was just taking longer than expected.
25 Decay heat continues to warm up the plant, during the

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1 start up, [REDACTED] (Phonetic) being withdrawn. We get
2 critical somewhere in the 110 pound range, roughly.
3 The procedure that says establish a 90 degree an hour
4 heat uprate by withdrawing control rods, 90 degrees an
5 hour correlates to a certain psig per hour, based on
6 the steam table. And it says by withdrawing control
7 rods. Nowhere does it say and use the bypass valve or
8 a steam load or something to maintain pressure below
9 150 because you don't have FCSI (Phonetic) in.

10 So the start up was paused while the steam
11 lines over here for -- I point over here because
12 that's the way it is in the control room. As I use my
13 hand to point over somewhere.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you.

15 [REDACTED] The start up is paused
16 while the RCSI (Phonetic) steam lines are being
17 pressurized, and again, we're in the intermediate
18 range, so we're opening steam line loads to do RCSI.
19 So that will also depress pressure and it also has an
20 inherent reactivity effect which will cause you to get
21 more neutron flux. It's perfectly well understood
22 that in any boiler that when you're starting up and
23 that happens. Because RCSI was not yet ready and we
24 got to 135 pounds, we stopped withdrawing control
25 rods. Decay heat continued to warm up the moderator

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1 up to 132, 133, another pound or two. But bulk
2 cooling temperature slightly higher. That suppresses
3 neutron flux and we range back down on the IRMs. This
4 is our September subcriticality event.

5 The gist of it all, the fall out of it all
6 is we look at it and we say well, you know what? If
7 they had RCSI (Phonetic) ready, they wouldn't have
8 found themselves in this spot. But yeah, they would.
9 But you can pause a start up for any reason whatsoever
10 for any reason I would want to stop it. What do I do
11 then if I stop it? And that was the end of some of
12 the fall out that occurred in September.

13 MR. BARBER: What was the heat up rate at
14 the time when that was paused?

15  Just prior to being in
16 stop, about 60 an hour, for about an hour. Maybe an
17 hour and a half or so. And then when it stopped, or
18 when control rod withdrawal, it was directed to be
19 stopped. Stop withdrawing control rods, continue to
20 monitor the core.

21 MR. BARBER: What would happen if you were
22 allowed to open a turbine bypass valve up a small
23 amount?

24  Yes, what would have
25 happened? A small amount would have been as

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1 significant as opening the RCSI bypass valve or more.
2 Or how about a steam line drain or an MOV? No one
3 knows. No one has any idea what would be the effect,
4 especially upon range 7 or 8 of the IRMs.

5 MR. BARBER: It might slow the heat up
6 rate, but wouldn't it allow more control?

7 [REDACTED] Yes. So it would have
8 slowed the heat up rate.

9 MR. BARBER: But you couldn't pull rods to
10 compensate and actually probably put yourself on some
11 sort of stable period?

12 [REDACTED] Yes. It was a relatively
13 stable, positive period coming up. But if we open up
14 the bypass, use the jack because Ks automatically use
15 150, put a steam load on the core in a controlled way,
16 would be using the installed design system for it, now
17 you draw off and then you make up for it with -- and
18 that's the standard of starting up of BWR. The jack
19 was unauthorized. The jack was --

20 MR. BARBER: By the procedure change?

21 [REDACTED] By the NAG (Phonetic)
22 order.

23 The NAG (Phonetic) order that was in the book.

24 MR. BARBER: Why couldn't you have written
25 an on-the-spot change to kind of override the NAG

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1 (Phonetic) order?

2 [REDACTED] You're right. Maybe an
3 on-the-spot change while you sit here with the reactor
4 at criticality.

5 MR. BARBER: Well, maybe that's not
6 desirable, but the thing is, it's still going to be
7 that way, right?

8 [REDACTED] What's that?

9 MR. BARBER: So you know that this problem
10 happened, but the procedure is still written.

11 [REDACTED] The procedure has been
12 changed to address a subsequent subcriticality, not at
13 all to address a pressure control mode.

14 MR. BARBER: How was it changed?

15 [REDACTED] The procedure is changed
16 and now addresses, you know what? You might have a
17 reason, any reason to stop the start up. You and I
18 could sit and think of a dozen. For whatever reason,
19 the plant is not ready for this next step in the start
20 up because you didn't get people out there in time.
21 The valves are not open. The piping is not warm,
22 whatever the reason might be. And you have to pause
23 the start up and when you do, if it is during a forced
24 outage, shortly after a forced outage, decay heat will
25 warm up a little more than it does with a new core and

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1 it will cause the moderator to get warmer and it will
2 cause neutron flux to go down. So we were subcritical
3 based on that. Balanced, yes, but subcritical in
4 ranging down.

5 So from there, we paused. Once RCSI
6 (Phonetic), the steam inlet pressure came up, RCSI is
7 now in standby. We can continue up with our PV
8 pressure. If we had a complete pause of many -- and
9 I say many, I mean like a 10-minute little breakout
10 session with the operators that are there, recognizing
11 that the reactor had gone subcritical and that the
12 next rod withdrawal would be a recriticality, log it
13 as such and take all the required readings and we'll
14 take all the required precautions beforehand. All the
15 prerequisites, precautions for withdrawing a
16 criticality will be performed prior. Brief the entire
17 control room, shift manager, ops manager present,
18 senior reactor engineer present. Concurrence is felt
19 for all around the room. Hope Creek Control Room, is
20 it an inner or outer horseshoe? So the people who are
21 working RCSI are over on the other side. They're
22 doing something. They don't really know what I'm --
23 what the -- they should, but you can sometimes get
24 little islands of knowledge.

25 So I brought all that together, brought

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1 all that together and briefed that. Everybody
2 recognized that found this very next notch that we
3 will get back on a positive period and will be pulling
4 to re-achieve criticality. And then after that, we
5 went about doing that. Inserted the SRMs so that the
6 core was monitored, the IRMs were on range, the SRMs
7 were on range and the last few minute checks that were
8 in the IO to make sure that we didn't miss any
9 prerequisites or precautions and notched the rod out
10 one notch and we're critical at a positive period and
11 continued on with the start up that day.

12 But the gist of it, the emphasis on the
13 post fact-finding was on the -- you went subcritical.
14 You wouldn't have because you should have had RCSI
15 going. In essence, I can find a dozen reasons to
16 pause the start up and in this case a lack of a
17 pressure control device.

18 In other words, we start the reactor up
19 from zero to 150 pounds. We're going to add all these
20 BTUs to the water and we have no way of letting it
21 out. That's our -- taking away that turbine bypass
22 valve jack. And it was done as part of fall out from
23 what I was describing before.

24 MR. BARBER: Is there no note of caution
25 in the procedure that allows you to establish a steam

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1 load? Isn't there something in there prior to -- in
2 the steps that -- prior to getting to 150 pounds, as
3 I was reading through the steps, isn't there a note in
4 there that says you can do this?

5  That says you can do what?
6 Open the jack?

7 MR. BARBER: Or put a steam load up?

8 : No, not specifically.
9 Sure, when it says put other components and warm up
10 the RCSI line, warm up HPSI, those things are on-
11 going, but that's not going to be any steam load.
12 Place the -- you might call it a reboiler. We call it
13 the steam seal evaporator. Place it in service.
14 There's a steam load, but it's not a pressure control
15 load. It's a load. It's not something that is an
16 automatic, controlling our PV pressure or something
17 that is on manual that's controlling our PV pressure.
18 It's just a steam load that's static.

19 The removal of the jack essentially and it
20 being fallout of a highly political power -- what was
21 the word you used earlier, power excursion, and the
22 reactions that came out of that basically paced it
23 into a tighter corner and essentially caused a
24 subcriticality.

25 There are those that would say 

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1 you're out of your mind. It was because you didn't
2 have RCSI ready. Okay, fine. I didn't. You got me.
3 But I can stop the start up for any reason. At any
4 reason, I should be able to say and for any reason,
5 the period is a little less than I would desire. I
6 would instruct them and demand that he insert the rod
7 one notch and do so. And it would not be with
8 specific reactor engineering guidance that says this
9 rod goes to here and then -- starts here goes to here
10 and then you can put it back in. The procedure won't
11 say that.

12 We're saying, now we're saying that it
13 does or that it will. And that you can't stop a start
14 up for any reason. This is some of the fallout that's
15 coming out of this.

16 You can't pause and go subcritical. We're
17 changing the start up procedure that says so.

18 MR. BARBER: When did all this happen
19 again?

20  September.

21 MR. BARBER: In September.

22  Yes.

23 MR. BARBER: Do you think there's ever
24 going to be a time when that's going to be allowed
25 where you can, in fact, use the jack?

1 [REDACTED]: Yes. That's being
2 revisited.

3 MR. BARBER: Okay.

4 [REDACTED] That's being revisited and
5 additionally, there's -- it just so happens that our
6 RHC system is older than most and a digital one is on
7 order to in during the next outage and it will start
8 taking over automatic control at lower pressure. I
9 think it's 100 pounds. It's not zero to 100, so I
10 don't know how we'll control it from zero to 100, by
11 procedure anyway without using something like a manual
12 jack or manual MOV or a manual steam line load to the
13 condenser.

14 This issue, you must have sensed by now
15 it's a personal one to me. I was in the control room
16 that day and I directed that we stop withdrawing
17 control rods. That direction was repeated back and
18 complied with and continued to monitor the core with
19 no other duties to do and he continued to monitor the
20 core and he continued to range the instruments
21 appropriately to keep them on range and keep the core
22 monitored and controlled. He was always standing by
23 to insert a last rod to its previous target, or more,
24 if necessary. And if need be, take the subsequent
25 action of locking the mode switch and shutdown. We

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1 never felt that that was ever even, that we were even
2 in margin space of that. We weren't even -- I mean it
3 just never was being felt that that was a challenge.
4 Nothing was out of control. Things were delayed, but
5 never out of control.

6 So is there a personal issue? Yes, I take
7 it a bit personal that I didn't have RCSI ready to go.
8 I took that. I took that delta that I needed to get
9 better at making sure that thing happens. The thing
10 was this wasn't my first start up. This is about my
11 ninth and this has happened before. RCSI is isolated
12 in the past when we went to put steam through it and
13 I directed that we put control rods in because the hat
14 up rate from the forced outage was still going up and
15 we briefed that this could happen during this last
16 start up in training and every -- all the focus of the
17 station has been on the fact that the control room
18 supervisors' command and control issue did not have
19 RCSI ready to go when it should have been. Okay, I
20 agree, I agree. But none has been on the fact that
21 the control room supervisor does not have the ability
22 to control RPV pressure when he starts up the reactor
23 between 0 and 150 pounds.

24 There were two outages, actually, I think
25 it was October. When is Columbus Day? There were two

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1 outages in October.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Around the 10th.

3 [REDACTED] There was the hurricane.

4 The salt-induced outage.

5 MR. BARBER: That was in September,
6 actually.

7 [REDACTED] Okay, and then we roll in,
8 we go on-line for a week and EHC leaks and causes us
9 to scram the unit manually. That EHC leak was known
10 and identified and I wasn't aware of this because I
11 didn't -- I was on the first outage startup and then
12 went on days off, came back and the unit is off line
13 and I had asked the -- I had heard through the
14 grapevine that we knew about the EHC leak. So when I
15 came in for turnover, I asked the off-going
16 superintendent wasn't this EHC leak identified last
17 week? It was only the week before. And the answer
18 was huh? What? I'm not quite sure. I said well, did
19 we start the plant up with a known EHC leak? I didn't
20 know about it when I had to do the first plant start
21 up, but the EHC leak was there and existing. I said
22 -- when I found out, now I'm angry. I'm angry because
23 first of all I'm in a bit of a box because of the
24 subcriticality issue happens with the first startup.
25 So I'm a bit ticked off that I'm being pressed on

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1 that. And then I come to find out that essentially I
2 started up the plant with an EHC system that's not
3 completely reliable that has a known leak. So I said
4 did I hear somebody say earlier that we knew about
5 this leak? Well, that's unknown. We're not quite
6 sure. And I ask again later, but it's in the middle
7 of the turnover. I said is it true? He says well,
8 yes, we did know about it. We had -- it was being
9 looked at and deemed okay and good enough to start the
10 plant up.

11 And I have no idea who makes those
12 decisions in our organization, who is the person that
13 says, stamps their name and affirms that okay, I have
14 the EHC leak and you know what, what's the risk,
15 what's the business issue, what's the nuclear safety
16 issue, but we'll live with it.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't know who
18 that was in this instance?

19  No, I don't.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was the turnover
21 manager for you? Who was the shift manager?

22  That would be my
23 

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's who you were
25 having this conversation with?

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1 [REDACTED]: Yes, he was there.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He confirmed that the
3 leak was known, but it was deemed okay?

4 [REDACTED]: Yes.

5 MR. BARBER: Is it possible that the
6 reason that the leak was deemed okay is that whoever
7 looked at it didn't have the system configured
8 properly?

9 [REDACTED]: Yes, the turbine may have
10 been tripped or not tripped. Yes, it is. It is. But
11 was it looked at --

12 MR. BARBER: Maybe they said EHC is
13 running, so that's all we need. We see no leakage.

14 [REDACTED]: Absolutely, it is
15 possible.

16 MR. BARBER: Not knowing that the turbine
17 had to be reset, so you'd have pressure at the
18 location where this valve was.

19 [REDACTED]: Yes --

20 MR. BARBER: And you actually could see
21 what the magnitude of the leak was.

22 [REDACTED]: You're absolutely right.
23 Is it also possible that the central outage group and
24 managers that are aware of an EHC leak ask those very
25 questions? Yes, that's also possible. In essence,

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1 one week later, we scrambled for a known reason.

2 MR. BARBER: Is there an accountability
3 problem?

4 [REDACTED] I would say yes.

5 MR. BARBER: Where is it? Is it within
6 outage group or is it with ops or engineering,
7 maintenance, where is it? Or all of the above?

8 [REDACTED] Good questions. Excellent
9 questions because essentially, I mean I will tell you
10 that that day that I was asking those questions and I
11 would admit on my own faults being a human being, that
12 I was somewhat belligerent to the fact that that was
13 the case because of the previous week, the goings on
14 during the -- my start up.

15 I'm a human being. I try not to be
16 defensive. I own the fact that RCSI wasn't the way it
17 was, but the subcriticality issue blew into something
18 in my opinion was a controlled documented and directed
19 evolution.

20 I may be told otherwise at some point and
21 that's fine. But that day when I was asking those
22 questions, I said you know what, because [REDACTED]
23 scrambled the units two days before. I said [REDACTED], who
24 directed that the unit be scrambled when you found out
25 that you couldn't get EHC fluid in the reservoir fast

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1 enough? He goes I did. I said good. That's good,
2 because everybody knows who's accountable when this
3 has to happen. Who is accountable when we directed
4 the plant be started up last week? Who is it? Oh, I
5 don't know, it's everybody. There's a list about six
6 signatures where you affirm that you're ready. It's
7 by committee. There's no single point --

8 MR. BARBER: Isn't there a start up review
9 where you sit down and have SORC (Phonetic) or
10 something like that where there's actually an
11 affirmation in front of a group of people and it's
12 readiness for restart?

13 [REDACTED]: Did they ask the
14 questions, is EHC in the configuration that we want to
15 see if it does or does not have the leak? I don't
16 know.

17 I know I don't start the plant up without
18 the plant manager's permission.

19 MR. BARBER: Wouldn't that be in the SORC
20 (Phonetic) minutes though if they did ask that
21 question or would it not?

22 [REDACTED]: I can't say. I don't
23 attend those.

24 MR. BARBER: Okay.

25 [REDACTED]: On any routine or regular

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1 basis, but I will eventually because I'm now more day
2 shift and I'll become more privy to those. When I'm
3 on shift, I come, I do my 12 hours. I try to -- it's
4 more point of contact versus strategic thinking and
5 yeah, the accountability issue, who does that? Who
6 decides those things? Who decides that we're going to
7 start up without a pressure control mode? Who decides
8 that we should sync the generator even though the
9 bypass valve is fluctuating? There needs to be and
10 maybe there was, maybe that's why [REDACTED] doesn't
11 work here any more. I don't know.

12 That's what the rumor is that change has
13 happened for the better and it doesn't matter to me.
14 But there definitely is, even on the risk assessment
15 during an outage the O-rim (Phonetic) on-line outage
16 risk assessment management tool, well, that page is
17 put and it's reviewed that we're all agreeing because
18 all the ECSSs (Phonetic), there's nine signatures on
19 there, nine people signing. It's like accountability
20 by dilution in committee as opposed to -- and when you
21 have these committees, aren't you exposing yourself to
22 some sort of group think of whatever the culture might
23 be, some sort of group think mentality? Yes, we
24 should start the plant up. Next thing you know you've
25 got this person saying yeah, yeah, yeah, we should.

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1 And you've got this whole group think. There's not a
2 whole lot of provocative outliers that are willing to
3 say no, that's wrong. That's not what we're here for.
4 I think it's a cultural issue. That kind of goes back
5 to the one I've been saying before. The person that
6 says no, that weekend is not working for me, if I
7 can't have the integrity to my wife and daughter, why
8 should I have it here at work? That's --

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It seems like it
10 would go more to the group think explanation that
11 you're offering because you couldn't have been

12 [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]

That's right.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He was gone at that
15 point in time. So you take him out of it and if
16 that's -- if somebody would have pointed to, that
17 wouldn't be a possibility would it?

18 [REDACTED] I read your letter and I
19 saw what [REDACTED] response is. I'm fixing the problems.
20 I've done my reorg. We're on our way. We're on our
21 way. It's fixed.

22 (Laughter.)

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I just have to note
24 that these are examples that you're offering that
25 occurs September, October of 2003.

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1 [REDACTED] You're right.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're just saying
3 there's no one place to say who made the decision and
4 why?

5 [REDACTED] The accountability, I had
6 another accountability issue --

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Example?

8 [REDACTED] A question and I can't
9 think of what it was off the top of my head that
10 basically says where does that come from?

11 And it works both ways. It works, it
12 absolutely works both ways in not only just for
13 safety, but also for business reasons. I have no
14 problem with somebody saying okay, I've heard your
15 facts on the safety issue. I've heard your facts on
16 the business issue and now it is my decision to do
17 this. I may not always like it and I may disagree and
18 I've given you some examples that I might disagree
19 with, but there are some that I don't have any problem
20 with as long as somebody will stand up in front of me
21 and say that was my call. That was my call and I
22 decided and maybe it was wrong in this case. Maybe I
23 shouldn't have asked you to do that. I was wrong.
24 And I'll learn from that.

25 But step up and say I decide, I direct

1 that you sync the generator that day.

2 (Pause.)

3 The EHC leak came to mind. I mentioned
4 not exercising all control rods during a forced
5 outage. Where did that decision come from? And it
6 comes into the control room from my shift manager and
7 to the reactor operators and it comes with sort of
8 like a stamp of management's approval, so you're like
9 wow, we should exercise, but there's no need to and --

10 MR. BARBER: Is there a procedure that
11 tells you something to the contrary? Or is the
12 procedure silent?

13 [REDACTED] It's nebulous. It's a
14 judgment with words like "should."

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What would be the
16 reason to skip that?

17 [REDACTED] It takes time.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Schedule pressure.

19 [REDACTED] Yes. Business needs.

20 [END TAPE 2, SIDE B; BEGIN TAPE 3, SIDE
21 A.]

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're starting Side
23 A. It's approximately 2:04 p.m.

24 [REDACTED] And going back to the
25 example I used where I said the only example, I am

1 sitting with the core asset and yet I don't know who
2 the person is who is accountable for those sort of
3 decisions, what they're about, what their vision, what
4 their strategy is, what their idea of conservative
5 decision making, of business strategy, where do I want
6 the business to go? And that's a huge gap.

7 My superintendents, I mentioned, their
8 working hours, undoubtedly, plus they're here for
9 meetings every week. Every Thursday night and only
10 until recently did I start hearing what they're
11 talking about. Only just today. They met last night
12 and I got to hear a little bit of a roll out on what
13 they're talking about. It just leaves an individual
14 just in the dark.

15 MR. BARBER: What were they talking about?

16 [REDACTED] Recent corrective action
17 resolutions, nothing of any significance, more minor
18 this person is going to take the package to go to
19 [REDACTED] There was some recent downsizing going on,
20 some procedure changes.

21 Oh, and the [REDACTED]
22 (Phonetic) gave a control room supervisor roll out
23 Tuesday evening and he wanted to hear our feedback.
24 My boss wanted, actually [REDACTED] asked my boss to find
25 out what the feedback was from the guys. And that

1 took up most of the meeting.

2 MR. BARBER: What was the roll out on?
3 What was the issue?

4 [REDACTED] roll out?

5 MR. BARBER: Yes, [REDACTED] roll out.

6 [REDACTED] He's new. So it was his
7 first meeting with body contingent of SROs. He has
8 met weekly and more often daily with the
9 superintendents since he got here. Tuesday was his
10 first group meeting with those people who hold the
11 asset in their hands. To me, that's a gap.

12 MR. BARBER: Was he just -- was it just
13 kind of a hey, get to know you meeting?

14 [REDACTED] No, it was a lecture. It
15 was a lecture.

16 MR. BARBER: About what?

17 [REDACTED] I would characterize it as
18 a mild, gentler beating meeting, you guys need to do
19 this better, you guys need to do this smarter. You
20 guys aren't doing this and you need to. These are my
21 expectations.

22 I have had them before. I'll give him a
23 chance and see how it goes. My overall leaving from
24 it was see how it goes. I'll try harder. I'll try
25 smarter.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He gave you what he's
2 expecting from you. Did he give you anything what to
3 expect from him?

4 [REDACTED] You asked the question and
5 this is the very question I gave my boss today. I
6 said what I heard at Tuesday night's meeting was what
7 I need to do, what I need to do better, how I need to
8 better talk with people. That when a subordinate
9 brings up an issue, safety conscious work environment,
10 I need to hear it, I need to listen to it. My body
11 language can't turn that person off. I can't go huh,
12 don't bring me your problems with my body. And I
13 understand all of those things. But did he say if I
14 hear that, what would he do for it? No. No. And I
15 mentioned it to my boss and it was a here's the ops.
16 manager, here is you, [REDACTED] (Phonetic) and
17 here is me and here's basically [REDACTED] is saying all the
18 things he needs me to do down here. He is not saying
19 anything about what we're going to do between here.
20 It was a glaring, in my opinion, way to kick off the
21 relationship. It was -- so the overall flavor was it
22 was another beating.

23 (Laughter.)

24 And I told that to my boss. I said that's
25 what he gave up. Now I don't think he wanted to.

1 He's a good speaker. He talked about, very, very
2 small minority of the time talked about you know what,
3 it can't always be about losing. In other words, the
4 job is hard. We have a hard job. It's tough. And it
5 will always be hard. But it can always be harder, so
6 let's try to get to where it's just hard. And stay
7 away from it being harder.

8 And that was about as much as he talked
9 out about as far as you know what, you've got to
10 occasionally let people win. Occasionally, you've got
11 to say that's it. That is exactly what I needed. You
12 did exactly what I needed. And throw him the victory.
13 And let him know. That's, to me, what works. That's
14 my management style. That's what works for me. I'm
15 not saying I puff smoke and then play rah, rah for
16 everybody that works for me, but when I catch them
17 doing good, I let them know, let them know,
18 absolutely, that is exactly what I need to see.

19 And then when I catch them doing bad, I
20 say that does not meet my standard or my expectation,
21 but it has to be at least fair. You have to recognize
22 it. And he touched on that ever so slightly and I was
23 -- for a moment there I was charged. I was like come
24 on baby, go there, go there with your spiel, you'll
25 hook me. And then it went back to as supervisors,

1 you're the first guys out there, you're my eyes,
2 you're my ears. I need you to be engaged with the
3 people down there. And that was the gist of that roll
4 out.

5 That was the -- I've been here [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] That was the ^{7c}third control room supervisor^{*}
7 (Inaudible) that I've ever been to. It was the ^{*}third
8 like all ^{7c}SRO control room supervisor-wise^{*}. The fact
9 that it was offered at 4:30 on a Tuesday afternoon
10 which meant most of us couldn't be here until 6:30
11 when we would rather be somewhere else was another
12 piece of feedback that I provided [REDACTED] when he asked.

13 Asking questions at 6:10 in the evening
14 from a bunch of people that have been there since 6
15 o'clock in the morning, are there any questions? You
16 guys got anything for me is apt to be met with nothing
17 but silence. Everybody -- you're looking around the
18 room of 30 people and it's just like asking the
19 instructor, excuse me, Professor Smith, but weren't
20 you going to give us a quiz today? No one is going to
21 ask that question and no one is going to ask any
22 questions. It was a perfect closure, you know? I
23 gave them my spiel and they had nothing for me. Good,
24 good, that's a good delivery.

25 MR. BARBER: If there's no questions, then

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1 I guess we can go to lunch. If there's no questions,
2 I guess we can all head home.

3 [REDACTED] Yes, yes. That's too bad.
4 I'm hoping for better and I'm hoping that what I told
5 my boss this morning that it gets to him. I'm hoping
6 it does.

7 I said to [REDACTED] this morning, I said, [REDACTED]
8 I hope it does. I hope he hears that because I am
9 tired. I am tired of being treated like a chair. I'm
10 tired of being treated like carpet and being walked
11 on. I'm just fed up with it. I said you don't need
12 to -- what I said before, I'm going back over it
13 again. You don't need to kiss me and hug me, just
14 occasional water and sunshine and that will be great.
15 And as leaders, we hire so many technocrats instead of
16 people that know people, that wander through, not just
17 their subordinates, but the net layer down and say
18 hey, are you doing anything this afternoon? What do
19 you say we go out and have a bite to eat down in the
20 cafeteria? Not necessarily to smooch me by buying my
21 lunch, but hey plop down here next to me, tell me what
22 you're thinking. Instead we have formalized programs
23 like brown bag lunches that when you're selected, it's
24 like oh gosh, what is this. It needs to be more
25 casual. It needs to be more sincere. It looks

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1 propped up.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was, in your
3 informal discussions with your peers after that SRO
4 meeting, what was --

5 [REDACTED] Mixed.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Some negative, some
7 positive?

8 [REDACTED] Yes, yes. I left overall
9 neutral.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Doesn't sound like
11 it.

12 [REDACTED] No, I mean --

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Sounds like you took
14 a beating.

15 [REDACTED] In fairness to him it was
16 the first cut and hopefully there will be another one
17 and there will be an opportunity he'll take from that,
18 maybe if I hold these at 3 o'clock in the afternoon,
19 I won't be able to get everybody, the night shift will
20 miss out, but smaller, more frequent would probably
21 work and maybe he'll go there.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That or hold one time
23 and one later on.

24 [REDACTED] Yes. Am I holding my
25 breath for that to happen? No. I'm not. I've seen

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1 them come and go. I never expected that I'd be here
2 five years and I'd see three or four ops managers and
3 several CNOs and a couple of VPs. I never knew [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED] You mentioned him earlier. Yeah, okay,
5 he's somebody that does something, somewhere. Again,
6 I'm just a [REDACTED] I'm just a guy with
7 the asset in the palm of his hand, but I don't know
8 what [REDACTED] was ever about and [REDACTED]
9 To me, that's a serious gap. I don't think I need to
10 know what [REDACTED] had for breakfast every day,
11 but to me, there definitely should be more interface
12 between the VP of Ops, whatever the other position is
13 now and anybody that has Ops in their names, I should
14 occasionally maybe know. And they should probably
15 know me by name. I mean they should know the
16 caretakers of their asset, at least by name. That's
17 what I think. I may be wrong.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's your opinion.
19 That's what we're looking for.

20 Do you have anything else on that subject?

21 MR. BARBER: No.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We'll go off the
23 record so there's no blank space.

24 (Off the record.)

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on after

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1 a brief break. It's approximately 2:15.
2 [REDACTED]: Many other stations,
3 actually our station is going to take out the head
4 spray piping. This is the piping that comes in the
5 top of the head, RHR. It goes up there and cools down
6 the head and effectively cools the upper portions of
7 the vessel and allows for maintenance for taking the
8 next step and the whole job is to get all of that out
9 of the way and get into the vessel for refueling.
10 We're going to take that out and we're going to take
11 it out because it's -- the pipe is difficult to made
12 up, it's not quite aligned right and it takes
13 significant effort to install it and then there's two
14 valves that then need to be tested, both for leakage
15 and for IST requirements and they have to be wired in
16 place and all those things that need to be done. So
17 it's going to come out. It was supposed to come out
18 last outage, but because of that removal, I was tasked
19 with figuring out how can we cool the upper regions of
20 the vessel and I needed to talk with other units and
21 benchmark how they do it.

22 And there are other stations, the way they
23 do it is basically fill up the vessel all the way,
24 shortly after they get the MSIVs closed, fill it all
25 the way up and all the way up into the head and then

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1 let down. The water temperature at that time is like
2 150 degrees or so and the head flange temperature is
3 somewhere in the neighborhood of 400. It stays
4 significantly hot. It's a big chunk of steel.

5 So I had some concerns that I wasn't quite
6 sure we were analyzed to take 140 degree water from
7 the bulk coolant, raise that water level up, all the
8 way up there and put it on top of the very large piece
9 of 400 degree steel. So I talked to [REDACTED]
10 He is the [REDACTED] And I said [REDACTED] what
11 do you think? I mean is that something that is okay?
12 Other stations are doing it and he said I'm not quite
13 sure. I'll have to look into it. And he does and he
14 says you know what? I think it's okay. I looked into
15 the pressure and temperature curves that we have in
16 our design from the manufacturer. Hope Creek's vessel
17 was designed and manufactured by Hitachi, so some of
18 the documentation is in a foreign, Far Asian language
19 and most of it has been translated because most of it
20 is built to a General Electric spec which is standard.
21 So he had to do some looking and searching and stuff
22 and he says I've looked at them and he says, guess
23 what, it's not really defined. I don't really think
24 we should proceed this way. And I said okay, [REDACTED]
25 that's good. Is there another option? He said well,

1 we can, but we don't have the skill set to do that
2 here. Our metallurgical engineers, that would exceed
3 their expertise. However, because I've been dealing
4 with the power uprate issue, I know of a few and I
5 won't remember their names, but GE was one of them.
6 And there were a lot of other engineering job shop or
7 contracting company that had the expertise to provide
8 us with adequate documentation, save the stresses, in
9 so doing such an evolution would not impose any
10 excessive duty or fatigue on the vessel.

11 And he said, he was more -- had more than
12 reasonable confidence that that would be able to be
13 provided. So I said okay, where do we go from here?
14 He said really, it shouldn't be an issue at all. I'll
15 just get the work order approved, get the check cut
16 and they'll probably give us a report back in maybe a
17 week or two. This was something like two months
18 before the outage. Well, the flood up and cool down
19 aspect, our strategy, that was hardly basically rolled
20 into the schedule and had already trimmed off 16 hours
21 of critical path time in the schedule. So since I'm
22 already committed to this strategy as part of the
23 schedule, ~~XXXXXX~~ calls me the next day and says that
24 project or that money for this evaluation, \$24,500,
25 was not in his engineering manager's budget. I just

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1 basically hit him up with it two weeks earlier. I
2 said really? I'm not familiar with projects. I don't
3 buy/sell contracts. I don't do it, so I'm not that
4 familiar. I said what do you have to do next? He
5 says well, I was hoping or at least my manager tells
6 me that you might be able to squeeze the Ops Manager
7 or the Outage Manager for the contract for that money
8 and if they could part with that, they'll deliver it.
9 I've already sent them the data. They have done the
10 work. It can be faxed to me once they have their
11 money, almost, it was essentially the gist of it.

12 Well [REDACTED] okay, let me see what I can
13 do. So I mention it to [REDACTED] who is the [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED]
15 -- I'm not sure if he's [REDACTED] He's
16 basically the [REDACTED] and I mention
17 it to [REDACTED] who was the [REDACTED] and then it
18 goes to [REDACTED] who is the [REDACTED] and then
19 to the Hope Creek outage manager and [REDACTED]
20 (Phonetic) who was an [REDACTED] I'm
21 trying to search for this money.

22 The next day, maybe it was a weekend in
23 between, we're starting to get into the last four
24 weeks. Then you also change the procedure to do this.
25 The shutdown procedure, I have the change ready, but

1 I need the documentation. And [REDACTED] is convinced
2 that, we're both convinced that we're not going to
3 break the vessel, but we would like to have the
4 calculation, be able to pull off the shelf and say you
5 know what, you're right, but we also looked at it.
6 Here is the documentation. And we both want that.

7 [REDACTED] got a call and he told me, he says,

8 [REDACTED] I don't know what to make of this. I'm going
9 to forward you this voice mail. And the voice mail
10 basically, it's -- I'm not going to remember who it
11 was. I wish I had a better memory, whether it was

12 [REDACTED] I don't recall. But in
13 essence, it was, [REDACTED] -- or the feeling that [REDACTED]

14 had, the perception that [REDACTED] portrayed to me,

15 hearsay, so to speak was that [REDACTED] do we really need

16 this? Is this what we really need? Other stations

17 are doing this. Do we really need to spend this

18 \$24,000 for this evaluation? Other stations are doing

19 this. Why can't you guys just figure out a way that

20 it's okay and can be done?

21 [REDACTED] gave me the voice mail and I

22 listened to it and I said, [REDACTED] that disturbs me

23 that you're getting that sort of pushback on what is

24 \$24,000 versus 16 hours of critical path activity?

25 Critical path activity is in the neighborhood of what,

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1 \$25,000 an hour. I'm going to get \$16,000 back,
2 hopefully, if this works. I don't see why they're
3 balking with spending this money. [REDACTED] says I know,
4 it's not a lot of money, but I spend that much
5 company-wide to GE and those sort of places. I said
6 well, that just -- that disturbs me too that they
7 would balk on providing that, spending that money.
8 Let me see what I can do. Now eventually, I go back
9 and I talk to [REDACTED] and I say [REDACTED] for us to proceed
10 with this, we've got to

11 -- are you sure we've got to have this? Yes, I'm
12 convinced. In fact, the design basis documents that
13 are out there, they clearly don't support the way we
14 do it even now, before we do this vessel flood out.
15 We need to proceed with that. We need to have the
16 money that will buy this thing.

17 He said if I spend this money, you're
18 going to assure me that we'll get those 16 hours. And
19 I said well, -- he goes hold on. Then he plays a
20 voice mail that is [REDACTED] voice saying [REDACTED],
21 as we go for this money, I want those hours noted in
22 the schedule. In other words, on that particular day,
23 critical path, whatever it might have been, let's say
24 28 days, he wanted to see 16 hours drop off of 28 and
25 be 27. Well, the 28 days had already incorporated the

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1 existing -- the --

2 MR. BARBER: Benefit?

3 [REDACTED] Yes --

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The cool down by the
5 speed up?

6 [REDACTED] Yes.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So they're looking
8 for
9 a double benefit.

10 [REDACTED] And the projected savings.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He didn't know that
12 though.

13 [REDACTED]: No, he didn't.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So it wasn't possible
15 for you to do that?

16 [REDACTED] Right. And I said [REDACTED]
17 it's already incorporated. You're not getting an
18 additional 16. This is the best I can do and 16 is
19 the long shot. I'm hoping -- I'd call it a win at
20 eight. In fact, I'd call it a win with one, based on
21 the equation costing \$25K and I get one hour back.

22 All right, well, you come through with me
23 on this. Okay.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Come through? Where
25 is the agreement at this point? You have to be at 28

1 or less?

2 [REDACTED] I'm sorry, no basically,
3 I need to get the head cooled down in less than -- I
4 was supposed to reap the savings by six hours. That's
5 what I kind of committed to. I said I think I can
6 commit to six hours savings over last year's outage.

7 All right, well, where do we go from here?
8 Again, I'm not familiar with projects or going after
9 money. So then I talk to [REDACTED] (Phonetic) who
10 was at the time the purse string goalie for the
11 station. If you're going to spend project money, it
12 needs to go through him and this money exceeded some
13 milestone that needs the ultimate stamp of approval of
14 a committee and that's after they see a display of
15 slides and projections and all these things.

16 I called him and [REDACTED] says yeah, [REDACTED] has
17 been talking to me about that, but I don't see it
18 going forward whatsoever. I said [REDACTED] this makes
19 sense. First of all, I've got to have it and it makes
20 solid business sense. If they give it to me, that's
21 what we need in the back of our pockets to proceed
22 with the procedure change and implement this.

23 He says well, it's not in the budget. If
24 you needed to have it, you needed to have it months
25 and months before. I said [REDACTED] okay, you're right, I

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1 should have, but this is unacceptable. He said well,
2 why do you think that? I said the process is just to
3 cumbersome. He said the process is that way because
4 we would have people spending this kind of money
5 everywhere. And I said [REDACTED] let me tell you how it
6 works where I work. I work in the control room. And
7 I walk down to a diesel and find an oil leak and I can
8 go through \$25,000 in a heartbeat with no problem at
9 all by word alone. I want that diesel fixed. And
10 fixed now. And I'll go through \$25K in labor alone on
11 a Sunday afternoon without winking an eye. When do I
12 need to present this case to that board? Well, I
13 think we can get you in, how about next Wednesday? So
14 I show up at a conference room and go through the 10
15 minute discussion and we would write the check the
16 next day. It was really just that simple. Here's
17 what I want to do, this is the stumbling block we're
18 up again, I need the eval.

19 The whole essence of my discussion with
20 [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] got negative -- not negative -- the
21 feedback that [REDACTED] received, he and I would somewhat
22 categorize that or at that time, categorize that as an
23 undue press, an undue pressure for not doing the right
24 thing.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that the pushback

1 you talked about in the first voice mail that he
2 received?

3 [REDACTED]⁷⁶: Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You couldn't recall
5 if that was [REDACTED]⁷⁶ or [REDACTED]⁷⁶

6 [REDACTED]⁷⁶ I don't remember exactly.

7 He forwarded it to me and at the time I did not have
8 a phone number with voice mail.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: These are the
10 management individuals involved with it at that point
11 because when you went to [REDACTED]⁷⁶, he had [REDACTED]⁷⁶
12 [REDACTED]⁷⁶ on voice mail?

13 [REDACTED]⁷⁶: Yes.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So it's between the
15 two of them?

16 [REDACTED]⁷⁶: Yes.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The whole time?

18 [REDACTED]⁷⁶: Yes, either one of them
19 not basically wanting to free up the money from
20 somewhere. Essentially, they were like saying come
21 on, the gist of what I heard from [REDACTED]⁷⁶ voice mail
22 was this is the sort of tone, [REDACTED]⁷⁶ this isn't going
23 to stop us from going ahead with this, is it? You're
24 going to be able to take care of this, right? That
25 was the kind of gist that the perception that I heard,

1 the sort of press to resolve the issue.

2 And again, when I go back over what did I
3 originally read when I read the paper? I read there
4 are a couple of people that were [REDACTED] reorg. victims.
5 They're upset. They went to the NRC. I started to
6 think about what does it look like? What does it look
7 like when you -- I don't know. It just is the wrong
8 message and it's being sent to an engineer, trying to
9 do what's right, trying to do the best thing because
10 he's been tasked by ops. to provide a different
11 strategy that long-term, the head spray is coming out
12 this outage and there will never be another way to
13 cool it without that system and he's trying to get
14 that done right and he's trying to get it done the
15 right way and he's getting the little press like we
16 don't really need that, do we? Other stations are
17 using it. Why can't we just get the one that Hatch
18 has or maybe it wasn't Hatch. Maybe it was
19 Susquehanna. It might have been Limerick, but
20 somebody said something along those lines and [REDACTED]
21 has to defend. This is a Hitachi vessel. It's
22 different. It's a different plant. It's a different
23 place. And that was the sort of -- just that little
24 itty bitty shove like you're not going to ask me to
25 spend more money, are you, so that we can do the right

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1 thing? That's just an example.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So they put him in a
3 position to argue that?

4 [REDACTED] Yes, yes. And that was
5 the way [REDACTED] (Phonetic) explains it. It's
6 sort of what the process is suppose to do.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Justify?

8 [REDACTED] No problem there. The
9 business demands that we not spend money all over the
10 place, but let's not try to strong arm the
11 engineering, sort of a roll over integrity issue.
12 That's just how I felt it was -- not -- I'm thinking
13 not the word overt, not directly, just a subtle --
14 this isn't going to stop us, is it?

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who ended up paying
16 for that?

17 [REDACTED] Projects. I presented it
18 to them (Inaudible) Team and the money came from
19 somewhere.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're not sure?

21 [REDACTED] And the product was
22 provided.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did operations have
24 to support it? Did the outage group support it? Or
25 they got paid for it when the eval. got done?

1 [REDACTED] Yes. It didn't work. The
2 implementation, we had a forced outage just prior and
3 that forced outage was during that time about six
4 weeks prior to the outage I was to go to the simulator
5 and train the team that was to do the shutdown and how
6 it would work, what the methodology would do, answer
7 all their questions. We had a forced outage to find
8 a -- we had a chill water leak in the dry well that no
9 one could figure out that was chill water. They
10 thought it was a recirc. pump seal. So we shut down
11 for that, a chosen planned outage. And that chewed up
12 10 days or so and I didn't go to the training center
13 and didn't train the on-coming shift. The first time
14 they saw the new procedure was the day of
15 implementation.


16 And so instead of filling the vessel at a
17 rate that would get water up into the head, they
18 filled it at such a slow rate, essentially, they
19 filled it at the same rate as they did the outage
20 before, so the benefit was not achieved at all. And
21 --

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You didn't get the
23 six hours?

24 [REDACTED] Nope. Nope. I think I
25 would though. And [REDACTED] and I are still working on

1 it. We think there's some other things that we can do
2 that will do it. But it just -- actually, did get an
3 hour and a half. It was an hour and a half better.
4 So I'd like to get more. But that wasn't just a
5 business issue, it was also safety. There were people
6 that were trying to get down there on top of the
7 vessel head to take it apart and it's 400 degrees. So
8 I want to get it to temperature that is something that
9 they could at least get near to do things like take
10 the insulation off so it would cool down. It's just
11 the gist of my discussing that point was that subtle
12 pushback."

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: On engineering?

14  Yes, yes. That's really
15 about all that I have to say. If you have any other
16 questions for me --

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let me just think one
18 second. We'll go off the record, 2:32 p.m.

19 (Off the record.)

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's about 2:34 p.m.
21 When you were talking about the pushback that came out
22 over the -- to the engineer, to 
23 regarding the flood up plan and the evaluation that
24 you wanted, you talked about yourself going to 
25 to have to -- you went there in response to the voice

1 mail that you listened to, it sounded like? How did
2 you enter discussions with him about?

3 [REDACTED] It may have been a little
4 before, a little after, in the neighborhood. It
5 wasn't necessarily in response to -- no, it was not in
6 response to [REDACTED] telling me that. The first
7 discussion I had was -- let me back up. Maybe it
8 wasn't. I went to [REDACTED] says well, if we can't,
9 we can't. If we can, we'll try to free up some money.
10 I remember meeting with him. The discussion I had
11 with [REDACTED] and he showed me the voice mail was just
12 prior to my presentation to this ORB, I don't remember
13 what it's called, sort of review board. There's a PRB
14 and an ERB. And I don't even know what they stand
15 for. They're the people that hold the purse strings.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So had you already
17 approached them to get on the schedule to make your
18 presentation when you talked with [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] Yes.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the concern from
21 him, it seemed like, the way you summarized it was
22 more about the time that you were going to be able to
23 give them and there was this misconception on [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED] part that you were going to knock some time
25 off the 28 --

1 [REDACTED] voice mail was like
2 saying [REDACTED] if we spend this money I want to be
3 counting on seeing the number of hours taken off the
4 schedule of critical path.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, he didn't
6 realize that had been factored in up front.

7 [REDACTED]^{7c} Yes, that that would
8 result in double dip.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you see it as a
10 push back to you from [REDACTED]^{7c} Were you getting
11 pushed back yourself?

12 [REDACTED]^{7c} Specifically, no, I
13 didn't, but I worked for [REDACTED]^{7c} before and when I first
14 came on board, so my relationship with him was one
15 that I was always kind of on guard for that.

16 MR. BARBER: Wasn't this part of a mod?

17 [REDACTED]^{7c} No.

18 MR. BARBER: It wasn't. How do you do it
19 without doing a mod? You're cutting out the head
20 spray?

21 [REDACTED]^{7c} That's part of a mod, yes,
22 that's on-going.

23 MR. BARBER: Right. I mean it had a
24 function, right?

25 [REDACTED]^{7c} Head spray?

1 MR. BARBER: Yes.

2 [REDACTED]: Yes.

3 MR. BARBER: I mean it had a designated
4 function. It was probably an FSAR to say this was the
5 function of the head spray system?

6 [REDACTED]: Yes. And that is being
7 removed as part of a modification.

8 MR. BARBER: And so the presumption would
9 be that whatever the alternate method was to provide
10 a function would have had some sort of review to make
11 sure it was safe and adequate to do, right?

12 [REDACTED]: Yes.

13 MR. BARBER: And when this, when you're
14 describing this analysis, would have been part of
15 that?

16 [REDACTED]: No, because the RHR, the
17 head spray, mobile DCP, when it was being pulled out
18 of most stations and Susquehanna isn't one of them,
19 they still use it, when they were being pulled out
20 because of all of those overriding reasons I
21 mentioned, testing, bid up, having to remove the
22 piping because in order to get to the head you need to
23 get the piping out of the way. It's another critical
24 path step that needs to get out of the way.

25 . So when this was being formulated to

1 remove it at that time, most plant outages were into
2 the -- still into the 35 and 45 days cooling the upper
3 regions of the head to get to the next step to get to
4 there, was never really on critical path. There were
5 all sorts of other balance of plans, shut down
6 activities.

7 MR. BARBER: So it happened inherently is
8 what you're saying?

9 ⁷⁰ [REDACTED] Yes, the head cooled down
10 and the ambient is on its own. Hope Creek several,
11 several years ago like 8 or 9 years ago, used head
12 spray and they were -- someone did not realize how
13 much water they were spraying on to metal at first and
14 went too overly aggressive with the throttle valve and
15 put a bunch of water on the top right off the bat and
16 it also turns out that the nozzle at this station is
17 offset, significantly enough that all the water goes
18 to one place, not one place, but half of it over to
19 the other side.

20 And so the TEs that are up there, around
21 the flange, they reacted significantly like I've seen
22 it in step fashion, from 400 something degrees to 140
23 almost instantly. That's a stress that is
24 significant. It was looked at at the time it was done
25 and deemed to be not necessarily of any significant

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1 duty in a cyclic fatigue situation. That was years
2 ago. So head spray was essentially kind of like well,
3 we don't ever like to use it. And then NGE came out
4 saying when you take this stagnant piece of pipe that
5 has been sitting there with water in it and rusting
6 chips and everything else and you turn around and put
7 it on top of your driers and separators that have been
8 sitting there with steam flowing this way and now you
9 basically turn around and wash all that stuff, you're
10 washing everything down on top of your fuel. We would
11 prefer you not to use it if you're not going to use it
12 that often. Or if you do, think of ways of flushing
13 and filling and venting the lines.

14 So for those reasons we had essentially
15 not used head spray with any outage in the last
16 several years. And the DCP for its removal, in fact,
17 cites one of the facts is cooling down the head is not
18 critical path, so this system is not giving us
19 anything for its buck. Let's get it out. If [REDACTED]
20 had his way, it would probably be modified, maintained
21 and probably start being used again to do the function
22 that we're asking this other way to do.

23 Essentially the way -- you can't fill up
24 to the flange until you close the MSIVs. You can't
25 close the MSIVs until you got pressure pretty much

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1 down to about zero-ish. In any event, you can't do
2 any of that until you get below 82 pounds. The RHR
3 shut down cooling interlock, because if you do you'll
4 have an isolation. All of these things kind of need
5 to come together, so roughly at about 150-200 degrees
6 is when it closes the MSIVs and somewhere between 200
7 and 150 because you're going to continue to cool down
8 through RHR, we're going to take that 150 to 200
9 degree water from all the way down above the fuel to
10 the very top of the flange and get that water to go up
11 and touch that flange and cool it off. And that's the
12 gist of it. Get it up into the head and let it back
13 down to the flange and take the head off.

14 That's the way it's done at Peach Bottom
15 and at Hatch. And also we haven't been doing it. We
16 haven't used head spray. So my task was find a way to
17 cool the head. Two outages ago we had the best cool
18 down ever. We aggressively got to mode 4 and we're
19 all set for them to start unbolting, but they
20 physically cannot get down in the hole because the
21 metal is too hot. My task was to talking with the
22 vendors, hey, this is not a problem when we go to XYZ
23 plant, what can you do for us? I said okay, let me
24 think about this. How would I do it? How can I do
25 it? What will I do? What I essentially need to do is

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1 I need to get that water and its heat removal
2 capability and get up on that hot steel and do its job
3 and that was it.

4 MR. BARBER: I think I understand what
5 you're describing. My comment and question is
6 actually leading to a different point. If management
7 didn't support the money, funding the money for the
8 modification, then why didn't you just say okay, fine,
9 I'll put the hours back in and we can wait for it to
10 cool to ambient?

11 [REDACTED] That's essentially where
12 I was headed, but it won't go. It won't go without
13 it.

14 MR. BARBER: If you don't want to fund it,
15 that's no problem, we'll just go back to the old way
16 of doing things except not because of where we're at
17 in the outage and we're not in a 35 to 45-day outage,
18 we're in a 28, 22, 15 -- oops, somewhere in a very
19 short outage duration, historically speaking.

20 [REDACTED]: Most plants are trying to
21 get into unbolting and into the 18 and 19 hours these
22 day as opposed to 72, 80 which is where it was five,
23 six years ago, somewhere way ahead of others, but RHR
24 DCP or the head spray DCP that means we haven't used
25 head spray for years here at Hope Creek, so no one

1 ever thought that the DCP needs to bring in a method
2 of how to do it. The DCP itself basically dismisses
3 the need to do the function. It's not needed. We
4 don't need to cool the head. It's definitely not an
5 ECCS function. It's just a maintenance function.
6 Let's use it to do that. So it doesn't even address
7 how are you going to fulfill that function now.

8 MR. BARBER: Did you bring it up to [REDACTED]
9 or to anyone else, just to say I don't have a dog in
10 this fight, if you don't want to do this, that's fine.
11 We'll go back to the old way of doing it and we can
12 sit here and wait. Was there a realization of what
13 the impact was?

14 [REDACTED] I was assigned by them to
15 do it.

16 MR. BARBER: To come up with a way of
17 doing it?

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 MR. BARBER: You were marching to the
20 expectation?

21 [REDACTED] Yes.

22 MR. BARBER: This was your (Inaudible) and
23 you had to be successful?

24 [REDACTED] Yes. And I think I was.
25 I just got to the point where I needed the money to do

1 it. And I had a point there and I can't remember it.
2 You would think that the DCP for its removal would
3 have -- what's the alternate way to do this method.
4 You would think that it would be there and it's not
5 and it probably won't be.

6 And it wasn't because back -- this DCP has
7 been sitting on a shelf just waiting for us to
8 basically write a check for somebody to do the work.
9 And it's been sitting on a shelf for probably years
10 from when the time outages were so much longer and the
11 method just wasn't needed. And it's going to come out
12 in this outage, at least that's what they say.

13 MR. BARBER: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] I think that's all I
15 really have.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

17 [REDACTED] Wait, you were asking me
18 a question, did I get to it? No, I didn't.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When we were talking
20 about the pushback?

21 [REDACTED] Yes.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think you pretty
23 much answered it. I guess what I was looking at in
24 looking at that whole incident you saw [REDACTED]
25 as getting this unreasonable pushback, but you didn't

1 name yourself necessarily in there.

2 [REDACTED] Like I said, my testimony
3 is somewhat hearsay in that. Oh yeah, because I
4 perceived that as a different relationship with [REDACTED]
5 in that having worked for him in the past, I kind of
6 developed a rapport that it wasn't going to happen.
7 The pushback was essentially I'm holding you to what
8 you say you can do. I thought it was going to be
9 reasonable to deliver it.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] My pushback out to him was
12 I need the eval.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You need the money.

14 [REDACTED] And then he played the
15 voice mail from [REDACTED] which at that level I can see the
16 need for saying hey, all right, justify this business
17 expense. I'll spend it. I'll approve it. But you
18 need to come through for me here and basically puts in
19 that message was [REDACTED] telling me to come through for
20 him. The pressure really occurred with the voice mail
21 and I wish I could remember specifically who it was,
22 that was with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] even says -- [REDACTED] was
23 verbalizing and saying this really makes me feel
24 uncomfortable. That's just not right. This is a slam
25 dunk, no brainer, spend the money, reap the benefit,

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1 but it should be done. So even from a business
2 perspective, it's just the way he characterized, come
3 on, the vessel is not going to break, [REDACTED] You're
4 not going to get in the way of this, are you? That
5 was the kind of characterization of it, of the
6 environment at the time. That's really all I have.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. I have a
8 couple of questions in closing for you. Have I or any
9 other NRC representative offered you any promises of
10 reward or threatened you in any manner in exchange for
11 your information today?

12 [REDACTED] That's a negative.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And have you appeared
14 here freely and voluntarily?

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

17 [REDACTED] Well, not freely. I'm the
18 salary right now.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's approximately
20 2:47 p.m. and what we'll do is close and I thank you
21 for the large amount of time that you gave us today.
22 Thank you.

23 [REDACTED] You're welcome.

24 (Whereupon, at 2:47 p.m., the interview
25 was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of

[REDACTED]

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F and [REDACTED]

Location: Salem, NJ

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.

Francesca Zook

Francesca Zook
Official Transcriber
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