

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

3 + + +

4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS
5 INTERVIEW

6 -----x

7 IN THE MATTER OF: :

8 INTERVIEW OF: : Docket No.

9 : (Case No. 1-2003-051F)

10 [REDACTED] 7c

11 (CLOSED) :

12 -----x

13 Thursday, October 23, 2003

14 NRC Resident's Office

15 Salem Hope Creek

16 The above-entitled interview was conducted

17 at 7:30 p.m.

18 BEFORE:

19 EILEEN NEFF Special Agent

20 ALSO PRESENT:

21 SCOTT BARBER, Division of Reactor Projects

22 NRC Region I

23
24
25
Information in this record was declassified
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 7C
FOIA- 2005-194 (202) 234-4433

NEAL R. GROSS
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

M-42
www.nealrgross.com

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (7:30 p.m.)

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today is October 23,
4 2003. The time is approximately 7:30 p.m. Speaking
5 is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC Region I,
6 Office of Investigations. Also present from Region
7 I is Scott Barber from the Division of Reactor
8 Projects.

9 What follows will be an interview with
10 [REDACTED] an [REDACTED] currently employed at Salem
11 Generating Station, in regard to the NCR assessment
12 of the safety culture here at Salem in Hope Creek.

13 [REDACTED] I'll call you [REDACTED] would
14 you please provide your name, spell your last name
15 for the record, your date of birth and social
16 security number.

17 [REDACTED] I'm [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] My social
19 security number [REDACTED]

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you. As I
21 explained to you prior to going on the record, we'll
22 conduct the interview under oath and also that you
23 were told that it's interesting that I didn't
24 contact you originally for this interview; you had
25 contacted me. We spoke for the first time

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

yesterday.

You understood that this assessment was on-going and that you had volunteered that you had some information that you thought might be relevant. We'll get into that in a minute.

I also pointed out to you that at this time there's no potential specific violation that we're looking at. It's an assessment of the safety culture on-site. You understand that.

[REDACTED] Correct. *RC*

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Now, yesterday you called when you learned, at some point in this week, you learned that we were doing this assessment and talking to people on-site. You called me and indicated that you'd like to be interviewed as part of it.

[REDACTED] *RC*
That is correct.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Before we get into any questions on that, can you raise your right hand, please. Do you swear that the information that you're about to provide is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

[REDACTED] *RC*
I do.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you. Why don't we go into that directly. What prompted you to call

1 in and say that you had some information for us?

2 [REDACTED] Last week, on the 15th, I
3 was standing watch as Salem reactor one [REDACTED]
4 About 3 o'clock in the morning, we got an overhead
5 enunciator code 15, which is a digital feed problem.
6 Myself and another [REDACTED] took response
7 and come to find out we had a 14-BF-19, which is the
8 feed reg valve was stuck and was non-responsive.

9 We took manual control of it. It would
10 not close. We took manual control of its bypass
11 valve, which by design, opened when there's a
12 deviation between demand and actual valve position.
13 We closed that and with the max load on the
14 (inaudible), it's been over-filling it, and thus
15 also preventing a reactor trip.

16 By the time we got the water level under
17 control and turned, we were about 59 inches. I was
18 going to manually trip the reactor at 65, because an
19 automatic would have happened at 67. By the time we
20 got the whole plant stabilized and everybody felt
21 comfortable again, it was a little bit after 4
22 o'clock in the morning.

23 At that point they called in, I think they
24 called the Rapid Response Team -- it's a board of
25 engineers, maintenance supervisors, technical people

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 that were all supporting the Unit Two outage -- into
2 a conference room with all the data and details of
3 the event. At about 5:30 they had all the
4 information they needed. They said they're going to
5 go formulate their plan of attack.

6 Initially all the ROs involved believed
7 that 14-BF-19 was stuck. The main reason is I've
8 had controllers fail on me in the past. I was on
9 duty the night we had the PS-3 spray valve fail and
10 we took a safety injection about a year ago.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I don't want to get
12 too far off track, but I omitted something. What I
13 should do is have you explain your experience here
14 on site.

15 [REDACTED] Okay. ^{7C}

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I'm sorry. I went
17 around that.

18 [REDACTED] Not a problem. I've been ^{7C}
19 at Salem Generating Station about [REDACTED] ^{7C} years. I
20 started in as a ([REDACTED]) I was
21 an ([REDACTED]) for about [REDACTED] ^{7C}
22 [REDACTED]. I applied and got selected to go to
23 [REDACTED] I completed that in [REDACTED] ^{7C}
24 I've been ([REDACTED])
25 [REDACTED] ^{7C}

1 To get back, I'd had controllers fail open
2 where we had no control of the controller and we
3 took an automatic safety injection that night. I've
4 also seen controllers fail where the valve fails
5 close and we can't get them open. I've had
6 automatic controls fail where they get erratic, but
7 one we take manual control we can regain control.

8 All attempts to control the BF-19 failed.
9 It was stuck at about 74 percent open. That was
10 with a full close demand, zero percent open for
11 about two minutes. Normally the feed water
12 isolation valve is supposed to fail close in 10
13 seconds.

14 So I firmly believe the valve was stuck at
15 that point. So did the other 
16 involved. Immediately once we got the plant
17 stabilized we got equipment operators in the field,
18 they got some INC technicians went out and looked at
19 it, as well as one of the supervisors went out and
20 looked at it. The initial response was that they
21 didn't see anything wrong with the valve.

22 What we did at that point was we ran the
23 demand of the valve back up to 69 percent, which is
24 about five percent where it should have been, in
25 case whatever was holding the valve -- a mechanical

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 binding or whatever -- decided to let go, we didn't
2 want it to slam shut, which if it slammed shut we
3 weren't going to be sure if we could open it again.
4 So we put it in a more reliable position should
5 whatever the condition release the mechanical
6 binding.

7 At that time, like I said, the INC
8 technicians and mechanic -- I didn't get the
9 mechanic's name -- had looked at the valve. They
10 said they didn't see anything externally. They did
11 a quick external inspection of the controller. They
12 said they didn't see anything they could think that
13 would prevent the valve from physically closing.
14 However, the design of this gate or this controller
15 doesn't have inlet and outlet pressure demand
16 signals where they could say it's being told to do
17 this and it's not responding. It's pretty much a
18 magic box as far as controllers go unless you start
19 hooking up more gear to it.

20 What we got in the control room was that
21 the technicians believed it might be a controller
22 problem. They were going to investigate that
23 further. In the control room, we had asked why do
24 you think it's a control issue. The response we got
25 back was it was zero percent demand on the valve.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 Nothing apparently prevented the valve from
2 shutting. It should have been shut. Therefore, it
3 must be a controller holding it up.

4 The ROs in the control room, none of us,
5 really bought the story because the obvious
6 explanation pointed at the valve itself.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who were the [REDACTED] in
8 the control room at that point?

9 [REDACTED] 7c was the other [REDACTED]
10 in there with me, [REDACTED] 7c (phonetic) was an

11 [REDACTED] After we got the event stabilized, they brought
12 in [REDACTED] 7c (phonetic), another [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] We were all in agreement that it
14 was a stuck valve.

15 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Could I ask you
16 something at this point.

17 [REDACTED] 7c Yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Now that was based
19 on your experience, but isn't this system a little
20 bit unusual because it's digital?

21 [REDACTED] 7c It is. It's an advanced
22 digital feed system. That's where the INC
23 technician, after I talked to him, after this event
24 happened, he goes, well I pretty much believed it
25 was the valve. He goes, but I wasn't going to say

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 that it wasn't possible that there had been a
2 failure in the advance digital feed that may have
3 given a solid, like 75 percent, to it that no matter
4 what we did it was overriding us. That's why he
5 said, well I'm not going to say 100 percent that it
6 can't be the control.

7 So when we got that, we were like, well I
8 think it's the valve, but if there's a chance it
9 could be the controller and we're in a safe
10 condition, there's no reason for us to cycle the
11 plant on an abnormal shut down right now until they
12 get more data. At this point they talked about
13 bringing the on-coming crew into the simulator,
14 training them. Because normally all the other feed
15 valves are designed to operate at a given
16 differential pressure across as well.

17 The shut down that they ended up doing was
18 manually controlled steam (inaudible) feed pump,
19 which didn't have the normal DT for the power levels
20 across the valve. So the other BF-19s were actually
21 -- under normal conditions we would have called them
22 a rag, but they were all three acting the same way,
23 but it wasn't the normal steady program reduction in
24 water level on (inaudible).

25 So I didn't feel too uncomfortable at that

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 point. I didn't like the turnover we were at but --
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At what point in time
3 are you? What time is it now?

4 [REDACTED] This was about 7 o'clock in
5 the morning by the time we turned over.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who is the [REDACTED]
7 involved?

8 [REDACTED] (phonetic)
9 was an [REDACTED] that night. [REDACTED]

10 (phonetic) was another [REDACTED] I didn't get the
11 mechanic's name that went out there that night. The

12 [REDACTED] that went out in the field that night was

13 [REDACTED] (phonetic). The [REDACTED] of the unit was [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED] (phonetic). The [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]
15 (phonetic).

16 Once we got this data the decision was
17 made between the [REDACTED] and I believe he talked with

18 [REDACTED] (phonetic), one of the [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] They determined they were going

20 to call it a potentially controlled issue and do
21 further evaluation. So we turned over, and like I

22 said, I was kind of uncomfortable at that point, but
23 it did seem valid like they're going to train the

24 people for the shut down and maybe there was some
25 other data.

1 I was scheduled to come back into work
2 that night. I came back in; it was about a quarter
3 after six when I came in. They started direct power
4 reduction. They were at about 55 percent power when
5 I got back into work. They were reducing power at
6 about one percent a minute.

7 I could tell it was a pretty dynamic
8 shutdown. They trained the crew, so I was working
9 outage after they got unit one tripped, brought it
10 down offline and tripped it. Once they got
11 everything stable and all the reports and everything
12 made to bring the unit offline, I went and I talked
13 to the [REDACTED] that night which was [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] (phonetic) and kind of expressed my
15 concern.

16 I said, [REDACTED] when I left this morning I
17 didn't have a real good feeling, but what was the
18 delay? It seemed like an awful long delay to bring
19 the unit down offline, because I said at some point
20 they had to call it a stuck valve. Calling that
21 valve a stuck valve would have put us in tech-spec
22 303 shut down, which from the time you call it you
23 have to be free within seven hours, an hour to fix
24 her -- you know, come up with a plan, six hours to
25 shut down.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Why 303?

[REDACTED] ^{JRC} Well, it was --

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Let me back up a minute. Is there a specific tech-spec for this valve?

[REDACTED] ^{JRC} There is a tech-spec under -- yes.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Just stay with this.

[REDACTED] ^{JRC} Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Is there something on the valve itself?

[REDACTED] ^{JRC} No, it's a feed water isolation valve.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay, so is there a tech-spec for the feed water isolation signal?

[REDACTED] ^{JRC} Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay, what does that say? Do you know?

[REDACTED] ^{JRC} It goes under our ESF actuation, which is 3321 -- I have to look at the action line, but it required that we have to test the signals. In most of our instrumentation tech-specs there are actions that if you have a faulty channel, you have to verify it stable within six

1 hours or bring the unit down.

2 In this case since it was a feed water
3 isolation signal that didn't have bi-stabile
4 (inaudible), we really had no action other than we
5 had to test it as a feed water EFS signal. So we
6 talked about it that night and said, well if we
7 can't, if we're going to say it's the valve itself
8 that's physically damaged, we don't really have an
9 action covering it, but it is a feed water isolation
10 valve. So they (inaudible) no action required then
11 by the motherhood. We go in a 303.

12 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Is that a very
13 unique approach, or is that just something that's
14 standard practice?

15  That's pretty much a
16 standard practice. We have, there's not a whole lot
17 of items we have that aren't governed by specific
18 limiting conditions of operation, but this is one of
19 them. Since there were no actions to take when it
20 was faulty, you really didn't have a field to comply
21 with, so we had to declare it an off and shutdown.

22 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Do you know what
23 the time frame was for feed water isolation signal?
24 Let me ask it differently, if there have been a
25 longer time frame, could you have taken, could the

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 shift have taken more time to get the plant offline?
2 [REDACTED] If they determined that it
3 was a controller problem, they could have probably
4 taken a longer time. There wouldn't have been a
5 required shutdown at that point if it was a controls
6 issue. If they thought a feed water isolation
7 signal, which the interface in that it's feed water
8 isolation actually fills the solenoid through the
9 air to the valve, and the valve fails closed within
10 10 seconds.

11 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

12 [REDACTED] Where it's outside the
13 tech-spec realm is where digital feed comes into
14 play. Initially we said, well if it's a controller
15 issue and we fail the air to the valve, it's going
16 to fail closed within its required 10 seconds, so it
17 would still perform its safety function. That's
18 what -- for the call or not to call it 303 --
19 initially was a control signal holding the valve
20 where it was at. If we cut the air line essentially
21 to the feed water isolation signal, it would have
22 gone shut and would have provided its safety related
23 function. Then it would have just been a normal
24 shutdown.

25 Throughout the course of the day, they

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 developed trouble-shooting. There was some question
2 as far as how the jack was still -- it's a unique
3 physical valve as far as the jacking mechanism goes
4 on it. Throughout the course of the day it seemed
5 like every time they got a question, somebody
6 disagreed with it, and they had to send it back for
7 more resolution. It was 3 o'clock before they got
8 the trouble-shooter written, approved, taken through
9 SORC, which is a committee they have for -- I can't
10 remember what the acronym stands for, but it's like
11 technical engineering --

12 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Safety Operations
13 Review Committee? .

14 [REDACTED] Yes, that's it.

15 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

16 [REDACTED] I didn't know if that was a
17 standard acronym or not, but SORC approved it and
18 they went into the trouble-shooting. The first step
19 of the trouble-shooting was they operated a jacking
20 mechanism and they failed air to the valve. When
21 they did, the valve did not move even a fraction of
22 an inch. There was a zero air signal applied to it,
23 and it should have failed closed within 10 seconds.

24 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Was that done with
25 the plant at full or a higher power, or was it full

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealgross.com

1 power or where was it?

2 [REDACTED] That was, I believe they
3 were still at full power at that point.

4 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: So they were
5 actually doing that trouble-shooting --

6 [REDACTED] At power, which is why they
7 said they wanted a more detailed trouble-shooting,
8 because it had the potential of tripping the unit.

9 At that point when it failed the valve,
10 they realized the valve was not going to move at
11 all, they declared 303 and implemented the shutdown
12 at one percent a minute. By the time I came in at a
13 quarter after six, they were down to about 55
14 percent power.

15 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

16 [REDACTED] On the way down they did
17 several other mechanical agitations of it. Because
18 we have had in the past, the BF-19s have gotten an
19 excessive packing drag on the valve where it would
20 lock in one position. We would mechanically agitate
21 the valve with a little hammer or something, just
22 enough to shake it, and it responds fine after that.

23 The technician that afternoon was doing
24 that. He was giving it the (inaudible) blow hammer
25 many attempts. He's not a small guy either, and he

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 said, I've probably hit this valve harder than I've
2 ever hit any valve.

3 (inaudible) did not respond. I think it
4 came down with the shutdown. It got down to about
5 25 percent. Tried to stabilize it. Xenon coming in
6 through the rapid down (inaudible) took the unit
7 down, tripped it, and went into EOP, took it down to
8 mode three.

9 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Is there a problem
10 with (inaudible)?

11 [REDACTED] 7c: Not that I'm aware of. I
12 haven't heard about --

13 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: When you trip the
14 plant under those conditions, do you (inaudible)?

15 [REDACTED] 7c: Normally we would get a
16 feed water interlock. The difference between what a
17 feed water interlock is and a feed water isolation:
18 a feed water interlock is (inaudible) 553. It shuts
19 the BF-19s and 40s. The reactor trip signals, you
20 trip the reactor --

21 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: What are the 40s?

22 [REDACTED] 7c: It's the BF-19 bypasses.

23 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] 7c: So it shuts the feed water
25 and the feed water bypass valve --

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

2  -- trip signal only gets
3 553 degrees. Then the difference between that and
4 the feed water isolation is the feed water isolation
5 signal comes in either one of two input, either
6 safety injection or steam generator water level is
7 greater than 67 percent. Safety injection is just
8 like the bottle up containment in generators.
9 Greater than 67 percent it's a preemptive strike so
10 that if you get too much water in the containment
11 and you have further degradation of systems, you
12 don't have excess mass and energy in a container.

13 When they trip the plant, it immediately
14 goes to 553. The RO was looking at it, they said,
15 you watch the BF-19. If it doesn't close and we
16 trip the plant, initiate a close on the BF-13 so
17 when it shrinks, it doesn't come right back in the
18 one steam generator. The feed pump now is feeding
19 one steam generator solely, because the level is
20 going to go screaming, and we would have gotten it,
21 a feed water isolation signal. So we did that; we
22 tripped the plant.

23 The RO noticed that the other the BF-19
24 and 40s went closed and that one did not. We
25 initiated a close signal on the BF-13 which

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 (inaudible) that we had isolated it. They had
2 already initiated off feed before the trip and
3 everything went fine afterwards.

4 But when I started asking questions as far
5 as what took so long --

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this when you
7 (inaudible) --

8 [REDACTED] ^{7c} Right.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- when you came on
10 the next time?

11 [REDACTED] ^{7c} Right. I was on that
12 night, and I thought (inaudible) and I can
13 understand getting questions about the valve and all
14 that, because I'd come to find out it operated it a
15 little bit different even than what I thought it
16 did. He goes, well you know, we had to get the
17 people in. We had to get the trouble shooter
18 involved. It just seemed like 12 hours after that
19 seems like an awful long time. Especially when we
20 had the proper people here at 4:30 in the morning.
21 It's not like they had to wake somebody up and bring
22 them in from home. He goes, well trouble shooters
23 take a long time.

24 At that point I started hearing some
25 rumors going around that people had attempted to

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 mechanically agitate the valve early in the day.
2 They were beating on the valve early in the day
3 before they did the trouble shooting, to me that's
4 admitting that it's a stuck valve early in the day.
5 There'd been no reason to delay it until 3 o'clock.
6 As I researched, I found out that wasn't true.

7 No one actually attempted to mechanically
8 agitate the valve until about 3 o'clock when they
9 initiated the trouble shooting. But then as I
10 started talking, I started hearing even the
11 mechanics, the INT technicians that went out
12 believed in their gut it was the valve, that they
13 weren't going to say for sure it couldn't have been
14 the controller.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This is the
16 individual that on 75 percent --

17 [REDACTED] ^{7c} Right. That was [REDACTED] ^{7c}
18 (inaudible), and I talked to him about it. He goes,
19 I was going to say 100 percent no way it's the
20 controller, because the digital feed is a different
21 entity that comes into play. It's a very
22 complicated computer signal, computer system that
23 controls it. It works great. But he says, I can't
24 guarantee unless I search prints and go into the
25 computer and pull out data points that it couldn't

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 have locked in signal. He goes, I don't think it
2 could, but I'm not going to say that it can't.
3 That's what they had on as far as not calling it a
4 303.

5 Then, like I said, the more I talked to
6 more people, everybody seemed like they all kind of
7 had the idea that it was a stuck valve, but they
8 weren't ready to call it that yet. In fact, on
9 Monday morning, after I went back into work on (day
10 shift) now, I went to [REDACTED] (phonetic), who's
11 the [REDACTED] now, and I said, [REDACTED] I've got
12 questions about this BF-19 thing. I said, do you
13 have any information that I don't have right now.
14 You know, if he had information that would satisfied
15 my questions up front, I really wouldn't even had a
16 concern.

17 Engineering came up with these -- this
18 could have possibly happened and blocked the valve
19 in that position. He said, no. In talking to him,
20 he goes, actually as the day progressed, he was
21 getting the sinking feeling that more and more it
22 was actually going to be a valve issue and not a
23 controller issue just because data wasn't
24 materializing. It seemed like it was taking longer.
25 He goes, if it took longer, he wanted to get the

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 trouble shooter.

2 He said it was actually getting to the
3 point to where before they even got the trouble
4 shooter proof, he was going to say shut the unit
5 down. He goes, it's been too long now.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he say why he
7 didn't?

8  He didn't say that he
9 didn't want to shut the unit down, but he was kind
10 of led at the same time to believe that he thought
11 it might be a control issue. He also didn't want to
12 shut the unit down in an abnormal condition I'm
13 going to call it, without the feed direct dial
14 operating correctly. As far as a complicated shut
15 down, bringing the unit offline, cycling the people
16 and everything, if there was a way to avoid it.

17 Then as the day progressed, he said he's
18 getting more to where he wanted to take action to
19 shut the unit down. I was satisfied with that
20 response. I was actually sitting back to see what
21 all the other actions were taken at that point.
22 Then when I talked to, I started questioning other
23 people, and a lot of the ROs were saying no.

24 Some of the  were
25 standing there while -- one of them was 

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 [REDACTED] (phonetic), I'm not sure how long he's
2 been licensed, but it's longer than I've worked
3 there. He's seen problems where they used to have
4 manual feed control not the digital feed came on and
5 you're (inaudible) stuck in valves before, valves
6 failed before. He goes, that's what it looks like
7 to me. He didn't believe it was a controller all
8 along. [REDACTED]⁷⁴ said, well I don't know the digital
9 course as far as the internal, I know how the
10 system's supposed to work, but internally I'm not a
11 computer genius so I couldn't say that it couldn't.

12 That's where we stood with that. At the
13 time it's almost like a lot of people, I think, had
14 the belief in the back of their mind that it could
15 have very well been the valve, but they didn't want
16 to call it that if there was a glimmer of hope not
17 to call it that.

18 I guess you've heard it called before the
19 mega-watt mentality. I've seen it in several other
20 applications where what's being done isn't
21 necessarily wrong, but it seems like the stretch to
22 the extreme limit that sometimes tech-spec
23 requirements and stuff until the last minute until
24 they have to take action to take the unit down
25 offline.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 In fact, I talked to Dan Orr, (phonetic)
 2 today when I was in the control room. He came
 3 through. He's the resident inspector. I said, Dan,
 4 you were here for the whole shutdown throughout the
 5 whole day -- because he pretty much came in as we
 6 were getting relieved and left -- I said what was
 7 your gut feeling as far as what you saw. He goes,
 8 well the initial response he was happy with as far
 9 as the way our crew had stabilized the plant, put it
 10 in a safe stable condition until the course of
 11 action could have been determined. But he said the
 12 same thing, he goes, as the day progressed, he goes,
 13 I think the organization took way too long to call
 14 it a tech-spec 303.

15 He goes from what he gathered he thought
 16 it was a stuck valve early in the morning, too. He
 17 goes finally they got into the trouble shooter,
 18 failed the air to it, and the valve didn't move.
 19 Come to find out it was a piece of all thread stuck
 20 in a seat. It wouldn't matter how big of an
 21 operator we put on it, it wasn't going to close the
 22 valve.

23 He said that was his biggest concern as
 24 far as why it took so long to call it that. I've
 25 seen trouble shooters in the past, if it was a piece

1 of equipment that was going to prevent us from
2 coming back up online, I've seen trouble shooters
3 walk through SORC and are done in three to four
4 hours, where this one took from 5:30 in the morning
5 when all the data was complete until three in the
6 afternoon to get it pushed through.

7 Talking to some of the technicians,
8 there's one INT technician who's like the master on
9 this valve. He knows these valves inside and out.
10 He's the one who sets them and tunes them and drags
11 them all out. He was available that morning. He
12 was in the Unit 2 pressurizer doing something. They
13 didn't utilize him, bring him out and ask his
14 expertise on the valve. There was another
15 supervisor that's supposed to be really in depth
16 with the electronic controls on the valve, but he
17 was off assigned to another job. It's almost like,
18 I'm not saying it was willful, but they had some
19 very key players that were very familiar and
20 knowledgeable on this piece of equipment and weren't
21 contacted and brought into the picture early in the
22 day, which I think if they had them in there, a lot
23 of questions and arguments they had back and forth
24 that strung the whole day out, would have been
25 answered early in the day, and they could have gone

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 into the trouble shooting by 10, 11 o'clock maybe.
2 They could have started the unit shutdown four to
3 five hours earlier if that's what was required.

4 I talked to [REDACTED] I said I was kind
5 of uncomfortable that morning, but I knew the plant
6 was safe. But when I came back in and realized it
7 really hadn't moved, in my mind I'm like, we
8 shouldn't even be at this position right now. I
9 wholeheartedly expected to come in and find the unit
10 offline. That was my gut feeling when I left that
11 day, as well as every other [REDACTED] on
12 duty with me that night and several equipment
13 operators.

14 (inaudible) one of the equipment operators
15 actually going through license class right now. He
16 came in and he goes, we shouldn't be there. I've
17 learned more now. He looks at it from a different
18 way than he did six months ago. He goes, this unit
19 shouldn't be online right now. That's my concern.

20 Since then, that was on Monday I talked to
21 [REDACTED] On Tuesday [REDACTED] (phonetic)
22 who's the [REDACTED] came down and talked to me.
23 He says, I hear you have a concern. I said, I do.
24 I had the same discussion with him that I had with
25 [REDACTED]. I asked him the same thing. I said if

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 you have some physical evidence or some reason that
2 -- to me it would have justified the extra time it
3 took to come up with this action plan. I really
4 don't have any concerns at this point, but if you
5 can't give me some more information or a tidbit of
6 knowledge that I'm missing, I says, I don't
7 understand why it took this long to formulate this
8 plan.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did he say?

10  He goes, well you're right.
11 It did take a lot longer than we should have. He
12 goes, they're doing an investigation trying to
13 figure out where the pit falls were. He actually
14 said, it may take a week or two to get all the data.
15 He goes, when I'm done, would you look at the report
16 and see if it's actually accurate and if not, tell
17 me why. I said, yes, I'll do that, because I'm kind
18 of interested to find out why it took so long.

19 Now I've been in situations where it's
20 been a clean, clear and cut, just as a tech-spec
21 shutdown item, and there's no hesitation whatsoever
22 when it's cut and dry. Like once they failed the
23 air to it, there's no question on the 303. It's a
24 stuck valve; we've got to shut down. The action was
25 taken.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

20
1 I've seen other instances where they don't
2 actually shutdown, but maybe sometimes a power
3 reduction or stuff where it's not real defined as
4 far as whether it's a failed component or restricted
5 component. It almost seems like a lot of times it's
6 extended out until it's almost to the limit. Not
7 saying anything's being violated, but it's almost
8 stretched to the extreme. Then they say, okay now
9 it is; we've got to go back and take the actions.

10 There've been a couple instances of that
11 where I haven't felt real comfortable but I was like
12 the lone wolf on that one. I advocated and the
13 explanation I'd get (inaudible), okay I can live
14 with it because we're not breaking any rules or
15 violating anything. But I felt like we were
16 violating the tech-specs and the licensing that day,
17 especially when I came back into work.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For this incident?

19  For this incident, right.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This is the one you
21 described to me, said it was pushing (inaudible) --

22  I mean I thought this was
23 really not conservative on this one.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you comparing the
25 other incidents, because you might have been a lone

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 wolf on the other ones?

[REDACTED]

2 Right, you know, one

3 incident they had where early in the day they had a

4 dropped rod -- not a dropped rod, a dropped emission

5 failure. We went into our tech-specs, did the

6 surveillances --

7 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Same day?

8 [REDACTED]

9 No, this was a year or so

ago. I'm just giving an example where I felt --

10 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

11 [REDACTED]

12 -- and we were doing the

surveillance for it and in the middle of the night

13 we had a system they call Beacon that reactor

14 engineering can run at flux map that's actually

15 pulling a flux spindle through the core. They have

16 an electronic version that they do use.

17 It was coming up to be due. The same

18 reactor engineer sent it in. Well, CRS took it that

19 night and started reviewing it. They started

20 looking at it, and come to find out, it was the Unit

21 2 beacon that it has been laying on. When they

22 started looking, the one previous in the day, the

23 same reactor engineer ran, was a Unit 2 beacon. It

24 was Unit 1 (inaudible).

25 So now we are outside the allowable time

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 for not having a flux map for the rod condition
2 indication. So that one would have been a tech-spec
3 required action, but they were doing preparations
4 for shutdown. They knew that the beacon was going
5 to come back. The guy was like, I'm running it
6 right now talking to him on the phone. They knew it
7 was getting ready to get faxed right into him.
8 Normally we would have an hour to come up with a
9 plan then commit a shutdown. This time it was about
10 an hour and 20 minutes before they said okay, we're
11 going to start shutting it down. The beacon flux
12 map came over the fax. We said okay, we're back in
13 compliance now. We don't have to shut the plant
14 down.

15 I'm like, well that's stretching it, but I
16 didn't think that was really breaking any other
17 rules, because we were still actually talking about
18 a reactivity plan, what we have to do to come down.
19 A little longer than what we would normally take --

20 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Why would you say
21 that they would be in compliance if they continued
22 to shutdown (inaudible)?

23 [REDACTED] That's actually one of the
24 action statements in it. If you have inoperable
25 valve position indications, you have to do this,

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 this and this. Or --

2 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Did you have a
3 reasonably (inaudible)?

4 [REDACTED] Failed indication is what
5 it was. They had a --

6 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: I may not
7 understand exactly the nature of the problem, but
8 there's --

9 [REDACTED] We had a misaligned rod,
10 but we didn't have actually rod position indication
11 by the tech-specs we have, we have to surveil them
12 twice a shift.

13 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

14 [REDACTED]: To verify they're all rods
15 out on the shutdown panel.

16 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay, but there's a
17 very specific surveillance requirement, the
18 motherhood component, talks about missed
19 surveillances.

20 [REDACTED]: Right.

21 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Do you know what
22 that says?

23 [REDACTED] The one where if it's a
24 normal schedule surveillance you have up to 25
25 percent or greater than 24 hours, whichever is

1 shorter to fix it or get back out of it.

2 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Right. I don't
3 understand all the details of what you're
4 describing, but I have a general knowledge of what
5 you're describing. I'm trying to understand why
6 that 24 hour allowance wouldn't have applied.

7 [REDACTED] ^{7c} Well that wouldn't have
8 applied because this wasn't a normal scheduled
9 surveillance. This was an LCO surveillance that we
10 had to do, because it was done --

11 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: It was part of an
12 action statement.

13 [REDACTED] ^{7c} It was part of an action
14 statement. It wasn't a normal --

15 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: I got it. I
16 understand.

17 [REDACTED] ^{7c} -- missed surveillance.
18 The valve position was inoperable. So as a result
19 of being operable, you will do a flux map every
20 eight hours. You will do this; you will do this.

21 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: I understand.

22 [REDACTED] ^{7c} If you don't, you will shut
23 down.

24 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: I got it.

25 [REDACTED] ^{7c} That's where we were out.

1 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: So you were acting
2 on the LCO actions?

3 [REDACTED] We were actually forming
4 the LCO action statements and the CRS was doing the
5 paper. They said wait a minute, this isn't mine.
6 The guy behind me, there's nothing wrong with his
7 rods. Then he started comparing it. The one that
8 they'd given him in the middle of the day was also
9 for Unit 2. So now we've been missing the LCO
10 required actions now for 12 hours.

11 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: You said it
12 happened about a year ago.

13 [REDACTED] Somewhere around a year
14 ago.

15 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Do you remember,
16 can you tie it to anything, either to a plant
17 activity or was it before or after an outage?

18 [REDACTED] No, it was after an outage.
19 Let's see, I'm trying to think. It may not have
20 been quite a year ago. It was when Hope Creek had
21 the diesel issues. They had something about they'd
22 changed their surveillance program. They had issues
23 with how --

24 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: That was in
25 December.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25



Was it in December? Okay,
it's coming up to it. It was right at that same
time. Because I remember they had to pull
technicians off Hope Creek trying to prove all their
diesels operable to come over and help resolve it.
So that's about when it was.

I think what they were doing, they were
doing some kind of calibration of the rod position
system that day. I think they had a power supply
fail on them, not just one but several of the rods.
So we were in an action recovery off of that.

But that was one where we were actually
still in a process of coming up with our shutdown
plan when the compliance sheet came back too and
they said we haven't started moving the plant.
We're back in compliance. We're not going to shut
down now.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Was there any kind
of acknowledgement of the error in the log somewhere
or --



Yes, there was, because
actually they made a notification of the missed
surveillance.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: There wasn't a
surveillance. You just told me --

1 [REDACTED] Well, I won't call it a
2 surveillance. It was a missed LCO action.

3 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: LCO, okay.

4 [REDACTED] It was the same action as
5 we do on our surveillances, but they wrote up a
6 level two, I think it was a level two, notification.
7 They wrote that they missed LAR action for required
8 flux mapping. They did the investigation, the
9 reactor engineer I'm not sure what his --

10 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Was there an LAR
11 written on that do you know?

12 [REDACTED] I don't remember.

13 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Do you know if
14 there is a requirement for the LAR for those kind of
15 conditions?

16 [REDACTED] I believe there is, but I'd
17 have to actually read it to make sure.

18 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: There's a general
19 requirement that a condition followed by tech-specs.

20 [REDACTED] Right.

21 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Is there any time
22 that you have an LCO where the action statement, you
23 can't comply with the action statement? You've
24 exceeded the LCO requirement.

25 [REDACTED] I believe there way, but I

1 can't say for sure that we did. I believe we did,
2 but I'm not sure.


3 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: That would have
4 been in December.

5  Right. That one, you know,
6 this is the hour, we should be starting to shut
7 down. It's coming right now, and we're still in the
8 process of prepping it. Then we met, we were back
9 in compliance.

10 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Can I ask you, why
11 do you think that, why would the shift be reluctant
12 to start the shutdown? The hour's up, why not just
13 start the shutdown?

14  That's why I say it almost
15 goes back to in some cases what we call the mega-
16 watt mentality. They knew they were going to be
17 back in compliance. I'm not saying the pressure
18 came from the shift itself. I mean it's actually my
19 shift, and the LS was actually in agreement with us.
20 I think pressure came down from higher in the
21 organization. Anyone who was actually in at that
22 point.

23 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: What do you mean
24 in? You mean in control?

25  He actually came back in to

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 the, he came in that -- I don't remember what time
2 of the night.

3 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: But you're saying
4 it was other than the normal day shift.

5 [REDACTED] Right, it was after hours.

6 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] He came back in. He goes,
8 look we're back in compliance. We're not moving the
9 plant down. We're making the preparation
10 (inaudible) offline. Then we came back in
11 compliance. So they said we --

12 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Was this a
13 technical -- we're getting ready to do our shutdown,
14 we're getting our paperwork ready, officially we're
15 entering our shutdown procedure, but we're not
16 actually going to move --

17 [REDACTED] Right. We're making all
18 the preparations. We're getting our activity
19 planned. We're actually making copies of the
20 procedures in case for whatever reason it came back
21 and it was (inaudible) we were going to shut the
22 plant down. But it was a little leeway given on the
23 normal hour we take to prepare. We're in the
24 process of finishing preparations. Then the flux
25 map came back. They were in compliance, and we

1 didn't need the plan.

2 That's what I kind of get to what I've
3 referred to as the mega-watt mentality.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who's the [redacted] on?

5 [redacted] That night I believe it was

6 [redacted] (phonetic).

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted]

8 [redacted] Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the [redacted]

10 [redacted] That was [redacted]

11 (phonetic).

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You've indicated that
13 you thought that there was pressure. What makes you
14 say that?

15 [redacted] There have been a lot of
16 instances where people get perceived pressure coming
17 down like a lot of times it comes down from [redacted]

18 [redacted] He does put a lot of pressure out as far
19 as if it's questionable of whether it's a
20 requirement to bring it down as far as cut and dry,
21 it seems like he almost goes to the non-conservative
22 side in many cases.

23 If it's plain cut and dry, he will do
24 this. I will say that if it's a trip, if it's a set
25 up trip (inaudible) signal, no one there's going to

1 hesitate to trip the reactor and bring it off line.
2 But as far as normally moving a plant doing a power
3 reduction, it seems like the feeling a lot of us get
4 is it's delayed as long as it can be.

5 Now I understand there's business
6 philosophies to it, but I've made the comment
7 before, I don't care if we're making zero mega-watts
8 or 1,170 mega-watts, if I don't feel comfortable
9 doing it, I don't want to do it. That's kind of
10 like how I was at the other day.

11 There's arguments on both sides. I know
12 we can't say shut down or none of us will have a
13 job, but at the same time, if I feel if I can't meet
14 everything I'm supposed to be doing, either one, I
15 don't want to be in there on watch and be part of
16 it, or we should be taking the action to get rid of
17 it.

18 Most of the ROs and I'd say the majority,
19 most of the CRSs and OSs feel that way. But
20 sometimes there's pressure. They can sway some of
21 them to try to think well, we're right on the edge
22 of being in compliance. It might be inapplicable
23 anymore. It's almost like they'll take an extra few
24 minutes sometimes to make the decision, which
25 sometimes is the right thing to do. If it's going

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 to cycle the plant, quick unnecessary manner,
2 sometimes it is the right thing to get the data
3 before we do it.


4 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Let me ask you
5 something. Just kind of stepping back and looking
6 at the situation of the controllers you've
7 described. If that were today, what's the normal
8 shut down rate under a --

9  A non-emergent shutdown?

10 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Yes.

11  One percent a minute.

12 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: One percent a
13 minute?

14  Yes. That's the normal
15 reduction. Normal shutdown is one percent a minute.
16 Controlled, I mean it's not challenging any of the
17 systems. We can even go as far as three percent a
18 minute and it would still be controlled and no
19 problem.

20 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: What if it had been
21 a half a percent or a quarter percent a minute?
22 Let's say that in that 20 minutes extra power would
23 have been lowered from 100 percent to 95 percent.
24 Would you have had the same objection to the current
25 philosophy that was used that day? I'm just trying

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 to get a feeling for --

2 [REDACTED] I really do not believe
3 that at that point we would have been taking action.
4 The normal rule of thumb we have when we have to do
5 a shutdown is whatever the action time is, we try to
6 get there in half the time.

7 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

8 [REDACTED]: If it's a six-hour
9 shutdown, we like to get there in three. That way
10 one, if we have breach complications on the way
11 down, we're not running hell-bent through the finish
12 line and now something trips us up and we didn't
13 make the required shutdown time or the required mode
14 three time. That's been pretty much, all the
15 officer managers that I've (inaudible) have had that
16 philosophy: whatever the action time, as far as
17 when you need to be at a certain place, we cut it in
18 half. That way even if it's a three-hour shutdown,
19 come down at one percent a minute, you're there in
20 an hour and a half.

21 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Right.

22 [REDACTED] That's even pausing to take
23 equipment out. So it's not even a race to get down
24 there. So if we're moving down a half a percent a
25 minute, I wouldn't have felt like we were in any

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 violation. In fact, if we'd starting moving the
2 plant the other night anything faster than one
3 percent a minute, I'd be saying wait a minute, this
4 is too challenging. That's generally been my
5 feeling.

6 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay. In that
7 case, the plant didn't move at all.

8  That case it didn't because
9 officially we didn't have everything we needed to
10 start moving the plant down. We were still
11 promulgating. There was discussion as to whether
12 they actually had to do a shutdown. It wasn't like
13 they were saying well, we're going to sit on the
14 clock and wait now. Then once the action was made,
15 okay we need to do it upon the hour of discovery.
16 It took a little bit longer. The process wasn't
17 working to take the action (inaudible) flux map. We
18 were going to bring the unit down and offline.

19 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

20  The one big concern I had
21 was it seemed like a long time frame for the BF-19
22 the other night. I didn't feel comfortable with the
23 whole 12-hour time span to come up with a trouble
24 shooter to prove what a lot of people actually had
25 the gut feeling.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Were you the -- you
2 said there were other people who felt the same way.
3 Has anyone else come forward in any way to try and
4 express concerns to management about the way that
5 was handled? It sounds like you have.

6 [REDACTED] I'm not sure if anyone else
7 has.

8 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Has anyone talked
9 to you about the fact that they were bothered by
10 what was done?

11 [REDACTED] Yes. In fact, before I
12 even started bringing up my concern to management, I
13 did the peer check with senior ROs and said, I'm I
14 just being scared on the extreme cautious side now?
15 In fact, myself and [REDACTED] who is a [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] he was actually in on break on relief when
17 we got the alarm. I was looking because (inaudible)
18 there's several inputs into it. I'm looking at all
19 my valves. I'm looking at my feed pump. I'm trying
20 to find it. Well [REDACTED] actually saw the feed BF-40,
21 which is the bypass valve, change position.

22 That did it by design. Once you got, I
23 think, it's a 320 percent deviation between demand
24 signal and valve position, the bypass valve says,
25 hey, this one's not working. I'm doing what I need

1 to be doing. I'm telling this valve to go closed;
2 it's not. It might pop in a minute so the bypass
3 comes open by design.

4 [REDACTED] ^{TC} saw that valve pop open. He goes,
5 it's 14-BF-19. At which point I tried to take
6 manual control. I couldn't close it. Then I saw
7 the 40 wide open, so I closed it. We were ready to
8 blow down the (inaudible) generator level. He said
9 as far as his experience, and he's gotten the
10 nickname mode three [REDACTED] ^{TC} because he's got the luck
11 of being in there when things break and the unit
12 trips. That's what we call him.

13 He felt like the valve was stuck. Another
14 guy that's experienced between [REDACTED] ^{TC} and myself, he
15 said the same thing. I think it's the valve. I
16 can't, I'm not a 9C guy, but all the ROs involved
17 pretty much thought it was the valve that was stuck.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You've indicated that
19 the INC guys on their first assessment when they
20 were looking at that --

21 [REDACTED] ^{JTC} Their gut feeling was that
22 it was a valve.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- they were there,
24 but weren't willing to say a hundred percent that it
25 was not controlled. When there was resistance to

1 say it wasn't that, where was that coming from? At
2 what level was that? I mean it starts right with
3 the guys on site and looking at it, right?

4  Right. I think some of
5 this may come back. About a year and a half ago, I
6 think it was, I'm not sure of the time frame. I was
7 licensed, so I know it's been in the last two years,
8 we had coming out of one of the startups, they had a
9 valve position indication problem on one of the feed
10 pumps. They had one of the INC on the wing team
11 that goes out and does minor maintenance and
12 corrective action. We had both an open and closed
13 indication on the stall. He was going out. We're
14 going to take both engine data to try to determine
15 what the problem was on the limit switch.

16 In drawing voltages, he had to draw an
17 arc. Unbeknownst to most people, that limit switch
18 came from the same power supply (inaudible) to the
19 feed pump. I'm not sure if other utilities have had
20 this problem or not, but they've taken measures to
21 try and fix it. But we've had a history of what's
22 called a silent feed pump has failed, a silent feed
23 pump trip. It normally has to do with a power
24 supply observation. It pretty much just shuts the
25 governor down. You don't get any trip signals. You

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 don't get dips --

2 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: It just went to
3 like minimum --

4  It goes down to idle speed.
5 They call it a silent trip because the first
6 indication you normally get is a steam generator
7 program deviation. If you're not fast and hit a
8 trip -- you've got to identify which pump it is
9 within 20 seconds -- if you don't do it, if you're
10 at full power, there's no way you can prevent a unit
11 trip at that point.

12 Since then they've put an overhead
13 enunciator on it to help prevent the silent trip.
14 It's programmed speed from the speed controller
15 first is speed pump action speed. It gets, I think,
16 it's 200 RPM difference. It says, hey, look at this
17 one. It gives you time to react because, depending
18 on how heavy the feed to the feed pump, how fast it
19 will slip down. Since this was the gentleman that
20 caused the unit trip because he couldn't respond
21 fast enough (inaudible), the unit tripped.

22 Initially the response that came out was
23 they were wanting to fire him. They didn't think he
24 was doing proper trouble shooting techniques. This
25 was one of the better technicians, one of the guys

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 if I had a problem I'd want them to send this guy
 2 out in the field. The initial response was they
 3 completely disqualified. You can't touch anything.
 4 It was almost like he made the mistake to trip the
 5 unit, we're going to really hammer you hard and to
 6 the point where there was talk about him being
 7 fired.

8 Well, he didn't get fired, because once
 9 they realized this wasn't the right attitude and
 10 they were really going to give the wrong message,
 11 they backed off. But that was the gut response that
 12 was given to a guy that made an honest mistake. It
 13 also went to --

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This was [REDACTED] TC
 15 (phonetic)?

16 [REDACTED] TC: No this wasn't [REDACTED] TC
 17 this was -- let me think of his name -- [REDACTED] TC

18 [TAPE FLIP]


19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- at 8:20 p.m. What
 20 you were saying was -- let me see if I can get this
 21 in terms that you're using it. This mega-watt
 22 mentality that you're attributing towards, you think
 23 that might be where some of this is coming from,
 24 this hesitancy to shut down the BF-19 problem last
 25 week. The mega-watt mentality is defined -- if I

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 follow you right -- as shut down only if you have
2 to. If you're in an area where you may be able to
3 push it for, not necessarily have to shut down right
4 away, that's where the push is going to go, this
5 non-conservative, we'll shut down only if we have
6 to.

7 Compare that to a directive, a production
8 over safety. Have you ever seen or felt or heard
9 production over safety directives? Do you have any
10 other incidents that go to that -- I would say that
11 your mega-watt mentality may be a step behind that.
12 Have you ever seen it cross that line?

13 : I haven't ever seen it put
14 out we're going to keep the units up no matter what
15 it cost. I haven't ever seen that.

16 In fact, they always say safety before
17 production. We'll take the action we need to remove
18 power, remove the units from line. When it's clear
19 cut and non-questionable, those actions have always
20 been taken.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The way you're
22 indicating, it's rather simple. It's a quick
23 decision.

24  Right.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's clear and it's

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 done. But there's a greyer area --
2 ~~_____~~ It's that grey area.
3 Sometimes it's where we'll take the extra time to
4 come up with more data or more reflection before we
5 take the unit offline until the point where it
6 becomes clear cut. As soon as it's clear cut, it
7 goes. But it's almost as if, well if we can delay
8 it by six hours, we'll delay it six hours, then
9 we'll take it down.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: From what you've been
11 telling us, this incident with the BF-19, that valve
12 problem, this is the one that made you uncomfortable
13 and you pushed this from your shift manager to the
14 ~~_____~~ and now you're saying
15 ~~_____~~ came and talked to you about it to
16 review the report. Is there any other incident like
17 that that gave you that level of discomfort in terms
18 of how far it was pushed?

19 ~~_____~~ No, I'd say this was the
20 hardest push I've had. They've never directly
21 pushed down on the operating floor, don't take
22 action that you know needs to be taken. In this
23 case it seemed like the whole shutdown took longer
24 than ever. Like I said, the ROs on shift, part of
25 us were on the back, on the human side. We said

1 we're glad we're not moving the plant physically
2 right now. It was late in the shift. We'd already
3 been stressed stabilizing the plant, and we believed
4 the new coming crew needed to be trained on this
5 abnormal shutdown. If it was a condition that even
6 licensed training really didn't cover.

7 They've learned some if they have to do
8 it. In fact they've talked about they're going to
9 give training like this in a simulated (inaudible).
10 Because it could easily happen again, and it was not
11 the norm.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You also said, and
13 this was off the record, which is why I started back
14 in on this before you got back in the room, Scott.
15 The mega-watt mentality, you indicated to me that it
16 wasn't always there.

17 [REDACTED] No, it wasn't.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where do you see that
19 shift coming in?

20 [REDACTED]: Hopefully we see it turn
21 around real quick. I got here during the restart
22 effort when the entire utility was being scrutinized
23 heavily because of prior practices and lack of
24 maintenance and everything else. They were in a
25 forced shutdown. At that point [REDACTED]

1 (phonetic) was our [REDACTED] He was very clear
2 cut on his expectations. He was like the anti-mega-
3 watt mentality. He was like if I can't do it,
4 everything correctly, by the law, without any
5 question or hesitation, he goes, I won't start the
6 units up.

7 There were several instances here in the
8 restart efforts initially bringing the units up
9 where he ordered the plant shut down because he
10 didn't feel comfortable and he had questions. We
11 got the units up and running. He went from ops
12 manager to plant manager to where he left.

13 People that started progressing through
14 it, we went through several ops managers. Some of
15 that, I think a lot of it is the way that they've
16 selected some of the management here. The last
17 three ops managers we've had were not from within
18 the organization. I know a lot of utilities bring
19 people from other organizations in, but we have a
20 lot of instant SROs in our senior reactor positions.
21 In fact, there's only about six of them that have
22 been at the island longer than I have. I don't know
23 how many SROs we've licensed, but there are six or
24 eight of them that are still active licenses.

25 It's human nature if something is going

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 awry, they'll turn around and they'll lean more
2 heavily on the people who have been there longer.
3 One' of those guys being [REDACTED] When I got
4 here he was a [REDACTED] He became
5 a [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]
7 I've noticed more since time's gone on he
8 leans more towards -- I'm not saying production over
9 safety -- but he leans more towards the production
10 side.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Mega-watt mentality.

12 [REDACTED]: Mega-watt mentality.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's down from --

14 [REDACTED]: Right.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In that you don't
16 take the unit offline unless that's what you have to
17 do.

18 [REDACTED] Unless we really need to do
19 it, we don't want to take the unit offline. That
20 falls into play. He was [REDACTED]. He
21 came in that night. He was involved the very next
22 day when they were still in their trouble-shooting
23 development phase trying to get data and how the
24 valve really worked, how the interfaces worked.

25 I talked to [REDACTED] (phonetic). He was

1 a. [REDACTED] on Unit 2 that day on the shut
2 down unit. He was approached by [REDACTED] to say I want
3 you to reset the feed water interlock so we can
4 stroke this valve. [REDACTED] goes, we're not in a
5 condition to do that. He goes, well do this and
6 that. Reset the interlock. He goes, we can't.
7 We've got to reset and keep closed the reactor trip
8 breakers. I'm not in a condition to do that. I
9 can't do this. He goes, well we did it the other
10 day. He goes, the other day I was a manual SI test
11 in the middle of an involved procedure. He goes,
12 set me up for the conditions for procedure and give
13 me a procedure that says I can do it and I will do
14 it. But right now I'm just not going to attempt to
15 do it so we can trouble shoot on the fly, cowboy,
16 whatever you want to call it, to learn about this
17 valve so you can go across the hall and apply it to
18 a valve that's going to make the unit shut down if
19 you can't make it respond.

20 He goes, unless you give me valid reason,
21 I'm not going to do it. At which point, [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] left the control variable. I think [REDACTED]
23 was in the control room when this happened.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] didn't

1 reset the feed water interlock or anything else so
2 he could stroke the valve.

3 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: What would he have
4 had to do again to do that?

5 [REDACTED] To reset it? He would have
6 had to shut the reactor trip breakers, which if they
7 had the all trip signals clear, at this point in a
8 refueling they would have had to install jumpers to
9 the feed permissive, which they do routinely during
10 an outage. Because he didn't have all trip signals
11 clear in order to reset the reactor, close the
12 reactor trip breakers.

13 The way the feed water interlock works is
14 the reactor trip breakers open, that's half the
15 signal. Then you have to be greater than 553. We
16 can bypass the temperature aspect, which is how we
17 do control cool down. The way it works is you open
18 the reactor trip breakers, the temperature comes
19 down to 553, the feed water interlock shuts the BF-
20 19s and 40s, which prevents you from an overfeed,
21 over cool down condition post trip.


22 Now past that point, now we're in control
23 of the plant. Now we're going to cool down. We can
24 defeat the feed water interlock by pressing
25 (inaudible) which bypasses it and allows us to cool

NEAL R. GROSS


COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 down and go below 553, which is normal for a normal
2 shutdown.

3 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

4  But it's initially a
5 protected feature so you don't over feed causing
6 reactivity. Because you can't stroke the BF-19s and
7 40s with a standard feed water interlock signal
8 line. Plus he'd also had a feed water isolation
9 signal on this point, because he filled several of
10 the steam generators to wet lay up, which is greater
11 than 67 percent.

12 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

13  That circuitry is the same
14 circuitry that the safety injection signal comes in
15 through, so there's more interlocks and it gets real
16 complicated. It starts logics and permissives to
17 reset it to the point where  actually said look,
18 we don't need all these logics. Put me a procedure
19 where we can start bypassing or defeating them and I
20 can do it, but I'm not doing it on the fly.

21 That's where I get into what I perceive as
22 a mega-watt mentality. This unit's down. You can't
23 do anything by doing it. But we have to define data
24 and make this valve do what we want over here. We
25 can go across the hall and do it over there. The

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 reactor operator on that date said I'm not doing it.
2 Tell me a procedure I can do and I'll do, but
3 otherwise I'm not doing it.

4 He goes at that point  acted like he
5 was mad and left the control area. That's where
6 there's restrain comes through. Like I said,
7 there's been a few other instances where maintenance
8 technicians one they were repacking a port valve and
9 one of the last couple of outages we had --

10 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Could we back up to
11 that a minute.

12  Yes.

13 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Every time I hear a
14 story about putting the plant in an unusual
15 condition, I always go back and I think about 10C
16 part 5059 (inaudible) changes custody experiments.
17 I can't help but think every time I hear that it
18 just sounds like an experiment. It's like I want to
19 move the plant and put it in -- I want to try some
20 things out. In this case on a nuclear shutdown, so
21 I can learn information that I can apply to a unit
22 that's operating.

23  Right.

24 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Which you can do as
25 long as it doesn't --

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

^{TK}
[REDACTED]

You're right, with a trouble shooter.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: -- right, as long as it doesn't involve a change of tech-specs and as long as it doesn't involve around a safety question.

^{TK}
[REDACTED]

Right.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: But then what happens is it has the same controls as modification, so you have to write up all this real thorough modification type review work and you have to take -

^{TK}
[REDACTED]

Right.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: -- and you have to review it. You have to look at all the bad things that can happen.

^{TK}
[REDACTED]

Right. That's what pretty

^{TK} much [REDACTED] said. He goes, show me a procedure that let's me do, I can do it. He goes, but I'm not doing it on the fly.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: What I find kind of surprising, I guess, about this is that if the [REDACTED] would be willing to do this without controls, if you were, without any kind of - because really in effect this is a big set of administrative controls that was imposed.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

[REDACTED]

For a reason.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Exactly.

[REDACTED]

It's so that people don't do dangerous things.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Don't do things that are potentially unsafe. They may not -- they may turn out to be perfectly, but you may not know it until -- as you pointed out --

[REDACTED]

If you don't analyze it, you've got to treat it as unsafe until you prove it safe.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Right.

[REDACTED]

7c
[REDACTED]

That's pretty much what the [REDACTED] told him. I'm not doing it until either you one give me a procedure that allows me to do it right now, or I'm not going to do it. He goes, because I'm just not going to start pushing buttons for you so you can operate this valve and take it next door to try to prove that valve works so we don't have to shut the unit down.

SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Were there any repercussions to that individual that you're aware of?

[REDACTED]

Not that I'm aware of, no.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So [REDACTED] just went

1 away mad?

2 [REDACTED] He acted like he was made
3 and left, but as far as any rebuttals or anything, I
4 haven't seen any.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Has that happened
6 before, had [REDACTED] behaved in that way before,
7 given that kind of directive?

8 [REDACTED] I haven't personally seen
9 him do it in the control room. I have seen him give
10 -- I won't say a directive to do any violations. I
11 have seen rebuttals from him toward other equipment
12 operators in the past during outages. Not does it
13 just come from [REDACTED] to a given individual. There
14 are a couple of individuals that are having personal
15 conflicts between them.

16 One of them is one of [REDACTED] who
17 actually got [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] It's
18 evolved to where it's like a head-butting match
19 between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who is one of
20 our [REDACTED] to the point where he was
21 coming in for a union meeting one day because there
22 were a lot of grievances that weren't being handled.
23 They were being sat on and not resolved. [REDACTED] was
24 coming in on one of his days off to settle these.

25 He goes, look you say you're too busy.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 This day you're here. I'm coming in on my day off
2 to resolve these issues for the union. Well when he
3 ordered out to our processing center, the people he
4 was supposed to meet out there weren't there. He
5 called [REDACTED] which is the [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED]

7 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: The processing
8 center right here?

9 [REDACTED] Right out here.

10 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Is it a processing
11 or training center?

12 [REDACTED]: Processing center
13 initially.

14 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

15 [REDACTED]: He comes out to the
16 processing center, he goes, where are they? They're
17 not here. They're like, well he changed it; they're
18 out at the training center now. They said but you
19 need to go to FFD. He goes, technically I'm not
20 even at work and I'm not on the clock. They said,
21 well you've got to do FFD.

22 Well, he talked to -- I think it was, I
23 might get my time frames mixed up -- I think it was
24 [REDACTED] the store [REDACTED] then. It might have
25 been [REDACTED] but it was right about the turnover

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 time. He went out to the meeting. They said, well
2 you've got to go do FFD. He talked to them -- and
3 this is all third party, he said, [REDACTED] said --
4 supposedly, I think it was [REDACTED] said he was going
5 to take care of that he didn't need to do FFD.

6 So they got done with the union meeting.
7 He wasn't on the clock or anything. He went home.
8 Then he got called at home by [REDACTED] (phonetic)
9 who was one of the [REDACTED] at the time. He goes, hey,
10 you've been called for FFD. You'd better get back
11 in here.

12 So he drove from [REDACTED] all the way back
13 to the island to give a urinalysis sample and went
14 home. Then it got twisted then -- I'm not sure, I
15 think it was [REDACTED] but I don't know for a fact. I
16 wasn't involved in it. I know it was legal issues
17 and it was all kind of hushed.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You think it was [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] 7C
20 [REDACTED] 7C I believe it was. He said,
21 how do we know he didn't go take something at home
22 to mask a urine sample. He refused to give a sample
23 when we told him to. He went home. He came back
24 in. He said, I drove an hour back into work to get
25 it when you said I had to do it. And it went back

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 and forth, and eventually they [REDACTED] initially
2 for failure to comply with FFD. [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED]
4 Since then now it's almost like a cat and
5 dog. I'm not saying it's not instigated on both
6 halves sometimes. It's almost like, hey, I can get
7 kid brother over there and get him mad if I do this.
8 But it seems like some of the shop stewards when
9 they brought up issues and concerns and tried to
10 bring things up, sometimes they get retaliated.

11 I'm sure [REDACTED] (phonetic) talked
12 to you about the last refueling outage when he
13 brought up concerns. He was essentially called a
14 road block in production. He goes, I'm following
15 the rules you're telling me. This is what it says.
16 Don't yell at me for doing it.

17 There's an instance where they filled oil
18 in an RCP. They hadn't had any alarms. Engineering
19 was all in. They reset the fuel mark. They were up
20 at NOPNOT getting ready to start. They said [REDACTED]
21 we want you to go back up to the RCP stand and pull
22 PCs just to check the oil level one more time.
23 There were six people up there the night before, but
24 it was kind of well, you've been a road block.
25 We've got this other job. We're going to make you

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 go do this one.


2 He brought it up as a (inaudible) concern
3 and all that. I'm sure he talked to you definitely
4 about that yesterday.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: These are the kinds
6 of things that happened to the stewards and the
7 people who have issues?

8  Right. Yes, sometimes
9 they're given -- of all the work that gets done,
10 they're given sometimes physical labor, sometimes in
11 like undesirable locations, more time in containment
12 as a result of it.

13 I know people spend time in containment.
14 The first year I was licensed, I spent the entire
15 outages seemed like in containment instead of the
16 control room. But when they get rotated around, it
17 seemed like they were on the end getting more of the
18 less desirable end of the job.

19 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: There's another way
20 to look at that, and I'm not saying that this is
21 what happened, but if the containment job is an
22 important job and these people are senior, part of
23 the reason that they may be sent in there is because
24 --

25  To make sure it's done

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 right.

2 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: -- their knowledge.
3 They may not feel that way.

4  Right.

5 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: They may feel like
6 they're being put upon or what have you, but there
7 may be other motives.

8  Right. I understand that,
9 too. Like I said, some guy goes well you're a
10 licensed guy, you spent more time in the can. But
11 I've done a lot of containment time during outages.
12 Being licensed, (inaudible) with that outage I look
13 at it from a different aspect. I learned a lot,
14 because I saw them doing the 10-year inspection in
15 the vessels. That's stuff you don't normally see.

16 I looked at it different. I found a lot
17 of stuff. I brought up questions and concerns.
18 They were all rectified the way they should have
19 been.

20 But to get back to maybe why the INC guys
21 were hesitant to say it is the valve and not the
22 controller, after this one guy did what he felt was
23 a good job, and called a unit trip, he was chastised
24 pretty heavily for it. That was 
25 (phonetic).

1 We had -- I'm not sure of the details on
2 it -- we had a couple of maintenance mechanics that
3 were reassembling a port valve. He missed a sign
4 off step where they didn't install a bushing
5 correctly. No one caught it. Even the QA monitor
6 didn't catch it until they started bringing the unit
7 back up in pressure and it got to about 350 pounds
8 and the core popped about a quarter inch.

9 That instigated a short term (inaudible)
10 until they shut the block valve. They went back in
11 and found out there were pieces of valves missing
12 out of the -- and initially they were going to fire
13 those two mechanics. Now the general consensus of a
14 few of us is like wait a minute, if I do something
15 now that causes an adverse reaction, and it was not
16 an intentional mistake or fault that I did, there's
17 a good chance that I'm going to get fired now.

18 Being in the control room, I can see the
19 shift of response for several maintenance guys and a
20 couple of our shift technicians where it used to, if
21 we had a fan cool unit (inaudible) and we need to
22 get it blown down, we'd call down to the INC shop,
23 hey could you go blow down this fan cool transmitter
24 for me? Sure, not a problem.

25 Nope, not now. I need a notification for

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 it. It was almost to the other extreme to where
 2 we're not going to do anything unless everything's
 3 covered under paperwork and my bosses tell me to do
 4 it, because if I go out there and I do something
 5 wrong and it breaks and it causes a shutdown, now
 6 I'm out there hanging.

7 I'd hate to be the INC guy that just
 8 brought the unit down. From what they've seen from
 9 their peers, now it's the valve and when they shut
 10 it down and go pull the controller off to find out
 11 there was a short. (inaudible) system telling this
 12 valve to stay open. There was physically nothing
 13 wrong with the valve. He's probably feeling the
 14 pressure.

15 Essentially I told them they needed to
 16 bring it off because it wasn't a control issue. Now
 17 it was. There'd be some, he would feel the
 18 retaliation. Hey, this guy just took a voltage
 19 reading and tripped the unit. What are they going
 20 to do to me when I told him to shut it down and I
 21 wasn't justified.

22 So I think that's where some of that came
 23 from, that there was enough hesitation in ~~that~~^{7c} that
 24 it justified it could be a controller issue, so we
 25 don't have to shut down now to prove it's the valve.

1 That's where the long delay comes in. That's where
2 my concern comes from is if it gets to -- it's not
3 the production over safety yet, but there's going to
4 be a point where I'm sure it's going to come to that
5 point.

6 I hope it doesn't come to that, but we've
7 got new guys coming into the control room all the
8 time. Not all of them are as head strong as I am to
9 some degree. I won't have any problem tripping
10 unit, because I make the same amount of money
11 whether it's online or off. It's easier when it's
12 online, but I don't care.

13 I mean I care about operating it
14 correctly, but mega-watts going out is back minded
15 doing the job the right way. But there are some
16 more timid guys in there that, and it's human nature
17 if someone has been there longer than them and is in
18 an authority position, says do this, do this, do
19 this, don't do that, do this, they may not
20 necessarily take the right actions right off the bat
21 and one day might jeopardize safety or nuclear
22 safety or something along that line.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It seems what you're
24 saying is it's not that you've seen it -- you
25 haven't seen it get there yet. I'm wondering, and

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 it seems clear, you raise concerns whenever you feel
2 like you need to raise a concern. I guess the
3 question for you would be is there ever a time when
4 you didn't feel you could raise a concern?

5 [REDACTED] Not yet.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You haven't been
7 there yet.

8 [REDACTED] I haven't been there yet,
9 no.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about these
11 individuals -- you finish your answer.

12 [REDACTED]: But I'm sure there are more
13 timid people that are probably scared to come up to
14 the person. There's some people, I think, that if
15 they ever saw the same issues that I was and were in
16 the control room with me, they might more go through
17 employee concerns, might try to go the more
18 anonymous route, which isn't necessarily a bad thing
19 either. But that isn't necessarily the most direct
20 route in my case.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You directly went to

22 --

23 [REDACTED] I went to the shift manager
24 when I came back in. I said, hey I think we should
25 have shut down.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- and your [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED] You can't tell me, okay,
4 I'm going to go see [REDACTED] on Monday. I was
5 waiting, I was actually in the wait mode to see what
6 [REDACTED] was going to say. Actually I was kind of
7 waiting to see when Dan Orr came back to the control
8 room I was going to ask him what he thought. I
9 actually saw him this afternoon when he came
10 through. I said, hey. He goes, it's a little
11 slower in here today. I said, a lot slower. I
12 said, what was your gut feeling the other night? He
13 pretty much said exactly what I said, which is
14 exactly what [REDACTED] (phonetic) said. I
15 said, okay we're all communicating. We all pretty
16 much said the same thing.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Took too long.

18 [REDACTED] It took too long. Then
19 [REDACTED] came back. He goes, look we're going
20 to try to figure out what we can do to make it
21 faster. But I don't want it to, the trend I'm
22 seeing where it seems like if it's a data gathering
23 it takes longer and longer. Everyone right after
24 restart when we were still under very, very tight
25 scrutiny on every move that was made, it was almost

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 to the fact we were like, wow, why are we taking
2 this extreme this quick. It seems like we could
3 wait a half-hour and get more data before we took
4 the action. Right after restart it's do it, and
5 then we'll justify our actions later, or we'll just
6 restart and recover later on if it wasn't needed.

7 Now I don't know if it's just because
8 they've got different people in charge, it's a more
9 competitive environment now as far as utilities in
10 general go, but it seems like the initial we're
11 going to chop it and then recover it before we chop
12 it. Now we're going to sit back and look and see
13 which way we want the tree to fall before we do it.

14 It's not production over safety yet, but
15 it's a trend I'm seeing that's headed -- I'm not
16 going to say it's going to be there next week or in
17 six months from now, but at the rate we're going,
18 I'm scared it's going to get there. I'm looking at
19 longevity if I stay at this utility, but I don't
20 want it to be 10 years in the control room thinking
21 I've got eight more to go before I can retire now
22 because of the actions going this direction now
23 we've been shut down again and they're not going to
24 pay the money to restart the units. Now I'm
25 ~~old~~ old and trying to find a new job again.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 That's kind of where I'm going at this.
2 Right now, I don't think anything's really been done
3 that's been unsafe, but I don't like the trend that
4 I'm seeing.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in terms
6 of the individuals that you say get this -- from
7 your point of view -- you've seen them get the less
8 desirable jobs, mostly stewards you identified.

9 [REDACTED] Yes.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you see a
11 declination in them to not raise concerns? Do you
12 see a hesitancy where any of that has had an adverse
13 affect on them raising concerns of any nature?

14 [REDACTED]: Of those two I'm going to
15 say no.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're talking about
17 two individuals.

18 [REDACTED]: The two individuals that
19 I've really seen it performed to.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] and

21 [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED] Because they say what they want to say, too,
24 which is good as far as I'm concerned. A lot of
25 times they're not politically correct in what they

1 say and almost -- in some aspects -- it's almost
2 like an egging on. But I can say every time that
3 [REDACTED] brought up issues where he's been called a
4 road block, you can go over to the book and he'll
5 show you in the book where it says he has to do it.
6 It's not that he's just twisting screws. He says
7 you're telling me to follow the rules and
8 guidelines, well here's your rules. Now you're
9 telling me not to do it because last week that was
10 the buzz word or the target of focus but this week
11 you want this job to be done. But this rule says
12 I've got to do this, this and this instead of this
13 and only that.

14 When it gets into sometimes time
15 constraints, it's almost as if we want you to follow
16 all the rules, but if it's in a hurry, you can cut
17 this rule and that corner and get it done. But next
18 week again we want you to do it all in order again.
19 He's like, no, I'm not doing that. That's where, in
20 [REDACTED] case, a lot of times he's called a road
21 block, because he says, you said follow the rules,
22 here's the rules. Either change it, or I'm going to
23 do it this way. If you don't like it, change it.

24 He's very meticulous. He holds the rules
25 up. I have to give him that credit. I like the way

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 some people have looked at him as being childlike.
2 I can't call him that, because if he's not doing it
3 exactly right, they're also watching him. When he
4 steps out of bounds, you're going to hammer him. So
5 he walks a real tight line.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He's learned to stay
7 right on that line.

8  He walks that tight line.
9 As a result of it he's been -- I'm not going to say
10 discriminated against, but he's gotten some
11 harassment.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: (inaudible)

13 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: No. I just -- you
14 probably covered this before. Is there any other
15 circumstance, even though you may not be aware of
16 first hand, like first hand experience, but you've
17 heard others talk about that -- you've alluded to
18 the fact that there may be other folks that won't
19 bring their issues forward, that are a little bit
20 more timid. (inaudible) that would say I had an
21 issue with this or that but I'm not sure what to do
22 with it, you know, where they felt uncomfortable
23 raising it to their supervisor?

24  I haven't really seen it in
25 the control room. Actually I haven't really seen it

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 in the field. Normally it's a pretty good work --
2 as far as all the operators, they work together.
3 It's always been where most of the guys, and it's a
4 good thing, where somebody has a question about
5 something, hey am I looking at this from a different
6 angle or am I completely out of line? We're human;
7 we don't want to start a spiral and fighting and
8 arguing if it's not justified.

9 Most of the people say, yes or no. In
10 some cases there are some people who say, don't
11 worry, it's taken care of. They'll bring it up for
12 the person that would be scared to bring it up. Now
13 they do enforce, and they always put out the
14 employees' concerns. They do openly, if you do have
15 a concern and you're scared to bring it up, take it
16 to employees' concerns and --

17 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay. Those are
18 all good things. But I guess what I'm asking is
19 there anything specifically that you're aware of? I
20 mean you kind of talked in generalities --

21  No, nothing specific.

22 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where somebody might
24 be, as you said too timid, but you also said that
25 they may not take your direct approach where you go

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 and see the office manager. They might use some
2 other process --

3  Right.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- for raising a
5 concern.

6  Right. They've got them.

7 There's all the different concerns. One may not
8 talk to the guy on his shift, but he may mention it
9 when he goes to another shift. They've always got
10 the employees' concerns. You've got the
11 notification process. A lot of people write
12 notifications and just sit back and see what happens
13 as a result of it.

14 They do, if it's a legitimate concern, a
15 lot of times they will come out of your night orders
16 and mid-shift training and say this has been brought
17 to our attention, this safety concern has been
18 brought up, and either validate it, sustain it, or
19 expand off of it to where it should alleviate the
20 concern.

21 I haven't seen anybody like this is really
22 burning me up but I'm scared to tell anybody. I
23 haven't seen it get to that point yet. I'm not
24 saying it's headed that way either, because I think
25 there's a wide enough disparity that most people

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

will bring up concerns. I hope it doesn't get to that point.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, it's 8:50.

[OFF THE RECORD]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on the record after about a minute. The point I wanted to make in terms of your raising concerns, it's clear that you don't hesitate to raise concerns. But having done that over a long period of time. You said before, I think off the record, that you got into this mind set in high school, but you must have been operating this way since you got here on site. Have you ever felt or suffered any adverse actions as a result of you questioning what was going on or raising any concerns?



No, I've never been adversely affected by it. I've not always been looked upon fondly for the way I bring things out. Sometimes I'm blunt, and there have been times I've brought up concerns that, as I've found out really weren't valid concerns (inaudible) people for the puzzle, which is how I brought this whole concern up is am I missing something? The questions I had before I even brought the concern up were I'd seen what had been brought up with some other people --

1 not actually repercussions but necessarily more
2 favorable jobs than anything.

3 Being in my position, it gets to a very
4 suggestive evaluation period, especially when it
5 comes to simulator performances and stuff like that.
6 I was going to make sure that everything I was doing
7 was correctly done and documented, because I didn't
8 want to get to a point to where I made too many
9 people mad on bringing this out in case it comes out
10 that someone was willfully trying to do something
11 that they shouldn't have been, that it couldn't come
12 out like a simulator performance appraisal --

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're talking about
14 this latest, the BF-19 incident?

15  Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You kind of carefully
17 --

18  I carefully navigated it --

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- researched your
20 fears and made sure --

21  -- researched it because as
22 licensing goes simulator performance is very
23 subjective. They could take the best operator on
24 any given day and make him look like an idiot, or
25 they could take the worst operator and by

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 subjectiveness make him look like he walks on water.

2 I was going to make sure that I didn't
3 blatantly cross boundaries and be in the wrong by
4 doing it to where it possibly could come back to
5 over settle the training process or whatever to
6 where they can tell you matters that do great in
7 trend, now we don't need this guy in the control
8 room any more.

9 I didn't want that to happen, which is why
10 I went to [REDACTED] first. There was actually another
11 operator who mentioned that he knew the process
12 based on past experiences and everything as far as
13 to make sure the different process I had for
14 bringing up concerns, documenting it. In fact, I'd
15 even looked at, he had provided me the direct
16 approach to the NRC for bringing up an employee
17 concern. He goes, this is what they say, but if you
18 read it they've got this format. He goes, I brought
19 one up and his happened to be, by the luck of the
20 draw, I hit all the normal protocol that they had.

21 I said all right, I'll give it a shot.
22 That's when I directly approached the [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]
24 I'd wait and see how it responded out of there, then
25 I would actually approach down the chain from [REDACTED]

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 [REDACTED] He wanted to know what my concerns were.

2 I'd say with both of those there was no
3 animosity, no anger, no repercussions. It seemed
4 like they looked like they were actually open to the
5 input, which I appreciated because the last thing I
6 wanted to do was sit with the plant manager thinking
7 now I'm out to get this guy. I got no feeling with
8 that. When I discussed it, I said this is why I see
9 it. I laid the facts on the table. I said if I'm
10 mistaken, tell me right now and we'll either nullify
11 my concern or we'll work off of it.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's where he
13 offered the report?

14 [REDACTED] That's where he offered me
15 the report. So I feel right now -- I'll have to see
16 what the reports say -- but right now I think it was
17 handled the way it should have been handled. I
18 haven't had any ill repercussions off of it as of
19 yet.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Another point,
21 we were talking about where you saw some of the
22 changes, the mega-watt mentality or the push to the
23 non-conservative and let it go as long as you can
24 before we make that shut down decision. You talked
25 about that coming from [REDACTED] but you also

1 mentioned that [REDACTED] (inaudible) exhibited
2 with him, too.

3 [REDACTED] Right. He seems like he's
4 really production oriented. It's gotten him in
5 trouble in the past. He's always in charge of
6 outages coming up. A lot of times he'll come
7 through and implement on the spot changes to
8 procedures, sometimes changes. Not necessarily is
9 it always a bad thing, but it seems like a lot of
10 times where I've gone into an outage and change the
11 way we do our IOPs as far as coordination and in
12 some cases even the ROs have pushed back and said
13 no, let's not do this right now because you've got
14 too many spoons in the pot at this point. At this
15 point in the shutdown, let's reorganize. Sometimes
16 it seems like he tries to get too much going too
17 fast.

18 I've seen it before on a plant cool down
19 right after I got licensed. It was my first plant
20 cool down for real. We were limited to a hundred
21 degrees an hour while I was cooling down at 86
22 degrees an hour, which to me was as fast as I wanted
23 to go. He was like, you're limited to a hundred;
24 why aren't we doing a hundred?

25 Because I don't feel comfortable going

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 faster. Another one of the reactor operators said
2 we're fine where we're at. Just take your time.
3 You've got it under control. Don't speed it up. It
4 was going to save us maybe 30 minutes by going
5 faster. He goes, don't worry about it; keep it
6 slow.

7 That's where I say he gets almost like the
8 mega-watt mentality. He wants to see it. He looks
9 at the entire picture. In his mind it's almost like
10 he sets up for the most senior, most experienced guy
11 to do it and he wants everybody else to race to keep
12 up with this guy. Sometimes -- I'm not saying he
13 forces people to do stuff -- but it's like he pushes
14 to try to encourage them to go faster sometimes when
15 I don't like that a lot times, especially if it's
16 newer people.

17 There are a lot of things I haven't done.
18 I don't like being rushed if it's my first time
19 doing it.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about the
21 incident that you threw out regarding [REDACTED]
22 and his questioning (inaudible) [REDACTED] the
23 conversation that they had regarding the
24 instructions in looking to apply one unit test to
25 another unit to see if maybe he could make the valve

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 function, get around it in some way.

2 [REDACTED] Right.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything questionable
4 like that when -- do you see the same thing coming
5 from [REDACTED] Or is it just in what you
6 described as general pushing? He's pushing you to
7 your limit.

8 [REDACTED] It's the general push
9 sometimes. Sometimes he'll ask if -- I haven't seen
10 [REDACTED] come and say I want you to do this, this and
11 this, but then he goes, hey while we're doing this,
12 is it possible that you can do this, this, or this?
13 He's not trying to say you can do it, but he asks a
14 lot of questions off-handedly to try to say, yes, I
15 think we should do that [REDACTED]. If you're not
16 opposed against it and you don't say no, we don't
17 need to do that, a lot times the next time you'll
18 see the procedure where that's put into it. Where
19 it's almost like an unofficial bye. And I've seen
20 it in the past where he'll go in and he'll ask one
21 or two people and a policy will change or a
22 procedure will change. We'll say where did this
23 come from? He'll say, well I talked to a lot of the
24 operators. When? Come to find out he might have
25 asked one guy and he may not have felt uncomfortable

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 doing because he's being on the boards for 20 years
2 doing it, while the majority of the other guys
3 wouldn't have felt comfortable doing that.

4 Or when he answered the question, he may
5 have been answering it for the specific condition
6 they were in and not the normal shutdown condition
7 or 600 pounds lower in pressure than where we were
8 at.

9 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Is there anything
10 that's like that still in procedures where a
11 procedure changes (inaudible) implemented but
12 they're not quite right?

13 [REDACTED] No, it's more --

14 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: -- of that nature?

15 [REDACTED]: Not that I can personally
16 remember. We're pretty, that is one thing we're
17 very strong about right now is procedural usage. If
18 you can't -- and I don't know of a single person
19 that's (inaudible) right, we're not doing it, just
20 stop what you're doing. Put it in the same
21 condition either on the spot or send a procedure
22 change out to SORC and get it fixed.

23 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: That's if it's --

24 [REDACTED] In effect.

25 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Yes and it's easy

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 to recognize.

2 : Right.

3 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: There may be
4 something like what you described earlier on this
5 subject where it says cool down for a maximum rate
6 of 100 degrees per hour. You could write down the
7 procedure, and it's allowed by the tech-specs, but
8 the implication is you don't exceed it, but you cool
9 down at that rate.

10 : Right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: But that'
12 subjective. So if you're not cooling down at that
13 rate, you're not, quote, complying with the
14 procedure. Depending on the wording. The way you
15 describe what he was doing sounded like that where
16 there was latitude in procedure and he was
17 maximizing it for the sake of production.

18 : Well a lot of the
19 procedures are like that then. A lot of the cool
20 down and IOP procedures we have actually have the
21 tech-spec limit in it.

22 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Does it say do not
23 exceed this, or does it say maximize --

24 : It'll say cool down not to
25 exceed 100 degrees an hour. I'm not saying that a

1 lot of people get pushed to hit a hundred degrees an
2 hour, but in my case I was cooling down at 86
3 degrees an hour, which for my first cool down, that
4 was as fast as I wanted to go. He was like, you
5 know, you can do a hundred. I'm doing 86.

6 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: That's probably
7 best.

8 [REDACTED]: That's plenty fast. That's
9 the way a lot of them are written, but then there
10 are some people who aren't as outspoken. Okay, I
11 can tweak it a little bit more and maybe I'm doing
12 95 now. But if you're not careful you'll lose it
13 and you'll lose control. You're going to have to
14 back back down and get it back under control anyway.

15 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Or you could exceed
16 the tech-spec and have to write a report.

17 [REDACTED]: Or you have to exceed the
18 tech-spec, which is why --

19 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: -- initial
20 evaluation.

21 [REDACTED]: I'm a firm believer in,
22 when it comes to those limits, I put a buffer and I
23 don't like going near them, because one small
24 derivation and you're there. It's happened in the
25 past, so I don't push limits like that normally.

1 But most of the procedures that we have actually
2 have the tech-spec limits in them without a written
3 buffer.

4 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: Okay.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything else?

6 SPECIAL AGENT BARBER: No, I don't have
7 anything.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything
9 else you'd like to add?

10 [REDACTED] ^{TC} No, I think that's it.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have I or any other
12 NRC representative offered you any promises or
13 threatened you in any manner in exchange for today's
14 information?

15 [REDACTED] ^{TC} No.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you appear here
17 freely and voluntarily?

18 [REDACTED] ^{TC} Yes, I have.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I thank you for your
20 time. It is approximately 9:05 p.m. Thank and
21 we'll close the interview.

22 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of



Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Hope Creek Nuclear Power
Station

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Suzanne Riggs'.

Suzanne Riggs
Official Transcriber
Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.

NEAL R. GROSS
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701