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Official Transcript of Proceedings

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

X Interview of [REDACTED] TC

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Wilmington, Delaware

Date: Thursday, June 24, 2004

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Pages 1-54

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW

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IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.1-2003-051F



(Closed) :
7C

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Thursday,

June 24, 2004

1300 N. Market Street

Suite 400

Wilmington, Delaware

The above-entitled interview was
conducted.

BEFORE:

DAVID J. VITO, Senior Allegations Coordinator

JEFFREY TEATOR, Senior Special Agent

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APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Interviewee:

MICHAEL T. BISSINGER, ESQ.

of: Pitney Harden LLP

P.O. Box 1945

Morristown, New Jersey 07962-1945

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

5:24 p.m.

1
2
3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: 5:24 p.m., and now
4 we're going to begin the second interview. This
5 interview of [REDACTED] the NRC has been conducting a
6 review and assessment of the safety conscious work
7 environment down at Salem/Hope Creek. You are
8 considered a witness in this investigation. There is
9 no NRC regulation regarding the safety conscious work
10 environment, but we have been conducting a review and
11 an assessment in that area down the plants, and you're
12 just considered a witness in this area. Although, you
13 know, I reminded you you are still are under oath. Do
14 you understand that?

15 [REDACTED] Yes, I do.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And, again,
17 you're just considered a witness in this
18 investigation.

19 Dave, you want to read off and then I'll
20 jump in.

21 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Okay. It's just
22 for background.

23 Allegations, not just [REDACTED]
24 allegations, but other allegations as well as
25 inspections that is also for the past couple of years

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1 are the reason that we initiated the review.

2 Okay. You're probably aware, [REDACTED] that
3 we've had issues in the PI&R area, the problem
4 identification and resolution area --

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: -- at Salem and
7 Hope Creek. And I'm an allegation coordination, so
8 I'm not incredibly versed in the new reactor oversight
9 process, but PI&R is considered a cross cutting issue.
10 It's an area that effects all areas of the plant. It
11 relates to finding, identifying problems, getting them
12 into a process that can correct those problems and
13 taking action to make sure that they don't occur again
14 to the best of your ability.

15 We've had issues in that area, and you're
16 aware of a lot of those issues.

17 We got to a point in time where we just
18 felt we needed to do an independent look to see what
19 we could see. And it's pretty different, probably the
20 first time the NRC's done anything like this for
21 proactively, I guess, is the way we would look at it.

22 We initiated the review in the fall of
23 2003. We've interviewed, how many, Jeff? Sixty-five.
24 Somewhere between 65 and 70 people. And about half
25 way through we got to a point where we had seen enough

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1 commentary from our interviews that we felt that we
 2 needed to provide some findings to PSEG. There were
 3 issues that we saw, we didn't want to wait three or
 4 four or five or six more months to finish the review
 5 and then say well then here's this big pile of issues
 6 that we see. We wanted to make sure that the licensee
 7 was aware of those ahead of time.

8 So on January 28th, I don't know whether
 9 you've seen that letter or not, of '04 we wrote a
 10 letter to Public Service giving them preliminary
 11 findings. And I'll read through them briefly.

12 We had concerns as safety conscious work
 13 relates to the handling of emersion equipment issues
 14 and associated operational decision making. We had
 15 concerns about the station's ability to effectively
 16 address potential safety issues.

17 And we know that a lot of these comments
 18 have been documented in inspection reports and
 19 assessments letters, and we noted the substantive
 20 cross-cutting issue and the problem identification in
 21 the solution area.

22 Some of the specifics that our review
 23 brought out were questions about the openness of
 24 management, the concerns and alternative views, the
 25 strength of communications, the effectiveness of the

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1 station's CAP, corrective action program and feedback
2 to that program, work management type thing. And
3 events involving disagreements or different
4 perspectives of operators and senior managers on
5 operating decisions particularly as they might impact
6 on continuing plant operations and outage schedules.
7 And we talked about a couple of those examples earlier
8 today.

9 And questions as to whether management
10 assessed and addressed the negative impacts of some of
11 these disagreement on the people at the station.

12 We wanted to interview you a while ago.
13 We're glad we're getting the opportunity to do it now.
14 You're an integral person in what was going on at the
15 facility over the past few years, so we would like to
16 get your comments, perceptions, your impressions.

17 There were some assertions made about your
18 involvement in that area, and we're going to ask you
19 some questions about that. But I guess just to start
20 off with just a real general question, I wrote down a
21 comment that you said earlier today in a prior
22 interview that related to a different case about when
23 you came on board and you looked at the organization
24 and you saw that changes needed to happen. And I
25 guess I'll ask, I'll start with a real general

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1 question of did any of those changes relate to the
2 work environment broadly and problem identification
3 and how readily folks at the site knew about the
4 corrective action program, how easy it was to use,
5 that kind of thing?

6 If we could just start off with that and
7 then we'll go down into some specific questions from
8 there.

9 [REDACTED] One change with SAP, right,
10 was to automate the corrective action program and link
11 it with the work management system. That really made
12 the corrective action program difficult. We were
13 taking a look at the corrective action program looking
14 at the backlog, looking at the identification of
15 issues, etcetera, that computer would allow people to
16 send notifications back and forth and then close them
17 inappropriately, etcetera. And so that issues could
18 live forever or issues could be closed incorrectly.

19 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: The old process or
20 the SAP, the new process?

21 [REDACTED] The new process. The new SAP
22 process.

23 So we -- I want to say many occasions, but
24 went out and benchmarked our corrective action program
25 to the industry and revised our program according to

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1 the -- in putting more line management reviews of the
2 corrective action documents so that we could improve
3 the process. We wanted to make sure that problems
4 were being identified. When the problem was
5 identified, that the root cause or approximate cause
6 was appropriate and germane to the issue. That was
7 one, you know, one change over the years. One change
8 over the years was to improve the effectiveness of the
9 corrective action program because the computer program
10 really set us back a little bit.

11 Benchmarked it a couple of times. Made
12 the changes. Put the corrective action review board
13 in process -- in place, put other committees in place
14 to improve the program.

15 We also came up with performance
16 indicators to track along the process. At my staff
17 meetings we would look at the performance indicators,
18 age of the corrective action program, number
19 initiated. The average age of the efficiencies
20 identified. That package was put together, it was put
21 together by staff -- excuse me, a lot of
22 reorganization with respect to that. But that package
23 also became a part of the package that biweekly I had
24 a telephone conference call with [REDACTED] video
25 conference. And it was a key indicator in there as to

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1 our -- whether the corrective action program was being
2 effective from this bean count and not from through
3 measurement of effecting some of the closeout of HIL.

4 We implemented leadership academy and
5 taught -- tried to put all the supervisors through the
6 leadership academy. And that process went through
7 change over the time I was there from non-existent to
8 six weeks, cutting back to I guess it's three weeks.

9 What I wanted to do in that program, give
10 them, the supervisors, basic fundamental leadership
11 skills. Ingrain in them the philosophy of safety
12 reliability, cost effectiveness through people. An
13 element of that was problem identification. An
14 element of that was assessment.

15 So I don't if that --

16 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: I understand. I
17 guess I want to ask, we have the benefit of going
18 through a lot of review up to this point in time. We
19 had a meeting with the utility in March to tell them
20 what the results were, as I had mentioned from the
21 letter. And we asked them to come up with a plan to
22 make things better. At that time they had already had
23 Synergy in to do a review, to do a work environment
24 review at the site.

25 There was a group called ISA, which I

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
1 believe it's a -- USA?

2  USA.

3 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: A group of
4 individually owned utilities, and they were going
5 around the country doing assessments of work
6 environment, I take in response to the Davis-Bessie
7 incident. I think that there was an IMPO ER that
8 bought that out. And they also committed to doing
9 their own review. And they hired a bunch of -- some
10 ex-NRC people, a lot of utility executive types. And
11 they brought people in to do an independent review.

12 And out of all of those reviews together,
13 they sort of found that a lot of those things that we
14 mentioned in our letter were happening. And that
15 corrective action program problems were one of the
16 things they validated, you know, still --equipment in
17 bad shape, you know, that stays there forever. People
18 put in condition report or notification after
19 notification after notification. The problems get
20 shuffled to the bottom of the pile and don't get
21 resolved.

22 I guess from your time there were you
23 frustrated? Did you see problems in projects in the
24 PI&R, the corrective action area?

25  Was I frustrated, yes. Did

1 I find the program acceptable, yes. Did I find the
2 program what I wanted it to be, no. The program had
3 deficiencies, right, and in the context using, right.

4 When I got there the backlog of
5 maintenance items was very high. And we placed that
6 indicator and started working off the backlog. At
7 different points in times, different years we put
8 monies aside to particularly solve longstanding
9 equipment problems on things. There was a long
10 backlog. We went after it from the equipment issues.

11 At Salem, the aux building vent vans were
12 always failing, the belts were always failing. We
13 found that we -- you know, [REDACTED] came -- we
14 just don't have the technical expertise to solve any
15 of these problems. So he went out and brought
16 expertise in, you know, consultants, brought them in.
17 And we just started ticking through the major problems
18 that we had, recurring problems.

19 CSCUs was a problem. And it's a
20 complicated system, complicated control system but we
21 were able to make changes to the instrumentation
22 associated with it, and the number came down.

23 One year [REDACTED] authorized us -- you know
24 authorized, not in a sense of piece of paper, but I
25 made him aware that we're going to spend \$30 million

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1 above our budget to improve these equipment issues.
2 And we had identified for him what all the equipment
3 issues were so we get tick them off.

4 It was extremely frustrating to me. We
5 reorganized the engineering department when IMPO would
6 come into the reliability issue as opposed to the
7 maintenance issue so that we could get the engineer
8 closer for the mechanic so we solve the problem.
9 There were issues, you know, communications issues
10 between engineering, operation, maintenance as to our
11 effectiveness and what really was broke, what wasn't
12 broke, what should be fixed first.

13 One year we -- it seems like it was \$5
14 million like eventually we put towards the chemistry
15 system to fix the problems we were having there, due
16 to a lot of little leakages, but it turned out to be
17 there were some major tanks leakage that just had to
18 be fixed.

19 I guess I'm trying to communicate with ten
20 years of service there was still a lot of equipment
21 problems, longstanding equipment problems that had to
22 be fixed. We were working on the most important ones
23 and bringing it down. And it was a dynamic interplay,
24 as you're aware of; the more you fix the more they
25 identify, the more it breaks the less likely they are

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1 to turn in -- as long as it's not, you know, safety
2 related equipment, important equipment, the operators
3 will start to lose your respect, your trust and not
4 turn in as many issues. But to comment that I and the
5 given manager would take a walk through the plant each
6 Friday so I could see for myself what the plants are
7 working on to ensure cleaning them up, right.

8 But I was aware of -- and very frustrated
9 with the continued issues of inability to get to the
10 bottom of the issue and solve. There were some issues
11 that I thought were either: (a) were not solvable or
12 just major undertakings. The grassing incident for
13 example. I just look at that system and say I don't
14 know how I'm going to keep the Delaware River from
15 generating all that grass, I just don't know to do it.
16 But that's like so what, like there's got to be
17 someone out there who knows how to do that. And so,
18 you know, we initiated a project to go do that.

19 The CSCUs, we initiated a project to try
20 and eliminate them, eliminate them and that has
21 something to do with the engineering analysis and make
22 these problems go away. So to make them go away, I
23 built in some redundancies.

24 We would do some surveys, PCP surveys, you
25 know, to make sure if people were still willing to

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1 identify issues. And with that it looked reasonable.

2 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Everything you talk
3 about gets me into another. You talked a ECP, I'll
4 tell you one of the pieces of input we got and it was
5 also brought out by PSEG's subsequent review is that
6 all the elements were there for ECP to work.

7 [REDACTED]: Yes.

8 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: But that a lot of
9 people, a fairly large percentage of the folks on
10 site didn't trust them. And I'll be frank, but the
11 reason that was stated as to why they didn't trust it
12 is because they knew they were tied directly to [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] At least the perception was there that an
14 issue would come in and you would know about it
15 relatively quickly, and that was the reason given by
16 a number of folks as to why they choose not to use
17 ECP.

18 Were you aware of that or what's your
19 comment or reaction --

20 [MR. BISSINGER:] I don't follow exactly
21 what you're saying. An issue would come in that he
22 was aware of and -- 7C

23 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Employee concerns
24 programs are alternative means of raising safety
25 issue.

1 MR. BISSINGER: I'm familiar with the
2 program.

3 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: The standard
4 process is to go through the corrective action
5 program.

6 MR. BISSINGER: Right.

7 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: We don't regulate
8 ECP either. But we're interested in them because they
9 are alternative means to raise issues, and they can be
10 a place where condition adverse to quality is raised.

11 [REDACTED] Sure.

12 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: And we would hope
13 that they're there and functioning and able to gather
14 those issues and then put them into the corrective
15 action process so they can get resolved.

16 [REDACTED]: I wasn't aware that the
17 employees had that concern.

18 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] And I was insulated from it.
20 In other words, I had line managers between me and it.

21 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Okay. But there's
22 a sense of anonymity -- it's more difficult -- it's
23 easier for me to -- someone's anonymity that comes to
24 me, but it's harder for an ECP director because he
25 works at the plant and he knows the person that

1 brought the issue, and it's hard to follow it up.

2 MR. BISSINGER: I'm clear now. You're
3 saying that the program was directly tied to [REDACTED] so
4 they were concerned there was no anonymity?

5 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: That was the
6 perception. And we just wanted to hear [REDACTED], what he
7 thought of it. And, you know, do you remember being
8 tied in on ECP issues that quickly?

9 [REDACTED] Absolutely not. Absolutely
10 not. You know, had I know that was an issue, heck I
11 would have had that thing move off site. I just
12 wasn't aware there was.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did ECP report to
14 you while you were the [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED] No.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who did they report
17 to, do you remember?

18 [REDACTED] When I left they reported to
19 [REDACTED]

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] And I always kept it, you
22 know --

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED] in turn
24 then reported to you, though.

25 [REDACTED]: Yes, he did. Right. But,

1 you know, in the end --

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Everybody reported
3 to you at the site.

4 [REDACTED] Right. But I -- because I
5 used to test with the ECP people, you know, how was it
6 going, you know, do you have adequate resources,
7 etcetera. What's the sense of the troops? And we
8 used to do surveys. And I never got the feedback that
9 you know, people they wouldn't discuss this system
10 because it came to me. That's news.

11 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: I know they did
12 surveys periodically. Did you think the surveys were
13 useful, successful, pertinent? I mean what's your
14 general comment about the ECP surveys?

15 [REDACTED] I mean, I thought they were
16 too general. They hit all the bold dots right, but we
17 were asking the same question year after year or
18 quarter after quarter. And in the end, you know,
19 employee is going to say aahh. So I think with time
20 they lose their usefulness.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The surveys do?

22 [REDACTED] The surveys do. They'd have
23 to change the survey form. TC

24 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Did it seem that
25 way after a while that they were not putting out

1 useful information to you?

2 [REDACTED] The only thing I noted,
3 right, was there wasn't change in it, you know, in the
4 indicators. The one I watched closely was to make
5 sure that the age of the ECP item was working its way
6 down, met its targets, all right. And it did.

7 You know, I had a chance to a cursory
8 review of the -- independent review of the company
9 that -- on the safety conscious work environment and
10 it really struck me that this was a new approach or a
11 different way to do the business. And I just wish I
12 had that knowledge back then so I could improve the
13 system. I wish our people had that knowledge so they
14 could improve the system.

15 I on the one hand was probably lulled to
16 sleep because our manager at the ECP program, or one
17 of the managers at one point in time was highly
18 respected as an ECP manager, knew the programs, go
19 around the industry. So I really believed we had a
20 good program.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is it [REDACTED]?

22 [REDACTED] Yes, it was [REDACTED]

23 So it surprises me.

24 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Were other reviews
25 done of work environment while you were there? I'm

1 asking about IMPO/WANO type reviews. Were there other
2 assessments that were done periodically of that area?

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Work environment.

4 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Work environment,
5 problem identification area?

6 [REDACTED] Have a routine survey, it was
7 an annual survey. It dealt with the Gallup survey.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

9 [REDACTED] I can't -- there were other--
10 the implements we gave to the senior management team
11 to look at the leadership attributes which would, you
12 know, impact the employee's concerns or the work
13 environment, and so we did that, yes.

14 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: We were given
15 information that at least in some context IMPO
16 provides some feedback on the work environment when
17 they do their assessments. Is that true or not true?

18 [REDACTED]: I don't recall them doing
19 that for me.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I got a question.

21 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Go ahead, Jeff.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I mean it's a
23 little bit different area. And I'm going to describe
24 a meeting to you where a number of people have
25 testified that you made a statement, it's the [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED] you don't it meeting." Do you remember that
2 meeting?

3 [REDACTED] No, but I remember making
4 that statement.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What we understand,
6 there was an incident that happened in one of the
7 plants and then you then had a meeting with the
8 licensed operators at the site, SROs and above where
9 you made a statement you don't get it. And from what
10 we've been told the -- well, first, did you recall
11 that?

12 [REDACTED] This was the lightening event
13 of '99 at Hope Creek?

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Yes. Okay.
15 And it's been reported to us that during that meeting
16 you informed the operators that they didn't have the
17 power or authority to bring the unit --

18 [REDACTED] To increase power.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Increase power,
20 right.

21 [REDACTED] Okay. Yes.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you go ahead
23 and share with me?

24 [REDACTED] I was the [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED]

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

2 [REDACTED]: And I was in the control room
3 like at night. I was there with the shift supervisor.
4 And the unit took a lightening strike. And all the
5 indicators came on, they all came on and all the
6 lights down here, one way or another. And, you know,
7 the shift supervisor is standing there wondering are
8 we still on line. So he's focusing on the reactor
9 power level indicator, he's trying to see. And he
10 says, you know, nobody touch anything.

11 So from that event I learned lightening
12 strikes, big problem.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

14 [REDACTED] High stress for the
15 operators.

16 When I was the executive for Entergy my
17 responsibilities for Grand Gulf. Grand Gulf would
18 reasonably get hit with lightening during this time
19 period, fairly reasonable, fairly regularly, and it
20 could end up with a trip, right?

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

22 [REDACTED]: Again, I'm into the impact of
23 lightening strikes. My biggest learning or one of the
24 biggest learnings off of TMI -- I was [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] -- one of my biggest learnings was

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1 you have to have the shift call off site. They have to
2 tell you that there's some transient undergoing at the
3 power plant, that they need the Marines.

4 MR. BISSINGER: When you say "Marines,"
5 just --

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You call that the
7 TARP process --

8 [REDACTED] The TARP process.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- is that where it
10 eventually it evolves into the TARP process?

11 [REDACTED] Eventually it evolves into
12 the TARP process, right. But I mean I had to call off
13 site so someone knew the plant was undergoing a
14 transient, right?

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

16 [REDACTED] And in this situation the
17 phone call went off site. It went to an AOM, right.
18 He took the call. The OM, operation manager of the
19 site, convened to him took the lightening strike, took
20 a look around, I'm ready to increase power because we
21 had even undergone a runback to about 80 percent
22 power. I'm ready to go up.

23 The OM, you know, thought about it; should
24 I go in the plant, shouldn't I go in the plant,
25 elected not to go into the plant. He told me, he

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1 elected not to go in because he had a SORC meeting
2 that morning and if he went now, because it was
3 sometime during the evening, he would be too tired, he
4 could to the SORC meeting.


5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: SORC.

6  SORC, right.

7 So we went up in power and we had violated
8 -- operations because the heat water valve shut and
9 the heat water -- and I was really upset because my
10 expectations were that someone has to go to the
11 control room from off site and see the whites of their
12 eyes. I mean, these people have just undergone a
13 significant transient, what is really happening in
14 that power plant. What's really happening in the
15 power plant, what kind of head are these people in? Is
16 the plant safely shutdown at point and in a stable
17 condition. I mean, that has to occur, the purpose of
18 this phone call.

19 And I found out there was no such process.
20 There was just that phone call and then the receiver
21 of the phone call can elect not to go to the power
22 plant.

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

24 : And an SS could then just
25 increase power level. I'm saying, see, he'd just

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1 undergone this transient. These same guys that are
2 shook up, if you will, take a look around and puff,
3 they miss the light on the control room panel. That
4 can't happen.

5 So I had this meeting, right, to say you
6 don't get it, you know. The plant undergoes a severe
7 transient, right, you can't raise power level again
8 until you know the accurate status of the power plant.
9 Bringing people in, have them walk around and be
10 available to the OS or OM to support whatever needs he
11 has. And so you don't get it.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

13 [REDACTED] Why are you increasing power?
14 There's this comment production over safety.

15 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: We're getting
16 there.

17 [REDACTED] I'm saying why are you
18 increasing power level. I mean, it -- I'd had, you
19 know, a different -- you know, the same topic but a
20 different conversation with Dave Garchow. Dave, when
21 we take the reactor critical, it's a very involved
22 process, detailed procedures, etcetera. That same
23 analogy applies not just taking it critical, but
24 taking the unit up in power. 7

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he disagree

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1 with you on that area that you don't get it issue?
2 Did [REDACTED] disagree with --

3 [REDACTED] No, he did not disagree with
4 me.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

6 [REDACTED]: And from there [REDACTED] started
7 saying, oh yes when I was in [REDACTED] we had things
8 similar to the TARP process. I got it. I know what
9 you want.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: From that meeting
11 that you just described that you had with the licensed
12 operators, did the TARP process evolve out of that?

13 [REDACTED] Yes.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Now, I want
15 to ask you this question, going forward in time did
16 anyone bring to your attention or say to you that this
17 TARP process, the you don't get it message turned
18 around to where the licensed operators, the shift
19 managers felt they didn't have the power themselves to
20 take the plant down in power?

21 [REDACTED] No. No. And like I
22 mentioned to you, my conversations with them, right,
23 when I became [REDACTED] right, my conversations at an all
24 hands meetings, right, my conversations at the senior
25 leadership academy or leadership academy graduation,

1 my conversations to them being licensed operators,
2 right, the day they got the license we hold a dinner,
3 a celebration appreciation, right. And I would
4 deliver the message or [REDACTED] would deliver the message
5 of you've got the license, got to shut the unit down.

6 So, I mean, no.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because at some
8 point the units didn't have a plant manager position,
9 is that correct?

10 [REDACTED]: Each unit, that's correct,
11 yes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. There came
13 a point in time at that artificial island that there
14 was no plant manager for each unit. And what people
15 have told us is that taking that into account and the
16 TARP process becoming a -- I'm going to use my word --
17 a beast of its own, that because there's no plant
18 manager and you had this TARP process, it became a
19 decision by committee type issue on which way the
20 plant is going to go, up or down, not led the shift
21 managers, SROs and even ALNs to feel they -- they
22 didn't have the power to move the plant where they
23 thought it needed to go up or down in power. I'm
24 asking for you --

25 [REDACTED]: I mean, but you can see how

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1 it could evolve to that, right?

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Some people it did,
3 yes.

4 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: That was the
5 feedback that we got.

6 [REDACTED] When we had the TARP process,
7 right, the OSs, the shift managers loved it. Because
8 prior to that they'd have to personally call -- you
9 know, if they needed an engineer, you need a mechanic.
10 They had to make their own phone calls. I'm saying
11 we're here to serve them, right.

12 So what you're feeding back to me is it
13 took a life of its own and we nuclearized it or
14 Salemized it or something and it missed what I had
15 originally set out for it, and I didn't help it out.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Question. You
17 mentioned that at least initially the OSs loved the
18 TARP process, is that correct?

19 [REDACTED] Yes.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At some point,
21 though, the OSs, shift managers were lead to believe
22 that inoperability decision, they were led to believe
23 that they had to then try and prove that something was
24 inoperable before an action could be taken as opposed
25 to -- well, this is what we were told by people and

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1 this is the impression we've gotten in testimony that
2 people at their level were led to believe that
3 something had to be proven inoperable before they
4 could take the plant down. It had to be -- instead of
5 the other way, you have to prove it's operable.
6 That's the industry standard.

7 [REDACTED] Yes.

8 MR. BISSINGER: That's why we wrote the
9 letter.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Could you comment
11 on if you had knowledge that --

12 [REDACTED] I had no knowledge.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- people at that
14 level -- at least some of them felt that's the
15 direction they were being given.

16 [REDACTED] I'm glad you did the reviews.
17 I didn't know that. We put engineers on shift to help
18 the manager. We had, you know engineering problems
19 was there to help the SS do operability
20 determinations, right. But how that got twisted, you
21 know, at least in some of their minds that you've got
22 to prove the equipment is inoperable --

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Actually,
24 [REDACTED] that feeling among OSs, operation supervisors,
25 shift managers led them to ask for a meeting with [REDACTED]

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1 [REDACTED] where that very issue was brought up to [REDACTED]
2 and the OSS wanted clarification on what management at
3 the site wanted --

4 [REDACTED] That's great.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- on that very
6 issue. Well, it's not great, because they thought it
7 was a problem.

8 [REDACTED] What I mean is it's good they
9 had the discussion, is what I'm saying.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. But the bad
11 part of that --

12 [REDACTED]: The bad part, they shouldn't
13 had the discussion.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. And they
15 did have it, but then they did not get satisfaction
16 from that conversation with [REDACTED]. Was any of that
17 brought to your attention at all?

18 [REDACTED] No.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No? And that would
20 have been with [REDACTED] while he was still the [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED] took over in -- I'm not sure when he
22 took over.

23 [REDACTED] I'm not either. Late '02.

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But this happened
25 when [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED]. Did [REDACTED] ever

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1 bring that to your attention?

2 [REDACTED] I don't recall, no.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because stuff like
4 this strikes right at the --

5 [REDACTED] Nuclear safety.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, yes.

7 [REDACTED] I mean, I'm there.

8 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: To go one step
9 further on the production versus safety issue. I'll
10 use that bypass valve issue as an example and get to
11 my question from there.

12 When we got this comment from a number of
13 people, when that event happened and it did take what
14 a lot of folks perceived as an inordinant amount of
15 time to make the decision to shut the plant down,
16 questions were asked to the effect of there's got to
17 be pressure coming from somewhere for us to be sitting
18 here waiting to shut the plant down. And a lot of
19 that perception led to corporate. Are people on site
20 being told by folks at the corporate office, you know,
21 keep that thing up at all costs if you can.

22 [REDACTED] Yes. Absolutely not.

23 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: And that's my
24 question. Were you ever aware of a situation, not
25 just that but any other time where you or you were

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1 aware of any other manager at the site being contacted
2 by, pressured by, whatever by someone at the corporate
3 office to keep the plant on line?

4 [REDACTED] To keep the units alive?
5 Absolutely not. Absolutely not. I mean, [REDACTED] -- you
6 know, I reported strictly to [REDACTED] I mean, [REDACTED] is --
7 well I think you know he's an [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] I mean he operated the plant safely.
9 I mean, those are the things that scare me to death.

10 It concerned me, and I've had
11 conversations with -- it concerned me even the control
12 room talking to a load dispatcher.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's right.

14 [REDACTED] How that conversation goes.
15 It concerned me, and it's because it's the world, if
16 there's anything I can do about it, they -- the
17 operators, they know what the price of electricity is,
18 right.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In a new
20 environment.

21 [REDACTED] In a new environment.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Deregulated
23 environment.

24 [REDACTED] In a new environment, yes.
25 But so do you and I in a sense of it's summer, it's

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1 hot, electricity is going for a high price, you now.
2 It's the fall, mild weather, if you will, there's
3 excess generation. I mean, they know that, right.
4 But my messages to them, right, is you have to ignore
5 that. You know, it's no way could safety be
6 compromised by production. And that was everything I
7 was about, given all these speeches I alluded to
8 earlier.

9 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: You mentioned that
10 you reported directly to [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: And we've gotten
13 several comments when [REDACTED] came in that
14 reporting chain didn't exist anymore.

15 [REDACTED] That's correct.

16 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Your replacement
17 now had to report through [REDACTED]
18 And the assertion that has been stated to us is that
19 that's not a good thing, that [REDACTED] is not a
20 nuclear person and he's more from the business side of
21 TS and the making power side, and isn't that going to
22 be detrimental to future, you know, operations in
23 terms of how upper management looks at production
24 versus safety. Before you left did you ever hear that
25 kind of commentary? Do you care to offer any comment?

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1 [REDACTED] I mean I could see how it
2 could it could occur. I don't remember anyone making
3 those kinds of statements. I could see how it could
4 occur. But in the end a nuclear person ends up
5 reporting to a non-nuclear person because there are
6 very few top nuclear people, you know. Even the
7 Entergy Generation Company ends up reporting to, you
8 know, a non-nuclear CEO of a corporation. So I mean
9 that's -- that is reality.

10 I know [REDACTED] had gone off to the MIT
11 school.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED] So, I mean,
14 did have some --

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did have some
16 training.

17 [REDACTED] Did have some training. But
18 [REDACTED] actually knew -- I mean, the company has been
19 through enough problems over its history at the Salem
20 units that [REDACTED] knows the plant has to be operated
21 safely. Let the board of directors do it. 75

22 I believe that, and I don't know this,
23 right, that the nuclear community of the board still
24 exists. And it's the outside directors. And while I
25 was there was not a member of that committee, but used

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1 to attend that committee meeting in executive session.
2 I was the [REDACTED] of Salem/Hope Creek. So I
3 still had the access around [REDACTED] right to the board.
4 Always had the access to go around him to [REDACTED] too.
5 And that didn't change. Like you're saying, the only
6 change was [REDACTED] there.

7 That made sense to me, putting [REDACTED]
8 there. Administratively it becomes cumbersome. The HR
9 changed back and forth, back forth. By that I mean
10 over the years at the site nuclear had their own
11 company, did away with that. Not just in nuclear, but
12 everywhere. And then [REDACTED] brought in someone --
13 prior to [REDACTED] but the same role. And that
14 individual now is trying to get up to speed, so where
15 HR and going right to [REDACTED] process. We're going
16 straight to HR. With the passage of time, well [REDACTED]
17 in there so it's a complicated IR issues, complicated
18 human resource issues and putting [REDACTED] in charge
19 cleaned that up.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: People have said to
21 us during our review that the day your retirement was
22 announced, on that very day the power and reporting
23 relationship changed where, you know, at that point
24 [REDACTED] was in charge of nuclear. The day of
25 your retirement was announced that at that point

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1 [REDACTED] was in fact running nuclear. Can you comment
2 on did anyone express a concern to you while you were
3 still there that [REDACTED] was running the nuclear
4 organization and he wasn't just qualified to? Anyone
5 express that to you?

6 [REDACTED] I was responsible for the
7 safe operation of the facility.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Up until the day
9 you left?

10 [REDACTED] Up until the day I left,
11 right.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

13 [REDACTED]: [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] talked to me and says I'm trying to hire a
15 training manager and he had gotten -- you know, some
16 feedback. He couldn't do it. I say what's going on.
17 So he ends up calling [REDACTED], right. [REDACTED] gives
18 him a message that he can't do it, right?

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He can't do it?

20 [REDACTED] Can't do it. I had no idea,
21 all right, prior to this conversation that they had
22 frozen those jobs. That [REDACTED] had stepped in. I
23 called [REDACTED] and said, you know, what's going on? And
24 he said for the critical jobs, and the training
25 manager was a critical job, he wanted to fill that

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1 with a -- he wanted [REDACTED] to be involved in the filling
2 of that job.

3 MR. BISSINGER: What was the timing of
4 this? How close was this to period we're talking
5 about.

6 [REDACTED] It's close to the end.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think people have
8 said what did he do in your actual retirement, because
9 it would have been right about that time that people
10 are saying --

11 [REDACTED] Like the 8th of March.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. So it's
13 probably --

14 [REDACTED] Three weeks.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- around that time
16 period.

17 [REDACTED] And, you know, like I said it
18 was a shock to me. If [REDACTED] would have communicated
19 that to me, if [REDACTED] would have communicated to me
20 that that's what he wanted and that was going on, I
21 don't think [REDACTED] would have had issue. I don't know
22 how far around the falls it would have gone, but I
23 think it was also brought back up to me.

24 (Whereupon, a recess.)

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's 6:12 we're

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1 back on the record.

2 I guess [REDACTED] is there something you want
3 to continue with.

4 [REDACTED] Well, I was going to say when
5 I had put -- I told that to [REDACTED] I don't know exact
6 date, but [REDACTED] came to the site. He came looking for a
7 house, he stopped by the site. He and I had a
8 discussion. He said he didn't agree with that, that
9 you know when he took over the site, he'd do whatever
10 is there when he takes over the site.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

12 [REDACTED] And I told him to tell [REDACTED]
13 that and I presume he did. I don't know that.

14 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Can I just ask a
15 quick question. Other the training manager job, did
16 you feel in any other way that [REDACTED] somehow
17 marginalized your ability to run nuclear after -- in
18 this March time period --

19 [REDACTED] Oh, it wasn't as the training
20 jobs. It was both jobs we were looking for.

21 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Whichever job --

22 [REDACTED] Right. Yes.

23 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: -- you were talking
24 about, did you feel that he had in addition to that
25 somehow marginalized your ability to run nuclear as

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1 you saw fit?

2 [REDACTED] I mean I thought I could run
3 nuclear safely with or without the plant manager, but
4 his decision had an impact on the station.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, it did on
6 people. It left them with that impression that he was
7 running the show.

8 MR. BISSINGER: X Did you have that
9 impression, [REDACTED] was somehow running
10 the show?

11 [REDACTED]: No, I did not. Running the
12 people show, but not that. Not the plant.

13 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Just a couple more.
14 Hopefully, we can get this done fairly quickly.

15 We did receive some comments about your --
16 the monthly leadership meeting that you ran and that
17 [REDACTED] ran I guess prior in that time frame. And I
18 guess the general comment was that those meetings were
19 pretty hard hitting if not intimidating. And I just
20 want to get your comments on that, how you think those
21 were and whether you think anybody could have been
22 negatively effected by how those meetings were
23 conducted?

24 [REDACTED] No, I can't recall the
25 subject matter of any of the meetings. They were

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1 direct in the sense of trying to explain our
2 performance, what issues we had and could have adverse
3 impact on anyone, any person. Yes, they could have.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I have something.

5 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Go ahead, Jeff.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Go back to talk
7 about [REDACTED] for a minute.

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And I talked to you
10 about the perception that the OSs and shift managers
11 had under [REDACTED] regime that things had to be proven
12 inoperable before they'd be allowed to move the plant.

13 Now, that impression on that level of
14 people continued to the [REDACTED] regime as [REDACTED].
15 Did anyone make you aware when [REDACTED] became [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] that they felt that, that they were concerned in
17 that area?

18 [REDACTED] No. I can't recall.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Now, you've
20 testified earlier that when the bypass valve issue
21 happened in March of 2003, you believe you were away
22 from the site then the day that issue -- the day and
23 a half that that issue occurred on the site.

24 [REDACTED] Yes.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: From what we

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1 understand, [REDACTED] was acting for you
2 while you were gone.

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And on that issue,
5 [REDACTED] had a discussion with [REDACTED] about
6 the bypass valve issue. Did [REDACTED] share with
7 you his conversation with [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] I don't always hear [REDACTED].
9 [REDACTED] I was aware that he called [REDACTED] because
10 I had left directions for each of the VPs, like if
11 they find -- if they are acting in my stead and the
12 plant undergoes a transient that they need to give a
13 cursory call to [REDACTED] so he knows the plant
14 underwent a transient and describe what the transient
15 was.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Now, when you were
17 acting as the [REDACTED] when you in place there was a
18 transient in the plant, were you required to give [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED] such a call also?

20 [REDACTED] Required, no. Did I, yes.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why would you?

22 [REDACTED] It was just perfunctory,
23 right. Transients are a potential indicator of a
24 problem at the power plant. He was my boss. My
25 analogy is if the plant underwent a transient, I

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1 expect the [REDACTED] to give me a call. Why? Because I'm
2 responsible for the operation of the power plant.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

4 [REDACTED] And the same analogy now back
5 to [REDACTED]

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. During any
7 of those discussions you had with [REDACTED]
8 surrounding the transient in the plant, did he provide
9 any type of direction that he wanted the plant taken
10 back up, increase power, come out of an outage when
11 you felt the plant really couldn't do that at that
12 point?

13 [REDACTED] Absolutely not. Absolutely
14 not.

15 [REDACTED] had a keen interest in the technical
16 aspects of why you were where you are, whether you're
17 coming up and you're delayed or whatever. And, you
18 know, many outages we were delayed.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. I think the
20 record can show that.

21 [REDACTED] Yes. And I'd just tell him,
22 you know, here's what's happening. There was never
23 any pressure back to me, any comment that would
24 indicate I want you to move the plant up. Never. 7C

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That was my next

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1 question. I mean, you have outages which are planned.
2 [REDACTED] Planned ones, they don't go
3 well.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

5 [REDACTED] We have outages that are
6 inadvertent.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

8 [REDACTED] And for each of those we put
9 together a schedule and I get the schedule.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

11 [REDACTED] wants to know.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. So when
13 those outages are longer than scheduled, planned or
14 unplanned, would you call [REDACTED] and let him know
15 that and the reasons why?

16 [REDACTED] Most times. Sometimes, you
17 know, like give him a quick call. If we're over a
18 minute, give [REDACTED] a call, tell him we got a new
19 schedule, right. It ain't like that.

20 The plant was down, he knew the plant was
21 down.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

23 [REDACTED] He had a feel for when it was
24 going to be up, indicate to it. If it didn't get up,
25 it didn't get up.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. But when it
2 wouldn't get up and it would go into more days of
3 being in a outage, would you then call him back and
4 explain to him where the plant was and why it wasn't
5 back up?

6 [REDACTED] I would keep him apprised of
7 the change in schedule. It wasn't a requirement, and
8 sometimes I did it. You know, [REDACTED] hadn't asked for
9 that or anything like that, it was just me give him a
10 call.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

12 [REDACTED] You know, it's like when a
13 new schedule came out, and it wasn't like people
14 quickly going like this and giving it to him. I'm
15 trying to communicate that if I knew that we had to
16 extend the outage for two weeks, you know --

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

18 [REDACTED] I'd tell him. Tell him, hey,
19 I might tell him tomorrow.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. If [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED] were unavailable to you, on vacation, out of
22 country, whatever, would you then have those
23 discussions with [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED]: Yes.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

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1 [REDACTED] I started having those
2 conversations with [REDACTED] because he was, you know,
3 responsible for generation, and so he'd know.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Question.
5 During any of those discussions you had with [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] did they put any undue pressure on you to
7 get those plants back up when you didn't think they
8 were ready to do so?

9 [REDACTED]: Absolutely not. Absolutely
10 not. Those were pretty much -- you know, the
11 communication was one way, here's where we are, all
12 right. They'd ask informational questions, why it's
13 down, how long do you think it'll be done. I'd answer
14 the question.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You understand why
16 I'm asking you?

17 [REDACTED]: Yes, I understand why you're
18 asking me. Absolutely not.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did the
20 conversation in that area about a longer outage or the
21 plant not being able to come up schedule, when you had
22 those discussions with [REDACTED] was it more challenging
23 from him than it was under [REDACTED] when you had those
24 conversations with [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]: No. I viewed them as less

1 challenging, right. And by that I mean [REDACTED] was --
2 because he was a technocrat.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 [REDACTED] If you tell him down because
5 of the -- oh, is that the green part of the coffee cup
6 or the other part. So that [REDACTED] phone calls were
7 always longer because he was interested in it, you
8 know, and it was no pressure the VP on up or anything
9 like that, it was just interest in --

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He had a background
11 in the industry.

12 [REDACTED] Yes, the depth was
13 phenomenal. [REDACTED] didn't have that kind of
14 knowledge, you know. We're down, you know, how long
15 you down for. And there is nothing given back.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

17 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: While you were
18 there were there a lot of ops managers at Salem.

19 [REDACTED] Yes.

20 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Did you ever step
21 back and ask the question, you know, how come we got
22 a revolving door here?

23 [REDACTED] Yes, we talked about that
24 quite a bit. We thought we were selecting the right
25 person for the right reason. Sometimes we didn't

1 support them properly. I don't know what that support
2 would look like, but we didn't support them properly.
3 And [REDACTED] got real frustrated because of the work
4 management process, program.

5 That was also one of the reasons why we
6 put [REDACTED] on that because of Salem. Rather
7 than to out to the street and bring another person in.

8 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Well, a lot of the
9 perception that we got on this that we got was they
10 were back to the feel they were being over challenged
11 from the operational decision making area. Did that
12 ever -- was that ever a question with you?

13 [REDACTED] No. No. But I'm not quite
14 sure what you meant they were over challenged, but I'd
15 meet with those guys and they -- you know, the
16 operations manager one-on-one. And they had the
17 opportunity to convey to me the issues they had. And
18 that never came up.

19 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Not you necessarily
20 directly, but that they had to go through more hoops
21 than they thought they needed to in order to be in
22 charge in the control room to make the decisions that
23 they needed to make; that's the kind of comments that
24 we got.

25 [REDACTED] Yes. I don't what that -- I

1 thought -- I'm interpreting the comments right now.
2 That process became more bureaucratic. Depending on
3 the issue, they may have talk to () may have to talk
4 to [REDACTED] --

5 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Right.

6 [REDACTED] Yes. I did this. This place
7 is more complicated. Come up to the office.

8 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Yes. Go ahead,
9 Jeff.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Going back to talk
11 about [REDACTED] for a minute on the bypass valve
12 issue, you had a discussion with [REDACTED] And I think you
13 said that he told you he was playing the devil's
14 advocate there and pushing his people, okay.

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Now from what we
17 understand that's not the only time that [REDACTED] pushed
18 his people like that. And the impression from the
19 level of managers just underneath him, that led them
20 to believe or feel that [REDACTED] was pushing production
21 over safety. That's the impression that that left on
22 levels of managers at that level. Did any of those
23 directors, shift managers, AOMs, OMs, operations
24 directors bring that to your attention that, of course
25 I don't believe this, but this is some of the things

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1 I'm hearing from that level of people. Was that ever
2 raised to your attention?

3 [REDACTED] No, I don't recall it. I
4 don't -- and, you know, I didn't --

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You know [REDACTED]
6 a pretty aggressive guy.

7 [REDACTED] He's a very strong guy.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

9 [REDACTED]: He's frank. And if handled
10 the wrong way, it could be his weakness, right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

12 [REDACTED] I mean, no doubt about it.
13 But, you know, [REDACTED] just comes from safety. You know,
14 I should account -- why did he take the devil
15 advocate? You know, why confuse the organization? I
16 don't have responses to that.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because that's
18 apparently what it did --

19 [REDACTED] Yes.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It did confuse
21 people, one of the reasons why we're here. But that
22 wasn't raised to your attention that people had that
23 concern with [REDACTED] management style and the message it
24 was sending, was that --

25 MR. BISSINGER: Production over safety?

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1 [REDACTED]: Yes.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, and just
3 pushing. You know, the devil's advocate all the time.
4 It's black and white and still pushing.

5 MR. BISSINGER: X You were challenged.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Makes people think
7 where the heck is he coming from. It plants a seed --
8 let me finish -- that there's management above [REDACTED] who
9 is pushing you. That's the seed. Can you comment on
10 that?

11 [REDACTED]: That's absolutely not true.
12 Move off of production for a second of the reactor.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] That was very valuable in
15 developing schedule for refueling outages. Okay. This
16 activity is going to two days, one day, whatever it
17 is. [REDACTED] challenging why. Developing challenge review
18 boards -- so that style of management being strong in
19 the right situation is very good.

20 You point out to me the down side of it,
21 right, and was I aware that that generated, you know,
22 concern with nuclear safety. No, I wasn't aware of
23 that.

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And [REDACTED]
25 personality he said he's a strong individual, he's

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1 forceful.

2 [REDACTED] Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I sat with him
4 across a table for a number of hours. Well, I know
5 him a little bit and I could see that, how people
6 would take the way he managed with those type of
7 issues. But in your -- would [REDACTED] have been one of
8 your direct reports while you the [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] Oh, yes.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Did you ever
11 counsel him on his management style and how that --
12 his style might affect the people who worked for [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] No, I did not. I counseled
14 him on his language use. When he first came he was
15 pretty rough language. You just can't do that. Can't
16 do it. I counseled him on that.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. But not on--
18 [REDACTED]: Not on his forceful impact
19 having an impact on safety, no. TC

20 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: We could for many
21 more hours, but I really don't have any --

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm going to go
23 back in.

24 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Yes, go ahead,
25 Jeff.

1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. I think
2 this just might another area. People have testified
3 to us during this review that it was their belief that
4 safety was the number one priority as long as it
5 didn't impact schedule or generation. If something
6 had to give, it tended to be safety. That's the
7 impression that the management style was left on
8 managers, SROs, down to the NEL level. We talked to a
9 whole level of people. So can you comment on that at
10 all? Did anyone bring that concern to your attention,
11 first? I guess that's my first question.

12 [REDACTED] I think elements of that came
13 out in our surveys like the Gallup surveys.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, we've them.
15 We've seen some of the comments.

16 [REDACTED] So, you know, so the answer
17 is yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] A different question of I
20 know it was the ~~(SROs)~~ that were feeling that.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think they
22 anonymous.

23 [REDACTED]: Yes. So, I didn't relate
24 that back to it could have been a licensed operator,
25 senior licensed operator, anything like that.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. But when you
2 saw those responses in the Gallup survey, was any
3 action taken to address that issue with the site
4 staff? I'm asking if you know?

5 [REDACTED] Yes. We took -- I don't
6 know how to respond. We were constantly dealing with
7 safety initiatives, right. I had an outside safety
8 come into this meeting. And people would get hurt,
9 we'd do a detailed review and correct the problems.
10 So I thought if you looked at OSHA safety performance-

11 -

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

13 [REDACTED] That over the five years
14 we're getting better. So you know, I mean we're
15 getting better because we were making the changes,
16 right, improving the system, improving the plant,
17 communications, better training through leadership
18 academy, etcetera. So that would be my response.
19 Whether we're bringing [REDACTED] in -- I don't know if
20 you're familiar with [REDACTED] his industrial
21 operators handbook.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No, I don't know
23 that one.

24 [REDACTED] Anyway, he's got the
25 incidents that have happened around the world to

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1 balance it. India, PMI -- he teaches that course from
2 a couple of perspectives and one is, he'll put it on
3 for leadership attributes, sometimes he'll put it on
4 for to train assessors and another way to do it is
5 just train operators in safe operations. I mean, he
6 kind of in all those kind of activities.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. [REDACTED] I'm
8 going to take a very short break just to see if we
9 need anything else. I don't think I have anything
10 else.

11 (Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m. a recess until
12 6:35 p.m.)

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. We're back
14 on the record. It's approximately 6:35 in the
15 afternoon.

16 [REDACTED] I don't have any other
17 questions for you on the work environment area. Dave,
18 is there something more you want to add?

19 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: I have no more
20 questions.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED] I don't have anything to
24 add.

25 [REDACTED] I have nothing to add.

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SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. [REDACTED]

thank you for your time. I know it's been a long day,
but this interview is concluded. Thank you very much.

We're off the record.

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded at
6:35 p.m.)