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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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(time not provided) Again, I think (phonetic) was in 2 the room. 3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. 4 That's a think. 5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. 6 And, And It was really an office 7 decision. 8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Sure, yes. 9 Was he challenging anybody else more in particular of those 10 11 three? don't remember. I don't really remember, 12 Jeff. 13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. 14 Again, I think I asked you this before but I'm going to ask you 15 it again, was there, to your knowledge, was there any pressure being put on that 16 decision to not shut down and fix the valve, was there any pressure being 17 applied from senior management up in Newark to not let that happen, turn the 18 plant back on and we'll go forward? 19 Not that I know of. Not that I know of, and 20 I've never - I've never heard of that happening here either. So, you know. 21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. 22 Did you make a statement to the effect - I'm getting a little 23 more direct with you now -24

hat's fine

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: – but it's just to probe this 1 some more, because this issue is something that the Commission is interested in, 2 right, Dan? 3 MR. ORR: Yes, absolutely. 4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you make a statement 5 to the effect of, that if we had not gone in and fixed that valve, instead turned the 6 7 plant back on and you moved forward, that that could be grounds for the NRC taking the keys away to this place? Words to that effect. 8 It don't remember saying it, but I could – I 9 could - that would not be out of character for me to, you know, say something 10 to get the attention if I thought that the meeting was going the wrong way. 11 So, my answer to you is, I don't remember saying that quote. 12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. 13 [Late | I can tell you, Jeff, that if I was in a - if I was 14 in a three-hour meeting on something like this, and I started getting concerned 15 that the meeting was going the other way, or that the decision was going the 16 other way, yeah, that's a card I'd play to get people's attention. 17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you play that card? 18 Like I said, I can't remember saying that 19 20 quote. SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. 21 I can't remember saying that quote. 22 23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At the meeting. 24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. 25 170

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MR. ORR: Okay.



But, I don't remember that influencing the

MR. ORR: Okay.

How about any of the other licensed operators present, did they express any concern to you over undue pressure, they being the license holders being challenged for what you see as kind of a simple safety decision? I don't remember, no, I don't remember who the licensed individual was that night. Whoever it was spent very little time in the room, to my memory. They may have been in and out, but kind of left it to

MR. ORR: Okay.

and I think was there. But, that's appropriate.



I can't remember who it was either.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I've got to take a short break for a minute. I have to hit the men's room. It's 20 after 6:00.

(Whereupon, at 6:20 p.m., a recess until 6:30 p.m.)

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, it's almost 6:30, a couple more things I wanted to go over with you

Coming out of the decision regarding the bypass valve, where eventually the right decision was made, did that leave you with a feeling, though, that just the fact that they were retaining some of the ideas there, I mean, we didn't get into all the specifics, but there were people in there who thought it was clear black and white we need to shut down and fix the valve, investigate and then fix the valve if needed. And in ris challenging the group, challenging the OPS (phonetic) people, challenging the group. Did the fact that

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senior management, in the form of was challenging in that way, did that make you wonder about where he was coming from regarding safety perspectives?

I'm probably going to be jumping ahead, but I feel the need to to answer your question on this one. I answered before was challenging.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

Where I got frustrated, and I mentioned this before, on this recirc issue where I got frustrated to the point, I sort of let that linger, you know, the thing from the bypass valve.

MR. ORR: Okay.

Because I knew what he was doing, he was challenging. Quite frankly, I'm going to use the word, I thought it was just inefficient. I thought we should have just made the decision and gone on. I said that before in this interview.

But, with the recirc decision, I sort of let that stay inside me with the recirc decision. I remember having a conversation with afterwards, which was after the bypass valve decision, and saying — I said something to the effect to him that, you know I don't understand how we can linger so long over this shut down issue with the bypass valves, and then you get something here on the other side, with this recirc pump or whatever the issue was, and we had options available to us, and then we lay a — put a line in the sand and say we are not going over that. I told him I thought it sent mixed messages, and I was upset by that.

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How did he respond?

We talked it out, and he said, well, you know, you can't take it that way. And, I remember saying something to the effect, if I remember properly, that, you know, what we've already talked about in here, that, you know, my job is to challenge people, is to challenge the organization, so they are, you know, always thinking and fully walking through all the different options on the issue. And, I was okay with that when he went through with that.

I hope that answered your original question, but it actually extended into the second example as well.


SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

When you told that you felt a mixed message was being sent, did you get specific to him as to what you saw as a mixed message?

Specific as far as my statement that, you know, we had the bypass valve issue with the spoilt in the pipe, and then we have this other issue with recirc, and that can be, that in itself can be a mixed message where we spend all that time on the bypass valve and then we stop on the recirc pump, that can be a mixed message to folks on the management team.

And, he was, you know, he felt that that was a fair conversation.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm trying to understand -




SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: — the mixed message thing. What was the —

We have what to some was a safety issue.


SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The valve.

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

And, let's just go make the decision and be

on with it type discussions. It sounds fairly simple, but who is in charge --

(Whereupon, bad section of tape.)



I can't remember exact time lines, but I

remember one -

(Whereupon, bad section of tape.)




We have



functioning as the plant manager, but really has all three units reporting to the Vice President of Operations as well.

MR. ORR: Who would that be?



MR. ORR: Did this get emotional, talk about this valve issue, in March of this year?

I think in those March issues I would use that example on the bypass valve. There was – during the shutdown there was a

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
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Not ultimately, but with the way that the committee, if you will, for lack of a better term, and we can talk about that more if you want on follow-up, I am not one to spend a long time debating the issue as far as I like to see what the facts are and what the technical people have and then go do the right thing and put the plant in the right place. And, what I saw was that we were debating issues, for example, with a bypass valve, this is specifically what I remember, Jeff, that the technicians went down, the valve was stroked, and it was not a closed indication, and there was redundant reactor parameters that indicated that the valve was, indeed, open. Okay?


SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

And, the valve squealed when it stroked. In other words, something was bound in it.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Stroked means shut.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

And, there was quite a debate over what the right thing to do was.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What was, really, according to like the plant license, you know, and the requirements, what was the right thing to do?

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Shut the plant down and go into the valve
and find out what's wrong.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
Did that happen?
Yes.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
Yes.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
But, okay, now I don't know what your -
obviously, what your input is, but I come up with this example and kind of cast
my line in the water for you, because of the length of discussions that went on,
and, you know, people talked to me outside the room after this discussion would
go on for four hours, and we'd talk about who was there if that's important or
whatever.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, that would help, the
major players, the people putting forward the position.
was there, myself, this is to
the best of my memory. I mentioned his title,
(phonetic) this is to the best of my memory now
at the time Date at the time
I'm not sure –
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Somebody from corporate?
don't remember.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: By phone?
No. All 10

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
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something that was not a safety issue for the reactor, and at some point, even if

I have to go off the record or call you afterwards, it will come to me, it was not 1 a safety issue for the reactor and wasn't necessary for the start up of the unit. 2 Can we just stop the tape for one second? 3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. 4 It's just I want to remember. 5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's 5:08, I just wanted to 6 put the time on there. 7 (Whereupon, at 5:08 p.m., a recess until 5:10 p.m.) 8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. We're back on the 9 record. It's about 5:10. 10 you were trying to recall this recirc problem that you 11 recalled holding the plant back up from going back up to full power. You were 12 trying to recall that. 13 Actually, I asked Jeff to go off the record 14 because I was trying to recall what the specific subject was, and I wanted to talk 15 to Dan Orr. But, I cannot recall, but it was an issue with the recirc pumps that 16 17 was a non-safety-related issue. It was something that could have been addressed during the start-up sequence, and we had a tremendous amount of difficulty, 18 once again, making the decision. 19 Now, in this particular case – I cannot recall what the subject 20 was, in this particular case my feelings were that the right thing to do, it had no 21 22 safety implications whatsoever, tech spec or otherwise, was to start the reactor up and monitor it, and we could remove the pump - I remember having the 23 technical thought that we could remove the pump from service if necessary at 24

And, there was some – there was some emotion around that. Now, that may not be a safety conscious work environment type thing from the NRC perspective, but the emotions of the frustration that management could feel about this meeting, or excuse me, decision by committee type thing, I think is another example.

If you need the actual subject I'm sure that can be found through the corrective action program or operator logs.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You've gone back to that twice now, decision by committee.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, correct me if I'm wrong, if I'm hearing you right senior management here at the site didn't really like that management by committee, they wanted what? Am I right, is that what you are saying?

No, I didn't - no, I'm not saying that. I think it evolved, that type of behavior evolved because you didn't clearly have in the organizational makeup who the right decision maker was.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The plant manager.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: For each plant.

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And so, it evolved over the course of time into decision by committee.


SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

And, there were those who really, you know, and myself included - well, let me say the sentence first - there were those who really had no decision-making authority on some of these issues in their present positions, yet, everybody is in the room providing input. I mean, it's good to have that input, but, you know, without the clear authority you can get the emotional decision, or the emotion feelings around that.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It sounds like here in this recirc issue, though, whereas in the first issue you thought it was clear cut, they should have shut down, checked the valve out, and then go forward.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In this second issue, where you are beginning to come back up to power after fixing the valve -



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -you think this isn't really a problem, let's increase power and move towards full power.

There was actually beginning to pull for criticality and then starting the start-up sequence. There was no – I had no concerns with – what I do recall is, I had no concerns whatsoever, as did others in the group, with the operation of the recirc system and its ability to cool the All TC core.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.



Definitely.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. And, this is a Hope Creek issue again?



Yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

Now, this one doesn't – this one, for me, my story doesn't put a bunch of people in a room. I do have some perspective on it.

The exhaust off of, I believe, it was the B (Bravo) diesel generator. There's a series of, it's a manifold, just like a huge muffler on your car.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.



And, it goes out the exhaust out the roof.

There are expansion bellows, wavy pieces of metal to absorb the growth, the metal growth from the heat, and several of those had developed leaks.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.



was the transfer of the last o


the time, I had outages and work management, work control, basically.

And, I didn't realize at the time how significant these leaks were, and I should have. The leaks were of such a magnitude that ultimately the decision was made, based on the carbon monoxide levels in the room, that they were directing — they being the Operations Department — were directing the equipment operators to, based on the safety input, the industrial safety input, there were SCBAs in the room, self-contained breathing apparatus, in the room to do the surveillance.

have identified, at some point, that there was a CO2 leak coming out of this manifold.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Carbon monoxide is -



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's carbon dioxide.

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, I bet.

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been.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Understandable.


be learned from that. The irony is, ultimately, when we went into this outage to replace the recirc seal we did this job, and we did it, I believe, well I know it was less than 24 hours, and it's a 72-hour LCO. If the flag had been accurately or appropriately, not accurately, appropriately raised we could have jumped all over this thing and done it on line before it ever got to a situation where it was such an emotional event.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were the NLOs voicing a concern with this leak getting progressively worse? I mean, if there –


licensed operator about it, because really it wasn't hitting a proper priority.

Now, I'm kind of up in the management chain.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Sure.




SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I would think.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When did you become aware of this issue?

back, I don't know, in January or February, I'll say one to two months before we got this thing where the decision is being made. I believe that the Safety Department got involved with a level to the Operations Department management

that the decision was made if we were going to do this in March, the surveillance 1 2 in March, we'd have to wear – the guys would have to wear SCBAs. SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. 3 And, that was the point I remember where 4 myself and some others included, I remember, and to use him as 5 an example again, where what are we doing? And so -6 7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In your mind, that issue did rise up in management in an appropriate fashion? 8 That's correct, that's the point I'm making 9 10 there, right. SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, right after you came 11 to that realization, did you go back and explore why that didn't happen? 12 13 14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What did you find, did you 15 find that middle level management weren't letting it rise? There seemed to be – there seemed to be the 16 communication up from the NLOs through the shift ranks to the department 17 18 management didn't seem to be strong. These are my words, the whole group 19 seemed to say, let the process run its course, you know, in other words it needs to be scheduled and put into some window somewhere, where in reality what 20 was going on was that this was a moving target as far as the equipment was 21 degrading from month to month, and we had to change the course. We had to 22 change the priority, and that wasn't done, and I think that's where the 23 communication channel vertically broke down, in my opinion. 24



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That would come up through your organization, or work control?

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, the smarter thing to

do.


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But, you asked about my organization.



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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

If you go back to the NLO side of the

example, and these guys that - I mean, these guys are on rotating shifts so you do it once a month, well, not the same guy is going to do it every month. Well, somebody is going to write a notification and a corrective action thing that this or that, you know, was wrong, and then now it's this, and now it's that, and the emotion you've got there. And, people who screen these things in my organization failed to put two and two together and say something themselves. like why don't they go over and say when are we going to fix this.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.



And so, that was disappointing on my

department's behalf as well.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Hold on here, we're going to switch over to the second side. It's about 5:28.

(Tape 1, side A ends; tape 1, side B begins.)

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. We are on side B, and we were talking about the "B" diesel manifold issue. I guess it was leaking, and we were talking about your organization.

Were there any corrective actions put into place in your department to try not to let that happen again, to make it real - to ask it plainly? I know you've got your corrective actions all over the place, but was there specific put in to open up the level of communication or the avenues of communication, not let that type of thing occur again?




Not specifically to this issue.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

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The feedback I get from them is, you know, why can't I get it fixed, is more - not I go to a certain level and it gets knocked back down, no.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You are not getting that?



No. I get, why can't I get it fixed, why does

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's what you get.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Plain as that.




SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.



And, depending on the example, this is probably the most extreme example, this exhaust one.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, that's an example, yes.



And, I think there's a large element of, when you talk about NLOs in particular, of education, of downward communication, and that needs to be done. I'm talking about, you know, it's easy to come in on Friday, Saturday and Sunday night and say, oh, the things leaking again, but what it takes to get it fixed and to be properly prepared -

1	(Whereupon, bad section of tape.)
2	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They are union guys, right?
3	Yes.
4	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you come up through
5	your reactor operator or did you go instant SRO?
6	f was instant.
7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. So, you were never
8	a union employee?
9	No.
10	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
11	The ROs are union here, though, right, the reactor operators?
12	Yes.
13	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
14	Is there something more you want to ask about the diesel
15	manifold issue, Dan?
16	MR. ORR: No.
17	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: If there is, go ahead.
18	MR. ORR: No, I'm okay.
19	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is there something more
20	you want to add on that diesel?
21	Not on that one, I don't think.
22	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
23	Another example if you wanted to go over
24	it. 10

1	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, you nad four, there
2	was another one you were going to go over and then I'm going to go back and
3	touch on a couple of things.
4	Okay.
5	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But, there was a fourth
6	thing you wanted to talk about as an example of something that you think I
7	might be interested in here.
8	Well, the Salem –
9	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This is the grass issue,
10	right?
11	- right - the Salem station was grassing.
12	Now, this was the first week in March, and due to the weather in the northeast
13	in the winter, especially the one particularly large snow storm and the cold snap
14	afterwards, the grass in the river was tremendous. It was, for historians of this
15	site, it was, I believe, maybe I'm misquoting this, but it was orders of magnitude
16	higher than it was on April 7th when the large issue there was in 1994 or
17	whatever.
18	There was a lot of operational decisions that needed to be
19	made on maintaining the unit at power.
20	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
21	Both units at power, and where to keep
22	reactor power as the grass was coming in with the tide changes, over the course
23	of what was really four of five days, and the situation degrading.
24	Ultimately, to my memory, one unit shut down and the second
25	unit. I believe, ended up at around 40 percent power, if I remember properly.

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
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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

behind where the units were left with any people at that time, and what the management decisions that were made. You mentioned in your introduction production over safety.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.



And, I don't recall the level of emotion on the diesel exhaust issue as, you know, here, but, once again, if I was thinking about — if I was thinking about the Safety Conscious Work Environment from a worker's aspect, and where would my emotions be relative to management decisions, I think that could be another area as well.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The grassing issue.

exhaust. This thing is getting worse, why don't we just – you know, I'm kind of taking it from the non-licensed operator perspective primarily – why don't we just shut the thing down and fix the – wait until the grass goes by, you know, over the course of a couple days. I'm not as technically knowledgeable at Salem as I am at Hope Creek, although I can get by.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you directly involved

in the discussions surrounding this issue?

All





I was - I was - I partook in some of the

phone calls and some of the meetings. Once again, you know, you make your decisions based on differential temperature in the condenser, the ability of pump amps and whether it's actually – the screen can actually pass enough water with all the heavy grass on it. And, it's a cyclical thing because it's tidal.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.




And, I tend to be a supporting cast member there. Once again, you had this committee thing, a supporting task member in that type of scenario as opposed to Hope Creek because I have more experience on the unit.

But, I felt, I personally felt, beyond the non-licensed operator at that particular issue, that there seemed to be less emotion with the decisions, and I think in the same case as the bypass valve and the recirc, the example on the bypass valve, the right things were done by management, it just seemed to be my memory of it less of an emotional roller coaster than say the bypass valve example at Hope Creek in March, yeah, March, later on in the month.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So, you are speaking that from if you were an NLO, non-licensed operator, involved in this issue, you would think they would see this as a safety issue.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, it's your opinion.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

Was the right - you said the right thing was done, was it done when it should have been done? Was it done in a timely fashion?

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
Going back to my memory, to my memory yes. We never really challenged the plant. As a matter of fact, I take that back,

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

when we got done I felt pretty good about it.

I learned a lot. I felt pretty good about where we left the plants and where we got through it. I thought we stayed ahead of it, and I just want to say one more thing, Dan, and when we got done I thought, geez, you know, a lot of that work we did on the screens to make it better seemed to work. I mean, there was more things that we could do that we could learn, but they seemed to work, and this system seemed to work better.

MR. ORR: Okay. I was just trying to clarify, you felt better about the grass and the way the decisions were being made in regards to grassing.




MR. ORR: Compared to, or just –

Smoother operation, I guess. It just seemed to be a smoother decision-making process than some of the other examples that we've had.

MR. ORR: Okay.


Was anybody emotional about the decision making that was occurring for grassing? Was anybody disagreeable about the decisions that were made, or do you recall?



I don't think anybody was.

MR. ORR: Okay.

All 10



After the fact, did your group get any feedback from the NLOs, who were maybe out there cleaning the trawling screens, or cleaning the water buckets.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, you call them boxes.

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Did you become aware of any feedback from the non-licensed 1 operators that they felt differently on that? 2 The non – 3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I know you told me what 4 your opinion was if you were an NLO, but did you get any feedback? 5 - the non-licensed operators, I'm going to 6 7 talk through this and maybe you can follow this with Dan, but the non-licensed operators, I don't know as many of them as well, but we have been doing a 8 modification, my group and the maintenance organization, have been scheduling 9 10 these modifications to make it easier for them to combat the grassing at the screens. Just to put it in simplistic terms, it's a big plate that goes over it with 11 a flip arm. They had been doing it with rakes, which they considered to be an 12 industrial safety issue, and I could understand that. 13 And, I believe that we had completed a third to a half of them, 14 probably more like four of the 12, would be my memory, and so my memory is, 15 I remember talking to a couple of them at that time, and not only with those two 16 17 individuals I confirmed there, you know, wants to have more of those, all 12 of them done. 18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They weren't done at that 19 point, though, mechanically. 20 There's four of them, done, not the other 21 eight. 22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. 23 I can't say, I can't say what the overall 24 opinion was of all the non-licensed operators or any selective ones. 25

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. If don't know if they all felt that way. 2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: With regards to whether, 3 you know, did the NLOs think, hey, you know, this is too dangerous for us to 4 5 be out there, only four of the 12 water boxes have this mechanical clean-out system going, we should shut the plant down because of that? 6 I never got that feedback. 7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. 8 I never heard any feedback like that. 9 10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Why don't we take a very short break. It's like quarter of 6:00. 11 12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We probably have about 13 another 15, 20 minutes. 14 15 Okay, fine. SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Good. Let me turn this off. 16 (Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., a recess until 5:47 p.m.) 17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We're back on the record 18 19 after a short break. I guess it's about 13 before 6:00. Okay, we've talked about four issues, and there's – I wanted 20 to go talk general for a minute and then come back and talk about something. 21 There's a group called - I know about INPO, but there's a 22 group called WANO, do you know what they are? 23 24





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So, that's a tough thing to swallow.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They're going to be coming


back again this -



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - in '04, right?




SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you hear him, any reaction from him about the INPO score, at a senior management meeting?

Well, I was there only when we had our debrief. The way the process works is, being a member of senior management on the island –

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Here?

you meet and they go over some of the key items, and then the actual score is not discussed. So, the fact that we are talking about this, you know, I've never been shown a number that site is. I know we are a focus area, I feel the need to qualify that, but in the exit meeting they talk about some of the major points in the meeting and then

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office there, with the INPO management, and the actual score is given, and then that's that. So, I've never seen a number.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.




And, that's common with all different plants.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did



come out and brief senior management here at the site after they went in with INPO management and got the score? Did they come out and say –



Yes, we had a subsequent meeting with



about a month later.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How did that go?

Well, he wanted to see what the – how should I say it, I'm struggling for my words – you know, where's the accountability with the people towards fixing the problems, was the words I remember and the tone that I remember.

So, who is in charge, you know, of fixing these issues, and you are the team, and you guys have got to get the right people in place. And, you know, it's not a fun meeting.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

Was there discussion during that meeting, and I'm just going to say in black and white, where we are going to change our focus more from maybe – more to a production focus?



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At all?



Absolutely not. All in the contrary.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, meaning what?

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you were part of, regarding this bypass valve issue, where you got upset with the

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course of the discussion and you got up and left the room, do you recall that 1 2 occurring? This is what we've been told happened, and I'm trying to 3 corroborate that. 4 5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, if it did happen I want 6 7 to explore why. Again, it's going back towards -I think it was on the recirc thing. 8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. 9 I think it was on the recirc thing. 10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you tell me what 11 happened? I know where you came out on that, I mean, your position was you 12 thought that the recirc system was going to work, let's move the plant further 13 into power. 14 1.5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, you guys think it's 16 going to be fine. 17 First of all, I know it was on the recirc thing. 18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. 19 Because I'll tell you one thing, I'm not trying 20 to – I'm not trying to play a high horse or anything, but the bypass valve issue 21 22 was a safety issue and we needed to shut the plant down. SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. 23 I wouldn't get frustrated and upset and leave 24 the room and leave that risk of something else happening. 25

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. 1 I wouldn't do it. I just would not do that. 2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Good. 3 I'm sure it was on the recirc issue. 4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How sure are you? 5 Positive. 6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, that's pretty good. 7 I don't get that too much. 8 I'm positive, because I can tell you what the 9 circumstances were. 10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Go ahead. 11 I was angry, because - although I can't 12 remember what the specific subject was, it's like, fine, you want to wait and fix 13 this problem, that's fine, I remember it was getting late, and by late I mean it was 14 10:00 or 11:00 or so, or 9:00 or 10:00 anyway, and we had been sitting in there 15 for a couple hours, and it was like the second or third of these management by 16 committee deals. 17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. 18 And, I went to look at something in a 19 procedure to see if, you know, I forget what I was doing, but it was something 20 in the recirc system and convincing myself that it didn't really matter, and then 21 I went home. 22 And, I remember, either I called 23 said, he said, well, where are you going, and I said, look, you know, if you want 24 to go work on this thing and continue on with a shut down that's fine, I'm not -25

called me and he

you know, I'm not holding anything about that, but I don't think we should do 1 it. And, that's what I told him. I said, I thin's we should start up, and I know 2 felt the same way because I talked to him about it. 3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: 4 Yes, and I remember talking to him about 5 that, I'm positive about that, too, and I said, you know, if we want to do it we'll 6 go and do it, we'll be good soldiers, but I told him I didn't think it was necessary. 7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was pushing from the 8 other side then on that issue? 9 To fix it, my recollection is 10 and my recollection in phonetic). 11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's a new name here 12 13 now. That's my recollection. 14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. 15 And that I'm not sure of. 16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Would he be the site VP? 17 He would be the 18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, they felt that it 19 needed to be fixed before you can come back up to power? 20 Yes, there was some design issue, or they 21 were tying it obliquely to a design basis thing, and I didn't get the connection. 22 But, I mean, I was tired, and I was frustrated at that point. 23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. 24

I'm looking at it, though, I mean, I'm not an engineer, but I'm 1 2 looking at this as, all right, those - the senior people being involved in this discussion are being, in the eyes of some, too conservative in that call. 3 It wasn't – it wasn't, in my opinion, and once 4 again I'll come back to the subject, it wasn't in my opinion a safety issue. 5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. 6 It was something that we ended up wanting 7 to do, and it was clear that after all the discussion we weren't going anywhere, 8 we weren't advancing the ball, and like I said, this was the second or third of 9 these conversations during the course of three or four days on these different 10 issues. I didn't have anything else constructive to add. 11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You already had it all out, 12 huh? 13 Yes, I'm being honest with you, you know. : 14 So, that was that. 15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. 16 17 I do want to make one thing perfectly clear, again I understand what I'm doing in here, I would not get up and walk away 18 from that bypass valve issue. 19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. 20 We are going to go right back to that, Dan. Was there 21 anything you wanted to ask about -22 MR. ORR: No, not this particular issue. 23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. 24 The bypass valve issue. 25 110




SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This seems to be the one that, my words, if I'm wrong correct me –




SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - you had - of these four issues you talked about, you had the most problem with that one, from it being an actual safety issue?

No, I'd say I had the most problem with the recirc issue, because, you know, but from a safety issue, that's what your question was?

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you have any talks with employees about whether, you know, discussions regarding what we should do with that work, that some of the discussions, some of the input, was "dangerous," if we went this way it would have been a dangerous thing to do? That's the quote, "dangerous."

I may have said that out of frustration, yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

While we were in the three hour thing. My memory is why would we do this, this doesn't seem right, you know. So, he was the

All 10

1	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why, from which
2	perspective?
3	Well, it was out of compliance with tech
4	specs, the valve stuck open, or, I can't remember if it actually closed or not.
5	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Dan, do you remember?
6	MR. ORR: I think the issue was –
7	Or it wouldn't go full open.
8	MR. ORR: - were you putting the turbine on and expecting
9	in response of the turbine bypass valves to close, and then you had this one not
10	fully close?
11	can't remember exactly. I can't remember.
12	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'll come back to the
13	question.
14	I remember being concerned that how far as
15	we taking this thing, over the course of three hours. Okay?
16	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
17	Of conversation, and, you know, people are
18	walking in and out of the room and doing this or that, and we're trying to make
19	this decision, and like I said earlier, it seemed fairly clear cut, and, you know,
20	I forget what your quote was, but –
21	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That you called that
22	process or some discussion "dangerous."
23	It is dangerous when you go too far down
24	that road and you actually consider it too much, because that can then cloud your
25	judgment. All 10

And, that can lead to getting to the wrong - making the wrong 1 decision. 2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, I agree. 3 And, I would maintain that, you know, if you 4 are – maybe I make my mind up, but if your mind is made up, and there's no 5 clear decision maker, and the conversation continues, frustration builds, and you 6 say, you know, something on the side, I remember my memory is, saying to the 7 8 Director of OPs, what are we doing here, this seems like we are going – you know, and maybe I used the word "dangerous," I don't know. 9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. 10 But, I can recall having that emotion. 11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You talked about 12 13 __14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You had the conversation 15 - 16 17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was the decision 18 maker then? Someone had to be the decision maker. Was it 19 Was it someone above them? I'm trying to understand that, because 20 this - I mean, you are talking about a compliance issue here, it's not just an 21 industrial safety type concern. 22 23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This is a regulatory – this 24 is a regulatory issue? 25

25

anyone



Then you wouldn't know.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

Did you get the impression that he was getting overruled by


know very well, I worked for him for two or three years, three years I guess, he was - he was challenging everyone.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.



not, but is not one - he's not shy, and he's not timid in those things. And, he'll push you to the edge to see how strong your convictions are.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.




s - I don't know if you are going to talk to him or.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think it can.

And, but that's what he was doing. If you know what he's doing, then it's not – it's not some scary thing, he wants you to come with all the facts, you know, but in this case it was a series of long meetings.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was he, you know him, so you knew where he was coming from, but did other people confide in your, did he say he felt intimidated by things that were – by the challenging nature of the challenging those meetings?



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

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Did any –

He didn't insinuate it either.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

Others at the meeting, did any of them voice that to you, that I'm having a big problem with his challenging behavior on this, this is clear, we should be doing, we should go into shutdown now to fix the valve?



My impression of this thing was -

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

that it seemed like the people in the room, myself included and the frustrating part on the other one was, I'm going to use my words, or the words I'm going to choose are, it seemed like a meaningless exercise.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

Because the decision, we know where we have to go, let's just get through the committee decision and let's go get on and do it, you know. And, I mean, that's what I recall of my thoughts at that time.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

It took a long time, though.

Did you have a feeling that the discussion got to a point where a decision – it was going to get close to the decision being made that we've talked ourselves back into going back up without fixing the valve, was it headed that way, was it heading that way? Did it get close to that decision being made?

that it was going to go there.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

All 70

25



can't remember everyone that was in the

room, but I don't remember having that emotion.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

Was in that meeting?

I think so.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think that's one of the names you mentioned.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was



(Whereupon, tape 1, side B ends; tape 2, side A begins.)

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's now 6:34, we're on the second tape, and I was asking a question about the mixed message that – you had a discussion with after this bypass valve issue was resolved, about mixed messages. Can you go ahead and share with me what you meant by that?

bypass valve discussion, and then there's the recirc pump discussion. Okay, and they were separated by a couple days.

The context of the meetings were relatively the same. One was the bypass valve discussion, it was a safety decision on shutting down. The recirc discussion was the discussion on should we start up or not, for what my memory is is a non-safety issue.

My memory is the frustrations in the recirc discussion, or at least that's where my frustration surfaced, and having a conversation with after the recirc discussion about, you know, what are you so frustrated about,

1	Here's what I'm frustrated about, the bypass valve appears to me to be a
ż	straightforward, shut the reactor down and find out what's wrong with the valve
3	issue.
4	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
5	And, the recirc issue receives some debate,
6	but we hold the line for something that's non-safety, but yet we debate the
7	bypass valve issue for a long amount of time. People can take that the wrong
8	way.
9	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
LO	And, I remember having that discussion with
11	
L2	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you tell him that you
13	took it the wrong way?
14	No.
L5	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or, did you take it the
16	wrong way?
L7	No, I told him that it can be taken the wrong
18	way.
L9	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
20	After – well, let me – I think to get the complete – to get a
21	complete picture here from you on some things -
22	Okay.
23	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -I'm going to have to play
24	a tape of something that I want you to listen to, and I want to get your
25	perspective on it, okay?

p.m.)



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

It's 25 of 7:00.

(Whereupon, at 6:35 p.m., off the record to play tape until 6:50

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. It's about ten of 7:00, I just played a copy of a conversation that was taped by an individual named Kim Harvin (phonetic), of a conversation she had with

I just played that for you. A lot of it is inaudible.

You wrote some notes down. I have some typed up notes here of what is said.

But, before we go into that, I just want to stop for just a second, okay?

(Whereupon, a brief recess.)

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, we're back on again.

I wanted to check my battery. My battery appears to be working well.

I just played that tape for you. Do you recall the conversation,

And, if so, do you want to talk about it right now?

Yes, I'd like to talk about it. I don't remember specifically the conversation. If you were asking me about it without having listened to the tape, I probably wouldn't have recalled anywhere near those details.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

Well, after listening to it, there's some details we'd like to talk about, but first, you wanted to say something?

Yes. It may take a while, is that all right?

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
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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, that's fine. I have 1 2 plenty of tapes and I've got power right here in the wall. Let's go. 3 Kim Harvin is, or was, the Cultural Transformation Manager. 4 She was a direct report to 5 From listening to the tape that was me on the tape, and it 6 sounds like the tape was done at some point during, near or after, some of the 7 8 bypass valve and recirc pump discussions that we've been talking about earlier on in this interview. 9 I was not aware that that conversation was being taped. I'd 10 like to put that on the record. 11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was it a one-on-one 12 discussion? 13 I don't remember whether it was or not, 14 because I don't remember talking with her specifically. It certainly sounds like 15 it was. 16 17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. .Her office – 18 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.) 19 Ms. Harvin's role in the organization, as 20 well as others -21 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.) 22 tried to encourage that, encourage that. 23 All 10

1	And so, I was a little bit surprised and shocked on how this
2	thing would play out here in this meeting, but that's something else to be
3	covered.
4	It was - I wrote down several of the quotes, and I guess you
5	can ask me questions about it. It was –
6	(Whereupon, bad section of tape.)
7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - managers after meetings
8	like that occurred?
9	I'm not sure what her - what her charter was,
10	she worked directly for I'm not sure what her charter was.
11	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
12	So, I'm not sure if
1.3	do that or whether she did it on her own initiative.
14	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: She did it, though.
15	Yes.
16	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. I have some
17	questions.
18	Go ahead.
19	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, you know, you fill in
20	where you need if you want to add something.
21	Sure, go ahead.
22	MR. ORR: There's a couple of minutes of discussion, then she
23	asks you a question about what did you mean yesterday when you said this place
24	is "dangerous?" Is the decision making like muddled, is it kind of - and you
25	respond again, the tape isn't perfect, but the response is pretty much, "Yes, I

25


meant it from a nuclear safety standpoint," then there's an inaudible part. "We came this close, when I say 'dangerous,' we almost talked ourselves on Monday of just starting right back up and not going into the bypass valve." We talked about that a little bit.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But, the point I'm interested in is, you used the word "dangerous," and what you said to her is you meant it from a nuclear safety standpoint. Can you go ahead and share a little more on that?

It's really nothing that I don't think we already talked about. It seemed like – I also wrote down that the conversation lasted four to six hours, and had over a barrel. I think that was a reference

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Correct barrel talking about this thing."



And, it just seemed like, I was probably – I was probably, in several of these quotes, letting out the emotion from what I referenced earlier on before the tape, on being frustrated with, once again, what I considered a fairly straightforward decision, and laying it all out over time.

And, surprised, I guess, would be the word that we'd debate over it for that long.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

There's a following comment after talking abou that, "There was pressure, that senior leadership was considering from up north

1	," I took that to mean Newark, " to go back up without the valve repair," and
2	then it went inaudible.
3	I don't remember that, really. I got the tape,
4	I'm not saying that I'm not saying what's on the tape.
5	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
6	But, I don't remember any conversation on
7	that in the meeting.
8	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: After the meeting was
9	there an impression that there was pressure being provided by corporate?
10	Yes, I don't remember anything like that,
11	Jeff. Obviously, I said that, I don't know where the reference is coming from.
12	I really don't.
13	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - grounds for taking the
14	keys away, we talked about that a little bit.
15	Right.
16	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: If you did do that.
17	That's from the reference that we talked
18	about earlier from starting up the reactor and whether the refuel outage was in
19	a month or a year, and finding out that we started up with a valve being
20	inoperable, that would just be – that would just be very bad.
21	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
22	Let's talk about this first part of this tape.
23	Okoy.
24	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which we just talked
25	about. All 1c

Was it your impression then that generally there was pressure 1 from senior site management to maybe debate, challenge, beyond what was 2 acceptable before – at the plant that might cause the plant to cut down or to stay 3 4 down longer than required? One more time with the question. 5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. 6 :I kind of lost my focus. 7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was it your impression 8 9 back then, I mean we are talking about, this is all in March, and most of the issues that you brought up occurred in this frame, 2003 time frame, was it your 10 impression during that time period that there was pressure from senior site 11 management to challenge issues which might cause - maybe inappropriately 12 challenge issues which might cause the plant to have to come down, stop 13 operating, make outages longer than people thought needed? Was that your 14 15 impression, that there was that kind of pressure from senior – I mean, you are pretty senior here, but from way above even you, was there that kind of pressure, 16 was it your perception? 17 No. Obviously, I'm a day away from some, 18 you know, emotional frustration here on this tape, and I'm talking to this person 19 20 who is supposed to be, you know, some type of guru type thing. SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. 21 But, no, no, I honestly don't see the pressure 22 angle from senior leadership in these issues. 23 Now, at this point, this was in March, I'm seven months away 24 from this, but -25 All 10

1	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Our understanding is the
2	conversation took place March 20th, which is –
3	And, this is October.
4	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - I guess, three days after
5	the valve event, wasn't it March 17th?
6	MR. ORR: That sounds right.
7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
8	That timing makes sense with what I heard
9	on the tape —
10	(Whereupon, bad section of tape.)
11	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -the conversation talking
12	about the length of the meeting, " after four to six hours, but this is my
13	perspective I'm not going to share with anybody."
14	I didn't write that one down.
15	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I can go back and play it.
16	No, I don't - I'm not challenging you.
17	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
1.8	I mean, from the Agency's perspective, if they think someone
19	at your level can't share your perspective on your view on a safety issue, like the
20	valve issue, with anybody, then the Commission might think that would be a
21	problem down here at the site.
22	f see.
23	I think that the reference on saying that is that it wasn't much
24	of - as much of a - how should I say it - ask me the question again, I'm a little
25	flustered. All 1C

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, that's all right. I mean, I understand. 2 I'm a little flustered. This has never happened 3 to me before, so -4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This is something new. 5 – I'm a little off base here. 6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: There's a comment that you 7 make on the tape, talking about the valve issue again. "After four to six hours, 8 9 but this is my perspective I'm not going to share with anybody." And, my follow-up to you was, if the Commission feels that or sees that a manager at 10 your level can't share his or her perspective on a safety issue like the valve issue, 11 that we might view that as a Safety Conscious Work Environment issue. 12 13 14 So, the way you asked the question, I think I understand it. We get to the right decision, it takes that long, and the 15 16 management decision is belabored and, ultimately, I guess - I don't know if I do have an answer for this now that I -17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I guess the part of it, "... 18 I'm not going to share with anybody," is the thing I'm asking about, why did you 19 feel that way at that time? Or, is it even in context, number one, it seems like 20 21 it is. I think so. 22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why did you feel that way 23 24 at that time?

All TO

So, I'm not going to talk to anybody about it could be a 1 reference to - was that what the quote was? 2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. 3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: "After four to six hours, 4 but this is my perspective I'm not going to share it with anybody," you were 5 talking about the issue, the meetings, the discussions. 6 Right, now I don't know what the topic was. 7 I think I got this in context, and maybe – I don't know what the timing of this 8 was relative to this recirc incident I'm talking about, I don't know whether it was 9 between the two, after the second one, I don't know. It was probably between 10 the two, with the length of time we needed to go into the thing. 11 12 But – I lost my train of thought – the situation with the recirc system, and I did end up talking to him -13 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.) 14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You said you did. 15 The whole scene was playing out again. 16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. And, you did say 17 earlier that you were talking about both. 18 Right. The whole scene was playing out 19 again all over again. 20 So, I don't know if that answers the question or not, but -21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you think that 22 conversation with conversation with Kim Harvin? 23 The way to determine that, there would be 24 an easy way to determine that. 25 All 10

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh. 1 Oh, okay. 2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Again, but the question 3 goes to, it sounds like you – at least when you are talking to her, you are telling 4 her you are not going to share your perspective on that issue with anyone. 5 6 7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you still feel that way about -8 9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - safety issues here at the 10 plant? 11 12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did something change 13 between now and then, where now you would, back then in that time period 14 maybe you wouldn't? 15 -16 Can we go off the record for a second? 17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's 7:14. 18 19 (Whereupon, at 7:14 p.m., a recess was taken.) SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Back on the record. 20 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.) 21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - context. 22 Well, my response is as follows, I think that 23 24 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.) 25



- we talked about it earlier on in the

interview, and -

(Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

To him, it was about this issue, and the reality was, subsequent to this, several days later, or a few days later, I did, and I recall, as I had said earlier, about the mixed message that it sends, and that people talk about these types of decisions, and we need to – we need to be more decisive in our – in what our decision is and how we communicate it out, because these types of conversations do occur amongst managers, whether that's appropriate or not.

So, I wanted to get that point across.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You made a comment off the record that you went in and talked to about this after the recirc valve issue. You brought up both issues to him.




SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, you said you came out of that meeting where you made the statement, "That's exactly what I was talking about," can you tell me what you meant by that?

Yes. When I said "that's exactly what I was talking about," what I'm trying to say is that, what I'm trying to say is that, that when we debated over this issue on the bypass valve, and it sent a message to the people in the room and others that, you know, we had to debate four to six hours over something that was ultimately a bolt in the valve, and then we debated an equivalent amount of time on the recirc issue, and there was other

All TC

options there, it became - it became clear that other - that we could be perceived 1 as not being firm in our position relative to how we are operating the plant. 2 And, I pointed those issues out to like I'm thinking from my 3 memory if we actually built the time line about two days later, two or three days 4 later from when this taped conversation occurred. 5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The next statement on the 6 tape that you made was to the effect of, "The fact that we were even there means 7 we don't come from safety," again talking about this valve issue. What did you 8 mean by that, "... we don't come from safety." 9 Well, it's the same theme, I think that in the 10 frustration of this moment it was - it was, we were looking at this from an issue 11 12 of - of -SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Production over safety? 13 - I can't go there, I can't say that, I can't say 14 it's production over safety, over what all the items it could be, but you have to 15 keep in mind that I believe if you built this time line it's probably best to take a 16 step back here, and that's probably the way I can answer the questions better. 17 I was frustrated, I sat there for – for – in this meeting, and I 18 had – I struggled with the debate, we shut the plant down, we found the problem 19 with the valve, and I needed somebody to vent those frustrations towards to clear 20 my head to make - to do the right thing, which was ultimately to talk to 21 about it. 22 So, I think that's what this occurred, I think that this is like a 23 venting process for me. 24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: With Kim Harvin? 25

1	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you still feel that way
2	today, that we -
3	Vo.
4	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - meaning senior
5	management, plant management, site management, doesn't come from safety?
6	No.
7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have you felt that, have
.8	you emotionally felt that way over other issues down here at the site, like you
9	did with this one? You've been here a long time, you've got a lot of experience
10	down here.
11	Right. No, I can't recall feeling that way
12	about any other issues.
13	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This was, in my words, an
14	event for you, hearing this conversation –
15	Yes.
16	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -reacting to it, and getting
17	emotional about it.
18	But, I have been emotional before.
19	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
20	I've been upset before.
21	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, we all have.
22	I have strong feelings about doing the right
23	thing, and I can't say that there's not some other issue somewhere where I could
24	have said something like that.
25	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
- 1	·



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

But, after the fact, and I review it, and you ask me about it, I probably wouldn't have characterized this in my memory, six or seven months later, whatever it is, seven months later, I probably wouldn't have added this into that question either as being, did you come from safety, because, ultimately, we did the right thing. There was frustration —

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.



at the time over having to debate it for so


long.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

That was a very emotional meeting and emotional decision, because, you know, first of all you don't know what's inside the valve.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

Wow, how hot did it get in that meeting? I mean, it just sounds like it's even more than we initially talked about.



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was it everybody had a position and then that had his position?

challenging everybody.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.



I don't - seven months later, I don't

remember the context of it.

All 70

Later on in this taped conversation there's a comment you 1 2 make that, something to the effect of you don't understand the economics. It's a little inaudible around there, but -3 didn't hear it. 4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - if I remember correctly, 5 it's you relating this to Kim Harvin, and she's asking you questions about, you 6 know, maybe why this took so long, why - you know, why the challenging 7 questions from and you make this statement that, you are being told, 8 9 or when you are raising the concern you are being told, "You don't understand the economics of it." Do you remember that? 10 I didn't hear that one on the tape, that's not 11 one I wrote down. I was trying to listen to all the significant quotes. 12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, that's a significant 13 14 thing, too. es, I know, but I didn't hear it. 15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. 16 17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I can replay it if you want, 18 to get the context if you want, it's in there. 19 I don't think you have to. 20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did that come up in the 21 putting forth, "You don't understand the 22 economics of the decision to turn the plant off and fix the valve," did that come 23 24 up?

All 10

to keep the plant running, or, you know, we are not going to be able to meet some target or do this or that. Okay? I've never heard that, I never heard reference of it, and I've never been in a meeting with it. Okay?

So, like I said, this would be a context type thing for her to explain, you know, everything that goes into a management decision. That's what I think will come out of that.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

Well, I mean, today, yourself, I mean if you had a concern here at the plant, safety concern, industrial safety, nuclear safety, do you feel like you could bring it up to management, your management, to get it resolved? If it's hitting a wall someplace, do you feel that you are able to do that freely without suffering any repercussion?



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have people in your chain of command told you that they felt they couldn't do that, for fear of repercussions, retaliation?



SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You said that you know many of the non-licensed operators in the Hope Creek site. Have any of them told you that they feel that they can't push what they think, right or wrong, they might not be right, but if they think they have a true safety concern at the plant, have any of them told you that they feel they can't raise that up, or push that, or pursue that, for fear of retaliation?

No. It's like I said before, it's they feel more frustrated, it's not retaliation, it's identifying industrial safety issues, especially

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for the non-licensed operators, or plant fix problems and they can't get 1 something fixed to their satisfaction in time. 2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, okay. 3 Dan? 4 MR. ORR: For those reasons, do they stop raising issues? Out 5 of frustration, do they stop raising issues out of frustration? 6 I don't know, I will say that I don't know if 7 that's true or not. I don't have – I don't have direct evidence, although I will say 8 when I go into the plant with what I'll call something of a, you know, critical 9 eye, I see things that - I see some things that probably should be identified that 10 aren't. 11 MR. ORR: Yes. 12 And, I don't know if that is the result of their 13 behavior or not, I don't know, of that behavior or not, I don't know. 14 MR. ORR: Okay. 15 A point on clarification and trying to understand, you talked 16 about two meetings in the OSC. Was that two meetings on one issue, the turbine 17 18 bypass valve issue? No, my memory is one was on the bypass 19 20 valve and one was on the recirc issue. MR. ORR: Okay, all right. 21 That's my memory. 22 23 MR. ORR: So, they were separate in time. 24

25

MR. ORR: So, the meeting on the turbine bypass valve issue pretty much went continuous until you reached some sort of consensus.



That's, to my memory, yes, to my memory.

MR. ORR: Okay.

No further questions.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR I hit you with a lot tonight, but I'm going to tell you, our coming to you, it was the same reason. We had something a little - the tape was something unusual, but there's been a broad – there's been a concern raised with the broad skewy environment down here. This is just part of what I guess the Commission is going to try and do with this, and I'll speak for the Commission, you know.


But, it's not like we are just going to talk to you and this is going to end, I wanted to tell you that. But, I wanted to tell you, I appreciate you meeting with us today, coming down here, not knowing what this was about, not knowing me, not knowing - I explained to you the purpose of what we were going to do, and I thank you for sitting through all of this, including me pulling the tape out and playing it.

I wanted to tell you thank you for that, and thank you for your cooperation, your time, and your patience, with this whole process.

With that, I don't have anything else to add. Is there something you would like to add?

I'd like to go off the record for a second and review my notes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.



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1	No.
1	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right, it's 7:40.
2	(Whereupon, at 7:40 p.m., a recess until 8:45 p.m.)
3	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. It's about 8:45.
4	is there something you want to add?
5	No, nothing else.
6	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, then this interview
7	is concluded. Again, thank you very much.
8	(Whereupon, at 8:45 p.m., the above-entitled matter was
9	concluded.)
10	. 10
11	All 1
12	7'`