

Official Transcript of Proceedings
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

ff Interview of [REDACTED] 7C

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey

Date: Tuesday, October 6, 2003

Work Order No.: NRC-1136

Pages 1-109 86

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Act, exemptions 7C

FOIA- 2005-194

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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

3 + + + + +

4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

5 INTERVIEW

6 -----X

7 IN THE MATTER OF: :

8 INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.

9 [REDACTED] : 1-2003-051F

10 (CLOSED) :

11 -----X

12
13 Tuesday, October 6, 2003

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16
17 The above-entitled interview was conducted at (Time not
18 provided).

19
20 BEFORE:

21 Senior Special Agent JEFF TEATOR

22 ALSO PRESENT:

23 NRC SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR DAN ORR

24
25 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

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2
(time not provided)

1
2 [REDACTED]: Again, I think [REDACTED] (phonetic) was in
3 the room.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

5 [REDACTED]: That's a think.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

7 [REDACTED]: And, [REDACTED] It was really an office
8 decision.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Sure, yes.

10 Was he challenging anybody else more in particular of those
11 three?

12 [REDACTED]: I don't remember. I don't really remember,
13 Jeff.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

15 Again, I think I asked you this before but I'm going to ask you
16 it again, was there, to your knowledge, was there any pressure being put on that
17 decision to not shut down and fix the valve, was there any pressure being
18 applied from senior management up in Newark to not let that happen, turn the
19 plant back on and we'll go forward?

20 [REDACTED]: Not that I know of. Not that I know of, and
21 I've never - I've never heard of that happening here either. So, you know.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

23 Did you make a statement to the effect - I'm getting a little
24 more direct with you now -

25 [REDACTED]: That's fine.

ALL TC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: – but it's just to probe this
2 some more, because this issue is something that the Commission is interested in,
3 right, Dan?

4 MR. ORR: Yes, absolutely.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you make a statement
6 to the effect of, that if we had not gone in and fixed that valve, instead turned the
7 plant back on and you moved forward, that that could be grounds for the NRC
8 taking the keys away to this place? Words to that effect.

9 [REDACTED] I don't remember saying it, but I could – I
10 could – that would not be out of character for me to, you know, say something
11 to get the attention if I thought that the meeting was going the wrong way.

12 So, my answer to you is, I don't remember saying that quote.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

14 [REDACTED] I can tell you, Jeff, that if I was in a – if I was
15 in a three-hour meeting on something like this, and I started getting concerned
16 that the meeting was going the other way, or that the decision was going the
17 other way, yeah, that's a card I'd play to get people's attention.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you play that card?

19 [REDACTED] Like I said, I can't remember saying that
20 quote.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

22 [REDACTED] I can't remember saying that quote.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At the meeting.

24 [REDACTED] Right.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

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1 [REDACTED] But, yeah, because that's—I mean, well, look
2 at it, I mean —

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I know.

4 [REDACTED] — you find a bulb in the seat (phonetic).

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The noise when the valve
6 was stroking was something.

7 [REDACTED] Well, just play the scenario the other way
8 around, and we go to shut down a month later and it wouldn't be good.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 [REDACTED] For anyone.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why were you going to
12 shut down a month later, for the outage?

13 [REDACTED] Refuel outage, yeah.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was there any discussion
15 about, let's wait until the outage before we go in and check the valve? Did that
16 discussion occur during this three hour or so meeting?

17 [REDACTED] I'm laughing because I can't remember — I
18 can't remember who is saying what in the meeting.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

20 [REDACTED] Because I'm just kind of waiting for the right
21 decision to come.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

23 [REDACTED] So, I'm in idle most of the time.

ALL 7C

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that part of [REDACTED]
2 challenge to the group, we've got an outage in the month, if there's something
3 in the valve we'll go in and find out then.

4 [REDACTED] I can't remember him saying that. I can't
5 remember him bringing that up. I don't remember those words.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You don't remember or
7 could it have been said?

8 [REDACTED] I mean, it could have, I don't remember it.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

10 You wanted to ask something?

11 MR. ORR: Were there any considerations for production,
12 besides just the obvious, coming up in power, like the fuel reload analysis, right,
13 that was potentially jeopardized? My question is, were those considerations
14 taking place along and factored into the decision making?

15 [REDACTED] Yes. I remember - I remember that being a
16 concern.

17 MR. ORR: Okay.

18 [REDACTED] And, the fuel exposure, because that was a
19 month before the outage.

20 MR. ORR: Right.

21 [REDACTED] I don't - I don't remember that being
22 discussed in the meeting, I remember that being a question out that [REDACTED]
23 (phonetic) and the group wanted, you know, would we need to run for another
24 week to fully deplete the fuel for the next cycle, and what would be the - what
25 would be the impact of that.

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1 MR. ORR: Okay.

2 [REDACTED] But, I don't remember that influencing the
3 decision in the meeting.

4 MR. ORR: Okay.

5 How about any of the other licensed operators present, did
6 they express any concern to you over undue pressure, they being the license
7 holders being challenged for what you see as kind of a simple safety decision?

8 [REDACTED] I don't remember, no, I don't remember who
9 the licensed individual was that night. Whoever it was spent very little time in
10 the room, to my memory. They may have been in and out, but kind of left it to
11 [REDACTED] and I think [REDACTED] was there. But, that's appropriate.

12 MR. ORR: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] I can't remember who it was either.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I've got to take a short
15 break for a minute. I have to hit the men's room. It's 20 after 6:00.

16 (Whereupon, at 6:20 p.m., a recess until 6:30 p.m.)

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, it's almost 6:30, a
18 couple more things I wanted to go over with you [REDACTED]

19 Coming out of the decision regarding the bypass valve, where
20 eventually the right decision was made, did that leave you with a feeling,
21 though, that just the fact that they were retaining some of the ideas there, I mean,
22 we didn't get into all the specifics, but there were people in there who thought
23 it was clear black and white we need to shut down and fix the valve, investigate
24 and then fix the valve if needed. And [REDACTED] is challenging the group,
25 challenging the OPS (phonetic) people, challenging the group. Did the fact that

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1 senior management, in the form of [REDACTED] was challenging in that way, did
2 that make you wonder about where he was coming from regarding safety
3 perspectives?

4 [REDACTED] I'm probably going to be jumping ahead, but
5 I feel the need to to answer your question on this one. I answered before [REDACTED]
6 was challenging.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

8 [REDACTED] And, I saw that that's what he was doing.
9 Where I got frustrated, and I mentioned this before, on this recirc issue where I
10 got frustrated to the point, I sort of let that linger, you know, the thing from the
11 bypass valve.

12 MR. ORR: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] Because I knew what he was doing, he was
14 challenging. Quite frankly, I'm going to use the word, I thought it was just
15 inefficient. I thought we should have just made the decision and gone on. I said
16 that before in this interview.

17 But, with the recirc decision, I sort of let that stay inside me
18 with the recirc decision. I remember having a conversation with [REDACTED] afterwards,
19 which was after the bypass valve decision, and saying - I said something to the
20 effect to him that, you know, [REDACTED] I don't understand how we can linger so long
21 over this shut down issue with the bypass valves, and then you get something
22 here on the other side, with this recirc pump or whatever the issue was, and we
23 had options available to us, and then we lay a - put a line in the sand and say we
24 are not going over that. I told him I thought it sent mixed messages, and I was
25 upset by that.

A11 7C

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How did he respond?
2 [REDACTED] We talked it out, and he said, well, you
3 know, you can't take it that way. And, I remember [REDACTED] saying something to the
4 effect, if I remember properly, that, you know, what we've already talked about
5 in here, that, you know, my job is to challenge people, is to challenge the
6 organization, so they are, you know, always thinking and fully walking through
7 all the different options on the issue. And, I was okay with that when he went
8 through with that.

9 I hope that answered your original question, but it actually
10 extended into the second example as well.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

12 When you told [REDACTED] that you felt a mixed message was being
13 sent, did you get specific to him as to what you saw as a mixed message?

14 [REDACTED] Specific as far as my statement that, you
15 know, we had the bypass valve issue with the spoilt in the pipe, and then we
16 have this other issue with recirc, and that can be, that in itself can be a mixed
17 message where we spend all that time on the bypass valve and then we stop on
18 the recirc pump, that can be a mixed message to folks on the management team.
19 And, he was, you know, he felt that that was a fair conversation.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm trying to understand --

21 [REDACTED] Okay.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- the mixed message
23 thing. What was the --

24 [REDACTED] We have what to some was a safety issue.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The valve.

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[REDACTED] Yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED] And, let's just go make the decision and be on with it type discussions. It sounds fairly simple, but who is in charge --

(Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

[REDACTED] I can't remember exact time lines, but I remember one --

(Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

[REDACTED] We have [REDACTED] who is functioning as the plant manager, but really has all three units reporting to the Vice President of Operations as well.

MR. ORR: Who would that be?

[REDACTED] And then, of course, the Vice President of Operations, and it seemed, I'm going to use this as the example, it seemed like, and I don't mean to jump on one individual, it seemed like at that time it was always decision by committee, and I'm using this example, and I'll just kind of keep talking, and, therefore, you get opinions on what the right thing to do is, as opposed to the leader making a decision and everyone providing the technical input on what the right thing to do is. It sounds like a simple difference, but it could be -- it could be emotional in these types of examples.

MR. ORR: Did this get emotional, talk about this valve issue, in March of this year?

[REDACTED] I think in those March issues I would use that example on the bypass valve. There was -- during the shutdown there was a

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1 diesel exhaust manifold that needed to be repaired, that we clearly didn't put our
2 best foot forward on, and there was another issue on the recirc system. If we
3 need to either stop for a second or I might need Dan's memory help, but I
4 remember that being in that same time frame, the decision to start up from that
5 outage after we fixed the bypass valve with -

6 MR. ORR: My memory is, you came down for a recirc pump
7 seal replacement, right? You had a bad acting seal, you came into a forced
8 outage.

9 [REDACTED] We started up and there were some decisions
10 about not starting up because of something on a recirc pump. It was another
11 emotional issue.

12 MR. ORR: Yes.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Same shutdown?

14 [REDACTED] Yes. There was three events all in one, Jeff,
15 and probably as I keep talking it will come to me.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

17 [REDACTED] I apologize for not having it right now.
18 All three of those, and I don't know whether this has anything
19 to do with what you are looking into or not, but all three of those were the
20 management by committee routine. There was a lot of strong feelings about
21 what we should or shouldn't do, and there was long discussions within the Hope
22 Creek Station before decisions were ultimately made.

23 MR. ORR: Did you view any of those discussions as being -
24 or any positions as being inappropriate, going against the safety culture?

A11 TC

1 [REDACTED] Not ultimately, but with the way that the
2 committee, if you will, for lack of a better term, and we can talk about that more
3 if you want on follow-up, I am not one to spend a long time debating the issue
4 as far as I like to see what the facts are and what the technical people have and
5 then go do the right thing and put the plant in the right place. And, what I saw
6 was that we were debating issues, for example, with a bypass valve, this is
7 specifically what I remember, Jeff, that the technicians went down, the valve
8 was stroked, and it was not a closed indication, and there was redundant reactor
9 parameters that indicated that the valve was, indeed, open. Okay?

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] And, the valve squealed when it stroked. In
12 other words, something was bound in it.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Stroked means shut.

14 [REDACTED] I can't remember if it was open or shut, but
15 -

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

17 [REDACTED] - in either direction there was mechanical
18 noise, metal-to-metal noise.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

20 [REDACTED] And, there was quite a debate over what the
21 right thing to do was.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What was, really,
23 according to like the plant license, you know, and the requirements, what was
24 the right thing to do?

All TC

[REDACTED] Shut the plant down and go into the valve and find out what's wrong.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

Did that happen?

[REDACTED] Yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED] Yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

[REDACTED] But, okay, now I don't know what your – obviously, what your input is, but I come up with this example and kind of cast my line in the water for you, because of the length of discussions that went on, and, you know, people talked to me outside the room after this discussion would go on for four hours, and we'd talk about who was there if that's important or whatever.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, that would help, the major players, the people putting forward the position.

[REDACTED] was there, myself, this is to the best of my memory, [REDACTED] I mentioned his title, [REDACTED]

(phonetic) [REDACTED] this is to the best of my memory now [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] at the time. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I'm not sure –

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Somebody from corporate?

[REDACTED] I don't remember.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: By phone?

[REDACTED] No.

ALL TC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

2 [REDACTED] And, you know, we debated the issue, and
3 I think the fact that we debated it, and I'll try the other two examples, too, I think
4 one of them is a different subject, Jeff, but the fact that we debated it when your
5 senses tell you, hey, we really ought to do this and get on with it –

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: "Do this" meaning shut the
7 plant down and find out what the problem with the valve is?

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

10 [REDACTED] – could lead one to believe – why does that
11 take so long, are we really being as safe as we should be.

12 And, once again, I want to reiterate, the right thing was done.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

14 [REDACTED] Okay, operating in accordance with the
15 license and the right thing to do. I mean, there was a bolt that was found in the
16 valve from the seat of a sister valve on the same bank.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which side of the equation
18 were you on at that meeting? Were you on the side, hey, we need to shut down
19 and find out what's wrong with the valve?

20 [REDACTED] Well, my emotion was that I thought it was
21 sort of silly that we were even talking about it.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So, to answer my question

23 –
24 [REDACTED] I thought we should have been shutting
25 down.

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, and who was
2 voicing the opposing position the most strongly of the group?

3 [REDACTED] My memory is that [REDACTED] was
4 making sure that we had -- was challenging the team that we had all angles, if
5 you will, or had thought of all the possibilities, before we went and made the
6 decision. And, that was his job.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] To make sure that we fully understood the
9 issue.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who else was on his side
11 of the equation in that group? Do you remember?

12 [REDACTED] I don't really remember anybody being --
13 taking sides per se.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

15 [REDACTED] I remember [REDACTED] asking questions, and
16 people either stating what they knew about it or having to go out and get
17 information and bring it back.

18 And so, I wouldn't say it was a taking sides issue, as much as
19 it was do we really know what we are doing here.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] So, and I think some of that emotion was
22 people saying, hey, this is pretty clear, but [REDACTED] just wanted to make sure.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How long did that
24 discussion go on? I mean, people were thinking it was a clear-cut decision, how
25 long did the discussion go on before, ultimately --

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[REDACTED] Two hours.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - two hours.

[REDACTED] That would be my guess, maybe three.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was there -

[REDACTED] It was evening I remember.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - was there like an action statement clocked and started at that point?

[REDACTED] I don't think so.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No?

[REDACTED] I'm not sure, though.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED] I don't think so. We may have been below the power level that's required, it may have been below 25 percent. I'm not sure.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because of these other two things that were going on at that point?

[REDACTED] No, no, no.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You said that there were three issues.

[REDACTED] Yes, but it wasn't due to the other two items.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, we'll come back to those other two.

[REDACTED] If that's of interest to you.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, it is.

[REDACTED] The plant conditions, and I'm not sure of the narratives and all, but would tell you if we were actually in an action statement.

1 For that particular action statement, as an experience on the unit, the reactor –
2 that action statement doesn't apply below 25 percent thermal power. I know we
3 were low on power, but I don't know where we were.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm going to ask you how
5 you felt regarding [REDACTED] position, did you feel his challenging the staff in
6 that meeting was – went over the line?

7 [REDACTED] I don't think so.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No?

9 [REDACTED] I don't think so, I just thought it was – I
10 thought it was more than what we needed to go over. We had a lot of work to
11 do to turn the thing around.

12 I'm trying to remember exactly, there was two meetings in the
13 OSC, and this was one of them. Yes.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, this meeting is
15 regarding the Hope Creek turbine bypass valve issue?

16 [REDACTED] That's correct.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

18 Did [REDACTED] make any statements to the effect of where
19 he was – if he was getting direction from anyone above him regarding his
20 position, challenging this? Let's make sure we know everything.

21 [REDACTED] No.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he make any
23 statements to that effect, meaning he was getting pressure from corporate to not
24 shut the plant down, did he give any indication that that occurred here?

25 [REDACTED] Corporate Newark?

All TC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, or the CNO here at
2 the site, I guess that's who [REDACTED] would report to.

3 [REDACTED]: Oh, not to my knowledge.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Either/or.

5 [REDACTED]: Not to my knowledge. When you said
6 corporate I – relative to operations, operating activities, they are not – they are
7 not what I would say involved. So – and when I think of corporate I'm thinking
8 of executive officers in Newark.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, that would be above
10 [REDACTED] (phonetic) used to be.

11 [REDACTED] right, was the [REDACTED] at that
12 time.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But, he would have
14 reported to the most senior people in the whole corporation.

15 [REDACTED] he was a direct report to [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] I believe, [REDACTED] reports to [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED] so there's someone between [REDACTED]

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

19 But, when [REDACTED] was here, [REDACTED] reported straight to
20 [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]: That's correct.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was [REDACTED] still here when
23 this issue occurred, this bypass valve issue?

24 [REDACTED]: Yes. [REDACTED] left in May, my memory is he
25 left in May, and this occurred in March.

ALL TC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you recall him
2 providing input into where this decision should go, whether let's shut the plant
3 down, check the valve out, or let's continue, let's debate, let's review?

4 [REDACTED] None to my knowledge.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

6 Did any of these other people who were present at the meeting
7 that you are recalling, [REDACTED] there's a license
8 holder there you can't recall the person's name, did any of those people tell you
9 that they thought [REDACTED] challenging or direction was inappropriate, sent the
10 wrong message? I mean, this is all personal kind of stuff, I mean, you have
11 people's feelings, whether they thought that [REDACTED] went over the line, did any
12 of those people tell you that they felt that way in how he handled and was
13 directing the team and challenging the team on this issue?

14 [REDACTED] I don't remember specifically on that, no.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because everybody has
16 their own opinions and feelings.

17 [REDACTED] Right.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, that's a little bit what
19 this is about.

20 [REDACTED] Right.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do people feel like they
22 can bring up concerns?

23 [REDACTED] Right.

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do they feel they can push
2 their position if it's a conservative position, without suffering some impact by
3 their management?

4 [REDACTED] See, the other thing, Jeff, that I wanted to
5 bring up, and this may be a little bit of a shift gear, but it also might give you
6 incite and answer some questions for you, is -- let me kind of go for a little bit
7 more, all right?

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, yes.

9 [REDACTED] So, we do this, we make this decision on this
10 bypass valve thing.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You find a bolt down there
12 in the valve.

13 [REDACTED] Yes, then we are starting back, we're getting
14 ready to start back up. I'm doing this from my memory. There is something on
15 the recirc system that's holding us back from starting back up, and it's not tech
16 spec related. It's killing me, I can't --

17 MR. ORR: I don't remember anything.

18 [REDACTED] Well, you wouldn't have paid too much
19 attention to it, Dan --

20 MR. ORR: Not at the Hope Creek site.

21 [REDACTED] -- because it wasn't -- that's true, too, because
22 it wasn't license related.

23 However, it was something, it will come to me, it was
24 something that was not a safety issue for the reactor, and at some point, even if

All 7C

1 I have to go off the record or call you afterwards, it will come to me, it was not
2 a safety issue for the reactor and wasn't necessary for the start up of the unit.

3 Can we just stop the tape for one second?

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

5 [REDACTED] It's just I want to remember.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's 5:08, I just wanted to
7 put the time on there.

8 (Whereupon, at 5:08 p.m., a recess until 5:10 p.m.)

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. We're back on the
10 record. It's about 5:10.

11 [REDACTED] you were trying to recall this recirc problem that you
12 recalled holding the plant back up from going back up to full power. You were
13 trying to recall that.

14 [REDACTED] Actually, I asked Jeff to go off the record
15 because I was trying to recall what the specific subject was, and I wanted to talk
16 to Dan Orr. But, I cannot recall, but it was an issue with the recirc pumps that
17 was a non-safety-related issue. It was something that could have been addressed
18 during the start-up sequence, and we had a tremendous amount of difficulty,
19 once again, making the decision.

20 Now, in this particular case – I cannot recall what the subject
21 was, in this particular case my feelings were that the right thing to do, it had no
22 safety implications whatsoever, tech spec or otherwise, was to start the reactor
23 up and monitor it, and we could remove the pump – I remember having the
24 technical thought that we could remove the pump from service if necessary at

All TC

1 an intermediate power level during the start-up sequence and safely perform the
2 maintenance evolution if we had to, restart the pump and continue on.

3 And, once again, the meeting attendees, this was several days
4 after the bypass valve discussion, the meeting attendees were, basically, the
5 same, and we actually held off the reactor start up to fix that issue.

6 And, there was some -- there was some emotion around that.
7 Now, that may not be a safety conscious work environment type thing from the
8 NRC perspective, but the emotions of the frustration that management could feel
9 about this meeting, or excuse me, decision by committee type thing, I think is
10 another example.

11 If you need the actual subject I'm sure that can be found
12 through the corrective action program or operator logs.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You've gone back to that
14 twice now, decision by committee.

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, correct me if I'm
17 wrong, if I'm hearing you right senior management here at the site didn't really
18 like that management by committee, they wanted what? Am I right, is that what
19 you are saying?

20 [REDACTED] No, I didn't -- no, I'm not saying that. I think
21 it evolved, that type of behavior evolved because you didn't clearly have in the
22 organizational makeup who the right decision maker was.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The plant manager.

24 [REDACTED] Right.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: For each plant.

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[REDACTED] Right.

And so, it evolved over the course of time into decision by committee.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] And, there were those who really, you know, and myself included – well, let me say the sentence first – there were those who really had no decision-making authority on some of these issues in their present positions, yet, everybody is in the room providing input. I mean, it's good to have that input, but, you know, without the clear authority you can get the emotional decision, or the emotion feelings around that.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It sounds like here in this recirc issue, though, whereas in the first issue you thought it was clear cut, they should have shut down, checked the valve out, and then go forward.

[REDACTED] Right.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In this second issue, where you are beginning to come back up to power after fixing the valve –

[REDACTED] Correct.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: –you think this isn't really a problem, let's increase power and move towards full power.

[REDACTED] There was actually beginning to pull for criticality and then starting the start-up sequence. There was no – I had no concerns with – what I do recall is, I had no concerns whatsoever, as did others in the group, with the operation of the recirc system and its ability to cool the core.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

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Did [REDACTED] feel that way on that issue, do you remember?

[REDACTED] My memory was he wanted it fixed.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, well, yeah, everybody wants it fixed.

[REDACTED] No, he wanted it fixed before we started up.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. So, he was trying to put players in spots here. It's not always easy.

[REDACTED] Correct.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But, it seems like [REDACTED] on this issue, was more conservative, meaning he wanted —

[REDACTED] To fix whatever the equipment was before a rod was pulled, yes, you could say that, yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Whereas others, including yourself, thought it was okay to increase power the way it was, based on your feeling that the recirc system was going to do its job.

[REDACTED] Right.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right, that's interesting.

[REDACTED] Once again, you know, for the technical matter, and any judge on that with the NRC, you'd have to get the actual issue from the records.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I defer to these guys.

[REDACTED] Got it.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

So, those are two issues around the March time frame.

[REDACTED] Yes.

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, you mentioned a
2 diesel.

3 [REDACTED] I actually have two other issues. I guess
4 there's four issues, and if I'm hitting it, Jeff, or not, hopefully, I'm giving you the
5 background.

6 Another Hope Creek example on diesel exhaust, and I can talk
7 about that if you'd like.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, please.

9 [REDACTED] And then, the other example that I have is,
10 we had a bout with grassing at Salem in March, it was March.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you do the diesel one
12 first?

13 [REDACTED] Sure.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is that good?

15 [REDACTED] Sure.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right, time frame?

17 [REDACTED] It was before the bypass valves and the recirc
18 issue, because we fixed this issue during this outage. So, the actual exhaust
19 issues that I'll go through, I'll say it's March to April time frame, probably
20 March.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Of '03?

22 [REDACTED] Yes.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, but before the
24 bypass issue.

25 [REDACTED] Yes.

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23
1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

2 [REDACTED] Definitely.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. And, this is a
4 Hope Creek issue again?

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] Now, this one doesn't -- this one, for me, my
8 story doesn't put a bunch of people in a room. I do have some perspective on it.
9 The exhaust off of, I believe, it was the B (Bravo) diesel generator. There's a
10 series of, it's a manifold, just like a huge muffler on your car.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

12 [REDACTED] And, it goes out the exhaust out the roof.
13 There are expansion bellows, wavy pieces of metal to absorb the growth, the
14 metal growth from the heat, and several of those had developed leaks.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

16 [REDACTED] I was the [REDACTED] at
17 the time, I had outages and work management, work control, basically.

18 And, I didn't realize at the time how significant these leaks
19 were, and I should have. The leaks were of such a magnitude that ultimately the
20 decision was made, based on the carbon monoxide levels in the room, that they
21 were directing -- they being the Operations Department -- were directing the
22 equipment operators to, based on the safety input, the industrial safety input,
23 there were SCBAs in the room, self-contained breathing apparatus, in the room
24 to do the surveillance.

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1 So, the severity of that issue, and the need to jump on that and
2 fix that, in my opinion, at least at my level, was never fully expressed to me, in
3 such a time that my department could systematically repair the leaks or schedule
4 up a systematic repair to the leaks.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What happened then, with
6 the flow of information to your department on that issue, if you know? I mean,
7 how come you –

8 [REDACTED] I don't know. I don't know. What I would
9 say is that, you know, I can't say it at this level, it was never properly
10 communicated and prioritized from the Operations Department to the Work
11 Control boys. And, I mean, that may be a statement of the obvious in this case,
12 but –

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You don't know why? Do
14 you know why that didn't –

15 [REDACTED] Well, I can't say it in detail. I mean, when
16 you ask me that, I'm thinking about people and notifications.

17 This thing, this thing didn't start leaking in one run, it got
18 progressively worse over – over months.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So, surveillances must
20 have identified, at some point, that there was a CO₂ leak coming out of this
21 manifold.

22 [REDACTED] Right.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Carbon monoxide is –

24 [REDACTED] Right.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's carbon dioxide.

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[REDACTED] CO, same thing.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

[REDACTED] It's just like sitting in your garage with a car running and the door closed.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Not good.

[REDACTED] That's not good.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was the operation of the diesel at that point, was it critical for the plant that that piece of equipment remain in operation?

[REDACTED] Absolutely.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

[REDACTED] Well, not in operation, to remain operable.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

[REDACTED] Remain to be able to function, to support, you know, a loss of power.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were the other diesels available if that one had to be taken out of service?

[REDACTED] Yes, we could have easily scheduled that, yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED] Yes. The thing is, Jeff, the reason I bring up this story is, first of all, you know, I think it could be an example on the Safety Conscious Work Environment type thing. You know, indirectly, I know that caused a lot of problem and emotion for the non-licensed operators.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, I bet.

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[REDACTED] And -

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Understandable.

[REDACTED] - it should. And, it should. There's a lot to

be learned from that. The irony is, ultimately, when we went into this outage to replace the recirc seal we did this job, and we did it, I believe, well I know it was less than 24 hours, and it's a 72-hour LCO. If the flag had been accurately or appropriately, not accurately, appropriately raised we could have jumped all over this thing and done it on line before it ever got to a situation where it was such an emotional event.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were the NLOs voicing a concern with this leak getting progressively worse? I mean, if there -

[REDACTED] I never - I never specifically talked to a non-

licensed operator about it, because really it wasn't hitting a proper priority. Now, I'm kind of up in the management chain.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Sure.

[REDACTED] But, they had to have been.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I would think.

[REDACTED] With the shift supervision, they had to have

been.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When did you become aware of this issue?

[REDACTED] I knew that there was issues, and I'm going

back, I don't know, in January or February, I'll say one to two months before we got this thing where the decision is being made. I believe that the Safety Department got involved with a level to the Operations Department management

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1 that the decision was made if we were going to do this in March, the surveillance
2 in March, we'd have to wear – the guys would have to wear SCBAs.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 [REDACTED] And, that was the point I remember where
5 myself and some others, [REDACTED] included, I remember, and to use him as
6 an example again, where what are we doing? And so –

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In your mind, that issue did
8 rise up in management in an appropriate fashion?

9 [REDACTED] That's correct, that's the point I'm making
10 there, right.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, right after you came
12 to that realization, did you go back and explore why that didn't happen?

13 [REDACTED] Yes.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What did you find, did you
15 find that middle level management weren't letting it rise?

16 [REDACTED] There seemed to be – there seemed to be the
17 communication up from the NLOs through the shift ranks to the department
18 management didn't seem to be strong. These are my words, the whole group
19 seemed to say, let the process run its course, you know, in other words it needs
20 to be scheduled and put into some window somewhere, where in reality what
21 was going on was that this was a moving target as far as the equipment was
22 degrading from month to month, and we had to change the course. We had to
23 change the priority, and that wasn't done, and I think that's where the
24 communication channel vertically broke down, in my opinion.

11 70

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was there a particular level
2 of management where you saw that --

3 [REDACTED] I can't say.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- that level of
5 prioritization couldn't -- wasn't allowed to rise up?

6 [REDACTED] No, I didn't see evidence of that.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] I haven't seen evidence of that.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Haven't seen evidence of
10 what?

11 [REDACTED] I haven't seen evidence of -- here's what I
12 think when I hear you say those words -- I haven't seen evidence of an individual
13 who is saying, no, we are not doing that, work, just get back to work, you know,
14 blah, blah, blah, I haven't seen any evidence of that.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's what I was asking.

16 [REDACTED] Right. I haven't seen that at all. I've seen
17 more evidence of a behavior of, you know, let's get it put into the system, let
18 everything -- don't permutate what the process has, when we get to it we're going
19 to fix it, and this was an example where it got worse before we could fix it, and
20 then the communication channels weren't happened. It's getting worse, we need
21 to move it up.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: To prioritize.

23 [REDACTED] Right.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That would come up
25 through your organization, or work control?

1 [REDACTED] It would come up through OPs, and then it
2 would route to us, and they'd say, hey, look, I mean, you know, you review this
3 stuff all the time in the -- well, we'll go over that in a second, because there's
4 culpability on more organization, too, here, I'm not trying to -- let's let that go.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Speak to what happened
6 in your organization on that issue. How come it didn't catch your organization's
7 ear earlier, and I'm not -- just to understand what -- because someone could have
8 got hurt here, I guess.

9 [REDACTED] Absolutely.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Someone could have died.

11 [REDACTED] Sure. Sure, absolutely.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That wouldn't have been
13 good for anybody.

14 [REDACTED] I think more than that what you had was, you
15 had a bunch of work arounds that were being institutionalized, where all these
16 people would go down there for the surveillance for all the different things you
17 had to monitor and do, and you had to limit access, and make sure that all these
18 controls were in place, where why not just go and fix it.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It sounds like it would
20 have been an easier thing to do.

21 [REDACTED] Yes.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, the smarter thing to
23 do.

24 [REDACTED] Right.

25 But, you asked about my organization.

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED] If you go back to the NLO side of the example, and these guys that – I mean, these guys are on rotating shifts so you do it once a month, well, not the same guy is going to do it every month. Well, somebody is going to write a notification and a corrective action thing that this or that, you know, was wrong, and then now it's this, and now it's that, and the emotion you've got there. And, people who screen these things in my organization failed to put two and two together and say something themselves, like why don't they go over and say when are we going to fix this.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] And so, that was disappointing on my department's behalf as well.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Hold on here, we're going to switch over to the second side. It's about 5:28.

(Tape 1, side A ends; tape 1, side B begins.)

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. We are on side B, and we were talking about the "B" diesel manifold issue. I guess it was leaking, and we were talking about your organization.

Were there any corrective actions put into place in your department to try not to let that happen again, to make it real – to ask it plainly? I know you've got your corrective actions all over the place, but was there specific put in to open up the level of communication or the avenues of communication, not let that type of thing occur again?

[REDACTED] Not specifically to this issue.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

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1 [REDACTED] Not specifically to this issue.

2 We house an operator over here, and have done that on both
3 sides of the island, and that helps a lot to fix that.

4 I'll tell you, and I'll go back to the beginning of the interview,
5 Jeff, I think the biggest help is going back to a plant manager and department
6 manager routine, where the department managers have that support, to be able
7 to give that influence.

8 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

9 [REDACTED] - Operations Department that
10 communicates. You know, and I'll come back to them with, you've got to
11 clearly articulate the problem vertically.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

13 [REDACTED] So everybody has an opportunity to win. So,
14 we had that dialogue.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

16 [REDACTED] And, we have this in other issues as well.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you get feedback from
18 them when you are talking to them about issues like this, have you ever gotten
19 feedback from them that, hey, we tried to raise this up to management and got
20 slapped down?

21 [REDACTED] No.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Specific to this issue, do
23 you know if that occurred? Did any of those people say that?

24 [REDACTED] No, I can't remember that.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

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[REDACTED] No, I can't remember that.

The feedback I get from them is, you know, why can't I get it fixed, is more – not I go to a certain level and it gets knocked back down, no.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You are not getting that?

[REDACTED] No. I get, why can't I get it fixed, why does it take so long.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's what you get.

[REDACTED] Yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Plain as that.

[REDACTED] Yes, consistently.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] Consistently.

And, depending on the example, this is probably the most extreme example, this exhaust one.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, that's an example, yes.

[REDACTED] But, the guy on shift, you know, would go through and say, hey, if you want to do something simple, you know, you need to go through with a structure of the work processes, what the structure of getting something changed, if that's what it is, if we don't have the funding already approved how we have to go through the funding process to get it.

And, I think there's a large element of, when you talk about NLOs in particular, of education, of downward communication, and that needs to be done. I'm talking about, you know, it's easy to come in on Friday, Saturday and Sunday night and say, oh, the things leaking again, but what it takes to get it fixed and to be properly prepared –

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(Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They are union guys, right?

[REDACTED] Yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you come up through
your reactor operator or did you go ~~instant~~ SRO?

[REDACTED] I was instant.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. So, you were never
a union employee?

[REDACTED] No.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

The ROs are union here, though, right, the reactor operators?

[REDACTED] Yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

Is there something more you want to ask about the diesel
manifold issue, Dan?

MR. ORR: No.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: If there is, go ahead.

MR. ORR: No, I'm okay.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is there something more
you want to add on that diesel?

[REDACTED] Not on that one, I don't think.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED] Another example if you wanted to go over
it.

All 10

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, you had four, there
2 was another one you were going to go over and then I'm going to go back and
3 touch on a couple of things.

4 [REDACTED]: Okay.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But, there was a fourth
6 thing you wanted to talk about as an example of something that you think I
7 might be interested in here.

8 [REDACTED]: Well, the Salem -

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This is the grass issue,
10 right?

11 [REDACTED] - right - the Salem station was grassing.

12 Now, this was the first week in March, and due to the weather in the northeast
13 in the winter, especially the one particularly large snow storm and the cold snap
14 afterwards, the grass in the river was tremendous. It was, for historians of this
15 site, it was, I believe, maybe I'm misquoting this, but it was orders of magnitude
16 higher than it was on April 7th when the large issue there was in 1994 or
17 whatever.

18 There was a lot of operational decisions that needed to be
19 made on maintaining the unit at power.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] Both units at power, and where to keep
22 reactor power as the grass was coming in with the tide changes, over the course
23 of what was really four of five days, and the situation degrading.

24 Ultimately, to my memory, one unit shut down and the second
25 unit, I believe, ended up at around 40 percent power, if I remember properly.

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

2 [REDACTED] I don't know, Jeff, if there was emotion
3 behind where the units were left with any people at that time, and what the
4 management decisions that were made. You mentioned in your introduction
5 production over safety.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

7 [REDACTED] And, we had conference calls. We had
8 meetings in here, it was over a weekend. We looked at the response of the non-
9 licensed operators, again, primarily, both at the intake structure and the fellows
10 who were needing to clean the water boxes and the frequency at which they had
11 to do it, and what their conditions were.

12 And, I don't recall the level of emotion on the diesel exhaust
13 issue as, you know, here, but, once again, if I was thinking about – if I was
14 thinking about the Safety Conscious Work Environment from a worker's aspect,
15 and where would my emotions be relative to management decisions, I think that
16 could be another area as well.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The grassing issue.

18 [REDACTED] Yes, for the same reasons as the diesel
19 exhaust. This thing is getting worse, why don't we just – you know, I'm kind of
20 taking it from the non-licensed operator perspective primarily – why don't we
21 just shut the thing down and fix the – wait until the grass goes by, you know,
22 over the course of a couple days. I'm not as technically knowledgeable at Salem
23 as I am at Hope Creek, although I can get by.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you directly involved
25 in the discussions surrounding this issue?

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[REDACTED] I was – I was – I partook in some of the
phone calls and some of the meetings. Once again, you know, you make your
decisions based on differential temperature in the condenser, the ability of pump
amps and whether it's actually – the screen can actually pass enough water with
all the heavy grass on it. And, it's a cyclical thing because it's tidal.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] Okay.

And, I tend to be a supporting cast member there. Once again,
you had this committee thing, a supporting task member in that type of scenario
as opposed to Hope Creek because I have more experience on the unit.

But, I felt, I personally felt, beyond the non-licensed operator
at that particular issue, that there seemed to be less emotion with the decisions,
and I think in the same case as the bypass valve and the recirc, the example on
the bypass valve, the right things were done by management, it just seemed to
be my memory of it less of an emotional roller coaster than say the bypass valve
example at Hope Creek in March, yeah, March, later on in the month.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So, you are speaking that
from if you were an NLO, non-licensed operator, involved in this issue, you
would think they would see this as a safety issue.

[REDACTED] Perhaps, I'm only –

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, it's your opinion.

[REDACTED] – it's only conjecture on my part.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

Was the right – you said the right thing was done, was it done
when it should have been done? Was it done in a timely fashion?

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[REDACTED] Going back to my memory, to my memory
yes. We never really challenged the plant. As a matter of fact, I take that back,
when we got done I felt pretty good about it.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED] I learned a lot. I felt pretty good about where
we left the plants and where we got through it. I thought we stayed ahead of it,
and I just want to say one more thing, Dan, and when we got done I thought,
geez, you know, a lot of that work we did on the screens to make it better
seemed to work. I mean, there was more things that we could do that we could
learn, but they seemed to work, and this system seemed to work better.

MR. ORR: Okay. I was just trying to clarify, you felt better
about the grass and the way the decisions were being made in regards to
grassing.

[REDACTED] Yes.

MR. ORR: Compared to, or just —

[REDACTED] Compared to — it just seemed to be a
smoother operation, I guess. It just seemed to be a smoother decision-making
process than some of the other examples that we've had.

MR. ORR: Okay.

Was anybody emotional about the decision making that was
occurring for grassing? Was anybody disagreeable about the decisions that were
made, or do you recall?

[REDACTED] I don't think anybody was.

MR. ORR: Okay.

All 7C

1 [REDACTED] I don't think anybody was. I'm trying to –
2 I'm trying to think back to that, and I'd say, my memory is no.

3 MR. ORR: Okay.

4 [REDACTED] Like I said, and this is repetitive now, but
5 when I did this I tried to make a list of what seemed to me could be inferred as
6 Safety Conscious Work Environment things in 2003.

7 MR. ORR: Okay. All right.

8 Now, how about after the fact with a unit having to be
9 manually tripped and another one run back to 40 percent, after the fact did
10 anybody second guess the decisions that were made earlier on?

11 [REDACTED] I don't remember anyone doing that.

12 MR. ORR: Okay.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The grassing issue, less
14 emotion, it sounds like less people disagreeing with where you were, how you
15 got there, and where the plant was going, the plants were going at that point, this
16 is both units.

17 [REDACTED] Right, yes. It seemed – yes, that's my
18 memory of it, right.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

20 After the fact, did your group get any feedback from the
21 NLOs, who were maybe out there cleaning the trawling screens, or cleaning the
22 water buckets.

23 [REDACTED] Boxes.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, you call them boxes.

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Did you become aware of any feedback from the non-licensed operators that they felt differently on that?

[REDACTED] The non -

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I know you told me what your opinion was if you were an NLO, but did you get any feedback?

[REDACTED] - the non-licensed operators, I'm going to talk through this and maybe you can follow this with Dan, but the non-licensed operators, I don't know as many of them as well, but we have been doing a modification, my group and the maintenance organization, have been scheduling these modifications to make it easier for them to combat the grassing at the screens. Just to put it in simplistic terms, it's a big plate that goes over it with a flip arm. They had been doing it with rakes, which they considered to be an industrial safety issue, and I could understand that.

And, I believe that we had completed a third to a half of them, probably more like four of the 12, would be my memory, and so my memory is, I remember talking to a couple of them at that time, and not only with those two individuals I confirmed there, you know, wants to have more of those, all 12 of them done.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They weren't done at that point, though, mechanically.

[REDACTED] There's four of them, done, not the other eight.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] I can't say, I can't say what the overall opinion was of all the non-licensed operators or any selective ones.

ALL TC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

2 [REDACTED] I don't know if they all felt that way.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: With regards to whether,
4 you know, did the NLOs think, hey, you know, this is too dangerous for us to
5 be out there, only four of the 12 water boxes have this mechanical clean-out
6 system going, we should shut the plant down because of that?

7 [REDACTED] I never got that feedback.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

9 [REDACTED] I never heard any feedback like that.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

11 Why don't we take a very short break. It's like quarter of 6:00.

12 [REDACTED] Okay.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We probably have about
14 another 15, 20 minutes.

15 [REDACTED] Okay, fine.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Good. Let me turn this off.

17 (Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., a recess until 5:47 p.m.)

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We're back on the record
19 after a short break. I guess it's about 13 before 6:00.

20 Okay, we've talked about four issues, and there's – I wanted
21 to go talk general for a minute and then come back and talk about something.

22 There's a group called – I know about INPO, but there's a
23 group called WANO, do you know what they are?

24 [REDACTED] Yes.

ALL 10

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did they come here, I
2 guess it was last year at some point, and give their rating of the plant?

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, and from what I
5 understand you guys were rated a 3?

6 [REDACTED] Yes.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, that's not good. It's
8 a 1 to 4 system, 4 being –

9 [REDACTED]: Actually, I don't know what the bottom one
10 is, but 3 is not the score we are looking for.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, right, I understand.

12 [REDACTED] Right.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Talking about that time, if
14 we could, because it sounds like you have a – at least on the Hope Creek side,
15 you have relationships with the non-licensed operators, you know most of them.

16 [REDACTED] Yes.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Coming up, leading up to
18 the when WANO comes in and does their review, and gives you guys your
19 grade, your score, was the work environment here improving up to that point?
20 How would you characterize the work environment from the fact, you know,
21 people are happy at work, generally happy, they feel that management is
22 listening to at least some of what they have to say, of course, there's a
23 management/worker conflict because that's the way it is.

24 [REDACTED] Right.

ALL
1C

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But, you know, the union
2 people have a feeling that things are generally okay, maybe not great, but
3 generally okay, maybe even improving, getting better, up until this WANO visit,
4 did that visit change? Did you see any change in the work environment here at
5 the plant after they came and gave their grade here at Hope Creek, did you notice
6 any major shift after that where it went south, south meaning it started to
7 deteriorate, the work environment here?

8 [REDACTED] No. I'm trying to think back, WANO was
9 just a -- that was just -- WANO is INPO.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It sounded like it's INPO,
11 but it's the World --

12 [REDACTED] World Association of Nuclear Operators,
13 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's part of INPO.

15 [REDACTED] Yes, just through a matter of semantics, just
16 for the record, the INPO visit happens every two years, we have a joint
17 evaluation, or we have had, for the two stations together.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

19 [REDACTED] When you have a WANO visit, it just means
20 that there are some people from the worldwide nuclear industry come in and
21 participate in the plant evaluation, which is really conducted by the folks in
22 Atlanta with INPO.

23 That evaluation occurred in July of 2002, and this is for my
24 benefit, Jeff, I'm recalling things, July of 2002, there was a lot of work done with
25 that. And then, you are asking, I'm trying to understand question --

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, it was pretty wordy.
2 [REDACTED] - and then you are asking the question, did
3 - how did you word it?

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did -
5 [REDACTED]. The morale go down after that?

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - go down after that, after
7 the site received their grade from WANO/INPO, did you see a drop off?

8 [REDACTED] I think we in management were disappointed.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

10 [REDACTED] I think that, you know, a lot of the work you
11 put in and you are not recognized for it from an industry perspective, and it's
12 truly a measurement of your effectiveness as a management team, is really what
13 the evaluation is all about.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

15 [REDACTED] That can be rather humbling, and you asked
16 earlier, a 3 is not a good score, it's not what you aspire to.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

18 [REDACTED] So, it doesn't necessarily mean you are
19 unsafe, which is the subject of what some of this interview is about.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

21 [REDACTED] It's a measure of you against your peers.

22 And so, yes, I think that hurt management a little bit, from the
23 perspective of, you know, what the team is trying to do and what your peers see
24 you as relative to the rest of the industry.

All 10

1 As far as the workers go, I thought, and we talked a little bit
2 about [REDACTED] earlier on, I thought that [REDACTED] had laid in some
3 priorities with getting along with and listening to the union and working with
4 them, that were very positive. I think if you talk to union leadership on a level
5 of, say, industrial safety, and some of the maintenance arena, and some of what
6 they do in outages, from that perspective I'd say they would be pretty positive
7 about what was going on, in that time frame.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Even after?

9 [REDACTED] Yes.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Even after the INPO score
11 is given to the site and management is disappointed?

12 [REDACTED] Yes, I think if you talk to union leadership
13 I would say that that's true.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That they thought it was
15 good.

16 [REDACTED] It didn't substantially change afterwards,
17 that's my perception.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] Because I sort of heard that in your question.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, you did hear it.

21 [REDACTED] Okay.

22 You know, there's not a lot of 3s, there's a couple 4s out there,
23 there's one or two of them, there's about nine 3s and the rest are 1s or 2s, if you
24 know your INPO scores at all.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

ALL TC

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[REDACTED] So, that's a tough thing to swallow.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They're going to be coming
back again this --

[REDACTED] End of --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- in '04, right?

[REDACTED] -- end of next year, yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED], let's talk about him for just a minute.

[REDACTED] Okay.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you hear him, any
reaction from him about the INPO score, at a senior management meeting?

[REDACTED] Well, I was there only when we had our
debrief. The way the process works is, being a member of senior management
on the island --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED] -- you walk in, you walk in with their
management team.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Here?

[REDACTED] -- yes, it was in August of 2003, INPO has
sort of a funny way that they conduct business, but they -- you go in there and
you meet and they go over some of the key items, and then the actual score is
not discussed. So, the fact that we are talking about this, you know, I've never
been shown a number that site is. I know we are a focus area, I feel the need to
qualify that, but in the exit meeting they talk about some of the major points in
the meeting and then [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] retire to, you know, into the

1 office there, with the INPO management, and the actual score is given, and then
2 that's that. So, I've never seen a number.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 [REDACTED] And, that's common with all different plants.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

6 come out and brief senior management here at the site after they went in with
7 INPO management and got the score? Did they come out and say -

8 [REDACTED] Yes, we had a subsequent meeting with [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED] about a month later.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How did that go?

11 [REDACTED] Well, he wanted to see what the - how
12 should I say it, I'm struggling for my words - you know, where's the
13 accountability with the people towards fixing the problems, was the words I
14 remember and the tone that I remember.

15 So, who is in charge, you know, of fixing these issues, and you
16 are the team, and you guys have got to get the right people in place. And, you
17 know, it's not a fun meeting.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

19 Was there discussion during that meeting, and I'm just going
20 to say in black and white, where we are going to change our focus more from
21 maybe - more to a production focus?

22 [REDACTED] No.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At all?

24 [REDACTED] Absolutely not. All in the contrary.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, meaning what?

ALL 1C

1 [REDACTED] I've known [REDACTED] for quite a few years,
2 and I think he's frustrated. He's never said this directly, but I know the man fairly
3 well, I think he's frustrated that we have not been able to improve our position
4 in the industry with INPO, and he clearly understands that it's about safety and
5 improving safety, and then whatever follows with production is going to occur.
6 And, there's no question in my mind that he feels that way.

7 And, I think he, over time, is frustrated that he hasn't gotten,
8 you know, that —

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Recognition?

10 [REDACTED] — that chemistry and, therefore, recognition
11 with INPO.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

13 [REDACTED] So, that was some of my, I'll say, non-verbal
14 reaction from his words in that meeting.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

16 Can we go back and talk about the Hope Creek turbine bypass
17 valve issue?

18 [REDACTED] Okay.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, just a couple things
20 I wanted to go over there, a couple pretty specific questions I have, and I want
21 to get your feedback, get your impressions on them.

22 From what I understand about this valve issue, there was a
23 discussion which you were part of, probably with some of these other guys who
24 we talked about before were at these meetings, but there was a discussion where
25 you were part of, regarding this bypass valve issue, where you got upset with the

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1 course of the discussion and you got up and left the room, do you recall that
2 occurring?

3 This is what we've been told happened, and I'm trying to
4 corroborate that.

5 [REDACTED] Okay.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, if it did happen I want
7 to explore why. Again, it's going back towards -

8 [REDACTED] I think it was on the recirc thing.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

10 [REDACTED] I think it was on the recirc thing.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you tell me what
12 happened? I know where you came out on that, I mean, your position was you
13 thought that the recirc system was going to work, let's move the plant further
14 into power.

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, you guys think it's
17 going to be fine.

18 [REDACTED] First of all, I know it was on the recirc thing.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

20 [REDACTED] Because I'll tell you one thing, I'm not trying
21 to - I'm not trying to play a high horse or anything, but the bypass valve issue
22 was a safety issue and we needed to shut the plant down.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

24 [REDACTED] I wouldn't get frustrated and upset and leave
25 the room and leave that risk of something else happening.

All
TC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

2 [REDACTED] I wouldn't do it. I just would not do that.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Good.

4 [REDACTED] I'm sure it was on the recirc issue.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How sure are you?

6 [REDACTED] Positive.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, that's pretty good.

8 I don't get that too much.

9 [REDACTED] I'm positive, because I can tell you what the
10 circumstances were.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Go ahead.

12 [REDACTED] I was angry, because -- although I can't
13 remember what the specific subject was, it's like, fine, you want to wait and fix
14 this problem, that's fine, I remember it was getting late, and by late I mean it was
15 10:00 or 11:00 or so, or 9:00 or 10:00 anyway, and we had been sitting in there
16 for a couple hours, and it was like the second or third of these management by
17 committee deals.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] And, I went to look at something in a
20 procedure to see if, you know, I forget what I was doing, but it was something
21 in the recirc system and convincing myself that it didn't really matter, and then
22 I went home.

23 And, I remember, either I called [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] called me and he
24 said, he said, well, where are you going, and I said, look, you know, if you want
25 to go work on this thing and continue on with a shut down that's fine, I'm not --

All TC

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1 you know, I'm not holding anything about that, but I don't think we should do
2 it. And, that's what I told him. I said, I think we should start up, and I know
3 felt the same way because I talked to him about it.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED] Yes, and I remember talking to him about
6 that, I'm positive about that, too, and I said, you know, if we want to do it we'll
7 go and do it, we'll be good soldiers, but I told him I didn't think it was necessary.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was pushing from the
9 other side then on that issue?

10 [REDACTED] To fix it, my recollection is [REDACTED]
11 and my recollection is [REDACTED] (phonetic).

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's a new name here
13 now.

14 [REDACTED] That's my recollection.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

16 [REDACTED] And that I'm not sure of.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Would he be the site VP?

18 [REDACTED] He would be the [REDACTED]

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, they felt that it
20 needed to be fixed before you can come back up to power?

21 [REDACTED] Yes, there was some design issue, or they
22 were tying it obliquely to a design basis thing, and I didn't get the connection.
23 But, I mean, I was tired, and I was frustrated at that point.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

All 74

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1 I'm looking at it, though, I mean, I'm not an engineer, but I'm
2 looking at this as, all right, those – the senior people being involved in this
3 discussion are being, in the eyes of some, too conservative in that call.

4 [REDACTED] It wasn't – it wasn't, in my opinion, and once
5 again I'll come back to the subject, it wasn't in my opinion a safety issue.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

7 [REDACTED] It was something that we ended up wanting
8 to do, and it was clear that after all the discussion we weren't going anywhere,
9 we weren't advancing the ball, and like I said, this was the second or third of
10 these conversations during the course of three or four days on these different
11 issues. I didn't have anything else constructive to add.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You already had it all out,
13 huh?

14 [REDACTED] Yes, I'm being honest with you, you know.
15 So, that was that.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

17 [REDACTED] I do want to make one thing perfectly clear,
18 again I understand what I'm doing in here, I would not get up and walk away
19 from that bypass valve issue.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

21 We are going to go right back to that, Dan. Was there
22 anything you wanted to ask about –

23 MR. ORR: No, not this particular issue.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

25 The bypass valve issue.

ALL TC

1 [REDACTED] Right.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This seems to be the one
3 that, my words, if I'm wrong correct me --

4 [REDACTED] Okay.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- you had -- of these four
6 issues you talked about, you had the most problem with that one, from it being
7 an actual safety issue?

8 [REDACTED] No, I'd say I had the most problem with the
9 recirc issue, because, you know, but from a safety issue, that's what your
10 question was?

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

12 [REDACTED] Yes, that had the most significance to it.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

14 [REDACTED] I think you can be fair in saying that.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you have any talks
16 with employees about whether, you know, discussions regarding what we should
17 do with that work, that some of the discussions, some of the input, was
18 "dangerous," if we went this way it would have been a dangerous thing to do?
19 That's the quote, "dangerous."

20 [REDACTED] I may have said that out of frustration, yes.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

22 [REDACTED] While we were in the three hour thing. My
23 memory is [REDACTED] why would we do this, this doesn't seem right, you
24 know. So, he was the [REDACTED]

ALL TC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why, from which
2 perspective?

3 [REDACTED] Well, it was out of compliance with tech
4 specs, the valve stuck open, or, I can't remember if it actually closed or not.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Dan, do you remember?

6 MR. ORR: I think the issue was —

7 [REDACTED] Or it wouldn't go full open.

8 MR. ORR: — were you putting the turbine on and expecting
9 in response of the turbine bypass valves to close, and then you had this one not
10 fully close?

11 [REDACTED] I can't remember exactly. I can't remember.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'll come back to the
13 question.

14 [REDACTED] I remember being concerned that how far as
15 we taking this thing, over the course of three hours. Okay?

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

17 [REDACTED] Of conversation, and, you know, people are
18 walking in and out of the room and doing this or that, and we're trying to make
19 this decision, and like I said earlier, it seemed fairly clear cut, and, you know,
20 I forget what your quote was, but —

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That you called that
22 process or some discussion "dangerous."

23 [REDACTED] It is dangerous when you go too far down
24 that road and you actually consider it too much, because that can then cloud your
25 judgment.

All 7C

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1 And, that can lead to getting to the wrong – making the wrong
2 decision.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, I agree.

4 [REDACTED] And, I would maintain that, you know, if you
5 are – maybe I make my mind up, but if your mind is made up, and there's no
6 clear decision maker, and the conversation continues, frustration builds, and you
7 say, you know, something on the side, I remember my memory is, saying to the
8 Director of OPs, what are we doing here, this seems like we are going – you
9 know, and maybe I used the word "dangerous," I don't know.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

11 [REDACTED] But, I can recall having that emotion.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You talked about

13 [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]: Yes.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You had the conversation

16 with [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]: Yes.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was the decision
19 maker then? Someone had to be the decision maker. Was it [REDACTED] Was it
20 [REDACTED] Was it someone above them? I'm trying to understand that, because
21 this – I mean, you are talking about a compliance issue here, it's not just an
22 industrial safety type concern.

23 [REDACTED]: Right.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This is a regulatory – this
25 is a regulatory issue?

ALL 7C

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[REDACTED] Right.

By our -- by our procedures [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you recall how

[REDACTED] felt? Did he feel like you?

[REDACTED] He felt the same way.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED] To my memory.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

[REDACTED] He felt like, you know, we just shut down

and fix it.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he not have the power to do that? I mean, the real power to say, hey, we are shutting this down now, we are not going to debate this for two hours, three hours.

[REDACTED] Right.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he have the power to do that? This is an opinion question, but did it appear to you that he had the authority, the actual true authority to do that, during those meetings, or during that three hour meeting?

[REDACTED] He probably did, I don't know if he ever

exercised it.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Well, that's fair, if he didn't exercise it.

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[REDACTED] Then you wouldn't know.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

Did you get the impression that he was getting overruled by anyone, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I don't think [REDACTED] was overruling him. I know [REDACTED] very well, I worked for him for two or three years, three years I guess, he was -- he was challenging everyone.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED] And, their convictions.

And, [REDACTED]s -- I don't know if you are going to talk to him or not, but [REDACTED] is not one -- he's not shy, and he's not timid in those things. And, he'll push you to the edge to see how strong your convictions are.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] And, that can be taken the wrong way also.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think it can.

[REDACTED] And, but that's what he was doing. If you know what he's doing, then it's not -- it's not some scary thing, he wants you to come with all the facts, you know, but in this case it was a series of long meetings.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was he, you know him, so you knew where he was coming from, but did other people confide in your, [REDACTED] did he say he felt intimidated by things that were -- by the challenging nature of [REDACTED] during those meetings?

[REDACTED] No, no, he didn't say that.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

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411 TC

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Did any -

[REDACTED]: He didn't insinuate it either.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

Others at the meeting, did any of them voice that to you, that I'm having a big problem with [REDACTED] his challenging behavior on this, this is clear, we should be doing, we should go into shutdown now to fix the valve?

[REDACTED]: My impression of this thing was -

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] - that it seemed like the people in the room, myself included and the frustrating part on the other one was, I'm going to use my words, or the words I'm going to choose are, it seemed like a meaningless exercise.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED]: Because the decision, we know where we have to go, let's just get through the committee decision and let's go get on and do it, you know. And, I mean, that's what I recall of my thoughts at that time.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

It took a long time, though.

Did you have a feeling that the discussion got to a point where a decision - it was going to get close to the decision being made that we've talked ourselves back into going back up without fixing the valve, was it headed that way, was it heading that way? Did it get close to that decision being made?

[REDACTED]: I don't really ever remember being concerned that it was going to go there.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

All TC

1 [REDACTED] I can't remember everyone that was in the
2 room, but I don't remember having that emotion.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

4 Was [REDACTED] in that meeting?

5 [REDACTED] I think so.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think that's one of the
7 names you mentioned.

8 [REDACTED] I think so, yes.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was [REDACTED]

10 (Whereupon, tape 1, side B ends; tape 2, side A begins.)

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's now 6:34, we're on the
12 second tape, and I was asking a question about the mixed message that -- you
13 had a discussion with [REDACTED] after this bypass valve issue was resolved,
14 about mixed messages. Can you go ahead and share with me what you meant
15 by that?

16 [REDACTED] Yes. So, in chronological order there's the
17 bypass valve discussion, and then there's the recirc pump discussion. Okay, and
18 they were separated by a couple days.

19 The context of the meetings were relatively the same. One
20 was the bypass valve discussion, it was a safety decision on shutting down. The
21 recirc discussion was the discussion on should we start up or not, for what my
22 memory is is a non-safety issue.

23 My memory is the frustrations in the recirc discussion, or at
24 least that's where my frustration surfaced, and having a conversation with [REDACTED]
25 after the recirc discussion about, you know, what are you so frustrated about,

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All TC

1 [REDACTED] Here's what I'm frustrated about, the bypass valve appears to me to be a
2 straightforward, shut the reactor down and find out what's wrong with the valve
3 issue.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

5 [REDACTED] And, the recirc issue receives some debate,
6 but we hold the line for something that's non-safety, but yet we debate the
7 bypass valve issue for a long amount of time. People can take that the wrong
8 way.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 [REDACTED] And, I remember having that discussion with
11 [REDACTED]

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you tell him that you
13 took it the wrong way?

14 [REDACTED] No.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or, did you take it the
16 wrong way?

17 [REDACTED] No, I told him that it can be taken the wrong
18 way.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

20 After -- well, let me -- I think to get the complete -- to get a
21 complete picture here from you on some things --

22 [REDACTED] Okay.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: --I'm going to have to play
24 a tape of something that I want you to listen to, and I want to get your
25 perspective on it, okay?

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[REDACTED] Okay.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

It's 25 of 7:00.

(Whereupon, at 6:35 p.m., off the record to play tape until 6:50 p.m.)

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. It's about ten of 7:00, I just played a copy of a conversation that was taped by an individual named Kim Harvin (phonetic), of a conversation she had with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I just played that for you. A lot of it is inaudible. You wrote some notes down. I have some typed up notes here of what is said.

But, before we go into that, I just want to stop for just a second, okay?

(Whereupon, a brief recess.)

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, we're back on again. I wanted to check my battery. My battery appears to be working well.

I just played that tape for you. Do you recall the conversation, [REDACTED] And, if so, do you want to talk about it right now?

[REDACTED] Yes, I'd like to talk about it. I don't remember specifically the conversation. If you were asking me about it without having listened to the tape, I probably wouldn't have recalled anywhere near those details.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

Well, after listening to it, there's some details we'd like to talk about, but first, you wanted to say something?

[REDACTED] Yes. It may take a while, is that all right?

All TC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, that's fine. I have
2 plenty of tapes and I've got power right here in the wall. Let's go.

3 [REDACTED] Okay.

4 Kim Harvin is, or was, the Cultural Transformation Manager.
5 She was a direct report to [REDACTED]

6 From listening to the tape that was me on the tape, and it
7 sounds like the tape was done at some point during, near or after, some of the
8 bypass valve and recirc pump discussions that we've been talking about earlier
9 on in this interview.

10 I was not aware that that conversation was being taped. I'd
11 like to put that on the record.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was it a one-on-one
13 discussion?

14 [REDACTED] I don't remember whether it was or not,
15 because I don't remember talking with her specifically. It certainly sounds like
16 it was.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

18 [REDACTED] Her office –

19 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

20 [REDACTED] Ms. Harvin's role in the organization, as
21 well as others –

22 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

23 [REDACTED] – tried to encourage that, encourage that.

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1 And so, I was a little bit surprised and shocked on how this
2 thing would play out here in this meeting, but that's something else to be
3 covered.

4 It was -- I wrote down several of the quotes, and I guess you
5 can ask me questions about it. It was --

6 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- managers after meetings
8 like that occurred?

9 [REDACTED] I'm not sure what her -- what her charter was,
10 she worked directly for [REDACTED] I'm not sure what her charter was.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

12 [REDACTED] So, I'm not sure if [REDACTED] directed her to
13 do that or whether she did it on her own initiative.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: She did it, though.

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. I have some
17 questions.

18 [REDACTED] Go ahead.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, you know, you fill in
20 where you need if you want to add something.

21 [REDACTED] Sure, go ahead.

22 MR. ORR: There's a couple of minutes of discussion, then she
23 asks you a question about what did you mean yesterday when you said this place
24 is "dangerous?" Is the decision making like muddled, is it kind of -- and you
25 respond again, the tape isn't perfect, but the response is pretty much, "Yes, I

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1 meant it from a nuclear safety standpoint," then there's an inaudible part. "We
2 came this close, when I say 'dangerous,' we almost talked ourselves on Monday
3 of just starting right back up and not going into the bypass valve." We talked
4 about that a little bit.

5 [REDACTED] Right.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But, the point I'm
7 interested in is, you used the word "dangerous," and what you said to her is you
8 meant it from a nuclear safety standpoint. Can you go ahead and share a little
9 more on that?

10 [REDACTED] It's really nothing that I don't think we
11 already talked about. It seemed like – I also wrote down that the conversation
12 lasted four to six hours, and had [REDACTED] over a barrel. I think that was a reference
13 to [REDACTED].

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Correct, "[REDACTED] over a
15 barrel talking about this thing."

16 [REDACTED] Right.

17 And, it just seemed like, I was probably – I was probably, in
18 several of these quotes, letting out the emotion from what I referenced earlier on
19 before the tape, on being frustrated with, once again, what I considered a fairly
20 straightforward decision, and laying it all out over time.

21 And, surprised, I guess, would be the word that we'd debate
22 over it for that long.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

24 There's a following comment after talking about [REDACTED]
25 that, "There was pressure, that senior leadership was considering from up north

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1 ..., "I took that to mean Newark, "... to go back up without the valve repair," and
2 then it went inaudible.

3 [REDACTED] I don't remember that, really. I got the tape,
4 I'm not saying that I'm not saying what's on the tape.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

6 [REDACTED]: But, I don't remember any conversation on
7 that in the meeting.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: After the meeting was
9 there an impression that there was pressure being provided by corporate?

10 [REDACTED] Yes, I don't remember anything like that,
11 Jeff. Obviously, I said that, I don't know where the reference is coming from.
12 I really don't.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- grounds for taking the
14 keys away, we talked about that a little bit.

15 [REDACTED] Right.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: If you did do that.

17 [REDACTED] That's from the reference that we talked
18 about earlier from starting up the reactor and whether the refuel outage was in
19 a month or a year, and finding out that we started up with a valve being
20 inoperable, that would just be -- that would just be very bad.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

22 Let's talk about this first part of this tape.

23 [REDACTED] Okay.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which we just talked
25 about.

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1 Was it your impression then that generally there was pressure
2 from senior site management to maybe debate, challenge, beyond what was
3 acceptable before – at the plant that might cause the plant to cut down or to stay
4 down longer than required?

5 [REDACTED] One more time with the question.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

7 [REDACTED] I kind of lost my focus.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was it your impression
9 back then, I mean we are talking about, this is all in March, and most of the
10 issues that you brought up occurred in this frame, 2003 time frame, was it your
11 impression during that time period that there was pressure from senior site
12 management to challenge issues which might cause – maybe inappropriately
13 challenge issues which might cause the plant to have to come down, stop
14 operating, make outages longer than people thought needed? Was that your
15 impression, that there was that kind of pressure from senior – I mean, you are
16 pretty senior here, but from way above even you, was there that kind of pressure,
17 was it your perception?

18 [REDACTED]: No. Obviously, I'm a day away from some,
19 you know, emotional frustration here on this tape, and I'm talking to this person
20 who is supposed to be, you know, some type of guru type thing.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

22 [REDACTED] But, no, no, I honestly don't see the pressure
23 angle from senior leadership in these issues.

24 Now, at this point, this was in March, I'm seven months away
25 from this, but –

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Our understanding is the
2 conversation took place March 20th, which is --

3 [REDACTED] And, this is October.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- I guess, three days after
5 the valve event, wasn't it March 17th?

6 MR. ORR: That sounds right.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] That timing makes sense with what I heard
9 on the tape --

10 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- the conversation talking
12 about the length of the meeting, "... after four to six hours, but this is my
13 perspective I'm not going to share with anybody."

14 [REDACTED] I didn't write that one down.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I can go back and play it.

16 [REDACTED] No, I don't -- I'm not challenging you.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

18 I mean, from the Agency's perspective, if they think someone
19 at your level can't share your perspective on your view on a safety issue, like the
20 valve issue, with anybody, then the Commission might think that would be a
21 problem down here at the site.

22 [REDACTED] I see.

23 I think that the reference on saying that is that it wasn't much
24 of -- as much of a -- how should I say it -- ask me the question again, I'm a little
25 flustered.

ALL TC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, that's all right. I
2 mean, I understand.

3 [REDACTED] I'm a little flustered. This has never happened
4 to me before, so -

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This is something new.

6 [REDACTED] - I'm a little off base here.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: There's a comment that you
8 make on the tape, talking about the valve issue again. "After four to six hours,
9 but this is my perspective I'm not going to share with anybody." And, my
10 follow-up to you was, if the Commission feels that or sees that a manager at
11 your level can't share his or her perspective on a safety issue like the valve issue,
12 that we might view that as a Safety Conscious Work Environment issue.

13 [REDACTED] Okay.

14 So, the way you asked the question, I think I understand it.

15 We get to the right decision, it takes that long, and the
16 management decision is belabored and, ultimately, I guess - I don't know if I do
17 have an answer for this now that I -

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I guess the part of it, "...
19 I'm not going to share with anybody," is the thing I'm asking about, why did you
20 feel that way at that time? Or, is it even in context, number one, it seems like
21 it is.

22 [REDACTED] I think so.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why did you feel that way
24 at that time?

All 7c

1 [REDACTED] I think if we talk about, there was another -
2 let me try this, because maybe I'm able to answer the question with the next
3 quote. I thought I heard myself saying on the tape at one point immediately after
4 the thing, "... can't talk to him," and I think that was a reference to [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] I don't know if that's in the written copy or
8 not.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's in there, a little bit
10 earlier, but it's in there.

11 [REDACTED] I wrote it down under "Makes me wonder,"
12 so I don't know, I was just writing the ones down I heard.

13 But, it seemed to me like from the meeting that there really
14 wasn't a lot of - I guess those above me [REDACTED] in particular that I recall from the
15 meeting, wasn't really listening to other points of view at that time. I don't know
16 what the individual's motivations were.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

20 [REDACTED] I don't know what his motivations were at the
21 time. I'm sure you'll talk to him.

22 The "can't talk to him" piece was, he just didn't seem like he
23 was listening. He was more probing and asking questions, challenging, and just
24 had to wait.

ALL TC

12
1 So, I'm not going to talk to anybody about it could be a
2 reference to -- was that what the quote was?

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: "After four to six hours,
5 but this is my perspective I'm not going to share it with anybody," you were
6 talking about the issue, the meetings, the discussions.

7 [REDACTED] Right, now I don't know what the topic was.
8 I think I got this in context, and maybe -- I don't know what the timing of this
9 was relative to this recirc incident I'm talking about, I don't know whether it was
10 between the two, after the second one, I don't know. It was probably between
11 the two, with the length of time we needed to go into the thing.

12 But -- I lost my train of thought -- the situation with the recirc
13 system, and I did end up talking to him --

14 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You said you did.

16 [REDACTED] The whole scene was playing out again.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. And, you did say
18 earlier that you were talking about both.

19 [REDACTED] Right. The whole scene was playing out
20 again all over again.

21 So, I don't know if that answers the question or not, but --

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you think that
23 conversation with [REDACTED] occurred after this conversation with Kim Harvin?

24 [REDACTED] The way to determine that, there would be
25 an easy way to determine that.

All TC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

2 [REDACTED] I think you said you had the date on this
3 conversation.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It looks like March 20th,
5 from what we understand.

6 [REDACTED] I don't know what the exact dates were of
7 anything.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It would be a Thursday.

9 [REDACTED] You could easily draw a time line that said
10 the bypass valves, this conversation you have the date on, we shut down, where
11 this conversation fell, and where this recirc issue, actually when the unit went
12 to operational condition too, after the bypass valves. If you built that time line
13 with those three issues, that would answer the question.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

15 The next audible statement is, "I'm not going to share it with
16 [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED] Yes, I heard that. I don't --

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Then it went inaudible.

19 [REDACTED] -- I don't know who [REDACTED] is.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED] is the new [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED] that's who we think it is. This would have
22 been back in March, would you have known then?

23 [REDACTED] I don't think so, I don't know. Maybe.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was he coming in then?

25 MR. ORR: He showed up April 1st.

All
7C

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh.

2 [REDACTED] Oh, okay.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Again, but the question
4 goes to, it sounds like you – at least when you are talking to her, you are telling
5 her you are not going to share your perspective on that issue with anyone.

6 [REDACTED] Right.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you still feel that way
8 about –

9 [REDACTED] No.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: – safety issues here at the
11 plant?

12 [REDACTED] No.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did something change
14 between now and then, where now you would, back then in that time period
15 maybe you wouldn't?

16 [REDACTED] No.

17 Can we go off the record for a second?

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's 7:14.

19 (Whereupon, at 7:14 p.m., a recess was taken.)

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Back on the record.

21 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: – context.

23 [REDACTED] Well, my response is as follows, I think that

24 –

25 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

ALL
TC

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[REDACTED] - we talked about it earlier on in the interview, and -

(Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

[REDACTED] - I couldn't talk to - when I said I can't talk to him, it was [REDACTED] about this issue, and the reality was, subsequent to this, several days later, or a few days later, I did, and I recall, as I had said earlier, about the mixed message that it sends, and that people talk about these types of decisions, and we need to - we need to be more decisive in our - in what our decision is and how we communicate it out, because these types of conversations do occur amongst managers, whether that's appropriate or not.

So, I wanted to get that point across.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You made a comment off the record that you went in and talked to [REDACTED] about this after the recirc valve issue. You brought up both issues to him.

[REDACTED] That's correct.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, you said you came out of that meeting where you made the statement, "That's exactly what I was talking about," can you tell me what you meant by that?

[REDACTED] Yes. When I said "that's exactly what I was talking about," what I'm trying to say is that, what I'm trying to say is that, that when we debated over this issue on the bypass valve, and it sent a message to the people in the room and others that, you know, we had to debate four to six hours over something that was ultimately a bolt in the valve, and then we debated an equivalent amount of time on the recirc issue, and there was other

All TC

1 options there, it became – it became clear that other – that we could be perceived
2 as not being firm in our position relative to how we are operating the plant.

3 And, I pointed those issues out to [REDACTED] I'm thinking from my
4 memory if we actually built the time line about two days later, two or three days
5 later from when this taped conversation occurred.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The next statement on the
7 tape that you made was to the effect of, "The fact that we were even there means
8 we don't come from safety," again talking about this valve issue. What did you
9 mean by that, "... we don't come from safety."

10 [REDACTED] Well, it's the same theme, I think that in the
11 frustration of this moment it was – it was, we were looking at this from an issue
12 of – of –

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Production over safety?
14 [REDACTED] – I can't go there, I can't say that, I can't say
15 it's production over safety, over what all the items it could be, but you have to
16 keep in mind that I believe if you built this time line it's probably best to take a
17 step back here, and that's probably the way I can answer the questions better.

18 I was frustrated, I sat there for – for – in this meeting, and I
19 had – I struggled with the debate, we shut the plant down, we found the problem
20 with the valve, and I needed somebody to vent those frustrations towards to clear
21 my head to make – to do the right thing, which was ultimately to talk to [REDACTED]
22 about it.

23 So, I think that's what this occurred, I think that this is like a
24 venting process for me.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: With Kim Harvin?

1 [REDACTED] With Kim Harvin.

2 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

3 [REDACTED] Just around this issue, and what went on
4 during this that he was part of.

5 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's a pretty strong
7 statement.

8 [REDACTED] Yes, it is. Yes, it is.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In fact, I've been doing
10 investigations for 14 years, it's darned rare to see a manager at your level that
11 even will admit to saying that – or we have another means of showing that's
12 what the person said.

13 (Whereupon, bad section of tape.)

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Again, if you can share
15 something on that, I mean, that's what this is really about, if there's a problem
16 down here, the Commission wants to identify it and help the licensee get back
17 to where they've got to be, if there's a problem.

18 MR. ORR: Absolutely, we need to know, from a public health
19 and safety perspective.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Where did that statement
21 come from?

22 [REDACTED] It came from the context of the meeting,
23 from the frustration over the context of the meeting. I really have nothing more
24 to add on it.

All 7C

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you still feel that way
2 today, that we -

3 [REDACTED] No.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - meaning senior
5 management, plant management, site management, doesn't come from safety?

6 [REDACTED] No.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have you felt that, have
8 you emotionally felt that way over other issues down here at the site, like you
9 did with this one? You've been here a long time, you've got a lot of experience
10 down here.

11 [REDACTED] Right. No, I can't recall feeling that way
12 about any other issues.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This was, in my words, an
14 event for you, hearing this conversation -

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -reacting to it, and getting
17 emotional about it.

18 [REDACTED] But, I have been emotional before.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

20 [REDACTED] I've been upset before.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, we all have.

22 [REDACTED] I have strong feelings about doing the right
23 thing, and I can't say that there's not some other issue somewhere where I could
24 have said something like that.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

All TC

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1 [REDACTED] Okay?

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

3 [REDACTED] But, after the fact, and I review it, and you
4 ask me about it, I probably wouldn't have characterized this in my memory, six
5 or seven months later, whatever it is, seven months later, I probably wouldn't
6 have added this into that question either as being, did you come from safety,
7 because, ultimately, we did the right thing. There was frustration –

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

9 [REDACTED] – at the time over having to debate it for so
10 long.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

12 [REDACTED] That was a very emotional meeting and
13 emotional decision, because, you know, first of all you don't know what's inside
14 the valve.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

16 Wow, how hot did it get in that meeting? I mean, it just
17 sounds like it's even more than we initially talked about.

18 [REDACTED] Well, I don't –

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was it everybody had a
20 position and then [REDACTED] had his position?

21 [REDACTED] I remember primarily it being that [REDACTED]
22 challenging everybody.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] I don't – seven months later, I don't
25 remember the context of it.

All TC

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1 MR. ORR: Any idea why [REDACTED] was so persistent? I mean, I've
2 known [REDACTED] probably longer than you have, why was he so persistent on
3 something that seemed so fundamentally high for safety?

4 [REDACTED] I don't think -- I don't think that [REDACTED] at the
5 time felt that OPs was asking all the questions, and had really, not just on this
6 issue, but in general, had really asked all the questions and had fully thought
7 things through.

8 MR. ORR: Yes.

9 [REDACTED] And, I think he really wanted to test that.
10 And, that wasn't -- that wasn't unusual.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But, at a certain point, I
12 guess it became unusual, when it continued.

13 [REDACTED] My memory is it got a little ridiculous.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm going to turn the tape
15 off for a minute, I'm going to review my notes. If you think about something,
16 because I think I'm almost done here.

17 Dan, you think if you want to ask anything, too, and then we'll
18 finish up.

19 [REDACTED] Okay.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But, if you have something
21 you want to add, by all means do so.

22 It's 7:30, I'm going to turn the tape off.

23 (Whereupon, at 7:30 p.m., a recess was taken.)

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I just have one other
25 question then I think I'm done, unless there's something you wanted to add.

1 Later on in this taped conversation there's a comment you
2 make that, something to the effect of you don't understand the economics. It's
3 a little inaudible around there, but -

4 [REDACTED] I didn't hear it.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: - if I remember correctly,
6 it's you relating this to Kim Harvin, and she's asking you questions about, you
7 know, maybe why this took so long, why - you know, why the challenging
8 questions from [REDACTED] and you make this statement that, you are being told,
9 or when you are raising the concern you are being told, "You don't understand
10 the economics of it." Do you remember that?

11 [REDACTED] I didn't hear that one on the tape, that's not
12 one I wrote down. I was trying to listen to all the significant quotes.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, that's a significant
14 thing, too.

15 [REDACTED] Yes, I know, but I didn't hear it.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

17 [REDACTED] So -

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I can replay it if you want,
19 to get the context if you want, it's in there.

20 [REDACTED] I don't think you have to.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did that come up in the
22 conversation with [REDACTED] putting forth, "You don't understand the
23 economics of the decision to turn the plant off and fix the valve," did that come
24 up?

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[REDACTED] No, I don't think so. I think the context of that comment is probably, I found this often with Kim Harvin, was -- you know, she was a person that a lot of people had these types of conversations with, and this is a little bit emotional, but taking it out of context, or saying in context, you need to understand what the gravity of the decision is and everything that's in play there and explain that to her, that was not unusual to make that type of comment to her on, hey, we need to make this decision on, you know, we'll be down for another five or six days. There's ramifications for fuel impact and outage impact and all that, and to understand the gravity of the situation and all the different variables, to make the management decision. That wasn't unusual.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: For you to make that kind of comment to her about an issue?

[REDACTED] Correct.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Not necessarily meaning any economic pressure to keep the plant up?

[REDACTED] Right, right, correct.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Could it have meant that?

[REDACTED] Um --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I mean, I couldn't hear what was all around that part of the tape, but could it have been?

[REDACTED] Right, I didn't pick up the word "economics" in it, but I've never been in a meeting here --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right, this is good.

[REDACTED] I've never been in a meeting here where, you know, that was verbalized, not in this issue or others. You know, we have

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1 to keep the plant running, or, you know, we are not going to be able to meet
2 some target or do this or that. Okay? I've never heard that, I never heard
3 reference of it, and I've never been in a meeting with it. Okay?

4 So, like I said, this would be a context type thing for her to
5 explain, you know, everything that goes into a management decision. That's
6 what I think will come out of that.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 Well, I mean, today, yourself, I mean if you had a concern
9 here at the plant, safety concern, industrial safety, nuclear safety, do you feel like
10 you could bring it up to management, your management, to get it resolved? If
11 it's hitting a wall someplace, do you feel that you are able to do that freely
12 without suffering any repercussion?

13 [REDACTED] Yes. Yes, I do.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have people in your chain
15 of command told you that they felt they couldn't do that, for fear of
16 repercussions, retaliation?

17 [REDACTED] No.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You said that you know
19 many of the non-licensed operators in the Hope Creek site. Have any of them
20 told you that they feel that they can't push what they think, right or wrong, they
21 might not be right, but if they think they have a true safety concern at the plant,
22 have any of them told you that they feel they can't raise that up, or push that, or
23 pursue that, for fear of retaliation?

24 [REDACTED] No. It's like I said before, it's they feel more
25 frustrated, it's not retaliation, it's identifying industrial safety issues, especially

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1 for the non-licensed operators, or plant fix problems and they can't get
2 something fixed to their satisfaction in time.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, okay.

4 Dan?

5 MR. ORR: For those reasons, do they stop raising issues? Out
6 of frustration, do they stop raising issues out of frustration?

7 [REDACTED] I don't know, I will say that I don't know if
8 that's true or not. I don't have – I don't have direct evidence, although I will say
9 when I go into the plant with what I'll call something of a, you know, critical
10 eye, I see things that – I see some things that probably should be identified that
11 aren't.

12 MR. ORR: Yes.

13 [REDACTED] And, I don't know if that is the result of their
14 behavior or not, I don't know, of that behavior or not, I don't know.

15 MR. ORR: Okay.

16 A point on clarification and trying to understand, you talked
17 about two meetings in the OSC. Was that two meetings on one issue, the turbine
18 bypass valve issue?

19 [REDACTED] No, my memory is one was on the bypass
20 valve and one was on the recirc issue.

21 MR. ORR: Okay, all right.

22 [REDACTED] That's my memory.

23 MR. ORR: So, they were separate in time.

24 [REDACTED] Right.

All
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1 MR. ORR: So, the meeting on the turbine bypass valve issue
2 pretty much went continuous until you reached some sort of consensus.

3 [REDACTED] That's, to my memory, yes, to my memory.

4 MR. ORR: Okay.

5 No further questions.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR [REDACTED] I hit you with a lot
7 tonight, but I'm going to tell you, our coming to you, it was the same reason.
8 We had something a little – the tape was something unusual, but there's been a
9 broad – there's been a concern raised with the broad skewy environment down
10 here. This is just part of what I guess the Commission is going to try and do
11 with this, and I'll speak for the Commission, you know.

12 But, it's not like we are just going to talk to you and this is
13 going to end, I wanted to tell you that. But, I wanted to tell you, I appreciate you
14 meeting with us today, coming down here, not knowing what this was about, not
15 knowing me, not knowing – I explained to you the purpose of what we were
16 going to do, and I thank you for sitting through all of this, including me pulling
17 the tape out and playing it.

18 I wanted to tell you thank you for that, and thank you for your
19 cooperation, your time, and your patience, with this whole process.

20 With that, I don't have anything else to add. Is there
21 something you would like to add?

22 [REDACTED] I'd like to go off the record for a second and
23 review my notes.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

25 [REDACTED] And then, I may or may not have something.

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right, it's 7:40.

(Whereupon, at 7:40 p.m., a recess until 8:45 p.m.)

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. It's about 8:45.

[REDACTED] is there something you want to add?

[REDACTED] No, nothing else.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, then this interview
is concluded. Again, thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 8:45 p.m., the above-entitled matter was
concluded.)

ALL TC