

Official Transcript of Proceedings
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

X- Interview of [REDACTED] TC

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Station, New Jersey

Date: Tuesday, April 20, 2004

Work Order No.: NRC-1459

Pages 1-114

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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OFFICE OF THE INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW

-----x

IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.

[REDACTED] -7C : Case No. 1-2003-051F

(CLOSED) :

-----x

Tuesday, April 20, 2004

Office of [REDACTED] -7C

Salem-Hope Creek Nuclear
Station, NJ

The above-entitled interview was conducted
at (time not given).

BEFORE:

JEFF TEATOR, Senior Special Agent

SCOTT BARBER, Senior Project Engineer

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APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Witness, [REDACTED]

Jeff Keenan, Esq.

PSEG Counsel

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (Time not given)

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Today's date is
4 April 20, 2004. My name is Jeffrey Teator. I'm the
5 Senior Special Agent with the United States Nuclear
6 Regulatory Commission, Office of Investigations and
7 this morning I'm interviewing [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] That's close enough.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
10 Interviewing [REDACTED] in his office at the Salem-
11 Hope Creek Station at Artificial Island in Salem, New
12 Jersey. Also participating in the interview is Mr.
13 Scott Barber with the Division of Reactor Projects in
14 Region 1.

15 [REDACTED] you're being interviewed
16 today strictly as a witness in the conduct of an
17 investigation or an assist to staff that OI is doing
18 for Region 1, into the safety conscious work
19 environment here at Salem-Hope Creek. Again, you're
20 being interviewed as a witness, but it's still your
21 obligation to answer all of my questions truthfully
22 and completely. This is a voluntary interview.
23 Knowing it's voluntary, do you wish to go forward?

24 [REDACTED] Yes.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Thank you. Do

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1 you have any objection today to providing sworn
2 testimony?

3 [REDACTED] No, I do not.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Raise your
5 right hand for me, please?

6 [REDACTED] do you swear that the
7 information that you are about to provide to me is the
8 truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

9 [REDACTED] I do.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You're
11 represented by counsel today, if counsel could
12 identify himself and explain his representation,
13 please?

14 MR. KEENAN: Yes, my name is Jeff Keenan,
15 I'm Assistant General Solicitor for PSEG Services.
16 Today, I'm representing [REDACTED] and PSEG in a
17 dual capacity. I'm not aware of any conflict of
18 interest. Should a conflict arise, we'll take a break
19 from the record and figure out how to best handle
20 that. We would appreciate the ability to review the
21 transcript when it's available to the NRC and we would
22 review it in your presence at that time.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, I just
24 ask that when you want to review the transcript,
25 contact me and we'll talk about scheduling it at that

1 point.

2 ~~MR. SKENAN~~ Very good.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Thank you. ~~HE~~
4 ~~REDACTED~~ a few follow-up questions regarding
5 representation.

6 Does your employer require you to have
7 counsel represent you when you're interviewed by OI?

8 ~~REDACTED~~ No, they do not.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you in any
10 way threatened with any type of adverse action by your
11 management if you did not request counsel to represent
12 you during this interview?

13 ~~REDACTED~~ No:

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you
15 understand you have the right to a private interview
16 by OI if you wanted to do that?

17 ~~REDACTED~~ Yes, I do.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Understanding
19 all of this, do you wish to go forward with counsel
20 present?

21 ~~REDACTED~~ Yes, I do.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Thank you.
23 Maybe we could just get a little background
24 information about you.

25 Your date and place of birth, please?

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[REDACTED]: I was born [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And your Social Security Number?

[REDACTED]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Thank you. Your home address, please?

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And your home phone number, please?

[REDACTED]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Thank you. Did you ever serve in the United States military?

[REDACTED]: No, I did not.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right, have you served in the Armed Services?

[REDACTED]: No, I did not.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have you attended college?

[REDACTED]: Yes, I did.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which college did you go to?

[REDACTED]: I'm a graduate of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which year?

[REDACTED]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What's the degree in?

[REDACTED]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED] I'm also a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. What year did you obtain that?

[REDACTED] That was [REDACTED] It's called the [REDACTED]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Any further degrees?

[REDACTED]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At some point did you become employed by PSEG Nuclear?

[REDACTED] Yes, I did.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When was that?

[REDACTED] I came here in the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Salem and Hope

Creek and that was a -- I came here from the [REDACTED]

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1 [REDACTED] where I served in the same
2 capacity.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: From the desert
4 to the East Coast.

5 How long did you remain in that position?

6 [REDACTED] Approximately nine months
7 and then I became the [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] after we found the Unit 1 steam generator
9 issues during the recovery of Salem.

10 I did that for about five months and then
11 I became a [REDACTED] and served in that
12 capacity through the recovery of both Salem stations.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Now you said
14 you were the [REDACTED] would that be for
15 both units?

16 [REDACTED] Yes, that is correct.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And can you
18 give me the dates you were the [REDACTED]
19 approximate?

20 [REDACTED] Yes, it was approximately in
21 the summer of [REDACTED] And

22 then I went over to [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED] as a growth developmental
24 assignment for six months. And then when [REDACTED]

25 (Phonetic) who left to go DC Cook, I went back to

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1 being the [REDACTED] for approximately seven
2 months, six or seven months. And then in the summer
3 of -- it would be -- let's see, I have to think here.
4 I'll work backwards.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You held a lot
6 of positions here at the plant.

7 [REDACTED] Yes, my dad says I couldn't
8 keep a job. They all seem to be better than the last
9 one I had.

10 I became [REDACTED] in
11 the summer of [REDACTED] and then in the fall of [REDACTED] became
12 the [REDACTED] until the fall of

13 [REDACTED] That was a rotational assignment and then I
14 became the [REDACTED]

15 when the company embarked on a several hundred million
16 dollar capital program. I set a project, put in all
17 the project controls and signed contracts for steam
18 generators, reactor vessel heads, turbine, power
19 uprates, those kinds of things. And I did that until
20 the fall of [REDACTED] where I then assumed the [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED] which also included the
22 projects organization. The entire design that we did
23 of setting up the projects was just for me to go set
24 up the infrastructure before we combined back because
25 there was just such a large volume of work to get

1 initiated. It needed that kind of focus.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You mentioned
3 in the fall of [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED] That's correct.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And I thought
6 you said that as a rotational assignment. Can you
7 explain?

8 [REDACTED] Yes, in my development, at
9 this level, part of my development in preparation for
10 potential future jobs was to be able to have senior
11 management experience different areas.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] So part of that was for me
14 to go over and gain operations experience at the
15 senior level. Since I'd been a [REDACTED] and
16 previously had mentioned this, but actually I have an
17 [REDACTED] and I worked in the [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] earlier in my career.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How many years
20 were you an [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED] Approximately three.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you a
23 shift [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED]: Yes. I had a regular active
25 license which I maintain current. I was an [REDACTED]

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1 the way the program worked out there. You know, you
2 had to serve your watches that were required by Part
3 55 on a quarterly basis to be able to maintain your
4 license.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you ever
6 licensed here at --

7 [REDACTED] No, I was not.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Now when you
9 were the [REDACTED] who would you have reported to?

10 [REDACTED]

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The entire
12 time?

13 [REDACTED] The entire time.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Direct
15 reporting link to [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED] Correct. And as you
17 probably established in your investigation, the [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] as we were set up to run Salem and Hope Creek was
19 a little bit atypical to what you might have and
20 atypical to what the [REDACTED] is
21 today here in that I only had operations, maintenance,
22 radiation protection, security and fire protection.
23 Maintenance and work control and outages were being
24 run by [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED] which is a little bit different than

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1 you might have seen in your travels of how
2 organizations are set up.

3 So even though I was the [REDACTED] it was
4 mostly strictly operations with no maintenance work
5 control or outages.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And when you
7 became the [REDACTED] again in the fall of
8 [REDACTED] do you remember what month that would have been?

9 [REDACTED] It was -- we did a
10 realignment and I think we made the realignment effect
11 the end of October, middle of October. It was
12 following the refueling outage in the fall of [REDACTED]
13 but really, we planned this reorganization and
14 realignment under [REDACTED] from June to October,
15 so I knew what my position was going to be in the mid-
16 summer and then we worked through a whole
17 reorganization staffing process that became effective,
18 I believe the end of October.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Jeff, if we can
20 get those details, that's important for the record.

21 MR. KEENAN: Yes.

22 [REDACTED] That's the general --

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And when
24 you were the [REDACTED] the fall of [REDACTED] would
25 you have reported to [REDACTED] then?

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1 [redacted] That is correct. In fact,
 2 when I was the [redacted] I reported to [redacted].
 3 [redacted] until [redacted] changed and
 4 then I reported as the [redacted] to
 5 [redacted] until the reorganization in the fall of
 6 [redacted]

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
 8 Good, thank you.

9 Let's, I guess maybe we'd like to begin
 10 going back to when [redacted] left the side here. My
 11 understanding is it was 1998 time period, 1997-1998
 12 time period. Is that your recollection? That's about
 13 the time --

14 [redacted] That's about the time [redacted]
 15 [redacted] came and I believe that's when [redacted] retired.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And when [redacted]
 17 [redacted] came on board here, what was your job then? I
 18 know we didn't go back that far, but do you remember
 19 what your position was then?

20 [redacted] Let's see, I believe that I
 21 was the [redacted] and then [redacted]
 22 was here when [redacted] left and because we needed a Salem
 23 [redacted], [redacted] asked me to return back to the
 24 station until we could complete what he was planning
 25 to do as -- [redacted] was planning to do as a

1 reorganization which subsequently occurred in the
2 summer of that year when [REDACTED] was hired and I
3 was promoted to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] came in.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED] Correct. And at that time,
6 we haven't mentioned it, but there was another [REDACTED] here
7 who was the [REDACTED] (Phonetic).

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]
9 (Phonetic)?

10 [REDACTED] Correct.

11 MR. BARBER: Was he just Hope Creek? He
12 was [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] When we did the realignment
14 in the summer after [REDACTED] got here, the alignment was
15 we hired [REDACTED] and the alignment was we had [REDACTED]
16 (Phonetic), [REDACTED] and myself with [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED] type work control. We can
18 get you those org. charts.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When [REDACTED]
20 came on board, did you see a change in the way the
21 plant was going to managed down here? Did he come in
22 with a program or an agenda that was something
23 different than [REDACTED] was using or putting in
24 place here?

25 [REDACTED] Well, just for the record,

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1 your question would tend to suggest that [redacted] and [redacted]
2 were peers and that is not true.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

4 [redacted] actually worked for
5 [redacted] The peer to [redacted] that was here at that time,
6 the [redacted] When he
7 retired, [redacted] came in. [redacted] reported to [redacted] until
8 he retired.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So when [redacted]
10 left, who took his place?

11 [redacted] When [redacted] left, that's when
12 we did the realignment that I discussed with [redacted]
13 [redacted] and myself. And there was a few
14 weeks, months transition. But in the end, we sort of
15 changed to that alignment.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So [redacted]
17 [redacted]

18 [redacted] That is correct.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: My question
20 going to that change. Did you see a change in
21 direction or here at the plant between [redacted]

22 [redacted]
23 [redacted] was here and drove
24 mostly the restart of Salem. Obviously, Hope Creek is
25 running and having reviewing outages, but the focus at

1 the time clearly was the recovery of the Salem
2 stations. We had at that point without confusing you,
3 [REDACTED] (Phonetic) was a very capable [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED] of Hope Creek and we were able to keep the
5 majority of the organization focused on Salem and had
6 a management team at Hope Creek sort of running that
7 station while we really were into, as you know, a very
8 large effort.

9 When [REDACTED] came, so [REDACTED] was mostly into
10 the recovery, that focus. When [REDACTED] came, he brought
11 a focus to the organization on safety as a core value
12 that was much more visibly pronounced than [REDACTED] was.
13 [REDACTED] was obviously very much towards reactor safety.
14 But [REDACTED] approach was right when he got here that
15 we were absolutely going to get to top quartile and we
16 were going to do it by focusing on safety. And if we
17 focused on safety, this was what I used to call
18 [REDACTED] speech number one, if we focus on safety,
19 industrial, radiological or nuclear, we will then
20 create the behaviors necessary that will give us the
21 reliability and then if we get the reliability, we
22 will be cost competitive. And his focus, I mean,
23 every venue or business plan was built around that so
24 in a very focused way [REDACTED] was all about driving
25 safety and safety behaviors in the organization.

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And I don't mean to say that [redacted] wasn't, but when the new leader came, [redacted] made that the mission of PSEG Nuclear and made that the framework for our Management Program that everything was built upon.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [redacted] came in and put his focus, his core value on safety?

[redacted]: Correct. Literally, I mean just for the record, if you care, there's all hands meeting presentations I'm sure that are still available. You could just see how every, all hands meeting, every management meeting, our metrics were set up with safety, reliability and cost. So I mean his whole program was geared around that.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Of those three, what was the top? Safety, reliability or cost?

[redacted] used to always say that the way that we're going to get reliable is by focusing on safety and if you get the safe behaviors, that people have their safety behaviors and processes that are keeping us safe industrially and nuclearly, those behaviors then translate into behaviors that will produce reliability of the unit.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was the corporate management out of Newark supportive of [redacted].

1 [REDACTED] direction? And if so, could you give some
2 examples showing their support?
3 [REDACTED] The way we were set up, our
4 focus is the officer team was on the units and [REDACTED]
5 managed the Newark interface. Specific examples, I
6 would suggest you're probably going to have to get
7 from [REDACTED] because we would go up to [REDACTED]
8 quarterly leadership conference, the CEO's conference
9 and we would have a bi-weekly videoconference where we
10 just generally discussed unit status and upcoming
11 highlights, but my personal corporate interface when
12 I was [REDACTED] was pretty much
13 limited to those kinds of venues. We'd submit a
14 budget. We got all the capital projects approved for
15 power up grade and turbine replacements. So [REDACTED]
16 pretty much went to all to this strategic planning
17 meetings and staff meetings and stuff up in Newark and
18 we didn't go to very many of those at all.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But the
20 meetings or discussions you were then part of, I want
21 to ask you a couple of questions about those. During
22 any of those was there a pushback from [REDACTED] or
23 his people up there regarding -- let me finish the
24 question -- regarding plant operations status, having
25 to shut down, extending outages, anything along those

1 lines at all?

2 [REDACTED] I cannot recall any and
3 there were -- we presented many times at
4 videoconferences, outage schedules and forced outage
5 schedules that were having an impact on the company
6 and I never was aware of any or heard any personally
7 or was aware of any where in those forums and
8 videoconferences or other forums where -- if your
9 question is was there pressure to start up?

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That is my
11 question.

12 [REDACTED] Actually, I did not hear
13 anything in those meetings that gave me concern about
14 pressure to start up.

15 In many cases [REDACTED] was very supportive of
16 -- and I can think of several cases where he said
17 well, we have to do what we need to do to run safely
18 and it's not about one day of generation today, it's
19 about the long term reliability of the asset.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

21 [REDACTED] So I never heard any -- now
22 we're in business to make electricity, so obviously
23 everybody that's involved knows that our terminal
24 objective is to when we're shut down in a very smart
25 methodical way return to service as prudently as we

1 can and that's what he expected, but I never heard any
2 pressure to start up or take any actions that would be
3 short cuts or do something that was not in accordance
4 with our programs or policies.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you recall
6 if [REDACTED] would have been a participant in some
7 of the discussions or meetings that you were at?

8 [REDACTED] Over what time frame?

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The time frame
10 you discussed, when you're having the
11 videoconferences, you go up for the quarterly
12 meetings. It's a general question.

13 [REDACTED] The answer is yes. I'll say
14 after -- the reporting relationship is [REDACTED] reported
15 directly to [REDACTED] And when [REDACTED] came, we did a
16 little realignment and [REDACTED] reports to [REDACTED] now.
17 So the videoconferences after -- and [REDACTED]
18 involvement, he had direct line authority for the
19 nuclear plant, has increased tremendously since the
20 realignment.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That was in
22 about April of 2003?

23 [REDACTED] That's correct.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So [REDACTED] left
25 in March. [REDACTED] came in April.

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[REDACTED]

April, May.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Somewhere in that time frame and then alignment took place at that time?

[REDACTED]

Correct. Now since then I

think [REDACTED] has been at most every videoconference.

[REDACTED]

has been down here a lot. We go to [REDACTED] or now

[REDACTED]

go to [REDACTED] staff meeting. I mean the whole

set up has changed since [REDACTED] came.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I want to go back and talk a little bit about deregulation. When did that occur here in New Jersey?

MR. KEENAN: I can add to that. PSEG was created in August of 1999. I believe it was August 22 or thereabouts.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

MR. KEENAN: That's when we officially became a deregulated entity.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

[REDACTED]

Which makes sense because

that was the time frame that we named the officers.

That's when I became [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of this new entity called PSEG Nuclear LLC.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When management knew that that was going to occur in preparation for

1 the change in the environment, really, the business
2 environment I'll say, did you notice a change in the
3 support received from corporate regarding plant
4 operational decisions down here that [REDACTED] and his
5 people were making?

6 MR. BARBER: Or the focus of the
7 decisions.

8 [REDACTED] I don't recall anything
9 changing. You're saying did a videoconference or any
10 involvement by [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] for the tone of them change
11 the day we deregulated or soon after?

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, before in
13 preparation of the deregulated environment?

14 MR. BARBER: You had a significant change
15 that was scheduled to take place. You know it was
16 coming. The timing you may have had a little bit of
17 control over from a company standpoint, maybe not
18 totally, but approximate timing. It was a major
19 transition for the company.

20 [REDACTED] The only change that I can
21 think of that occurred in that time frame is we had to
22 create an interface with our trading company that we
23 didn't necessarily have before in the deregulated
24 market.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why?

1 [REDACTED] Because in the deregulated
2 market there's no dispatching of -- there was a whole
3 different displace scheme for the power plants and
4 we're an independent generator of electricity, so we
5 through our trading company, bid our assets into the
6 power market on a daily and going ahead basis. And
7 because of that, we had to make sure that for planned
8 outages, that we would have a communication with our
9 trading company, to let them know when planned outages
10 were so they could go make appropriate business
11 decisions on replacement power. That was not in the
12 conversation much before then that I'm aware of. It
13 may have been through Hope Creek, but if you remember,
14 you really don't have to dispatch in a shutdown unit,
15 so most of my career there was (Inaudible) being shut
16 down, but -- so we had to create a protocol to notify
17 the trading company when we were going to move the
18 units around.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Talk a little
20 bit about that, about the interface, when there were
21 unplanned outages, if you could?

22 [REDACTED] We just would call the
23 trading company and tell them that we're shut down and
24 here's what our best estimate is and we're coming back
25 and then we would just keep them apprised.

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who would make
2 that call?

3 [REDACTED] When I was [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED] we set up a protocol that that would
5 either be through the [REDACTED] which at
6 that time was [REDACTED] or the [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED] Before then, we
8 had -- now, I think we have that going through the
9 Plant Managers, but I'm not certain of that. You'd
10 have to validate that, but at that time, we had
11 established a protocol through those individuals.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you ever
13 make that call yourself when you were the [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] To the trading floor? I'm
15 not aware that I made that call.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Talking about
17 unplanned outages, did [REDACTED]
18 ever give you the impression that they received
19 pushback or pressure from those people when they had
20 to make the call to them regarding unplanned outages?
21 [REDACTED] I'm not aware of them
22 receiving any feedback to that. Most of the time we
23 -- we had some issues where we weren't as prompt
24 calling the trading floor as we could have been and we
25 worked through those issues, but as far as pressure to

1 return the unit from the trading floor, they were
2 always interested in when we thought our best
3 percentage chance of that because they would make
4 decisions based on probabilities. And we actually
5 refined that more and [REDACTED] could probably
6 elaborate more on that. But we'd actually provide
7 like a 60 percent confidence schedule or an 80 percent
8 schedule, 100 percent confidence schedule. Well,
9 obviously, the 100 percent confidence schedule, we
10 gave ourselves a lot of float to account for emerging
11 issues during the start up so that the trading company
12 could make an appropriate decision.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We're talking
14 about work environment and you're really talking about
15 people's perceptions of things.

16 [REDACTED]: Uh-huh.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How they're
18 viewing things, seeing things and how they're
19 perceiving that.

20 Did any of your direct reports share with
21 you any concerns that they were having or feeling
22 regarding operating the plant in the new environment
23 and having to deal with the other people on the
24 trading floor?

25 [REDACTED]: No. Not that I recall.

1 There was an occasion, I do recall, which I corrected,
2 and I don't recall the time frame. I apologize for
3 that some time in my two years as [REDACTED] where it
4 was reported to me there was an inappropriate
5 conversation between the trading floor and the Control
6 Room that occurred and I went to the president of the
7 trading company and we -- he put some direction out
8 and that never occurred again.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you tell us
10 what that was about?

11 [REDACTED] I don't recall the exact
12 issue, but the -- it was generally along the lines
13 that you were talking about where the person on the
14 other end of the calls were to get the feeling that
15 the trading guy was pushing a little and that got to
16 my attention. We stopped actually at that point, the
17 trading company and calling the Control Room.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] That was the only example of
20 that that occurred that I can recall and we prompted
21 took care of it.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you give us
23 a time frame for when that occurred?

24 [REDACTED] That was some time in my [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] I apologize for not --

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you remember
2 who you heard that from?

3 [REDACTED] It was from the Hope Creek
4 side.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: . Okay.

6 [REDACTED] I don't recall any more than
7 that. It would have -- I mean it was either going to
8 be [REDACTED] I mean it would have likely been [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED] but that's a guess on my part, only because
10 that's who the [REDACTED] was at that time.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'd like to try
12 and get a little more from you, your memory about the
13 substance of the call made to the Control Room, if you
14 could.

15 Can you share with us more about that?

16 [REDACTED]: I don't recall the specifics
17 of it other than -- I think it was in the perception
18 that you were talking about. The real issue was that
19 it was inappropriate that the trading, that the trader
20 called the Control Room and that was not a routine --
21 that was not a routine interaction that I was aware of
22 and so that's why we stopped it immediately.

23 Nothing, no action was taken differently
24 as a result of the trader calling that interaction
25 with the Control Room staff. I mean we didn't do

1 anything differently because of that.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We're going to
3 take a short break and I'm going to flip the tape
4 over.

5 (Off the record.)

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, we
7 flipped over to Side B and [REDACTED] I just wanted
8 to talk a little more about this call to the Control
9 Room. When you became aware of this specific instance
10 which you discussed, did you find that that had been
11 -- that those type of calls had been occurring before
12 that?

13 [REDACTED] No, quite the contrary. As
14 I recall when I was discussing it with -- and I'd be
15 guessing, most likely, probably [REDACTED] that that was
16 not that common and when -- if it had occurred, it
17 wasn't common in what he references as the tone, I
18 guess, of that particular call was different. I
19 reported that to [REDACTED] and he was 100 percent in
20 agreement that that was unacceptable, supported my
21 discussions with the trading floor and we resolved
22 that issue by setting up a more formal protocol and to
23 the best of what was brought to my attention. It was
24 an isolated occurrence that we promptly addressed.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, but did

1 you consider at that point that that call to the
2 Control Room sent a message to the operators about a
3 change in something?

4 [REDACTED] I don't believe that it was
5 relayed to me nor do I believe that -- I know for a
6 fact it wasn't relayed to me and I don't believe that
7 it was a big issue within the Hope Creek Staff. We're
8 making a bigger deal out of it now, in this
9 conversation, than the actual tone that this issue was
10 brought.

11 I recognize the potential that could occur
12 with that which is why I jumped right on it and I'm
13 confident that [REDACTED] communicated back the new protocol
14 and then the issue was resolved.

15 I was not aware of any other issue around
16 that topic after that --

17 MR. BARBER: I'd like to move on to a
18 slightly different time frame and a slightly different
19 line of questioning. Somewhere in the summer of 2000,
20 there was a problem at Hope Creek and that related to
21 an over power event, slight over power. If I remember
22 right, what happened was it was something on the
23 order, there was some transience at the station and
24 there was a loss of feedwater, some sort of partial
25 loss of feedwater. And the operators recovered from

1 it, but not totally and they brought the plant back up
2 to power and the feedwater going into the reactor was
3 a little bit colder than it should have been because
4 of the feedwater heating problem.

5 [REDACTED] I am very familiar with the
6 event.

7 MR. BARBER: So our understanding was the
8 TARP Process came out of that because of the way that
9 -- the recovery of that event was managed. It was
10 kind of managed on a local level more. The shift made
11 decisions on what to do.

12 [REDACTED] That's correct.

13 MR. BARBER: And this led to our
14 understanding was some concern on the part of the
15 senior management team as to what was going on, why it
16 was happening, what kind of controls should be in
17 place and what kind of message should be sent to make
18 sure that the operators understood what the limits of
19 the responsibilities were and what the appropriate
20 controls were. And this led to a meeting, I think
21 around August 2000 where [REDACTED] called a number
22 of operators into a group discussion. Were you at
23 that meeting?

24 [REDACTED] I was not.

25 MR. BARBER: You were not. Did you hear

1 -- did you know of the content of the meeting or were
2 you briefed on it at all?

3 [REDACTED] Yes, I was aware of what we
4 were trying to accomplished because we had discussed
5 that as a senior management team.

6 MR. BARBER: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] And you're right, the TARP
8 Process came out of that.

9 MR. BARBER: Okay.

10 [REDACTED] So I'll let you ask a
11 question.

12 MR. BARBER: What was discussed and what
13 was the message that was conveyed to the operators, as
14 you understood it?

15 [REDACTED] I wasn't there. As I
16 understand -- when we talked about it, [REDACTED] wanted to
17 -- he was the [REDACTED] so I mean he was
18 the person accountable for the operation of the
19 station. He wanted to let the operators know that
20 decisions, some decisions -- there is a protocol that
21 has to be followed that is linked to safety of getting
22 management notifications, getting extra help and
23 getting thinking involved in decision making,
24 especially when they're not time dependent decision
25 making on the unit returning to power, that that's

1 different. And he was very clear because I heard him
2 talk about this when he talked about it afterwards.
3 He was very clear in his conversation that that didn't
4 mean that they couldn't trip the plant any time that
5 they thought that they needed to trip it, make
6 immediate decisions to trip or derate the unit. They
7 had the accountability to do that based on their
8 judgment and their evaluation of what's going on in
9 the plant at the time.

10 Once we did the down power, their decision
11 making and the protocol for when we had done enough
12 management reviews to say it's okay to return to
13 power, [REDACTED] put a control in that said he wanted to
14 make sure because we didn't have plant managers on
15 that alignment -- it's a little confusing -- there
16 were different work structures, that he wanted the
17 Vice President of Operations to have an opportunity to
18 review the situation and ask questions and authorize
19 the return to power.

20 And he did that as an added control for
21 safety which I agreed with. It had nothing to do with
22 the operational decision making of tripping or
23 derating and the operators knew that and in fact,
24 there's examples after that effect where there were
25 numerous occasions where the operators based on real

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1 time needs and transmission lines maybe going down,
2 circulators at Salem clogging, whatever caused
3 immediate down powers and the operators knew they had
4 the authority and did. I can show you examples where,
5 numerous examples where they derated the unit and we
6 encourage that. When I was [REDACTED] I would go
7 thank the crew for taking the prompt action and
8 derating. But once it was down, we put in place a
9 protocol that assured the adequate level of reviews
10 occurred before we authorized increases in power. And
11 in the event they specifically addressed, what had
12 occurred was the Operations Superintendent made
13 inappropriate decision making to go ahead and return
14 Hope Creek to service after a lightning strike in the
15 switchyard with absolutely very little walk downs and
16 engineering reviews and assessment of the plant before
17 we returned to power. And in fact, in that, as you
18 alluded to, missed -- did assess even the impact of
19 the lightning strikes sufficiently to catch the B
20 water string that was isolated.

21 And when we returned to power that created
22 a configuration issue that resulted in that slight
23 operation over 100 percent power that he talked about
24 until the on-coming crew caught the feedwater string
25 was isolated. Well, our management response to that

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1 was no, that's unacceptable, because it was
2 unacceptable.

3 And until we -- to get a management
4 control in place that we could adequately ensure that
5 we had the right kind of reviews and plant evaluations
6 done, before we returned to power or increased back
7 power, we put the TARP Process in place that caused
8 the response and the experts to come out here and
9 assess the situation and provide the Operations
10 Director and the Operation Managers with the assurance
11 that we understood what happened and it was safe to
12 return to power.

13 And that control of calling me is that the
14 [REDACTED] in the middle of this that's when I rotated
15 with [REDACTED] He went over to the [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] That gave me the chance to
17 ask questions and make sure that I was satisfied that
18 we covered all the bases before we turned the unit to
19 service.

20 MR. BARBER: And it was your understanding
21 that the focus of this was clearly on returning it to
22 service --

23 [REDACTED] Increasing power.

24 MR. BARBER: Was there any discussions to
25 your knowledge that related to power changes in the

1 downward direction?

2 [REDACTED]: No. In fact, we made it
3 clear and I personally made it clear that our
4 procedures made it clear and in fact, I can show you,
5 it's not a good story, but there were opportunities in
6 our sky lines (Phonetic) I can show you where those
7 down powers occurred on numerous occasions.

8 I can recall an event in the spring of --
9 it would have been the spring of 2001 and I want to be
10 precise, if you want me to look at the sky lines.

11 MR. BARBER: Sure.

12 [REDACTED] Could you hand me the sky
13 lines for Salem? As I recall this, I recall this
14 vividly.

15 I'm looking, Jeff, for the down powers due
16 to -- maybe it was 2002, due to grassing and then we
17 took the unit to 50 percent.

18 The [REDACTED] you're getting called in
19 the middle of the night and -- I think it was right
20 here. I think it was this one. We had trouble with
21 heavy grassing. This spring of 2002 was the highest
22 level of grass ever observed at the Delaware River, so
23 we had some issues with having to take circulators out
24 to clean water boxes and in the -- do we have the TARP
25 Report for that? You can read the TARP Report for

1 that.

2 It talks about, in the middle of the
3 night, I got a call that -- from the shift -- and we
4 were on a conference call with [REDACTED] and
5 myself and the Shift Manager and he called to tell me
6 he'd taken the unit down to 50 percent power and he
7 called out a TARP and we had a conversation on that
8 about what the plant configuration was and we
9 concluded and I directed that we take the unit off
10 line and we all agreed and [REDACTED] felt more
11 comfortable because he was -- at 50 percent and
12 stable, we were sitting there in a condition that we
13 were really not where I wanted to be.

14 So we, in the middle of the night, made
15 the conclusion let's take the unit off line and in
16 fact, we did and we stayed off line 13 days until we
17 got the required number of circulators back and got
18 the plant back in a configuration when we came up to
19 power we could manage the river, as you can see, in a
20 satisfactory way afterwards.

21 MR. KEENAN: So for the record, [REDACTED] is
22 indicating to what we call a sky line which is a
23 generation chart and for this specific issue and we
24 can make this available to you, Jeff and Scott, is a
25 sheet that shows Salem Power one output for March of

1 2002 on a megawatt basis. So it shows times where
2 we've reduced power and come on line.

3 [REDACTED] The reason I brought this
4 one up in reference to this conversation, Scott, is
5 [REDACTED] called me and told me he was already at 50 percent
6 power. So there was no requirement that he had to
7 call [REDACTED] or I to take that kind of action. Once he
8 did that he was following his Ops chain of command,
9 got a hold of [REDACTED] and I on a conference call and
10 talked through and we came to the conclusion, let's
11 just go off line. And that was totally, totally what
12 was expected of me from [REDACTED]. And when I called
13 [REDACTED] I didn't call [REDACTED] to ask permission to tell
14 him I was taking the unit off line, I didn't need --
15 that was not the protocol that [REDACTED] required.

16 I called [REDACTED] up afterwards, told him
17 what we were doing, told him that we were going to get
18 a fragment (Phonetic), called [REDACTED] and said
19 we're going to need some maintenance help and we're
20 going to lay out a fragment (Phonetic) and go get the
21 right number of circulators. Because I think if you
22 look back here in January, as I recall, you can see
23 that we went down to 50 percent power here to do a
24 traveling screen. Came back up two days, went down to
25 50 percent power here, came up a little bit later

1 there. A day later, down -- you don't see --

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is that January
3 or February you just showed in that previous one?

4 [REDACTED] February. So you can see we
5 were sort of -- and you see we don't stop at 50
6 because that was like for one hour while this phone
7 call was going on that particular night, in the middle
8 of the night. Told them to take the plant off line.
9 I didn't have to ask permission from [REDACTED] nor would
10 I ever.

11 MR. BARBER: Well, you're talking about
12 [REDACTED] being the coordinator, took the unit to 50
13 percent, but wouldn't the procedures dictate he was
14 to reduce power?

15 [REDACTED] Yes, he had to reduce power
16 to 80. He went down to 50 to give him some more
17 margin and then made the call. The decision to go off
18 line was far in excess of -- this could have looked
19 just like the one I showed you previously. (Inaudible)
20 That was again an hour to operate the unit and when I
21 called [REDACTED] he was totally supportive of that and
22 [REDACTED] has a boss called [REDACTED] so I'm sure he
23 called [REDACTED] and I was not aware of any conversations of
24 anybody above [REDACTED] (Inaudible) other than us getting
25 the unit in a configuration that we felt comfortable

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1 with coming up and being able to run reliably.

2 And if you look, the grass is still high
3 in the river. Not all decisions turn out to look like
4 this, but I mean on this particular one, taking the
5 time to restore the unit was absolutely the right
6 thing to do and stop the seesawing of the unit that
7 had been occurring.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's 9:20 in
9 the morning. We're going to take a short break,
10 please. We'll go off the record.

11 (Off the record.)

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, it's
13 approximately 9:30 in the morning. We're back on the
14 record and there's something you wanted to share with
15 us, [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED] Yes, the August lightning
17 strike event which, for the record we clarified did
18 occur in August of 1999 as opposed to August 2000
19 which Mr. Barber had indicated in the introduction to
20 this line of questioning.

21 When this occurred, [REDACTED] had this
22 as a very significant operational decision making
23 error and [REDACTED] was very troubled by this and what
24 that meant as far as how we were actually operating
25 the station and how we were actually monitoring the

1 station as a senior management team. And he called us
2 together, I believe it would have been [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED] and I, and gave us a pretty direct
4 set of expectations on what was acceptable and how
5 we're going to operate these power plants and what
6 wasn't. And what wasn't acceptable is us returning
7 these units to power or -- and not properly evaluating
8 the plant when transience occurred and I mean in my
9 entire career I have never been coached or counseled
10 one, that effectively from a reactor safety
11 standpoint; and two, very clear expectations from
12 [REDACTED] that he expected us to put in place the kinds of
13 corrective actions we did, the TARP, the approvals to
14 return to power, to make sure that that did not happen
15 again. That was [REDACTED] with his direct reports being
16 laser-precision sharp, that that was unacceptable and
17 that wasn't going to happen again.

18 In my entire career having ran plants here
19 and out in [REDACTED] I had never received that direct
20 or impactful coaching from my boss in my nuclear
21 career. That tended to have an impact on me relative
22 to my recollection of the event than the corrective
23 actions. This was a big event and [REDACTED] wanted us to
24 fundamentally use this as a way to change the approach
25 that we were going to have to the operations here

1 which is why I believe, back to our previous line of
2 questioning that [REDACTED] took the -- what was probably
3 an unprecedented step of personally going and
4 addressing the Hope Creek SROs so that it was laser-
5 clear to them.

6 MR. BARBER: Because of his strong,
7 passionate feelings about the circumstances that there
8 was a potential that in the way he communicated with
9 passion and with conviction that maybe some of the
10 messages that he was trying to convey could have
11 gotten misread?

12 [REDACTED] I wasn't at the meeting, so
13 I can tell you I heard his direction and his passion
14 and it was laser crystal clear what he was looking for
15 and why he was troubled by this as the person that was
16 ultimately in charge of the facility. I wasn't not at
17 the SRO meeting, so I'd be speculating as to how that
18 might have landed on anybody that was there.
19 Obviously, I have -- you should go talk to those folks
20 because they could give you that perception. I would
21 be speculating.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We have talked
23 to many of those folks, actually. We've done a number
24 of interviews as a part of this work environment issue
25 and some people have pointed to this meeting that [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED] had with the operators as how things started.
2 People took, some of what you said, from that point
3 forward, people's perceptions did change.

4 [REDACTED] Okay.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: A fundamental
6 change about the approach to Ops, that was maybe not
7 so positive. So we're going to talk about some of
8 those specific instances right now.

9 [REDACTED] Okay, fair enough. I have
10 one more clarification.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Sure.

12 [REDACTED] In a relative scale, the
13 impactfulness of the August 2000 lightning strike
14 event and our correction actions and how we saw that
15 as profound as compared to the one singular example I
16 had of the trader that I was made aware of that maybe
17 made an inappropriate call to the Control Room and our
18 corrective actions, those were widely different in
19 magnitude.

20 I mean I was not aware of any, nor am I
21 aware that there was any subsequent issues along those
22 lines with the traders after we took that corrective
23 action and to my best recollection I would say today
24 that was a single point, maybe a lapse in judgment by
25 a particular trader that we both corrected on the spot

1 and then put a protocol in place so that it wouldn't
2 occur again and in the relative scheme of things, that
3 was a very small issue on the scale of things and
4 especially compared to our reactions in our correction
5 actions, only because I'm not aware that -- it wasn't
6 repetitive and I was not aware of any other examples
7 by my management team where that had occurred within
8 appropriate actions with the trading company.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We're not going
10 to be talking about trading company reactions. We're
11 going to be talking now about operations interactions
12 and the way some things went down that people didn't
13 think went down appropriately or correctly.

14 So I want to talk to you about and get
15 your impressions of some certain events.

16 [REDACTED] Great.

17 MR. BARBER: The first one involves, it
18 was start up. It was probably 2001, 2002 time frame.
19 We believe that you were the [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] at the time and let me give you a little
21 bit of background. Hopefully, this will ring a bell
22 as far as what the issue was, but the Salem start up
23 was in progress and then somewhat of a protracted
24 start up. There were some problems with some
25 generator work that caused some delays about a week

1 and there was a desire to try and bring the plant up
2 in kind of an unusual configuration in that one of the
3 things that was done was in an attempt to get
4 condenser vacuum there was some special seal, sealing
5 type material that was put in place in the main
6 turbine seals and the vacuum was, in fact, drawn
7 (Phonetic). There was -- basically it was to try to
8 move the plant along schedule-wise, that there was a
9 number of activities that had taken place. There were
10 some delays. I think the desire was to try and do as
11 much in parallel as possible to kind of move the plant
12 along with the start up.

13 And there was some concern about making
14 sure there wasn't too much steam in the header because
15 if you got above 100 pounds you could actually roll
16 the turbine. But you wanted to have adequate steam
17 pressure for vacuum purposes and there were a number
18 of other issues in that regard.

19 Also, at the time, on the schedule there
20 was -- it might have been coming out of a refueling
21 outage. There was a desired scheduled physics
22 testing, a performed physics testing. And so to kind
23 of set the stage, the plan is in kind of unusual
24 circumstances, you're trying to move the plant along
25 with start up. You have a vacuum in the condenser,

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1 but you have this unusual thing with the steam seals.

2 There's a push from the senior management
3 team and some of it has been attributed to you where
4 you're pushing to do physics testing and you're
5 directing the start up manager to do physics testing.
6 And the feedback we're getting from him and others is
7 that they feel like they're being -- there's an
8 unusual amount of pressure to start the unit up.

9 And the unit is in a very, very odd
10 configuration, doing physics testing, actually taking
11 the reactor critical. You got -- any kind of change
12 in any kind, any type of thing that would affect a
13 reactivity coefficient could work for you or against
14 you. You could have cold water injection. You could
15 get an overpower condition, but yet the feedback we
16 got was there's a push, there's a production push.
17 And we want to get the unit started up. We want to do
18 as much as we can in parallel.

19 Do you recall that at all?

20 *rc* - [REDACTED] I recall the issue. I also
21 would characterize it a bit different. I don't
22 dispute that in your interviews that somebody might
23 have had that perception because I can't control
24 people's perception.

25 You would characterize it that we were

1 trying to advance the schedule. We really -- that
2 didn't advance the schedule. [REDACTED] and I had
3 talked, what we wanted to try to do is get as much
4 discovery in as we could early so that we could
5 correct any other problems so that when we did return
6 the condenser back to the normal configuration, if we
7 did have problems with condensate on long path
8 research steam seals we could have found those and
9 fixed those in parallel.

10 So we didn't really advance the schedule
11 any with that line affecting. Am I making sense?
12 Because we couldn't go anywhere with the temporary
13 turbine seals anywhere. What that allowed us to do is
14 bring back pieces of the secondary plant to see if
15 there were issues so that we could fix them in
16 parallel as opposed to in series.

17 So we weren't advancing the end date of
18 the outage a bit because you can't run the plant with
19 temporary steam seals. What it did allow us to do is
20 bring back and do more testing to find other issues
21 that we could correct. So that's a subtlety -- I want
22 to make sure that --

23 MR. BARBER: Did you get any push back on
24 this? Did anybody --

25 [REDACTED] We did some evaluations and

1 there were some concerns and we addressed those
2 concerns with engineering specifically on the ability
3 to draw vacuum with the temporary seals and we did
4 find some industry experience that was related to me
5 that that had been done before, so it wasn't like we
6 were off -- there were turbines and condensers
7 everywhere in coal plants and nuclear plants and that
8 this wasn't a profound new idea to bring a vacuum up
9 that way.

10 MR. BARBER: Was there a 5059 done for the
11 unusual configuration because there was a change --
12 you considered it a change to the normal starting up?

13 [REDACTED] I don't recall that there
14 was or was not.

15 MR. BARBER: Was that something that was
16 considered?

17 [REDACTED] I don't recall. I do recall
18 we did do an evaluation. I don't recall the specific
19 evaluations we did and then I also don't recall, I do
20 recall the discussion with Operations and the concern
21 around the low power physics testing. And as I
22 recall, we didn't do the low power physics testing in
23 that configuration.

24 MR. BARBER: Okay, but the way it was --

25 [REDACTED] Help me out --

All TC

1 MR. BARBER: The way it was described to
2 us is that you were pushing the station to do this, to
3 push the physics testing to advance the schedule.
4 That's the way it was being described to us.

5 *TC* [REDACTED] I'm not going to dispute how
6 somebody described something to you.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let us ask the
8 question, were you pushing to have that testing done?

9 *TC* [REDACTED] No, I was pushing to have
10 parallel evaluations done so that we could make a
11 management decision with Operations' involvement and
12 what was possible to allow us to keep moving the
13 discovery piece of the outage forward while we were
14 waiting to fix the main generator.

15 So again, the low power physics testing
16 would have allowed us to find other problems. I
17 didn't direct them to do it and I would believe nobody
18 would have told you that because I didn't direct
19 anybody to do that. I kept parallel valuations going
20 on so that we could make an informed choice on what
21 the right operational decision was. That is totally
22 appropriate to what I feel is the role of the [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED] is. So I'm asking questions. We're getting some
24 other evaluations and reviews done to see what was
25 possible. I don't think that's inappropriate.

1 Now nobody informed me that I recall that
2 they felt pressured or not and it certainly wasn't
3 directly ordered to go do that. Part of operations is
4 exploring alternatives all the time and we do that as
5 part of sound operational decision making.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you need to
7 say something, Jeff? Do you want to take a break?

8 MR. KEENAN: Can we go off the record?

9 (Off the record.)

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, we're
11 back on the record after [REDACTED] took a short
12 break. It's about 9:49 in the morning.

13 We just want to follow up a little bit
14 about this issue we were talking about.

15 MR. BARBER: On this issue, did anybody
16 express concerns to you about the way this -- the
17 start up was being managed and what was being asked?

18 [REDACTED]: Not that I recall
19 specifically. I know it would have been typical for
20 [REDACTED] and I to be talking with the [REDACTED] and the
21 Outage Managers talking about where we're at and what
22 the plan to move forward was, but I don't recall any
23 specific conversations.

24 In the end, the Operations Department had
25 the authority and as I recall, this is vague

All 70

1 recollection, that we didn't do the low power physics
2 testing that that evaluation was --

3 [End of Tape 1, Side B; begin Tape 2, Side
4 A.]

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, after
6 going back on the record for about 30 seconds, I put
7 in tape number 3. I'm sorry, [REDACTED] if you
8 could go ahead, please.

9 [REDACTED] I lost that last thought --

10 MR. BARBER: This issue that we've been
11 talking about for the last few minutes, was it coming
12 out of the refuel outage?

13 [REDACTED] I believe it was. It was
14 after we had damaged the main generator during a
15 maintenance evolution that extended the outage, as I
16 recall 9 days.

17 MR. BARBER: And were you [REDACTED]
18 during this -- what we were talking about during this
19 time period?

20 [REDACTED] I believe I was. Did you
21 have the date, Scott, of when that was?

22 I know when it was. It was the outage
23 before the last Unit 2 outage because we did the
24 generator repair last fall, so if it's fall of 2003,
25 it's spring of 2001 and I was the [REDACTED]

1 MR. BARBER: Do you remember who the
2 [REDACTED] for that outage?

3 [REDACTED] I believe it was [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED]

5 MR. BARBER: Did you have a start up
6 manager at the time or is that -- was it one of the --
7 [REDACTED] We had a position called a
8 Start Up Manager, Recovery Manager and I don't recall
9 who that was. If you know who it was that would
10 probably jog my memory.

11 MR. BARBER: [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] Yeah, we had to do one of
13 the outages.

14 MR. BARBER: Do you remember if he was
15 involved in this particular issue we're talking about?
16 [REDACTED] If you have the fact sheet
17 that he was the Recovery Manager for that outage, I
18 would agree with you, but I'll say if he was, that
19 would have been one of the assignments he would have.
20 I didn't recall that it was [REDACTED] or somebody else. He
21 worked directly for the Operations Managers. There
22 are three or four levels of management between this
23 going on and me.

24 MR. BARBER: I thought you mentioned when
25 we began talking about this particular issue that

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1 there was a concern raised and Engineering had
2 addressed something.

3 [REDACTED] I remember the conversation
4 about using the temporary seals or using some sort of
5 sealing material to allow you to draw back and in our
6 daily -- in some of the updates we get on the outage
7 I was made aware we devaluated this and it wasn't
8 unique and that it appeared that it would be
9 acceptable. In fact, the decision was made to do it.
10 That's the level of understanding that I have of it.

11 MR. BARBER: And where did that decision
12 come from, that it was okay to do that particular
13 thing?

14 [REDACTED] It would have been through
15 our normal process with the Operations Manager and the
16 Outage Manager and the Operations Director.

17 MR. BARBER: Where was the push coming
18 from to do this because this was unusual. This wasn't
19 per the procedure? You would likely have had to make
20 a procedure change or multiple procedure changes to do
21 this.

22 [REDACTED] During the outage, we always
23 had look ahead teams and we're always looking for ways
24 of bringing the plant back to get it in testing in a
25 way that we can find issues so that everything isn't

1 in series because everything doesn't have to be in
 2 series and it's no safer or unsafer to do things in
 3 series or parallel and we do have an obligation. We
 4 are an electric generating plant where it's prudent
 5 and appropriate to look ahead, do things in parallel
 6 so we can bring the unit back to service safely as
 7 efficiently as we can because our business is to
 8 generate electricity.

9 In that, when we ran into the problem with
 10 the generator, we had people looking at how could we
 11 bring the secondary plant back so we could get into
 12 this discovery that I was talking about and bring
 13 pieces of equipment back now that we had this event
 14 occur which we weren't anticipating called damaging
 15 the generator during our repair. As part of that,
 16 this idea came up and got evaluated through the outage
 17 organization and ultimately implemented. TC

18 I, as the [REDACTED] would not make
 19 -- it wouldn't be my practice in the way I operate
 20 making locally based equipment related decisions. I
 21 was probably the least -- in an organization, probably
 22 the least effective place. I might say hey, have you
 23 thought of this, have you thought of that? Can we do
 24 this? Can we get somebody to look at this? Is there
 25 any way that we can in parallel bring back pieces of

1 the plant so that we can find things and fix them so
2 we're not in serious -- I would have had that
3 conversation.

4 MR. BARBER: People have said that you
5 were directing some of that work be done and it caused
6 some people problems frankly and that's why we're
7 exploring it with you.

8 7C - [REDACTED] And if somebody pushed back
9 and said I really don't want to -- I'm saying I have
10 the ability -- I don't recall the specifics of that,
11 directing a particular individual, but doing an
12 evaluation so that you can have the right inputs for
13 management decision making, I do require that to be
14 done. I didn't direct anybody to start up the turbine
15 with the temporary seals. I'm quite confident --
16 that's not my style or the way I do business.

17 Now do I want to make sure that we're
18 making (Inaudible) all available options? That's
19 conservative decision making. And a prudent business
20 decision making.

21 MR. BARBER: Had there not been a delay
22 because of the damage in the turbine (Inaudible) would
23 all of this have been done? Would you have gone and
24 put temporary seals in? Would there have been a push
25 to --

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1 [REDACTED] There would have been no
2 need to do that because we would just have started up
3 the plant in the normal frequency that the outage
4 schedule had dictated. Now we have this event and we
5 know that it's nine days. Rather than just sitting
6 there hoping -- getting the nine days done, we're
7 asking questions. Hey, the plant is generally put
8 back together. Is there any way we can modify safely
9 the configuration so that we can bring some of this
10 equipment back so if it's not correct, we can do the
11 retest and correct it under the window of the
12 generator being repaired?

13 MR. BARBER: You just made my point. What
14 you described was that had the outage gone as planned,
15 had there not been some unexpected problem that you
16 would have conducted the outage as planned. But yet,
17 when you lost time on the outage, there was a push, a
18 pressure coming from the senior management team to
19 meet the original schedule or to come as close to the
20 original schedule as possible --

21 [REDACTED]: That's not correct --

22 MR. BARBER: -- by doing things in
23 parallel. That's what you just described.

24 [REDACTED]: I disagree with that. If my
25 testimony led you to that conclusion, I'll take

1 another run at what I said.

2 The generator, once it was broken, was
3 going to be there 9 or 10 days and we can go back and
4 get the facts set (Phonetic) of the outage schedule
5 and what it was, but as I recall, 9 or 10 days, to
6 fix.

7 There was no sync'ing (Phonetic) that
8 generator any sooner until it was fixed. I mean it
9 had to be repaired and it was going to take what it
10 took to repair it.

11 Well, we were in that hammock (Phonetic)
12 which did extend the duration of the outage. We were
13 looking to see is there any way we can bring back
14 pieces of equipment to test so we can find them
15 satisfactory tested or not so we can make repairs or
16 not. Well, we're under this umbrella called fix the
17 generator and trust me, the generator was not going to
18 be sync'd until it was fixed and put back together,
19 independent of any decision that I might make.

20 And so the rest of the plant meanwhile was
21 coming back together, while this repair of the
22 generator is going on. So we asked and [REDACTED] and I
23 discussed and said hey, let's get some evaluations,
24 see if we can get some creative thinking and
25 appropriately not violating or short cutting, do some

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1 things in parallel, bring some of this equipment back
 2 so when the generator is fixed, we have a very good
 3 chance of being able to just smartly start up a plant
 4 without having to -- the first time we start the
 5 condensate pump (Inaudible), if there's a way that we
 6 can get the condensate pumps started earlier, that's
 7 prudent and allows us an opportunity to fix those
 8 kinds of problems while the generator is being fixed.

9 If the generator was not damaged, you
 10 would have just done things based on the original
 11 schedule. You would have done them as planned, based
 12 on the original outage schedule?

13 [REDACTED] That's correct because I
 14 would have had no hammock to -- I would have had no
 15 extended period that I knew I was going to be in to
 16 fix the generator.

17 MR. BARBER: Do you understand that --

18 [REDACTED]: I actually don't.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's okay,
 20 Scott, we're going to talk about it.

21 MR. BARBER: If there was no damage to the
 22 generator, the outage would have progressed as
 23 scheduled and I'm sure there would have been some
 24 schedule pressure or some production pressure, but it
 25 would have been the normal pressure that would have

1 been exerted during any outage to get the unit back on
2 line which is we all are aware that there's always, at
3 least a relative amount of pressure there.

4 With an emerging condition, an unexpected
5 condition that is eating into critical path time,
6 whatever it is, whether it's 9 or 10, whatever the
7 number is --

8 [REDACTED] It obviously started driving
9 the outage, there's no dispute with that.

10 MR. BARBER: Exactly. So what happens is
11 with the Senior Management Team coming in, and pushing
12 the station and saying hey, managers, take a look at
13 this. We need to look for economies. We need to look
14 for things we can do up hill that there is a
15 production pressure that's being put on there. And
16 there are people in the station that are saying
17 management wants us to take shortcuts. And that
18 management is in the form of [REDACTED] and others
19 at his level that are pushing us to take shortcuts.

20 [REDACTED] I mean I'll say okay that
21 wasn't what we were trying to do. That wasn't what we
22 communicated. And if you read INPO documents on how
23 you safely execute an outage and respond to emerging
24 issues, they talk about the look ahead manager. They
25 talk about the recovery manager. They talk about

All TC

1 doing evaluations to try to do things in parallel when
2 you run into unexpected things. I mean there's
3 nothing -- you're conveying a tone and I can't get in
4 people's heads, you know, or what they would tell you
5 for their perceptions. I'm not doubting your
6 credibility on facts if that's what people told you.
7 But I disagree with the way that you're making it,
8 connect the dots, because I don't see the dots
9 connecting that way.

10 MR. BARBER: We're not connecting, people
11 have. We're talking to you about that. I'm just
12 describing it the way it was described to us in other
13 interviews we've conducted.

14 [REDACTED] So it is appropriate for us
15 to ask for alternative reviews to be done to try to
16 get testing done so we can find issues efficiently
17 once we were provided with this time as opposed to
18 just having the unit lie fallow and then pick up the
19 sequential thing. That just isn't prudent and --

20 MR. BARBER: I disagree --

21 [REDACTED] That's not the way outages
22 are ran.

23 Now if you're asking me did that land on
24 certain individuals in a way that they felt that we
25 were pressuring them to do stuff to take short cuts?

1 If they told you that, I can't dispute that. There's
2 a lot of intensity around outages.

3 My typical style and I don't recall
4 exactly conversations in this particular event, but my
5 typical style was just let's go get some parallel
6 evaluations done so that we can determine if there's
7 another course of action to be taken. There's nothing
8 unsafe about going and doing an evaluation. There's
9 nothing unsafe about me going and asking somebody to
10 say hey, is it possible to go do low power physics
11 testing in parallel here. You're well below the point
12 of adding heat. Typically, we do -- we've done low
13 power physics testing in some plants over the years
14 without even vacuum in the condenser and you're aware
15 of that. So you're not -- you're 10^{-7} , 10^{-8} , in that
16 couple (Phonetic). We're not talking about power
17 ascension testing or power range testing. We were
18 talking about the verification testing that the
19 reactor engineers do just above being critical. And
20 it was an evaluation on -- I do not recall, now would
21 it be my practice to direct that being done. I
22 directed it to be looked at.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I got a
24 question for you. Scott asked you before and I don't
25 remember what your answer was and I apologize.

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Do you know if there was a 5059 evaluation done surrounding what we're talking about?

[REDACTED] I do not know that there was or was not.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you recall it being discussed that one was maybe needed, do you recall?

[REDACTED] I don't recall. And again, at the [REDACTED] level, the Chairman of SORT, the convening of SORT, the people that were on SORT was

[REDACTED]

In the outage tracking system, if one needed to be a SORT that would have been assigned and it would have been executed. I typically did not because I was in charge of all three units, did not get down to an individual SORT level.

And to directly answer your question, I don't recall the conversation around whether a 5059 was needed or not. That would have been [REDACTED] or the Operations Manager's decision whether we needed one or didn't and if we did, one would have been done and then the SORT would have happened and if they concluded that we didn't, one wouldn't have happened.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Fine, we'll go on to another issue.

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[REDACTED]

Yes, okay.

MR. BARBER: Thanks, we'll move on to something. This is -- the time for this would have been in early 2002 and it was a service water issue. There was a failed surveillance test and it looked like it was with service water. There was a check valve that was tested and it resulted in the loop being declared inoperable and there was some discussion between you and the operating shift and it looks like what happened was that the shift made a decision to declare inoperable and you raised some questions with them about who they interacted with prior to making the decision.

The details are a little sketchy, but it looked like it was a test that was done. There's a surveillance. It failed the surveillance. The shift declared the loop inoperable. Our understanding is you got involved. You started asking some questions about that and do you recall that issue at all?

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Early 2002, and specifically, and I'll be pointed, that you criticized the Shift Manager for calling the service water loop inoperable?

[REDACTED] - 70

It would not have been my practice to criticize an operability determination.

1 I might have asked the inputs. Once it's inoperable
2 in the log, it's inoperable.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm asking you,
4 I gave you that bit of information to try and see if
5 you recall this event we're talking about?

6 [REDACTED] I don't recall that specific
7 event. I also -- we must have called out a TARP which
8 was -- so let's look at the TARP log because the only
9 way I would get notified at all on an LCO entry is in
10 the context of a TARP.

11 It wasn't my expectation, nor was it the
12 protocol that I would get called directly by the Shift
13 Manager for anything other than the initiation of a
14 TARP, if they couldn't get a hold of the Operations
15 chain of command.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You made a
17 comment earlier that when you were the [REDACTED] it
18 was not uncommon for you to get calls in the middle of
19 the night.

20 [REDACTED] When we crossed the TARP
21 threshold, I would get the calls. The procedure
22 required them to call [REDACTED] and if they couldn't get a
23 hold of [REDACTED] call me. And then sometimes [REDACTED] would
24 call me and we would get into conversations with a few
25 other folks on the phone. That happened a handful of

1 times, one of which was the one I related on the circ
2 water issue.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You mentioned
4 "would cross the threshold." What do you mean by
5 that?

6 [REDACTED]: Our TARP procedure had some
7 clear criteria when we had to call a TARP and a
8 communications protocol for what had to occur when we
9 called the TARP.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So just the
11 initiation of a TARP would be the crossing of that
12 threshold you're talking about?

13 [REDACTED]: Right, and there's clear
14 criteria in the TARP procedure on what requires the
15 TARP.

16 Do we have a (Inaudible) inoperable?

17 MR. KEENAN: I looked in the spring of
18 2002 time frame. I don't see a TARP that relates to
19 that.

20 [REDACTED]: I mean I'm not disputing the
21 facts that I talked to a Shift Manager. On that
22 particular issue, I don't recall that specific issue.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let me just
24 move off that and into sort of a related topic. Do
25 you recall discussion between yourself and a group of

1 Shift Managers in one of the Ops offices about
2 operability decision making in which there was a
3 fairly large group, maybe four, five or six Shift
4 Managers that wanted to have a discussion with you
5 about operability determinations and what their belief
6 was and what your understanding of what was expected.
7 Do you recall that?

8 [REDACTED] I believe I recall being
9 asked to come to a Salem OS meeting. I think it was
10 Salem.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It was Salem.

12 [REDACTED] (Inaudible) getting into
13 what you're talking about. And there was a
14 conversation about they wanted to make sure that my
15 expectation was that they had the authority to make
16 those calls and I recall in that meeting that I did
17 reiterate that that was the expectation.

18 But I also reiterated that when we're not
19 in a time, you know, a five minute, that the
20 expectation is that they get Engineer's input,
21 Licensing -- they have the ability when they're not in
22 immediate, to get other people involved to help and
23 make a better decision.

24 I recall that was sort of the genesis of
25 the conversation, the best I recall.

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That
2 characterization was a little different from the
3 Operators' perspective, Shift Managers.

4  I recall meeting with them.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Their
6 perception was a bit different. What -- the way they
7 described it was somewhere along the way and they
8 didn't necessarily attribute this to you or maybe they
9 did, I don't know, but they basically said something
10 to the effect that our paradigm shift on our we did
11 operability determinations. Instead of prove it's
12 operable, it became prove it's inoperable. And the
13 need and the desire to get Engineering involved, to
14 get Licensing involved, to get -- whether it be System
15 or Design Engineering or whoever else was out there
16 that could shed light, the focus was clearly on
17 proving that the equipment could perform its intended
18 safety function instead of doing an objective
19 evaluation of the deficient condition it was. Do what
20 we need to do to keep the plant on line. Do what we
21 need to do to show the equipment is inoperable.

22 And that all this push to get all these
23 outside groups involved were nothing more than just an
24 attempt to maximize generation.

25 MR. BARBER: That's the perception that

1 was explained to us. 7C

2 [REDACTED] Clearly wasn't what was
3 communicated.

4 And clearly, 9118, Revision 1, the
5 resolution in nonconforming integrated conditions in
6 nuclear power plants, your document, doesn't expect
7 that you call things inoperable on limited information
8 all the time. In fact, that document which we train
9 the operators on and test them, tells you to go get
10 the diverse input. Tells you to make judgment calls
11 on the best available information. It also tells you
12 that where it's unclear and I was reviewing that,
13 trying to get some of this out in this LS meeting that
14 if it's a 72-hour action statement and the action has
15 to be done within 6 hours, on the first information
16 that comes to the Control Room, you don't have to call
17 it inoperable. You don't expect that. The regulation
18 doesn't expect it. If they need to confirm, get some
19 additional input. If it's something that requires an
20 immediate -- the action statements what they want,
21 (Inaudible) do something, well, you really don't have
22 a lot of time.

23 Most action statements are not written
24 that way and the expectation and my expectation, you
25 know, I'll believe you when you said that it didn't

1 land on some of the operators that way was that as the
2 Shift Manager, they're a member of the Management
3 Team. They have to take information that comes into
4 the Control Room and go get some QVV validating
5 information when they have time to do it because it
6 isn't necessarily operating just safely, to be cycling
7 the unit on erroneous information, calling something
8 inoperable, entering 3 of 3 (Phonetic), that isn't the
9 intention of 9118.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, you don't
11 have to believe us when we're telling you, but I'm
12 going to get to the meeting you had with the Shift
13 Managers. What did they explain to you their concern
14 was or if they had a concern?

15 *TC* [REDACTED] As I recall the meeting, and
16 again, I don't have ways to pinpoint the meeting, as
17 I recall the meeting, they wanted to make sure that I
18 saw that they still have the ability to make the
19 decisions, to operate the plant and I did confirm that
20 in that meeting, that I was entrusting them and they
21 were there 24 hours a day and they had the training
22 and they were the person that was in charge. I also
23 expected that they did a little bit of QVV, as I
24 mentioned.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What's that

1 stand for?

2 [REDACTED] Qualify, validate and
3 verify. It's a human error technique.

4 And I did expect them to go verify before
5 they necessarily take the action and I thought we had
6 a productive discussion. We talked out some issues.
7 It was clear they had some issues and I thought when
8 we got out of the meeting that I validated that they
9 were in charge and they would be backed up on those
10 decisions.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you see
12 just the fact that they came to you, scheduled a
13 meeting with you to discuss their concern, did you see
14 that as a work environment issue at that point?

15 [REDACTED] No.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Here's a group
17 of Shift Managers coming to you --

18 [REDACTED] That's not how it occurred.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's the way
20 it's been portrayed to us.

21 [REDACTED] They asked me if I could
22 attend one of their regular Shift Manager meetings
23 which I agreed to do and that was not atypical for me
24 to do that.

25 I didn't attend every one of them because

1 there was the Ops Managers meeting.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This has been
3 described as an atypical meeting.

4 [REDACTED] It was probably an atypical
5 Shift Manager meeting because I was there, but it
6 wasn't -- they meet regularly -- I want to say every
7 other Thursday. I don't recall what it was, but they
8 had a forum where they all would meet to discuss
9 operational issues because they're on rotating shifts
10 and they had to figure out a way to get almost all of
11 them together at one time before and after a shift and
12 I was asked to come to that to discuss some of the
13 (Inaudible).

14 Would that have been atypical? Yeah, but
15 they asked me to come. Did I know they had some
16 issues? Yes. I didn't perceive it to -- to directly
17 answer your question, did I connect the dots that it
18 was a skee reissue (Phonetic)? I didn't see it that
19 way.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why not?

21 [REDACTED] I just didn't see it that
22 way at that time. I saw it as they had some issues we
23 needed to talk through and I felt we talked through
24 them and I did make the point, as I recall of
25 reinforcing that they were in charge.

All TC

1 MR. BARBER: Did anybody ever come to you
2 in this time frame and just complain about production
3 pressure? They felt they were being pushed too much
4 to do things they felt uncomfortable with?

5 [REDACTED] No.

6 MR. BARBER: Or in the two years that you
7 were the [REDACTED] no one ever came to you and
8 said they had concerns or something, some direction
9 the station was being asked to take or pushed to say
10 hey, I don't feel comfortable with this. I think it's
11 nonconservative. I think there are more conservative
12 ways we could do things. I think we should stay where
13 we are or do whatever. You never had discussions like
14 that?

15 [REDACTED] Not that I recall with that
16 laser precision and I believe I would have recalled if
17 somebody would have been that direct because that kind
18 of directness would have tripped me into a different
19 course of action.

20 MR. BARBER: Did you ever have anybody
21 ever tell you that they wouldn't do something because
22 they felt it was unsafe and you were asking them to do
23 it?

24 [REDACTED] Directly on a specific
25 event? I'm not going to do this because it's unsafe?

1 MR. BARBER: Or they felt it was unsafe
2 and they tried to portray that to you?

3 [REDACTED] Not that I recall, not with
4 that kind of laser precision.

5 MR. BARBER: How about the start up that
6 we talked about earlier with wanting to do physics
7 testing in parallel with the unusual line up with the
8 secondary?

9 [REDACTED] In that particular issue, I
10 didn't know whether it was safe or unsafe until we did
11 an evaluation. The conversations that occurred when
12 we asked for these evaluations were I said were
13 probably premature, let's go at least look at it. We
14 weren't directing it to be done. There was a lot of
15 -- I don't manage by emotion. I try to manage by
16 fact. And you manage by fact by going out and getting
17 diverse opinions and evaluations and do conservative
18 decision making and diverse inputs.

19 The fact that you mention something and
20 somebody goes absolutely, that's unsafe. Unsafe based
21 on what? We hadn't looked at it. Your opinion?
22 Okay, I got your opinion. Let's go take -- we're
23 engineers. Let's go take a look at it. And if we
24 come at it that it's not something we want to do, we
25 won't go do it, but I couldn't live in a world where

1 we're just --

2 MR. BARBER: I understand your point about
3 being an engineer and I understand your comment, but
4 operators don't always think that way. They tend to
5 think in terms of black and white, yes and no, and
6 they get uncomfortable when they're asked to do things
7 that are not per their normal procedures.

8 [REDACTED] I never directed anybody to
9 do anything outside of the procedures and any
10 evaluations that were done, if we were going to change
11 the course, I had an expectation we would follow or
12 normal process. If we had to do temporary procedure,
13 there was nothing in that was that -- in the middle of
14 the night, we were just going to do something. It was
15 do the evaluation. Is it the right thing? Let's go
16 make it happen safely. If it didn't occur to them
17 that way (Inaudible) management, I believe you.

18 MR. BARBER: Did you consider when the
19 Shift Managers asked you to attend that meeting, did
20 you consider where they were coming from that there
21 was a perception problem that maybe they were having?

22 [REDACTED] Right, and that's what we
23 tried to talk through and I tried to relay that that
24 wasn't what I was about and that wasn't what the
25 senior management team was about.

1 We could argue the effectiveness of that,
2 hindsight, this line of questioning, but that clearing
3 up that perception in their role, I also recall
4 getting feedback after that meeting that that was a
5 very productive meeting. So some of the folks gave me
6 feedback that that was good that I came and they could
7 hear where we were coming from.

8 MR. BARBER: I was given feedback that it
9 wasn't productive.

10 [REDACTED] They never gave me that
11 feedback.

12 MR. BARBER: Okay, you didn't get that.

13 [REDACTED]: That I recall and I believe
14 that I would have recalled that.

15 MR. BARBER: Right. You might be right.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We're going to
17 take a break and switch the tape.

18 (Off the record.)

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We're back on
20 the record. It's about 10:23. I switched over to
21 Side B.

22 Let's talk about a new issue, if we could.
23 Spring 2001 outage, Salem. From my understanding
24 there was an unplanned automatic reactor trip, a trip
25 due to current transformer failure which caused a

1 generator turbine and reactor trip in that sequence.

2 [REDACTED] May of 2001?

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Spring 2001
4 outage, coming out of the outage.

5 [REDACTED] Just by luck, we're on that
6 page.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Good. I
8 thought we were going to go to that one next.

9 [REDACTED] It's just luck.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Good.

11 [REDACTED] May 22nd.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you remember
13 that issue, coming up out of the outage, you had that
14 reactor trip as I described? Started with a current
15 transformer failure?

16 [REDACTED] I'd have to review the TARP
17 report to get the specifics..

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm not going
19 to ask you specifics about the event, but I'm just
20 trying to --

21 [REDACTED] Do I recall when the current
22 transformer failed? Yes. And do I recall we had a --
23 appears to be a four-day outage, yes. Now that I look
24 at this.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, good.

All 7C

1 Then we're on the same page then.

2 During the spring 2001 time period in
3 relation to this outage, coming out of the outage, an
4 issue we just described, was there a sensitivity
5 regarding the NRC's ROP program at that point? What
6 color the plant could change to if certain events
7 happened or didn't happen? Is that a topic of
8 conversation among senior management at your level
9 that you can remember?

10 [REDACTED] I don't recall a specific
11 conversation about that. We reviewed the PIs every
12 month through SORC and we had management review
13 meetings. I don't recall his specific conversation
14 relative to this trip or anything else.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'll ask you a
16 specific question.

17 [REDACTED] Okay.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you say to
19 anyone or suggest to anyone after the reactor tripped,
20 as I've described here that we need to get the plant
21 back up as soon as possible or it's going to make us
22 go from green to white in the NRC's eyes? Did you
23 make a statement to that effect?

24 [REDACTED] I would not have. For one
25 thing, factually, that's not correct because there

1 would be nothing that -- that would make no sense in
2 your ROP process.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why wouldn't it
4 make sense?

5 [REDACTED] Because you tripped, you
6 tripped. So I don't understand.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, to get
8 the plant back up in a certain time period?

9 [REDACTED] That is completely obviously
10 to the NRC's performance indicator set. Whether I
11 tripped and stayed out --

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was there
13 something related to the trip that was unique? Was it
14 loss of heat tank or was there some other factor --

15 [REDACTED] Not that I'm aware of. The
16 way you phrased that question, and Scott will tell
17 you, once you trip the duration of the outage doesn't
18 have anything at all to do with the NRC.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Unfortunately,
20 a lot of information we have was developed without the
21 ability to follow up, like the dates and all that
22 We're kind of relying on --

23 [REDACTED] Sort of piecing the quilt
24 together.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Exactly.

All JC

1 [REDACTED] But I am quite certain that
2 I would not have had a conversation with the
3 Operations Staff about a decision making that would
4 have been done in a way to avoid in some manner an NRC
5 performance indicator. We weren't managing, nor do we
6 manage by the NRC PIs (Phonetic).

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm going to
8 tell you that an individual or individuals from the
9 Operations Staff had told us that you had that exact
10 conversation with them. That's why I'm asking you
11 about it. I'm not just pulling this out of the air.

12 [REDACTED] I didn't accuse you of doing
13 that.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No, but I mean
15 I'm telling you your statement was that you would
16 never have said that and people said, in fact, that
17 you did.

18 [REDACTED] That doesn't even support
19 what you were saying because there's nothing to do
20 with that trip. If this did trip us white and I don't
21 recall if this did or didn't trip us white, it had
22 already occurred. So there's nothing starting up --
23 if there was a fact and I don't know if this was a
24 fact or not. If it turned us white, it's just the
25 fact that it turned us white. It doesn't affect

1 anything down stream from an operations perspective.

2 Scott can attest to that. I'll give you
3 a chance to go look at your -- but there's nothing in
4 the decision making to start up that has anything to
5 do with the NRC PIs.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I know
7 what conversation we're talking about. I'm not
8 disputing what you're saying, but what I'm telling you
9 is that conversation was relayed to me and you did, in
10 fact, say that to individuals in the Operations Staff.
11 I'm not going to keep debating this, but --

12 [REDACTED] If it's a fact that this
13 turned us white, would that have been generally known
14 to the site? Yes.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I would think,
16 right.

17 [REDACTED] I'm just speculating without
18 going and looking whether this trip actually turned us
19 white. I do believe we did have a white finding in
20 unplanned power changes or reactor trips in this time
21 frame.

22 I see Scott nodding his head. Whether
23 this was the one that tripped the threshold, I'd have
24 to go back and look.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The flavor of

All TC

1 this was --

2 [REDACTED]: You need to give me some
3 more information.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I am. I'm
5 going to try anyway. The flavor of this was that we
6 need to get the plant started back as soon as possible
7 or it's going to affect our going from green to white.
8 That's what was --

9 [REDACTED] I believe that a review of
10 my background would tell you and Scott will attest
11 that there's probably no industry executive that
12 understands the regulatory process that we put in
13 place better than me since I was involved two days a
14 week in Washington, D.C. with your group developing
15 this whole program as Scott is aware of and there's no
16 -- I mean the operator could have misinterpreted
17 something that told you that, but factually, there's
18 no basis for that. There would be no reason for me to
19 say that. I wouldn't have said it even out of some
20 misknowledge of the process. I understand the revised
21 oversight process as well or better than anybody in
22 the industry because of my unique involvement in being
23 very active in developing it.

24 There's nothing --

25 MR. BARBER: You know what, I was trying

1 to think if there was a finding -- it was
2 characterized as a performance (Inaudible) related to
3 a finding.

4 [REDACTED] But even starting up -- when
5 we start up has no relationship on a finding.

6 MR. BARBER: Not timing, unless it had to
7 do with the root cause and what you knew when you
8 started up and --

9 [REDACTED] Obviously, I don't have
10 enough information to even give you much, other than
11 one, the facts that you've presented is not -- it is
12 just technically makes no sense from your process.
13 Two, it wasn't normal and customary for me to use the
14 NRC performance indicators or findings in any kind of
15 operational decision making process. It's not today
16 and it's not our practice today. It's almost a
17 backwards process. I mean it tells you what happened
18 to PIs.

19 It would not be appropriate, nor is it our
20 practice where we do it where it's the end of a
21 quarter and you determine whether you're going to do
22 something. Those conversations just don't occur.

23 We take the actions we need to take, when
24 we need to take them and we react to the outcome of
25 that in the revised oversight process, as we've shown.

1 We've been late a couple of times. We react.

2 Let me add, in this time frame, you'll see
3 some voluntary power issues in this time frame in
4 these quarters where we reduce the power. We make
5 decisions to reduce power that were unplanned that
6 would have affected the performance indicator for
7 unplanned power changes in an environment where we
8 knew we were close to the threshold and none of those
9 affected our decision making. There's a condensate
10 pump repair.

11 Some of it was planned, but some of it was
12 unplanned. I'm not doing a scientific evaluation.
13 I'm just trying to read more into your question and
14 say are there other examples where --

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You don't have
16 to read anything into -- I'll you one more follow up
17 question on this.

18 Did you make the statement coming out of
19 that outage that we need to get the reactor started by
20 a particular date or our NRC performance indicator is
21 going to go from green to white?

22 [REDACTED] I'm quite certain I did not
23 because --

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

25 [REDACTED] It makes no sense.

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You've already
2 explained why it didn't make sense, but I wanted to
3 ask you one more time, yes or no.

4 Scott, go to the next issue.

5 MR. BARBER: This issue is about a start
6 up from transition Mode 5 to 4. The operators at
7 Salem had identified a problem with the 14 CFU,
8 containment fan-cooled unit and it had -- it had some
9 containment (Inaudible) reading implications. They
10 delayed the start for about an hour. They got a team
11 together to look at the problem, the leakage and I
12 guess some time you became aware of this issue, went
13 in the control room and made some comments about well,
14 the way it was described to us was you made a
15 statement "who's holding my plant hostage?"

16 The implication was why aren't they moving
17 along with the start up? Why are things stagnant?
18 The individual involved who was an operator in a
19 decision making role felt pressured to start up, that
20 that statement came across as production pressure,
21 that there was a push from you to move things along,
22 to not worry about this issue, not spend a lot of time
23 on it and move it along.

24  That would be factually
25 incorrect.

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1 MR. BARBER: Okay.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What's
3 factually incorrect about it?

4 [REDACTED] One, it's not my practice
5 nor would I make statements like that in the Control
6 Room. I have been an [REDACTED] and it just wasn't my
7 practice to do that. I'm quite certain that I did not
8 use those words in the control room. I certainly
9 don't recall saying it and I know quite certainly it's
10 my practice not and to be careful when I'm in the
11 Control Room around that.

12 I don't recall the specific issue with the
13 14 CFUs coming out of an outage. I'll just leave it
14 at that. But that's not typical of what I would do.

15 I personally, in this time frame, myself,
16 did not feel schedule pressure to start the units up
17 when we were down. I felt pressure to make sure we
18 were doing all of the prudent things as I described
19 before, so working as smart as we can to make that
20 happen and that drove some of my conversations with
21 the operators, but as far as schedule pressure that I
22 felt, I did not feel any schedule pressure, nor did I
23 believe I translated that to comments like that.

24 Why someone would quote me like that, I
25 don't know.

1 MR. BARBER: That's a direct quote, too.
2 That's how we related it.
3 [REDACTED] I'm quite certain I did not
4 say that.

5 MR. BARBER: We've talked about a -- my
6 term -- handful of issues today. And all of them are
7 perceived by the people who discussed them with us as
8 production, over emphasis on production, production
9 over safety type. And you had an explanation for each
10 specific one, but can you see where -- from the
11 questions that we're giving you, based on the
12 information we've got and probably 60 interviews or so
13 we've done.

14 We've done a lot of interviews on this
15 work environment issue, that there -- I'm going to say
16 there was a perception problem by operators and not
17 just reactor operators, we're talking SROs, shift
18 managers, AOMs, they perceive that there was a
19 production -- over emphasis on production, production
20 over safety issue.


21 I'd like you to address that maybe
22 generally, if you could. We talked about specific
23 things. You've denied saying things. People have put
24 quotes to you that you denied and you've explained
25 some of the technical things, but that's really where

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1 we're coming from. We're getting this information
2 from these people and we're trying to get an
3 understanding for what, if anything, was going on down
4 here that maybe made them think this.

5 Maybe you could talk about that some.

6  I want to come at this in a
7 different way. But I'll get to your point. We had a
8 very young Shift Manager leadership team,
9 inexperienced, young. And we also had some examples
10 of inappropriate Shift Manager and Operations decision
11 making, some of which we've talked about with the Hope
12 Creek example. There were other lower level ones at
13 Salem. That caused us to put in place some issues
14 where we probably just because of not wanting to be
15 negligent in our role of being accountable for the
16 safe operation of the facility, probably put ourselves
17 in some operational decision making at a senior
18 management level and I'm not just talking me, I'm
19 talking at the Director level and maybe even the
20 Operations Manager level that was probably -- we did
21 this for a situational basis, what may be an
22 unanticipated consequence. But the reason we did that
23 is to make sure that -- not that we could do things so
24 we could, as you would say, as alleged, take
25 shortcuts, feel this production pressure. If we did

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1 in a way that we could understand the quality of the
2 operational decision making and make sure it was sound
3 and that it had the right operational inputs and that
4 we were making the best decision.

5 Now did that land on some people in a
6 different way? I have no reason not to believe you.
7 It did when 60 people that you interview some of them
8 tell you that.

9 MR. BARBER: A fairly high level here in
10 the Operations (Inaudible).

11 *TC* [REDACTED] And our performance at this
12 station is not one of the top performing stations in
13 the country and it's not one of the top performing
14 stations in the country due to several reasons, one of
15 which is the quality that we were working on, [REDACTED] and
16 myself, the senior leadership team. When I was a
17 member of the team and then when [REDACTED] took over, was to
18 try to work on the quality of the operations
19 leadership and some of that wasn't that sound in this
20 time frame.

21 So where we inserted to a level and did we
22 get involved to a level more than I might have
23 situationally with a further developed staff? The
24 answer is yes.

25 Did we do as good a job explaining what we

1 were trying to do in that time frame to the operators?
2 I mean 20-20 hindsight would probably tell you no. We
3 didn't do as good a job of explaining that.

4 There was nothing that I believe, that I
5 can recall where we -- where I personally, I won't
6 talk for anybody else -- directed anybody to do
7 anything unsafe. Did I ask for some things to be
8 looked at so we could have broader operational
9 decision making? Yes, and I believe that's
10 appropriate.

11 Did I pick in this environment with three
12 units and outages every six months that there was
13 maybe some of this perception issue that needed to be
14 attended to? And did I have an understanding that the
15 Operations Directors and I had an Ops Manager that
16 were -- that's their accountability to work in this
17 area? I had an understanding that they were working
18 in this area and we were making progress.

19 I did not -- obviously, your interview
20 records show that the effectiveness of that could be
21 questioned and in hindsight, I agree with you.

22 I don't know if that was helpful, but I
23 tried to get that back to -- that's what we were
24 trying to do, but it appeared to have an unanticipated
25 consequence that we didn't pick up on as quick as we

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1 ought to have. I'll yield that in hindsight.

2 Did it result in anything unsafe happening
3 at the Salem-Hope Creek Generating Station? I'm quite
4 confident we did not operate unsafely in this, in that
5 environment. Does that make sense?

6 MR. BARBER: Yes, it does, but it's a
7 matter of perspective. I mean we're not talking about
8 things that are tech spec related. Those are -- the
9 thing is there's a clear requirement for tech spec,
10 you know if it says the equipment has to be able to do
11 this and it can't do that. There's no question that
12 the operators will do what's required and management
13 supports it. That's not where all the issues are
14 coming.


15 The issues come is where the guidance is
16 not clear. It's your choice. You can choose this
17 path, you can choose this path. From an operator
18 perspective, they tend to look for a conservative
19 path, almost universally per person, they say this is
20 the path we want to take. We want to get this
21 equipment fixed. We want to take this action. We
22 want to declare it inoperable. We want to do these
23 things.

24 And I understand management has a role to
25 kind of look at the bigger picture and offset that,

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1 balance that. But in a way that's being done, the
2 take away issue you describe is different. They're
3 not getting a balanced view, if you will. They're
4 getting we're being pushed for production, production
5 at all costs. Tell me where it says we can't do this?
6 Oh, if we can't do this, then let's go ahead and do
7 it. There's nothing that prohibits it. It's more the
8 paradigm and the way that the station operates and
9 that's the way it's being described to us.

10  There's nothing that I
11 described that's different than the other two
12 facilities that I worked at that are -- one of them is
13 probably the best operating nuclear plant in the
14 country and that philosophy and getting diverse input
15 and doing technical reviews, appropriate technical
16 review of alternatives to plot the best course of
17 action, it does balance safety and reliability and
18 cost and still maintain safety. That isn't atypical.

19 What's atypical is the reaction to that
20 here as a (Inaudible). So there's a situational
21 leadership piece here, based on our internal
22 investigation we're doing as a result of the NRC
23 letter and others and we obviously have to try a
24 different approach because this view, at least of some
25 people, of this unanticipated consequence that this

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1 has created, you know, we're committed to fix and this
2 isn't atypical. Most everybody here came from
3 somewhere and did not invent this approach here.

4 MR. BARBER: Would you be surprised if I
5 told you that operators that have been elsewhere said
6 that the way the station operates and the way the
7 management pushes is very different than their
8 previous locations and management pushes production
9 over safety here more than at the prior locations?

10 [REDACTED] In this environment where
11 we're at now, does this surprise me? People would
12 tell you that? No. Do I believe that to be true?
13 No.

14 There are examples where we could have --
15 we made some mistakes or could have done some things
16 better, I'll yield that. The answer is yes. But in
17 general, [REDACTED] focus on safety, our trying to work
18 on safe behaviors, pre-job briefs, getting people to
19 follow procedures, stop in the face of uncertainty,
20 those are common industry messages. We developed as
21 an industry with INPO's help over the years and --

22 MR. BARBER: But (Inaudible) has come with
23 people when they try and act according to those
24 conservative type of things that are put in. They're
25 feeling is the rub comes from senior management, when

1 they go up against that and try and do that, that's
2 what we've heard.

3 [REDACTED] And we've created an
4 environment where it's not okay for senior management,
5 apparently I'm taking this to an extreme, just in this
6 conversation, where apparently it's not okay for
7 senior management to ask a clarifying question or ask
8 the basis for something and when there is no basis,
9 apparently the expectation is that the senior
10 management team won't coach on the fact that we need
11 a basis that as a Shift Manager I'm not paying you
12 just to make input decisions in your ear and make a
13 five-second decision. Sometimes I am, but the point
14 (Inaudible) equipment issues and you yielded, Scott,
15 we're not debating those at all. But when those
16 decisions occur, the reactors get tripped. I've given
17 crews lunches thanking them for tripping the reactor.
18 I've written letters to shift managers thanking them
19 for very prudent start ups. There's no debate, I
20 don't believe, in those issues.

21 What we were trying to work on and what I
22 still think is an efficiency here in the Operations
23 Staff is getting the right technical input to make
24 quality decisions as opposed to taking the first piece
25 of information and saying this is what we're going to

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1 do. That is not appropriate in my opinion.

2 Now in our attempt to coach that kind of
3 behavior and I' not talking about the middle of the
4 night when the reactor needs to be tripped. We're not
5 -- I heard Scott say we're not debating those
6 decisions, those are obvious and they're made
7 appropriately and senior management reinforces by
8 thanking the crews for doing that.

9 Some of these other more elective decision
10 making, all I was trying to do in improving the
11 Operations leadership is approve the quality of the
12 inputs and making sure that we weren't making rushed
13 decisions and we had time to get better input. And in
14 the end, once we had all that input, the Operations
15 Department made the decision and we did -- they made
16 the decision.

17 I don't remember the facts of that low
18 power physics example, but I believe, as I recall, we
19 didn't go do that after we did the evaluation.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you want to
21 talk about the last specific incident?

22 MR. BARBER: Okay.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Then we'll
24 finish up.

25 MR. BARBER: This is actually a fairly

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
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1 recent event. This goes back to September of last
2 year. It was during the hurricane, Hurricane Isabel
3 and really relates to an interaction that you
4 supposedly had with the Shift Manager about the arcing
5 and sparking of the switchyard.

6 We know what happened. We know what the
7 end result was, so that's not the discussion. The
8 discussion is about the interaction about what the
9 Shift Manager was doing, why he wanted to do it and
10 again, it goes to conservative decision making.

11 Our understanding was at the time there
12 was a severe storm that was underway. There was
13 lightning, severe wind conditions. There was, in
14 fact, there was arcing and sparking in the switchyard.
15 The individual involved had actually gotten some OE
16 from another station about similar circumstances had
17 been happening and he wanted to take the unit off
18 line.

19 And then I believe you were the senior
20 management representative who was either on call or
21 here that night and you had a face to face discussion
22 with him. This is the way we understand it. And
23 basically told him to go out and get more information.

24  That's absolutely not
25 correct. And I would actually, if you were going to

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1 ask me for an example of where I thought this worked
2 appropriately, I would give that example, because he
3 recommended that we take the unit off line and I
4 concurred and we did. We went out and we looked at
5 the switchyard from the turbine deck and took the unit
6 off line and I suppose in this environment I wouldn't
7 do that.

8 I actually thought that that was one of
9 the better interactions we had. Hope Creek had
10 tripped so I came out for the trip which is why I
11 happened to be there. I heard a report that there was
12 a lot of sparking in the Salem switchyard. I went to
13 the Control Room. He said what he was looking at and
14 thinking of and we didn't need -- shouldn't be running
15 the unit and I asked him well, let's go take a look.

16 So we walked out of the Control Room, went
17 to the handrail there and about 30 nanoseconds -- my
18 recollection, he was struggling with the decision
19 making. He did not communicate to me that he wanted
20 to take the unit off line. He was sort of in a don't
21 know what to do and I told him, hey, it's fine to take
22 the unit off. We just tripped Hope Creek. If we keep
23 going, we're going to end up tripping the other two
24 Salem units. Let's go off line. He goes, are you
25 going to call [REDACTED] first? Why would I do

7C
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1 that? I'll tell him what we're doing. So we walked
2 back into his Control Room. [REDACTED] gave the order to
3 take plant -- I called [REDACTED] and told him we were taking
4 the Salem units off line. He said fine.

5 So I'm just astounded at the -- there's a
6 -- I won't go into my feelings. I'm just astounded
7 because that was textbook. He was struggling with the
8 decision making, absolutely was struggling. I said
9 let's go take a look. When I said let's take the
10 units off line I saw him get relieved. Not relieved
11 like relieved, but --

12 MR. BARBER: That's not it was described
13 to us.

14 [REDACTED] That absolutely confounds
15 me. As a matter of fact, I wrote to [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] afterwards, commending him on his decision
17 making and his operational leadership for that and
18 there's a letter in his file to that effect.

19 MR. BARBER: That's not the way it was
20 described to us. The way it was described to us was
21 he wanted to take the units off and he wanted to do it
22 immediately and you held him up. You said no, let's
23 go out and look and make sure that we really are
24 seeing something out there.

25 [REDACTED] That's not actually correct.

1 My sense is when I was talking to him he was wavering.
2 I had not seen the sparking. We took two minutes --
3 [End of Tape 2, Side B; begin Tape 3, Side
4 A.]

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, it's
6 about 10:53. We're going to Tape 4 and we were
7 talking about this switch order thing.
8 [REDACTED] So as I recall, when I went
9 to the Control Room, he was not in a definitive mode.
10 He was worried and when I relayed that it's okay to
11 take the units off, we literally within five minutes
12 of me being there we were doing that.

13 MR. BARBER: Well, why do you think he has
14 such a different perspective?

15 [REDACTED] I have no idea. Because I
16 actually recall and I don't recall the genesis of him
17 actually thanking me for helping. So this absolutely
18 confounds me. And it also might point to another --
19 I don't know the dynamics that are going on. Maybe
20 there's a lot of frustration and people are using this
21 process as a way of doing other things, but that --

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What are you
23 talking about?

24 [REDACTED] I think there may be a -- I
25 don't know where people's frustrations are, so [REDACTED]

1 could be totally (Inaudible) and the person we're
2 talking about for [REDACTED] to thanks us, there was nothing
3 secret about it. He was on shift.

4 And this just absolutely confounds me that
5 he would communicate that any differently because
6 absolutely when I went to the control room he wasn't
7 hey, I'm taking the units off line because I don't
8 like where we're going. He was I'm not sure really
9 what this means and we've got some report. This was
10 all just unfolding. I got here, this was in the real
11 time.

12 It's not typical of somebody like me is
13 here in the real time, but I went over there and he
14 said he was trying to -- I don't remember his exact
15 words but "this doesn't look good", "there's a lot of
16 sparking out there." "The AOs are reporting." "I
17 went out and looked." I don't recall him mentioning
18 OE consulting. I don't know that he did or didn't but
19 I do recall the OE because it came up in our
20 conversation after we took the units off line.

21 And it takes less than five minutes to
22 walk out of the control room, walk over, look and walk
23 back in. I called [REDACTED] and told him we're taking the
24 units off.

25 MR. BARBER: Let me ask a follow up on

All 7C

1 that. Was there anybody from -- I'm not sure what
2 group it would be, but it would be the group that
3 would be in the probably equipment and switchyard. Is
4 there anybody that was involved either before or after
5 that you made a comment to about "who's paying for
6 this outage? Is your group paying for this outage or
7 are we paying for it?" You never made a comment like
8 that?

9 [REDACTED] Not like that. The second
10 part of this, let me talk to you about what the
11 discussion was, so this is really funny.

12 MR. BARBER: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] When we deregulated, so
14 we'll circle all the way back to your first
15 conversation, there is an agreement in the State of
16 New Jersey that does not allow the nonregulated
17 utilities part of the company to benefit from the
18 regulated part of the company without a billing going
19 on and we have a thing called the billing of standards
20 and I personally had to sign under oath that I
21 understood when we created PSEG Nuclear.

22 The question that I asked wasn't in the
23 tone that you mentioned. I said hey, when T&B comes
24 out to do this and we're going to get support, we need
25 to know that that is billed appropriately because the

All 7C

1 law requires it.

2 MR. BARBER: Who were you asking that to?

3 70 [REDACTED] I asked that, I believe, I
4 don't recall the guy's name. There was a fellow here
5 from T&B. It wasn't about who was going to pay for
6 it. The company is a big company. We're going to go
7 fix this switchyard.

8 When I called out -- after we tripped, I
9 got a hold of the VP of Transmissions and I said I
10 need some help in the switchyard here, getting the
11 plan together and cleaning this and when I was talking
12 to his guy here I said hey, let's just be sure we get
13 the accounting right so that we don't screw up the
14 billing of standards because were going to have some
15 of their guys clean our start up yard and there's a
16 demarcation in our switchyard of where the equipment
17 is owned and operated by our T&B which is regulated
18 and where the crossover point occurs to where it's in
19 the deregulated side of the business.

20 Rather than split that up, since they were
21 bringing all their washer trucks and all the people to
22 clean the switchyard to come, as you know, clean the
23 switchyard, I wanted to make sure that they knew that
24 when they were working in our part of the switchyard,
25 they had to bill us for that. And that was the

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1 conversation.

2 MR. BARBER: It way it came across was
3 that you were asking some poor technician a question
4 that really should be directed to a VP, that's the way
5 -- that was my take away.

6 [REDACTED] I don't recall talking to a
7 technician.

8 MR. BARBER: Or an engineer or somebody,
9 but basically it wasn't a person in a decision making
10 role.

11 [REDACTED] It wasn't. I just wanted to
12 validate that he knew there was some treatment we had
13 to do and he was, I believe, the person I was talking
14 to, at least a supervisor level. I don't recall the
15 gentleman's name.

16 MR. KEENAN: I would be glad to provide
17 the affiliate standards --


18 [REDACTED] That was the whole basis of
19 my conversation. And it didn't have anything to do
20 with who was going to pay because we're a \$10 billion
21 company and had money to fix the switchyard.

22 MR. BARBER: The focus was on the outage
23 of the units, not so much who was going to pay for the
24 cleaning --


25 [REDACTED] That wasn't even in my mind

1 at that time. I was focused on getting the help here
2 to again, prudently and efficiently, clean the
3 switchyard because I knew that we weren't going to go
4 anywhere until we got the switchyard clean.

5 MR. BARBER: I guess we can still go back
6 to Jeff's earlier line of questions. We asked about
7 a number of situations and circumstances and you have
8 answers to most of these that are different than what
9 we've heard and understandably so, but it does point
10 to the fact that the information -- there's a
11 difference in the way you understand the information
12 and the way the others that are involved with the
13 information are taking away from that.

14  For some reason, and this
15 would just confirm that, this is why you just asked me
16 the follow up, what do I mean? I'll answer a little
17 more directly.

18 MR. BARBER: Good. Thank you.

19  I don't know why. I'll
20 admit I don't know why and we'll get some learnings
21 probably out of our (Inaudible) assessment team and
22 the NRC letter and it's sort of driving at this same,
23 my understanding and my reading of the NRC letter that
24 you sent us, is actually driving the exact area that
25 we're talking about right now.

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All TC

1 There is a tendency and you came up with
2 the examples as well about it as I could have -- there
3 was some I was unaware of until we had this
4 conversation that (Inaudible) issues, to cast a lot of
5 what the senior management says or does in the worse
6 possible light and draw that conclusion that you are
7 promoting, Scott. Why that is? We're going to have
8 to go figure that out through a lot of communication
9 and discussion.

10 But literally, there's a 1 percent
11 (Inaudible) 99 percent not, the 1 percent gets grabbed
12 upon and is made larger than life. So the lens that's
13 being looked at -- I came to this realization earlier
14 this spring when we started down this path that I
15 didn't realize -- well, I'll take accountability for
16 not realizing that everything that -- everything is an
17 exaggeration, some of what we're saying and doing is
18 being cast to make the worse possible light and that
19 turns into being the water cooler conversation and the
20 scuttlebutt conversations that make some of these
21 issues larger than life in the operators' eyes and we
22 did not recognize that.

23 MR. BARBER: Some of this is directing an
24 action.

25 [REDACTED] I'm just saying --

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1 MR. BARBER: This particular incident we
2 just talked about is talking about the person who you
3 had a direct conversation.

4 [REDACTED] Right.

5 MR. BARBER: And the others which we
6 haven't specifically mentioned are involved in direct
7 interactions.

8 [REDACTED] Right.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's not
10 second, third, fourth hand information.

11 [REDACTED] And in many of the other
12 (Inaudible), I don't recall the exact conversations.
13 Some of them made no sense, to start up with the
14 (Inaudible). The one with [REDACTED] I can remember
15 clearly I thanked him, afterwards talked to him and it
16 absolutely astounds me that he would cast that
17 differently based on conversations I had with him
18 after the fact.

19 MR. BARBER: I'd like to pick up on that
20 for a minute because you described the interaction
21 with [REDACTED] you described that and you
22 mentioned that he -- when you said "fine, we'll take
23 the unit off line" you said that he was relieved.

24 [REDACTED] Yes.

25 MR. BARBER: Maybe that's part of the

AM 10

1 problem. Why would he feel -- I mean I'm asking you
2 why would he feel, but you see, apparently --

3 [REDACTED] He told me now, in
4 retrospect, in light of three hours of focused
5 conversation on this area, he -- I have actions I take
6 that demonstrate that I wanted the stations to operate
7 conservatively.

8 Back when I was [REDACTED] and I would
9 frankly put this switchyard in that example,
10 inappropriately, apparently. He may have had in his
11 mind that this vision or this perception as you've
12 been calling it is so anchored, it influences the way
13 they look at every interaction with this. That's my
14 learning out of this conversation.

15 MR. BARBER: People at his level.
16 (Inaudible) about this.

17 [REDACTED] I wouldn't say --

18 MR. BARBER: To me it is.

19 [REDACTED] I'll just leave it at that,
20 but that was my learning out of this conversation
21 because even in a good interaction, it's not -- I mean
22 in my opinion that would have been one of my examples
23 if you asked me for some examples where my actions
24 demonstrated conservative decision making and
25 reinforced what I was trying to accomplish with safe

All TC

1 operations, I would have used that as an example,
2 quite frankly.

3 MR. BARBER: And the other thing --

4 [REDACTED] Along with others, I have.

5 MR. BARBER: And the other thing [REDACTED].

6 [REDACTED] said to you, he asked you a question and you
7 said this, "are you going to call [REDACTED]"

8 Didn't he ask you that?

9 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.

10 MR. BARBER: It's almost like -- I'm
11 getting the sense that he didn't feel -- he didn't
12 want to make that call.

13 [REDACTED] was one of our [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] at the time when this occurred. He hadn't been a
15 [REDACTED] very long and I sensed that there was a
16 -- that that's what gave me my relieved sense is that
17 he hadn't been in that situation before. He was a
18 little new and he was new in his position at that
19 time.

20 MR. BARBER: You have a different
21 impression than the impression we got, just from
22 interactions in this situation and others in that you
23 feel like you're acting as a helpmate and helping him
24 make a decision that he wanted to make and the
25 impression we get is he wanted to make a decision, but

ALL TC

1 maybe he didn't feel like he could because of
2 interactions like August 1999, the message take aways
3 from that.

4 [REDACTED]: I can't judge what is in
5 [REDACTED] mind.

6 MR. BARBER: It's not just him. It's not
7 just --

8 [REDACTED] No, but you're giving that
9 example. You're speculating.

10 MR. BARBER: I'm talking about that, but
11 we also had the other situation when you had a group
12 of Shift Managers that wanted to have a discussion
13 with you, confirming your approval to make decisions.
14 They shouldn't have to have that. You can't grant
15 that. We give that to them. They're (Inaudible) by
16 NRC, not by [REDACTED] They can make those
17 decisions.

18 [REDACTED] Nobody said they couldn't.
19 Find something that says I said they couldn't.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, we have
21 and you disagree with them.

22 [REDACTED] Where I said they couldn't
23 make the decision? That directly?

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: "Who is holding
25 my plant hostage?" is pretty direct.

All 10

1 [REDACTED] I did not say that to the
2 best of my recollection and it would not be consistent
3 with my behavior in the control room.

4 MR. BARBER: You may have just answered
5 the question, "I wonder who is holding my plant?" We
6 don't know. And a lot of these instances we don't
7 know. Well, we know what the balance of the evidence
8 is indicating.

9 As Jeff articulated, we have a very large
10 number of interviews and it's not just you.


11 [REDACTED] I'm not taking it
12 personally.

13 I'm trying to figure out how to solve the
14 problem going forward because there's a lens that's
15 being looked at and we're not the best running nuclear
16 plant in the country which is not a surprise to
17 anybody and some of the best managers in the country
18 have been brought in here to come to change the
19 culture here which is long standing and part of that
20 cultural issue is this cultural issue of proper
21 operations, leadership and decision making which at
22 least in the tenure, the time I was [REDACTED] recognized
23 that we needed to improve the quality of the inputs in
24 the decision making by the Shift Managers.

25 And they wanted to be able to make

1 economist decisions which, without rehashing the
2 record, there's no -- when a plant needs to be
3 tripped, they trip it. When (Inaudible) go to 303 and
4 shut down. I'm not aware of any examples and you've
5 brought forward no examples where any senior
6 management person intervened in those more urgent
7 decision making opportunities.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That involved
9 you --

10  Okay, on my watch, I'm not
11 aware of any and you've brought forth, so let's just
12 keep it in the record of what I'm aware of. And some
13 of the others, I think you categorized correctly.
14 Some of the ones that are a little bit more
15 discretionary, you know, it appears to me based on
16 what (Inaudible) is, our attempt to get more diverse
17 inputs and the correct inputs and decision making did
18 not land as we wanted it to and caused some
19 perceptions, I'll use your words, and at least people
20 relating to you may have influenced their decision
21 making.

22 I'm just relating what I'm learning and
23 processing when I'm sitting here for two hours or
24 three hours.


25 MR. BARBER: Communications is a real

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1 important factor and you probably are walking away
2 with that thinking I'm saying one thing and they're
3 taking away something totally different, so there's
4 something there, there's something there. There's
5 also some inherent differences in the way an engineer
6 things and the way an operator thinks and I'm not
7 going to argue one side or the other. I can actually
8 see from both sides.

9 But just thinking like an engineer,
10 talking to an operator, there's the potential to talk
11 past each other and then I think the fact is there's
12 situations, that it seems like the ability to deal
13 with the situations in the manner you're describing
14 are all dealt with in a wide format. They're not in
15 a training setting where you're talking about case
16 studies. It's all we have this situation and we have
17 to resolve it. Let's go forward and what the take
18 away is from many of the people we've talked to is
19 heavy handedness on the part of senior management,
20 it's all pushed for production, a push for it. Tell
21 me why I can't do this? No, is this conservative, but
22 tell me why? And that's what we're getting. That's
23 the message we're getting.

24  So they hear "tell me why I
25 can't do it?" is what I'm asking, what I'm asking in

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1 some of these examples. What did we actually look at
2 to make that decision? Nothing. I can't live with
3 that rule. You looked at nothing? No, I'm just going
4 off my gut feeling. Okay, I pay you for a bit of
5 that, but I also pay you ask questions, get diverse
6 input and make quality decisions. That connection,
7 you just articulated that. That connection was faulty
8 in some cases.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We're going to
10 take a short break and then we'll finish up.

11 [REDACTED] I'm fine.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, then
13 we'll go right to finish then.

14 Scott, is there anything you want to go
15 over?

16 MR. BARBER: No.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Jeff, is there
18 something you want to review with your client? If
19 there is, go ahead.

20 MR. KEENAN: I think we're good.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED] is
22 there something you wanted to add that we didn't get
23 to today?

24 [REDACTED]: No, I mean there are
25 examples I would give in the counter, you had a

All 70


1 couple. I'm sure there isn't a lot of examples coming
2 out of where we held the plant up to fix equipment,
3 where we took significant amount. I mean I can show
4 a record during this same period of time where we cost
5 the company, if we were (Inaudible) to be all about
6 making money, we operated at extended periods of time
7 at reduced power to go through and fix heater train
8 pumps, common safe pumps, circulators, took the plant
9 down on numerous occasion to fix items that were
10 bothering the operators. I mean to the extent I would
11 imagine that given that, I think some of the
12 perception or some of the other drivers, I'm sure
13 those weren't coming out in your interviews. I would
14 hope some of the balance came out.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, we did.
16 To be frank, we did get some of that and we're looking
17 for a balanced answer, if there is one. We have
18 gotten positive --

19 MR. BARBER: We tried to ask balanced
20 questions.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We did.

22 MR. BARBER: I have to tell you the
23 propensity has been on the other side.

24  (Inaudible)

25 MR. KEENAN: Will this conclude the safety

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

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1 conscious work environment portion or do you think
2 there's a further follow up?


3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think we're
4 done.

5 MR. BARBER: I think so.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think we're
7 finished.

8 : I can look through my period
9 of time here in  memories (Inaudible).

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I will be
11 talking to you again about another matter. If you
12 want to bring something to my attention during that,
13 please. You need to take the opportunity then to do
14 so.

15  Do we want to try to at
16 least give you some dates that you could be starting
17 to work with?

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's go off
19 the record.

20  Go off the record to do
21 that?

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

23 Does anyone else have anything further?

24 MR. KEENAN: What about the closing
25 questions?

All TC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I don't have
2 any closing questions.

3 MR. KEENAN: Those NRC standard -- I
4 apologize.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's okay.
6 It's 11:15. Is there anything more you want to add?

7 *7c* [REDACTED] No.

8 I don't have any further questions. This
9 interview is concluded. Thank you.

10 (Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the interview
11 was concluded.)

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
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of



Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Station, NJ

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Francesca Zook".

Francesca Zook
Official Transcriber
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