

# Official Transcript of Proceedings

## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ORIGINAL

Title: Interview of [REDACTED] *7c*

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Salem, New Jersey

Date: Tuesday, December 23, 2003

Work Order No.: NRC-1267

Pages 1-49

NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.  
Court Reporters and Transcribers  
1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005  
(202) 234-4433

Information in this record was deleted  
in accordance with the Freedom of Information  
Act, exemptions 7c  
EOIA- 2005-194

*M-39*

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
+ + + + +  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS  
INTERVIEW

\_\_\_\_\_  
IN THE MATTER OF: :  
INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.  
( [REDACTED] ) : 1-2003-051F  
(CLOSED) :  
\_\_\_\_\_x

Tuesday, December 23, 2003

Salem and Hope Creek Nuclear  
Power Station

Salem, New Jersey

The above-entitled interview was conducted  
at 1:40 p.m.

BEFORE:  
Special Agent Eileen Neff, NRC/RI/OI

APPEARANCES:  
SCOTT BARBER, NRC/DRP, Senior Project Engineer  
TED WINGFIELD, nrc/drp, Project Engineer

PROCEEDINGS

(1:40 p.m.)

[REDACTED] -- and that is a case by case basis, and you know how strong it is, but realistically I have had very little resistance, and again I feel that I get some respect from them because of my duration and position.

MR. BARBER: Okay. Very good. I think I am done with that line of questioning.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. I need to take a quick break, all right?

(Brief recess.)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We are on the record, and it is December 23rd, 2003, and the time is approximately 1:40 p.m. Unfortunately, we had a glitch with the recording device, and we are going backwards over some testimony that started at 1:25 p.m.

Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC Region I, Office of Investigations, and also present from Region I is senior project engineer Scott Barber, and Project Engineer Ted Wingfield. Today's interview is taking place with [REDACTED] and that is spelled [REDACTED] and last name, [REDACTED]

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS  
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED] is a Salem [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] experience here at Salem. The location of this interview is the NRC Residence Office at Salem and Hope Creek Station.

The subject of the interview is the safety conscious work environment, and it has been identified for [REDACTED] that there is no potential violation associated with the safety conscious work environment, and in that you are not being approached as a subject of any investigation. You are a witness to this investigation, more or less a witness to the assessment that is ongoing here of the culture here on-site.

We had placed you under oath, am I right? I will do that again.

(Whereupon, [REDACTED] was resworn.)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And your identification, again, your date of birth and social security number?

[REDACTED] My date of birth is [REDACTED] and my social security number [REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you. And for the record your education and background, and you

1 summarized it as having high school and some college,  
2 and your work experience we just summarized, right?

3 [REDACTED] Correct.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: With [REDACTED] years on-  
5 site?

6 [REDACTED] On-site.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And we have been  
8 talking about your perspective, and it is all your  
9 experience at the Salem side. Initially what we did  
10 was go into individuals -- we went into your  
11 assessment of the culture as it exists today, and your  
12 assessment of the safety culture today, and what I was  
13 looking for were whether you had noted any particular  
14 strengths or any particular weaknesses in that.

15 [REDACTED]: True, and I saw it only as  
16 strengths, and I didn't see any weaknesses.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And we covered  
18 with you that you feel that the ability for people to  
19 raise concerns of a nuclear safety nature from those  
20 that you have managed, your observation is that they  
21 do that, and that they can do that without fear of  
22 retaliation based on your experience.

23 Your testimony also was that your peers  
24 and yourself can raise concerns to operations  
25 management, and to senior management in the same

All TC

1 manner, and that you are able to raise concerns  
2 without fear of retaliation?

3 [REDACTED]: That's correct.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Then all of  
5 that is accurate then. And then we covered an area  
6 that we got into, and Scott, you were asking some  
7 questions, along the lines of operability decision  
8 making, and I don't know if you want to go and cover  
9 some of that.

10 MR. BARBER: Sure, I can summarize that.  
11 We were talking about containment fan cooler units,  
12 and [REDACTED] was relating just for example a problem with  
13 leakage, or potential problems with leakage with the  
14 fan cooling units, and I was asking him about  
15 operability determinations, and what or how he  
16 processed those, and he said that in general that he  
17 would make a decision on whether the component was  
18 operable or not, and he would discuss it with his  
19 direct management, being [REDACTED]

20 And then we had a dialogue about what kind  
21 of feedback they gave him and whether he felt free to  
22 make his own decision on the operability  
23 determination.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And your answer to  
25 that, sir?

ALL TC

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED]

That there was little resistance and that I was free to make recommendations.

MR. BARBER: That's good.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The information, or some of the information that we have been working with, and some things that have been reported, indicates that the Salem shift managers, at least in the period of 2002, late 2002, and into 2003, the Salem shift managers as a <sup>whole</sup> felt that there was a rift between them and senior management, in terms of operability decision making.

Do you know where that would come from?

Do you have an understanding of the basis that goes into saying something like that?

[REDACTED]

I have no personal experience.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I mean, had you heard anything that would or might offer an explanation for something like that?

[REDACTED]

Well, I know that decisions were made where senior management had given a certain direction, and then as time went on, and things were not progressing, they changed their philosophy.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what time period are we talking about?

All 7c

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED] I am trying to remember. It was a Unit 2 start up probably at the beginning of the year based on the number of circulators and circulating water pumps that they wanted to have in the condenser before they move the unit up.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So this would be the beginning of this year?

[REDACTED] I believe that is when it was. It is a guess. It was either the end of last year or the beginning of this year.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did it include grassing?

[REDACTED] Yes, right, that was the concern, and if they didn't have enough circulators running and you lost another one, you would just have to back down again.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So you are saying that this is not something that you were a part of, but something that you had heard about?

[REDACTED] That I had heard about, right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you identify who was involved in the situation? Who were the senior management and who were the [REDACTED] involved?

[REDACTED] It was [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

All JC

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And the  
2 positions taken? What was [REDACTED] position?  
3 [REDACTED] Well, the original criteria  
4 was that we would have five circulators running before  
5 we brought the unit up, and they got to four, and they  
6 said, well, that is good enough. There was some  
7 disagreement as to what was conservative and what  
8 wasn't.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED] position?  
11 [REDACTED] It was that four was okay at  
12 that point.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And did you  
14 witness any of these discussions?

15 [REDACTED] No. All hearsay.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So this is  
17 something that you heard about?

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that might go into  
20 why someone would describe this as a rift with  
21 management, with shift managers and senior management?

22 [REDACTED]: Correct.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about anything  
24 else? I mean, does one incident cause a rift, or is  
25 there something more to it?

All 7C

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED]

That is the only one that I can recall.

MR. BARBER: What if you were the shift manager for that set of circumstances. Would you have an issue with starting it with four?

[REDACTED]

Not really.

MR. BARBER: Is there a minimum that you need?

[REDACTED]

Well, what we used to do is just as long as you had one in each condenser that would be good, but given the circumstances with the grassing that was doing on, you would like to have a little comfort zone in case you did have to take one out.

MR. BARBER: So if you had to take one out, and if you only had three, and you had to take one out, would you have to take one off-line, or shut it back down?

[REDACTED]

Right.

MR. BARBER: Could you start up with two, like two circulators?

[REDACTED]

It is not advisable.

MR. BARBER: Okay. Is there something in the procedure that prohibits that?

[REDACTED]

No, I don't think so.

**NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS  
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

All TC

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is there a minimum  
2 that is required by procedure?

3 [REDACTED] Well, usually you try to get  
4 one in each water box.

5 MR. BARBER: Okay. But would that be  
6 specified? I mean, a lot of times what you will see  
7 is if you go to a general ops procedure, it will say  
8 circ water system in operation for umpty squad, and  
9 then that is an individual system procedure.

10 And if you go into that, and you read it,  
11 it will tell you, and sometimes it will tell you how  
12 to start watches.

13 [REDACTED] It will tell you to start as  
14 long as you have one in each condenser, and you were  
15 good.

16 MR. BARBER: Okay.

17 [REDACTED] But that was more like you are  
18 already running, and it was not more for starting up.

19 MR. BARBER: Okay. Thank you.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there anything in  
21 2002 that you would think would fall into this  
22 category?

23 [REDACTED] Not that I can recall.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about -- the way  
25 that it has been described is that some of the

1 decision making is considered to be a gray area.

2 [REDACTED] That is how it goes with  
3 everything. I'm sorry.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes, and in that gray  
5 area, you might find yourself to the far or on  
6 conservative side.

7 [REDACTED] Sure.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then you might  
9 find yourself up against someone who has an opinion  
10 that is on the less conservative side, and maybe being  
11 more aggressive in terms of what can be done and what  
12 can't be done.

13 Have you personally been in a situation  
14 where you are making a decision, and you are making a  
15 call on what the plant status is to be on an  
16 operability decision, and you are finding your call  
17 questioned or debated, or you are having to defend it  
18 in some manner with anybody in your management chain.

19 [REDACTED]: Anybody in the management  
20 chain? I would say, yes, it would be questioned, but  
21 usually if you give them an explanation and you have  
22 a sound basis, there is no problem.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And how long  
24 does something like that last? I mean, how long does  
25 your questioning take to explain your position?

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED]

It depends upon the complexity of the situation, too. It could take 5 minutes, and it could take an hour.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And where does it come from usually? Who does the questioning?

[REDACTED]

Whoever I am talking to, be it

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So either of your

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And typically that is

where your questions are coming from?

[REDACTED]

Right. And then he will go to his superior, and if he has any questions, then it falls back down again.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You might go through

it a little further?

[REDACTED]

Sure. It depends on somebody else getting a different perspective. right.

MR. BARBER: You specifically mentioned

the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

There were a few people here before, and

[REDACTED]

All 7c

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED]

Did you ever have any dealings with either one of those individuals on operational type issues?

[REDACTED] Usually they would go through who I work for, and they would not deal with me directly. I mean, a chain-of-command type of thing.

MR. BARBER: Right. I mean, you never had like [REDACTED] talk to you and ask you about something that was going on, or would have a discussion about something that was happening in the plant?

[REDACTED] Oh, sure.

MR. BARBER: Did he ever ask you to do something a certain way, or provide feedback on where to move the plant?

[REDACTED] Not to me. I mean, he would go through [REDACTED] and then they would come down and talk to me if that was the case.

MR. BARBER: Did you ever experience something where either [REDACTED] would say that upper management wants to do this, or upper management wants to do that, and whether it be [REDACTED] [REDACTED] or something like that, and it just didn't seem quite right to you, or you weren't sure why you

1 were doing something?

2 [REDACTED]: No, they would always offer an  
3 explanation and most times you can see their  
4 perspective, and say, okay, I didn't consider that.

5 MR. BARBER: Have you ever experienced a  
6 set of conditions where you feel like the way with  
7 dealing with issues and problems, and whether you move  
8 the plant in a certain direction or not, it has like  
9 changed?

10 Like if it was 6 or 7 years ago, and we  
11 would have done it this way, and if it is 2 or 3 years  
12 ago, we would have done it something totally  
13 different.

14 [REDACTED]: It is far more conservative  
15 these days.

16 MR. BARBER: Is it?

17 [REDACTED]: Oh, yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As compared to when?

19 [REDACTED]: Six or seven years ago.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Six or seven?

21 [REDACTED]: Sure. It is a whole different  
22 culture, and I am saying that as I believe it is not  
23 only here, but I believe that is throughout the  
24 industry. I mean, people are a lot more conservative  
25 than they used to be.

**NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS  
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

All TC

1                   And again it is a learning curve, too, and  
2                   the longer you operate, the more that you know.

3                   MR. BARBER:    Okay.

4                   SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:  In recent years when  
5                   you have made your decision, and you explained it to  
6                   your AOL or your ON, have they ever come back to you  
7                   and questioned further, debated further, to a point  
8                   where you were made uncomfortable in having to defend  
9                   that position, or you felt that they crossed the line?

10                  [REDACTED]           No, I have not had that  
11                  experience.

12                  SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:  Did you ever get to  
13                  the point where you felt that they challenged the  
14                  safety of the plant and that they are either  
15                  questioning it, delaying it, or debating what you were  
16                  going to do?

17                  [REDACTED]           I can't think of any.


18                  SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:  You can't think of  
19                  any?

20                  [REDACTED]           No.  Sorry.

21                  SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:  Okay.  No, I am just  
22                  asking you.  Now, on the -- we were looking at that  
23                  from the point of view of -- and this being a gray  
24                  area, you are on the conservative side, and management  
25                  would be on the more aggressive and less conservative,

1 and decision making.

2 Now, flip that, and have you ever been in  
3 a position where you have made a call, and they have  
4 argued it to do something different on the more  
5 conservative side?

6  I noticed circumstances out  
7 there. I can't think of -- I am not good with  
8 specific examples, and I apologize.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you want to take  
10 a moment and think if there are examples out there, or  
11 do you think that it isn't going to come?

12  I don't think it will come.  
13 I know that there have been instances, because there  
14 is a lot of things that go on.

15 MR. BARBER: If I could add some stuff  
16 that maybe will jog your memory.

17  Sure.

18 MR. BARBER: These are just like issues,  
19 and one of the things is that we have talked to  
20 different people at all levels of the organization,  
21 and things come up from time to time.

22 One that you specifically mentioned was  
23 grassing, and how many circulators to start up with.  
24 Another one that has been mentioned is temporary logs.  
25 Can you characterize -- I mean, how would you

All 7c

1 characterize a number of temporary logs if you had one  
2 or two, and what is your feeling as far as the  
3 numbers? Are they about right, excessive?

4 You know, are you surprised that there was  
5 as fe was there is, or what is your --

6 [REDACTED] I would say that they are  
7 probably excessive.

8 MR. BARBER: Okay. And that is based on?

9 [REDACTED] Based on where we are at. And  
10 I think that we do start temporary logs a lot quicker  
11 than we used to. You just used to rely on the  
12 operator actually going out there and doing what he  
13 was supposed to do. Now you have to document it more  
14 thoroughly. So that is what we try and do.

15 MR. BARBER: Can you give me examples of  
16 some things that have temporary logs on them right  
17 now?

18 [REDACTED] Right now, there is a problem  
19 with the Unit 2 hydrogen dryer, and so we have got  
20 them doing random checking, and twice a shift checks  
21 on the alarm panel to make sure that another alarm has  
22 not come in, because there is no reflex capability.

23 MR. BARBER: Okay. So is the concern with  
24 the reflash, or what is the specific concern with the  
25 dryer? It's just not functioning properly?

**NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS  
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

All TC  
www.nealgross.com

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED]

Right. There is maintenance issues with it. It needs parts.

MR. BARBER: It needs parts?

[REDACTED]

Yes.

MR. BARBER: Has maintenance been good about supporting these kinds of things? I mean, presumably, most of the things that you are talking about are -- there is some equipment malfunction or deficiency, and the temporary logs are to increase the monitoring of whatever it is.

[REDACTED]

If the WIN team can get it, it will get fixed somewhat expeditiously; whereas, if it falls into the program, it may take a little longer.

MR. BARBER: How long will it take if it -

[REDACTED]

Oh, it could be a month.

MR. BARBER: A month?

[REDACTED]

Yes.

MR. BARBER: Okay. Is there anything else that stands out in your mind as far as like other equipment deficiencies that are being monitored by temporary logs? Is there anything else like that?

[REDACTED]

There is a monitoring of the river water temperature, because the point on Unit 2 doesn't work. Unit 2, if the point is not working on

1 the computer, you have to log it every hour.  
2 MR. BARBER: Okay.  
3 [REDACTED] And they have been doing that  
4 for quite a while, because there is design issues with  
5 that.  
6 MR. BARBER: The nuclear program operators  
7 have been doing that?  
8 [REDACTED] No, the control room operators  
9 are doing that.  
10 MR. BARBER: All right. So they have to  
11 do what, go to a different point or something?  
12 [REDACTED] Yes. They have to go to the  
13 Unit I control room and get it off their computer,  
14 because theirs still works.  
15 MR. BARBER: Okay. Anything that is more  
16 significant from an operation of the plant standpoint?  
17 [REDACTED] No. Most of the additional  
18 reading logs that last for any duration are not really  
19 significant. Things are just more or less  
20 compensating for the inability to get things fixed.  
21 MR. BARBER: Okay. How about work  
22 arounds? Do you have a lot of work arounds?  
23 [REDACTED] I have not looked at the list  
24 in a while. I know that there is some out there, but  
25 --

All 7C

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

MR. BARBER: Burdens?

[REDACTED] Burdens, yes. The same thing.

MR. BARBER: Okay. Have you been involved with any significant plant issues recently, within the last 6 months or a year? I mean, is there things that have come up on your shift that were like either plant trips, or equipment problems, or --

[REDACTED] Well, I had that thing in July where we lost half the switch yard.

MR. BARBER: You lost half the switch yard?

[REDACTED] July 29th, and I think you were there.

MR. BARBER: I was there.

[REDACTED] I was behind you.

MR. BARBER: You were?

[REDACTED] Yes.

MR. BARBER: Okay. What did you think of that event as far as the way the shift handled it, and what the long term corrective action was to address that?

[REDACTED] I thought we got through it and fortunately there were no complications. So it was a rather clean trip. And you would characterize it was clean other than the fact that the diesels

1 ended up (inaudible). But from a shift response, I  
2 thought we did fine.

3 MR. BARBER: Did you have any concerns or  
4 issues with the way the equipment performed as far as  
5 did everything operate the way that it was expected?

6 [REDACTED] Yes. And I am darn glad of  
7 that, too, you know. That could have been complicated  
8 when you lost all that power, and you start -- and any  
9 time you lose power, things can go a lot worse. All  
10 the diesels started, and the diesels ran for the  
11 duration.

12 MR. BARBER: Did you watch the restoration  
13 at all?

14 [REDACTED] Most of it.

15 MR. BARBER: Did you see what happened  
16 when the diesels were taken off the --

17 [REDACTED] Yes.

18 MR. BARBER: Did that surprise you?

19 [REDACTED] Initially.

20 MR. BARBER: And for the record why don't  
21 you explain what happened?

22 [REDACTED] Well, when we stopped the  
23 diesel, we didn't expect the vital bus breaker, in-  
24 feed breaker, to close in. But after we thought about  
25 it, we knew that the other station power transformer

All 7C

1 was dead and it did what it was supposed to do.

2 MR. BARBER: Okay. Anything else besides  
3 that event? Were there any other issues that came up?

4 [REDACTED] Recently?

5 MR. BARBER: Well, within the last few  
6 months or so.

7 [REDACTED] No, none.

8 MR. BARBER: Was there a problem with the  
9 feed reg weld when you guys were involved with the  
10 jets?

11 [REDACTED] Yes. Thanks.

12 MR. BARBER: And what was that about?

13 [REDACTED] The 14VF 19 feet reg guide  
14 apparently jammed, and we went through a process to  
15 try and evaluate what the problem could be. We  
16 started with all the controls issues, and kind of  
17 trouble-shot them and eliminated them one by one, and  
18 finally came to the conclusion that the valve was  
19 jammed.

20 MR. BARBER: Okay. Were you satisfied  
21 with how long it took to get to that conclusion?

22 [REDACTED] I would have liked to have  
23 seen that, and I didn't think that it would last all  
24 day like that, because I was on nights, and left in  
25 the morning. And I was surprised that it took until

1 the afternoon.

2 But it was a thorough evaluation and they  
3 looked at everything else that it could be and then it  
4 came down to that.

5 MR. BARBER: Did you get any feedback on  
6 that event? I mean, did anybody talk to you about  
7 what the time frames, and either they were satisfied  
8 or had some concerns with how long things were taking?

9  Nothing formal. I mean, we  
10 discussed it among ourselves. I never got anything.

11 MR. BARBER: Did ROs, and the control  
12 operators, was there any discussion with them, or INC,  
13 and did anybody have any concerns about, hey, the  
14 valve is stuck. Why don't we just do what we need to  
15 do?

16  We knew that the valve was not  
17 responding, and whether it was stuck, or whether it  
18 was not getting the right control signal was  
19 indeterminate in the beginning. And with the digital  
20 feed, and with all the microprocessing, it is kind of  
21 hard to determine what kind of signal is getting out  
22 to the valve.

23 I mean, we used to have old positions that  
24 we could go out there, and you could see the air  
25 signal coming to the valve, but with these new

All 7c

1 positioners, we can't tell anything.

2 And unfortunately there was a technician  
3 who used to be in what they used to have as a  
4 dedicated group to valve repair, and so he was one of  
5 the more experienced AOB mechanics, and he was going  
6 through a thought process to try and determine if it  
7 was or not.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And who was that?

9 [REDACTED] His name is [REDACTED]

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were you on shift  
11 when the problems started?

12 [REDACTED] Yes.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then you turned  
14 it over to the day shift you are saying?

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then where is the  
17 time delay that you say you were surprised that it  
18 took? What specifically took too long in your mind?

19 [REDACTED] The engineering process, and  
20 I forget what they call it, but to eliminate all  
21 possibilities, and here is what it could be.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Troubleshooting?

23 [REDACTED] Yeah, like a troubleshooter.  
24 They have a name for it.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that took a

All TC

1 while?

2 [REDACTED] It took a while, and it will  
3 be when you get two engineers in a room debating what  
4 it could be.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that what the  
6 cause of that was, was the trouble shooting segment?

7 [REDACTED] Pretty much. I mean, that is  
8 my understanding. That had not started when I left,  
9 and it went pretty much through the day.

10 MR. BARBER: Was there any operability  
11 issues with that valve?

12 [REDACTED] In the end, yeah, there was  
13 when they found out that it was jammed and would not  
14 close.

15 MR. BARBER: And what is the operability  
16 concern?

17 [REDACTED] Just the fact that you isolate  
18 that generator if you get a trip.

19 MR. BARBER: Okay. Is there a tech spec  
20 that covers that?

21 [REDACTED] Yes, a poorly written one, but  
22 --

23 MR. BARBER: Okay. Is it -- why do you  
24 say it is poorly written?

25 [REDACTED] Well, the tech spec that they

**NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS  
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealgross.com

All 7C

1 ended up going into is for just this all state  
2 protection system, and it requires you to declare the  
3 whole system inoperable. It does not break it down to  
4 a component level. So it is far more restrictive than  
5 it really has to be.

6 I mean, if you have one malfunctioning  
7 component, you shouldn't have to say that the whole  
8 system from the initiation signal, and all the way  
9 through to the final action, is inoperable.

10 MR. BARBER: Was there a tech spec  
11 specific to the feeder reg valve?

12 [REDACTED] No. And that is the problem,  
13 and if you had one, it wouldn't be as limiting. What  
14 they told me is that the -- what do you call it, that  
15 the advanced tech specs or revised tech specs.

16 MR. BARBER: Per standard tech specs?

17 [REDACTED]: Right, it gives us 72 hours to  
18 get to the (inaudible). And where in ours it just  
19 gives 6 hours.

20 MR. BARBER: Okay.

21 [REDACTED]: And again it is not as far  
22 reaching as -- I mean, those tech specs were written  
23 in the '60s. Things are a little different today.

24 MR. BARBER: Right. Right. You said  
25 there wasn't one for the valve specific, and would it

All 7c

1 considered a containment isolation valve?

2 [REDACTED] No, it is a feeder reg guide  
3 isolation valve, and not a containment isolation  
4 valve.

5 MR. BARBER: Is there a separate  
6 containment isolation valve?

7 [REDACTED] Yes.

8 MR. BARBER: So based on that then, that  
9 containment isolation valve spec wouldn't apply?

10 [REDACTED] Right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there anything  
12 specifically for feed water isolation or is that the  
13 thing that you are saying was part of the solid state  
14 protection system?

15 [REDACTED] Right, and it only looks at  
16 the solid state protection system automatic actuation  
17 signal.

18 MR. BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] And the whole signal was good,  
20 but it was just that the final act -- and there is  
21 other things with that, too, other valves that go  
22 close.

23 MR. BARBER: Okay. All right. I don't  
24 think I have anything more on that. Do you have  
25 anything?

All TC


1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No, but what you were  
2 doing was offering or asking if there were any  
3 incidents that came up on your shift, or anything for  
4 you to get involved in handling, and the BF-19 issue  
5 was one that jogged your memory.

6 Do you have anything else on that? Not on  
7 that incident, but any other incidents that you can  
8 think of?


9  Like I said, I am not good at  
10 recalling, and if you give me some feed, I can  
11 elaborate.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything  
13 else on that?

14 MR. BARBER: Do you know anything about  
15 any kind of an ISI issue or circumstance where there  
16 was problems with valves, maybe with leakage, or  
17 something like that, that was not properly addressed?  
18 Maybe safety injection valves or charging system  
19 valves; i.e., safety injection?

20  Check valve leakage you're  
21 saying?

22 MR. BARBER: Yes, check valve, or maybe  
23 bin inlet or outlet valves? Do you recall anything  
24 like that?

25  A while ago, yeah, there was.

1 MR. BARBER: And what was that about?

2 [REDACTED] It was a packing leakage on a  
3 bin outlet valve.

4 MR. BARBER: Okay.

5 [REDACTED] And what we were doing testing  
6 on quite a frequent basis.

7 MR. BARBER: And what was the concern  
8 there about the leakage?

9 [REDACTED] I am trying to remember. Just  
10 that it was elevated.

11 MR. BARBER: Is this the --

12 [REDACTED] That one I don't remember  
13 good.

14 MR. BARBER: -- leakage from --

15 [REDACTED] It was an SJ-12, I think it  
16 was, on two sides.

17 MR. BARBER: And what is the program that  
18 covers that, that addresses that? Isn't there a  
19 program that addresses that?

20 [REDACTED] There is an IST program that  
21 is, SAP-51 for moderate leakage outside the  
22 containment and that would be in there.

23 MR. BARBER: And that is a unique program,  
24 right? I mean, that is something that is mandated by  
25 Section 6 of the tech specs isn't it?

**NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS  
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

All 7c

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED]

Right. And the SAR, right, the design basis limits.

MR. BARBER: Okay. And how was that addressed to your recollection? Were the valves actually repaired or what would happen with that?

[REDACTED]

I am trying to remember. Sorry. It was a while ago.

MR. BARBER: Were you involved in it at all?

[REDACTED]

No. Again, it was --

MR. BARBER: Well, did this stuff ever happen on your shift?

[REDACTED]

Those two did get cited. I went for a good time there with nothing happening, you know.

MR. BARBER: You were lucky, huh?

[REDACTED]

It goes in cycles, you know.

Once you get in there, and stand back, because more is coming. It is funny how it works, and that was something that I wasn't really --- and I knew that there was an issue out there, and they changed the frequency of doing it.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED]

And then we went to the DCPU because the valves used to be open and now the valves

1 are closed. So, to eliminate that.

2 MR. BARBER: Okay. Have you ever been  
3 exposed to any interactions with senior managers at  
4 the [REDACTED] either  
5 surrounding the start up or the shutdown, where you  
6 felt like they were encouraging you to do something to  
7 move the plant, either get the plant started up  
8 sooner, or --

9 [REDACTED] Not on a one to one basis.

10 MR. BARBER: No?

11 [REDACTED] No.

12 MR. BARBER: Do you recall anything  
13 related to maybe a start up years ago, where there was  
14 a problem either with the stat or the rotor of the  
15 main generator? There was some planned activity, and  
16 the rotors were being put back in place, and then the  
17 rotor shifted or dropped, and damaged either the rotor  
18 bars or starter bars, and they had to be extracted?

19 [REDACTED]: Right.

20 MR. BARBER: And some repair activity had  
21 to take place? The primary plant was in a position to  
22 be started up, but was being held up, and so there was  
23 some packing material that was put on the main turbine  
24 glands? Do you remember that?

25 [REDACTED] Yes, to draw a vacuum.

All 7C

1 MR. BARBER: To draw a vacuum. And then  
2 there were other limits, like a steam pressure limit  
3 in the main steam header, like a hundred pounds, and  
4 there were some other things to the gland seal system,  
5 and some alignments that had to be specially made?  
6 Were you on shift when that was taking place?

7 [REDACTED] Well, it went for quite a  
8 while.

9 MR. BARBER: Okay.

10 [REDACTED] And I had talked to the  
11 turbine engineer, because I am the [REDACTED] for the  
12 turbine.

13 MR. BARBER: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] And he pretty much assured me  
15 that it was a workable thing, between him and the  
16 maintenance guy that was the maintenance supervisor  
17 for the turbine. And it realistically did work out.

18 MR. BARBER: Okay. Well, they were  
19 worried about what the turbine -- their focus was on  
20 the turbine and what the capabilities of the turbine  
21 were, and what the design limits of the turbine were,  
22 and what the parameters were?

23 [REDACTED] Right.

24 MR. BARBER: What about the primary plant?

25 [REDACTED]: Again, there is a reluctance

1 on senior management's part to come up on the  
2 atmosphere dump outs, and that was not there before.


3 MR. BARBER: Okay. Well, isn't part of  
4 the reason was or is because the steam dumps, the  
5 normal steam dumps didn't really work properly? I  
6 mean, if you backtracked before the dual unit  
7 shutdown, like in '95?

8  Yes, you would use the  
9 atmospheric without even hesitating.


10 MR. BARBER: And did the steam dumps even  
11 work then?

12  Barely.

13 MR. BARBER: What was your first choice  
14 though?

15  You could work on them  
16 manually to take some of the load off the  
17 atmospheric.

18 MR. BARBER: Okay.

19  I mean, you could just crack  
20 them open and dump steam to the condenser that way.  
21 It didn't work really well in automatic.

22 MR. BARBER: Okay. So there was kind of  
23 an inherent preference to use the ---

24  The atmospheric.

25 MR. BARBER: --- atmospheric dump belts,

1 the SM-10s, prior to the '95 time frame, and then  
2 coming out of the bull unit outage, the steam dumps  
3 were --

4 [REDACTED] Let me think.

5 MR. BARBER: --- fairly thoroughly  
6 repaired and so there was really no reason to use the  
7 SM-10s after that?

8 [REDACTED]: They did modifications on  
9 that, and we did use them on occasion prior to that.

10 MR. BARBER: Okay.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where is the  
12 reluctance then? When does that start?

13 [REDACTED]: I guess it is the  
14 dependability of the steam generators, and risking  
15 having an off-site release if you do get a tube leak  
16 while you are blowing the atmospheric.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What time frame  
18 though? You are saying --

19 MR. BARBER: That was the first time that  
20 I heard it at.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that is going back  
22 pre-'97?

23 [REDACTED]: It was '95, or '96, yeah.  
24 When we started up coming out of restart, and I guess  
25 that is when we experienced it somewhere.

All 7c

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And just going back  
2 a bit, but when Scott asked you about any [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED] input regarding  
4 startups and so forth, you --

5 [REDACTED] They would not deal directly  
6 with me.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not one to one,  
8 right?

9 [REDACTED] No.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have any other  
11 incidents that come to mind on that? If not directly  
12 to you, then what was the direction that you were  
13 getting?

14 [REDACTED] Just to proceed, you know, as  
15 I saw fit.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Nothing that  
17 you disagreed with?

18 [REDACTED] No, not that I recall. And if  
19 it was something that was that dramatic, I am sure  
20 that it would stand out.

21 MR. BARBER: Have you ever had an instance  
22 where you have been on shift where you just felt like  
23 I can't believe that I am doing this or I am being  
24 asked to do this, whether it was from those, whether  
25 it was from senior management or AONs, or ops

1 management? Have you ever had a situation like that  
2 where you were just like, you know, what are we doing?

3 [REDACTED] Not recently.

4 MR. BARBER: Okay. Not recently?

5 [REDACTED] Well, not recently, not in the  
6 past few years. You know, in the past few years.

7 MR. BARBER: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] I think I ave a good working  
9 relationship with [REDACTED] used to be a  
10 [REDACTED] on my shift, and I used to  
11 work with him for 5 or 6 years pretty closely.

12 MR. BARBER: All right. So you have never  
13 like been disgusted with where the plant has been  
14 directed to go or where you have been asked to put the  
15 plant?

16 [REDACTED] Myself? No. They would not  
17 do anything without a good reason, and their reasons  
18 aren't usually because I want to get this done. It is  
19 -- you know.

20 MR. BARBER: Well, have you ever had a  
21 situation where you felt like you were weighing like  
22 production and safety in the balance, and you said,  
23 well, there is more of a push on the production side  
24 than there had been in the past?

25 That if we do this, then we can move the

All 7c

1 outage ahead by this amount, or we can start the  
2 clean-up sooner, or we can limit our shutdown time, or  
3 things like that?

4 [REDACTED] Sure.

5 MR. BARBER: Have you notice more of that  
6 recently?

7 [REDACTED] No. No, that has always been  
8 there.

9 MR. BARBER: Always?

10 [REDACTED] Yes, especially 40 days into  
11 a 35 day outage, you know.

12 MR. BARBER: How about this recent -- what  
13 was it, Unit 2; the Unit 2 outage?

14 [REDACTED] Well, you have the schedule  
15 going in, and then you have problems that arise that  
16 kind of throw your schedule off. So then you have to  
17 start looking at alternative paths, right, to at least  
18 try to keep up with where you are at.

19 MR. BARBER: Were you involved with the  
20 problem with surface water, and where there was a  
21 voltage testing was supposed to be done to set a valve  
22 up, and then after that you were supposed to start up  
23 the system, and it was done out of sequence and the  
24 valve was operated, and the valve drove through the  
25 operator?

All 7c

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED]

Yes.

MR. BARBER: Were you involved with that at all, or did you hear about that?

[REDACTED]

Yeah, the guy that was in charge of that job usually works for me, and it was a communications thing. It was the way that he perceived it, or the way that he told me.

MR. BARBER: Well, isn't that a sequence issue? I mean, that you have got the system start-up or system event prior to setting the valve up? Isn't that what happened? I mean, that is more than just --

[REDACTED]

Well, the whole thing was the guy releasing the tag that was choking the valve, and his impression that it is good to go.

MR. BARBER: Okay. So that is where the communications error was?

[REDACTED]

Right. That's the way that I got it.

MR. BARBER: Isn't there a requirement to check the package, the work package, or whatever it is, to see if in fact the work is (inaudible)?

[REDACTED]

The tags were off. He knew the work wasn't done-done, and he knew there was still work to be completed.

MR. BARBER: Okay. Was there anything

1 else like that during the recent outage that you are  
2 aware of?

3 [REDACTED] No.

4 MR. BARBER: Well, that's not that long  
5 ago, and that is only within the last couple of  
6 months.

7 [REDACTED] It runs together.

8 MR. BARBER: Okay.

9 MR. WINGFIELD: Can I ask a question?

10 [REDACTED]: Sure.

11 MR. WINGFIELD: You said that the work was  
12 still being required to be done, and work that didn't  
13 require the boundary isolation.

14 [REDACTED] The valve was free to be  
15 operated, but the limits weren't set yet, and the  
16 maintenance supervisor from my perspective should have  
17 never released the motor and given them the ability to  
18 cycle the valve with the motor if he had not set it up  
19 yet.

20 And I will give it to you and you can  
21 operate the hand load, because the handle won't work.  
22 Don't give them the motor if you can do it  
23 (inaudible), because that would be the inclination to  
24 do I do physical work or do I push the button and the  
25 valve works.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED]: Right. Thanks.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you -- and this is going to go back a little bit, and so you will find this one interesting, but a couple of years ago -- and I think this is when [REDACTED] but do you recall a situation where the shift managers as a whole got together and objected to the direction of [REDACTED] and it what it had to do generally with was the time that it took you to make an assessment, in terms of operability decisions, and how much time you were taking.

The idea was that [REDACTED] wanted to extend that time frame and build in additional tests and things into the assessment period, but the shift managers were more comfortable with the more brief, and this is the way I see it and this is the way that I am going to go.

Do you recall as a whole that the shift managers got together and presented their position regarding some direction from [REDACTED]. It was enough to make a wave so that everybody kind of got on board and said this is the way that we are going to be viewed on this issue?

[REDACTED] No, I don't remember that one. I probably was not directly involved.

All TC

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were you working here  
2 in that time frame?

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: About 3 years ago?

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Straight through and  
7 no breaks or anything?

8 [REDACTED] If you are on vacation or out  
9 in the training center, you are kind of isolated.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you had long  
11 extended periods in the training center?

12 [REDACTED] Two weeks.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That would be the  
14 extent of it?

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It would seem that  
17 something like this would make an impression?

18 [REDACTED] Start some discussion?

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes, and there would  
20 be some discussions.

21 [REDACTED] I remember where he was  
22 looking at the difference between operability and non-  
23 conformance, and the differences there. I remember  
24 that discussion. It is not inoperable. It's just  
25 non-conforming. I remember that from one instance.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall if that caused --

[REDACTED]: It was a bolting thing. The class of bolting that was being used.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So it was tied to a particular incident or a particular problem?

[REDACTED]: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall that it caused some level of concern among the shift managers?

[REDACTED]: Not that I recall. I mean, it was a different perspective than we usually took. But somebody with a strong engineering background could see that.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall that the fact that it was different, do you recall the outcome of that? Did the shift managers get in line with his way of thinking, or did they go the other way?

[REDACTED]: As I recall, yes. The bolting material was essentially the same, and it was just the classification difference. But the function design, or that type of thing, was adequate.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in terms of time frames, and that it was purportedly affecting the length of time that it took to make these decisions,

1 and I don't recall that it was particular to one  
2 incident. It was just in general.

3 [REDACTED] In general?

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes. That he was  
5 affecting or pushing for the amount of time that it  
6 took you to make a call on operability issues.

7 [REDACTED]. Well, 91.18 pretty much says  
8 that you can't override that. I mean, it is right  
9 there and commensurate with the seriousness of the  
10 situation.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall any  
12 challenges to that? Do you recall anything that  
13 pushed up against that, and where --

14 [REDACTED] Not that I was involved in.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So you don't  
16 have any recollection of where something like this  
17 might have been?

18 [REDACTED] No, not that one. And again  
19 if I was not directly involved, I probably was not  
20 included. Again, even so, I mean, at times I will be  
21 off for 7 days, too.

22 MR. BARBER: Have you ever been involved  
23 with shift meetings or meetings between shift managers  
24 on some period of the SOP? Don't you routinely have  
25 those?

All TC

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED] Yes.

MR. BARBER: Is there a certain day of the week, or a certain --

[REDACTED] It is usually Thursdays. It varies, depending upon --

MR. BARBER: And in any of these meetings, and let's say the more recent ones within the last few years or so, do you recall any kind of discussions about senior management in the organization pushing us a certain direction, and not feeling comfortable with that, or wanting to do something a little different?

[REDACTED] I always want to do something different.

MR. BARBER: But how about collectively as a group? Have you ever felt like senior management as a group, or as you as one of the many members of the group, have you ever felt a situation where senior management is saying, hey, we want to do this and we want to move the plant along, and we want to take this action?

Have you ever been a part of a group that said, well, we understand what you want to do, but we want to temper that with our knowledge, and our experience, and our ability, our license, because we are all SRO licensed, and our responsibility?

**NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS  
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

All JC

1 Have you ever felt like there has been a  
2 discussion of that sort, where you were like we really  
3 need to challenge management or at least kind of stay  
4 together on things?

5 [REDACTED]: Not that I can recall.

6 MR. BARBER: Okay.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Without going so far  
8 back as to the 1996-1997 time frame, and in more  
9 recent years, you have had some management changes,  
10 and specifically this year, CNO and VP of operations,  
11 but have you seen any effect on the change out in  
12 those positions in the safety culture here on site?

13 [REDACTED]: Not that I could attribute to  
14 that happening.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you seen any  
16 changes in the safety culture, period?

17 [REDACTED]: I don't think so.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So you are not  
19 noticing any changes and you are not noticing anything  
20 that was brought about by the change in management,  
21 either for the better or for the worse?

22 [REDACTED]: No.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you have  
24 any concerns regarding the culture as it exists on-  
25 site today? Do you have anything that either we have

All TC

1 not asked you about or you would like to express?  
2 [REDACTED] About the safety culture?  
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.  
4 [REDACTED]: Well, like I said, I think the  
5 safety culture is good here, and I don't think --  
6 there are people -- the way I see it working in some  
7 cases is that there are people who are reluctant to  
8 bring things up, but there is always somebody in the  
9 group who isn't as reluctant. So he will take his  
10 concern, and he will raise it.  
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What level are you  
12 talking about?  
13 [REDACTED] On a bargaining unit level.  
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So the  
15 operators?  
16 [REDACTED] I don't think any of [REDACTED]  
17 would be afraid to throw something back at me, and I  
18 don't think the NCO's would be.  
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But at the LEN  
20 level there might be somebody who is reluctant to  
21 raise a concern?  
22 [REDACTED] Yes, and it is just a  
23 personality thing.  
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: An individual  
25 reluctance?

ALL 7C

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED]

Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And not for cause?

[REDACTED]

Right. But there is enough  
outspoken ones to pick it up and push it.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. The reluctance  
that you are seeing, is there any basis for that?

[REDACTED]

No. I think it is just more  
of an introverted personality.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[REDACTED]

It is just in society as a  
whole that you see that, and I don't think we are any  
segment of it that is different.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Some people are going  
to be more comfortable and some people less so?

[REDACTED]

Sure. Sure.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And at the, let's  
say, CRS level, do you see that across the board?

[REDACTED]

I don't. I don't think that  
any of them would be afraid to raise a concern to  
either me or anybody above me if they don't like my  
answer.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And we covered  
it earlier, but you kind of gave your perspective on  
yourself and your peers, in terms of raising issues to  
senior management?

All TC

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

[REDACTED]

Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you seem comfortable with doing that?

[REDACTED]

Oh, yes. Yes. I have no fear of retaliation.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. You have been here and you have a lot of experience that you are speaking from.

[REDACTED]

Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And has your comfort level always been the same?

[REDACTED]

Pretty much, yes, but I think the rest of the organization has come along like I said since restart.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Going back to '96 or '97, or so?

[REDACTED]

Yes. It is a whole shift within not just the working culture, but the whole culture in society in general the way that I look at it.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you have anything further?

MR. BARBER: No

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Ted?

[REDACTED]

No.

**NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS  
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Would you like to add  
2 anything?

3 [REDACTED] No. I think I told you  
4 everything. Sorry that I could not be more specific.  
5 But that is not my strength. If you could feed me  
6 something, I could --

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, when prompted,  
8 you seemed to have some recollection of the detail.  
9 I just have a few closing questions for you.

10 [REDACTED] Sure.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have I or any other  
12 NRC representative offered you any promises of reward  
13 or threatened you in any manner in exchange for your  
14 information today?

15 [REDACTED]: No.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you appeared  
17 here freely and voluntarily?

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And we don't  
20 have anything else to add and so we will go off the  
21 record, and I thank you for your time. It is  
22 approximately 2:25 p.m.

23 (Whereupon, at 2:25 p.m., the interview  
24 was concluded.)

25

All - 10

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings  
before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of

[REDACTED] - TC

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Salem, New Jersey

were held as herein appears, and that this is the  
original transcript thereof for the file of the United  
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and,  
thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the  
direction of the court reporting company, and that the  
transcript is a true and accurate record of the  
foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided  
by the NRC.



Paul Intravia  
Official Transcriber  
Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.

**NEAL R. GROSS**  
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS  
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701