

Official Transcript of Proceedings

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

Interview of [REDACTED]

Docket Number:

1-2003-051F

Location:

Salem, New Jersey

Date:

Tuesday, December 23, 2003

Work Order No.: NRC-1267

Pages 1-49

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1 UNITED STATED OF AMERICA
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

5 INTERVIEW

6 _____ x

7 IN THE MATTER OF: :

8 INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.

9 [REDACTED] : 1-2003-051F

10 (CLOSED) :

11 _____ x

12 Tuesday, December 23, 2003

13 _____
14 Salem and Hope Creek Nuclear
15 Power Station

16 Salem, New Jersey

17
18 The above-entitled interview was conducted
19 at 1:40 p.m.

20 BEFORE:

21 Special Agent Eileen Neff, NRC/RI/OI

22 APPEARANCES:

23 SCOTT BARBER, NRC/DRP, Senior Project Engineer

24 TED WINGFIELD, nrc/drp, Project Engineer

25 _____

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (1:40 p.m.)

3 [REDACTED] -- and that is a case by case
4 basis, and you know how strong it is, but
5 realistically I have had very little resistance, and
6 again I feel that I get some respect from them because
7 of my duration and position.

8 MR. BARBER: Okay. Very good. I think I
9 am done with that line of questioning.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. I need to
11 take a quick break, all right?

12 (Brief recess.)

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We are on the
14 record, and it is December 23rd, 2003, and the time is
15 approximately 1:40 p.m. Unfortunately, we had a
16 glitch with the recording device, and we are going
17 backwards over some testimony that started at 1:25
18 p.m.

19 Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff,
20 U.S. NRC Region I, Office of Investigations, and also
21 present from Region I is senior project engineer Scott
22 Barber, and Project Engineer Ted Wingfield. Today's
23 interview is taking place with [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED] and that is spelled [REDACTED] and last
25 name, [REDACTED] — 7C

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1 [REDACTED] is a Salem [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED] experience here at Salem. The location of
4 this interview is the NRC Residence Office at Salem
5 and Hope Creek Station.

6 The subject of the interview is the safety
7 conscious work environment, and it has been identified
8 for [REDACTED] that there is no potential violation
9 associated with the safety conscious work environment,
10 and in that you are not being approached as a subject
11 of any investigation. You are a witness to this
12 investigation, more or less a witness to the
13 assessment that is ongoing here of the culture here
14 on-site.

15 We had placed you under oath, am I right?
16 I will do that again.

17 (Whereupon, [REDACTED] was resworn.)

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And your
19 identification, again, your date of birth and social
20 security number?

21 [REDACTED] My date of birth is [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] and my social security number [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you. And for
25 the record your education and background, and you

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1 summarized it as having high school and some college,
2 and your work experience we just summarized, right?

3 [REDACTED] Correct.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: With [REDACTED] years on-
5 site?

6 [REDACTED] On-site.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And we have been
8 talking about your perspective, and it is all your
9 experience at the Salem side. Initially what we did
10 was go into individuals -- we went into your
11 assessment of the culture as it exists today, and your
12 assessment of the safety culture today, and what I was
13 looking for were whether you had noted any particular
14 strengths or any particular weaknesses in that.

15 [REDACTED]: True, and I saw it only as
16 strengths, and I didn't see any weaknesses.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And we covered
18 with you that you feel that the ability for people to
19 raise concerns of a nuclear safety nature from those
20 that you have managed, your observation is that they
21 do that, and that they can do that without fear of
22 retaliation based on your experience.

23 Your testimony also was that your peers
24 and yourself can raise concerns to operations
25 management, and to senior management in the same

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1 manner, and that you are able to raise concerns
2 without fear of retaliation?

3 [REDACTED] That's correct.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Then all of
5 that is accurate then. And then we covered an area
6 that we got into, and Scott, you were asking some
7 questions, along the lines of operability decision
8 making, and I don't know if you want to go and cover
9 some of that.

10 MR. BARBER: Sure, I can summarize that.

11 We were talking about containment fan cooler units,
12 and [REDACTED] was relating just for example a problem with
13 leakage, or potential problems with leakage with the
14 fan cooling units, and I was asking him about
15 operability determinations, and what or how he
16 processed those, and he said that in general that he
17 would make a decision on whether the component was
18 operable or not, and he would discuss it with his
19 direct management, being [REDACTED]

20 And then we had a dialogue about what kind
21 of feedback they gave him and whether he felt free to
22 make his own decision on the operability
23 determination.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And your answer to
25 that, sir?

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1 [REDACTED] That there was little
2 resistance and that I was free to make
3 recommendations.

4 MR. BARBER: That's good.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The information, or
6 some of the information that we have been working
7 with, and some things that have been reported,
8 indicates that the Salem shift managers, at least in
9 the period of 2002, late 2002, and into 2003, the
10 Salem shift managers as a ^{w hole} while felt that there was a
11 rift between them and senior management, in terms of
12 operability decision making.

13 Do you know where that would come from?

14 Do you have an understanding of the basis that goes
15 into saying something like that?

16 [REDACTED] I have no personal experience.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I mean, had you heard
18 anything that would or might offer an explanation for
19 something like that?

20 [REDACTED] Well, I know that decisions
21 were made where senior management had given a certain
22 direction, and then as time went on, and things were
23 not progressing, they changed their philosophy.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what time period
25 are we talking about? *All 7C*

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1 [REDACTED] I am trying to remember. It
2 was a Unit 2 start up probably at the beginning of the
3 year based on the number of circulators and
4 circulating water pumps that they wanted to have in
5 the condenser before they move the unit up.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So this would be the
7 beginning of this year?

8 [REDACTED] I believe that is when it was.
9 It is a guess. It was either the end of last year or
10 the beginning of this year.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did it include
12 grassing?

13 [REDACTED] Yes, right, that was the
14 concern, and if they didn't have enough circulators
15 running and you lost another one, you would just have
16 to back down again.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So you are
18 saying that this is not something that you were a part
19 of, but something that you had heard about?

20 [REDACTED] That I had heard about, right.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you identify who
22 was involved in the situation? Who were the senior
23 management and who were the [REDACTED] involved?

24 [REDACTED] It was [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And the positions taken? What was [redacted] position?

[REDACTED] Well, the original criteria was that we would have five circulators running before we brought the unit up, and they got to four, and they said, well, that is good enough. There was some disagreement as to what was conservative and what wasn't.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was }

position?

It was that four was okay at

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And did you witness any of these discussions?

No. All hearsay.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So this is something that you heard about?

Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that might go into why someone would describe this as a rift with management, with shift managers and senior management?

Correct.

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1 [REDACTED] That is the only one that I
2 can recall.

3 MR. BARBER: What if you were the shift
4 manager for that set of circumstances. Would you have
5 an issue with starting it with four?

6 [REDACTED] Not really.

7 MR. BARBER: Is there a minimum that you
8 need?

9 [REDACTED] Well, what we used to do is
10 just as lone as you had one in each condenser that
11 would be good, but given the circumstances with the
12 grassing that was doing on, you would like to have a
13 little comfort zone in case you did have to take one
14 out.

15 MR. BARBER: So if you had to take one
16 out, and if you only had three, and you had to take
17 one out, would you have to take one off-line, or shut
18 it back down?

19 [REDACTED] Right.

20 MR. BARBER: Could you start up with two,
21 like two circulators?

22 [REDACTED] It is not advisable.

23 MR. BARBER: Okay. Is there something in
24 the procedure that prohibits that?

25 [REDACTED] No, I don't think so.

All TC

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is there a minimum
that is required by procedure?

Well, usually you try to get one in each water box.

MR. BARBER: Okay. But would that be specified? I mean, a lot of times what you will see is if you go to a general ops procedure, it will say circ water system in operation for umpty squad, and then that is an individual system procedure.

And if you go into that, and you read it, it will tell you, and sometimes it will tell you how to start watches.

[REDACTED] It will tell you to start as long as you have one in each condenser, and you were good.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED] But that was more like you are already running, and it was not more for starting up.

MR. BARBER: Okay. Thank you.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there anything in 2002 that you would think would fall into this category?

Not that I can recall.

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1 decision making is considered to be a gray area.

2 [REDACTED] That is how it goes with
3 everything. I'm sorry.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes, and in that gray
5 area, you might find yourself to the far or on
6 conservative side.

7 [REDACTED] Sure.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then you might
9 find yourself up against someone who has an opinion
10 that is on the less conservative side, and maybe being
11 more aggressive in terms of what can be done and what
12 can't be done.

13 Have you personally been in a situation
14 where you are making a decision, and you are making a
15 call on what the plant status is to be on an
16 operability decision, and you are finding your call
17 questioned or debated, or you are having to defend it
18 in some manner with anybody in your management chain.

19 [REDACTED] Anybody in the management
20 chain? I would say, yes, it would be questioned, but
21 usually if you give them an explanation and you have
22 a sound basis, there is no problem.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And how long
24 does something like that last? I mean, how long does
25 your questioning take to explain your position?

1 [REDACTED] It depends upon the complexity
2 of the situation, too. It could take 5 minutes, and
3 it could take an hour.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And where does
5 it come from usually? Who does the questioning?

6 [REDACTED] Whoever I am talking to, be it
7 [REDACTED]

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] Yes.
10 [REDACTED]

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So either of your
12 [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] Right.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And typically that is
15 where your questions are coming from?

16 [REDACTED] Right. And then he will go to
17 his superior, and if he has any questions, then it
18 falls back down again.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You might go through
20 it a little further?

21 [REDACTED] Sure. It depends on somebody
22 else getting a different perspective. right.

23 MR. BARBER: You specifically mentioned
24 the [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED] There were a few people here before, and [REDACTED]

1
2
3 Did you ever have any dealings with either
4 one of those individuals on operational type issues?

5 [REDACTED] Usually they would go through
6 who I work for, and they would not deal with me
7 directly. I mean, a chain-of-command type of thing.

8 MR. BARBER: Right. I mean, you never had
9 like [REDACTED] talk to you and ask you about
10 something that was going on, or would have a
11 discussion about something that was happening in the
12 plant?

13 [REDACTED] Oh, sure.

14 MR. BARBER: Did he ever ask you to do
15 something a certain way, or provide feedback on where
16 to move the plant?

17 [REDACTED] Not to me. I mean, he would
18 go through [REDACTED] and then they would come
19 down and talk to me if that was the case.

20 MR. BARBER: Did you ever experience
21 something where either [REDACTED] would say that
22 upper management wants to do this, or upper management
23 wants to do that, and whether it be [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED] or something like that, and it just didn't
25 seem quite right to you, or you weren't sure why you

1 were doing something?

2 [REDACTED] No, they would always offer an
3 explanation and most times you can see their
4 perspective, and say, okay, I didn't consider that.

5 MR. BARBER: Have you ever experienced a
6 set of conditions where you feel like the way with
7 dealing with issues and problems, and whether you move
8 the plant in a certain direction or not, it has like
9 changed?

10 Like if it was 6 or 7 years ago, and we
11 would have done it this way, and if it is 2 or 3 years
12 ago, we would have done it something totally
13 different.

14 [REDACTED] It is far more conservative
15 these days.

16 MR. BARBER: Is it?

17 [REDACTED] Oh, yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As compared to when?

19 [REDACTED] Six or seven years ago.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Six or seven?

21 [REDACTED] Sure. It is a whole different
22 culture, and I am saying that as I believe it is not
23 only here, but I believe that is throughout the
24 industry. I mean, people are a lot more conservative
25 than they used to be.

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1 And again it is a learning curve, too, and
2 the longer you operate, the more that you know.

3 MR. BARBER: Okay.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In recent years when
5 you have made your decision, and you explained it to
6 your AOL or your ON, have they ever come back to you
7 and questioned further, debated further, to a point
8 where you were made uncomfortable in having to defend
9 that position, or you felt that they crossed the line?

10 [REDACTED] No, I have not had that
11 experience.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you ever get to
13 the point where you felt that they challenged the
14 safety of the plant and that they are either
15 questioning it, delaying it, or debating what you were
16 going to do?

17 [REDACTED] I can't think of any.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You can't think of
19 any?

20 [REDACTED] No. Sorry.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. No, I am just
22 asking you. Now, on the -- we were looking at that
23 from the point of view of -- and this being a gray
24 area, you are on the conservative side, and management
25 would be on the more aggressive and less conservative,

1 and decision making.

2 Now, flip that, and have you ever been in
3 a position where you have made a call, and they have
4 argued it to do something different on the more
5 conservative side?

6 [REDACTED] I noticed circumstances out
7 there. I can't think of -- I am not good with
8 specific examples, and I apologize.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you want to take
10 a moment and think if there are examples out there, or
11 do you think that it isn't going to come?

12 [REDACTED] I don't think it will come.
13 I know that there have been instances, because there
14 is a lot of things that go on.

15 MR. BARBER: If I could add some stuff
16 that maybe will jog your memory.

17 [REDACTED] Sure.

18 MR. BARBER: These are just like issues,
19 and one of the things is that we have talked to
20 different people at all levels of the organization,
21 and things come up from time to time.

22 One that you specifically mentioned was
23 grassing, and how many circulators to start up with.
24 Another one that has been mentioned is temporary logs.
25 Can you characterize -- I mean, how would you

1 characterize a number of temporary logs if you had one
2 or two, and what is your feeling as far as the
3 numbers? Are they about right, excessive?

4 You know, are you surprised that there was
5 as fe was there is, or what is your --

6 [REDACTED] I would say that they are
7 probably excessive.

8 MR. BARBER: Okay. And that is based on?

9 [REDACTED] Based on where we are at. And
10 I think that we do start temporary logs a lot quicker
11 than we used to. You just used to rely on the
12 operator actually going out there and doing what he
13 was supposed to do. Now you have to document it more
14 thoroughly. So that is what we try and do.

15 MR. BARBER: Can you give me examples of
16 some things that have temporary logs on them right
17 now?

18 [REDACTED] Right now, there is a problem
19 with the Unit 2 hydrogen dryer, and so we have got
20 them doing random checking, and twice a shift checks
21 on the alarm panel to make sure that another alarm has
22 not come in, because there is no reflex capability.

23 MR. BARBER: Okay. So is the concern with
24 the reflash, or what is the specific concern with the
25 dryer? It's just not functioning properly?

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1 [REDACTED] Right. There is maintenance
2 issues with it. It needs parts.

3 MR. BARBER: It needs parts?

4 [REDACTED] Yes.

5 MR. BARBER: Has maintenance been good
6 about supporting these kinds of things? I mean,
7 presumably, most of the things that you are talking
8 about are -- there is some equipment malfunction or
9 deficiency, and the temporary logs are to increase the
10 monitoring of whatever it is.

11 [REDACTED] If the WIN team can get it, it
12 will get fixed somewhat expeditiously; whereas, if it
13 falls into the program, it may take a little longer.

14 MR. BARBER: How long will it take if it -

15 -

16 [REDACTED] Oh, it could be a month.

17 MR. BARBER: A month?

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 MR. BARBER: Okay. Is there anything else
20 that stands out in your mind as far as like other
21 equipment deficiencies that are being monitored by
22 temporary logs? Is there anything else like that?

23 [REDACTED] There is a monitoring of the
24 river water temperature, because the point on Unit 2
25 doesn't work. Unit 2, if the point is not working on

1 the computer, you have to log it every hour.

2 MR. BARBER: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] And they have been doing that
4 for quite a while, because there is design issues with
5 that.

6 MR. BARBER: The nuclear program operators
7 have been doing that?

8 [REDACTED] No, the control room operators
9 are doing that.

10 MR. BARBER: All right. So they have to
11 do what, go to a different point or something?

12 [REDACTED] Yes. They have to go to the
13 Unit I control room and get it off their computer,
14 because theirs still works.

15 MR. BARBER: Okay. Anything that is more
16 significant from an operation of the plant standpoint?

17 [REDACTED] No. Most of the additional
18 reading logs that last for any duration are not really
19 significant. Things are just more or less
20 compensating for the inability to get things fixed.

21 MR. BARBER: Okay. How about work
22 arounds? Do you have a lot of work arounds?

23 [REDACTED] I have not looked at the list
24 in a while. I know that there is some out there, but

25 --

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1 MR. BARBER: Burdens?

2 [REDACTED] Burdens, yes. The same thing.

3 MR. BARBER: Okay. Have you been involved
4 with any significant plant issues recently, within the
5 last 6 months or a year? I mean, is there things that
6 have come up on your shift that were like either plant
7 trips, or equipment problems, or --

8 [REDACTED] Well, I had that thing in July
9 where we lost half the switch yard.

10 MR. BARBER: You lost half the switch
11 yard?

12 [REDACTED] July 29th, and I think you
13 were there.

14 MR. BARBER: I was there.

15 [REDACTED] I was behind you.

16 MR. BARBER: You were?

17 [REDACTED] Yes.

18 MR. BARBER: Okay. What did you think of
19 that event as far as the way the shift handled it, and
20 what the long term corrective action was to address
21 that?

22 [REDACTED] I thought we got through it
23 and fortunately there were no complications. So it
24 was a rather clean trip. And you would characterize
25 it was clean other than the fact that the diesels

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1 ended up (inaudible). But from a shift response, I
2 thought we did fine.

3 MR. BARBER: Did you have any concerns or
4 issues with the way the equipment performed as far as
5 did everything operate the way that it was expected?

6 [REDACTED] Yes. And I am darn glad of
7 that, too, you know. That could have been complicated
8 when you lost all that power, and you start -- and any
9 time you lose power, things can go a lot worse. All
10 the diesels started, and the diesels ran for the
11 duration.

12 MR. BARBER: Did you watch the restoration
13 at all?

14 [REDACTED] Most of it.

15 MR. BARBER: Did you see what happened
16 when the diesels were taken off the --

17 [REDACTED] Yes.

18 MR. BARBER: Did that surprise you?

19 [REDACTED] Initially.

20 MR. BARBER: And for the record why don't
21 you explain what happened?

22 [REDACTED] Well, when we stopped the
23 diesel, we didn't expect the vital bus breaker, in-
24 feed breaker, to close in. But after we thought about
25 it, we knew that the other station power transformer

1 was dead and it did what it was supposed to do.

2 MR. BARBER: Okay. Anything else besides
3 that event? Were there any other issues that came up?

4 [REDACTED] Recently?

5 MR. BARBER: Well, within the last few
6 months or so.

7 [REDACTED] No, none.

8 MR. BARBER: Was there a problem with the
9 feed reg weld when you guys were involved with the
10 jets?

11 [REDACTED] Yes. Thanks.

12 MR. BARBER: And what was that about?

13 [REDACTED] The 14VF 19 feet reg guide
14 apparently jammed, and we went through a process to
15 try and evaluate what the problem could be. We
16 started with all the controls issues, and kind of
17 trouble-shot them and eliminated them one by one, and
18 finally came to the conclusion that the valve was
19 jammed.

20 MR. BARBER: Okay. Were you satisfied
21 with how long it took to get to that conclusion?

22 [REDACTED] I would have liked to have
23 seen that, and I didn't think that it would last all
24 day like that, because I was on nights, and left in
25 the morning. And I was surprised that it took until

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1 the afternoon.

2 But it was a thorough evaluation and they
3 looked at everything else that it could be and then it
4 came down to that.

5 MR. BARBER: Did you get any feedback on
6 that event? I mean, did anybody talk to you about
7 what the time frames, and either they were satisfied
8 or had some concerns with how long things were taking?

9 [REDACTED] Nothing formal. I mean, we
10 discussed it among ourselves. I never got anything.

11 MR. BARBER: Did ROs, and the control
12 operators, was there any discussion with them, or INC,
13 and did anybody have any concerns about, hey, the
14 valve is stuck. Why don't we just do what we need to
15 do?

16 [REDACTED] We knew that the valve was not
17 responding, and whether it was stuck, or whether it
18 was not getting the right control signal was
19 indeterminate in the beginning. And with the digital
20 feed, and with all the microprocessing, it is kind of
21 hard to determine what kind of signal is getting out
22 to the valve.

23 I mean, we used to have old positions that
24 we could go out there, and you could see the air
25 signal coming to the valve, but with these new

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positioners, we can't tell anything.

2 And unfortunately there was a technician
3 who used to be in what they used to have as a
4 dedicated group to valve repair, and so he was one of
5 the more experienced AOB mechanics, and he was going
6 through a thought process to try and determine if it
7 was or not.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And who was that?

9 His name is

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were you on shift
11 when the problems started?

12 Yes.

15 Yes.

19 [REDACTED] The engineering process, and
20 I forget what they call it, but to eliminate all
21 possibilities, and here is what it could be.

22 | SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Troubleshooting?

23 | Yeah, like a troubleshooter.

24 They have a name for it.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that took a

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1 while?

2 [REDACTED] It took a while, and it will
3 be when you get two engineers in a room debating what
4 it could be.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that what the
6 cause of that was, was the trouble shooting segment?

7 [REDACTED] Pretty much. I mean, that is
8 my understanding. That had not started when I left,
9 and it went pretty much through the day.

10 MR. BARBER: Was there any operability
11 issues with that valve?

12 [REDACTED] In the end, yeah, there was
13 when they found out that it was jammed and would not
14 close.

15 MR. BARBER: And what is the operability
16 concern?

17 [REDACTED] Just the fact that you isolate
18 that generator if you get a trip.

19 MR. BARBER: Okay. Is there a tech spec
20 that covers that?

21 [REDACTED] Yes, a poorly written one, but
22 --

23 MR. BARBER: Okay. Is it -- why do you
24 say it is poorly written?

25 [REDACTED] Well, the tech spec that they

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1 ended up going into is for just this all state
2 protection system, and it requires you to declare the
3 whole system inoperable. It does not break it down to
4 a component level. So it is far more restrictive than
5 it really has to be.

6 I mean, if you have one malfunctioning
7 component, you shouldn't have to say that the whole
8 system from the initiation signal, and all the way
9 through to the final action, is inoperable.

10 MR. BARBER: Was there a tech spec
11 specific to the feeder reg valve?

12 [REDACTED] No. And that is the problem,
13 and if you had one, it wouldn't be as limiting. What
14 they told me is that the -- what do you call it, that
15 the advanced tech specs or revised tech specs.

16 MR. BARBER: Per standard tech specs?

17 [REDACTED] Right, it gives us 72 hours to
18 get to the (inaudible). And where in ours it just
19 gives 6 hours.

20 MR. BARBER: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] And again it is not as far
22 reaching as -- I mean, those tech specs were written
23 in the '60s. Things are a little different today.

24 MR. BARBER: Right. Right. You said
25 there wasn't one for the valve specific, and would it

1 considered a containment isolation valve?

2 [REDACTED] No, it is a feeder reg guide
3 isolation valve, and not a containment isolation
4 valve.

5 MR. BARBER: Is there a separate
6 containment isolation valve?

7 [REDACTED] Yes.
8 MR. BARBER: So based on that then, that
9 containment isolation valve spec wouldn't apply?

10 [REDACTED] Right.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there anything
12 specifically for feed water isolation or is that the
13 thing that you are saying was part of the solid state
14 protection system?

15 [REDACTED] Right, and it only looks at
16 the solid state protection system automatic actuation
17 signal.

18 MR. BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] And the whole signal was good,
20 but it was just that the final act -- and there is
21 other things with that, too, other valves that go
22 close.

23 MR. BARBER: Okay. All right. I don't
24 think I have anything more on that. Do you have
25 anything?

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6 Do you have anything else on that? Not on
7 that incident, but any other incidents that you can
8 think of?

9 [REDACTED] Like I said, I am not good at
10 recalling, and if you give me some feed, I can
11 elaborate.

20 [REDACTED] Check valve leakage you're
21 saying?

22 MR. BARBER: Yes, check valve, or maybe
23 bin inlet or outlet valves? Do you recall anything
24 like that?

25 A while ago, yeah, there was.

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1 MR. BARBER: And what was that about?

2 [REDACTED] It was a packing leakage on a
3 bin outlet valve.

4 MR. BARBER: Okay.

5 [REDACTED] And what we were doing testing
6 on quite a frequent basis.

7 MR. BARBER: And what was the concern
8 there about the leakage?

9 [REDACTED] I am trying to remember. Just
10 that it was elevated.

11 MR. BARBER: Is this the --

12 [REDACTED] That one I don't remember
13 good.

14 MR. BARBER: -- leakage from --

15 [REDACTED] It was an SJ-12, I think it
16 was, on two sides.

17 MR. BARBER: And what is the program that
18 covers that, that addresses that? Isn't there a
19 program that addresses that?

20 [REDACTED] There is an IST program that
21 is, SAP-51 for moderate leakage outside the
22 containment and that would be in there.

23 MR. BARBER: And that is a unique program,
24 right? I mean, that is something that is mandated by
25 Section 6 of the tech specs isn't it?

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1 Right. And the SAR, right,
2 the design basis limits.

3 MR. BARBER: Okay. And how was that
4 addressed to your recollection? Were the valves
5 actually repaired or what would happen with that?

6 [REDACTED] I am trying to remember.
7 Sorry. It was a while ago.

8 MR. BARBER: Were you involved in it at
9 all?

10 [REDACTED] No. Again, it was --

11 MR. BARBER: Well, did this stuff ever
12 happen on your shift?

13 [REDACTED] Those two did get cited. I
14 went for a good time there with nothing happening, you
15 know.

16 MR. BARBER: You were lucky, huh?

17 [REDACTED] It goes in cycles, you know.
18 Once you get in there, and stand back, because more
19 is coming. It is funny how it works, and that was
20 something that I wasn't really --- and I knew that
21 there was an issue out there, and they changed the
22 frequency of doing it.

23 MR. BARBER: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] And then we went to the DCPU
25 because the valves used to be open and now the valves

are closed. So, to eliminate that.

2 MR. BARBER: Okay. Have you ever been
3 exposed to any interactions with senior managers at
4 the [REDACTED] either
5 surrounding the start up or the shutdown, where you
6 felt like they were encouraging you to do something to
7 move the plant, either get the plant started up
8 sooner, or --

Not on a one to one basis.

MR. BARBER: No?

No.

12 MR. BARBER: Do you recall anything
13 related to maybe a start up years ago, where there was
14 a problem either with the stat or the rotor of the
15 main generator? There was some planned activity, and
16 the rotors were being put back in place, and then the
17 rotor shifted or dropped, and damaged either the rotor
18 bars or starter bars, and they had to be extracted?

Right.

20 MR. BARBER: And some repair activity had
21 to take place? The primary plant was in a position to
22 be started up, but was being held up, and so there was
23 some packing material that was put on the main turbine
24 glands? Do you remember that?

Yes, to draw a vacuum.

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1 MR. BARBER: To draw a vacuum. And then
2 there were other limits, like a steam pressure limit
3 in the main steam header, like a hundred pounds, and
4 there were some other things to the gland seal system,
5 and some alignments that had to be specially made?
6 Were you on shift when that was taking place?

7 [REDACTED] Well, it went for quite a
8 while.

9 MR. BARBER: Okay.

10 [REDACTED] And I had talked to the
11 turbine engineer, because I am the [REDACTED] for the
12 turbine.

13 MR. BARBER: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] And he pretty much assured me
15 that it was a workable thing, between him and the
16 maintenance guy that was the maintenance supervisor
17 for the turbine. And it realistically did work out.

18 MR. BARBER: Okay. Well, they were
19 worried about what the turbine -- their focus was on
20 the turbine and what the capabilities of the turbine
21 were, and what the design limits of the turbine were,
22 and what the parameters were?

23 [REDACTED] Right.

24 MR. BARBER: What about the primary plant?

25 [REDACTED] Again, there is a reluctance

1 on senior management's part to come up on the
2 atmosphere dump outs, and that was not there before.

3 MR. BARBER: Okay. Well, isn't part of
4 the reason was or is because the steam dumps, the
5 normal steam dumps didn't really work properly? I
6 mean, if you backtracked before the dual unit
7 shutdown, like in '95?

8 [REDACTED] Yes, you would use the
9 atmospherics without even hesitating.

10 MR. BARBER: And did the steam dumps even
11 work then?

12 [REDACTED] Barely.

13 MR. BARBER: What was your first choice
14 though?

15 [REDACTED] You could work on them
16 manually to take some of the load off the
17 atmospherics.

18 MR. BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] I mean, you could just crack
20 them open and dump steam to the condenser that way.
21 It didn't work really well in automatic.

22 MR. BARBER: Okay. So there was kind of
23 an inherent preference to use the ---

24 [REDACTED] The atmospherics.

25 MR. BARBER: --- atmospheric dump belts,

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1 the SM-10s, prior to the '95 time frame, and then
2 coming out of the bull unit outage, the steam dumps
3 were --

4 [REDACTED] Let me think.
5 MR. BARBER: --- fairly thoroughly
6 repaired and so there was really no reason to use the
7 SM-10s after that?

8 [REDACTED] They did modifications on
9 that, and we did use them on occasion prior to that.

10 MR. BARBER: Okay.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where is the
12 reluctance then? When does that start?

13 [REDACTED]: I guess it is the
14 dependability of the steam generators, and risking
15 having an off-site release if you do get a tube leak
16 while you are blowing the atmospherics.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What time frame
18 though? You are saying --

19 MR. BARBER: That was the first time that
20 I heard it at.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that is going back
22 pre-'97?

23 [REDACTED] It was '95, or '96, yeah.
24 When we started up coming out of restart, and I guess
25 that is when we experienced it somewhere.

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And just going back
a bit, but when Scott asked you about any [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] input regarding
startups and so forth, you --

 They would not deal directly with me.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not one to one,
right?

No.

14 [REDACTED] Just to proceed, you know, as
15 I saw fit.

18 [REDACTED] No, not that I recall. And if
19 it was something that was that dramatic, I am sure
20 that it would stand out.

21 MR. BARBER: Have you ever had an instance
22 where you have been on shift where you just felt like
23 I can't believe that I am doing this or I am being
24 asked to do this, whether it was from those, whether
25 it was from senior management or AONs, or ops

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1 management? Have you ever had a situation like that
2 where you were just like, you know, what are we doing?

3 [REDACTED] Not recently.

4 MR. BARBER: Okay. Not recently?

5 [REDACTED] Well, not recently, not in the
6 past few years. You know, in the past few years.

7 MR. BARBER: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] I think I ave a good working
9 relationship with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] used to be a
10 [REDACTED] on my shift, and I used to
11 work with him for 5 or 6 years pretty closely.

12 MR. BARBER: All right. So you have never
13 like been disgusted with where the plant has been
14 directed to go or where you have been asked to put the
15 plant?

16 [REDACTED] Myself? No. They would not
17 do anything without a good reason, and their reasons
18 aren't usually because I want to get this done. It is
19 -- you know.

20 MR. BARBER: Well, have you ever had a
21 situation where you felt like you were weighing like
22 production and safety in the balance, and you said,
23 well, there is more of a push on the production side
24 than there had been in the past?

25 That if we do this, then we can move the

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1 outage ahead by this amount, or we can start the
2 clean-up sooner, or we can limit our shutdown time, or
3 things like that?

4 [REDACTED] Sure.

5 MR. BARBER: Have you notice more of that
6 recently?

7 [REDACTED] No. No, that has always been
8 there.

9 MR. BARBER: Always?

10 [REDACTED] Yes, especially 40 days into
11 a 35 day outage, you know.

12 MR. BARBER: How about this recent -- what
13 was it, Unit 2, the Unit 2 outage?

14 [REDACTED] Well, you have the schedule
15 going in, and then you have problems that arise that
16 kind of throw your schedule off. So then you have to
17 start looking at alternative paths, right, to at least
18 try to keep up with where you are at.

19 MR. BARBER: Were you involved with the
20 problem with surface water, and where there was a
21 voltage testing was supposed to be done to set a valve
22 up, and then after that you were supposed to start up
23 the system, and it was done out of sequence and the
24 valve was operated, and the valve drove through the
25 operator?

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1 [REDACTED] Yes.

2 MR. BARBER: Were you involved with that
3 at all, or did you hear about that?

4 [REDACTED] Yeah, the guy that was in
5 charge of that job usually works for me, and it was a
6 communications thing. It was the way that he
7 perceived it, or the way that he told me.

8 MR. BARBER: Well, isn't that a sequence
9 issue? I mean, that you have got the system start-up
10 or system event prior to setting the valve up? Isn't
11 that what happened? I mean, that is more than just --

12 [REDACTED] Well, the whole thing was the
13 guy releasing the tag that was choking the valve, and
14 his impression that it is good to go.

15 MR. BARBER: Okay. So that is where the
16 communications error was?

17 [REDACTED] Right. That's the way that
18 I got it.

19 MR. BARBER: Isn't there a requirement to
20 check the package, the work package, or whatever it
21 is, to see if in fact the work is (inaudible)?

22 [REDACTED] The tags were off. He knew
23 the work wasn't done-done, and he knew there was still
24 work to be completed.

25 MR. BARBER: Okay. Was there anything

1 else like that during the recent outage that you are
2 aware of?

3 [REDACTED] No.

4 MR. BARBER: Well, that's not that long
5 ago, and that is only within the last couple of
6 months.

7 [REDACTED] It runs together.

8 MR. BARBER: Okay.

9 MR. WINGFIELD: Can I ask a question?

10 [REDACTED] Sure.

11 MR. WINGFIELD: You said that the work was
12 still being required to be done, and work that didn't
13 require the boundary isolation.

14 [REDACTED] The valve was free to be
15 operated, but the limits weren't set yet, and the
16 maintenance supervisor from my perspective should have
17 never released the motor and given them the ability to
18 cycle the valve with the motor if he had not set it up
19 yet.

20 And I will give it to you and you can
21 operate the hand load, because the handle won't work.
22 Don't give them the motor if you can do it
23 (inaudible), because that would be the inclination to
24 do I do physical work or do I push the button and the
25 valve works.

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1 [REDACTED] Right. Thanks.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you -- and this is
3 going to go back a little bit, and so you will find
4 this one interesting, but a couple of years ago -- and
5 I think this is when [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] but do you recall a situation where the
7 shift managers as a whole got together and objected to
8 the direction of [REDACTED] and it what it had to
9 do generally with was the time that it took you to
10 make an assessment, in terms of operability decisions,
11 and how much time you were taking.

12 The idea was that [REDACTED] wanted to
13 extend that time frame and build in additional tests
14 and things into the assessment period, but the shift
15 managers were more comfortable with the more brief,
16 and this is the way I see it and this is the way that
17 I am going to go.

18 Do you recall as a whole that the shift
19 managers got together and presented their position
20 regarding some direction from [REDACTED]. It was
21 enough to make a wave so that everybody kind of got on
22 board and said this is the way that we are going to be
23 viewed on this issue?

24 [REDACTED] No, I don't remember that one.
25 I probably was not directly involved.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were you working here
2 in that time frame?

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: About 3 years ago?

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Straight through and
7 no breaks or anything?

8 [REDACTED] If you are on vacation or out
9 in the training center, you are kind of isolated.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you had long
11 extended periods in the training center?

12 [REDACTED] Two weeks.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That would be the
14 extent of it?

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It would seem that
17 something like this would make an impression?

18 [REDACTED] Start some discussion?

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes, and there would
20 be some discussions.

21 [REDACTED] I remember where he was
22 looking at the difference between operability and non-
23 conformance, and the differences there. I remember
24 that discussion. It is not inoperable. It's just
25 non-conforming. I remember that from one instance.

3 [REDACTED]: It was a bolting thing. The
4 class of bolting that was being used.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So it was tied to a particular incident or a particular problem?

7 [REDACTED] Yes.

10 [REDACTED] Not that I recall. I mean, it
11 was a different perspective than we usually took. But
12 somebody with a strong engineering background could
13 see that.

19 [REDACTED] As I recall, yes. The bolting
20 material was essentially the same, and it was just the
21 classification difference. But the function design,
22 or that type of thing, was adequate.

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1 and I don't recall that it was particular to one
2 incident. It was just in general.

3 [REDACTED] In general?

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes. That he was
5 affecting or pushing for the amount of time that it
6 took you to make a call on operability issues.

7 [REDACTED] Well, 91.18 pretty much says
8 that you can't override that. I mean, it is right
9 there and commensurate with the seriousness of the
10 situation.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall any
12 challenges to that? Do you recall anything that
13 pushed up against that, and where --

14 [REDACTED] Not that I was involved in.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So you don't
16 have any recollection of where something like this
17 might have been?

18 [REDACTED] No, not that one. And again
19 if I was not directly involved, I probably was not
20 included. Again, even so, I mean, at times I will be
21 off for 7 days, too.

22 MR. BARBER: Have you ever been involved
23 with shift meetings or meetings between shift managers
24 on some period of the SOP? Don't you routinely have
25 those?

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1 [REDACTED] Yes.

2 MR. BARBER: Is there a certain day of the
3 week, or a certain --

4 [REDACTED] It is usually Thursdays. It
5 varies, depending upon --

6 MR. BARBER: And in any of these meetings,
7 and let's say the more recent ones within the last few
8 years or so, do you recall any kind of discussions
9 about senior management in the organization pushing us
10 a certain direction, and not feeling comfortable with
11 that, or wanting to do something a little different?

12 [REDACTED] I always want to do something
13 different.

14 MR. BARBER: But how about collectively as
15 a group? Have you ever felt like senior management as
16 a group, or as you as one of the many members of the
17 group, have you ever felt a situation where senior
18 management is saying, hey, we want to do this and we
19 want to move the plant along, and we want to take this
20 action?

21 Have you ever been a part of a group that
22 said, well, we understand what you want to do, but we
23 want to temper that with our knowledge, and our
24 experience, and our ability, our license, because we
25 are all SRO licensed, and our responsibility?

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1 Have you ever felt like there has been a
2 discussion of that sort, where you were like we really
3 need to challenge management or at least kind of stay
4 together on things?

5 [REDACTED] Not that I can recall.

6 MR. BARBER: Okay.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Without going so far
8 back as to the 1996-1997 time frame, and in more
9 recent years, you have had some management changes,
10 and specifically this year, CNO and VP of operations,
11 but have you seen any effect on the change out in
12 those positions in the safety culture here on site?

13 [REDACTED] Not that I could attribute to
14 that happening.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you seen any
16 changes in the safety culture, period?

17 [REDACTED] I don't think so.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So you are not
19 noticing any changes and you are not noticing anything
20 that was brought about by the change in management,
21 either for the better or for the worse?

22 [REDACTED] No.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you have
24 any concerns regarding the culture as it exists on-
25 site today? Do you have anything that either we have

1 not asked you about or you would like to express?

2 [REDACTED] About the safety culture?

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

4 [REDACTED] Well, like I said, I think the
5 safety culture is good here, and I don't think --
6 there are people -- the way I see it working in some
7 cases is that there are people who are reluctant to
8 bring things up, but there is always somebody in the
9 group who isn't as reluctant. So he will take his
10 concern, and he will raise it.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What level are you
12 talking about?

13 [REDACTED] On a bargaining unit level.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So the
15 operators?

16 [REDACTED] I don't think any of [REDACTED]
17 would be afraid to throw something back at me, and I
18 don't think the NCO's would be.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But at the LEN
20 level there might be somebody who is reluctant to
21 raise a concern?

22 [REDACTED] Yes, and it is just a
23 personality thing.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: An individual
25 reluctance?

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1 [REDACTED] Right.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And not for cause?

3 [REDACTED] Right. But there is enough
4 outspoken ones to pick it up and push it.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. The reluctance
6 that you are seeing, is there any basis for that?

7 [REDACTED] No. I think it is just more
8 of an introverted personality.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

10 [REDACTED] It is just in society as a
11 whole that you see that, and I don't think we are any
12 segment of it that is different.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Some people are going
14 to be more comfortable and some people less so?

15 [REDACTED] Sure. Sure.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And at the, let's
17 say, CRS level, do you see that across the board?

18 [REDACTED] I don't. I don't think that
19 any of them would be afraid to raise a concern to
20 either me or anybody above me if they don't like my
21 answer.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And we covered
23 it earlier, but you kind of gave your perspective on
24 yourself and your peers, in terms of raising issues to
25 senior management?

All TC

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1 [REDACTED] Right.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you seem
3 comfortable with doing that?

4 [REDACTED] Oh, yes. Yes. I have no fear
5 of retaliation.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. You have been
7 here and you have a lot of experience that you are
8 speaking from.

9 [REDACTED] Right.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And has your comfort
11 level always been the same?

12 [REDACTED] Pretty much, yes, but I think
13 the rest of the organization has come along like I
14 said since restart.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Going back to '96 or
16 '97, or so?

17 [REDACTED] Yes. It is a whole shift
18 within not just the working culture, but the whole
19 culture in society in general the way that I look at
20 it.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you have
22 anything further?

23 MR. BARBER: No

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Ted?

25 [REDACTED]: No.

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3 [REDACTED] No. I think I told you
4 everything. Sorry that I could not be more specific.
5 But that is not my strength. If you could feed me
6 something, I could --

10 | Sure.

15 : No.

18 Yes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And we don't
20 have anything else to add and so we will go off the
21 record, and I thank you for your time. It is
22 approximately 2:25 p.m.

All-ye

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This is to certify that the attached proceedings
before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of

[REDACTED]

-7C

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Salem, New Jersey

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