


NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: Interview of  TC

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Salem Hope Creek NPS

Date: Tuesday, December 2, 2003

Work Order No.: NRC-1235

Pages 1-110

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW

-----X

IN THE MATTER OF: : Docket No.

INTERVIEW OF : 1-2003-051F

[REDACTED] TC

(CLOSED) :

-----X

Tuesday, December 2, 2003

Salem Hope Creek NPS

The above-entitled interview was conducted at
3:35 p.m.

BEFORE:

SPECIAL AGENT EILEEN NEFF

ALSO PRESENT:

SCOTT BARBER, Senior Project engineer

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

(3:35 p.m.)

1
2
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is
4 December 2, 2003. The time is approximately 3:35 p.m.
5 Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC Region
6 One, Office of Investigations. Also present is Senior
7 Project Engineer Scott Barber from DRP in Region One.

8 Today's interview is with [REDACTED]
9 who is currently employed by the [REDACTED] as an [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] by PSEG at Salem and
11 Hope Creek as a [REDACTED] That [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] Today the topic of this
13 interview is going to be the safety conscious work
14 environment at Salem and Hope Creek from [REDACTED]
15 perspective in his experience there.

16 What I'd like you to do at this point is
17 give a brief background for your experience in the
18 nuclear industry, when you first started working
19 there.

20 [REDACTED] Okay. I'm a [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED] I also was in the [REDACTED] Like
22 many [REDACTED] I was a [REDACTED] got out after one
23 [REDACTED] and I went to [REDACTED] I spent
24 approximately five years at [REDACTED] became a
25 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

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and served in the [REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So what year would that be?

[REDACTED] Well, I worked at [REDACTED] and I [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

I also left [REDACTED] in the end of [REDACTED] to go to Salem and [REDACTED] as a [REDACTED] at Salem midway through [REDACTED] I was on shift until [REDACTED] and went out to the [REDACTED] because I had some [REDACTED] and started out as a [REDACTED] assigned to [REDACTED] and then worked through [REDACTED] and then site [REDACTED]

I became [REDACTED] sometime in [REDACTED] and was the [REDACTED] up until [REDACTED] when I left.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and the difference between the position of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] can you distinguish between the two?

[REDACTED] Sure. [REDACTED] is just under the operations training program. The [REDACTED] is not only operations training but maintenance and engineering training. So, it's

1 one step up the reporting chain.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, including ops
3 maintenance and engineering then?

4 [REDACTED] Correct. I was a direct
5 report to when I left, it changed throughout the time
6 I was there, but I was the direct report to the [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] as the [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED]

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And through 2002, did
10 that change, or was that one individual?

11 [REDACTED] It was one individual
12 throughout 2002.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And who was that?

14 [REDACTED]

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and as I
16 explained to you before we went on the record, that
17 we'll conduct interviews, we conduct all the
18 interviews under oath, and you had no objection to
19 swearing to the information, right?

20 [REDACTED] Correct.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. If you would
22 raise your right hand. Do you swear that the
23 information you provide at this interview is the
24 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
25 help you God?

1 [REDACTED] I do.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you. What I
3 think we should address is this. We're coming to you
4 for information regarding Salem Hope Creek regarding
5 this inquiry into the status of their safety conscious
6 work environment. The reason that we're coming to you
7 is because in off the record conversations with Scott
8 Barber, Scott has indicated that you had some
9 concerns.

10 [REDACTED]: Correct.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And to capture that
12 and incorporate it into this particular probe, what
13 we'd like to do is get from you, where do your
14 concerns, where did they start, when did they start,
15 and what caused it?

16 [REDACTED] I would say there was a
17 change of management basically the entire senior
18 leadership team of the site changed out in 1997, 1998
19 time frame. I don't have the exact dates, but
20 previous to that time, just looking upward as a
21 management employee, the type questions that were
22 being asked about safety and how to run a power
23 station were consistent with the way I was trained in
24 the [REDACTED] and at [REDACTED]

25 After this management change-out, the

1 questions were more along the lines of production
2 pretty much at all costs, and the questions that, when
3 a situation arose, the questions that would typically
4 be asked, or I had been asked in my previous life at
5 [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] those typically weren't
6 being asked, and the questions were, you know, how can
7 you stay online. What can we do? Is there a way
8 around this requirement?

9 That was pretty consistent, and it was
10 kind of shocking because I wasn't used to having a
11 senior management team respond like that while
12 operating a power station.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're tagging it
14 to the change in the personnel in these management
15 positions. Does anything else contribute to that?

16 [REDACTED] It may have been the
17 environment, the fact that things were becoming more
18 competitive in the industry, but it seemed like there
19 was, I mean, there was competition before this
20 management team changed out. Now, maybe the
21 competition was more. I don't know what was happening
22 at the sale of the power level, but I just, from being
23 a site manager and site leader, there was a stark
24 difference between the way the power station was being
25 run previous to 1998 in that ballpark and after 1998.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about some of
2 the people? Who went out and who came in to fill
3 these positions that you talked about?

4 [REDACTED] The [REDACTED]
5 changed, and it was -- I can't remember --

6 MR. BARBER: [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]: No, no, one level higher.

8 It was --

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Prior to [REDACTED] then?

10 [REDACTED]: It was prior to [REDACTED] I
11 can't remember the name right now off the top of my
12 head, but then [REDACTED] came in.

13 MR. BARBER: That was a number?

14 [REDACTED]: No. I'll probably remember
15 while I'm talking.

16 MR. BARBER: All right.

17 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] left at some
18 point in time during that. [REDACTED] who was the
19 [REDACTED] left during that time, and [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] came in. [REDACTED] left, and he wasn't a
21 [REDACTED] yet. He was a [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] took over for site [REDACTED]

23 I forget what happened with engineering.
24 There was also a change in engineering. I can't
25 remember the names, but [REDACTED] came in --

1 MR. BARBER: Was it [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] Yes, there was a change in
3 terms -- literally the entire senior leadership
4 changed out over maybe six month to a year period, and
5 just the conversations around safety and how decisions
6 were made changed totally during that time period. It
7 went from developing a culture around safety to where
8 individuals and shift managers were trained to make
9 safe decisions to minuscule decisions being made at
10 the highest level, minuscule operational decisions
11 being made at the highest level of the company.

12 Generally those decisions were questioned
13 all the way down the chain as to whether there were
14 requirements or not to be able to do that. So, it was
15 a very stark change in leadership style in that 1998
16 time frame.


17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And from what you
18 were observing, were, I mean, was this observed by
19 other people? In general, was it questioned? Was
20 there any reason given for hey, this is the way we did
21 business before. This is the way we're going to be
22 doing it now? Was it addressed at all?

23 [REDACTED]: No, it was -- I would say
24 that the outward talk or the outward conversation,
25 like at meetings of senior leadership speaking to

1 management, all the right words are being said. You
2 know, we're all about safety and quality, but when it
3 came down to actual decisions being made at the point
4 of contact, it wasn't consistent with what was being
5 touted as here's who we are. You know, we're about
6 being a safe organization, but the individual
7 decisions being made were not consistent with that.

8 Some of those I had second hand, third
9 hand information, but two or three I was directly
10 involved in as a part of what's called a TARP team,
11 which was an immediate response management team that
12 would come in to take care of problems.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's talk about the
14 situations that you had immediate involvement with.
15 What in the handling of that do you question? Some of
16 the decision making, or where do you have concerns?

17 : Not so much. The decision
18 making ended up getting to where it needed to be. It
19 was the atmosphere surrounding how the decisions were
20 made. I'll give you an example. The one that sticks
21 out in my mind the most, we had a situation on Salem.

22 Salem relies very heavily on compressed
23 air to operate the power plant, both from a nuclear
24 safety side and probably more reliant on the power
25 generation side, valves open and shut with compressed

1 air. The plant basically won't run if it doesn't have
2 compressed air.

3 Well, they were doing some maintenance on
4 three air -- there's three station air compressors
5 that supply air to both Salem unit one and unit two,
6 and they were going to do some maintenance. They
7 followed the operations, thought ahead of time, hey,
8 let's have some back-up air compressors hooked up just
9 in case something happens to the stationary, the
10 installed stationary compressors.

11 They practiced it and made sure that the
12 temporary air compressors worked. Sure enough, when
13 they went to do the maintenance, they lost all station
14 air and ran out very quickly and put these temporary
15 air compressors in service.

16 Well, they had two temporary air
17 compressors hooked up, little diesel powered air
18 compressors supplying both power stations with air.
19 The air pressure normally runs about 100 pounds. It
20 was degraded. It was down I think 89, 90 pounds, just
21 above where you would have to manually trip the
22 reactor.

23 The three station air compressors, the
24 installed ones, were not very close to coming back
25 into service with the problems that they had with

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1 them.


2 MR. BARBER: Can I ask a question at this
3 point?

4  Sure.


5 MR. BARBER: You said they were sitting at
6 89. Was there actually a specific pressure in a
7 procedure than an abnormal procedure that's set at
8 some pressure?

9  Yes. I can't remember the -
10 - it's either 85 of 87 pounds, and they were flirting
11 with that pressure.


12 MR. BARBER: To your knowledge, did they
13 ever go below that during the event?

14  Don't know the answer to
15 that.

16 MR. BARBER: Okay.

17 : I don't know the answer to
18 that.

19 MR. BARBER: Right.

20  But I know when -- there are
21 two signs on these diesel air compressors that say do
22 not refuel while operating, just like your lawn mower.
23 You don't normally put fuel into something that's
24 running because it's creating heat, could spark, and
25 cause a problem.

1 So, they tried to shut one down to put
2 fuel in it, and pressure started to degrade down to
3 that set point that would cause them to have to
4 manually trip the reactor. So, they immediately
5 started it back up, and that's where the decision
6 making process that I'm used to, that I have a
7 training for, would be okay, here's where we're at.
8 This is not a good place to be.

9 We have to potentially put people in
10 harm's way to refuel the thing. Let's do a controlled
11 shutdown of the units so we don't need so much air,
12 and then we can refuel the compressors.

13 Well, I don't know if there was pressure
14 put on or what, but the fire protection people decided
15 okay, we can stand by with hoses and somebody can go
16 put fuel in that thing while it's running. That's how
17 the plant maintained operation. This is even before
18 the management team got in there to start taking a
19 look at what needed to be done.

20 So, that was the first kind of a weird
21 decision that was made that may have been a little bit
22 inconsistent with my training.

23 The way a TARP team works, and that's a
24 transient response team that if something happens, you
25 can supply some support for the operating group.

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1 Typically the way it works is you come in. There's a
2 lead, and I happened to be the lead for the TARP team
3 that was called out on this day. We would get
4 together a group of people such as maintenance
5 engineering, operations, supply, basically a
6 management level individual from every branch of the
7 organization to supply immediate support to the areas
8 that are needed.

9 It was really not a whole lot of guidance
10 on how to run. As a matter of fact, they took the way
11 I ran mine as being the example and proceduralized it.
12 So, the way I ran every one was pretty much
13 boilerplate.

14 The first thing we talked about was
15 safety. Is the unit in a condition that it should
16 still be operating, okay? The TARP team was borne out
17 of the fact that Hope Creek had an incident where they
18 had a power problem and came down in power, and then
19 went back up in power when they shouldn't have without
20 looking at everything.


21 So, part of the reason for the TARP team
22 was to make sure that the plant was in a known
23 condition before changing it.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I don't mean to
25 interrupt, but what period of time are we looking at

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1 here? What month and year?

2  It had to have been around
3 2000. I mean, I'm sure that there's a TARP report
4 that you can get with my name on it with a date, but
5 in or around the 2000 time frame.

6 So anyway, the TARP team assembled after
7 this incident occurred, and you know, first thing I
8 wrote on the board was safety, and I assigned the
9 operations person to go take a look at are there any
10 other abnormal conditions in the control room or in
11 the plant that shouldn't be there.

12 The engineering person, you know, are
13 there any reasons why we shouldn't have these
14 temporary compressors hooked up? Are we doing any
15 damage to anything right now?

16 Maintenance person, I said hey, go out and
17 start trying to figure out how we're going to get the
18 stationary compressors back to make the situation
19 better.

20 At the end of this one hour period of
21 initial looking at the problem, I want to make a
22 recommendation to management as to whether we should
23 shut down the units, the plant should shut down the
24 units, or can we stay operating in this condition
25 right now until we get the air situation straightened

1 out?

2 At that point in time, both the [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were in the room. They had
4 come in to respond to the event, and were listening to
5 my handling of the TARP team.

6 When I said the words, when I said the
7 string of words, "We need to make the recommendation
8 whether we should continue to operate or not continue
9 to operate in the current condition, [REDACTED]
10 stood up and started berating me like I'd never been -
11 - and I've got pretty tough skin. I'd never been
12 berated like that in my life, and it was in front of
13 a group of people that I was supposed to be in charge
14 of, and they were supposed to have respect for me.

15 I was running this TARP team no different
16 than any other TARP team I had ever run, and I ran a
17 bunch of them because Salem typically has a lot of
18 problems. He lit off on me like a Roman candle, and
19 basically I left the room. Very emotional, left the
20 room.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did he say?

22 [REDACTED]: At the point in time, I
23 can't believe you're even thinking about shutting down
24 the unit. You just need to be getting some goddamn
25 air compressors in here, and keep the units on line,

1 and all this kind of stuff.

2 Now, it didn't change my course of action.
3 I basically, when he came out in the hallway, I said,
4 you know, here's the deal. I'm going to run this the
5 way, as a nuclear professional I've been trained to
6 run this thing, or you can get somebody else to do it,
7 but until you get somebody to relieve me, we're going
8 to be looking at safety first, and I'm going to make
9 a recommendation after an hour whether we're going to
10 keep the units up or not.

11 Apparently the [REDACTED] who is
12 [REDACTED] pulled him aside afterwards and said
13 he's doing exactly what I would want him to do in this
14 situation. So, not only did I go away pretty rattled
15 and my understanding of what I was supposed to be
16 doing there was now a little changed, but the people
17 in the room that were supposed to be working for me
18 and that I was supposed to be leading were also
19 affected fairly significantly by that event.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, were the people,
21 just to cover a few issues, the people that were
22 present for that exchange, would they be documented on
23 the records?

24 [REDACTED] They would be on that TARP
25 team report.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you name some
2 people that were present?

3 [REDACTED] I think [REDACTED], who was
4 one of the [REDACTED] operations was there for that one.
5 That's one I think I remember off the top of my head,
6 but that should be a document that's fairly -- I did
7 so many of them, I don't know, and the players were
8 interchangeable. I probably couldn't name another
9 one.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It could be something
11 that we already have.

12 MR. BARBER: Yes, we may have that one.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But at the shift
14 manager level, then or now, can you think of anybody
15 else?

16 [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] wasn't
17 there at the time, but I think the [REDACTED] that
18 was on for that I think was [REDACTED] is another --
19 I think he's the [REDACTED] here now, but I think he was --
20 he may not have been in the room when that occurred,
21 but it was quite a -- I had not been treated like that
22 as a professional in my entire nuclear career.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that the extent
24 of it, the out in the open confrontation, his
25 questioning what you were going to do? When you

1 talked to him later, what happened then?

2 [REDACTED] No, because -- well, the
3 next day he apologized for that outburst, but later
4 that afternoon or evening, I forget what it was, they
5 went ahead and had somebody else come in and do the
6 TARP team lead for me. So, I think I -- again, I had
7 a lot of experience in doing these things. It wasn't
8 like I was bad at doing it, and my understanding is
9 they created the procedure around the way I did
10 things.

11 I was not being aggressive enough in a
12 certain area, namely, keeping the units up, as I think
13 they wanted me to be. So, they got somebody else in
14 there to bring in air compressors.

15 MR. BARBER: So would you characterize his
16 behavior as harassing under those circumstances?

17 [REDACTED] It was beyond that.

18 MR. BARBER: Or intimidating?

19 [REDACTED] It was intimidating.

20 MR. BARBER: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] There was a point in time
22 when I walked out of the room, and I wasn't sure if I
23 wasn't going to hand my badge in and walk out the
24 door. I was that distraught with what had happened.

25 MR. BARBER: So you thought he was going

1 to take some action to possibly have your employment
2 terminated?


3  Not for that one particular
4 event, but I think that -- did I think that I took a
5 chink in my armor after that event? Absolutely. I
6 mean, I had words with the vice president.

7 I didn't do it in front of the room. I
8 didn't take him on right in front of those other
9 people. I pulled him to the next office, and I said,
10 you know, this is garbage. I'm not going to be
11 treated like this.


12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, whose decision
13 was it that you be replaced on the TARP as the leader?

14  I think it was  I mean,
15 I don't know. Just somebody came in and said hey, you
16 know, we're going to take it from here, and that's it.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think he
18 appointed somebody to take over?

19  Right.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And were you out of
21 it at that point?

22  At that point, I was out of
23 it and went home.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And now that
25 afternoon, so on that day, you had two exchanges with

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1 him, where you're not seeing eye to eye on what needed
2 to be done, and the next day he apologizes for it?

3 [REDACTED] The next day, after I went
4 to my boss, who was [REDACTED] and basically said
5 I refuse to be treated like this in the nuclear
6 industry and, you know, apparently that had an effect
7 where I was asked to come in, and he apologized for
8 screaming at me in front of a group of people,
9 especially about that topic. I mean, I'm talking
10 safety, and he's screaming at me about production.

11 MR. BARBER: What was the sequence
12 specifically? Was it that you had the interaction.
13 The next day you talked to [REDACTED] first, and
14 then --

15 [REDACTED] No, I talked to [REDACTED] not
16 15 minutes after that occurrence.

17 MR. BARBER: Okay, so you called him at
18 home or whatever and talked to him?

19 [REDACTED] He was either in on site or
20 at home. I can't remember.

21 MR. BARBER: Okay, but you talked to him,
22 in other words?

23 [REDACTED] Correct.

24 MR. BARBER: At the time. So, [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] would have had the opportunity to have

1 interacted with [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED] I believe that's the -- all
3 I know, I was asked to go talk to [REDACTED] to work it out.

4 MR. BARBER: But that was the next day?

5 [REDACTED] Correct. Or I don't know if
6 it was the next day. It was very soon after. It was
7 within a week.

8 MR. BARBER: Okay.

9 [REDACTED] Things kind of run together,
10 but it was very soon thereafter.

11 MR. BARBER: So do you think that you were
12 in fact replaced because of that run-in that you had?

13 [REDACTED] I don't know. I mean, I
14 really don't know. I know I was tired. I had put in
15 an awful lot of hours on that thing, so that may have
16 been a part of it, but I kind of felt like they wanted
17 some people that were going to be more aggressive at
18 not talking about safety but talking about how many
19 air compressors they were going to get in and hook up
20 to keep the unit online. In think that's the
21 impression I got when I walked away from it.

22 MR. BARBER: In any of those discussions
23 and interactions, even where you trying to work out
24 the way he treated you, did he have any mentions about
25 any pressures on him from, either from his bosses or

1 from other sources that would have cost him to behave
2 that way?

3 [REDACTED] No.

4 MR. BARBER: Was he coming in and saying,
5 you know, [REDACTED] expects, you know, the station
6 to run at a certain capacity factor or [REDACTED]
7 expects this or that or the other thing?

8 [REDACTED] I got no inkling.

9 MR. BARBER: Okay, so you just got --

10 [REDACTED] Well, see, part of the
11 conversation, I can't remember how much of this I did
12 in the room with the TARP team, but I know I had the
13 conversation with him afterwards, is that I was a
14 senior reactor operator on the power station. So,
15 there's pieces parts of information that he may not
16 have that I had such that to woo station air on a
17 Westinghouse plant, especially a four-loop
18 Westinghouse plant, means you have to -- first of all,
19 the end's going to trip.


20 Second of all, you have to put manual
21 operator, people operators on radios at each one of
22 the atmospheric relief valves to manually control
23 steam generator pressure, all within 100 pounds of
24 each other to prevent a safety injection from
25 occurring. So, it's a very precarious place to have

1 the plant in unless you've done maybe a controlled
2 shutdown ahead of time.


3 So, I made sure after the yelling and
4 screaming occurred, that I had a discussion with him
5 about, you know, here's part of the reason why I think
6 it's a big deal to not have station air. You may be
7 able to, while you're still limping along, get a long
8 way toward being a lot safer than if it just cut off
9 with both units at 100 percent power.

10 It's, you know, the rooms are very noisy,
11 and to put four -- actually, it would be eight people
12 on the radio trying to control parameter they can't
13 see to prevent a safety injection from occurring, it's
14 a very difficult thing to do, a loss of station air on
15 those stations and to have two at the same time. I
16 don't know if he had that flavor.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he indicate that
18 he had an understanding that that's what your concern
19 was?

20  No, I didn't get a feeling
21 that was the understanding, even after talking to him.

22 MR. BARBER: You mean he didn't know about
23 the safety injection signals, what the --

24  Well, I know he didn't know
25 that ahead of time. I don't think it mattered really

1 after I had the conversation, either. It just -- the
2 thought was we don't have enough air, so get more air,
3 not you know, we don't have enough air, so maybe we
4 should put the plant in a different condition while we
5 try to get more air.

6 MR. BARBER: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] Which was -- that was the
8 question I was trying to answer in that first hour,
9 not making -- I didn't even make the recommendation to
10 shut down. I was sending the people out to come back
11 with information to try to put together a good case
12 one way or the other.

13 MR. BARBER: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] So, that was probably the
15 starkest one I could think of.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And just two issues
17 on that. Were you a party to the conversation he had
18 with [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] No. [REDACTED] came in
20 afterwards and basically said he was completely out of
21 line because he knew -- I mean, I was rattled. I
22 mean, I was emotionally, physically rattled after
23 that. I mean, you know, to tangle openly or have a
24 disagreement of that level with a [REDACTED] level
25 individual, and you start thinking about can I pay my

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1 mortgage and where's my next job going to be.

2 So, he saw that I was kind of rattled and
3 red in the face, and he said hey, you're doing exactly
4 what I want you to do. Continue doing exactly what
5 you were doing before we came in the room.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] You know, and he had had a
8 conversation with [REDACTED] that I was doing
9 exactly what he wanted me to do, and that that needed
10 to continue.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he give you
12 anything about the response that [REDACTED] had to him?

13 [REDACTED] No, not in specifics.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. When you were
15 replaced, how was it handled? Was it handled any
16 differently than you'd recommended?

17 [REDACTED] By the time that, you know,
18 we're talking hours down the road now. It wasn't like
19 I was replaced 15 minutes later. We're talking
20 several hours later.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was different
22 circumstances.

23 [REDACTED] Right. There was nothing
24 more that anybody could do. We were already doing.
25 I mean, we had ordered air compressors from several

1 different states to be trucked in, figuring out a
2 different place to hook them in rather than the one
3 place that these two temporary ones were hooked in so
4 we could have more capacity. I mean, that stuff had
5 already occurred, and it was being implemented by the
6 group that came in.

7 MR. BARBER: How was the issue eventually
8 resolved? What happened with that?

9 ~~REDACTED~~ Well, they maintained the
10 unit. They set some parameters to trip the reactor,
11 obviously, and briefed over the procedures for having
12 to do it if they lost air totally, which was our
13 recommendation out of the thing.

14 Brought in more air compressor capacity,
15 and I believe they installed it, if I remember
16 correctly. I think there was a total of six
17 compressors or something quicked up at the end of this
18 thing.

19 Then they went ahead and fixed the
20 compressors that were broken and put the station ones
21 back in service and then took off the temporary ones
22 over that weekend.

23 MR. BARBER: To your knowledge, is that
24 reliability issue, which is sort of what you're
25 describing, is that still a problem at the station?



1 Do you know?

2 [REDACTED] I'm really not aware at this
3 point whether it would be or not.

4 MR. BARBER: Okay.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And when [REDACTED]
6 apologized to you, what was he apologizing for
7 specifically?

8 MR. BARBER: For the outburst and, you
9 know, the fact that he yelled at me in front of a
10 group of people. You know, not so much the ideology
11 but the fact, the way he handled it, he wanted to make
12 sure that he felt apologetic and that I knew that.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, for the way he
14 presented the way he wanted to go?

15 [REDACTED] Correct.

16 MR. BARBER: Could we maybe talk about
17 some other incidents that you possibly are aware of?
18 Maybe the start-up with the secondary plant open?

19 [REDACTED] Sure.

20 MR. BARBER: And maybe you could give us
21 a little details on that, as we've discussed before.

22 [REDACTED] Sure. This is in 2002, I
23 believe. In the spring of 2002, there was an outage
24 on Salem unit -- Salem unit, the one closest to the
25 building, energy unit two, and it was -- I think there

1 was going to be like a 30 or 28-day outage. Part of
2 the outage, you go and you test the generator to make
3 sure that the stator is in good shape and it will run
4 for the cycle.

5 Well, a test came back that there were
6 some grounds in that. There were some short outs in
7 that big bundle of copper. What they had to do is
8 pull the center part of it out, which is called the
9 rotor, the spinning piece, which is a big evolution to
10 pull that big chunk of metal out and set it down.

11 Then they did some repairs to the stator,
12 and as they were putting the rotor back in, it made
13 contact with the stator and bent something. So, they
14 had to pull it back out and do about a week's worth of
15 testing on the secondary, on the generator. That
16 caused the schedules for the outage to get a little
17 bit out of whack.

18 The primary plant refueling change-out,
19 the change-out of the fuel, the fixing, the equipment,
20 came together rapidly, and the secondary plant, which
21 was where the steam goes, wasn't coming together as
22 quickly because of this problem with the generator.

23 To exacerbate things, the problem with the
24 generator had some limits to it. Because of what they
25 were doing at the generator and the fact it was

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1 uncoupled from the turbine, you couldn't put on the
2 normal systems to allow vacuum to be drawn in the main
3 condenser in a normal fashion because the oil would
4 heat up and cause an elongation of the turbine such
5 that it couldn't be recoupled to the generator.

6 So, the question was how far can we go
7 with the plant start-up and really be aggressive about
8 getting the unit up to as far as it can possibly get
9 without hooking up the main generator. The original
10 thought was, well, let's go ahead and heat up the
11 plant.

12 So, did some search of the industry, and
13 for this I was considered the start-up manager. They
14 brought me in as a separate manager, ESR relationship
15 manager qualified, to be the go-between to get the
16 plant started up.

17 So, you know, a lot of obstacles and
18 hurdles for the outage we got across, and now this one
19 was how do we get as far as we can get. So, did some
20 scouring in the industry, found out that you could
21 put, you know, physically put stuff in each of the
22 glands of the turbine to allow vacuum to be drawn.

23 Normally you put steam in the gland seals
24 which keeps air from coming in so you can draw vacuum
25 in the main condenser. You have to draw a vacuum in

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1 the main condenser because it has to have a place for
2 the steam to go once you start making heat.

3 Well, we figured out another way to do
4 that procedurally, allow stuffing to be put in the
5 glands. We were able to mechanically draw vacuum, and
6 heated up the plant. So, we got the plant to normal
7 operating temperature, drew a vacuum on the plant.

8 The only one restriction was, normally
9 you'd allow the automatic systems to control the steam
10 going into the main condenser. In this case, they
11 didn't want any more than 100 pounds in the main steam
12 header. Normally it's like 900 pounds.

13 They only wanted 100 pounds to prevent any
14 possibility of rolling the turbine with no oil on it.
15 So, they didn't want any steam going to the turbine.
16 So, they kept the steam header at a lower pressure.

17 Well, that caused the operators to have to
18 manually operate a couple different systems in tandem
19 to keep the appropriate amount of heat going out of
20 the plant to the right place and maintaining this 100
21 pounds. So, they had to control the condenser steam
22 dumps and manual and the main turbine, or the MSIV
23 bypass valves and manual. Not a normal situation, but
24 it was going okay.

25 Next question came up because the

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1 generator was still lagging. Can we start up the
2 reactor and do what's called low power physics testing
3 on the reactor. As a person that had been trained in
4 the ~~to~~ to be reverent to the neutron, and my
5 training at ~~and even may training after~~ and even may training after
6 that point at Salem, there was not a whole lot of
7 procedural information to negate it.

8 The answer is no. I mean, if you've got
9 to have it for very good, solid heat sync to allow the
10 heat to go to in case something doesn't go right with
11 that start-up, and you do go into the power range. It
12 would be nice to have normal systems in service to
13 allow that steam to be dissipated or to give it
14 someplace to go.

15 I felt that way, and I went and pulsed the
16 shift managers that were going to be actually
17 implementing this. Their thought was, you know, we
18 really can't do this. I mean, there's nothing in the
19 procedures that prevents it from what we can see, but
20 this doesn't make good safety operational sense as
21 licensed senior reactor operators.

22 So, basically they told me we're not going
23 to do it, but in the position I was in, I needed to go
24 convince senior management that this wouldn't be the
25 right thing to do.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The shift managers
2 are saying we're not going to do that?

3 [REDACTED] Right. The licensed
4 operators --

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you didn't go tell
6 senior management?

7 [REDACTED] And I agreed with them, but
8 even if I came back and said hey, look, you need to do
9 this, they weren't going to do it.

10 MR. BARBER: But who specifically wanted
11 to start?

12 [REDACTED] Who specifically wanted? It
13 was [REDACTED] my boss, that was pushing forward
14 with doing all of the power physics testing, and I
15 think that was coming from [REDACTED] I don't know
16 that for sure, but I think he was getting a lot of
17 pressure from [REDACTED] to go ahead and start up the
18 reactor.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What makes you say
20 that?

21 [REDACTED]: Just I had worked with [REDACTED]
22 long enough to know that I don't think that was an
23 original idea. I think that was something that was
24 being -- he was being asked to do that. I don't have
25 any physical evidence of that. It's just a feeling

1 that I had from working with him, and some of the
2 references he made that he was kind of a go-between in
3 this conversation.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Had you seen him push
5 in that sort of a direction before?

6 [REDACTED] Maybe that was it. No, not
7 normal. So, it was a very kind of a surreal
8 conversation that I had with -- it was actually my
9 direct boss at the time, but he was also the [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]
11 I went and said the procedures, there's
12 really nothing in the procedures that don't allow it,
13 but the plant's not in its normal configuration right
14 now, and the plant's supposed to be in its normal
15 configuration before you start making nuclear heat.
16 You know, the comeback was well, you're not going to
17 make nuclear heat.

18 Well, my comeback was well, you could make
19 nuclear heat. I mean, you're making neutrons is a
20 possibility that you could have an excursion into the
21 power range and need those systems to be able to
22 operate.

23 What I did was I eventually got to the
24 point in the conversation where I erased his
25 whiteboard and worked from -- I actually used the term

1 let me work from the augment inspection team
2 backwards. Okay, so I said you have an event, and let
3 me work backwards from that.

4 You've done a reactor start-up where you
5 need the heat removal systems of the plant. You've
6 told the operators not to use the atmospheric relief
7 valves because that's not a good thing to do on a
8 pressurized water reactor. That's an entirely
9 separate subject. Most plants wouldn't have a
10 problem. They would shut the main steam line
11 isolation valves and use their atmospherics.

12 I had no problem with that, and neither
13 did the shift, but the way they were going to remove
14 decay heat from the plant was with two manual -- two
15 systems not in the normal configuration. They were
16 going to be in manual.

17 So you've had this event, and you've asked
18 your operators to operate not in the normal
19 configuration. You have systems in manual, and you
20 made the decision to start up the reactor, and I could
21 see that.

22 Because the systems were manual, you had
23 a reactivity excursion that because the guy didn't
24 control the system right, you cooled down a little
25 bit, caused the reactor to go more critical than what

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1 it was, or super critical. You go up into the power
2 range and have a reactivity event.

3 So, I kind of worked the logic backwards,
4 and the pressure was just phenomenal to go ahead and
5 do this. The outage manager --

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who were you working
7 that for? Who were you presenting this to?

8 [REDACTED] Both [REDACTED] who is
9 the site -- was the [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] which was -- [REDACTED] name was [REDACTED]

11 Several of the maintenance folks also, but the people
12 that I was surrounded by were not nor have they ever
13 been senior reactor operators. So, it was like I was
14 trying to explain something to people that should have
15 already known how the systems worked, and I guess I
16 just wasn't effective at getting the point across.

17 So, it did eventually, I think, between my
18 conversation and the shift manager's conversations,
19 the idea died, and they didn't start up the reactor,
20 but it took actually in my -- I can't remember if it
21 was physically written into my appraisal, but it was
22 certainly talked about verbally to me at my appraisal,
23 that that stand and that stand for safety cost me in
24 my career at PSEG.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And who talked to you

1 about that?

2

[REDACTED] So,

3

I can't remember if the words were physically written
4 in my appraisal or not, but I know as my appraisal was
5 presented to me that year, and actually, I don't think
6 it was that bad of an appraisal. It was you need to
7 be doing better at supporting senior leadership
8 decisions.

9

I was like, you know, if they were in the
10 general realm of nuclear safety, then I might support
11 them a little better, but in this case, I couldn't, as
12 a nuclear professional, support it.

13

MR. BARBER: What was his response to
14 that?

15

[REDACTED] It was not any kind of a
16 response. He was right. I was wrong. There was no
17 conversation in the middle, and it was very
18 frustrating to have worked for -- when I worked at
19 [REDACTED] the people that were constantly
20 talking about safe production of nuclear power were
21 the people that were above me.

22

In this case, everywhere I turned during
23 this last year that I was at PSEG, I was technically
24 superior to the people that I was talked to, because
25 of the fact that I ran the power station, but I

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
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
1 couldn't get them to -- I couldn't get them to see
2 where nuclear safety was being eroded away.

3 It's not a black and white kind of thing.
4 It's kind of gray. I mean, the procedures have a
5 black line, and there's this gray area that I wasn't
6 used to chipping into. At least during my latter
7 portion of time I was at PSEG, that gray area was
8 getting chipped at routinely in the decisions that
9 were being made that I was involved in.


10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Between the incident,
11 the spring 2002 and your evaluation that this
12 affected, how many -- what time period was that?

13  I don't believe it was long
14 after that. I think it may have been a mid-year
15 appraisal, a June, July time frame. So, it was a
16 couple of months afterwards.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A couple of months
18 after?

19  Yes.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was it this incident
21 that contributed to that in that you don't support
22 senior management's decisions or was there more to it?
23 Was this this one incident or more?

24  I think it was the one. I
25 really truly believe it was the one incident. I guess

1 my feeling, and I got back and look at my appraisals.
2 My appraisals were reasonably good in the time period
3 that I was there, and I was getting rapidly promoted.

4 I was interviewed to be the [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED] at Salem around that time frame because during
6 that same outage, [REDACTED] left, so they needed
7 another [REDACTED] and I was interviewed for
8 that. So, it wasn't like I was a negative performer
9 there. It just seemed like there seemed to be more
10 and more incidents that occurred that I was on the
11 other side of the senior leadership team as far as
12 decision making goes.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just to go back on
14 that incident, the [REDACTED] who said no, we're
15 not going there, who were they? Who was involved in
16 that?


17 [REDACTED] was involved in
18 that. I think [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. I'm not
19 positive, and I know [REDACTED] was in on that
20 decision also.

21 MR. BARBER: Okay, could we go back to the
22 event for a minute?

23 [REDACTED] Sure.

24 MR. BARBER: If there would have been
25 something in tech specs, I think, aren't there some

1 requirements spelled out in tech specs about physics
2 testing like applicable modes? Would it require you
3 to be in a certain mode, and those modes in fact have
4 ECCS requirements associated with that?

5  Well, they might have ECCS
6 requirements, but we had enough -- the atmospheric
7 dumps were available to be able to be used, but that
8 was not the way that we were allowed to control the
9 KE. There was say, there's a mindset that you do not
10 use the atmospheric relief valves unless it's
11 absolutely necessary.

12 So, it would have been preferable to the
13 senior leadership team to control two valves and
14 manual and have continuous adjustments of steam header
15 pressure rather than just to shut the MISV's and go
16 on. Automatic control system of the atmospheric
17 relief valves, which again, plenty of heat source or
18 decay heat removal capability. It's like up to ten
19 percent power to allow low power physics testing to
20 occur.

21 Again, systems and automatic, well
22 controlled. Go ahead and do a power physics testing.
23 In this case, you've got operators tweaking valves and
24 controlling the systems, and nobody felt comfortable
25 with doing that start-up.

1 MR. BARBER: All right.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What's to be gained
3 by doing that, going into low power physics?

4 [REDACTED] I think it was like 18
5 hours, something like that. There was a chunk of time
6 that would have been gained that you could have done
7 the lower power physics testing.

8 MR. BARBER: So it was a scheduled
9 pressure issue?

10 [REDACTED] Yes, oh, it was absolutely
11 a scheduled pressure issue. Absolutely.

12 MR. BARBER: So, [REDACTED] wanted to
13 save 18 hours in the schedule?

14 [REDACTED] Well, I mean, I think
15 everybody -- I think --

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the outage
17 management was involved in that?

18 [REDACTED] Absolutely. Well, I think
19 everybody did. I mean, it's not like I didn't want to
20 save 18 hours, but I just have this -- there is a line
21 for me, and that line for me was not the same as other
22 people that were in charge of my future. Their line
23 was somewhere else.

24 My line was based off of ten years as
25 [REDACTED] throw another five on top of

1 that as a [REDACTED] You know, I have like real bad
2 things that have occurred to me that have tempered my
3 ability to take risk, and the people that were making
4 these decisions really had no operational experience
5 at all that wanted to do this.

6 So, I've had enough things, when I tried
7 to take risks that got the legs knocked out from under
8 me, which tempers my -- I mean, I still take risks,
9 but it tempers that willingness to take risk.

10 MR. BARBER: One of the things you've
11 indicated, you have about [REDACTED] years of operational
12 experience. Do you have any idea how much experience
13 [REDACTED] has in operational experience?

14 [REDACTED] I don't know for sure. I
15 know he was a [REDACTED] for a short
16 period of time out at [REDACTED]. Other than that, he
17 had none. The [REDACTED] had none.
18 [REDACTED] was never licensed.

19 MR. BARBER: Was he licensed at [REDACTED]
20 to your knowledge?

21 [REDACTED] I don't believe he was.

22 MR. BARBER: Okay.

23 [REDACTED] I don't believe he was.

24 MR. BARBER: So, from a comparison
25 standpoint, your experience and knowledge is very

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1 significant compared to his own?

2 [REDACTED] Correct.

3 MR. BARBER: Okay, thanks. Did that weigh
4 into his willingness to listen to you? Wasn't he
5 willing to acknowledge that your --

6 [REDACTED] That was a difficulty, and
7 this I think goes beyond just me. [REDACTED] was very
8 confident in what he knew, and most senior people that
9 I've dealt with really like to listen to people that
10 are the technicians underneath.

11 [REDACTED] always thought he knew the answer
12 before you came in to talk to him. So, it was very
13 difficult to sway him one direction or the other once
14 he's made his mind up about something. So, it didn't
15 matter. I could have had 20 years or 30 years of
16 experience. It would have been very difficult for me
17 to sway him once that -- the thing is, they didn't
18 take the action to start up the reactor.

19 Enough people with operational background
20 said no, that I think he eventually listened, but it
21 definitely affected me because I think he saw me as
22 being -- there is an opportunity with my operational
23 knowledge to turn around the other way and talk to the
24 shift managers and talk them into doing it.

25 Again, it was a gray area. I mean, is

1 there anything in tech specs that said you couldn't do
2 it, no. Anything procedurally that said you couldn't
3 do it, no. There may have been a couple of minor
4 procedure changes you would have to make for the
5 procedures, but again it was a big gray area, and it
6 was one of those gut checks of nuclear safety, you
7 know, and it just didn't seem right to make neutrons
8 in a plant that was still torn apart.

9 MR. BARBER: Okay.


10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did anybody else
11 factor in? You said that enough people objected to
12 it, so they didn't go in that direction. Who else
13 other than you weighed in there?

14 ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ I don't know who ~~XXXXXX~~ talked
15 to. All I know is I weighed in, and then I waited to
16 see the outcome, and we didn't do the start-up. I
17 know he didn't do it just on -- he was so disgusted,
18 visibly disgusted with my conversation that I was
19 having with him, I know that didn't sway him.

20 So, I'm reasonably sure he checked with
21 some of the other shift managers and talked to some
22 other operational people at the plant, and eventually
23 just dropped it because it wasn't worth the 18 hours
24 that was going to be saved.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you'd indicated

1 that there are other incidents where they move into
2 this gray area, and this one seems like a pretty
3 significant issue for you, that you were directly
4 involved in. Were there others where you had to --

5  Well, there was a number, I
6 mean, I was involved in a number of the TARPs that had
7 to do with the partial losses of off-site power at the
8 station. I mean, we had three partial losses of off
9 site power in one year, which if normally a plant had
10 one partial loss off site power in one year, that's a
11 huge deal. We had three on Salem. One of them led to
12 a reactor trip.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In 2002?

14  In 2001, 2002 time frame.
15 Actually, it was more 2000, 2001, I think. It was
16 sometime in that time frame.

17 And the response was not to go find out
18 what happened. The response was to get the unit back
19 up, and the unit would get back up, and sure enough a
20 couple months later, the unit would trip again, or
21 you'd have to do a rapid downpower as a result of the
22 loss of the electrical system.

23 I know one of the times we did do a manual
24 reactor trip, and again, this is second-hand
25 information, but it's direct second-hand information.

1 I think it involved [REDACTED] He decided to manually
2 trip the reactor based off what happened with the
3 circulating water system, and he was second guessed
4 afterwards by management as to why he didn't go out
5 and take a heroic action to cross tie some busses to
6 allow a unit to stay at power.

7 I don't know to what degree he received
8 second guessing and from who, but I know he was very
9 unhappy and had conversations with me around the fact
10 that he got second guessed, and there's no procedural
11 guidance to go tie these busses. It was just you
12 needed to go out and tie the busses.

13 I think actually in writing, the root
14 cause analysis from that had some words in it to the
15 effect of, you know, if the operating shift had just
16 gone out and cross tied the busses, you wouldn't have
17 to trip. Well, there's no procedural guidance, and
18 the general training for an electrical fault is to
19 really understand where you're at before you start
20 bringing back the switch yard so you don't make the
21 problem worse.

22 Typically, electrical transient, you end
23 up where you're at, and if the unit can support power,
24 you support power. If not, you turn it off or it
25 turns itself off automatically, but before you start

1 re-energizing pieces of equipment, you have
2 technicians go out with meters to make sure that the
3 busses can support being energized one by one as you
4 bring them back.

5 The general flavor for this particular
6 reactor trip was why didn't you just go out and cross
7 tie the electrical busses. Then you could have kept
8 circulating water and service, and we wouldn't have to
9 trip.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: From your
11 conversation with him, where was the second guessing
12 coming from?

13 [REDACTED] Above. His boss, [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anybody between him
16 and [REDACTED]

17 (Whereupon, the foregoing
18 matter went off the record
19 briefly and went back on the
20 record at 4:25 p.m.)

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's almost 4:25 p.m.

22 [REDACTED] Okay. So again, I don't
23 know who was the OPS manager at that particular time,
24 but I know there's three TARP reports in fairly short
25 succession of partial losses of off-site power. We

1 would say loss of 11 station power transformer or loss
2 of 21 station power transformer, that kind of a thing.

3 Eventually after the third time, it was
4 determined that their lightning arresters in the
5 switch yard needed to be replaced, and they were
6 replaced.

7 It put the operators in a difficult
8 situation because the training that they had received
9 was as an off-shoot of the April 7 event that occurred
10 in 1994, was to take conservative actions with the
11 plant. So, they go out and take conservative actions
12 with the plant, and then the whiplash from that is why
13 didn't you, you know, cross tie busses to maintain the
14 unit at power?

15 Well, I don't have any procedural guidance
16 to do that. Then it wouldn't be smart to do it. So,
17 that's the kind of an atmosphere that you had to live
18 under.

19 MR. BARBER: What kind of environment did
20 that create for the shift managers? I mean, did they
21 discuss -- it sounds like at least on a couple of
22 occasions, someone would come to you and discuss other
23 concerns with you.

24 [REDACTED]: Yes, I was, both [REDACTED]
25 and [REDACTED] worked at [REDACTED] with me.

1 So, we had similar -- [REDACTED] was on the
2 [REDACTED] with me, so [REDACTED] I've worked with [REDACTED]
3 professionally since 1986. So, we had a very close
4 relationship.

5 Those conversations were constant, that
6 he, especially with [REDACTED] had never been in a situation
7 where he felt like he was going to have to go against
8 his management. Now, I don't have specific details,
9 but his general feeling was that at any moment at any
10 time, he might have to put his job on the line and go
11 against his management team because of the way he was
12 trained and the fact that he had the license for the
13 plant to be able to operate.

14 So, I can't, I don't really want to speak
15 for him, but those conversations were constant, and I
16 was an outlet for that.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And clearly where
18 would be something we'd get directly from him, too.

19 [REDACTED] Right, and one that I was --
20 I was not directly involved with this one, but I was
21 very close to being directly involved in it. I was
22 the TARP team lead when a steam leak occurred in the
23 turbine building on a feed pump, steam generator feed
24 pump inlet, a valve off the main steam --

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this September,

1 2002?

2 [REDACTED] I think so. I think that
3 was the time frame that occurred in.

4 I got called. Big steam leak. Going to
5 have to shut the unit down. You need to come in.

6 So, I got out of bed and started to come
7 in. Got into the plant and was told no, everything's
8 fine. We got the valve shut. You can go home. Well,
9 you know, I was already -- I started looking around,
10 and the steam leak was very large. There was lagging
11 blown all the way across the turbine building, and
12 I've seen steam leaks that scared me that threw a lot
13 less stuff around than this one did. So I know the
14 steam leak wasn't there when I got there, but from
15 everybody I talked to and what I saw, it was a scary
16 steam leak. You know, 20, 30 steam plume was what
17 most of the operators told me

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who told you that it
19 was going to be shut down and to come in?

20 [REDACTED] Whoever -- I think it was
21 the shift manager that called me out, either that or
22 [REDACTED] Typically [REDACTED] was the one that
23 called me and said hey, you need to come in.

24 My recollection is that I was the TARP
25 team lead for that particular event, but there was

1 never a TARP report written or anything because the
2 TARP didn't exist. You know, as the [REDACTED]
3 anything that occurs, I tend to try to gather
4 information to see if there's any training need in it.

5 In this case, I came in and found out from
6 the operators -- it was that morning I think, as I got
7 in there, that the operators had said that the
8 decision was made to shut the unit down. The shift
9 manager was making preparations to shut the unit down.

10 The [REDACTED] assistant OPS manager went to talk to
11 the vice president, came out of that meeting with the
12 vice president, climbed the ladder, and shut the
13 valve, when no other plant operators that would be the
14 normal, you know, the union folks that would normally
15 touch the valve and shut things. They said they would
16 not go up a ladder in that situation and hazard their
17 lives to do that.

18 So, my conversation the next day with --
19 this was a couple of months before I left the company,
20 was I went and I talked to the site vice president,
21 and my angle with him was what are you doing. I mean,
22 you're asking me as the [REDACTED] to
23 constantly reinforce safety and both nuclear
24 radiological and personal safety in the training
25 center. Then in one fell swoop, you train all the

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1 operators that all that stuff's not required, we're
2 just going to send a manager up to shut a valve with
3 a steam leak to keep the unit online, okay?

4 What am I doing professionally as the [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED] when you know, everything I say after
6 that point is going to be mute because if I pound a
7 fist on the table at the training center and you know,
8 grade people down because they're not doing things
9 safely, they can just point back and said but, you
10 know, you have the [REDACTED] climb the
11 ladder on a huge steam leak and keep the unit online.

12 I didn't actually -- [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED] were in the room when I had that conversation.
14 I just didn't get any kind of a satisfactory response
15 out of them. It was just not that big of a deal and,
16 you know, we did it.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No concern for future
18 effect that might have on what you were saying?

19 [REDACTED] No, absolutely no, from what
20 I could tell, absolutely no concern. I mean, I call
21 that a training event, when you train by your actions,
22 just like how you act around your kids is how your
23 kids act. It's the same way in training.

24 You spend so many times repeating how you
25 operate the power station, and then you watch a

1 manager level person climb a ladder and do something
2 that was admittedly unsafe and shut the valve.

3 MR. BARBER: Do you happen to know if he
4 had authorization from the control room to do that?
5 [REDACTED] I do not know the answer to
6 that.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the [REDACTED]
8 who was preparing to shut the unit down?

9 [REDACTED] I don't know which one. I
10 thought it was [REDACTED] but it may have been [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED] It was one of the two guys I know from
12 [REDACTED] I remember that.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED] It was [REDACTED] And I
16 do not know what transpired in conversations with
17 senior management. I just know that there was a cause
18 and effect. There was a plan to shut down the unit,
19 and a TARP team was being called in, and then frankly,
20 I don't even remember if I was the TARP team lead from
21 that. Everything kind of runs together. I may have
22 just come in the next morning and been exposed to that
23 as I saw the stuff run through. I can't remember,
24 because it was never written down as a TARP report.

25 I just remember gathering information

1 about what happened and being pretty disgusted with
2 the fact that, you know, I was getting compensation to
3 [REDACTED] to operate safely, and then this would
4 occur. The response I got from my boss and [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED] was just totally unsatisfactory. It was, you
6 know, so what.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And who was it that
8 [REDACTED] was supposed to have interacted with?

9 [REDACTED] My understanding it's
10 [REDACTED] but again, I was not privy to any
11 conversations that would go along with that.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did I cut you off,
13 Scott? Did you have something on that?

14 MR. BARBER: Actually, I do. I want to
15 explore just an area of questioning with
16 responsibility for operating equipment.

17 [REDACTED] Sure.

18 MR. BARBER: SIM has a conduct of
19 operations procedure, I would presume?

20 [REDACTED] Yes.

21 MR. BARBER: And what kind of things, what
22 kind of restrictions might that have, or
23 authorizations might it have relative to operating
24 equipment?

25 [REDACTED] The only time the equipment

1 is operated, the control room is supposed to provide
2 the guidance to actually operate the equipment, and
3 because of the union contract, in general, the union
4 would be the people that would operate the equipment.
5 There's a specific provision in the union contract
6 that, you know, the management individuals are not
7 supposed to operate equipment.

8 Now, in an emergency, it's allowable, but
9 the way this unfolded, it really wasn't like an
10 emergency. There was a bunch of union people standing
11 around the valve that was leaking. They were not
12 willing to perform that activity.

13 MR. BARBER: So if I understood you
14 correctly, then there was a discussion for the shift
15 with regard to they're there or not there about the
16 course of action or some decision made that yes, this
17 is really bad. We ought to probably take the unit off
18 line. We ought to start heading in that direction, is
19 that right?

20 [REDACTED] I know they were heading in
21 that direction pre-briefing, a shutdown.

22 MR. BARBER: And then [REDACTED] left the
23 control room, presumable?

24 [REDACTED]: I don't know where
25 physically people were. I mean, at the valve. I know

1 a conversation occurred and then a different response
2 occurred from that.

3 MR. BARBER: All right.

4 [REDACTED] My details are a little bit
5 off on that.

6 MR. BARBER: Okay. Well, that's one thing
7 we'll have to explore. We'll have to explore whether
8 they had authorization from the control room because
9 we have some of the conduct of operations procedure
10 elements, and they've talked about no operation of
11 equipment without specific guidance from the control
12 room authorization.

13 [REDACTED] Right.

14 MR. BARBER: So, he may have, in fact,
15 overstepped his bounds. The thing that makes this
16 more difficult, though, is because he's in the
17 operations chain. He just happens to be above the
18 control room, but he did not relieve the shift
19 manager, presumably. He would have found it very
20 unusual that he would have relieved him and went out
21 and done that. I don't think anyone believes that's
22 the case.

23 [REDACTED]: Right. I just again, it's
24 just starkly different from the way I was trained at
25 another nuclear facility which was [REDACTED] We

1 had big steam leaks at [REDACTED] I saw the big
2 steam leaks. I learned to be afraid of big steam
3 leaks by the things I saw at [REDACTED] The
4 decision making from the top on down was okay.

5 This is too big to do something with. We
6 are going to do a controlled shutdown in the unit. We
7 may keep the reactor running, but we're going to take
8 the turbine off, shut the MSIV's, fix the leak, and
9 then come back up. I'm just not used to seeing a
10 situation that you put a person in harm's way to keep
11 the unit at 100 percent power.

12 It was totally inconsistent with the way
13 I had been trained, both at Salem and at [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] I wasn't trained that way initially at Salem
15 in 1996, 1995. I was trained to keep my personal
16 safety and personal safety of others in the forefront.

17 MR. BARBER: Okay.

18 [REDACTED] And this was inconsistent
19 with that.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We'll take a quick
21 break, okay? It's about 4:35.

22 (Whereupon, the foregoing
23 matter went off the record at
24 4:35 p.m. and went back on the
25 record at 4:36 p.m.)

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, we're back on
2 the record. It's about 4:36.

3 The issue that you were talking about,
4 Scott, was there was some sort of --

5 MR. BARBER: Well, let's do the next
6 technical issue, which is one that you and I had
7 talked about informally about a problem with the
8 meteorological tower.

9 [REDACTED] I was definitely the TARP
10 team lead for this one. It actually started out as a
11 cut wire that arced and sparked, and they were digging
12 in a certain place and cut a wire. Obviously it's a
13 safety issue. Call a TARP team and go figure out what
14 happened.

15 The bottom line is we were running some
16 security power, I think, out to the new -- this was
17 after 9-11 because you need to put power out to the
18 new 9-11 security building, and they were doing some
19 stuff with the Met tower, and they were doing some
20 trenching activities and dug into a wire that supplied
21 power to the Met tower, meteorological tower, on the
22 site.

23 It's like off the access road to the right
24 as you're coming into the power station there. So, it
25 lost power as a result of this digging that occurred.

TC

1 That put us -- it was a reportable event. I think it
2 was an eight-hour reportable event, that if it
3 remained without power under 5072, you'd have to do a
4 report to the NRC.

5 There's a scramble by the [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] to put a temporary power supply or diesel in
7 place to that Met tower prior to a temporary
8 modification being completed. My understanding is
9 that they actually did apply power to the Met tower
10 with a temporary diesel generator and hooked up power
11 to it to meet the eight-hour requirement before any
12 paperwork had been completed for a temporary
13 modification and follow it up afterwards.

14 I think there was a notification, or CR,
15 written on the fact that they, you know, kind of
16 purposely didn't -- I mean, it's very clear what the
17 temporary, where the modification procedure has you do
18 to put power to something like that, but they went
19 ahead and put power on the Met tower to not have to
20 make an eight hour report.

21 Again, that's kind of the mindset of the
22 station, and it wasn't that way in '98, and it was
23 that way when I left in 2002. It was worse at the end
24 than it was at the beginning. The mindset was throw
25 a generator out there to make sure that you didn't

1 have to make the report, and we'll follow up with the
2 paperwork later on.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who made the
4 decisions on that?

5  I don't know because the
6 TARP was covering the thing from the standpoint of
7 personnel safety. You know, how did the wire get --
8 how was a wire out where they were digging and should
9 not have hit.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

11  It was kind of an after
12 thing the next day when I found out that -- we did say
13 hey, look, you got an eight hour reportable thing, and
14 I know you're not going to get power out to it in
15 eight hours, so that's kind of a side thing that was
16 going on.


17 But lo and behold, they did get power out
18 to it and didn't have to make the eight hour report.
19 Again, my understanding of that event was that the
20 paperwork followed well after the generator had been
21 hooked up.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And there was a CR
23 initiated on the handling of it?

24  I believe there was a CR
25 initiated on the fact that the temporary modification

1 procedure wasn't followed in that instance.

2 MR. BARBER: Do you think that was done
3 intentionally? I mean, do you think that the whole
4 push to get the diesel out there to get to provide
5 temporary power, it was really to avoid that eight
6 hour report and that the writing notification was sort
7 of an afterthought to sort of cover your bases? I
8 mean, kind of acknowledge that yes, we know we didn't
9 have paperwork, but we can write this up and make it
10 look like it was a mistake.

11  Engineering maintenance and
12 operations were all involved. There's not a person in
13 that chain that doesn't know the temporary
14 modification procedure. It's a license requirement
15 for an SRO to understand it. So, I can't come to any
16 other conclusion that it was intentional.

17 MR. BARBER: Okay.

18  I just can't. I mean, you
19 just don't operate a power station by hooking wires up
20 to stuff just to keep going.

21 MR. BARBER: So, just to clarify this for
22 the record, the normal process would be through the
23 temporary modification, process the paperwork. Do
24 whatever safety reviews have to take place, get the
25 required approvals, and then implement whatever it is.

1 [REDACTED] And you could have the
2 generator out there. You could have the leads one
3 inch away from where they need to get landed to supply
4 power to it, but you don't land it until you've done
5 the analysis that it's okay to do it.

6 MR. BARBER: Safe to do it?

7 [REDACTED] Right.

8 MR. BARBER: Okay.

9 [REDACTED] You know, from a -- were you
10 hooking wires up to the nuclear instrumentation
11 system? No. Was it completely divorced from power
12 after the wire got hit? Yes, it was a stand-alone
13 meteorological station, but it did have feedbacks back
14 to the power plant. So, you were hooking something
15 up.

16 MR. BARBER: Isn't it tech spec equipment?

17 [REDACTED] Yes.

18 MR. BARBER: And isn't it used to gauge an
19 accident response?

20 [REDACTED] Absolutely.

21 MR. BARBER: I mean, to make
22 recommendations to local counties regarding, you know,
23 which sectors to evacuate because it's got wind speed,
24 wind direction.

25 [REDACTED]: Yes.

1 MR. BARBER: Temperatures at various
2 elevations. Things are important for that.

3 [REDACTED] Correct. It clearly met the
4 requirements to do well, either a permanent
5 modification or a temporary modification, but it had
6 to go through this proper screening to do that.
7 Again, my understanding, you know, wasn't -- I wasn't
8 the guy hooking the wires up, and my understanding is
9 that that whole thing occurred without the paperwork
10 being there.

11 MR. BARBER: Do you remember when that
12 was?

13 [REDACTED] I think it was the summer of
14 2002 sometime. It had to be. It was after 9-11
15 because they had the shack out there. I think it was
16 summertime.

17 MR. BARBER: Okay.

18 [REDACTED]: So, maybe it was summer,
19 2002.

20 MR. BARBER: Okay. Is there any other
21 technical issues or any other things that you can
22 think of that you'd like to say?

23 [REDACTED] That's really all I can
24 think of at this point.

25 MR. BARBER: Okay. How about -- one last

1 thing that you and I talked about was something you
2 had heard second-hand regarding shift managers and
3 problems they had had with senior management and the
4 way they dealt with that. Could you --

5  Again, it was all about the
6 same time frame again. It was -- I think it was right
7 after the decision was made to do, you know, the
8 conversation around starting up the power station with
9 the generator still apart. So, it was in the June,
10 July, August of 2002 time frame.

11 It seemed like the shift managers were
12 being second guessed on every tech spec call or every
13 operational decision that they were making on the
14 power station by the senior management, and it was
15 made, and it was either second or third-hand knowledge
16 that it was made aware to me that the shift managers
17 were going to meet off-site to make sure they were in
18 alignment on what they would do under certain
19 circumstances when demanded to do things by senior
20 management.

21 I don't know if that meeting ever
22 occurred. I don't know the outcomes of the meeting,
23 but I do know that that meeting was being talked about
24 or scheduled by the shift managers, and this is
25 specific to Salem. I don't know if Hope Creek did it

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1 or not, but it was the Salem shift managers around
2 that time frame.

3 MR. BARBER: Do you remember any of the
4 ones that might have been a part, you know, that --
5 [REDACTED] I think I talked about it
6 with [REDACTED] It may have been [REDACTED] -- like I
7 said, I had two guys I was very close with from
8 previous working experience. I think it was one of
9 those two guys that had mentioned to me that that was
10 going to occur.

11 MR. BARBER: Do you think there was
12 something very specific that they were -- wanted to
13 have a discussion about, or was it just in general?

14 [REDACTED] I think it was a combination
15 of both. I think at the time, there was something
16 going on that was very specific, but it was also we
17 need to make sure that we are in alignment in any
18 event being asked to do something that's not
19 appropriate.

20 MR. BARBER: Now, have you ever seen or
21 heard of this before?

22 [REDACTED] Never. In my experience in
23 the industry, never, because typically again, senior
24 leadership are the ones that are typically the
25 conversation of safe versus unsafe. Typically, the

1 SRO's are aggressive at how they're trying to do
2 things, and the senior management are the ones that go
3 did you think about this, or did you think about that,
4 or what would be the outcome if, and that typically
5 slows everybody else down.

6 This was -- the roles were reversed at
7 Salem during this time frame. It was [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED], operating the power
9 station from their offices, and the shift happened to
10 try to put every ounce of their being to posing the
11 questions of, you know, what if, what if, what if. We
12 really can't do that.

13 Some of them were just as clear as like
14 the thing with the valve and the control room. The
15 head vent was -- you have a surveillance requirement
16 that says you got to see the valve go open and shut.
17 It didn't go open and shut by the indications. So, we
18 can't continue. You can't NA that stuff and act like
19 it didn't happen. It's a surveillance requirement.

20 MR. BARBER: That was the thing regarding
21 the NH stuff that [REDACTED] was allegedly involved?

22 [REDACTED] Correct.

23 MR. BARBER: And told him to NA this
24 stuff?

25 [REDACTED] Right, and they said they're

1 just not going to do that today. They're licensed by
2 the federal government to follow tech specs and follow
3 the surveillance requirements. Therefore, today we're
4 not going to NA the surveillance requirement. We're
5 going to do that and, you know, those are the kind of
6 things that at that time frame -- again, I was on the
7 periphery of this. I was the TARP team lead that
8 would come in a deal with these things once problems
9 would happen.

10 I was the [REDACTED] that was
11 supposed to explain these things to the operating
12 crews as they were occurring. I was not in the middle
13 of the conversations in the control room at that time.
14 The time that I was in the control room at Salem, none
15 of this was occurring. It was the way I was used to
16 seeing it, where you'd go to do something, and the
17 senior leadership was asking you those probing
18 questions to slow you down and to make you think about
19 nuclear safety.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: About mid-2002, this
21 changed?

22 [REDACTED] Absolutely.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] I mean, on my own small
25 world at the training center, I mean, I was being

1 affected, but non-operationally. I was being asked to
2 do things with licensed classes. Like, well license
3 class would run 14 to 16 months. It has a definite
4 end date with [REDACTED] and having an exam on a
5 certain date. It's a well defined training program
6 that's laid out for the systematic approach to
7 training and approved by INPO.

8 I was being asked to take a two-month
9 chunk out of the middle of it to send these guys back
10 to be on shift for the outage to make the outage go
11 quicker. That happened numerous times.

12 So, from an operational standpoint, that
13 was my operational problem that was similar to the way
14 the shift managers had to act, with real operational
15 problems. I had to try to figure out how to cull out
16 two months out of a defined program that had a defined
17 end date because we needed to hurry up and make the
18 outage go quicker. We couldn't plant that.

19 MR. BARBER: How did they meet the
20 operator requalification requirements? Didn't the
21 operator requalification program have --

22 [REDACTED] There was a notification
23 written in 2000 or 2001 that the operators didn't get
24 their 60 hours of requal and simulator one year
25 because they cut short requal training.

1 MR. BARBER: Isn't there --

2 [REDACTED] No, there's no specific
3 hours requirement, and it's per the systematic
4 approach to training. The program had defined 60
5 hours per year, and had to wear a notification against
6 the program.

7 MR. BARBER: Well, why do you say there's
8 no -- I mean, isn't the procedure requirement a
9 requirement?

10 [REDACTED] Absolutely, and it came out
11 to be like 59 hours or 58-1/2, depending on which
12 operator you were looking at in the year.

13 MR. BARBER: What would it normally have
14 been? It wouldn't have been the outage. Would it
15 have been way over?

16 [REDACTED] Yes, 80 to 100, in that ball
17 park.

18 MR. BARBER: All right, so I mean normally
19 it would be, the 60 is a minimum, and normally you
20 would have, you know, significant -- what would that
21 be, 30 percent, 30 to 60 percent more?

22 [REDACTED]: Correct.

23 MR. BARBER: And you were actually coming
24 out falling short, by a small amount given the hour,
25 hour and a-half, two hour delta, but still, you fell

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1 short.

2  Correct.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that the only area
4 that the training fell short, was in the simulator
5 requals? When they're asking you to take out two
6 months, where do they expect that time to be applied?

7  That was like in the initial
8 license program. The only requirement is that they
9 finished the program before signing the Form 398's to
10 go to the license exam.

11 In general, we would tell them that we
12 would rearrange the schedule, have them come in on
13 weekends or whatever, but their total hours would be
14 met or would not allow them to do it. My
15 conversations would be I'm not, you know, we can't do
16 this because the end date is firm, and I'm not going
17 to sign the 398's if they haven't finished the
18 program.

19 So, you know, and then typically it's
20 okay, well, that was a bad idea. We won't take the
21 license class guys now. Then they go somewhere else,
22 and this is from the senior, the most senior people in
23 the company, and that was my having to deal with this
24 push for production, were these king of things with
25 the training center.

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1 MR. BARBER: You mentioned initial
2 training. Was it also requal, or was it one or the
3 other or both?

4 [REDACTED] No, it was a combination of
5 initial and requal, depending on what the need was at
6 the given time. Generally we'd work around it, but I
7 remember one specific instance where we wrote a
8 notification at the end of the year mathematically.
9 I mean, we cut it right down to where we were going to
10 be right down to 60 hours and something occurred that
11 couldn't be counted for training, that we were below
12 the 60 hours for the year. We put ourselves on report
13 for it and did an analysis and made sure that it
14 wasn't going to happen in the future.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in terms
16 of the initial training programs? Was that an issue
17 that came up once and you had said I can't sign off on
18 these if they don't make it through, and then they
19 realized it was work?

20 [REDACTED] I think every license class
21 that came through, we were asked on a dime to pull the
22 license class in the middle of the outage. Got to go
23 back to the plan. I mean, some of them were reactor
24 operators. Some understood where, you know, they
25 could help with tagging and stuff, but I mean,

1 literally, I happened, I would say -- I'm going to say
2 every single class. That way I don't give absolutes.
3 I don't think there was a single class when I was in
4 charge that didn't go through with some kind of a
5 perturbation that we had -- and then we finally got
6 smart and we adjusted the beginning of the class to
7 have enough slop in it so that when they got called
8 out, we could re-shuffle the training.

9 There were some fairly acute points where
10 people had to put in a lot of extra hours to get their
11 qualifications because there are a set number of hours
12 that they have to stand on watch in the plant, and
13 they don't get their book signed unless they do this
14 set number of hours. The program has a set number of
15 hours in it.

16 But that's the kind of again, the big
17 picture was kind of missing. I mean, the big picture
18 of you don't want to take away from these guys' time
19 because you're going to put out more qualified
20 operators. If you give them their time to bake rather
21 than keep taking the souffle out of the oven, and that
22 big picture was missing.

23 Again, the same kinds of things were
24 occurring on shift with decisions being made at the
25 highest level.

1 MR. BARBER: Were they taken at like a
2 classroom period? I mean, I don't know specifically
3 how you schedule your initial training. Do you have
4 like a 12-week or a 16-week block of classroom
5 training or something like that?

6 [REDACTED] Yes, it varied. I mean,
7 they came out --

8 MR. BARBER: So when they would come out,
9 when the station would go out and say we need these
10 people back, would you physically take them out of the
11 classroom?

12 [REDACTED] Oh, absolutely.

13 MR. BARBER: So, would they get another
14 classroom session as a make-up, or did they have to
15 sit and read the material on their own or something?

16 [REDACTED] No, we'd have to make up the
17 classroom session somehow.

18 MR. BARBER: All right, so it kind of put
19 you behind the eight ball as far as resources.

20 [REDACTED] There were a number of times
21 I'd call [REDACTED] and get an extension on the exam, or
22 he'd move me out two months or whatever because that
23 perturbation occurred.

24 MR. BARBER: Did he ever ask you, I mean,
25 you know, about that? Did that ever come up?

1 [REDACTED] Yes, routinely. I mean, we
2 had conversations about why was I the only one in the
3 region that would keep having to go to the well and
4 move the license class around.

5 MR. BARBER: That's interesting. So, he's
6 also kind of intimating that it's just PSE&G that's
7 doing this and others are not?

8 [REDACTED] I wouldn't say just. I
9 mean, I think he has other requests to do it, but I
10 would come to the well. He might have another
11 request, and I'd come to the well again. He'd get
12 another request, and I'd come to the well again. So,
13 I was getting more than my fair share of attention.

14 MR. BARBER: Okay.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you say it was
16 every license class you ran had some sort of
17 perturbation in it?

18 [REDACTED] Every license class I ran
19 had some perturbation in it that had to do with, you
20 know, all of a sudden the outages and you know, the
21 outage is ten hours behind. We're going to stop the
22 license class and pull everybody out to the plant.

23 Now, is there any outfall from nuclear
24 safety? No. We do the make-up that we have to do,
25 and the individuals that pass the exam pass the exam

1 and get licenses.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So they get the
3 required training?

4 ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Correct. They get their
5 required training. Now, did the individuals feel more
6 valuable with the fact that they're getting yanked,
7 you know, they get one shot at license class or two
8 shots at license class, and it's getting perturbed by
9 the company.

10 MR. BARBER: Did you ever feel like
11 because of the way the schedule was perturbed that
12 people, although they may have passed the exam, didn't
13 get the quality of training you would like to have
14 given them in that maybe you -- let's say just take a
15 simple example. You teach systems training on a
16 system, but let's say you teach basic system
17 functions, things like that, something to do with
18 systems training.

19 Then maybe down the road you teach
20 procedures on say that's how that system works for
21 tech specs, but under let's say this circumstance of
22 duress or what have you, maybe they missed systems
23 here but get the procedures training and they have to
24 come back and learn the basic system functions later
25 so that --

1 [REDACTED] They got all the things they
2 needed to get, and again, there's a filter at the end
3 to insure that nothing gets out that's unsafe. Do I
4 think the individuals got fair? I think there are
5 people that didn't make it through because of the
6 perturbations that occurred with the process.

7 MR. BARBER: Did anybody say anything to
8 you about that, or did you ever get that feedback?

9 [REDACTED] Oh, it was constant. I
10 mean, everybody complained about having, you know, to
11 stop the class and start the class and stop the class
12 and start the class. Again, that was more of a
13 business decision of this is how we're going to choose
14 to run things.

15 Again, that was my production pressure.
16 So, as a [REDACTED] that was my direction
17 production pressure that that was occurring on a
18 routine basis, that training was getting shut down or
19 you know, if there was a dual -- if you looked at
20 years that were dual unit outages, like Salem One had
21 an outage in the spring and Salem Two had one in the
22 fall, training was thin for that year at Salem.

23 MR. BARBER: The way the recall program
24 was set up, was there any mandatory either hours or
25 frequency or anything of that nature that related to

1 the program that requalifying operators and senior
2 operators had to go? And that say for example the
3 years when there was a dual unit outage?

4 [REDACTED] There's nothing that says in
5 the program that to get your requalification of your
6 license or your re-up of your license, they had to do
7 a certain amount of hours. There was a program
8 required amount, and one was 60 hours. One year it
9 was 59 or 58.

10 It was made up for the next year and then
11 again because the license is a six-year period, the
12 procedure was rewritten to say in any two-year period,
13 make sure you get 120. In the one year, we missed the
14 60 hour requirement. There was a notification written
15 on it.

16 MR. BARBER: Okay.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where was that
18 pressure coming to you from to rearrange these
19 classes? Was this from an outage manager, or was it
20 from somewhere else?

21 [REDACTED]: No, it was directly from the
22 vice president of operations again. The decisions
23 were made -- decisions that were normally made at a
24 lower level were made at the top, with very little
25 discussion. So, it was like, you know, I'm trying to

1 run a license class here that has a definite outcome
2 and a definite end point.

3 The response would be go ask [REDACTED] for more
4 time. There's really no thought about what it did to
5 the candidates or what it did to the schedule at the
6 training center or whatever. Again, those are kind of
7 small potatoes, but that was my manifestation of the
8 pressure of production.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that was [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] at that time?

11 [REDACTED] In general, yes [REDACTED]

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you have
13 anything further on the training issues? Okay, and
14 everything else that you've --

15 MR. BARBER: I think we've covered
16 everything, unless you have any other either technical
17 issues or situations you want to discuss that stand
18 out in your mind, interactions with management?

19 [REDACTED] There's only one other
20 technical issue I remember. I know the plant --
21 again, I was not involved in this TARP, but there was
22 right over the Holidays, I think 2001 into 2002, there
23 was a reactor trip to the pressurizer spray valve
24 failure, and the spray valve failed open, couldn't get
25 it shut, and couldn't get the right combination of

1 reactor cooling pumps turned off, and ended up with a
2 reactor trip and almost an SI. They had to basically
3 turn off all the reactor coolant pumps before the
4 pressurizer spray stopped.

5 So, the procedure, once you do the manual
6 reactor trip, has you turn off the number one and
7 number three pumps, depending on which pressurizer
8 spray valve is failed open. In this case, pressure
9 kept going down in the plant, so eventually they had
10 to knock off all four reactor coolant pumps, which was
11 kind of an anomaly with the procedure.

12 Typically, the understanding of that whole
13 thing would have occurred before the plant would start
14 up, but again, I know [REDACTED] was applying significant
15 pressure to get the unit started back up, and later
16 admitted to the fact that he started the reactor up
17 with really no understanding of what occurred at the
18 event. They went ahead and did a reactor start-up
19 pretty much the next day, and then a whole bunch of
20 new learnings came out the next week after the root
21 cause was done as to why this anomaly occurred.

22 I mean, on the positive side for [REDACTED] he
23 admitted the fact he was going too quick, and admitted
24 that he started up the reactor with not having full
25 knowledge of what happened. But it was another

1 manifestation of pressure. You just don't normally
2 start a nuclear reactor back up without understanding
3 what took it out.

4 MR. BARBER: What was it determined to be?
5 Do you recall?

6  It was a phenomena with
7 pressurizer level. The higher pressurized the level,
8 I guess they pressurized the level really high so that
9 the difference, it didn't require much driving head to
10 drive spray flow.

11 MR. BARBER: Is that what it was?

12  Yes, and so even at the
13 other pumps, even once you got the one and three pumps
14 turned off, there was enough DP across the quarter
15 drive spray flow, and if the pressurized level was
16 normal post-trip, then you would not have had the
17 spray flow that they saw.

18 MR. BARBER: Okay.

19  I think they had to make
20 changed to the procedures to insure that you know, any
21 subsequent problem with pressurizer spray would have
22 been understood by the operators and of course you can
23 train on it to make sure the operators understand
24 what's going on. That didn't occur until after the
25 unit was back up for days.

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1 MR. BARBER: Was that aspect, not the
2 technical issue but the fact that there was a decision
3 made to start up without knowing that, was that ever
4 documented in a notification to your knowledge?

5 [REDACTED] I don't think it was. I
6 think, you know, I verbally heard [REDACTED] say you know,
7 we jumped the gun on this, and you know, there was a
8 pressure to get started up, and he went ahead and made
9 the decision to start up without knowing everything.
10 I don't think there was ever a notification
11 specifically about the decision to start up.

12 MR. BARBER: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] There may have been. I'm
14 just not aware of one.

15 MR. BARBER: All right. Would that be
16 something that could have been covered in a TARP, too?
17 I mean, would a TARP team have --

18 [REDACTED] Well, a TARP definitely has
19 been called out for a reactor trip.

20 MR. BARBER: Would they have ever made a
21 comment about that start-up decision?

22 [REDACTED] No, because TARP's a short
23 term type thing, and it rolls over into a start-up
24 type mode.

25 MR. BARBER: All right.

1 [REDACTED] I know there are some
2 changes made to the TARP procedure as a result of
3 that, if I remember correctly, to make sure there's
4 continuity. I forget what changes were made, but I
5 know they made some. I was getting out of TARP by
6 just about that time. I wasn't a TARP committee
7 anymore.

8 MR. BARBER: Normally, though, isn't there
9 after a scream or a trip, isn't our post-trip review,
10 which is similar to what a normal safety committee
11 would be?

12 [REDACTED] Right, and then they have
13 all -- they did the post-trip review and they had a
14 SORC.

15 MR. BARBER: Isn't one of the questions
16 asked is was there any indications that are not well
17 known or well understood?

18 [REDACTED] Probably there was some
19 discussion about that and they went ahead and started
20 up.

21 MR. BARBER: Okay, so there would have
22 been another opportunity to challenge that decision at
23 that time?

24 [REDACTED] Right. Again, I was not in
25 on that SORC, but somehow they didn't have all the

1 information going in. They didn't have all the
2 information coming out, and the unit started up. Then
3 it was determined about a week later, you know, hey,
4 it would have been nice to know all the information
5 before we started the unit up.

6 MR. BARBER: Normally you would have
7 expected it, right?

8 [REDACTED] Right.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you know who else
10 had involvement in that incident?

11 [REDACTED] No.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anybody else that we
13 would be able to talk to?

14 MR. BARBER: Do you have a time frame on
15 this one?

16 [REDACTED] I think it was 2001 into
17 2002.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You said holiday
19 season, right?

20 [REDACTED] Yes. So, that was probably
21 [REDACTED] still.

22 MR. BARBER: Let's just try just a little
23 bit of a different approach. What I'd like to do is
24 maybe just get you to think a moment about different
25 people that you've interacted with and tell me what

1 your thoughts are as far as any other additional
2 situations you might recall. Let's just do it by
3 specific manager.


4 If I were to say think of your interaction
5 with [REDACTED] is there anything else in your
6 interactions with [REDACTED] that you'd like to recall. I
7 think you did mention the one item with the site air
8 compressors. Was there anything else that you had any
9 dealings with him on that we should be aware of?

10 [REDACTED] You know, I would say in
11 general, any event that occurred at the plant, it was
12 always one of those 20/20 hindsight kind of things.
13 I mean, you do what you do, and you take your best
14 shot at doing the right thing, but if it wasn't
15 exactly what [REDACTED] wanted, his management style was to
16 be very abrupt and scream and yell and individually
17 berate individuals during these conversations in front
18 of the management team.

19 I've been exposed to other managers that
20 did that, or other senior leaders that have done that
21 before. His was particularly harsh. Again, I mean,
22 would that have affected me in raising a concern? No,
23 but could it have affected somebody else? Yes, I'd
24 say potentially.


25 MR. BARBER: Did you ever see him berate

1 someone when you were in a meeting or something and
2 just through that intimidation or the harassment of
3 berating, if you will, that you felt like they weren't
4 always willing to bring things forward, and did they
5 come to you and say you know, I wanted to tell him
6 this, but he didn't give me a chance to open my mouth?

7  Well, yes. Again, probably
8 name-wise, you could pass that around the management
9 team at that time. I think everybody at one time or
10 another got chewed on pretty hard.

11 MR. BARBER: Okay.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you see it happen
13 in fact from where he comes into play and his style is
14 this negative way. Did you see that have an effect
15 where people would raise issues before and then not so
16 much later? Were you able to --

17  From a general sense, yes,
18 I could say that, you know, the entire management team
19 was dulled down, and you recognize that if you stayed
20 in your fox hole and kept your head down, you got less
21 of a chance of getting your head knocked off. It was
22 just really unhealthy during that.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In taking a different
24 viewpoint?

25  In taking any viewpoint that

1 stuck your head above the table. I mean, and a
2 different viewpoint especially. Yes, it was pretty
3 astonishing. Again, I mean particulars, it happened
4 so often I cannot just say oh, I remember this one
5 time.

6 Other than the one that laser beamed on
7 me, I remember that one real good, okay, but of all of
8 the management meetings that I was at that this
9 occurred, I can't remember any one specific example
10 that really -- I just remember -- one person I think
11 that might have some insight was a guy named [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] I don't know if you've heard of him. He was
13 the [REDACTED] there.

14 During the outage of the 2002 spring
15 outage, on a couple of occasions, he just got up and
16 left. I mean, just got up and left the site, and
17 nobody knew if he was ever coming back or not. It had
18 to do with decisions that were being made and how he
19 was interfacing. Now, [REDACTED] had the same kind of a
20 mindset I did, where he was raised from a safety
21 standpoint. [REDACTED] was initially licensed with the
22 [REDACTED] So, this
23 guy's got a lot of years as a [REDACTED],
24 and he just flat out wasn't listened to.

25 So, I mean, he was a [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED] when I was a kid, and he just was not
2 listened to by this management team. I know it
3 frustrated him enough times that I mean, looking
4 around at the outage control center, he's supposed to
5 be the guy running the outage. Where's [REDACTED] He
6 left.

7 I think that happened on a couple of those
8 management type meetings also where he was getting
9 berated by [REDACTED] I think there was at least once or
10 twice where that occurred. So, he may have some --

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What time frame was
12 that? When did he leave?

13 [REDACTED] He left about right after
14 the outage, that particular outage. It was the summer
15 of 2002.

16 MR. BARBER: Okay. How about let's skip
17 over to [REDACTED] You've already given a number
18 of instances where you've had interactions with him.
19 Is there any other interactions that either stand out
20 in your mind either that affected you personally or
21 you saw him interact with others that stood out in
22 your mind?

23 [REDACTED] was not like a berating
24 type person. So, he was never one of the ones that
25 would just fly off and start screaming. So, that

1 wasn't how he handled things. In general, as a
2 supervisor, I liked him as a supervisor. The one
3 thing that I wasn't smart enough to realize is that he
4 made decisions based off how other people,
5 particularly [REDACTED] how he thought [REDACTED] thought it
6 should go. I don't know if that makes any sense.

7 He would do things based off of his
8 understanding of how [REDACTED] would want it to occur.
9 So, that, if you were really smart, you'd be down here
10 thinking okay, how would [REDACTED] want this to go? I'm
11 going to do it like this already so that -- and it
12 didn't matter whether it made any operational or
13 management sense at all. It's just -- so a lot of the
14 times the rubs with [REDACTED] and some of his direct
15 reports were around not conforming to what -- that
16 doesn't sound right.

17 [REDACTED] was very unpredictable as a
18 supervisor. I mean, his supervisory skills, he would
19 sit down and talk to you, but the hard part was you
20 would be doing what you thought was the right thing
21 based off of experience, and there was a lot of
22 experienced people there. Then it would come around
23 the blind side you that, you know, that wasn't what I
24 wanted and I didn't tell you. But it's not what I
25 wanted and I didn't tell you kind of a thing.

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1 So, it had its own subtle effect of I
2 guess in my mind you wouldn't -- again, you wouldn't
3 want to cause yourself to be seen at all because the
4 laser beam would go right on you.

5 MR. BARBER: Okay.

6 [REDACTED] So, I don't know if that
7 answers the question.

8 MR. BARBER: I think a little bit. I
9 mean, you sort of describe him as -- my way of saying
10 it would be kind of like a chameleon where he changes
11 his colors based on what the situation was.

12 [REDACTED] Right, I think that's the
13 right term, but I mean that's either good or bad. I
14 mean, that doesn't directly go at this issue. The way
15 it could manifest itself and did manifest itself was
16 typically a boss, one of the rules of a boss is to
17 train you and teach you, right? There was none of
18 that going on at all. You were just trying to guess
19 what the next, you know, if it's a yes or no answer,
20 what, you know, is it supposed to be no, and there
21 would be no feedback to you whether it was right or
22 wrong. It would just be, if it made [REDACTED] look bad,
23 you just got negative response.

24 It was just, there were just some
25 astonishing -- I'll bring this one anecdote up because

1 it's just amazing. It will paint a picture to you of
2 what goes on.

3 There was a tornado warning down in
4 southern Maryland. You know, there's actions you take
5 at a nuclear power station for a tornado. I was in
6 [REDACTED] office, and I was actually talking
7 specifically about wanting to set up the interview to
8 become the [REDACTED] to interview for [REDACTED]
9 there.

10 [REDACTED] says I got to go because [REDACTED] and I
11 have to go tie stuff down for the tornado. I had just
12 gotten off the internet looking at, you know,
13 weather.com. There were no possibility of storms
14 hitting anywhere within 100 miles of Salem.

15 (Whereupon, the foregoing
16 matter went off the record
17 briefly and went back on the
18 record at 5:12 p.m.)

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's approximately
20 5:12 p.m.

21 [REDACTED] Okay, and continuing, there
22 was this anecdote. It kind of paints a picture of how
23 crazy life was during that time. Again, I think this
24 was summer of 2002. It was definitely summer of 2002.

25 This was actually during that outage. I

1 remember that now because they needed to go make sure
2 stuff was tied down for the outage. [REDACTED] was getting
3 ready to go out with [REDACTED] to go, you know, physically
4 do something. I mean, they'd already given out the
5 order to tie stuff down, and there's a procedure with
6 making sure that there's no missile hazards.

7 But they needed to go out and run around
8 and make sure stuff was tied down as the site vice
9 president. That's a whole other story.

10 I asked [REDACTED] I said hey, did you look at
11 the weather, and he says well no, how do you do that.
12 I turned on his computer, and his internet thing had
13 never been enabled. So, we went through the whole
14 sequence of starting up the internet on a brand new
15 computer, and it popped up and I went on weather.com,
16 and there's a chunk of storms in New York and there's
17 a chunk of storms down in Virginia, and they're all
18 moving like this and there's nothing but sunny skies
19 over the area near us.

20 Now, we weren't even under a tornado
21 warning. There was a tornado warning for like
22 southern Maryland, and they started these actions. So,
23 I was hoping like the outcome of this would be hey
24 [REDACTED] why don't you come here and look at this, and
25 you know, maybe we don't need to cycle the site and do

1 all this stuff and stop the outage and no cranes
2 moving because there's not outcome.

3 But [REDACTED] would not, and [REDACTED] saw it. [REDACTED]
4 would not approach [REDACTED] with it, and him and [REDACTED] took
5 off to go tie stuff around the site. I just sat there
6 and just shook my head.

7 Sure enough, you know, for the rest of the
8 afternoon, it was beautifully sunny outside, no wind,
9 and we took tornado preparations for absolutely
10 nothing. Nobody was willing to question anybody about
11 that, even when shown that it just wasn't a physical
12 possibility to have a tornado in Salem. It wasn't
13 being called for, and there was no weather around.

14 MR. BARBER: Was there anything that said
15 that if you're within the proximity of a certain area

16 --

17 [REDACTED] I think [REDACTED] said there's
18 a tornado somewhere, so let's do something about it.
19 That's what I really think happened.

20 MR. BARBER: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] And the insanity of it was
22 just, I mean, and then it's not lost upon people that,
23 you know, there are other computers on site and there
24 are other people that are you know, I'm not a genius.
25 You know, other people looked up weather.com, and they

1 realized they stopped the outage and were taking all
2 these actions for nothing. Then we're fighting over
3 18 hours starting up a nuclear reactor in what I would
4 consider an unsafe condition.

5 So, that was my level on insanity toward
6 the end of this thing, that kind of paints a picture.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Typically is your
8 director of operations and your VP the people who go
9 out and tie things down?

10  Absolutely not. Not any
11 sane organization. In any sane organization, that
12 does not occur. You know, the water had gone out.
13 There's a procedure that people follow to do that.
14 The outage was stopped, but because it was the vogue
15 thing to do to run around in scrubs and yell orders
16 and tie stuff, batten down the hatches and throw ropes
17 over stuff, and that's what they were going to do,
18 even when I showed him it was not a physical
19 possibility.

20 That was part of the -- I was just looking
21 at this from up close and afar going this is just a
22 really unhealthy environment.  was unwilling to
23 show  the fact what the issue was with the
24 weather.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you're

1 attributing that to the fact that [REDACTED] would
2 do things based on what [REDACTED] told him, and if
3 [REDACTED] said there's a tornado and you must
4 prepare, there was no arguing with that?

5 [REDACTED] Correct.

6 MR. BARBER: How about [REDACTED] himself? Do
7 you have any take on him? I mean, you probably were
8 in meetings when he's ---

9 [REDACTED] could be the sanest
10 guy I ever met. I mean, like you'd go in and you'd
11 walk away thinking he had the wisdom of Solomon of
12 what he had just said. Then I'd say 70 or 80 percent
13 of the time, you'd walk and have absolutely no idea
14 what was just communicated to you.

15 I mean, speak English, but what was coming
16 out meant nothing. Another example of that was [REDACTED]
17 came out to the simulator with [REDACTED] who was
18 the [REDACTED] at the time, and observed
19 the crew. The crew got finished, and during the
20 grading of it, [REDACTED] looked at [REDACTED] and said -- and I
21 was not -- I came in five minutes after this.

22 So, [REDACTED] had just left. I walked in to
23 find out, because [REDACTED] stopped by my office and said
24 how terrible the training was. I walked in to talk to
25 the [REDACTED] and he says I don't even

1 know how to respond to this. [REDACTED] brought up a
2 question about why the operators were parroting each
3 other. Why do those operators sound like they're
4 parroting each other?

5 [REDACTED] pulled out the OPS standards and go
6 we have this thing called three-way communications.
7 It's not really new in the industry but, you know, in
8 case you haven't been exposed to it, here are our
9 standards. [REDACTED] just flat out didn't want to hear
10 it. Today was operators were parroting each other,
11 and it was ignored. I mean, nobody ever did anything
12 about it, but [REDACTED] was upset because the operators
13 were using three-way communications in his control
14 room per the operations standards and per the industry
15 standards.

16 MR. BARBER: So he was kind of that far
17 behind the curve that he didn't even know that that
18 was the standard?

19 [REDACTED] Behind, ahead, sideways,
20 coherent, incoherent. I don't know how to describe
21 it.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there some other
23 way he expected them to communicate? I mean, I
24 understand what you're saying. It's industry
25 standard. It's more than just at Salem. It's done

1 elsewhere, but --

2 [REDACTED] I don't know the answer to
3 that question. I mean, and I never found that
4 particular answer out.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He just questioned
6 why are they parroting?

7 [REDACTED] It was just kind of ignored
8 and everybody continued doing what was in the
9 standards.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Tornado prep.

11 [REDACTED] It was kind of like the
12 tornado prep.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] Like I said, there were some
15 days I went in, and I had a lot of interface with
16 [REDACTED] a lot of direct interface with him, and there
17 were times that him and I communicated, 20 or 30
18 percent of the time I walked out feeling wow, you
19 know, I'm on pretty firm ground with [REDACTED] There
20 were 70 or 80 percent of the time where I have no idea
21 whether I communicated or not.

22 I know he didn't communicate with me, and
23 that's unusual for me as a person, and it was
24 frustrating for me because in general I communicate
25 well with people I work for or peers with or friends

1 with. I communicate reasonably well, and I don't
2 think, if you talk to some of the other people that
3 worked there, I would not be an outlier in that.

4 It was very frustrating because there were
5 times that you think you were heard and you understood
6 what the communication was, and then there were other
7 times where you just have no idea whether your
8 communication hit base, whether he communicated with
9 you. It was pretty frustrating.

10 MR. BARBER: Did you ever get the
11 impression he was under a lot of pressure from --

12 [REDACTED] No, no. [REDACTED] was a pretty
13 cool cat. I mean, if he was under pressure, I didn't
14 know it.

15 MR. BARBER: Okay. Did he ever do
16 anything unusual, out of the norm as far as the way
17 he'd interact with other managers?

18 [REDACTED] Another one that's kind of
19 interesting is that there were times, and this never
20 happened with me, but there were other people that
21 said, you know, he'd be in the middle of a sentence
22 with you and he'd just turn around and walk away. It
23 was like, you know, another idea hit his head, and he
24 needed to go deal with it right then.

25 That never happened with me for some

1 reason. I did witness it. I did see it happen.

2 MR. BARBER: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] The guy was in the middle of
4 a sentence, and he just turned around and walked away.

5 MR. BARBER: How about just did he ever
6 have meetings off site?

7 [REDACTED]: No, I was never really
8 involved in any meetings off site with him. I mean
9 sporting events and stuff like that.

10 MR. BARBER: I mean like did he ever have
11 people over to his house to discuss plant issues?

12 [REDACTED] Yes. I mean, I was aware of
13 a -- I was pretty good friends with the [REDACTED]
14 there, a guy named [REDACTED] and I know that when
15 [REDACTED] first came there, he was trying to follow the
16 site's policy for writing QA reports and you know, the
17 QA kind of reports directly up to the chief nuclear
18 officer. The QA reports were coming out were
19 negative, and they had grades applied to them, like
20 different colors of organizations getting certain
21 color grades.

22 I know on numerous occasions [REDACTED] got an
23 invite directly to [REDACTED] to explain how he was
24 going to change the report because he didn't like how
25 the grading was. Eventually what happened was they

1 just got rid of the grading and just had comments.
2 Then the Nuclear Review Board came in and said you
3 know, what kind of garbage is this? How can you go
4 from having grading where we actually have something
5 to put our teeth into to just comments. The grading
6 kind of came back.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Like they weren't
8 doing enough self assessment there

9 [REDACTED] Right. I know [REDACTED] got
10 invited out to [REDACTED] to specifically talk
11 about that. I know that he had specific meetings with
12 the vice presidents to get colors changed because they
13 didn't like how their organizations were being
14 assessed. So, again, that's second hand, just talking
15 to the QA manager under some significant frustration,
16 but I know that occurred.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Time frame for that?

18 [REDACTED] They're all kind of about
19 the same time. That may have been 2001 into 2002.

20 MR. BARBER: Do you know, was anybody else
21 ever invited to his house that you're aware of to
22 discuss any other issues? It just seems very unusual.

23 [REDACTED] I think [REDACTED] was.
24 He was my former boss back in the 2000 time frame, but
25 I don't know the nature of those meetings.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was the end
2 result? Was this recommendation that they drop the
3 colors and when they were dropped, then the NRB came
4 in and said you can't do that.

5 [REDACTED] It kind of was a moving
6 target for awhile. Every time a QA report came out,
7 it was in a different format.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Different color?

9 [REDACTED] Generally really didn't get
10 dumbed down. I think the attempt was to kind of dumb
11 it down a little bit so it didn't say the biting
12 things that it --

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not as harsh?




14 [REDACTED] Yes, but it really still got
15 through to the point. I mean, they may have taken
16 away the colors, but if you read the paragraph, the
17 paragraph still said that maintenance didn't know how
18 to fix anything. You know, you put a red bullet and
19 say maintenance doesn't know how to fix anything or
20 you can just leave the red bullet off and say
21 maintenance doesn't know how to fix anything, and
22 here's the 20 examples.

23 It doesn't matter. I mean, it was still
24 getting -- it wasn't like the information was getting
25 squelched. I think that was because the people,

1 including the QA manager, wouldn't allow that to
2 occur, but there was a lot of frustration with that
3 organization communicating to the senior leadership.


4 I mean, normally what I was used to seeing
5 was the senior leadership committee would just take
6 that information at face value and go do something
7 with it, and there wouldn't be a lot of angling around
8 what the words said and how they were being said.
9 This organization was very much into how it's said,
10 why it's said, what color it is, and you know, how
11 much can we push over in this pile and how much can we
12 push over into this pile so I don't look bad kind of
13 a thing. That was kind of frustrating.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what you're
15 saying, from what you've seen, it didn't affect the
16 findings. The findings were still there. They just
17 might have been color coded differently.

18  Again, I just saw the
19 outcome, so I don't know what was originally said in
20 it before it got through the filter. I saw what came
21 out afterwards, and I just saw a bunch of -- you know,
22 I talked to   said you know, I got invited
23 over to  and the VP's are mad at me
24 because we're saying this stuff, and all I saw was the
25 outcome of this report that would change every time it

1 came out to some new format.

2 So, if you collected all the QA reports
3 for that time frame, they'd all look different, and
4 some would have colors, some wouldn't, and there was
5 this whole wrangling in the middle of that how to make
6 them look.

7 So, I mean I did hear that out of 
8 mouth, is the whole -- he called it the cycle of doom.
9 You know, the cycle of doom was you'd start out with
10 an NRB meeting and the NRB would tell you how bad
11 you're doing. Then it would purvey around to QA
12 telling you how bad you're doing, and QA would read,
13 or NRB would read all the QA reports and the
14 corrective actions, and then the NRB would again tell
15 you how bad you're doing.  used to describe that
16 as the cycle of doom.

17 I think he would try to change that with
18 the QA report so that the next time it fed around, it
19 wouldn't be so bad. It was kind of tough to, you
20 know, when you have three partial losses of off site
21 power in a year and injure a whole bunch of people,
22 it's kind of tough to make that thing look right
23 because these guys go out and look at other power
24 stations that don't have three partial losses of off
25 site power, seven or eight reactor trips in a year,

1 and hurt 20 people.

2 They don't see that at other stations, so
3 it's kind of tough, no matter how you slice it and
4 dice it and you know, move the indicators out and take
5 the colors off. It doesn't matter. You still see,
6 you know, X number of people getting hurt. You still
7 see pieces of equipment not operating. You still see
8 the outcome of the performance. So, that was
9 interesting.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There's been a number
11 of things said about, or at least there's some
12 information that the INPO rating in 2002 was a big
13 issue for [REDACTED] Does something like this feed
14 into NRB's evaluations of what goes on on site and
15 INPO's review of that? The fact that they were
16 getting a three and did get a three again, I think it
17 was twice in a row?

18 [REDACTED] I don't know. I think, you
19 know, INPO comes in and does an assessment. They do
20 a two-week assessment, and they see what they see.
21 Like within an hour of INPO being on the site during
22 that particular review, we had a tagging error that
23 resulted in either cardox dumping or somebody gets
24 shocked or something, like within an hour of them
25 being there. So, it would just, it wasn't like the

1 place would clean up and put on pretty clothing for
2 the two weeks that INPO was there. It's just the same
3 stuff continued to happen.

4 INPO looks very heavily. They have a PI
5 system, not unlike the NRC's PI system, that looks at
6 things like capacity factor and unplanned trips and
7 unplanned capability loss factor and this kind of
8 thing. Salem was like an industry outlier in the
9 majority of those categories, and so was Hope Creek.

10 I mean, if you just looked at that, that
11 paints a picture, but they ask you to send down like
12 your last couple years of corrective actions, and they
13 cull through the corrective actions and look for, you
14 know, big hitting type items. Then they come ask you
15 questions about all that. You know, why can't you
16 keep the units up? Why did you have three partial
17 losses of off site power? Why are you hurting people,
18 and why can't you fix the corrective actions? You've
19 written corrective actions, but you're not fixing
20 anything.

21 All that paints a picture, and then they
22 see people actually get shocked while they're out
23 there observing the site. It paints a three or a four
24 because, you know, INPO two or one plants don't
25 operate like that.

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1 So, I'm sure the pressure was enormous on
2 ~~_____~~ and the senior leadership team. The one thing
3 I would tell you is that no matter how many times the
4 puck got shot on goal, it would appear that the
5 operators at both stations still listened to the way
6 they were trained in '95, '96 coming out of the big
7 event that occurred in '94.

8 Because in '94, I think some of these
9 pucks would have gotten through the goal with the
10 operators they had. In '95, '96, '97, they were
11 trained by the former management team to not allow
12 pucks to go through the goal, and no matter how many -
13 - it didn't matter who were shooting the pucks. I
14 mean, sometimes it was the maintenance department.
15 Sometimes it was the plant playing tricks on you, and
16 sometimes it was the senior leadership team asking you
17 to do stuff you're not allowed to do. They wouldn't
18 let the pucks get through the goal.

19 So, if you look at the actual how many
20 errors and events and significance level, you know,
21 from what the NRC sees, it hasn't been that high at
22 the power station. I think the goalie is supposed to
23 be back here as the senior leadership team and
24 managers keeping those shots away from the control
25 room. The way it has been, I don't know the way it is

1 now, but the way it was up until the end of 2002 was
2 the shots on goal were right at the point of attack
3 with the goalie.

4 I hate to use a hockey analogy, but it's
5 kind of like that. The thing I wasn't used to seeing
6 was the senior leadership team out there shooting
7 pucks, too, at the control room.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that's the
9 reversal you talked about?

10 [REDACTED] Right, ala the [REDACTED]
11 coming in and asking you to NA a surveillance
12 requirement. That's just unconscionable. So, it was
13 just another puck that the shift manager or the CRS
14 had to say, you know, we're just not going to do this.

15 That's the picture I left with at the end
16 of last year, and it was pretty unhealthy. Now, you
17 know, ability to raise a safety concern, I don't know
18 if that's part of this or not, but I didn't feel like
19 I couldn't raise one, and people would listen to you,
20 but would they actually fix it or would they do
21 something with it once you did it? It's questionable.

22 I think it's an individual issue with all
23 that environment around you of seeing people get
24 yelled at, seeing people either -- actually, not too
25 many people got fired, but a lot of people quit. Just

1 with that aura and environment, I think it's up to the
2 individual whether they would feel, you know,
3 depending on you know, how severe the safety concern
4 is versus how secure do you feel in your job and how
5 bad you need a job as to whether you're going to raise
6 it or not.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But it definitely
8 played a factor in whether somebody -- this is a
9 factor for them.

10 [REDACTED] Right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How comfortable am I
12 and what response am I going to get.

13 [REDACTED] Now, do I feel as a nuclear
14 professional, I mean, this is not, if you read my
15 resume, [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] Do I feel that I was heard by my
20 management team at the end? Absolutely not. They
21 could care less what opinion I had on nuclear power
22 and nuclear safety, and it didn't matter.

23 So, that was the stark difference between
24 '95, '96, '97, the beginning of '98, I felt vital and
25 heard, and my nuclear experience was being used to

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1 better the plant. When I left at the end of [REDACTED] it
2 just didn't -- you know, if you look at resumes, I was
3 probably one of the heavier people there as far as
4 experience and education, and it just didn't matter.
5 Even if they did seek out my opinion, which didn't
6 happen very often, if I gave them my opinion on a
7 technical issue, it didn't matter.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that because of
9 part of what you said before, was that largely in your
10 experience when you've tested, things haven't always -
11 - you've had bad experiences where you've pushed, so
12 now you've learned not to push in those areas, and one
13 was the example that we talked about in 2002.

14 [REDACTED] Right.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So, I think you're
16 portraying that your actions are very conservative
17 because you don't want to push in certain systems and
18 certain areas. Is it that they don't seek your --
19 they didn't seek your opinion because you were going
20 to be conservative and give conservative guidance?

21 [REDACTED] I think that was a part of
22 it, but I also think it was -- I think that was
23 probably half of it. I think the other half, and this
24 is again, this is opinion. I don't have any fact to
25 back this up at all. I think 50 percent of it was the


1 fact that they knew I would give a conservative
2 response, and the other 50 percent was they already
3 had the correct answer anyway, and that it really
4 didn't serve them at all to get anybody else's
5 professional opinion on how to operate a power
6 station. That's truthfully what I think.


7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Correct answer coming
8 from that level of management?

9  From the chief nuclear
10 officer on down.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything else to add?

12 MR. BARBER: No.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is there anything
14 that you would like to add to,  that we haven't
15 asked or touched on? Anything that would be
16 significant?

17 MR. BARBER: How about any other examples
18 can you think of where you felt like people were
19 harassed or intimidated by anybody at the station
20 regarding, you know, just raising safety issues or
21 issues to be addressed or things of that nature? It
22 could from some other than we've talked. We focused
23 primarily on 

24 but what about others? I mean, were there
25 interactions you were a party to, or maybe there was

1 indirect pressure that we haven't already discussed?

2 [REDACTED] I'm trying to remember
3 specifics and names. They're out there, but I can't
4 remember for the life of me. I know there was a
5 documented harassment type thing with the [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] which came down
7 to the same berating type thing, and that was around
8 the same time frame, mid-2002.

9 MR. BARBER: Okay.


10 [REDACTED] I don't remember the
11 specifics. I know the [REDACTED] name was
12 [REDACTED] That was through employee concerns and
13 filed, the whole nine yards. I don't even know the
14 outcome of that, but I know there was a lot of heavy
15 handed type things occurring there throughout, and it
16 got progressively worse. I don't know if it was out
17 outfall of the environment and the INPO and the rating
18 and the needing to do better or what, but it got
19 progressively worse as time went on.

20 MR. BARBER: Is there any other situations
21 that you could think of that might involve either
22 intentional violations of NRC requirements or tech
23 specs or license issues or things of that nature?

24 [REDACTED] No, I can't think of any
25 specifics.

1 MR. BARBER: Okay, thank you.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. If there's
3 nothing else to add, all right, then we'll close.
4 It's approximately 5:35 p.m., and I thank you for your
5 time.

6  No problem.

7 (Whereupon, the above-referred to
8 interview was concluded at 5:35 p.m.)

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