

Official Transcript of Proceedings
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: Interview of [REDACTED] *TC* (2)

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey

Date: Friday, November 7, 2003

Work Order No.: NRC-1217

Pages 1-45

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF THE INVESTIGATIONS
INTERVIEW

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IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.



: 1-2003-051F

(CLOSED) :

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Friday, November 7, 2003

PSEG

NRC Resident's Office

Hancock's Bridge, NJ

The above-entitled interview was conducted
at 6:05 a.m.

BEFORE:

SPECIAL AGENT EILEEN NEFF, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

ALSO PRESENT:

SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR DAN ORR

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 6:05 A.M.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is
4 November 7, 2003 and the time is approximately 6:03
5 a.m. Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC,
6 Region 1, Office of Investigations. Also present is
7 Senior Resident Inspector Dan Orr.

8 The interview is taking place at the Salem
9 Hope Creek Facility at the NRC Resident's Office and
10 the interview is with [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] 7C
11 here at Salem.

12 The subject of this interview an
13 assessment of the safety conscious work environment in
14 that concerns have been raised indicating that there's
15 potential damage to the work environment here and
16 we're asking for your assessment of that and any
17 concerns you may have regarding the work environment.

18 I explained to you before going on the
19 record, there's no subject of investigation. You're
20 being interviewed more or less as a witness regarding
21 the situation. There is no specific potential
22 violation associated with the safety conscious work
23 environment potential problems that we're looking at.

24 I placed you under oath regarding another
25 matter before going on the record here. I'll just

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1 remind you that you're still under oath in terms of
2 your answers for this interview.

3 At this point, what we have been
4 discussing were concerns that were raised in September
5 of 2002 and brought to the attention, as a group, as
6 a shift you explained. They were handled at PSEG.
7 Your expectation was that [REDACTED] had heard about
8 problems that were caused by [REDACTED] manipulating
9 a steam leak.

10 And [REDACTED] became involved, [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED] became involved trying to determine what the
12 problems were so that she more or less would be able
13 to report on where all the concerns were specifically
14 on the Salem side with the NEOs. And that was for all
15 the shifts.

16 Is that accurate?

17 [REDACTED] Mainly the Bravo shift,
18 but the problems spread out from there to other
19 shifts. I mean there's overtime and there's talk
20 amongst people and then there was other things that a
21 lot of people thought were actions not exactly best
22 suited to safety going on. But that was the catalyst
23 that caused a big ruckus at that time.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and we had
25 discussed under this other matter an e-mail that was

1 written by you to [REDACTED] on September 24, 2002.
2 And it basically is outlining going forward with the
3 concerns, how to handle them, who to poll and the
4 kinds of questions to ask to basically what you're
5 calling issues that would affect the safe operation of
6 a nuclear generating station.

7 There were concerns at that time that you
8 had and you thought others might have had something to
9 add to.

10 [REDACTED] That's correct.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As a result of that
12 interview, that particular e-mail, it looks like this
13 is September 24, 2002, the one is dated 11:30 p.m.,
14 about 5 hours later. Five and a half hours later
15 there's another e-mail and I just wanted to show you
16 this and it's dated the 25th at 4:59 a.m. And it goes
17 from you to [REDACTED] and essentially you're having
18 second thoughts on the effectiveness of what [REDACTED] was
19 planning to do.

20 Let's take a moment to review this e-mail
21 and then we can discuss it, okay?

22 [REDACTED]: Okay. Before you actually
23 go off the record, you had said "due to problems
24 because of this incident" that [REDACTED] saw it as
25 problems. I don't believe that [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED] saw it as a problem. They can sit down and
2 they can rationalize their actions and I can see their
3 point of view and again a lot of people, myself
4 included thought there was problems with [REDACTED]
5 and his supervisors, but some didn't see them as
6 problems which itself is a problem. And that's [REDACTED]
7 got word of it that we're not happy and he was trying
8 to look into it.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, he may not have
10 agreed that there was a problem. He was responding to
11 the concerns.

12 [REDACTED] That's correct.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] I don't want it to go on
15 record thinking that he said there was a problem. I
16 believe that he never said there was a problem.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

18 [REDACTED] But there might have been
19 and he was looking into it.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thanks for the
21 explanation on that.

22 It's about 6:09 a.m.

23 (Off the record.)

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on. It's
25 about 6:10 a.m.

1 This e-mail is expressing -- it's 5 hours
2 behind the other e-mail to [REDACTED] and it's
3 basically you're saying you're having second thoughts.
4 I don't think that this is going to be effective and
5 it goes on to itemize how things have been in the past
6 and why you're thinking this isn't going to be very
7 effective at this point in time, but at the bottom of
8 it you make the statement, a couple of statements of
9 interest in terms of the work environment. One is you
10 had no plans on leaving the company, even if
11 management openly gives a little in the area of safety
12 to gain monetarily.

13 What are you talking about here?

14 [REDACTED] I'm trying to find out
15 where you are here.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I'm sorry, middle of
17 that last paragraph there.

18 [REDACTED] I also understand that
19 openly I will not -- does this start with "but I"?

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I guess if we don't
21 take the whole thing out of context -- basically
22 you're saying that you're going to be available for
23 any information that's needed. You attach some
24 letters that you sent in the past regarding some of
25 the issues that were below standards and if you still

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1 have these, could we get that?

2 [REDACTED] I'll try, yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: "I have no plans on
4 leaving the company, even if management openly gives
5 a little in the area of safety to gain monetarily."

6 What are you talking about there?

7 [REDACTED] A lot of these letters I
8 write when I'm upset about something and I believe
9 what I'm trying to say here is I have no plans of
10 leaving the company. I mean I'm here for the long
11 run. I honestly believe that overall, we're not
12 posing any safety issues to the environment or to
13 people. Mostly what I talk about is we try to see how

14 close we can come to that though, but I believe the
15 place is constructed and engineered in a way that you
16 pretty much have to do something to go in that
17 direction. But in the second part of that, even if
18 management openly gives a little on the area of safety
19 to gain monetarily, I've said something like this
20 before. What I say is management picks low hanging
21 fruit. They'll pick the cheapest -- we'll take care
22 of this to make it look like they're doing something.

23 So it gives a little in the area of safety
24 meaning that they're going to chip away at the low
25 hanging fruit to make it look like there's an effort

1 to gain safety, but it says monetarily meaning a
2 little in the area of safety meaning little in the
3 area of monetary funds from them. Big issues, it
4 costs a lot of money are hard to get corrected, but
5 they -- when I say I have no plans of leaving the
6 company and above that I said something -- I will be
7 available for any information that is solicited.

8 I mean this letter I wrote to [REDACTED] after I
9 wrote this. This says I'm going to take an active
10 part in this. I'm going to start -- I'm going to do
11 a lot of stuff. I'm worked up. I see [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
12 comes across and [REDACTED] going to try to help us and I
13 honestly believe that, so when I write this first
14 letter, I'm going to jump into the mix here. I'm
15 going to be [REDACTED] helper.

16 After four hours or five hours of thinking
17 about it, thinking that this is just another impotent
18 activity that's going to happen here, I decide that I
19 usually only get myself in trouble at these times,
20 that I'll be here if [REDACTED] wants information, if [REDACTED]
21 comes to me, but I'm not going to put a lot of effort
22 into it if I don't think it's going to go anywhere.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Prior to that when
24 you say you get into trouble, down -- again, in the
25 last paragraph you're saying "I understand that

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1 'openly' I will not, cannot be asked to disregard
2 safety" -- openly in quotes -- "asked to disregard
3 safety no matter what the company's real desire is,
4 but I can for my own feeling of safe employment tone
5 down my concerns for the time being and give you and
6 [REDACTED] time to show your desires."

7 [REDACTED] I can be a pain in
8 people's asses. I mean I can -- I'll try to get these
9 other letters for you, but what I'm saying is at this
10 particular time, there was a lot of stuff going on.
11 There's a lot of animosity between me and my
12 management and [REDACTED] We're not talking and when we
13 are talking, we're arguing. But because [REDACTED] comes
14 across as such a proponent of what [REDACTED] doing, I'll
15 tone down for a while and see what goes on.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let [REDACTED] be the lead

17 --

18 [REDACTED] Let [REDACTED] be the lead and
19 see what [REDACTED] can do.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you a fear, on-
21 site, on raising a concern and being retaliated
22 against?

23 [REDACTED] I do.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is there a basis for
25 something like that happening to you?

ALL GC

1 [REDACTED] I've had an OS stand up at
2 a meeting and say "you fucker". I called him on a
3 bluff, on a lie about actions, something similar to
4 something like this and yeah, when you think about
5 your manager getting upset, the guy who writes your
6 appraisal, yeah.

7 I've never been threatened to be fired,
8 never been written up, but when the people you work
9 for don't like you, yeah, I have a fear of that.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is the OS still here?

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you still working
13 with this individual?

14 [REDACTED]: Not as directly as I was
15 at that time.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have problems
17 working with him?

18 [REDACTED] No, not at all.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Having challenged him
20 on an issue?

21 [REDACTED] No, in a group atmosphere,
22 I did it in a group atmosphere for impact and it had
23 the right impact.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, for purposes of
25 what we're trying to accomplish here, what kind of

1 issue were you raising? What did you catch him in and
2 challenge?

3  We bring up concerns. He
4 comes in and he goes "we're going to be safe. Does
5 anybody have any safety concerns?" We say yeah, we
6 have a concern. He gets his little piece of paper out
7 and you tell him. You write your signature and I'll
8 look into it.

9 Two months later I'm in a meeting. A
10 safety concern is brought up and he says how are we
11 going to fix that if you guys don't tell us about it?
12 Maybe three or four times it happened again and I was
13 fed up at the time. I said I had notes. Sometimes I
14 take notes. I said on this day we told you, and as a
15 matter of fact, you call a guy into your office and
16 you reprimanded him because he didn't bring up the
17 concern and now it's a concern and you knew about it
18 and today you're telling me we don't tell you about
19 these things.

20 And I called him on a bluff and everybody
21 in the room knew it and he got up, meeting over, "you
22 fucking guys are pissing me off", he's out of the
23 room.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who is the
25 (Inaudible)?

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[REDACTED]

(Inaudible)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: To get an idea of where the problems are, would you say that there are some OSSs that are more of the proponents of safety than others or do you have particular problems --

[REDACTED]

Until they're beaten down, I believe so.

[REDACTED]

I work for [REDACTED] now who is not that gentleman and he comes across and in the beginning he tried to do things and it was pushed back, pushed back and he tries and I believe he actually got in trouble for some of these letters I wrote. He's not keeping me busy enough so that I can do stuff like this.

I don't know exactly how it went down, but he got in trouble for that to the point where he doesn't want to hear a lot of it either. He's doing his job. When they give him a safety message to read up, that's his job.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about this other individual? Is there -- do you see there being some sort of pressure on him in order to -- why would he not respond to something he's documented and talked to someone else about? Where does that come from?

[REDACTED]

I honestly believe he

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1 would have tried to fix those issues, bring them up.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

3 [REDACTED] Then tell them we're not
4 going to do it to the point where it led to that.
5 Eventually -- he got caught, that's all.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: (Inaudible) this
7 bluff, showing that he's going to fix (Inaudible).
8 Who's involved?

9 [REDACTED] Bravo shift again. I
10 don't want to make it sound like he's a bad guy, that
11 he's the catalyst that starts things.


12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But what you have to
13 understand is we're gathering a lot of information and
14 for me to know what incident we're talking about as I
15 go across the board, I need to know who was involved
16 in certain things.

17 It may be an issue that we never have to
18 bring up again, but I'm trying to get an understanding
19 of okay, on this shift, this is what contributes these
20 concerns. It's just by way of helping us make this
21 assessment and keep it all straight.


22 [REDACTED] The (●) at the time was
23 [REDACTED] (Phonetic). He lost his temper. But I
24 believe --

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But you think is it

1 because -- why did he lose his temper? Was it because
2 you called him out on it?

3  No, because management
4 puts him in front of the guys, and tells him to come
5 down here and give these messages of safety. Tell us
6 that he's working on these things, that he knows
7 they're not working on it, to the point that the union
8 guys want them to be worked on. And he's stuck like
9 this. We're pushing up, they're pushing down and he's
10 right in the middle and he does what he can. I
11 believe he does what he can with the limited power
12 that they give these guys.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

14  And I think he blew up
15 like I blow up. He's like "fuck" you know.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's pressure from
17 both --

18  Pressure from both sides.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That just helps me to
20 get an understanding of what's going on here.

21 Do you have any more questions regarding
22 that particular issue, anything specifically?

23 MR. ORR: You didn't say what the issue
24 was about though, right? Was it personal safety?

25  Personal safety? It was

All 7c

1 a barring of the diesels.

2 MR. ORR: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] We're using these wrenches
4 that weren't designed for the task and they push. For
5 some reason they design this thing so when you engage
6 it it kicks up and we brought it up before as an issue
7 and [REDACTED] (Phonetic) got hurt. He had his
8 watch up and it hit him. He's a big guy. And he
9 brought it up and he got hurt and he didn't say
10 anything about it.

11 Someone else brought up the fact that it
12 happened to him. [REDACTED] called him into his
13 office and said you got to -- and it was almost like
14 a reprimand. When something happens, you've got tell
15 me about it, blah, blah, blah and then later on he
16 said how can I fix these problems if you guys don't
17 bring them up and that pisses me off.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. I see.

19 MR. ORR: Does that turn people away from
20 bringing up future issues?

21 [REDACTED] Yes, but not me.

22 MR. ORR: Any examples of that?

23 [REDACTED] Steam leak --

24 MR. ORR: Operators say hey, you know, I'm
25 not going to tell management about that. I'm putting

1 words in your mouth, but --

2 [REDACTED] Why should I bring it up
3 if they're not going to do anything about it, that
4 kind of attitude?

5 MR. ORR: Yes.

6 [REDACTED] It happens.

7 MR. ORR: Can you think of any specific
8 examples where somebody has said something to you that
9 said --

10 [REDACTED] It's hard. I hate
11 examples. I could have better prepared for this
12 actually.

13 MR. ORR: You can always come back, right,
14 Eileen?

15 (Off the record.)

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on the
17 record. It's about 6:25 a.m.

18 In regard to raising concerns, you kind of
19 indicated other people may have hesitated. It doesn't
20 seem that it affected you. From what you've been
21 telling us this morning, it doesn't affect you in
22 terms of raising concerns.

23 Have you experienced adverse actions, any
24 negative response as a person who has raised a
25 concern?

All 7c

1 In other words, what makes you hesitant
2 and what makes you say for my own feeling of safe
3 employment, I want to bow out of this one?

4 [REDACTED] I will never do anything
5 I feel is unsafe.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] There are things I can do
8 safer, but I'll do them the way they are. I wrote up
9 a notification two nights ago, an operator had
10 performed an unsafe actions.

11 MR. ORR: I saw it.

12 [REDACTED] That was me. And we had
13 discussed that issue before. I had thought I had
14 written a notification up and I didn't and that job
15 has to be done. It's a four hour tech spec. You've
16 got to do things that don't meet their criteria of
17 safe. But I do them.

18 If -- I will not do something I feel poses
19 me in any immediate danger, nobody here will. I don't
20 know of anybody here that will do anything that has a
21 positive/negative outcome to it.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. You got to my
23 next question in terms of people raising concerns.
24 Are you aware of anyone who would hesitate to raise a
25 nuclear safety concern?


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
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 Yes, but not if it's a major concern. It might be something that's procedure. It's kind of foggy. What are they looking for here? It's a concern, but it's not going to be a bad thing.


SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where would you see the hesitancy?

 Here's one for you, diesel generator, 24 hour run. We proved that this thing will hold a load for 24 hours for tech specs. We wrote our tech spec which is the bible and it says you'll do this every year, but we do it before we take the diesel apart. What does that prove? That's ridiculous to run it for 24 hours to prove it will hold a load before you do your major maintenance on it. That's a safety concern that involves tech specs. I think it's a dead issue.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A dead issue, why? Has somebody addressed it or questioned it?

 Yes. Numerous people have.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And it goes?

 That's the way the industry is going now. We've got to make our outages shorter. We have to stay competitive in the market.

1 We're going to take those actions.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that part of what
3 you were referring to before about deregulation?

4 [REDACTED] Yes.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Remaining competitive
6 in the market?

7 [REDACTED] Yes.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You also made a
9 comment about deregulation limiting the actions of
10 some people and you were talking I think at the OS
11 level, that people feel their limits.

12 [REDACTED] When OS first comes in, he
13 has his mind on how he's going to run things. He's
14 hired, he believes he's hired because they've
15 researched him, they want his kind of person here. He
16 comes in, tries to do some things that cost too much
17 money or would take too much time. They shut him
18 down. He tries. They shut him down. Eventually, he
19 finds out what they really want and now that's where
20 he's at. He's operating between the lines that they
21 now give him.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you're saying
23 this would be at the OS level we hear more about that,
24 the between the lines that they're --

25 [REDACTED] No, it's all levels, but

25
1 it's easier to see there because these guys are.
2 Service water 405P, [REDACTED] might have brought this up,
3 but [REDACTED] a notification up. The procedure was
4 trying to unconservatively take account of a flow that
5 was leaking by a valve. This valve leaked so bad it
6 pressurized the whole header. The lines had already
7 filled and vented before they were supposed to be
8 filled and vented. They're shooting out at system
9 pressure now toward the actual vented lines that were
10 restricting flow. There's no way to measure that
11 flow, how much leak by there is now. And so they --

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And this incident was
13 when?

14 [REDACTED] All last year. All last
15 year. That's W17s. One of them was leaking by.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All last year,
17 everything that we're talking about?

18 [REDACTED] No, the service water
19 405Ps. The test we prove these pumps operable with.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Go ahead.

21 MR. ORR: Was there anything done
22 nonconservative on those calculations?

23 [REDACTED] The calculation assumed
24 the flow was leading -- you were leaking into the
25 other header.

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MR. ORR: Right.

[REDACTED] But you never compared the two headers' pressures together. That flow could have been leaking in.

MR. ORR: Okay.

[REDACTED] And then you assumed the flow was X amount.

MR. ORR: Yes.

[REDACTED] There was no way for them to determine the flow because what you're seeing as a leak now isn't the actual leak because it's limited by the -- where that water could escape that pipe. That pipe was up to the other header's pressure.

MR. ORR: Right, right.

[REDACTED] I've got to find that letter too.

MR. ORR: Okay.

[REDACTED] I explained it better at the time.

MR. ORR: Okay. All right. I'm sorry to interrupt you.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No, no.

MR. ORR: One other thing. On buying the diesel generators, you talked about a method where you used to use a wrench.

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[REDACTED]

Correct.

MR. ORR: Now you guys use the (Inaudible) and depress the tops of them?

[REDACTED]

Correct.

MR. ORR: Was there any hesitancy in going to that method?

[REDACTED]

It took years to go to that method. As much as it was unsafe, it took years to do that because they felt it dabbled in preconditioning.

MR. ORR: Okay.

[REDACTED]

And the valve --

MR. ORR: Okay, that was their concern and maybe this is preconditioning and we need to use the other method.

[REDACTED]

Right.


MR. ORR: Okay.

[REDACTED]


So we knew we had a safety issue, but we're going to ignore that because we can't think of a better thing to do now.

Now they know it's a safety issue. This thing is kicking up with a force enough to break your ribs. Small guys can't do it. You can only put big guys on and a big guy almost did get hurt, but it still took years for them to do anything about it.


1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We had -- let
2 me just check this. Before you made a comment you
3 were talking about how you see it as the plant and the
4 people at the plant operate safely. And your comment
5 was along the lines of you think you remain safe, but
6 it's pushed.

7  You accept risks.


8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You try to see how
9 close you can come to remaining safe. And this is in
10 terms of public safety. Are there incidents that come
11 to your mind that would indicate to you that you
12 either, you learned about it, saw or felt or heard
13 pressure or directives in which it was an issue of
14 production over safety or if you don't -- it's been
15 referred to as megawatt mentality or pushing the edges
16 of conservative decision making to nonconservative
17 decision making.

18  Every incident we've
19 talked about.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All of these go --

21  All of these go --

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So it's more than
23 just it takes too long to fix things and they
24 recognize --

25  This goes to the steam

1 leak. Hours and hours they spent trying to figure out
2 how they're going to keep the unit alive, how they're
3 going to stop this leak instead of the obvious safe --
4 and this leak was so bad the OS said we're going to
5 shut the unit down. He makes a few phone calls, gets
6 a hold of the [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] and now it's not
7 we're going to shut the unit down. Now it's what can
8 we do? We've got a leak --

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] was that [REDACTED]
10 (Phonetic)?

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] Yes, it was. [REDACTED] was
14 the [REDACTED] who was immediately taken out of the control
15 position, I believe. This is my opinion, by [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] who showed up. Now [REDACTED] is running
17 the show. I'm sure he's talking to his boss.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was [REDACTED] removed
19 mid-shift or something?

20 [REDACTED] Not removed. He's not
21 removed. He's the [REDACTED] He runs the department.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just the fact that
23 [REDACTED] shows up.

24 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] shows up, his
25 boss.

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

[REDACTED]

So now the plan is no longer to shut the unit down as soon as we can in a safe manner, it's we can live with this. We'll look for a way. We're talking money here and we shut the place down, but can we fix it? We have to have maintenance go out and look at it.

I never actually saw people looking at it. They said people looked at it and I'm sure they did, but it wasn't an everybody on board type of thing. It was the middle of the night. There's not many people here. They did everything they could to stall to the point where the group bus has started experiencing shorts from water getting in there. Now we can't shut down because we can't trust that equipment to do what it's got to do during the shut down.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Had [REDACTED] been

here on shift or did he arrive after this event occurred? Was he here scheduled?

[REDACTED]

That's a toughy.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I just don't --

[REDACTED]

I think maybe he arrived, but maybe he was here. But they waited long enough to where they couldn't shut the place down safely, whereas they could have if they acted immediately.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

2 [REDACTED] That's an example.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

4 [REDACTED] The BF19s, how long --
5 we're talking they had sledge hammers out there
6 wailing on this thing. They tried air, everything.
7 How long does it take to figure out if a valve is
8 stuck? The mentality is don't shut down, stall, do
9 whatever you can to fix it without shutting down.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The BF19s is fairly
11 well documented? You don't need anything further on
12 that, right?

13 MR. ORR: Yes, it's in this inspection
14 period. Yes.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Anything else
16 then, [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED] Well, the circ. water.
18 Circ. water grass.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The grassing.

20 [REDACTED] Yes, grassing. We lose
21 one circulator one day. The next day it's two
22 circulators. It's three circulators. There's four.
23 The NCO -- I'm not an NCO, but I understand it's real
24 tough to keep this place going with no heat sink.
25 That's the nature of nuclear power. But when those

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1 guys came out of a bad grass hit and everybody is
2 starting to breathe now, the power is coming back up,
3 the grass is letting up because the tide changed,
4 these guys are heroes. Good job, pat on the back.
5 Fantastic, great.

6 Next shift comes in. Now we went down to
7 one circulator for 15 minutes. Bam, pat on the back.
8 You did a good job. It got so bad. We all know what
9 happened. But management mentality pushed them right
10 there. They were driven there.

11 What would you have thought in the middle
12 of all this, one of us comes and goes grass shutdown,
13 bam. Taking it off line. The grass -- he'd be
14 looking for a job.

15 Yet there's a big plaque outside the
16 control room that says "we, the licensed operators,
17 will take conservation actions." It speaks for
18 itself.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

20 [REDACTED] And I say if the wrong
21 people get this information --

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think it was in
23 your first one on the 24th.

24 [REDACTED] I thought it was the
25 second one.

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's in the middle of that first one.

[REDACTED] "Should adding outside influence get word of it"? The Sunbeam wrote a story up, get one of their creative writers in there, write this story up about how this place, a situation like grassing, the BF19. Salem, bam, front line newspaper. One of the four generators was uncontrolled, was in an uncontrolled operation for 7 hours. We're using blow down, the control level. You don't do that. The procedure is not for that. But they could write it up to where the Society Against Nuclear Power gets a hold of it. They change the words a little bit. That could be my job.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Those are the kind of incidents that are contributing to what you're documenting here.

When was that last grassing, the date on that?

MR. ORR: Well, it reoccurs every spring.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is it May?

[REDACTED]: That was a bad year. We're talking five or six years ago.

MR. ORR: That was the worst they've had.

[REDACTED] What happened was --

1 MR. ORR: You're talking about the 1994
2 incident, right?

3 [REDACTED] Right. That's coming
4 back. You just said last year was bad. It gets so
5 bad, they lose so much cooling the power level comes
6 down and in 1994 they dipped below levels of 7
7 percent.

8 MR. ORR: I just don't remember.

9 [REDACTED] It dipped below P7. They
10 saved the place. I mean getting ready for the old pat
11 on the back, the power starts coming up. They forgot.
12 They have intermediate range or something. I'm not a
13 licensed operator, but they came up above a certain
14 power level without resetting the trip and bam, took
15 the unit out. One of the relief valves sticks on
16 this, on the pressurizer, pops the --

17 MR. ORR: Yes, it was a bad transient.

18 [REDACTED] It happened twice a day
19 for two months until -- every high tide, every low
20 tide.

21 MR. ORR: Yes.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Any other incidents
23 that go into that kind of pressure, those types of
24 issues? Anything we haven't discussed yet?


25 [REDACTED] I'm certain there are.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I know you indicated,
2 you said you could have been better prepared for this.
3 Do you think you want some more time or do you think
4 we're getting there?

5  We're getting there. I
6 mean I'll have to print out these memos that I have
7 written in the past.

8 Understand I'm a pretty sarcastic guy at
9 times. It would be comical, everybody reads it.
10 Calculus was a funny one. State of the station was
11 another funny one. In state of the station I wrote up
12 not major issues like the BF19, but issues that have
13 been around for years and they still exist. And I
14 have like a 3-page article, a 3-page thing that makes
15 like a Saturday Night Live thing out of the whole
16 thing, like the boiler. Just paint it. We'll get to
17 that 10 years from now or something like that.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What's the difference
19 here with the safety concerns doc and the plant safety
20 issues doc?

21  Plant safety issues are
22 more serious. When I outline my top five safety
23 issues, personnel safety I believe that one is. Plant
24 safety is -- I have to look at them again.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you have SAP

1 safety issues.

2 [REDACTED] SAP is just crap.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Tagging?

4 [REDACTED] SAP is a tool that's not
5 used. I don't like it. It's too complicated.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What we're
7 understanding is it's not user friendly. It's hard to
8 find notifications when they're in there and track
9 them all the way through resolution.

10 [REDACTED] I log on. I bring up a
11 safety concern that I brought up maybe a year ago.
12 It's an active thing, but you don't know what they're
13 doing. I can't find, I can't look in there and find
14 out what's being done. I went to the [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED] about one and he's on the [REDACTED] I
16 said what are they doing? At that time he couldn't
17 figure it out.

18 There are subscreens. You go to another
19 subscreen. I asked for a simple Excel file out there
20 that people can go into and find out what the top 20
21 concerns are and the actual, what they're doing, the
22 time tables and they will not provide it.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Had you ever seen one
24 of your own or heard of an issue or notification that
25 gets input and disappears, somehow is removed from the

1 process?

2 [REDACTED] That's a toughy. Like
3 this ventilation one. The CAV, I could have sworn
4 [REDACTED] before. It's not there. I don't know.
5 Yes. A supervisor was fired, [REDACTED] because he
6 cleaned the system out. The system got so bad with
7 this leaks, that leaks, this needs painting,
8 insulation missing. It got so bad that he did a dump
9 and I believe he was told to do that. A lot of people
10 complained about it and he ended up losing his job.
11 I believe because of it.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He just dumped the
13 issues. They weren't resolved, they were just
14 removed?

15 [REDACTED]: Not so much safety issues,
16 but plant deficiencies. Safety issues I'm sure were
17 in that dumpage, but they just went in there and --

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When did that happen?

19 [REDACTED] Three years ago maybe,
20 four years ago, I don't know.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED] And he had been an [REDACTED] at
23 one time.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He was an [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED] At that time he was part

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1 of maintenance doing something.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything else like
3 that?

4 [REDACTED] I know the one [REDACTED]
5 about challenging the -- yeah. Happy wake up thing --

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The error traps?
7 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the error
8 traps. That was closed out because we're not going to
9 try to avoid error traps. The only thing we might do
10 is train you on them. That's closed out and I don't
11 know why they closed it out.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Tell me a little bit
13 more about that. You said that your example was that
14 --

15 [REDACTED] I came into work --

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They did something,
17 they were testing something. They were testing
18 errors.

19 [REDACTED] Minor maintenance was
20 performed on a diesel which puts them into like a
21 72-hour tech spec. And at 6 o'clock there's a
22 mentality that each shift wants to get as many beans
23 in. The more stuff they get done, the better they
24 look.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When did this happen,

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MR. ORR: Can you give us the notification number?

[REDACTED] A year or two years ago. I could probably find that for you. A year or two years ago. And if I find the notification, you'll have the date, but I came into work right away --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You said something that you get credit for beans on a shift. So testing on a shift?

[REDACTED] If the supervisor signs off, he started this procedure, it looks good for him.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[REDACTED] His shift is getting work done. Anyway, I come into work --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you see a problem with starting a procedure that you don't finish on shift?

[REDACTED] Yes. A complicated procedure such as running a diesel, synchronizing, blah, blah.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It depends on the procedure?

[REDACTED] You start it, if it's sitting watching air pressure in a tank bleed off,

1 that's not a big deal, but I don't believe you should
2 do it anyway because people's minds aren't on the job.
3 It pisses them off which is more (Inaudible) on the
4 job.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Does it happen a lot?
6 The testing is started in order to get this credit,
7 this point?


8  Yes, I believe it happens
9 a lot. A lot of times we'll be finished up and it
10 doesn't actually go through turnover. They push it.
11 That one there was specifically, they knew it was
12 going through turnover.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Had you seen it
14 cause, practicing like this, any kind of safety-
15 related problem?

16 I know you questioned this diesel
17 incident, the fact that they even tested.

18  That was close. I'll
19 stick to that one because I know that one.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

21  I came in working 7 at
22 night until 7 in the morning. I show up to work. I'm
23 always an early guy. I come here quarter after 6, 45
24 minutes early. I walk in the door and expect to sit
25 down have you coffee, whatever. And we need you to go

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1 down and relieve the diesel. What happened? Nothing
2 happened. Maintenance gave it back to us and there
3 was a hold up a little bit on tagging or something,
4 but we start -- we sent two guys down there to run it.
5 It takes two guys to do this. I'm thinking is it
6 running already? No, it's not running. They're down
7 there now starting it. I'm like why would you want to
8 do that? They're gaining 45 minutes. They're nowhere
9 near their 72 hour tech spec yet, but they say, they
10 try to limit that time. I can understand that, but
11 now I have to explain some safety.

12 I go down, [REDACTED] he's down there
13 going through all the pre-start checks. He's going to
14 start it. I take relief from him. I'm way early.
15 Normally, he would have been halfway through starting
16 it, loading it when his relief showed up. They
17 couldn't get me a relief upstairs. The supervisor is
18 down there. It's a noisy area, not conducive to
19 proper turnover briefing. And I challenged that in a
20 notification saying we know better, we should stop
21 this. And they blew me off.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who is they?

23 [REDACTED] Probably [REDACTED]
24 level, but it turned out to be [REDACTED] who talked to
25 me about it saying we're not going to try to avoid

1 error traps, if we can train us to handle error traps.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] Which is detrimental to
4 nuclear safety. We should do everything we can to
5 prevent -- they gave us a book with the Titanic
6 (Phonetic) and all this other stuff to read. You see
7 that stuff. It's monetary. It's going to cost money
8 to fix it. Let's not fix it. Let's go to the next
9 outage.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about from --
11 [REDACTED] Forty-five more minutes to
12 a 72 hour tech spec.


13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How valid is that
14 statement in terms of we won't train to avoid them if
15 we can train you to handle them. Is that the case?
16 Do you get training in this area?

17 [REDACTED] They train us that they
18 exist as far as it really goes. Not what to do. What
19 can you do? It's half hour to eat. It's digesting
20 food. You're not really -- what do you do? You can't
21 do anything. But you'll sit up there and you'll -- so
22 it's bam, go up and see him, I've got a job for you.
23 Filling in containment, hanging up the pressurizer, it
24 doesn't matter to them. It's a job. You're a machine
25 to do a job and they'll use you as long as you're

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1 able. As long as you're not broken.


2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

3  It cost money to change
4 oil. Maybe I can get away with it for never change
5 oil and if the thing breaks at 80,000 miles instead of
6 150,000, I'll deal with it then. It's not productive
7 to give the guy a half hour to sit and wait. It's not
8 productive to eat 45 minutes on a tech spec. That's
9 --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Anything else?
11 Do you have anything else you'd like to add to it?

12  No. I'll print this stuff
13 out. And a lot of this stuff I write up, you might
14 have a lot more than this. You've talked to me for
15 the last two hours. I get hot headed and I get
16 excited. I like my job. I try to do the right thing.
17 It's frustrating to be told that that wall is yellow,
18 but as soon as I'm done being told that, they treated
19 it as blue. I believe there's a lot of stuff toward
20 safety is just a show that we're here for the money.
21 This is all about money.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this what goes
23 back to where you say the problem isn't here on the
24 island, the people on the island are trying to --

25  People on the island -- I

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1 respect [REDACTED] I respect [REDACTED] I've
2 worked with them. I've known [REDACTED] since he was [REDACTED]
3 He's not the same guy he was. I mean [REDACTED] isn't
4 the same guy he was two years ago. I saw a lot of
5 effort from all these guys. If Kim Harvin was still
6 working here, if she had made the transformation into
7 knowing what her real limits are as opposed to what
8 her published or written limits were, she'd be the
9 same way.

10 I have a lot of respect that she tried to
11 do the right thing and they said I sent you down there
12 to do your job. You're supposed to give me
13 information, now go away. I'll do what I want to do.
14 She's like no, these are guys looking for information.
15 I've got to tell them something. I may be even, came
16 right out and said they're not going to do anything.

17 I mean you're supposed to go down there
18 and placate these guys. Make them think there's this
19 big project that's going to make it safer, but there
20 really isn't.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's take a quick
22 break.

23 [REDACTED] Okay.

24 (Off the record.)

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on the

1 record. It's approximately 6:50 a.m. What you were
2 just saying you were talking about Kim Harvin and
3 where she actually became aware of the way you were
4 putting it was what she was going to be able to do as
5 opposed to what --

6 [REDACTED] I assume, I assumed that.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you know anything,
8 do you have any --

9 [REDACTED] I honestly believe she
10 thought she was here for the purpose of getting us and
11 upper management was going to take these actions based
12 on her interviews with us.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.


14 [REDACTED] And having been here for
15 [REDACTED] I can say that our concerns aren't all going
16 to be addressed. There's going to be -- these guys
17 are whining, it's their job and valid point. But I
18 believe she got a little upset, the fact that they
19 might have lied to her saying that they were going to
20 act on all of them. They didn't. I don't think they
21 acted on any.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Did you have
23 any conversations with anyone in management regarding
24 the decisions made on that? We covered particularly
25 regarding the concerns that she fronted or that were

1 given to her. But in terms of her employment here,
2 did you have any conversations with anyone in
3 management as to why she was no longer here?

4  No. This was probably
5 months after she was -- I guess what you're saying is
6 fired. I assume that's what happened. I didn't know
7 about it. We didn't have any connections with --


8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

9  I assume she still worked
10 here until someone said -- this was all --
11 interesting.


12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You didn't know that
13 until today?

14  Not today, when all this
15 started happening, I guess you had tried to contact me
16 like a couple of weeks ago, trying to --

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

18  Until the first interview
19 happened, I didn't know she was even fired.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right, we're
21 looking at -- you're kind of indicating that maybe you
22 could do a little more prep on some document and it
23 might be valuable to have some more time. We'll make
24 another appointment then and just do a follow-up?

25  That's fine. And as I

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1 say, I'll just give you some stuff that I have written
2 down and maybe you'll have some more questions. What
3 I'll do is I'll try to get this information together.
4 I'll drop it off at this office. I'll give you a
5 chance to look at it and maybe next Friday --

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right, we can set up
7 something tentatively for me to look at it and then
8 after I look at it I can talk to you about it.

9 [REDACTED] I'll drop it off to you in
10 this office on Monday and we'll -- I'll see you on
11 Thursday, before the next days off because I'm back on
12 (Inaudible) and I know you don't like waking up early.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is it that obvious?

14 (Laughter.)

15 Dan, do you have any questions right now?

16 MR. ORR: Is there any names that can help
17 us with 14BF19? I don't know if you had any first
18 hand experience with 14BF19.

19 [REDACTED] I was here that night.
20 That spanned to a couple of shifts. Licensed
21 operators in the control room I heard were complaining
22 about the way they had to control the plant. [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED] (Phonetic) (Inaudible) talked to him once,
24 saying how it's not the easiest thing in the world to
25 control steam generator level at power using blow

1 down. It was tough.

2 MR. ORR: Yes, yes, it was.

3 [REDACTED] Again, he never thought
4 that there was any major danger to the people.

5 MR. ORR: Okay.

6 [REDACTED] He said something that I
7 actually came back and said well, you're the license
8 operator, you can always ask to be relieved and leave
9 the control room.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you remember when
11 you saw him?

12 [REDACTED] No.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

14 (Phonetic)?

15 [REDACTED] Yes.


16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, anybody else?

17 [REDACTED] No, I didn't talk to many
18 other COs about it. But I was in the field. There
19 was a lot of grumbling about it. Here we are, pretty
20 major piece of equipment is not working and they got
21 dead weight blow hammers slamming on this thing as
22 hard as they can. To me that is not safe. It brings
23 you right back to doing main steam testing on the
24 roof, the valve testing, the bypass valves around the
25 MS28s, vinyl ones I believe they are. They stick a


1 lot. They go up there with big dead blow hammers and
2 hit them as hard as they can. I don't even like being
3 in the area.

4 We're talking about main steam line valve
5 hitting it with the heaviest hammer you can hit it
6 with and it breaks, if you're in that enclosure,
7 you're dead. We shouldn't operate with valves that
8 operate like that. That's every day -- for a long
9 time that was -- you'd expected that. They go into
10 that test knowing that they got -- they already have
11 the hammer at pre-stage, the guys who are going to hit
12 it. Is that nuclear safety? Is that personnel
13 safety? All of it goes back to nuclear safety.

14 MR. ORR: These are main steam reheat
15 valves, right?

16  MS28s, the stop valve
17 going into the high pressure turbine. The valve slams
18 shut. The bypass is suppose to open up so that you
19 can open the main valve up. The bypass sticks.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This was been going
21 -- you say it goes on for a while?

22  That's been going on for
23 a while.

24 Actually, I believe they just now got that
25 fixed. We'll see it when we come out of the outage.

1 This is Unit 2.

2 MR. ORR: Yes.

3 [REDACTED] That's a scary thing. I
4 mean there's a lot -- how many pounds of steam at what
5 temperature and you've got a guy sitting there, bam.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why don't we do this,
7 we'll talk further when we meet next week.

8 [REDACTED] Okay.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Continue it. I want
10 to visit time pressure.

11 [REDACTED] That's fine. It's my
12 quitting time now.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I thank you for your
14 time.

15 (Whereupon, at 6:50 a.m., the interview
16 was concluded.)

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
25

All TC

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of



Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Hancock's Bridge, NJ

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.

Francesca Zook

Francesca Zook
Official Transcriber
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