

**Official Transcript of Proceedings**  
**NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

Title:

*X* Interview of [REDACTED]

*7C*

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey

Date: Thursday, November 6, 2003

Work Order No.: NRC-1217

Pages 1-55

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
+ + + + +  
OFFICE OF THE INVESTIGATIONS  
INTERVIEW

-----X

IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF :

[REDACTED]

TC

Docket No.  
1-2003-051F

(CLOSED) :

-----X

Thursday, November 6, 2003

PSEG

NRC Resident's Office

Hancock's Bridge, NJ

The above-entitled interview was conducted  
at 5:25 a.m.

BEFORE:

SPECIAL AGENT EILEEN NEFF, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

ALSO PRESENT:

SENIOR PROJECT ENGINEER SCOTT BARBER

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 5:25 A.M.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is  
4 November 6, 2003. The time is approximately 5:25 a.m.  
5 Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC,  
6 Region 1, Office of Investigations. Also present is  
7 Region 1, Senior Project Engineer Scott Barber.

8 What follows will be an interview with

9 [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]

11 The subject matter of this interview  
12 concerns the safety conscious work environment, the  
13 safety culture at Salem. This is an assessment being  
14 conducted by Region 1. It does not have a potential  
15 specific violation associated with it. There is no  
16 subject of investigation. Is that all understood for  
17 you?

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What I would like to  
20 do is place you under oath at this point. If you  
21 would raise your right hand. Do you swear that the  
22 testimony you're about to provide is the truth, the  
23 whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?

24 [REDACTED] Yes.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For the record if you

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1 would state your full name and provide your date of  
2 birth and Social Security Number.

3 [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED] What else do you need?

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Social, please.

6 [REDACTED]

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and a work  
8 telephone number?

9 [REDACTED]

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And home telephone  
11 number.

12 [REDACTED]

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Let me start  
14 with this. My understanding of the events that led us  
15 to this interview is that you had learned of the  
16 assessment that Region 1 was doing regarding the  
17 safety culture. And I got word that you wanted to be  
18 interviewed?

19 [REDACTED] That's correct.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Then when we met this 7C  
21 morning just a little while ago, you gave me a  
22 summary, it looks like a number of issues. It's a  
23 page that you prepared. It's dated 11/6/03 for this  
24 meeting specifically with me. And you've got  
25 observations of plant management, issues regarding

1 schedule pressure. It's a one-page document,  
2 basically.

3 [REDACTED] That's correct.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's start with it,  
5 what is it, that you had concerns regarding the  
6 culture and I know that these are more specific  
7 issues, what would you say, if you have concerns,  
8 where your concerns focus regarding the safety  
9 culture?

10 [REDACTED] Where the management focus  
11 lies. I can break this down. Picking on long-term  
12 plant deficiencies. I don't know if it's a money  
13 issue, the plant has been around for 25, 26 -- running  
14 for 25, 26 years, how difficult it is to get parts, I  
15 don't know about that. But certain things that tend  
16 to go on forever that you probably wouldn't do in your  
17 own home. TC

18 I have an example of the Unit 1 boric acid  
19 batch tank level device. If one was to look at it  
20 right now, you'd see that it's a piece of Tigon tube.  
21 Now when something breaks, I don't expect the company  
22 to have the part on hand right away, but if you look  
23 at the documentation behind the notification and the  
24 order number, you'll find out that the plan to fix  
25 this goes way back and so how far back? And that's

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1 why I know this is specifically about safety, but if  
2 I want to look a problem up because I walk around the  
3 plant, that's my job.

4 My job is to find things that are wrong  
5 and report them and then to have a system where I can  
6 look to see what's the progress. And that's why I  
7 mentioned -- I have listed here SAP.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: SAP system?

9 ~~REDACTED~~ SAP system. And I wrote  
10 down here, "you have to learn the secrets of how to  
11 research previously identified equipment deficiencies.  
12 What I mean is when you use that system, it isn't --  
13 you have to -- it's almost like one of those kid's  
14 video games where you have to know where all the  
15 little blips are to find the key messages.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're hearing that  
17 the SAP just, in general, is just not user friendly.

18 ~~REDACTED~~ I'll tell you what, maybe  
19 that could be one thing, but if there is an ability  
20 for the people that manage this system to make it  
21 difficult for me to supply the information I need,  
22 then it becomes a problem for me. It's not just okay,  
23 ~~REDACTED~~ we need you to go out and identify problems.

24 Well, okay, if I've identified the problem  
25 and it's been there for who know how long and then I

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1 can't figure out what the plant is, then I'm stuck.  
2 So if it is a -- the batch tank is part of the CVCS  
3 system which is a --

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, you're saying  
5 that the people that manage the system and they make  
6 it difficult to find what you need to do to do your  
7 job, who specifically is managing that? Is there  
8 anybody you can control?

9 [REDACTED] I don't know if it's the --  
10 what they call IT, Information Technology. I don't  
11 know.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Whoever controls and  
13 supports the system?

14 [REDACTED] Right.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What kind of training  
16 did you have on it?

17 [REDACTED] Well, we get training on it,  
18 but it's not specific to everything, you know what I  
19 mean? It's like, first of all, we used to have a  
20 system, a computerized system called MMIS and I forget  
21 what the acronym stands for, but MMIS. I can get  
22 through that thing and find whatever I need. I can go  
23 back to 1963, if I had to. You know what I'm saying?  
24 I can get there. I can -- and if I'm writing a new  
25 work order or a new notification, I can give them a

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1 complete history on that component, whereas now, it's  
2 strange. You have to pull up the screen looking for  
3 what the problems are and it's like nothing is there.  
4 But if it's the fact that I need more training, then  
5 certainly. But I don't think it should be that  
6 un-user friendly.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you say you pull  
8 it up and you're trying to find out what the problems  
9 are, but nothing is there, is it that it's there, but  
10 it takes longer to find it?

11 [REDACTED] I don't --

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you known that  
13 there's a problem that exists that just doesn't get  
14 you into the system?

15 [REDACTED] Yes, that's correct, second  
16 part.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That there are  
18 problems that exist that don't get entered into SAP?

19 [REDACTED] As far as how I know how to  
20 use that system, all right? But even if I go to a  
21 supervisor, it just looks nefarious for anybody -- if  
22 I go to a supervisor. He's got say try here or try  
23 there. You shouldn't have to try 18 different spots  
24 to find out if anything is written. It should be  
25 clear.

1                   SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:     Right, and I  
2 understand what you're saying, but in issues if you  
3 can't find it and you know that there's a problem  
4 existing and you think a notification was written, has  
5 it been that it didn't exist or was it just that you  
6 didn't look in 17 of the 18 spots?

7                   [REDACTED]     Second thing.

8                   SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:     You will find it  
9 eventually, is that what you're saying?

10                  [REDACTED]     I'm saying maybe, if you  
11 look at all those 17 or 18 or however many sports  
12 there are.

13                  SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:     Okay.

14                  [REDACTED]     I'm not even sure how many  
15 spots there are to tell you the truth.

16                  SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:     Let me ask you this  
17 way. Are you aware of any instances where there are  
18 problems with equipment or anything that should have  
19 been entered into the system from a safety perspective  
20 that didn't get entered into the system?

21                  [REDACTED]     No, not specifically. It's  
22 just that -- well --

23                  MR. BARBER:     If we could, I'd like to  
24 explore some of these issues you have written down  
25 here?

1 [REDACTED] Okay. You were talking, the  
2 first thing you mentioned was you were talking about  
3 a temporary mod for the Unit 1 boric acid batch tank.  
4 It sounds like you're going about some Tigon tube?

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 MR. BARBER: They're using Tigon instead  
7 of whatever the installed instrumentation --

8 [REDACTED] Yes, that's correct.

9 MR. BARBER: I'm presuming from the way  
10 you describe that that's been a long-standing problem.

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 MR. BARBER: It's been around for a long  
13 time?

14 [REDACTED] Over a year. Over probably  
15 a year and a half. But the thing is -- here you go  
16 again. I don't like the idea of something being long-  
17 term to begin with and then if you have -- I'm not  
18 going to use the word audacity, I shouldn't do that.  
19 Audacity. To proceduralize that, it's like taking it  
20 to the next step. It is, in my mind --

21 MR. BARBER: Do you happen to know, is  
22 there still a temp. mod outstanding on this?

23 [REDACTED] Oh yes.

24 MR. BARBER: If I went to a temp. mod log  
25 would it show this?

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1 [REDACTED] You can walk right in the  
2 plant right now.

3 MR. BARBER: No, no, I believe that I  
4 could see it, but if I looked in the log would it show  
5 it? Because sometimes what happens is if you  
6 proceduralize a temp mod, if you take it out of the  
7 temp mod book, you say --

8 [REDACTED] Oh, I see what you're  
9 saying.

10 MR. BARBER: You've kind of made it a part  
11 of the installed plant equipment.

12 [REDACTED] Then I would have to ask you  
13 guys, but you see, this is a two way interview or a  
14 one way interview?

15 MR. BARBER: No, I mean.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For clarification, go  
17 ahead and ask your question.

18 [REDACTED] For a simple level device,  
19 to make it a T mod (Phonetic) --

20 MR. BARBER: No, the T mod would be Tigon  
21 2, in place of that.

22 [REDACTED] Okay, well then how long is  
23 too long or how long is customary or how long -- I  
24 don't know, but certainly over a year. TC

25 MR. BARBER: It's supposed to be

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1 commensurate with the safety significance.  
2 [REDACTED] It's a batch tank --  
3 MR. BARBER: Again, we would have to  
4 review it before making any judgment about it. How  
5 about the second item, is that service water four or  
6 five P surveillance versus service water 17 leakage?  
7 [REDACTED] Oh yes. Well, you'd have to  
8 --  
9 MR. BARBER: I'm not familiar with the 17.  
10 What is --  
11 [REDACTED] Okay, the service water  
12 base, the valves that connect one base to the other  
13 are the 17s.  
14 MR. BARBER: Okay.  
15 [REDACTED] That's a good thing, so you  
16 can share.  
17 But in the case where you have one of  
18 those bays gets a leak, you then want to isolate from  
19 the other bay and that's where the 17s come in.  
20 MR. BARBER: Okay.  
21 [REDACTED] So when you're doing a 405  
22 P on a service water pump, those 17s play a big part.  
23 MR. BARBER: Okay.  
24 [REDACTED] And if they leak, if they  
25 leak.

1 MR. BARBER: Aren't they normally kept  
2 open?  
3 [REDACTED] Normally kept open, right.  
4 MR. BARBER: Okay.  
5 [REDACTED] But during a test, it's not,  
6 right.  
7 MR. BARBER: There's two in parallel?  
8 [REDACTED] One on each bay so it's like  
9 a double --  
10 MR. BARBER: I should say two in series.  
11 [REDACTED] In series, right.  
12 MR. BARBER: Two in series.  
13 [REDACTED] That's correct.  
14 MR. BARBER: So you're saying if both of  
15 those valves are shut and there's a potential you  
16 could have a leak through to both of them?  
17 [REDACTED] That's correct.  
18 MR. BARBER: Okay.  
19 [REDACTED] And if you do, then it's  
20 affecting the pump run that you're surveilling.  
21 MR. BARBER: That's true.  
22 [REDACTED] And so they have  
23 proceduralized a long-standing problem. It's the  
24 leakage. I'll try to explain. You'd have to look at  
25 the procedure.

1 MR. BARBER: I think I have, actually.  
2 For some reason I think I've gone through this before.  
3 [REDACTED] INPO has made it a big  
4 issue, blah, blah, blah. But it's been around a long  
5 time and they actually have proceduralized a method  
6 now whereas we're going to measure the leakage and the  
7 leakage at one point was so bad that the pipe that was  
8 carrying the leakage to the sump wasn't really big  
9 enough to handle the flow.

10 MR. BARBER: All right.  
11 [REDACTED] All right? And then they  
12 go on in the back of the procedure and they make a  
13 chart.

14 MR. BARBER: Okay.  
15 [REDACTED] It's going to correct the  
16 head by .0 something and you can't even read .0  
17 something on the gauge that you're reading.

18 MR. BARBER: Okay.  
19 [REDACTED] You understand what I'm  
20 saying?

21 MR. BARBER: Yes, I think I do.  
22 [REDACTED] How far do you take that?

23 MR. BARBER: Okay.  
24 [REDACTED] So long-standing issue --

25 MR. BARBER: Well, this could be

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1 something. We have to look into it. Okay. Because  
2 it affects the ability of the system to function  
3 during accident conditions and that could be an issue.  
4 [REDACTED] Well, the reason you do pump  
5 surveillance is to make sure the pump is --  
6 MR. BARBER: Put out an adequate flow.  
7 [REDACTED]: Right.  
8 MR. BARBER: During design basis  
9 conditions.  
10 [REDACTED]: Right.  
11 MR. BARBER: Okay.  
12 [REDACTED] So if it's the big cost item  
13 to fix the 17s and I bet it would be because that's  
14 taking a whole bay out, but hey, I'm not the money  
15 guy.  
16 MR. BARBER: Okay. Do you know how big  
17 those valves are?  
18 [REDACTED] Big.  
19 MR. BARBER: Are they?  
20 [REDACTED] I don't know, big.  
21 MR. BARBER: Like 20 inch, something like  
22 that?  
23 [REDACTED] Real big.  
24 MR. BARBER: Are those butterflies?  
25 [REDACTED] Yes.

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1 MR. BARBER: Okay. How about this next  
2 item you mention, you said use of additional receipts  
3 to monitor plant deficiencies instead of plant  
4 equipment.

5 [REDACTED] Right, the instance that I  
6 mention there is 3 Unit. 3 Unit is the gas turbine.

7 MR. BARBER: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] The gas turbine becomes real  
9 important if you have a service water header out and  
10 you lose off-site power, blah, blah, blah. You need  
11 that 3 Unit, right? To start back up again.

12 MR. BARBER: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] Now, the air compressors, if  
14 you walk out to the plant now you'll see a truck, a  
15 nitrogen truck sitting out there. A long-term or  
16 long-standing problem. Those compressors haven't been  
17 working right. Okay? So what they do is they'll fix  
18 this one and then that one, they'll half fix it.  
19 Anyway, you always have just one compressor when  
20 there's supposed to be two, right? And instead of  
21 fixing, this thing has been like this I would have to  
22 say for years. Okay? TK

23 Now they park a nitrogen truck out there  
24 as a backup. Holy smokes!

25 MR. BARBER: You mean using the nitrogen

1 in place of the starting air compressor?

2 [REDACTED] Yes, if you need it. Right.  
3 It's like come on, you have two compressors, fix the  
4 compressors.

5 MR. BARBER: What's the reason for not  
6 fixing them?

7 [REDACTED] I don't know. Money? Like  
8 I said at the beginning, the plant is 25, 26 years  
9 running, right?

10 MR. BARBER: Right.

11 [REDACTED] Obsolescence? I don't know.  
12 Is it just money? It seems to me it's just a  
13 compressor, guys, come on. But if you back that --  
14 very similar. Like proceduralizing problems,  
15 additional reading sheets so that it looks like we're  
16 keeping an eye on it. It's like come on, fix it, so  
17 we don't have to --

18 MR. BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] That's the major point with  
20 that.

21 MR. BARBER: So the nitrogen truck that's  
22 out there is really a back up to the starting air  
23 compressor, is that what you're saying?

24 [REDACTED] That's correct. You know,  
25 you could look up the safety importance of that 3

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1 Unit.

2 MR. BARBER: All right, what about this --  
3 we already talked about the secrets. How about the  
4 periodic removal of unsightly EMS tags by management,  
5 EMS tags.

6 [REDACTED] Oh yes. I've seen it  
7 before. I didn't give you how long I've been here, so  
8 I'll do that now real brief, [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED] I worked my way up to the [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED] I gave it up. It wasn't for me.

12 But -- so [REDACTED]

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] Anyway --

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What year were you  
16 licensed?

17 [REDACTED]  
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So for [REDACTED]  
19 [REDACTED] in there?

20 [REDACTED] Yes.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And have you been an  
22 [REDACTED] since that time, around [REDACTED] or so?


23 [REDACTED] Yes.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All Salem side?

25 [REDACTED] All Salem. So let me see,

1 I've seen this before. You don't see the management  
2 people walk around and doing it, but if you've had the  
3 unit for several days in a row and then someone is  
4 coming to visit -- see, the idea of the EMS tag, you  
5 know it's just like you're at mid-loop, so you put  
6 signs up, hey guys, we're mid-loop, hey guys, EMS tag,  
7 so that you don't have 10 people in a row wasting time  
8 identifying in the SAP, S-A-P system the same problem.  
9 Right?

10 MR. BARBER: Right.

11  You don't waste time. The  
12 other thing is I can pull up the number and look at  
13 the big description of the problem, right? But at the  
14 same time if you've got a lot of them hanging around,  
15 what does it look like? Does it look like things  
16 aren't getting fixed? Does it look like a sore thumb?  
17 So one day they're there, the next day they're not and  
18 if you go to the same component you wonder, hey, it  
19 wasn't fixed. It's just an EMS tag, so did it fall  
20 off or --

21 MR. BARBER: Have you ever seen anybody  
22 take an EMS tag off?

23  No, but we have definitely  
24 noticed, right, in the plant, EOs, we've seen this  
25 before.

1 MR. BARBER: So you've noticed it, but you  
2 don't know who's doing it?  
3 [REDACTED] Right.  
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How frequently would  
5 you say that happened?  
6 [REDACTED] Well, I'd have to say if  
7 they have a big INPO team coming, right? That's when  
8 I've seen them. INPO --  
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you saw a pattern  
10 before the INPO review?  
11 [REDACTED] Yes, yes.  
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did the tags  
13 reappear?  
14 [REDACTED] No. Off forever.  
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They're gone, they  
16 staff off whether the equipment is repaired or not?  
17 [REDACTED] Right, off forever.  
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what about --  
19 what kind of equipment would you say this has happened  
20 with? Can you give us some examples?  
21 [REDACTED] No, I can't be sure that --  
22 all right, as far as the safety side, but I've  
23 definitely see it on the secondary side which is the  
24 turbine plant, but I don't know if it's a habit that  
25 they would -- all over. Okay?

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1                   SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So specifically it  
2 happens in the turbine unit you're saying?

3                   [REDACTED] Yes.

4                   SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What kind of pieces  
5 of equipment does this appear?

6                   [REDACTED] It could be anything, pump  
7 leakage, yeah, leakages, pump systems.

8                   SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When was the most  
9 recent INPO review?

10                  [REDACTED] Was it right before the  
11 summer? I think it was right before the summer. As  
12 a matter of fact, the 405P that I mentioned, the SW17  
13 leakage, guess who was involved with that when INPO  
14 was here? Me. I must have drawn the shortest straw  
15 for that day, but when they were observing this  
16 leakage it was like they couldn't believe it, but --

17                  MR. BARBER: They saw it in the field?

18                  [REDACTED] Yes. It's like you get a  
19 step in the procedure where it mentions that. You  
20 call the control room and it's like okay, we know what  
21 to do. We go all over the procedure because we've got  
22 to finish the test, blah, blah, blah. And then at  
23 that point INPO has a million more questions like come  
24 on, I give you all the information I have. It's right  
25 here. I'm going by the procedure, but it becomes a

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1 big deal, right, for my management and I don't know  
2 mentioning particular names is a bad thing or not, but  
3 if I go through the control room and say hey, this is  
4 what we've got, do we go forward, do we go -- stop,  
5 what do we do? And the CO talked to this one, they  
6 all come back and say we've gone ahead. And then INPO  
7 guy doesn't like and he goes back and talks to  
8 somebody and then on the exit interview, I get a visit  
9 from a [REDACTED] asking me what happened? It's  
10 like come on, guys. Who is missing? Everybody is  
11 here. You know what happened. It's just -- I don't  
12 get it. Why should [REDACTED] come back to me asking me  
13 questions? Come on. It's right in the procedure.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What kind of  
15 questions was he asking?

16 [REDACTED] Because the INPO guy was  
17 upset about -- I'm not sure particularly what this  
18 step was, but it had to do with that leakage.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

20 [REDACTED] And the fact that -- oh,  
21 here it is. He measured this leakage and remember I  
22 said the pipe wasn't sized big enough to handle the  
23 leakage, so one of the things you do is you measure  
24 that leakage first before you start the guts of the  
25 procedure. Right after you do that, the next thing

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1 you do is you're filling a vent or you're piping, so  
2 you don't hammer it, right? Along with the  
3 instrumentation lines. Well, the instrumentation,  
4 right, when we're not doing the tests, all of the  
5 drain valves are open. Well, as I'm doing this thing  
6 with the flow, guess what's coming out of the  
7 instrumentation lines, right, water. It's already  
8 vented because the leakage is so great, it's filling  
9 up pipes. So this guy sees it. He's going what's  
10 going on? I said we're going to get to that in the  
11 next part of the procedure. He can't believe this  
12 stuff, right? So apparently, he goes back and I  
13 express myself, right? It's like come on.

14 So he must have gone back when they had  
15 their little pow wow with management and then I guess  
16 [REDACTED] or whoever it was, but [REDACTED] came back and  
17 says what happened? What happened? So it's [REDACTED] you  
18 know what goes on here. Why are you --

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You thought he knew  
20 about the condition and he was acting surprised for  
21 you?

22 [REDACTED] It's like first of all, like  
23 I said, how ridiculous is it, you get to a point --  
24 check this out. Before, when that SW-17 leakage was  
25 a little bit, they said you can go on with the

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1 procedure, it's a procedure step, by the way, it says  
2 as long as the installed sump in that bay can handle  
3 that leakage, it's okay.

4 Well, the leakage gets worse and you know,  
5 then they install on top of the permanent sump, they  
6 put another sump. You'll see the hoses, if you go  
7 down there. Every time I run this test, there's a  
8 temporary sump. So now the procedure says and now as  
9 long as the permanent sump and the temporary sump can  
10 keep up with it, you can go ahead. It's like --

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How long has it been  
12 a problem?

13 [REDACTED] It's got to be years. How  
14 many years? I don't know.

15 MR. BARBER: Was it ever okay? Was there  
16 ever a situation that you can recall where the leakage  
17 was either minimal or not at all?

18 [REDACTED] Yes. How far back, I'm not  
19 sure. You know, if you look at the 405P for service  
20 water pumps in this plant, you will see, if you look  
21 up the history of it, how many different methods we  
22 have used in this plant to test these pumps.

23 MR. BARBER: Do you happen to know there  
24 is an operator/work-around procedure, there's actually  
25 an operator/work-around log. Is this in that or do

1 you know?

2 [REDACTED]: We don't even use the word  
3 work-around any more.

4 MR. BARBER: You don't use it, but what  
5 you are describing is, in fact, a work-around.

6 [REDACTED] How about the Tigon tube on  
7 that?

8 MR. BARBER: That's a work-around too of  
9 sorts. It really is. It's the same. What you're  
10 doing is putting some alternate means of level  
11 indication in place for the installed instrumentation.  
12 In this case you've got a situation where you have  
13 leakage through a valve that you're collecting and  
14 it's of such a magnitude that you had to install a  
15 second sump instead of fixing the underlying problem.

16 [REDACTED] But to proceduralize that on  
17 top, it's like come on.

18 MR. BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] I don't know.

20 MR. BARBER: Okay.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did -- when  
22 [REDACTED] talked to you about that regarding the INPO  
23 review, when did that occur, earlier this year?

24 [REDACTED] It was before the exit  
25 interview before the last INPO visit. When they do an

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1 exit interview with the INPO guys and all the head  
2 honchos, right, and it was right before.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So month and year, do  
4 you have an idea?

5 [REDACTED] I'm sorry, I'd rather not  
6 give you bum dope. It was before the summer.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This year?

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 MR. BARBER: So spring of 2003?

10 [REDACTED]: Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now he was coming to  
12 you asking what happened there.

13 [REDACTED] Yes. What I said to him  
14 was, I said [REDACTED] I said if he, the INPO whoever,  
15 doesn't understand anything, bring him in here right  
16 now and we'll discuss it. [REDACTED] left. Never saw [REDACTED]  
17 back again. Come on, if there's a question -- because  
18 the guy was right in the service water bay with me,  
19 doing the pump test. It's like if he wasn't sleeping,  
20 then he had to to know exactly what was going on. He  
21 did. He was watching every move I made.

22 So I don't think it's the INPO guy that  
23 doesn't understand. I think it's [REDACTED] that doesn't  
24 understand something or wants me to say it different  
25 or I don't know. But I say bring the other guy in

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1 here right now and we'll talk.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You said he wants you  
3 to say it different, what is that?

4 [REDACTED] I don't know what the  
5 problem is.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] It seemed pretty straight  
8 forward to me. Okay? But --

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that the end of  
10 it?

11 [REDACTED] That was the end of it.  
12 Didn't hear anything more.

13 MR. BARBER: How about some of these other  
14 issues? You've got getting the bean for starting  
15 surveillances at the end of the shift. What do you  
16 mean by that?

17 [REDACTED] Okay, if the surveillance is  
18 on the schedule to do, whether it's this shift or the  
19 next shift, right, it appears sometimes that the shift  
20 that wants to get what we call a bean, credit, for  
21 getting that surveillance started.

22 MR. BARBER: Started? Not complete?

23 [REDACTED] Oh no. Like a diesel run  
24 that takes an hour. Why would you start it a half an  
25 hour before the end of the shift.

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MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED]

Why would you do that? Now what that leads to, what that leads to is improper turnaround or turnover of that job, right? You've got a diesel that's running. It's not like it's going to run. It's running right now. Is that a good time? If it's only an hour surveillance and when I say an hour surveillance, it usually runs a total of two hours.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED]

By the time you clean it up at the end. But why do it at the end of the shift and then have a possible bad turnover? Because the engine is running as you're doing the turnover.

MR. BARBER: I don't understand the bean concept. That some of the shift gets kudos for starting the surveillance so that's what this some good practice -- look at all the surveillances that --

[REDACTED]

That's right.

MR. BARBER: That this shift did and why aren't you doing as many as this shift? Is that the gist of it?

[REDACTED]

That's it. That is it. TC

MR. BARBER: So you're saying it's kind of a bad practice because there could be some performance

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1 problems or whatever just because of the way --  
2 [REDACTED] Let me put it to you another  
3 way. The bean that I talk about -- if you have, as a  
4 supervisor, you've got the on-coming supervisor coming  
5 in and you're going to turn over to that supervisor,  
6 if all your guys are in the field, you tend to look  
7 good. I don't know, as opposed to not looking good?  
8 And being safer? Not having a rotten turnover with  
9 the diesel running? Take your choice. Who's afraid  
10 of what a guy right above them is going to think?  
11 Come on, be a man. I don't get it.

12 Do you understand what I'm saying?

13 MR. BARBER: I think so.

14 [REDACTED] Let's play craps here. But  
15 hey, so if a man says go down and do it, I go down and  
16 do it, right? Does it make sense to me? No.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How does that play  
18 through? I mean when the surveillance is started, but  
19 it can't reasonably be finished on a shift, what  
20 happens next?

21 [REDACTED] Let me -- I'll make it  
22 crystal clear. Before I do that surveillance run, I  
23 have a one on one, right? It's usually the control  
24 operator who is in the control room, me and the boss,  
25 right? We've got the procedure. We've got prints,

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1 whatever we need. Right? If it's -- but if it's a  
2 deal where I have to be relieved on station and after  
3 my regular hours are up, the next guy coming in  
4 doesn't get that kind of brief. He does not get that  
5 kind of brief. I am turning over to him while the  
6 engine is running for what good reason? If it's an  
7 hour or two hour run, surveillance, what is the good  
8 reasoning? Is it how it looks to the big boss? I'm  
9 not really sure. I don't get it. Why not start it  
10 earlier? That's the way it looks to us, to me.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you seen any  
12 instances where these poorly timed surveillances where  
13 it led to a problem because it was done that way where  
14 your shift turns over to another shift or on any shift  
15 that it happened that --

16 [REDACTED] The stress level. I can't  
17 recall anything, but I'll tell you, the stress level  
18 goes up.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: On the individuals  
20 involved in the surveillance?

21 [REDACTED] Oh yeah, oh yeah.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're working  
23 under pressure. So the person who got it started and  
24 the person who has to assume it --

25 [REDACTED] Absolutely. There's stress

1 on both sides.

2 Not that you can't handle it, but why  
3 should you do that? Why should you do that?

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At what level are  
5 decisions being made to send people to do that? Who  
6 are the people that want their guys in the field on  
7 the turnover?

8 [REDACTED] I would have to say the OSs,  
9 the Operations Superintendents have to be pushing --  
10 whether it's looking a certain way or saying  
11 something.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that's where  
13 you're sort of guessing what's the value of them doing  
14 that, but it seems like they want their people busy at  
15 shift turnover?

16 [REDACTED] Whose shift is it? If you  
17 say whose shift, it is the OS's shift.

18 MR. BARBER: I'm a little puzzled because  
19 let's say if you just say let's pick a turnover on a  
20 Saturday morning, let's say that you got a shift  
21 coming on and you've got a shift going off on  
22 midnights, and you got one Op. Sup. or shift manager,  
23 whatever you want to call them and he's come in and  
24 he's going to relive the other one, the one guy --  
25 basically, they're at the same level, so the

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1 posturing, if you will, the perception, it's like peer  
2 to peer. It would be like you're talking to another  
3 NEO and doing something a certain way so you're  
4 impressing an other NEO and it's really you're the  
5 same level.

6 [REDACTED] I understand what you're  
7 saying, but if you walk -- if you walk through the  
8 hallway that leads to the control rooms, you'll see  
9 these charts on the wall that gives a grade.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So they're tracking

11 --

12 [REDACTED] A numeric grade for the  
13 different -- there's five shifts, right? Check that  
14 chart out sometimes.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are surveillances a  
16 part of that? Is that what they're tracking?

17 [REDACTED] I don't know. But I don't  
18 understand a lot of the things in that chart either.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't know what  
20 goes into the numeric grade exactly?

21 [REDACTED] No.

22 MR. BARBER: What shift are you on right  
23 now?

24 [REDACTED]  
25 [REDACTED] Okay. So you're on

1 now and who's coming on during days?

2 [REDACTED] I forget the shift name.

3 MR. BARBER: Okay, all right.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is there some sort of  
5 requirement for -- on each shift for a certain number  
6 of surveillances to be completed or at least started?

7 [REDACTED] I have no idea about that.

8 I have no idea, but I could tell you being here for (

9 [REDACTED]) so I've seen different acts, okay?

10 I won't call them comedy acts, but I've seen where and  
11 they weren't always called OSSs, they were called  
12 senior shift supervisors, but I've seen where they  
13 would hide in the drawer, one that would want to get  
14 more credit. He would actually hide the next shift's  
15 work into his drawer so he could get it the next day  
16 and get more credit. I'm telling you.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How far back does  
18 that go?

19 [REDACTED] That goes back either late  
20 1970s -- sorry, mid-1980s. That guy is retired now,  
21 but that's how things -- so I don't know if that still  
22 exists.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, but you're  
24 saying potentially that's what contributes to their  
25 pressure for starting surveillances when they do it,

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1 it might go into this numeric grade that the OS has  
2 received?

3 ~~REDACTED~~ That's what I'm talking  
4 about, yes.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

6 MR. BARBER: How about this next thing?  
7 You've got a heading about saving time and schedule  
8 pressure and then it looks like under that the first  
9 item is trying to use the shop procedure instead of  
10 using a tagging procedure and your example is a 22  
11 waste gas compressor leakage.

12 ~~REDACTED~~ That's correct. What that  
13 is -- I don't know all the technical names. I can't  
14 recall like this all the technical names for the  
15 procedures, but there's one we call the shop, right?  
16 It's almost like an administrative procedure, a  
17 general procedure, but it's called a shop and it's got  
18 a long call letter. But in the shop, one of the  
19 things in the shop is how are we going to handle --  
20 what's the term I'm looking for? Where you control  
21 the components' positions, you know it --

22 MR. BARBER: The tagging, the  
23 administration --

24 ~~REDACTED~~ You know it, how a plant --

25 MR. BARBER: Configuration.

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Configuration.

[REDACTED] There it is, configuration control. It is a device in the shop, it's like an attachment, right?

MR. BARBER: A line up type thing?

[REDACTED] Whereas, if I take a valve and for two hours, that's not going to be beyond my shift. I open it and I fill out this sheet, right?

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED] It's off normal.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED] As long as it goes back to its normal position before the end of the shift, we don't have to (a) tag it or (b) put it in the normal list or something like that, right? Which is -- it's a nice device for that purpose. It gives short term control paperwork, right? If we never did that, we'd have -- like the turnover thing, right? If it got lost with no tag, nobody would know it's off normal, but in this case, the boss and I won't say who it was, we're looking for a gas leak in the waste gas header. That's where you have active gas.

MR. BARBER: Right.

[REDACTED] I had a rad waste operator that day and I'm losing gas pressure in my gas decay

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1 tech. It's a long story, but it all backs down to  
2 we're trying to find a leak in the system and what  
3 we're going to start with is this 22 waste gas  
4 compressor.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When did this happen?  
6 [REDACTED] This was just last week. So  
7 the boss -- and I commended the boss for deciding to  
8 do something. That's good, we've got to do something.  
9 But as we're talking, he's saying we're going to use  
10 the shop. I says well, you know, what you want to do  
11 is you want to close the discharge, close the section  
12 and close this relief valve, relief line here. So  
13 we're going to bottle the thing up and I say well,  
14 don't you think that we should tag the breaker because  
15 we got a whole thing is bottled up, don't you think we  
16 should tag the breaker so nobody accidentally turns,  
17 right? Because it's waste gas, radioactive.

18 He says no, we'll use a shop. I says 7C  
19 well, you think that's safe enough because anybody can  
20 go over and hit the switch. We're going to use a  
21 shop. I wasn't happy with that. So I went around him  
22 because with the units the way they are right now,  
23 right, the rad, the boss that handles rad waste is the  
24 non-outage unit.

25 MR. BARBER: Who were you talking to when

1 you said you went around that guy, who was that?  
2 [REDACTED] Should I mention the name?  
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 MR. BARBER: Okay, so you were talking to  
7 [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED]  
10 MR. BARBER: Okay.  
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What day was this?  
12 You said it was last week, do you know when?  
13 [REDACTED] I had rad waste. It could  
14 have been the 31st, the 1st or the second, like which  
15 day in particular, I don't know, but those are the  
16 days I had rad waste.  
17 Anyway, so I'm not happy, right? I'm  
18 really pushed against this brick (Inaudible) tag open.  
19 MR. BARBER: Why do you think he didn't  
20 want to -- he didn't want to tag it?  
21 [REDACTED]: Saving time and schedule  
22 pressure.  
23 MR. BARBER: Okay.  
24 [REDACTED]: Saving time and schedule  
25 pressure.

1 MR. BARBER: Did he actually say something  
2 that indicated that or did he say now --

3 [REDACTED]: No, he didn't say that, but  
4 why wouldn't you want to do that?

5 MR. BARBER: I don't know if there was  
6 another reason maybe you would mention it.

7 [REDACTED]: Okay. Well, anyway, I'm not  
8 happy.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he fully  
10 understand what you were looking at? Do you think he  
11 had a good understanding?

12 [REDACTED]: Yes, I explained just -- I'm  
13 emphatic when I talk. I am emphatic. I use my hands,  
-14 my -- if I could use my hair I would. He knew.

15 MR. BARBER: Okay.

16 [REDACTED]: So I says [REDACTED], while he was  
17 looking at the prints (Phonetic) I said I'll be right  
18 back. I didn't make a big scene. I go around the  
19 desk and I talk to the [REDACTED] I  
20 says [REDACTED] do you know what this guy wants to do to  
21 your equipment because it's Unit 2 equipment?" He  
22 understands.

23 MR. BARBER: Okay.

24 [REDACTED]: I says he wants to bottle it  
25 up which is a good thing we're looking for the leak,

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1 but the breaker, right? He says uh -- so pretend like  
2 you didn't hear nothing, right? I says I'll go back  
3 around and give you a wink or whatever. So I go back  
4 to where [REDACTED] is, right? I say hey, [REDACTED] we're  
5 going to bottle up your gas compressors. That was his  
6 cue and he took it. He says oh, well, don't forget to  
7 get the breakers. Well, now [REDACTED] eyes are wide,  
8 right? I don't know why he's pushing it to get his  
9 way? I don't know. If anything, it's more work on  
10 me. I have to go down, rack the breaker out, rack the  
11 breaker in. Do you understand what I'm saying?

12 MR. BARBER: Yes, I do.

13 [REDACTED] I'm not arguing not to do  
14 that. I'm saying it's a good idea -- anyway, so -- I  
15 said guys, I said you guys talk. I'll be back in 15  
16 minutes. You guys talk. I came back in 15 minutes.

17 MR. BARBER: Just out of curiosity, since  
18 this was a Unit 2 issue, why were you even talking to  
19 him on Unit 1?

20 [REDACTED] Because [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED]

22 MR. BARBER: Oh.

23 [REDACTED] You got it?

24 MR. BARBER: Yes.

25 [REDACTED] And that's why I want to

1 make sure that [REDACTED] knew what we were going to do  
2 with his equipment.

3 MR. BARBER: All right.

4 [REDACTED] He deserves that much.

5 MR. BARBER: Okay.

6 [REDACTED] But anyway, I got, I ended  
7 up getting the [REDACTED] involved too.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that?

9 [REDACTED]: That was [REDACTED] I  
10 said look, we have to talk, right?

11 MR. BARBER: Okay.

12 [REDACTED] So I'm going to let you guys  
13 talk just like I did 15 minutes earlier and I'll come  
14 back. Right? So what they ended up doing was a good  
15 thing. They read blocking tags on all the isolations,  
16 all the breaker --

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Went through the  
18 tagging procedure, not the shop procedure?

19 [REDACTED] That's correct. The safety  
20 tagging procedure. So why should I have to do that?

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Had you seen that  
22 happen before? If not just with [REDACTED] had you  
23 seen that happen with other [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED] Let me go through one --

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But had you seen that

1 happen before? You're saying it wasn't spoken, but  
2 you thought the issue was saving time and there was  
3 schedule pressure on going through this with the shop  
4 procedure, the inappropriate shop procedure. Had that  
5 happened before?

6 [REDACTED] I had not seen that before.  
7 I had never seen that. It didn't matter to me what he  
8 was trying to use. I wanted tags. It was going to be  
9 tagged.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and now you  
11 want it to go somewhere else. Go ahead.

12 [REDACTED]: Right. Okay.

13 MR. BARBER: This Unit 2 outage, what's  
14 this bay number 4 restoration of monitoring 2200 nuke  
15 header? I'm reading this. I don't understand what --

16 [REDACTED]: You're not familiar with the  
17 system, but we have two bays per unit, right? You've  
18 got three pumps in each bay, so you've got six pumps,  
19 whatever. And then you've got the turbine header,  
20 nonsafety, and then you've got two nuke headers,  
21 right?

22 MR. BARBER: What's this when you talk  
23 about service water again?

24 [REDACTED]: Yes, service water is SW.

25 MR. BARBER: Okay.

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1 [REDACTED] The way I recall it two bay  
2 has -- it has the first three pumps and four bay has  
3 the second three pumps, right?

4 MR. BARBER: Okay.

5 [REDACTED] You can time them together,  
6 whatever, whatever and feed the world.

7 MR. BARBER: All right.

8 [REDACTED] Or you can close off the  
9 17s, isolate each bay and work on a bay. In this case  
10 here, two bay was the in-service bay.

11 MR. BARBER: Okay.

12 [REDACTED] The in-service pump bay.

13 MR. BARBER: All right.

14 [REDACTED] Along with 21 nuke header.  
15 All right? Do you follow me so far?

16 MR. BARBER: Yes, I do, so far.

17 [REDACTED] Four bay, four pump bay was  
18 not pressurized right. Everything was fixed and we're  
19 getting ready to pressurize, that was the big push  
20 that morning.

21 22 header, nuke header was drained.

22 MR. BARBER: All right.

23 [REDACTED] So we're going to go --

24 MR. BARBER: On 4 bay, what was being  
25 pressurized? You're saying get ready to pressurize,

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1 but the 22 nuke header was drained? Pressurize it to  
2 what?

3 [REDACTED] I think you crack the 17s,  
4 right? If you've got two bay in and you've got to  
5 fill in a vent, four bay because everything is fixed  
6 now, right?

7 MR. BARBER: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] Then you crack the 17 and  
9 you put water in the four bay.

10 MR. BARBER: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] You press it up and fill in  
12 the vent. So --

13 [END TAPE 1, SIDE A; BEGIN TAPE 1, SIDE B]

14 [REDACTED] You need to go down to a  
15 certain area and watch for leakage to let us know so  
16 we'll stop pressurizing the bay. Okay, so I would --  
17 I'm going down there and 10 minutes later he calls me  
18 and says no, no, no. You don't want to look there.  
19 You want to look in another spot. I say okay and I  
20 can't remember exactly where the spot, the (Inaudible)  
21 number, but 5, 10 minutes later he says no, no. You  
22 don't want to look there. You want to look underneath  
23 the RAP tanks, the big R-A-P tanks, right?  
24 Underneath, you've got bilko (Phonetic) doors. It's  
25 like a big basement, okay? That's where the service

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1 water lines come in.

2 Well, I don't know if the elbow is taken  
3 off intentionally so they can isolate the bay from the  
4 header, I don't know or whether they were just working  
5 that elbow, but at any rate, underneath the RAP tanks  
6 where the elbow, big elbow is taken off, right,  
7 maintenance, right, after they had taken the elbow  
8 off, they're going to redress the flange which they  
9 did. They put the goop on there, all that stuff. So  
10 you go down there and you see high intensity lights  
11 shining on the flange. This is the pipe where the  
12 water is going to come out if they have leakage where  
13 they fill the bay. And I have high intensity lamps  
14 shining on a flange.

15 MR. BARBER: Yes.

16 [REDACTED] I've got six, seven, eight  
17 wires all over the place. The next thing I know  
18 there's no temporary sump hooked up to pump if we do  
19 get water. And you've got these -- you've got new CRS  
20 wannabes, the classes, right? These guys are not  
21 licensed. My licensed implementation service water  
22 guys sends the two nonlicensed guys out to help me.  
23 I say guys, make sure you call [REDACTED] (Phonetic)  
24 while I do something else, whatever else I was doing.  
25 Let him know high intensity lamps hold the music.

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1 Well, guess what? We've got to fill the bay. I said  
2 go back and tell him we don't have a temporary sump  
3 down here. And his reply was we can use (Inaudible)  
4 sump. Bullshit. In order to use the installed  
5 permanent sump underneath the RAP tanks where the  
6 bilko doors are, you have to sample with the GIPD  
7 (Phonetic) code. You have to sample for bad ju-ju  
8 (Phonetic) before -- because it pumps right overboard.

9 So by the time we're able to pump  
10 anything, if anything leaks, it's going to hit the  
11 lamp for sure and then where am I going to put the  
12 water?

13 MR. BARBER: What's in the RAP tanks?

14 [REDACTED] RAP. R-A-P. First one for  
15 refueling water storage.

16 MR. BARBER: Okay.

17 [REDACTED] Next one is aux. feed. And  
18 last one is primary water. RAP.

19 MR. BARBER: It's an acronym that  
20 describes three tanks.

21 [REDACTED] Right.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who is it that's  
23 making the decision and telling you you can use the  
24 pump under the RAP tank?

25 [REDACTED]

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He was the service water implementation team leader for CRS or whatever.

MR. BARBER: He was control room supervisor?

[REDACTED] No, no, no.

MR. BARBER: Who was he?

[REDACTED] For the outage, for the outages you have implementation teams that are outside of the control room. They're set up with their own OS, outage, O-S. And he has areas like primary, service water, balance of plant, electrical, right, like four or five different areas and service water is one of them.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED] And that's manned by a certain [REDACTED] that's chosen -- whatever they do. But [REDACTED] was the man.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why did he want to go that way, do you know?

[REDACTED] Schedule pressure.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Schedule pressure.

[REDACTED] Schedule pressure.

(Laughter.)

[REDACTED] Safety, no, what kind of

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1 safety? You hit high intensity lamps like that, you  
2 are going to have flying glass.

3 MR. BARBER: Of course, you have extension  
4 cords --

5 [REDACTED] Well, yes.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you talk about  
7 schedule pressure, are you talking about production or  
8 what I have to get done in these 8 hours or what is  
9 it?

10 [REDACTED] Critical path. Critical  
11 path is the term they use in outages. Critical path  
12 -- I don't know, critical path.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

14 [REDACTED]: I'm running out of time.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I know and I don't  
16 want to see you up against -- I want to ask you a few  
17 questions though.

18 Considering the work environment and your  
19 experience here is this -- and we'll go with recent  
20 years, is this an environment in which people raise  
21 concerns specifically regarding nuclear safety? If  
22 they have them, do they raise them?

23 [REDACTED] I do.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you do it without  
25 fear of retaliation? 7C

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[REDACTED]

If they retaliate, they

retaliate.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you ever felt that you were retaliated against for having expressed a concern?

[REDACTED]

No.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware of anyone who would be fearful of raising a concern of a nuclear safety nature?

[REDACTED]

New guys.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, why do you say that?

[REDACTED]

Afraid of losing their jobs.

Hey, they don't even get sick time for the first year, right?

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So just in a general category, if they're new, they're going to be more --

[REDACTED]

Absolutely.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They may not want to be seen that way?

[REDACTED]

That's correct.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware of any concerns that didn't get raised, based on a fear coming from whatever reason?

[REDACTED]

No.

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think concerns of a nuclear safety nature get raised and get addressed on site?

[REDACTED] Some guys do, some guys don't. I have to say human nature. I'm here --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right, there's a company --

[REDACTED] You know why I'm here, because I want to be here. Okay? Because I -- the guy that was announcing that you guys were doing this, I said I don't want to miss out because I talk to the people that I work for. I do that.

MR. BARBER: Do you have anything more before you take off?

[REDACTED] Yes --

MR. BARBER: Can we just spend -- I want to spend one or two minutes on 14 (Inaudible).

[REDACTED] Yes.

MR. BARBER: We heard a lot about this. But what we've heard is different than what you've highlighted. You're really highlighting the method used to shut the unit down.

[REDACTED] Uh-huh.

MR. BARBER: Now what was your question or comment on that?

7C

1 [REDACTED] I know, first of all, your  
2 background, operations?

3 MR. BARBER: Yes.

4 [REDACTED] So you understand.

5 MR. BARBER: Yes, I understand. This is  
6 the feed rad. valve. I know it was stuck about 75  
7 percent open. And I know that generally with the 404,  
8 four generators, the feed rad. valves have to move  
9 kind of in step where they're all about the same  
10 amount open.

11 [REDACTED] If you go down, way down in  
12 power to like 10, 15, your DP is like really low.

13 MR. BARBER: And you have to go on the  
14 bypasses?

15 [REDACTED] Yes. Well, now the other  
16 three are wide open, right?

17 MR. BARBER: Okay.

18 [REDACTED] You're basically frozen,  
19 aren't you? Right?

20 MR. BARBER: Right.

21 [REDACTED] How safe is that, number  
22 one.

23 MR. BARBER: What could the plant have  
24 done or what could they have done to --

25 [REDACTED] Trip.

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1 MR. BARBER: Trip the unit? And then  
2 what? They go on aux. feed?

3 [REDACTED] Aux. feed.

4 MR. BARBER: Okay.

5 [REDACTED] And what I wrote down here  
6 is -- hey look, any time you trip, whether it's  
7 certainly auto going out is a bad, bad -- any auto  
8 ECCS, that's a big report. That's like in 15 minutes,  
9 right? If you do it manually, that's a different kind  
10 of report.

11 MR. BARBER: Right.

12 [REDACTED] Right? But you don't want  
13 any reports. Right? You would rather not have any  
14 reports.

15 MR. BARBER: Okay.

16 [REDACTED]: Am I making sense?

17 MR. BARBER: Yes.

18 [REDACTED]: If you can bring the plant  
19 down without having reports that you've had to trip at  
20 a certain percent power, would you do it?

21 MR. BARBER: I understand your point. I  
22 know the residents were following, the NRC residents,  
23 inspectors, so they sort of knew what was going on.  
24 Not all up to date, minute to minute --

25 [REDACTED]: They had to put an NCO in

1 the simulator for 8 hours to see how it's going to go.

2 MR. BARBER: Yes.

3 [REDACTED]: I don't know. You're the  
4 NRC. I was hoping for more of a feedback from you.

5 MR. BARBER: One of the dilemmas that we  
6 would struggle within looking at these kinds of issues  
7 is wherever you have a piece of equipment that's in  
8 this case it was mechanically bound, we would not want  
9 something to be done quickly in the interest to  
10 safety, if in fact, the net result would be that it  
11 would turn out to be an unsafe act.

12 [REDACTED] Do you think?

13 MR. BARBER: I don't know. I don't know.  
14 It's just like if you actually look at the tech specs  
15 like for aux. feed, what you'll see is if you lose one  
16 pump you have to take action in a certain amount of  
17 time and it's a long time, you're assuming two hours,  
18 you lose two pumps, 12 hours; you lose three, guess  
19 what?

20 [REDACTED] You got to stay where you're  
21 at.

22 MR. BARBER: You don't do anything because  
23 moving the plant is unsafe. And so I know there was  
24 discussions like that, but I don't know what the  
25 outcome was about whether there would have been more

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1 of a negative effect if the unit had been taken off  
2 rapidly which was always an option. I just don't  
3 know.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I have another  
5 question for you. Are you good on the 19th?

6 [REDACTED]: Yes.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The incidents that  
8 you've given on the schedule pressure, these two are  
9 outage incidents that you talked about, the waste gas  
10 compressor and the second one on the RAP tank issue.

11 [REDACTED]: Well, to tell you the truth,  
12 the waste gas compressor was not part of the outage  
13 work.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, these are  
15 happening during the recent outage, right?

16 [REDACTED]: That's correct.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: My question for you  
18 and I need you to think of it overall, more than just  
19 in recent weeks is have you ever seen, felt or heard  
20 of directives that placed production over safety? And  
21 in that -- production over safety, may be seen as  
22 megawatt mentality. We've heard it referred to.  
23 Maybe pushing to the limit of non-conservative  
24 decision making. Think of it in terms of that. Have  
25 you ever seen felt or heard that pressure yourself?

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[REDACTED] I've felt the pressure, but never heard the words. Do you understand what I'm saying?

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[REDACTED]: Look, they would never say that.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. But can you point to an incident where it became this is an issue of production over safety?

[REDACTED] I can't answer that question. It doesn't even make sense to me, all right? The picture I am trying to show is that why would you do it this way when you can do it another way?

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right, you're talking about in terms of maintenance and other --

[REDACTED] The whole bag. It just seems to me it's either to impress, they do these things to either impress the next boss up or to save money. It has nothing to do with being safe, not in my mind. But if a person is trying to get by me, I'm driving 50 miles an hour run, why get in my truck when you can pass me? Why act like that? So why act like this? It just doesn't make any sense. 7C

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Basically what you're

1 saying is all the incidents you've documented you  
2 attribute to what your impression is it's not the  
3 right way to run the plant?

4 [REDACTED]: That is correct.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

6 [REDACTED]: That's all I've got. I do  
7 have to go. Look, I appreciate your time.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I appreciate your  
9 time.

10 [REDACTED]: Trying to interpret --

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have I or any other  
12 NRC representative offered you any promises of reward  
13 or threatened you in any manner with an exchange for  
14 your information?

15 [REDACTED]: No.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you appeared  
17 here freely and voluntarily?

18 [REDACTED]: Yes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything  
20 else you'd like to add to the record and I understand  
21 that we are rushing to get you to close out on your  
22 shift.

23 [REDACTED]: If I had more time, maybe  
24 next time, but not right now, okay?

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think that we

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missed anything significant?

[REDACTED] No. That's good enough.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so if we have any more questions, then we can follow up with you?

[REDACTED]: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: One more time, can I have your extension?

[REDACTED]: Yes, [REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] Are you interested in doing a transcript review when this is available?

[REDACTED]: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, it might be a little while only because of what we've got going on, but if I can, I'll arrange it.

[REDACTED] That's good.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you for your time.

[REDACTED] Thank you.

(Pause.)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: To add to the record, this interview ended at approximately 6:25 a.m.

(Whereupon, at 6:25 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings  
before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ] TC

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Hancock's Bridge, NJ.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the  
original transcript thereof for the file of the United  
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*Francesca Zook*

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