Official Transcript of Proceedings

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ORIGINAL

Title: Interview of [redacted] -7C

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F & [redacted]

Location: Hope Creek NPS

Date: Tuesday, March 2, 2004

Work Order No.: NRC-1364 Pages 1-130

NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers
1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 234-4433

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 7C
FOIA- 2005-194

m-21

1 UNITED STATED OF AMERICA

2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

3 + + + + +

4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

5 INTERVIEW

6 ----------x

7 IN THE MATTER OF: :

8 INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.

9 [redacted] 7C : 1-2003-051F

10 (CLOSED) [redacted]

11 ----------x

12 Tuesday, March 2, 2004

13

14 AOM's Office

15 Hope Creek Nuclear Power Station

16

17 The above-entitled interview was conducted

18 at 2:39 p.m.

19 BEFORE:

20 Special Agent Eileen Neff, NRC/RI/OI

21

22 Also Present:

23 SCOTT BARBER, Senior Project Engineer

24

25

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

(2:39 p.m.)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Today's date is March 2nd, 2004, and the time is approximately 2:39 p.m. Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC Region I, Office of Investigations.

Also present from Region I and from the Division of Reactor Projects is Senior Project Engineer Scott Barber. What follows is an interview of [redacted] spelled [redacted] who is currently employed by PSEG Nuclear as the [redacted] at Hope Creek.

[redacted] Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As agreed this interview is being tape recorded, and the location of the interview is the [redacted] office at the Hope Creek Station. The subject matter of this interview concerns a safety conscious work environment.

It has been explained to [redacted] that he is not the subject of any investigation, and that you are being approached as a witness for your assessment of the work environment at the station, and you understand that, right?

[redacted] Yes, I do.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And you were

All 7C

1 also further advised that there is no particular
2 subject of investigation, in that there is no
3 potential violations associated with the safety
4 conscious work environment.
5 And as I explained to you before going on
6 the record, we would conduct the interview under oath,
7 okay? Would you please raise your right hand to be
8 sworn in.
9 (Whereupon, [redacted] was sworn.)
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Briefly, could you
11 give me -- well, I'm sorry, actually what I need is
12 some complete identification information for you.
13 Your date of birth and social security number?
14
15
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And a home address,
17 please?
18
19
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you. And a
21 brief summary of your education?
22
23
24
25

All 7C

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And then work
2 history.
3 [redacted] I have been in the nuclear
4 industry since
5 [redacted] I went
6 through the [redacted]
7 [redacted]
8 And in [redacted] I came to Hope Creek as a
9 [redacted] and I was a [redacted]
10 [redacted] and now I am the
11 [redacted] in that [redacted] term.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So when were you
13 [redacted] at Hope Creek then?
14 [redacted] I was [redacted] at Hope Creek
15 in August of [redacted] as an [redacted]
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then when were
17 you a [redacted]
18 [redacted] Approximately -- I don't know.
19 Well, [redacted] later.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So in the [redacted] time
21 frame?
22 [redacted] In the [redacted] and [redacted] time
23 frame.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As a [redacted].
25 And promoted to [redacted] in what year? Do you recall?

All TC

[redacted]: Yes, [redacted]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. When you were [redacted] in that [redacted] time frame, who had you been reporting to, your [redacted] at that time, and your [redacted]

[redacted] My first [redacted], and [redacted], followed by [redacted] and subsequent [redacted]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then were you [redacted]

[redacted] Yes, I succeeded [redacted]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what about senior management then? Who were you working with at that point in time?

[redacted] Senior managers would have been a chain that -- well, I remember [redacted] in those senior positions while I was a [redacted]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: With regard to [redacted] they flipped in the [redacted] position at some point in time?

[redacted] and then [redacted] and through both of those tenures, I believe that [redacted] was the [redacted]

All 7C

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What I would
2 first like to do is to talk about an incident that we
3 have heard a lot about, and it is an incident that
4 goes back to March if 2003, the bypass valve.
5 [redacted] Sure.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There was a
7 reactivity management event associated with it, and
8 there were some other issues surrounding that in the
9 handling of the bypass valve incident, and we talked
10 to a lot of people, and we have looked at a lot of
11 whatever available documentation we have, and we have
12 examined the issue pretty closely.
13 And the sense that we get is that at that
14 point in time you were placed in a pretty
15 uncomfortable position by your senior management, and
16 what I would like to know is how do you respond to
17 that?
18 Are we wrong in that assessment? How do
19 you feel about that situation?
20 [redacted] About the question as to
21 whether or not to go in and repair the bypass valve
22 and start up or not start up; or for the handling of
23 the reactivity event?
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I realize that there
25 is two issues there, and the question is about the

All 7C

1 start up, and let's talk about that.

2 [redacted] Well, what I would or how I

3 would couch that is that when the reactor SCRAM was

4 actually carried out by the crew, the bypass valve

5 reflection wouldn't close, and there were some

6 questions by people in the organization as to, well,

7 the valve is closed, and it is not stuck open anymore.

8 So it is not a problem and can we start

9 back up, and that wasn't going to happen. We were not

10 going to start up the plant until we understood what

11 the problem was with the bypass valve. But I had to

12 explain that to the organization.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And when you say

14 organization and some people in the organization, I

15 would like you to be a little more specific. Can you

16 tell me where the questions were coming from?

17 [redacted] I know that were some

18 questions. I think [redacted] came over to a meeting

19 that we had that morning and specifically asking

20 questions of the plant status and where we were

21 headed.

22 And basically I ended up going to a

23 meeting in [redacted] office to discuss that. And

24 I was asked a lot of very specific questions with

25 regards to why we could not start the plant up.

All 7C

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And who was present at that meeting?

[redacted] and I think [redacted] may have been there, and I think [redacted] was there, and I think that the maintenance director was there. I don't remember his name right now. And I think that there were 3 or 4 other people in the room, but I don't recall their names.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were they outage people?

MR. BARBER: QA people?

[redacted] I don't remember who was there from QA, but now that you mention the outage group, there was an outage group guy there who is no longer here working, and I don't recall his name either. I would have to think about that. I am not good with names and so I don't remember who he was. But he is no longer an employee here. He is gone.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now these are all individuals that are all gathered at one point in time, or at different points in time?

[redacted] I remember a protected meeting in [redacted] office with this group there for a couple of hours.

All 7c

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For a couple of
2 hours? We are getting 3 or 4 hours. Does that sound
3 accurate?
4 [redacted] Well, I think the total time
5 involved in the decision making process for making the
6 presentation to senior management and getting the buy-
7 in to go ahead with what I felt we should do probably
8 lasted 3 to 4 hours as a total time.
9 I don't know that it was always spent in
10 that office, but it caused a 3 or 4 hour delay in the
11 cool down of the plant.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Can you go
13 into that in terms of if you are on this side of the
14 fence with your position, were others with you, or
15 were you convincing others that were not with you? I
16 mean, can you divide it up among the people that were
17 there and where they stood on the issue?
18 [redacted] I would tell you that I don't
19 remember a lot of conversation from the other people
20 in the room. I don't remember people having a strong
21 position until I was making a case and answering
22 questions, and basically I said that I would not
23 authorize a start up of the unit until we had done
24 that, and it was not going to happen until we actually
25 went in and determined the extent and condition of the

A117c

1 valve.

2 And at that time I remember [redacted]

3 and I think [redacted] had affirmed my position, and

4 said that is what we need to do.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So did you have to

6 state your case for that 3 to 4 hour time frame? I

7 mean, how long did it take for you to explain your

8 position?

9 [redacted] I don't know. I don't recall.

10 I know that it was a 3 or 4 hour delay in the cool

11 down of the plant. I don't know that I was there for

12 3 hours or 4 hours in that meeting. I just don't

13 remember.

14 But there were a lot of very direct

15 questions on understanding why the bypass valve was

16 still considered inoperable when it was closed, and

17 what was my justification, and I think I left the room

18 and went and got some technical specifications.

19 I think that I got a copy of the

20 surveillance procedure, and I brought back some

21 written documentation to the meeting to discuss it.

22 So there was time spent out of the room while I was

23 collecting some data and coming back.

24 So it was not all conversational. I did

25 some drawing on the board, and some explanation of the

All 7C

way that the system operates, and the way that it performs, and then a rather detailed explanation of system operation and technical specification requirements, and why I thought the valve was inoperable and required an extended condition on resolving the issue.

MR. BARBER: And who was the discussion with primarily?

[redacted] I think that most of the questions that I answered were directed at me by [redacted].

MR. BARBER: Okay. So kind of help us understand the picture. Was it one of these situations where suddenly a fairly large group, maybe 10 people or so, 8 to 10, to 12 people --

[redacted] Yeah, 8 to 10 people would be a good number.

MR. BARBER: And there is a dialogue it appears between you and [redacted] and they are listening and forming an opinion one way or the other. Did anybody else play a significant role in the discussion at any point along the way that caused the discussion to tip one way or the other?

It sounds like you said that [redacted] and [redacted] endorsed your position somewhere along the way.

All 7C

1 [redacted] Correct.

2 MR. BARBER: But was there any individuals

3 that spoke up one way or the other?

4 [redacted] Not remembering all the

5 players in the room at the time, and since you

6 refreshed my memory that there was a guy there from

7 the outage organization, I remember that he spoke, and

8 I believe his conversation was supportive of my

9 position.

10 But I don't remember the rest of the

11 players in the room at that time.

12 MR. BARBER: Okay. But what was your

13 sense though in the discussion? Did you have to

14 convince him that this was the right thing to do, or

15 was it just that you were just explaining the

16 situation?

17 [redacted] Well, I don't think the

18 opinion of the rest of the people in the room was the

19 same as mine. I don't, in their vision of what that

20 meeting was all about.

21 As an operator making significant

22 decisions for the station, I have had to provide that

23 justification to [redacted] on a number of occasions in the

24 past. His engagement in understanding what we are

25 doing was relatively high.

All TC

1 I don't know this as a fact, but I am
2 pretty sure that I would have spent a sufficient
3 amount of time in that room explaining to him why I
4 wanted to start up the plant without fixing the bypass
5 valve, just as much as I would have spent time in that
6 room explaining to him why I wanted to keep it shut
7 down until we fixed it.
8 MR. BARBER: Well, what you described in
9 trying to start up the plant seems less defensible
10 than wanting to shut the unit down. I mean, to
11 continue the cool down of the unit and identify the
12 root cause of the problem, seems more --
13 [redacted] Well, yes, from an [redacted]
14 perspective I think it is much easier to defend to
15 shut down and do an extended condition, than it is to
16 start up without knowing.
17 MR. BARBER: Right. And one thing that we
18 are not clear on is why the protracted period of time.
19 Why not -- you know, we talked to a number of
20 different people and polled a number of individuals
21 and they all felt that the right decision was to cool
22 the unit down and get into the bypass valve, and look
23 in and find out what the problem was. Why did [redacted]
24 [redacted] need that kind of convincing?
25 [redacted] I think [redacted] needed

All 7c

1 the information and the justification to be able to
2 talk to corporate and be able to say this is why we
3 are going to keep our unit down, even though corporate
4 would like to understand why we are not coming back up
5 on line when the bypass valve is not doing its job.
6 And I think that he needed the data to
7 support that to talk to corporate and say this is why
8 we are not bringing our unit back up.
9 MR. BARBER: How would they even know that
10 level of detail? I mean, how would they even know the
11 bypass valve had not shut when the unit SCRAMed?
12 [redacted] Oh, I couldn't tell you that.
13 I would imagine the communications that take place
14 between senior management and corporate on the status
15 of a unit being on-line or off-line are probably
16 relative significant and frequent, but that would be
17 out of my purview.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you participate
19 in any discussions that involved corporate in that?
20 [redacted] No, I did not.
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were they present on
22 the phone or in any way engaged in what you were
23 explaining?
24 [redacted] I don't believe they were, no.
25 No, I don't think there were any phone calls during

A117

1 that meeting time.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And do you think that

3 may have been driving [redacted] where he needed

4 justification for it?

5 [redacted] I think he specifically said

6 one time during the meeting that he needs to explain

7 to corporate what we are doing with our asset down

8 here, and he wants to have a good solid story when he

9 tells them what we are doing.

10 That is not a quote, but I think he

11 alluded to needing to explain what we are doing with

12 the facility down there.

13 MR. BARBER: Did [redacted] have an

14 operations background?

15 [redacted] I believe he has a relatively

16 strong operations background.

17 MR. BARBER: Did it seem reasonable to you

18 that the questions that he was asking over this period

19 of time, and not that he doesn't have the right and

20 even the responsibility to ask probing questions, but

21 just the extent to which --

22 [redacted] To take it at face value

23 because he knows the store already?

24 MR. BARBER: No, not even that, but why

25 didn't the discussion take a half-an-hour or an hour

All 7C

1 instead of 2 hours, or 2-1/2, or 3, or 4, or whatever?
2 I mean, there is obviously some amount of time that is
3 going to be an optimum amount of time.
4 But 3 or 4 hours just doesn't seem to fit
5 the need or the desire to take conservative action.
6 I mean, I can see it going the other way, and I can
7 see if you want to turn around and say let's take the
8 unit back up. I can see where you might want to take
9 that amount of time, but just to say, no, we want to
10 continue the cool down and get in and look.
11 [redacted] I would say that with me being
12 relatively new to the position, whether I was the
13 designated senior license holder or not, due to the
14 absence of my direct supervisor, [redacted] who was away,
15 and me being in a position of making significant
16 decisions for the station from a viewpoint of a lower
17 tier management employee, I think he wanted to
18 understand that I knew what I was talking about, and
19 that I was making the right decision for the company
20 from the perspective of what is the safe thing to do
21 from an operations orientation.
22 I am going to tell you that [redacted]
23 is a tough guy to be in a conversation with. He can
24 be very blunt, and he can be very asserting, but that
25 was his management style.

A117C

1 I was never afraid of [redacted] and
2 him and I had had multiple conversations of that sort,
3 and for me to say that I was in a difficult position,
4 well, I was having to answer more questions than I
5 thought that I needed to.
6 And I had to go do some research on them
7 because I came to the table without enough answers,
8 but I don't think that any of the questions that he
9 asked me were inappropriate.
10 And I think that his methodology and the
11 way that he conducted himself during that briefing may
12 have caused the rest of the people in the room to be
13 at a higher discomfort level than I was.
14 I was uncomfortable because I came without
15 sufficient answers, but when I gave him my answers, he
16 says okay, and if that is what I want, then let's go
17 do it.
18 MR. BARBER: What was that point? I mean,
19 was there something that he was looking for that once
20 you said something in a certain way, or at a certain
21 point, what was he looking for?
22 [redacted] I can't say that there was
23 something crystal in my mind that I knew that I had
24 done, or I was done when I said those words. I can't
25 say that I can recall that.

All 7C

1 It was not enough for me to say that the
2 bypass valve is inoperable, whether it is shut or not,
3 because it currently won't pass its surveillance, and
4 so it is inoperable.
5 And so I can't start up the plant and go
6 above 25 percent power, and I am certainly not going
7 to start it up until I understand why it didn't work.
8 That wasn't -- you know, it would be nice to say that
9 that is all you need to say, but then I needed to
10 provide and understand the justification of what the
11 bypass valves do for me, and why it takes more than
12 surveillance criteria to determine operability.
13 Why there is more things engaged than what
14 operability is all about. It is not enough to say
15 that passing a surveillance means that something is
16 operable. So don't use that as your only reason to
17 say that it is inoperable. What goes along with that.
18 And I didn't come prepared to the table to
19 discuss that. So I had to do some little research,
20 and some backtracking, and thinking on my feet to talk
21 about those issues.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It seems that the way
23 that it has been reported to us is that it was black
24 and white. It was crystal clear. You could not start
25 up and you needed to figure out why it had failed in

1 the first place.

2 [redacted] It was to me.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And it was to you as

4 reported, and you and others in operations management

5 believed it to be a rather simple issue. So to see a

6 3 to 4 hour discussion of questioning, probing,

7 pushing, on understanding why you can't start up in

8 that position stand out as an incident.

9 [redacted] Yes, and I would say that we -

10 - and I want to be careful about the 3 to 4 hours. It

11 did cause me 3 to 4 hours in delay and doing the cool

12 down.

13 As a matter of fact, you know, I stopped

14 the cool down one time because I got some guidance

15 from the director to stop the cool down, and where are

16 you at, until we resolve this issue.

17 And I did, but stopping the cool down was

18 not a significant impact on us. It didn't jeopardize

19 any of the paths of where we were headed. It was

20 always my intention to ensure that that is where we

21 ended up.

22 And halting the cool down for the time

23 period that we did, it did not have an impact on

24 anything other than scheduling business meetings, and

25 not reactor safety.

All 7C

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

2 [redacted] But I don't think that I spent

3 -- I don't think that I was on the defense and

4 explaining my position for 3 to 4 hours.

5 I was out of the room gathering data and

6 I came back, and I don't know if all the people were

7 there when I came back. There was still a crowd

8 there, but I don't know that everyone was still there.

9 But I clearly understand your questioning

10 attitude and something that appears to be black and

11 white, why did it take 3 to 4 hours to come to that

12 determination.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, you credited

14 with [redacted] as being an experienced operator.

15 [redacted] Yes, I believe he was.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And would you have

17 the understanding that you would both be on the same

18 page more or less?

19 [redacted] Right. I think that he wanted

20 to understand what we were doing with the asset, and

21 he wanted to understand that I knew what I was talking

22 about with respect to making a significant decision

23 for this facility.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you feel at any

25 point in time that it was direction to you and in

All TC

1 which way you would go?

2 [redacted] No, I would say that the only

3 direction that I received that I wasn't happy about

4 was to suspend the cool down, which I got from the

5 director. And I told him later on -- I said later on

6 that I am going to continue the cool down, and we are

7 going to take the unit cold.

8 I think I might have said that I am not

9 jerking the crew around anymore. We are going to a

10 systematic recooling of the unit down and go to full

11 shutdown. And that is the only direction that I got.

12 I didn't get any direction from [redacted]

13 As a matter of fact, if I had to suppose

14 what direction I ever received from [redacted] it would

15 be that I operate the unit in accordance with

16 standards with reactivity, and management concern.

17 And, you know, it's not -- I never got any

18 direction that was specific to operating the unit. It

19 was how to operate the unit.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: His expectations?

21 [redacted] His expectations, yes, of how

22 things worked.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Going back just a

24 little bit on your -- well, it is more or less an

25 assumption when you are saying that he was looking for

All 7C

1 a justification.

2 [redacted] That is my assumption.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And in that time

4 frame, at any point in time, did you get the

5 impression that he was pressuring for the start up

6 because of -- or for any reason at all? That he

7 wasn't questioning, but that he was pressuring for the

8 start-up in this length of time discussion?

9 [redacted] No, I don't. As a matter of

10 fact, what surprised me was that in the term of that

11 conversation, meeting, discussion, that it utilized 4

12 hours of what would typically be considered critical

13 path time and putting the unit in a condition to do

14 work, or starting up a unit, was not a concern.

15 And it could have been a 5 hour or a 6

16 hour meeting, and we would have held right now, and

17 when we made our decision, we would have implemented

18 the plan. So I was surprised that from a senior

19 management viewpoint that we weren't -- that I wasn't

20 being pressured to move forward in any direction.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You were holding?

22 [redacted] I was holding and that it was

23 okay to hold for 4 hours of critical path time without

24 regard to whether that is going to cost us either in

25 a start up or in the time that it takes us to get shut

All 7C

down.

And I have the sense, and I don't remember if it is because of conversation or not, that that time wasn't important. It was important for us to understand that we were doing the right thing.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in terms of where [redacted] sat in this particular point in the decision making? From what we are seeing, you were portrayed as somebody more or less in the middle, and possibly being seen as having to defend a position.

And Ops Management is saying this is what we need to do, and you are explaining that. You are explaining that. But consider it from this point of view; did you see [redacted] as also in the middle, and having to defend where he is going to move the plant, or where the plant will be going from his chain-of-command?

Did you get the sense that he was pressured in that way?

[redacted]: I didn't have the sense that he was pressured, but it was clear to me that he had to provide an explanation of what we were doing with the unit to corporate PSEG.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And by

A117c

position, who would that be?

[redacted] I don't know. I don't know who he would have conversations with.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What has been reported to us is that comments that you made indicated, and this is at that time frame, but indicated that there was pressure from the highest levels of PSEG Power on this process decision that you were going through, and that is what has been reported to us.

So I just need to turn that out to you, and whether that jogs anything?

[redacted] I would say that in my position with the organization and in my participation in that meeting, that I would not have been privy to that.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was not something that you were privy to?

[redacted] No.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you know why something like that would be attributed to you?

[redacted] To me?

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Through conversations that you had that has been reported to us in sworn testimony that there was pressure from PSEG Power,

All 7C

1 from the highest levels of PSEG Power, regarding that
2 process, that 3 to 4 hour discussion while you were in
3 there?
4 [redacted] Well, do you think the words
5 that I have already provided you, and that [redacted]
6 needed to provide justification and an explanation of
7 what we were doing with the asset could be construed
8 as pressure from senior management?
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I can see it being
10 construed that way, but I see a difference in there,
11 and what I am trying to hash out is what is the
12 difference. He may have felt that he needed to
13 justify something, but this is a little stronger.
14 [redacted] It is. It is significantly
15 stronger.
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.
17 [redacted] And it is also inappropriate.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay So you are
19 saying that is not what occurred?
20 [redacted] I am saying that I did not --
21 if I ever used the words that [redacted] was being
22 pressured by senior management to start the union back
23 up, I would say that I did not say those words.
24 What I will freely admit to is that
25 [redacted] needed a broad justification to corporate as

All 7C

1 to what we were doing with the asset down there, and
2 whether or not he was pressured is not something that
3 I know.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Okay.
5 [redacted] So I don't know that I -- I
6 would not have said that. I would not have said that
7 [redacted] was being pressured to start up the unit,
8 because I didn't know that, and I can't --
9 MR. BARBER: Well, would you have inferred
10 that just from the line of questioning that he was
11 asking you?
12 [redacted] Well, I don't think so.
13 Certainly I could have inferred that, but I don't
14 think that I did.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But you think that
16 the closest that you are coming to that particular
17 statement would be that he needed justification in
18 terms of when the asset would be moved?
19 [redacted] Correct.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that is the
21 closest that you would come to a statement like that?
22 [redacted] I think so.
23 MR. BARBER: Is it possible that when you
24 were completing your explanation with him that what he
25 was really looking for is some absolutely irrefutable

All 7C

1 explanation that pointed at a tech spec, and saying
2 that this is part of our license, and we are not
3 meeting it in this particular element of the
4 discussion, and there is no equivocation that we have
5 to shut the unit down because we are not reading our
6 license?
7 Do you think that is what he was looking
8 for, that he was looking for the absolute last bit of
9 irrefutable evidence that said that we made the
10 argument?
11 [redacted] If it was as simple as a tech
12 spec compliance issue, it would have been a done deal
13 from when we started the conversation. I think it was
14 more along the lines of -- I am going to tell you that
15 every time that I was in a conversation with [redacted]
16 [redacted] he was trying to make me think outside the
17 box and explain, and provide justification for the
18 things that we needed to do at a nuclear power
19 station.
20 He was never satisfied with a quick go
21 with the dancer. That was never satisfactory. You
22 always had to have a thought process behind it, and
23 you had to have 2 or 3 questions in depth for each
24 question that was asked to be able to explain why you
25 do things here at a nuclear power station.

1 He was in the education mode with me every
2 time that we had a conversation, and I never had an
3 easy conversation with him. It was never easy to walk
4 into his office and talk about something, and have it
5 take 5 minutes.
6 I got educated every time that I went
7 there, and I don't think that his standards for
8 nuclear power on what we should do and how we should
9 operate a nuclear facility are in question.
10 I think that his presentation skill and
11 the way that he talks to people, if you are not in
12 tune with what he is trying to accomplish can send an
13 entirely different message, and one that I did not
14 recognize at the time, but I see it now as potentially
15 challenging and stifling, and being overbearing.
16 And because I had a good first meet up
17 with him, and he explained to me what he was all
18 about, I was not challenged by him that way. I didn't
19 look at him as being threatening and domineering, and
20 forcing me to do something that I don't want to do.
21 And I know that I could never walk in that
22 office with a lame answer. I had to provide
23 sufficient justification and explanation of all the
24 things that I decided to do with the issue at hand.
25 MR. BARBER: Did you because of the way

1 that the conversation went the way it did and the
2 interplay between you and [redacted] did you feel that you
3 were swinging on the limb a little bit because you had
4 -- well, [redacted] wasn't here?
5 [redacted] That's correct.
6 MR. BARBER: And he was off and away from
7 the station, and [redacted] was here, and he could
8 have supported you. [redacted] was here, even
9 though he maybe wasn't in Ops at the time, and he had
10 a ton of operational experience, and he could have
11 provided some insight one way or the other.
12 Do you feel like you weren't getting any
13 support from the leaders that maybe should have
14 provided it?
15 [redacted] I would tell you that I never
16 thought that [redacted] was a strong leader. I
17 don't know what his background -- I couldn't tell you
18 what his background is. I didn't think that he was a
19 dynamic leader.
20 That I didn't get that kind of support
21 from him was disappointing, but I would tell you that
22 I probably also didn't expect it either, because I
23 don't know how strong his technical background was.
24 And at the time I didn't even think that
25 somebody from another department with operational

All TC

1 experience would rally and help me answer questions.
2 I didn't think about that.
3 [redacted] certainly has sufficient background
4 and technical knowledge to clearly understand the
5 issue, and could have easily said, yeah, that's right,
6 we're done. Let's go and fix it.
7 But I am going to tell you that I don't
8 remember if [redacted] spoke or not. I don't know if he
9 did. He may have added support. I don't remember.
10 I think he was there, but I don't remember any
11 participation. You could easily refresh me and jog my
12 memory, but I don't know that he did.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about with [redacted]
14 [redacted] I know that he was off-site at the time, but
15 did you have discussions with him regarding this
16 event?
17 [redacted] Yes, I did; of the event, you
18 mean about the meeting or the reactivity?
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: More about the after,
20 after the bypass valve wouldn't close, did you have
21 discussions with him about that as you can recall?
22 [redacted] Probably in passing, but not
23 in any great detail. I would say that the working
24 relationship that [redacted] and I had was not as strong as
25 it should have been.

All 7C

1 I would say that immediately after that
2 event his whole life became engrossed in the
3 reactivity event and the root cause analysis, and him
4 and I -- he worked in that sphere, and he was also
5 functioning as the quasi-plant manager.
6 So he was working as [redacted]
7 [redacted] and he worked in that sphere and I
8 worked with operating the unit. So the strength of
9 our relationship was not the strength that I currently
10 have with this plant manager, or with my current Ops
11 manager.
12 We separated and we divided and conquered
13 the accountabilities that needed to be done. I am
14 sure that I had a conversation with [redacted] after the
15 fact that we had this big meeting, and talking about
16 the start it up or shut it down question.
17 But I don't remember ever sitting down in
18 his office, and having a discussion with him where I
19 complained about it took me four hours to convince the
20 organization to shut the plant down. I don't remember
21 ever having had that conversation
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall what
23 you relayed to him in general about what went on with
24 that?
25 [redacted] No, I'm sorry, I don't.

All 7c

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In coming out of that
2 experience, and that particular event, your meetings
3 and whatever it took you to convince senior management
4 and others of the direction that you were going to go
5 with it, what was your feeling after having gone
6 through something like that?
7 [redacted] Well, that was pretty obvious
8 to me. I mean, I can recall that. That was a 4 hour
9 delay in what I wanted to accomplish, and I don't
10 think it should have taken 4 hours.
11 I am not going to -- and regardless of
12 what I jus said about my relationship with [redacted]
13 [redacted] being in the [redacted] office and
14 having to explain or justify what you are doing is not
15 a walk in the park.
16 It had some stress, and what am I doing,
17 and am I doing the right thing, and why did the
18 explanation have to be so detailed. So, yes, it was
19 not a pleasant experience for me. But I thought about
20 it numerous times afterwards, and not in the detail of
21 the words and conversation, but I really am satisfied
22 that I would have spent 4 hours there, whether I
23 wanted to start it up or shut it down, and providing
24 a justification to senior management on what I wanted
25 to do with the plant.

All 7c

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, why do you say that? Had you ended up in a conversation of that length from your other perspective at a point in time?

[redacted] Oh, no.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Had you been challenged from, let's say, call it the safety aspect?

[redacted] I would say that all of my conversations with [redacted] were challenging. It was never, hey, [redacted] we are going to do this. It was, well, tell me why you are going to do that. Tell me why you are not going to do this.

Give me the justification for doing what you are doing. It had to be -- you had to show the management team that you had your thought process made well, and it wasn't just a carte blanche rubber stamp on you walking in there and saying I am going to do something.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And in this particular incident, you are looking at your actions were going to be ultimately conservative, in terms of shutting the plant down and figuring out what was wrong with that valve.

And in this particular case, in this lengthy discussion, it was why can't we go another way, and have you considered this, and explain to me

All 1C

1 why we cannot go and start up.

2 [redacted] Correct.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you think of any

4 incident where you took a tactic, and you would have

5 been more aggressive or less conservative, and you

6 were confronted by [redacted] or anybody else in

7 your management chain saying --

8 [redacted] Take me the other way?

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- take me the other

10 way. Consider that, and take a more conservative

11 approach.

12 [redacted] Nothing comes to mind. I

13 won't tell you know, but as I said something comes to

14 my mind right now.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you are just

16 saying that any discussions that you ever had with

17 [redacted] you would expect to be engaged in a back and

18 forth, no simple answer, and we are going to delve

19 into that, and we are going to challenge that, and we

20 are going to look at that closely?

21 [redacted] Absolutely, which was

22 surprising to me for a senior manager to be engaged in

23 that kind of detail, and I have never experienced that

24 before.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And in that kind of

1 detail in operational decisions?

2 [redacted] Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So can you think of

4 other instances where it was that you were going to

5 take this conservative approach and you engaged in

6 that kind of discussion with [redacted] to that

7 degree?

8 You are kind of portraying it as though it

9 was a fairly common event?

10 [redacted] Yes, I think I had a

11 significant number of conversations with him with

12 respect to the Bravo diesel generator exhaust leak

13 issue, and I think I spent some time in his office

14 about that as well.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that is fairly

16 well documented, too, the diesel being the whole

17 internal investigation.

18 [redacted] Well, I keep that on my shelf,

19 and so I look at that problem every day of my life.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So from that

21 perspective what were you taking as a position on what

22 was being challenged?

23 [redacted] What was being challenged was

24 do I have a clear understanding of what I am trying to

25 do. My position back then was that the diesel

411 7C

1 generator was operable, and I had to provide some
2 justification as to why I thought it was operable.
3 And I think I engaged him at the point
4 where I had received sufficient push back from the
5 employees that I needed help, and again [redacted] was not
6 here during that time frame. [redacted] was not here during
7 that time frame either.
8 And what I needed to do was to solve a
9 significantly emotional problem with the bargaining
10 unit employees on what is safe and what is not safe
11 for them to do their job. And you need what? When I
12 look back on this thing for the Bravo diesel
13 generator, the mind-set that I had then and the mind-
14 set that I look at today is different.
15 And that I was looking for a way to make
16 it safe for the operators to run the machines so that
17 they weren't have any exposure to carbon monoxide, and
18 I said what would it take for you guys to feel
19 comfortable about this, because the levels in the room
20 are not exceeding any regulatory guidelines in part
21 per millions exposure.
22 And their feedback was, yeah, but we are
23 getting sick and we don't feel good. I said I
24 understand that, and I also understand that when I
25 drive down the highway behind a bus that I can smell

All 7c

1 the diesel fumes, but it makes my wife sick.

2 You know, she gets noxious from smelling

3 diesel fumes just walking by, and I said we all have

4 different tolerance levels for that odor. Are you

5 getting ill because of the smell.

6 It is not supposedly -- I mean, the

7 feedback that we had from our safety department was

8 that it was not reaching any threshold levels that

9 would challenge anybody's health.

10 And I said what is it that I need to do

11 for you to feel comfortable and safe? Do you need to

12 wear a face mask respirator, and the guys said that we

13 wouldn't do anything but operate in an SCBA, and I had

14 the mental image of that I am saying that the machine

15 is operable, but I have got to have operators to

16 operate the equipment in SCBAs, and I said what a

17 horrible picture that is. What a contradiction.

18 But I was comfortable that the machine was

19 operable and would perform its intended function for

20 the duration of the mission time, and I didn't think

21 that the issue that had risen to be such a emotional

22 one required that I exceed the LCO time and shut the

23 facility down to correct this issue.

24 And in hindsight, under the religion that

25 I have gotten for addressing those types of issues

now, that is not a good decision, and [redacted] and my conversation with respect to that was understanding why I thought the diesel was operable and that it would perform its function.

And I will discuss what I just explained, and his support of what it would require to make the bargaining unit individuals, the technicians who would have to actually operate the machine, be comfortable in their personal safety viewpoint to perform the task.

And those were the types of conversations that we entered into, and I think that I probably had an office visit and a follow-up phone conversation with respect to that.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: With [redacted] [redacted] With [redacted] yes.

MR. BARBER: You are saying that he was looking for a way to make them feel comfortable?

[redacted] No, I was. The safety department says you have not reached any threshold that jeopardizes anybody's health and safety. And the bargaining unit said we don't care. It is making us feel ill.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You were just explaining that it didn't make everybody feel ill, but

All 7C

1 certain individuals felt ill?

2 [redacted] That's right. So the concept

3 of trying to -- I needed assistance in working with

4 the bargaining unit and understanding their position,

5 and what it was going to take for us to probably

6 resolve the issue and make the employees safety

7 comfortable to go perform the manipulation.

8 And that was before we utilized and

9 exercised the safety issues resolution process, which

10 is a very effective way resolve those issues. That

11 was not in place at the time and it was a painful back

12 and forth between the bargaining unit and management

13 on doing the evolution.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

15 [redacted] And he weighed in to have

16 conversations with the bargaining unit leadership to

17 help make that happen.

18 MR. BARBER: There was -- I think we have

19 some information that attributes to wanting to find

20 out what it would take to direct someone to actually

21 go on through the area and take action if they would

22 not be willing to do so. Do you recall anything along

23 that line?

24 [redacted] I heard that, too, and I heard

25 that from the bargaining unit people and not from him.

A11 7C

1 Let me think. What was the word that I heard.
2 Insubordination. That was the word. I heard
3 bargaining unit people toss that around, that is the
4 company provided the data and the assurance that it
5 was a safe job to do, and that employees would not
6 perform that task, that would be insubordination.
7 And I did not hear him say that to the
8 bargaining unit guy, but I know that he had a meeting
9 with bargaining unit leaders here on site, and I don't
10 know if he said that or not.
11 MR. BARBER: Did you ever hear him say
12 that, and maybe not to the bargaining unit, but to
13 others, other management employees?
14 [redacted] No. No, I did not.
15 MR. BARBER: Never in any context?
16 [redacted] No.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's just take a
18 quick break, okay? It is 3:28 p.m.
19 (Recess.)
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We are back on
21 the record, and what I have in front of me is actually
22 the report of interview with you from that emergency
23 diesel generator investigation and the leakage and how
24 it was handled.
25 And the bargaining unit issues that were

All 7C

1 raised there, and there is an interview with you where
2 they actually interview you once, and you are talking
3 about the use of the term insubordinate, and you are
4 saying, no, not you, no, not me, not in my
5 conversation. But they find it necessary to
6 come back to you based on another interview, and upon
7 further review of all information gathered -- and I am
8 going to read from page 4 of 5 from your own interview
9 in that investigation.
10 "Upon further review of all information
11 gathered the investigators considered it necessary to
12 reinterview [redacted] to confirm some of your earlier
13 statements regarding comments made regarding
14 insubordination."
15 Now, they put you down as saying that [redacted]
16 -- and I am quoting -- I didn't have any conversations
17 with any representative of the employees where I used
18 the word insubordinate. We used the word
19 insubordinate in meetings with [redacted] but not
20 with employees.
21 Now, I don't know if this is in any way
22 refreshing you recollection. It further talks about -
23 -
24 [redacted] It doesn't. It doesn't
25 refresh my recollection, but I would tell you that

All 7c

1 that interview was held closer to the time in
2 question, and if I had said that closer to that time,
3 then it was probably accurate.
4 What I recall how is that I heard those
5 words from bargaining unit employees, and I don't
6 remember our conversation with [redacted] where he
7 used the word insubordinate.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, they go a
9 little further with and you clarified it a little
10 further it looks like. Now, you did have a
11 conversation with [redacted] on the topic, and you
12 noted that [redacted] thought it might be insubordinate if we
13 deem the work safe and the bargaining unit employees
14 refused to do safe work.
15 [redacted] recalls telling [redacted] words to the
16 effect that we really didn't want to be in that space
17 to get the work done. It would not be a winning
18 situation.
19 [redacted] I would say that if I said
20 that, it is an accurate reflection. I will tell you
21 now that I don't recall that conversation. I think if
22 I said that at that time, then I think that is a good
23 statement, but I don't recall it now.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. I guess what
25 we are looking at overall is the position taken here

All 7C

1 either by you and by [redacted] you are in a
2 position where you are saying your priority was that
3 you were looking to make the situation safe for the
4 operators, and some of the information here indicates
5 that you might have been up against it there a little
6 bit there, too, with [redacted] in terms of how you
7 were going to handle that.
8 [redacted] Well, in my experience as a
9 first-line supervisor, trying to accomplish something
10 with a hammer is never the right way to do it. It is
11 not the right way to do business.
12 Forcing people to do something is not ever
13 the right way to do business. It is not a win-win
14 situation at all. And I think that is what I conveyed
15 there.
16 Telling somebody to do something
17 because they will be insubordinate if they don't do it
18 would have been not a winning situation. That is a
19 fact.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And in this situation
21 that I was asking you about, you said that you had
22 engaged in a lot of operational decisions with [redacted]
23 [redacted] and --
24 [redacted] A number of them.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A number of them, and

All 7c

1 you would take the position that he would force, and
2 challenge, and probe, and not accept an easy answer
3 from you, or a simple answer from you?
4 [redacted] Correct.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you said this was
6 another example akin to the bypass valve issue. Are
7 there other issues, like any other number of issues
8 that you talked about, where you found yourself in the
9 same position with him?
10 [redacted] I will tell you that the two
11 times that I remember being in challenging situations
12 would have been the bypass valve and the diesel.
13 Those stick out in my mind painfully in the past 2
14 years, very painful.
15 I mean, there are other things that took
16 place at the facility that were questions, and are we
17 doing the right thing, but in March of 2004, I don't
18 remember the conversation specifically with [redacted]
19 [redacted] They were not significant enough to stick
20 with him.
21 But there are other things that have taken
22 place in the past 2 years where I have questioned
23 whether or not we were doing the right thing.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What is interesting
25 is that if it came from [redacted] it is a one way.

All 7C

1 It is challenging your conservative position. You
2 don't have any examples where he challenged you to be
3 more conservative.
4 And what I am saying that is of interest
5 is because this is a safety conscious work environment
6 probe, and so we are trying to figure out what was the
7 kind of direction that you were typically faced with.
8 Was it a push to be in that one direction,
9 and when you say that you could see yourself easily in
10 the position and flip in the 3 to 4 hour discussion of
11 having to defend, let's say, a more aggressive
12 position, what do you base that on.
13 Because based on what we have been
14 gathering, we are not seeing that.
15 7C . [redacted] Well, that is a perception on
16 my part, and that is not -- I don't have anything to
17 toss on the table to justify that. That is my
18 perception based on each of my conversations with him
19 were always challenging and depth to understand why I
20 was taking the position that I was taking.
21 And that regardless of what position I
22 show up with, I will be provided that kind of in-depth
23 justification.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that is your
25 expectation based on your contacts with him, but you

1 don't have anything that goes in the other direction?

2 [redacted] That would be correct.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that would be an

4 example of that?

5 [redacted] That would be correct.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything

7 further on that?

8 MR. BARBER: No.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I might have to speak

10 up being over here. There is another point that you

11 made just a little while back, and it was a comment --

12 [redacted] Well, let me pause here a

13 minute. I am bothered by my detail for information

14 recall in 2004 versus getting presented with something

15 that I said in a dated interview later on.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, you know what,

17 and it is probably -- the explanation is that we have

18 been looking at this more recently than you have, but

19 what I have to do is --

20 [redacted] Right, and I don't have a

21 problem with you providing me that information. I

22 just would say that the closer that information was to

23 the time period, the higher accuracy it is going to

24 have, versus what I am remembering now.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That is understood,

All 7C

1 but when we were going through that, our job is to
2 find out what is going on on-site, and having reviewed
3 this more recently than you have, what you said -- and
4 I knew that I had seen it somewhere before, and --
5 [redacted] Well, that clearly indicates
6 that in some meeting that I had with [redacted] over
7 in his office that we had a conversation about -- of
8 insubordination with employees.
9 I am glad to hear that I said what I said,
10 but I don't recall that particular conversation.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Let me put it
12 out for what I think it is worth just so that you
13 understand my position on it. When we have that kind
14 of information and you make a statement during an
15 interview in response to a question, Scott's question
16 about the word "insubordinate," I have to probe
17 discrepancies.
18 You know, I have to question it further,
19 and you resolved that to my satisfaction. My question
20 would be that in this situation and given your
21 responses here, what I want to make sure of is that
22 you are being forthcoming.
23 That you are not trying to protect
24 somebody, and that what we are trying to do is to get
25 your honest answers, and obviously you are under oath,

All TC

1 and there is the expectation that you will be complete
2 and accurate.
3 I can understand time frames
4 discrepancies, but that is why I have to probe a
5 little further, and we had this information more
6 recently than you did. But my concern would be that
7 you are being frank with us in terms of your
8 recollection of events.
9 [redacted] Good.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you understand
11 that is what we are looking for.
12 [redacted] I do. I am not trying to --
13 I will tell you that I am not trying to protect [redacted]
14 [redacted] I mean, I have no reason to.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that is where my
16 next question was going to.
17 [redacted] Well, I have no reason to
18 protect [redacted] If I thought that he was a
19 detriment to nuclear power, then he needs to not be in
20 nuclear power.
21 And I would tell you that at the time of
22 my interface with him, I did not view him as a
23 detriment to nuclear power. But I have been asked
24 some particular questions that never came into my mind
25 before on the type of senior manager and their

All 7C

1 demeanor, and the way that they deal with employees,
2 and what impact they have on a safety conscious work
3 environment.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This is where you
5 went before where you said in hindsight more or less
6 you were looking at situations that were handled?
7 [redacted] That's right. So his
8 predecessor by 2 or 3 people, who was a senior VP when
9 I got hired, and not that I lived under his reign for
10 very long -- a couple of weeks, a couple of months --
11 he was a very overbearing and challenging senior VP.
12 And he was hard on people, and the stories
13 that I hear say it is totally inappropriate. [redacted]
14 [redacted] was not to that degree, but his loud
15 challenging voice, and the words that he used when he
16 talked to people could very easily train you to keep
17 our mouth shut.
18 I don't think that I recognized that
19 during his tenure and in my relationship with him, but
20 in hindsight, and when I look back, and I hear that
21 people have a worse impression of that 3-to-4 hour
22 meeting than I do -- and I didn't think it was a good
23 meeting.
24 You know, I can't tell you that I wasn't
25 sweating and challenged during that meeting. I was.

All 7c

1 but I think the people who witnessed it had a more
2 sour take away from it than I did.
3 And that is the impression that that
4 senior leader had on the organization, and it did not
5 register with me at the time. When I look back on
6 that, that is the kind of thing that can be stifling
7 on an organization for people to speak up and identify
8 issues if you are not solid on your convictions and
9 what you want to do.
10 And I see that now and I did not see that
11 then. So I think he would be a challenge for our
12 organization today, and where we want to go with
13 advancing our organization.
14 I think that his management style would be
15 counter to what we want to achieve here with our
16 safety conscious work environment and moving our
17 organization in a positive forward fashion.
18 And I don't see that in the management
19 team that we have today. It is significantly
20 different in the tone and gender of the way that we
21 speak about things. It is really different.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And there were others
23 in that management team that you were dealing with at
24 that time, and from your perspective what was [redacted] -7C
25 [redacted] effect in that time frame?

1 It seems primarily that you had to deal
2 with [redacted] is what you are
3 talking about. But did you have any engagement with
4 [redacted]
5 [redacted] I had a longstanding
6 engagement wit[redacted] before he came here. My
7 interface wit[redacted]at Hope Creek was really removed
8 -- I mean, he was the [redacted] and I had
9 minimal with [redacted]
10 So I don't know how he influenced the
11 senior VPs other than the stories, and I don't know of
12 any direct things to report back.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And in terms for [redacted]
14 [redacted] you kind of give an impression of him being
15 I guess not very effective.
16 [redacted] Well, I don't think that he
17 was a strong leader, and I don't know about his
18 technical background being strong. I think he would
19 be -- my impression would be that he would be
20 negatively susceptible to that type of leadership.
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you are saying
22 that he was negatively susceptible, meaning he would
23 fall in line with it?
24 [redacted] Yes, I think so.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So whatever direction

All 1C

1 [redacted] was pushing for would become [redacted]

2 [redacted] Yes, and I would say -- and I

3 was not privy to any private meetings that they had.

4 I don't now if he stood up and had those types of

5 conversations that I had with [redacted] or not. I

6 don't know that.

7 I know that he was supportive of where I

8 was during that meeting, and the wrapping of it up and

9 this is what we are going to do, and we are going to

10 shut the plant down.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: After a certain point

12 in time, he was on your side with the issue?

13 [redacted] Yes, correct.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you got to a

15 turning point there, what was it?

16 [redacted] Scott did ask me that, and I

17 don't know that I remember what the turning point was.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You said what

19 actually clinched it and wrapped it up, and ended that

20 discussion. You don't know what it took to sway [redacted]

21 [redacted]

22 [redacted] No.

23 MR. BARBER: The only thing that puzzles

24 me about this is that it seems so very different than

25 how I would expect things to work, because often times

All 1C

1 when you get these difficult challenging situations,
2 you (inaudible) what the right answer is.
3 You may have an idea what the right answer
4 is, but you could pick up the phone and call [redacted] and
5 say, hey, [redacted] we have this problem in the plant, and
6 this is what I am thinking, and this is what [redacted] is
7 thinking, and what are you thinking?
8 And he could you his feedback and talk
9 about it, and then you could get on the phone and talk
10 to [redacted] and the three of you could talk. And
11 then you could get on the phone, the three of you
12 could get on the phone and talk t[redacted]
13 And sit down and have an informal
14 conversation, and hey, this is what we are thinking
15 of.
16 [redacted] Instead of having a --
17 MR. BARBER: Exactly.
18 [redacted] That was a management style
19 that I was not familiar with. I have been in the
20 industry since [redacted] and granted, I was always at a
21 level in the organization below the Assistant Ops
22 Managers at that time, but my conversations with
23 senior managers was for not.
24 I would never engage in any justification,
25 philosophical justification, on where we are going

All 7C

1 with the organization. That was always with and it
2 never had to go above the operations manager's level
3 from my perspective.
4 To be engaged in that type of explanation
5 to the [redacted] level was abnormal. It was kind of
6 a surprise for me and I wondered if that had taken
7 place before, and if that is the way that business was
8 done, because I didn't expect it to be the way to do
9 business.
10 MR. BARBER: Did you stop and talk to
11 anyone in Ops that you -- well, sort of like [redacted]
12 [redacted]-
13 [redacted] I don't believe that [redacted]
14 [redacted] was here for that.
15 MR. BARBER: I mean, did you have any
16 thoughts like when you knew that you had to go over
17 and talk to [redacted] on what is this about, and did you
18 share any thoughts with anybody?
19 [redacted] You know, I think I did have
20 a conversation with [redacted] because I was still
21 reaching out to talk to [redacted] periodically to help me
22 and coach me through the -- you know, I was like 5
23 months on the job, or 6 months on the job, and so I
24 still kept in touch with [redacted] to coach me on things.
25 I think that I did have a conversation

with him. I a pretty sure that I had a conversation with him, but I don't remember the details of the conversation.

MR. BARBER: Do you remember having an impression one way or the other about something that you either should do or not do? You're saying that you don't remember the details, but did you have an impression that I am going to do this or I am going to do that?

[redacted] You mean after talking with [redacted]

MR. BARBER: Yes.

[redacted] I don't think that [redacted] told me anything that changed my impression of what I was going to do at the facility. The facility was not starting up as long as I was the [redacted] It just wasn't.

[redacted] Did you tell that to anybody else that you can recall?

[redacted] Yes. Yes, I told people in the -- we had a meeting here in this room that [redacted] came to, and I told that meeting group, some of which went over to [redacted] office, that we weren't starting the unit up with me as the [redacted] and I said we are going to go cold.

All 7c

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And who comprised
2 this meeting group? Was it the shift people, or --
3 [redacted] No. I think they might have
4 been more along the lines of people who might be
5 structured in the FORT and TORT job titles. The first
6 outage response team, and the transient outage
7 response team.
8 And they were the leaders of that
9 organization, as well as there might have been some
10 engineers in there who were there to help us figure
11 out what the problem with the bypass valve might have
12 been.
13 And I don't even remember where the notion
14 of starting the plant back up even came from. I don't
15 know who vocalized that, but somebody did, and it
16 really caught me off-guard as to what are you
17 thinking.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You just hit my
19 question on that. If it was clearly something that
20 was not even in your thought processes, then where was
21 it coming from? Was it operations or was it outside
22 in senior management?
23 [redacted] I am almost absolutely
24 positive that it would not have come from my operating
25 crew. My people were not -- I don't remember anybody

All 7C

1 that I had to talk to in my organization that worked
2 for me that had to counter that it was okay to start
3 up.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about the outage
5 group? I mean, they have a deep involvement in the
6 schedule and what happens here.
7 [redacted] They do. Boy, I wish I could
8 remember that outage guy's name.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Hold on a minute. We
10 will just go off the record briefly. It is 3:49.
11 (Whereupon, at 3:49 p.m., a recess was
12 taken, and resumed at 3:50 p.m.)
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We are back on and it
14 is approximately 3:50. And the individual that you
15 recognized the name for was [redacted]
16 [redacted] That's correct. I remember
17 that he was -- I remember that over in the [redacted]
18 office that he ended up being supporting of the
19 position, and I know that he had some conversation
20 when we were next door in the OSC meeting prior to
21 going over to [redacted] office.
22 And I don't know if he suggested that we
23 have the capability to start up or not, or whether he
24 was asking the question just as a formality that had
25 to be addressed.

A11 7c

1 So I still don't remember where that
2 thought process came from, and is it okay for us to
3 start up because the bypass valve is not closed. I
4 don't know who originated that thought process or
5 question.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How did it come that
7 you got involved in that meeting at that point? How
8 did you get contacted and what were you told to come
9 to the meeting to discuss?
10 [redacted] Well, I was just getting ready
11 to roll up my list and I heard that somebody wanted to
12 start the plant up, and so then I would ask myself who
13 did I hear that from and I don't know. I don't even
14 know if that is a factor not.
15 But I have the sense that I went to that
16 meeting to put the train back on the track, and that
17 that meeting was talking about doing something that I
18 was not going to support, and that's why I think I
19 went to the meeting next store.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were you invited, or
21 did you have to go and put your two cents in?
22 [redacted] I don't know. I don't
23 remember.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But it is something
25 that you think that you might have heard about and you

A11 7C

1 just needed to weigh in on?

2 [redacted] Well, someone may have come

3 and gotten me. I am not sure.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You just are not sure

5 how that came about?

6 [redacted] Right. As a matter of fact,

7 I would tell you that that entire process of having to

8 have a discussion about starting the plant up or

9 shutting it down interfered with my response to the

10 reactivity event.

11 And that is where my focus was when I

12 realized that somebody has a different idea and I need

13 to stop that.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had one incident

15 on top of the next, huh?

16 [redacted] Yes, I did. And I think that

17 whole issue with ensuring that we did the right thing

18 with the facility interfered with me making sure that

19 I did the right thing in our response to the

20 reactivity event.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There was a delay

22 there?

23 [redacted] Yes, there was.

24 MR. BARBER: Well, it was a major

25 distraction. I mean, you are thinking about the

All 7C

1 reactivity management event that occurred on a Sunday
2 night.
3 [redacted] Right.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And there is
5 discussion on Monday morning, and it takes you in a
6 totally different direction.
7 [redacted] That's correct. It was a huge
8 distraction for me and I did not manage that well at
9 all.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why do you mention
11 that? Was there some sort of an impact from there
12 being a delay in handling it, the reactivity
13 management event?
14 [redacted] Absolutely. When I went to
15 SORC (phonetic), and I presented the details of the
16 shutdown in my post-transient response presentation to
17 SORC, when I discussed the issue of having had the
18 reactivity excursion, and looking at [redacted]
19 face was the first time that he had realized that.
20 And, you know, I think [redacted] was back by then, too.
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A couple of days
22 later?
23 [redacted] Yes. And I realized that my
24 director doesn't understand the magnitude of this
25 event. So I realized then that my actions in having

All 7c

1 properly communicated that to the organization, and
2 implementing the types of things that you should do
3 with that type of challenge to reactivity management
4 were woefully short.
5 And I attribute some of that to me being
6 here by myself, and having that challenge the next
7 day, and that distracted me from taking closure to the
8 initial event.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. It took you
10 off-track a little bit?
11 [redacted] It took me off-track a lot.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A lot?
13 MR. BARBER: Do you recall talking to
14 [redacted] The discussion on the bypass valve and what to
15 do about that was on Monday morning, and I think that
16 reactivity event was on Wednesday. Did you talk to
17 [redacted] at all on either Monday afternoon or at all on
18 Tuesday, or with [redacted] at all, about that?
19 I mean, was this a situation where maybe
20 you mentioned it to them, and it just didn't register,
21 or you just didn't have a chance because you really
22 were focused on --
23 [redacted] I don't remember a
24 conversation with [redacted] about the bypass valve. I
25 remember trying to explain the reactivity event to him

All 7C

over the phone.

MR. BARBER: And what was his take on that?

[redacted] I don't remember. I know that it was a big deal for [redacted] when he got back, and we were engaged in what is the right thing to do, and he was asking me what my course of action was with the cooling and where I was headed with that.

But I don't know that -- I am sure that some kind of red flag went up for him, but I don't know that he provided me any direction on things to do. I think he was asking me what are you doing, and what is your course of action.

MR. BARBER: How did the plant get into that? I mean, we have heard some information about that there was an ITT that was planned, and procedures --

[redacted] Sure, I will talk to you about that.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Before we go there, I just had another question on the other end of that event. From what you said before, you said -- when I asked you if there was direction coming at you, were you being directed to move the unit in a particular -- in other words, to not shut down, but to start up?

All 1c

1 You said there was no direction, but the
2 only direction that you objected to was to [redacted]
3 [redacted]
4 [redacted] To halting the cool down.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: To halting the cool
6 down?
7 [redacted] Right.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And at what point in
9 time did that -- when was that communicated to you?
10 [redacted] I think in the transition from
11 this meeting to the [redacted] meeting. Just hold
12 this thing stable until we go get all the stuff
13 resolved, and I think that is what that was.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But you did
15 that, right?
16 [redacted] I did. I told the shift
17 manager to slow and stabilize the cool down until I do
18 and solve this issue, and then I will come back and we
19 will finish our cool down.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
21 MR. BARBER: Actually, another question
22 that I wanted to ask you was on that. Your statement
23 to the group in here about -- what was it again?
24 Could you refresh my recollection on that?
25 [redacted] I can't give you a quote, but

All 1c

1 I will tell you is that I told the organization that
2 we weren't starting the plant back up, and I think
3 that I got some -- I think that [redacted]
4 were sensing -- well, it doesn't have to go that far,
5 and we will go and have a conversation about this, and
6 explain it to --
7 MR. BARBER: Some people have attributed
8 that to you trying to, quote, draw a line in the sand.
9 [redacted] Absolutely.
10 MR. BARBER: I am not going to be in this
11 organization if we are going to start the unit back
12 up.
13 [redacted] That's correct. Well, I think
14 that may have been part of the conversation that I had
15 with [redacted] you know, and being forceful about my
16 position.
17 As long as I have been in the industry -- I am a good
18 soldier. I am. I am a good soldier.
19 And you can ask me to do a lot of things
20 from a business perspective, but I don't have to agree
21 with it, but I will execute it. And you can ask me to
22 do an awful lot of things, but you can't ask me to do
23 that is a challenge to nuclear safety or personal
24 safety.
25 I am [redacted] years old, and I a not prepared to

All 7C

1 go out doing something that challenges our mission,
2 and I was prepared not to start the facility up
3 because it was not the right thing to do. Somebody
4 else could be the [redacted] if that command was going to be
5 given, because it was going to be me.
6 MR. BARBER: Did you tell [redacted]
7 that during the meeting?
8 [redacted] Sometime during the meeting,
9 I think I did say that. I don't think that I said
10 that in the early stages when I was getting asked
11 questions for understanding.
12 But I think later on during the meeting
13 that there was actually a question around the table of
14 the people who were there and what their position was
15 on what we are going to do with the unit.
16 And I think that I may have said that then
17 as well. I think that I said that a couple of times
18 that day here, and also over there.
19 MR. BARBER: Do you think that had an
20 impact on the decision that was made?
21 [redacted] I don't know. I don't know
22 that I was that important to --
23 MR. BARBER: Well, let's just back up a
24 minute here. One of the things that you said earlier,
25 and maybe it was an insightful point that you made,

All 7C

1 was that you were talking about forcing operators to
2 go into the diesel room and force them to do work that
3 they did not want to do.
4 And you said that is a really bad position
5 to be in, and I think you used that as an example, but
6 generically you were saying that was a bad situation
7 to be in.
8 So if [redacted] thought the same way
9 that you did on that kind of issue, here you have got
10 an [redacted] that is saying I am not going to start the unit
11 up from where I am.
12 So he may be thinking in his mind, okay,
13 so if I want to turn the unit around from where I am,
14 I have to acknowledge that that may result, and [redacted]
15 may say, okay, fine. You can relieve me, and have
16 someone else start the unit up. And considering that,
17 do you think that had an impact?
18 [redacted] Well, I would tell you that if
19 it came to the point where I felt that I needed to say
20 that, and I needed to play that card -- and that is
21 pretty strong stuff. It is.
22 And I did, I did say that, and I don't say
23 that to toot my own horn, but if it got to the point
24 where I needed to say that, then there was sufficient
25 challenge to the other position, to my position of

All 7C

1 what I wanted to do with the unit that I had to draw
2 that line in the sand.
3 And I will tell you that if I was on the
4 receiving end of that from one of my employees that
5 that would certainly make me think twice about what I
6 was asking them to do.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, you were there,
8 [redacted] We weren't. You had the benefit of seeing
9 expressions, and participating in this. Was this some
10 sort of a turning point? Did a light go on that said
11 that you really felt strongly about moving the unit in
12 that way?
13 [redacted] Well, what makes you think
14 that when you are throwing your job on the table like
15 that that you have the foresight to look at people's
16 faces and judge their emotion on it?
17 I mean, when you say something like that,
18 you could very well get the answer of that's fine, and
19 you are replaced, you know.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right, but you must
21 have been tuned in to a response to that, right? Once
22 you say something like that, you are looking to see
23 how he is going to react.
24 [redacted] I think he moved and asked the
25 next person down the line what their opinion was, and

All 7C

I think when he was done polling the group, he said okay, that's what we are going to do.

MR. BARBER: So that was a turning point?

[redacted] Well, I think that was the end of our conversation, because he was asking everybody their position, and so we were done with the justification viewpoint, and I think that I took some written material back to him after the meeting to substantiate some other things that I told him to follow up.

But when he is asking people around the room in a polling and voting fashion --

MR. BARBER: I don't understand --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When they weighed in on that were they of the same mind that you were?

[redacted] I don't remember anybody saying that we should start up. I think everybody was aligned with that viewpoint at that time, and I don't know if that was based on the strength of my justification, or whether they were on board with that from the get go.

They could have very well have been in my camp all along, but I don't know that for sure.

MR. BARBER: To me, him asking everybody in the room what they wanted to do -- I mean, that is

All 7C

1 an interesting approach, but you were the [redacted]
2 [redacted] right?
3 You were holding, quote, the [redacted]
4 [redacted] and it was your
5 decision to make unless he took it away from you.
6 [redacted] That's correct.
7 MR. BARBER: I mean, those were the
8 choices. You make the decision, or [redacted] can't make the
9 decision through you if you don't agree to that.
10 [redacted] That's correct.
11 MR. BARBER: But what he can do is that he
12 can replace you. He could have brought [redacted] back, or
13 promoted one of the shift managers, but that is a
14 pretty significant action, and he would have had to
15 have done it on the spot.
16 [redacted] That's right.
17 MR. BARBER: So to poll other people --
18 [redacted] I was not the first one that
19 he asked. I mean, it was a sequential around the table
20 kind of thing, and I wasn't the first one to get up
21 and talk.
22 MR. BARBER: But to poll other people --
23 [redacted] I was not the first one that
24 he asked, and I was not the first one to say that this
25 is what I think we ought to do.

All 7C

1 MR. BARBER: Well, it just seems that it
2 was a very odd management style to do this, and to
3 challenge you significantly on the course of action,
4 and to have people in there that may or may not have,
5 quote, a dog in the fight.
6 I mean, it sounds like there were people
7 there that weren't even sure what organization they
8 were from, and to ask them an opinion about something,
9 they may not have had the right to vote on that.
10 Didn't that seem odd to you that he would
11 be doing that?
12 [redacted] No, it didn't. I mean, even
13 as you mention it down, it is the way that we do
14 business in the industry, that when we have a
15 maintenance or SORC work that way, and SORC work is
16 where you poll and vote on it, and make
17 recommendations to the Chair to make recommendations
18 to the plant manager.
19 And it is the way that we do business and
20 who is the decision maker. Well, I think that when
21 [redacted] was here, people would have said that [redacted]
22 [redacted] is the decision maker.
23 I think in this organization that the
24 decision maker is over there in the control room. It
25 is the shift manager. That is who the decision maker

All 7C

1 is. But I think that pushing the decision making down
2 to the people who have the wherewithal to do that
3 activity is a vision difference in the management
4 organization that we have here today.
5 I mean, [redacted] never tells me what to
6 do. He asks me what I am going to do, and when I say
7 this is what I am going to do, he asks did you think
8 about think, and did you think about this. No, I
9 didn't think about that. Let me roll that into my
10 decision and I will get back to you.
11 And I will get back to him and say, yeah,
12 I am still doing that. So I am going to add this part
13 of it into my plan. Okay, good, fine. But he doesn't
14 - [redacted] doesn't say do. He says what are you doing.
15 And I would expect our organization to
16 think that [redacted] was the decision maker, and
17 that is not the place for that decision making to take
18 place.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And in that instance
20 were you getting do from [redacted] Is that why
21 you got to the point where you put your job on the
22 line?
23 [redacted] You are asking me that
24 question a lot, Eileen. I don't think he directed me
25 to do anything. I don't think he did.

All 7C

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But it got to a point
2 where you thought you had to take a pretty strong
3 stand?
4 [redacted] Maybe I was tired of having to
5 justify the answer, and I am done, and I want to get
6 out of here and go do what I am supposed to go do. I
7 don't know if I was inappropriately playing a trump
8 card, but it is a big emotional step to throw that
9 card on the table, but I was done with that game, and
10 it was time to go and take the plant to cold, and go
11 fix the problem.
12 MR. BARBER: It sounds like you were
13 pretty frustrated?
14 [redacted] I think I was. I don't back
15 up from -- you know, I am going to guess that I have
16 couched this entire conversation differently than you
17 have heard it from other people.
18 But I am not going to tell you that it was
19 okay. I am just going to tell you that I don't think
20 that [redacted] was going to make me start up, and
21 I think the position that I took was solidly
22 justified, and I think that I threw my job behind it
23 to support my conviction on what I was doing.
24 And that I was not going to start the unit
25 up as the [redacted] individual at Hope Creek.

All 7C

1 MR. BARBER: Okay.

2 [redacted] And I will tell you that I am

3 glad that I don't do that anymore. I am glad that I

4 don't have to do that kind of challenging

5 justification for the things that I am doing.

6 [redacted] is a challenging individual,

7 but it is at a much different tone of understanding

8 what you are going to do.

9 MR. BARBER: When you discussed your stand

10 with [redacted] what was his reaction to that? I mean, you

11 must have discussed the fact that you said that to [redacted]

12 [redacted]

13 [redacted] With [redacted]

14 MR. BARBER: Yes.

15 [redacted] I don't know that I did.

16 MR. BARBER: You didn't?

17 [redacted] I don't know that I did.

18 MR. BARBER: Wouldn't you have wanted to

19 do that? I mean, just to kind of share that with your

20 boss and say, no, it got to a point where I had to say

21 this just to make my point.

22 [redacted] I will tell you that [redacted] and

23 I did not have that kind of working relationship. We

24 just didn't. We dealt with what is the issue now

25 today, because there were plenty of issues now and

All TC

today that we didn't sit around shooting the breeze about, and that type of thing.

MR. BARBER: Well, not shooting the breeze, but did you tell him? I mean, that is talking about things that happened --

[redacted] Well, I will tell you that when I got engaged with [redacted] when he returned, it was the reactivity event is what we were engaged in. And I know that I had to have some kind of conversation with [redacted] in discussing the thought process behind the bypass valve, but I would tell you that I don't remember that.

I know that our lives were totally engaged in the reactivity event, and the impact that it had on our station and the industry, and that was all consuming. As a matter of fact, it consumed his life more than mine after we finished our short outage and started the plant back up, because he had the longer term resolution engagement.

And I took over staying focused on the operation of the facility.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There were a couple of points that you made about the differences between the way that things are working now, as opposed to when [redacted]

A11 7C

1 And you said more or less that you didn't
2 see it then, but you could see now where his style
3 would have a stifling effect. What is it that is
4 being done differently now that you can say you think
5 that has turned around?
6 I know that you made one point just a
7 minute ago about where decisions are being made in the
8 control room, as opposed to the input from the VP
9 level.
10 7C - [redacted] Yes. And I would tell you
11 that those decisions aren't accepted carte blanche.
12 They are always questioned, but the -- I think that
13 our organization understands more clearly now the
14 execution of the conservative decision making process
15 is your first choice.
16 You know, always fail on the side of
17 conservatism. And I would have told you that 2 years
18 ago. I would have told you the same thing 2 years
19 ago. I would have told you that I did not think that
20 we had a challenge to our safety conscious work
21 environment.
22 But as we mature and progress, and go
23 through different phases, and especially to be
24 followed by a kindly, gentler, but accountable
25 organization, that gives you the wherewithal and the

1 accountability to make a decision, you get an
2 opportunity to weigh and make comparisons between what
3 you had before that you thought was okay, to what yo
4 have now and make a judgment that would have you feel
5 that it is not okay.
6 I think that [redacted] brings an entirely
7 different vision, or a mission statement and vision of
8 the department and of the company has not changed a
9 bit. The promulgation and the communication of it to
10 the troops on down is different than it was before.
11 It is stronger.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As a concrete example
13 of where it is stronger, what do you see them doing
14 differently? I understand that you are saying that
15 you based that on a comparison, and you would not have
16 had that had you not shifted your management.
17 But what are the examples of where you see
18 it stronger, in terms of communication and mission
19 statements?
20 [redacted] Well, I think if I was going
21 to make a decision, [redacted] would ask me, well, why
22 wouldn't you do this instead, and why would you
23 provide the justification and rationalization on your
24 own as an operating organization without engaging the
25 rest of your support organization to help you make

All 7C

1 that decision and do the right thing.

2 And the case in point on that, and an

3 example would be the Bravo reactor feed pump issue

4 that we had a couple of months ago. We had a

5 vibration point that came into alarm on the reactor

6 feed pump, and the initial feedback was that it was

7 bad information, and bad instrumentation. So we said

8 okay.

9 I thought that I was conveying a

10 difference in the concerns of the decision making

11 process, and would be the reason with the Bravo

12 reactor feed pump and the vibration challenge that we

13 had on it.

14 And then we had an alarm on vibration that

15 initially was sent back to us through the

16 investigation from INC in engineering that it was not

17 accurate information, and that was a good thing we

18 said.

19 We said, good, we have got bad

20 instrumentation, and so we need to fix that, but the

21 pump is okay, and so we shouldn't have to shut the

22 unit down. But the alarm was in, and the procedure

23 wasn't changed to say an acceptable vibration of a

24 higher level would have been okay. So we didn't

25 change the procedure.

1 And we didn't follow our process to
2 document that the instrumentation was okay, which
3 would have been the expectation for the operating
4 crew. First you have to say that the instrumentation
5 is no good, and then document it as such so that you
6 don't have to follow it.
7 Or if the instrumentation is okay, then
8 you would have to change your procedure on the spot to
9 say that operating at that vibration level was
10 acceptable with appropriate justification from the
11 subject matter expert.
12 We didn't do either one of those things.
13 That was a bad call. That was rational relation and
14 justification that was Bravo diesel that was operating
15 the unit with 75 FTFM with an off-gas leak, and that
16 was the rationalization justification for everything
17 is okay and I don't have to do anything.
18 And we were taken to task on that strongly
19 and appropriately, and a follow-up incident with the
20 Bravo reactor feed pump was that while the vibration
21 was trending up, and not known to be a valve or not --
22 and as a matter of fact, we thought it was invalid, we
23 did not get sufficient feedback from the engineering
24 organization or the maintenance department in a timely
25 enough fashion.

1 And we said you know what, it is okay. It
2 is okay to come down 5 percent and take the Bravo feed
3 pump out, and then figure out whether or not you have
4 got an issue with it or not.
5 And that was a different sense of about
6 what is the right thing to do. If you go ask any
7 reactor operator are you comfortable taking the unit
8 off-line if you have to take the unit off-line, and
9 they will all tell you yes.
10 If I think that the unit is not the way it
11 is supposed to be, I will either take it off or I will
12 direct it to come off, and place into motion a
13 shutdown.
14 The one that is harder to deal with is the
15 unknown, where you think that everything is okay, and
16 you might have to reduce power, and those questions
17 can be tougher to answer.
18 The black and white is easy on either end
19 of the spectrum. It is the ones in the middle that
20 cause you the most consternation, and I think that we
21 are comfortable with the management at zero vibration
22 that it is easy for us to make the gray decisions now.
23 It is easier to make the gray decisions
24 because providing your justification is not a problem,
25 because you almost don't have to do it. I am not

1 comfortable with it, and this is what I am going to
2 do. Okay. You know, that is probably the only
3 feedback that I got today that I told the control room
4 supervisor.
5 I went over and I talked to him, and I
6 said so what are we doing with this feed pump, and he
7 said I am not comfortable with it. And I said then
8 why are you standing around being uncomfortable with
9 it.
10 I said bring the unit down power and take
11 the pump out. Well, you know -- and I said that's it.
12 And when I conveyed that information to the plant
13 manager, and this is what I am going to do, fine. Go
14 ahead.
15 And it is easy. I don't know that it was
16 that easy before. I think we have been provided
17 comfort in being able to make those decisions that
18 didn't exist before. Maybe we always had it, but I am
19 comfortable about things now.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At what point did you
21 get that sense of comfort? Can you tag a time frame
22 to that?
23 [redacted] Well, I would tell you not
24 long after [redacted] showed up at the gate, and came
25 and talked to us, and had conversations, and we

All 7C

1 understood where he was coming from, and his
2 conversations are gentle, but probing, and making you
3 understand what we are all about. And he made a
4 significant impact on our organization within weeks of
5 arriving.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what time frame
7 was that exactly? I am not exactly sure where you
8 are.
9 [redacted] Well, August. I think he
10 hired on in August, because that's when [redacted]
11 left the company, and I became the [redacted]
12 [redacted] and [redacted] told me that I would be the
13 [redacted] So it had to be in August.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And what you
15 are describing then is a change in your management
16 structure that took you from having to justify what
17 you were doing with the assets in the prior time
18 period, to where now conservatism seemed to be more
19 endorsed, and they are easier to come by?
20 [redacted] I think that is a valid
21 statement, and I see that now, and I would not have
22 seen that before.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't think you
24 saw it while you were living it?
25 [redacted] No, I don't think so.

All 7C

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, I took you off-
2 track before, and we were going into --
3 MR. BARBER: I was going to actually back
4 up a little bit around the bypass event, and you
5 talked about the reactivity management event. And I
6 started with talking about the IPPE, and what I was
7 trying to get to was, first of all, with the valve
8 stuck the way it was, who made the decision to treat
9 it as a (inaudible)?
10 Was that a decision that you made, or
11 someone else? I would kind of what to just understand
12 how you got to that process and who was involved?
13 [redacted] I think I did.
14 MR. BARBER: Okay.
15 [redacted] I think I did.
16 MR. BARBER: Okay. So what was the plan
17 when that decision was made?
18 [redacted] Well, I think that when we
19 placed the main turbine on-line and the bypass valve
20 did not go close, I think we said are we okay, and I
21 said, yeah, we are okay.
22 The plant is stable, and the generator is
23 operating okay, and I have got a bypass valve that did
24 not go full-close, and do we have time to assess this
25 situation and come up with a plan on what we are going

All 7c

1 to do. Yes, we do.

2 And I went to -- I don't know who I went

3 to. I went to a plant management organization, and it

4 may have been SORC, and I want to take some time and

5 put together a procedure to decide what we are going

6 to do with the unit, and how we are going to shut the

7 unit back down to make repairs to this valve.

8 And I am sure that we had executed

9 something to try and make some repairs on-line and

10 that was not successful, validating the concern, and

11 validating the issue, and making sure that the bypass

12 valve is really stuck open, and we can stroke it open,

13 but it doesn't go closed any further than 45 percent

14 or something like that.

15 So that would require the unit off-line to

16 make repairs, and not only that, but it will require

17 the reactor to be shut down as well. Because I had

18 never been a fan of doing that kind of work with the

19 reactor critical, which advocates (inaudible) to make

20 the reactor critical on-line, and I don't like that

21 (inaudible).

22 I think that it can be done safely, but I

23 think it provides -- it has never been challenged by

24 the operating crew that it is not required. So we are

25 going to come up with a plan to shut the unit down,

1 and the concern was that with where the power level is
2 at, we can just SCRAM the reactor and cool down the
3 vessel.
4 And the concern was based on a previous
5 shutdown that our decayed heat rate was not sufficient
6 matched up against the hole created by the bypass
7 valve that we would have been challenged in exceeding
8 the cool down rate on the RPV.
9 So we said, okay, so we don't want to
10 SCRAM it, and I was questioning whether to SCRAM the
11 unit and close the MSAV, and I said that I can do
12 that, too. And we train for that and do that in the
13 simulator all the time.
14 But why would I challenge my primary
15 containment as my isolated heat source, heat rejection
16 source, when I can develop a method to shut down the
17 plant and use the condenser as the heat rejection
18 source. Am I afraid of putting the heat in the
19 reactor?
20 No, it is designed for that, and in the
21 primary containment? No, I'm not. It is design to do
22 that. And when challenged by abnormal transients that
23 is what we are trained to do.
24 And I said why do I want to initiate an
25 abnormal transient on myself and put the decayed heat

removal process through primary containment when the condenser can be available. So let's devise a plan to shut the unit down and maintain the condenser as a heat containment, and use the primary containment as a fallback method to do that.

And that's why we developed a procedure to shut the reactor down with the bypass stuck open, and provide guidance to the operating crew on how to effect that.

MR. BARBER: Do you remember what day that was? Was that on that Thursday or Friday before that Sunday when the event happened?

[redacted] No, what I would tell you that it was probably 24 to 48 hours after we decided that we were going to shut the unit down. I think we had 2 or 2-1/2 days to develop a procedure on what we were going to do.

MR. BARBER: Okay. Do you recall just in general who was involved with the development, and who was the test engineer, and kind of how things flowed from there on out, or were you not involved with that?

[redacted] I had some engagement in that. I know that I had [redacted] working on the procedure, and there was some other SRO working on the procedure on the shift that [redacted] wasn't here.

A11 7C

1 I think that [redacted] was engaged,
2 because he had developed a section of the procedure
3 for the previous shutdown when we did some pressure
4 testing of an SRV, and so I think he was engaged in
5 that procedure development.
6 I remember [redacted] was the individual
7 that I assigned to be the test manager on the night
8 that the reactivity event took place, and I know that
9 [redacted] who had gone
10 through the training process to be prepared to execute
11 the evolution.
12 I don't remember who the guy was on the
13 off-hours when it didn't get executed, and that would
14 have been the manager on the day shift, and I don't
15 remember who that was.
16 MR. BARBER: As far as the (inaudible)
17 methodology was -- well, cover all of this: One is
18 that you do like a V&V type of procedure, where you do
19 a verification and validation, and you are doing the
20 research to kind of find out if this had ever been
21 done; and then the validation piece is kind of more
22 singularly oriented, and where you go out and try to
23 run this on the simulator and see what happens and see
24 if this will work, and if the sequence makes sense.
25 And then the presumption is that with the

All 7C

1 process that you go through that, and you refine the
2 procedure, and you make it as pristine as you can with
3 the amount of time that you have available. Then you
4 do the training.
5 And we have gone through a number of
6 discussions on how things happened, and how these two
7 things were combined, where the V&V and the training
8 evolution ended up being combined.
9 TC — [redacted] I would say that there was no
10 intention. I don't think that we sat down and said,
11 okay, let's do a V&V. I think basically we initiated
12 a procedure to provide guidance to people to shut the
13 plant down the same way and reverse it the way you
14 started out.
15 And we sent that out to train the
16 operators on, and their training, because of issues
17 and questions with the procedure, turned out to be a
18 V&V, and a finished product that they would be trained
19 upon never took place.
20 The training on a finished product never
21 happened, and that was unbeknownst to me until after
22 the fact. So that was a huge breakdown in the process
23 of what we were trying to accomplish.
24 MR. BARBER: I am sure that you probably
25 feel that a lot of it was not warranted, but we have

not delved into a lot of what you found out in the days and weeks that followed, and what were some of the things that went on.

When you look at the way that the organization suffered through that event, what kind of insights would you share as far as things that relate to our review, and what we are looking at?

You know, a safety conscious work environment, and the ability to raise safety concerns, and whether it was a concern with the procedure, and a concern with an evolution or what have you.

[redacted] Well, let me answer that last portion of your question. I think the [redacted] during his -- I know that the [redacted] during the training portion that turned into a V&V, and I knew that he was very concerned that it wasn't a solidified done deal plan.

And that caused him a lot of consternation when he was going through the training process. And his --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall who that was?

[redacted] Who that was? [redacted] And I don't think that his concerns were appropriately addressed at the time of the training evolution. The

All 1C

1 issues that he had should have been sufficient for us
2 to stop and question, and back up, and fix this issue,
3 because he was going to be the guy who directed the
4 (inaudible), but that didn't happen. That didn't
5 happen.
6 I don't know -- I mean, I have talked to
7 the shift manager and I have talked to the simulator
8 trainer as to why we didn't do that stuff then. You
9 know, it was never really clear why that wasn't a stop
10 and back up reaction for all. So we did not train the
11 procedure.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What were the answers
13 that you were getting about why that didn't happen,
14 and why were the concerns not addressed?
15 TC [redacted] Well, what I got out of it was
16 that we had a procedure that directed how we were
17 going to do it, and for some reason the operators
18 thought that they were out there to develop and
19 provide comment on, and that was not the intent.
20 And so there was a lot of conversation
21 about people thinking that this was the best way to do
22 it, and we ought to do this and we ought to do that,
23 and if became confusing and a jumble of what they were
24 actually trying to accomplish.
25 And it was not what the control room

1 supervisor wanted to hear. He wanted to hear that
2 this is our plan, and let's practice the plan, and it
3 became a challenge enough for him that we need to back
4 out of this and we need to get rezeroed on what we are
5 going to do.
6 And the shift manager noted, yeah, go
7 ahead. Take five, and back off, and we will take a
8 look at this while you are taking off and taking a
9 breather. But that should have been -- that was like,
10 okay, go ahead, and keep calm about this, but he may
11 have thought that he was doing the right thing for the
12 individual, but that should have been applied to that
13 my SRO is going to conduct this evolution that I am
14 not comfortable with, and we need to reevaluate and
15 see, and that we need more time to do this.
16 MR. BARBER: Who should they have come to
17 if they needed more time? Should they have come to
18 you? Should they have gone to [redacted]
19 [redacted] The training took place before
20 [redacted] and in all fairness to [redacted] I was going to be
21 th[redacted] on the day watch. I was going to be
22 the [redacted] and I turned that over to [redacted] and
23 I sat down and I went through the procedures with him
24 to tell him what his accountabilities were in
25 accordance with the SNP 84 (phonetic).

All 1C

1 And at the time, he was very comfortable
2 with what I told him, and what he needed to make sure
3 happened, but the accountability to ensure that the
4 crew was properly trained, I don't think that was in
5 that and I don't think that complied with the INPO
6 recommendations on what your IPTD procedures that your
7 test manager is supposed to be accountable for.
8 It is now because we have revised it as
9 part of our lessons learned, but I don't think it was
10 an accountability of the test manager to ensure that
11 the crew was -- he was there to provide the oversight
12 communication link to management, and to make sure
13 that the crew understood the basic -- all of the
14 standards, questioning attitude, and stuff like that.
15 And although it appeared to me that [redacted]
16 was comfortable with the turnover of duties, he must
17 not have been, because he did not execute them. He
18 continued to perform more in the role of a shift
19 manager than the big picture overview of management's
20 representative and doing the ITTE properly.
21 That was where he did not do his job and
22 ensure that he understood what I expected to happen,
23 and management control of that evolution.
24 MR. BARBER: As far as the actions that
25 you put in place, I think there was one action that

1 related to how to control the bypass valves?

2 [redacted] Right.

3 MR. BARBER: What was that specifically?

4 [redacted] Yes my expectation in the

5 development of the ITTE was that we would use

6 automatic pressure control as we brought the unit

7 down, and after we SCRAMed the unit the operators

8 would do the bypass jack to effect the cool down.

9 And during the training process and where

10 they were actually going to V&V, the crew decided that

11 they were going to use the bypass jack to control

12 pressure, in concert with the pressure regulator,

13 which got by me before edification.

14 And so using a manual pressure control

15 system when you have an automatic pressure control

16 system in place, why would you do that? Why would you

17 do that at that operating range of the reactor when

18 you are more susceptible to transients.

19 And so shortly after doing an evaluation

20 of what the crew did, and the procedure non-

21 compliance, there was use of the bypass jack at low

22 power level. And not that I remember everything that

23 went into the thought process of providing a guidance

24 anymore, but I don't want you to use the turbine

25 bypass jack with a reactor critical.

All 7C

1 And in hindsight that is a problem for me
2 that I have been mulling over for a certain amount of
3 time because I think you should be able to use the
4 bypass jack at low power levels to control pressure on
5 a start up.
6 But not when you are shutting it down, and
7 formulating the guidance to provide the operating crew
8 additional details and how the bypass jack will be
9 used, that direction as a contributor to the
10 subcriticality that we had this year, and that the
11 crew became disconnected in their teamwork with the
12 start up process, and pulling rods and establishing a
13 heat up break, and the rest of the coordination of the
14 crew in preparing and manipulating the balance of the
15 plan.
16 Primarily, placing RCIC in start up
17 alignment, which had to be done before you get to 150
18 pounds. And the automatic pressure regulator doesn't
19 open up until you get to 150 pounds. Actually, in our
20 facility it works around 148 or 149 pounds.
21 So they realized that they were heating up
22 faster than they were getting RCIC available, and so
23 they stopped pulling rods to speed up and concentrated
24 on getting RCIC available.
25 And when they decided that they weren't

1 going to pull any rods because they were concerned
2 that any rod pulled would increase the heat and take
3 them above the 150 pound set without RCIC operable,
4 they allowed the core to drift down.
5 And they monitored the core drifting down,
6 and they declared the core so critical, and the core
7 was so critical. Had they had the capability to open
8 the bypass jack and crack a bypass valve open to
9 control their pressure of less than 150 pounds, a
10 potential which has been a non-event issue, and that
11 they could have continued or stabilized their heating
12 right to the point where pressure was being controlled
13 on the surface bypass jack.
14 And with the influx of [redacted] from
15 another facility, and [redacted] from another
16 facility, and looking at and evaluating the corrective
17 action taken out of the reactivity event, they said
18 that was shortsighted, and was not a good
19 recommendation, and that we need to make that go away,
20 and to provide the right guidance for the operators.
21 MR. BARBER: And so has that been
22 addressed?
23 [redacted] Yes, indeed.
24 MR. BARBER: All right. Anything more on
25 -- are you fully covered in your pressure rates when

A11 7C

1 you take the reactor to critical? Can you take
2 reactor critical based on those valves?
3 [redacted] Well, yes.
4 MR. BARBER: But you use a pressure
5 control that is between zero and a hundred pounds?
6 [redacted] You don't need to control
7 pressure between zero and a hundred pounds.
8 MR. BARBER: When you run it through the
9 same situation, and if you cause a heat up for any
10 reason between zero and a hundred pounds, and it falls
11 between 100 and 150 pounds, could you not end up with
12 the same situation?
13 [redacted] You should have the confidence
14 that you can maintain the reactor critical in the heat
15 up range by rod withdrawal without heating up the
16 reactor.
17 And withdrawing rods to establish and maintain a heat
18 up rate, versus launching a rod periodically to
19 maintain criticality and to stabilize pressure, it may
20 seem that drains are another option for pressure
21 control.
22 Placing the steam through an evaporator in
23 service, and of course with the ILB, warming up the
24 RCIC lines are all steamloads that you can use in
25 concert with the direction of the ILP to maintain

All 7C

1 pressure.

2 MR. BARBER: Is that all done by

3 procedure? If I were to put in a procedure, I would

4 say that in this pressure that you can do these

5 things?

6 [redacted] They are not listed as reactor

7 pressure control modes. They are steps to performing

8 the procedure without recognition that these are

9 pressure control valves for you.

10 And one of my [redacted]

11 that day took corrective action to develop pressure

12 control versus crystallized pressure controls

13 methodology for ILPs when you are less than the bypass

14 operator function.

15 MR. BARBER: I don't have any more on

16 that.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I would suggest that

18 we take a break right now. It is 4:42 approximately,

19 and if we could take a quick break.

20 [redacted] Sure.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We will go off the

22 record.

23 (Whereupon, at 4:42 p.m., the interview

24 was recessed, and resumed at 4:56 p.m.)

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We are back on the

All 7C

1 record, and it is approximately 4:56 p.m. after a
2 brief break. All right.
3 MR. BARBER: All right. I had a couple of
4 things that I wanted to ask you about. One was where
5 I mentioned to you while we were off the record on off
6 gas. You actually brought it up that there was this
7 situation where off gas went from 120 to 40 FTFM,
8 depending on what the circumstances were.
9 And then over some period of time
10 progressed up and exceeded a procedural limit of 75
11 FTFM. What our understanding was that the procedure
12 was kind of weak or even silent on what to do if you
13 exceeded.
14 [redacted] Correct.
15 MR. BARBER: You could read it as you
16 can't operate the (inaudible) system and so you take
17 it off-line, and then you are playing with two fouls.
18 You could read it that way, or you could read it as
19 finding out the dates for this one, and find out the
20 dates, and I guess I would like to hear what your
21 thoughts were on that issue, and how that was handled,
22 and whether there were problems.
23 [redacted] Well, you are correct in
24 everything that you said, and the procedure also
25 provides some guidance during start up of the steam

All 7C

1 jet air detector, and you will concede 75 FTFM, and it
2 recognizes that, indicating that the system will
3 handle more than 75 FTFM, and in fact up to 150 FTFM.
4 So when we had that slowly degrading
5 condenser back in issue that provided that increased
6 flow in off-gas, what we did organizationally was
7 rationalize as we gave engineering time to tell us --
8 well, if it says don't operate above 75 FTFM, and we
9 know that everything works okay above that 75 FTFM,
10 and so what is the real number because this is not it.
11 And we gave them -- I think it took us two
12 days to change the procedure to provide us guidance
13 that we wanted to operate at above 75 FTFM. Well,
14 that is not the way to do business.
15 The rationalization was what is the
16 condenser vacuum. The condenser vacuum is good. How
17 is the steam jet air ejector performing. It is
18 operating very well. All the parameters on the steam
19 jet air ejector are within nominal.
20 How is the recombiner working. Well, the
21 recombiner is working very well, too, and how is the
22 off-gas train look. There is no challenge to the off-
23 gas train, and all the temperatures are good on the
24 off-gas train.
25 Well, we have increased flow and what is

1 going out to the staff? Nothing. So from start to
2 finish the elevated off-gas flow has no impact on any
3 of the equipment that said you are having an adverse
4 impact at operating at 75 FTFM.
5 And combined with knowing that you start
6 the system up and you can operate for hours above 75
7 FTFM due to the steam jets catching up to what the
8 mechanical vacuum limit is and the hogging down the
9 condenser vacuum, was a rationalization that 75 FTFM
10 is not the right number, and reducing reactor power,
11 and taking or doing a reduction in reactor power is
12 not going to change it, because it is an in-leakage
13 issue, and it is not a power generated issue.
14 And so engineering wants the right number
15 and so engineering came back and said that is not your
16 max limit. Your max limit is this based on the design
17 limiting component in the off-gas system.
18 So they changed our procedure and they
19 said do this and do this when you are above those
20 elevated temperatures. That is not procedural as to
21 what, and that was an issue that was brought up and
22 challenged, and we rationalized a response to it.
23 Well, that is a recognition point in all
24 of these events that we talked about today, and we had
25 -- I don't think that we recognized it at the time,

1 but we would rationalize our decisions to provide
2 justification that we were comfortable with, and that
3 we did not think challenged the safety of anything to
4 go do things that when I am at 70 FTFM, I had better
5 tell engineering that I don't think that 75 is the
6 right number, and you need to get me the right number.
7 And if you don't get it to me by the time
8 that I had 75 FTFM, the you are going to get it while
9 I am at a lower power, because I am going to take
10 action to comply and maintain 75 FTFM.
11 The vibration is trending up on this Bravo
12 reactor feed pump, and we don't think that it is
13 valid. You need to help me validate this condition.
14 If you don't validate it by the time that I hit this
15 set point, this feed pump is coming out of service.
16 And instead we did the rationalization
17 alone, and it is not accurate information, and it is
18 a bad instrument, and it is okay, and that is not
19 procedural. That is not the kind of procedural use
20 that you use in compliance tests, and it commits to a
21 message that we send the operators that work for us
22 and that we are permitted to operate a facility by
23 procedure.
24 Putting all those things together and
25 seeing them, you don't see that at the time. You see

1 that when you put them all together. And putting them
2 all together caused me to take the time to go back to
3 the technical specification and look at the
4 requirements for programmatic controls of the
5 facilities.
6 And if you go back and look at the reg
7 guides that stipulate that these are the systems that
8 you will have procedures, and if you go back to the
9 upper tier administrative procedures that put in place
10 the program for how you operate the facility, and the
11 lower tier is the department's administrative
12 procedures that tell you how you operate the facility.
13 And provide that education to the
14 operating force on what our expectations are for
15 procedures. And I also had the opportunity to share
16 with the operators that Bravo diesel management, 75
17 FTFM management, not closing the hydrogen make-up
18 valve outside when you are doing with the make up
19 employee, or bargaining unit employee, or technician,
20 not closing the nitrogen make up valve after nitrogen
21 make up that is required by the procedure, and a
22 decision made by the employee and not by --
23 MR. BARBER: You mean closing one instead
24 of three? -7C
25 [redacted] Right. The procedure says

1 that when you are done with make-up, go outside and
2 close this out. They closed out this side and they
3 left the outside valve open. But this is not a union
4 problem, and this is not a management problem.
5 This is an issue here in our operating
6 organization on rationalizing outside the bounds of
7 the procedure guides that you have. It is not an
8 acceptable way to operate the facility, and we are not
9 doing that.
10 And I think that the amount of time that
11 I have invested in communicating that message, I think
12 it is clear, and that the rationalization -- and that
13 the procedure is not correct, and that even if it is,
14 you need to fix the procedure to provide you with the
15 guidance, and that procedures are a decision making
16 tool that we had time to develop in the -- not at the
17 point of contact.
18 And I had time to sit down and figure it
19 out some other time, with days or weeks of evaluation,
20 as opposed to me making the decision in a 5 minute
21 time span on what is the right thing to do.
22 And I think that my organization is clear
23 on that expectation now, but the 75 FTFM was the
24 rationalization that I gave you from a vacuum, and
25 what is going up the stack, and everything in between,

1 and that number is not right.

2 And my procedure says that I can exceed 75

3 FTFM and so it is not a training component issue, and

4 what is that number. And engineering came back and

5 told us that it is not the number. So the

6 rationalization was correct, but the execution of it

7 was not.

8 MR. BARBER: Do you have any thoughts on -

9 - and I heard what you said about you are at 70 and

10 you are going to increase to 75, but do you have any

11 thoughts on how long it took to recognize the trend?

12 That you were at some nominal value, and

13 at some point you started departing from that novel

14 value, and obviously it trended up over a period of

15 time. I am not talking so much about the 75, but just

16 the recognition of the trend, and that we need to do

17 something in the power plant to identify what this

18 leakage is. Was that part of it?

19 [redacted] Let me just make sure that we

20 are at 70, and if you don't tell me by 75, and that

21 was an example of what we should do today, and not

22 what we did back then.

23 MR. BARBER: I understand.

24 [redacted] What I would say was that,

25 yes, we were on top of that vacuum, and that off-gas

All 7C

1 flow was degrading, and it was not a surprise to us
2 that we were at 75 FTFM, and we had been executing
3 things in leak investigation that was -- let me think
4 about that a little bit.
5 We had conversations and meetings about
6 our plans for going in and looking for the leakage
7 that I remember being challenged and limited by a
8 solid enough plan that justified the dose that people
9 would be receiving.
10 So we had a plan, and we were going and
11 looking, and we were doing helium shots, and we were
12 doing smoke testing, and looking for the leakage, and
13 we were not successful in finding the leakage.
14 And I remember that we had gone to the OTE
15 committee and said this is our plan, and they assessed
16 some value of dose associated with it, and we were in
17 the process of, hey, we have taken all the dose that
18 we have allotted to our plan, and we still have not
19 found it.
20 What do you want to do next, and the plan
21 was not solid enough to justify allotting more dose to
22 the effort at that time until we fixed the plant and
23 made it more solid. I think that there was that type
24 of activity going on.
25 MR. BARBER: When was engineering engaged

1 in the process as far as evaluating the leak? Did
2 they evaluate it after the window was exceeded?
3 [redacted] I believe so. I believe that
4 they were involved at 75 FTFM.
5 MR. BARBER: Can you explain why that
6 occurred, or why do you think that occurred, as
7 opposed to earlier on when the trend began?
8 [redacted] Well, engineering was engaged
9 in trying to identify the source, but not engaged in
10 validation of the limit. I don't think that we
11 expected to exceed the limit, and I think that we
12 rationalized that the was not a limit.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: More of the same
14 rationalization and justification type of decisions
15 that you don't see and that you have gotten away from?
16 [redacted] I believe solidly that we have
17 gotten away from that behavior mode.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At what point in time
19 do you see that changing? That you came to the
20 realization that that is not the way to operate? Do
21 you see a point in time for that being delineated?
22 MR. BARBER: You mentioned about [redacted]
23 and is that the only factor that has played into this?
24 [redacted] No, I don't think so. I think
25 he has been the solidification to it, but I think the

All 1c

1 problem with the diesel was enough for me, and the
2 Bravo diesel was the last time that I was going to be
3 in that boat.
4 MR. BARBER: One thing we have heard, and
5 some of this you hear, and you don't know how much
6 weight to attribute to it, but it has come from a
7 couple of different people, is that there is some
8 significant parts issues on-site; spare parts,
9 critical spares, and having the ability just to repair
10 the unit when equipment breaks or becomes unreliable.
11 7C [redacted] And I would say that I can
12 lend credence to that because I go to the manager's
13 meeting and I have seen notifications come across that
14 talked about parts issues with some kind of
15 regularity.
16 So what is -- well, what parts is the
17 organization required to have on hand, and what
18 components are there, and what systems are you going
19 to support that to.
20 It is one of those balancing acts between
21 -- you know, parts cost money, and I am not going to
22 keep a huge parts inventory, and I need to balance
23 that with that I have to have the right parts here so
24 that I can effect repairs in a timely fashion.
25 And there are the right parts and there

1 are quality parts, and I understand the impact that
2 has on me as a equipment reliability SRO hat on, and
3 I don't understand all the impacts of that from a
4 business decision of keeping a spare part or keeping
5 a spare plant out in the material center.
6 And I know that I can't keep a spare plant
7 out there. That would be cost prohibitive, and I know
8 that I can't order all the parts when I need them, and
9 who makes that determination and that balance in the
10 interim, that is not my field, and I don't know that.
11 MR. BARBER: Well, that is part of the
12 issue. It seems like no one has any -- and not to
13 point the finger at you, but no one seems to have any
14 sort of understanding of who is responsible for that
15 other than the warehouse folks who have been accused,
16 either rightfully or wrongfully, of sending parts back
17 to the distributors and to the manufacturers because
18 they are told that they paid too much tax.
19 That they are told that the company pays
20 too much income tax on the parts that are stored, and
21 so they sent almost as a rule almost everything back,
22 and that is probably an overstatement, but we have
23 heard that has contributed to the problem of being
24 able to get the right repair parts for the diesels.
25 And we have heard of things like shims and

washers, and parts of a very small value, very nominal value.

[redacted] Sure, I have heard that kind of thing, too. And sometimes I hear, well, this is a pretty important part, and why wouldn't we have this part available to us. I mean, you can expect these to go bad and why wouldn't we have one int he storehouse.

And then I have also heard the same thing that, gee, it is just a washer, and why wouldn't we have that washer. Why do I have to wait until I get that washer. And I think that we also do battle with obsolete spare parts, and the manufacturer no longer supplies them for that equipment.

It is very frustrating and I think the maintenance people are more frustrated with it even than I am, because they deal with it on a day to day basis, and the parts issue is significant to them. It frustrates me in the timeliness and repair, and equipment reliability that I am looking for in the facility.

But I would tell you that I don't know how that game is played in the business, and I don't have the business accruement to understand how a facility is supposed to maintain the right parts and the right quantity for a commercial facility, let alone a

1 nuclear facility.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, had that been

3 explained to you as the reason why you don't have the

4 part that you are looking for, and have you heard that

5 explanation before; that we can't have it sitting

6 around because we have to pay taxes on it?

7 [redacted] No.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that is not

9 something that you heard, and you don't --

10 [redacted] We can't have it sitting

11 around because we have to pay taxes on it? No.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You are saying that

13 you have been missing parts, and you questioned why

14 wouldn't we have a certain part, but you don't

15 understand why and where is the breakdown?

16 [redacted] Right.

17 MR. BARBER: Well, actually that is a good

18 segment into the next area that we want to discuss,

19 which is economic deregulation. You mentioned that

20 you have been in this industry for 25 plus years, and

21 you have been doing this a long time, and have seen a

22 lot of different things over those years I'm sure.

23 For the most part it seems like most of

24 your career has been in the regulated --

25 [redacted] Yes, it has.

All 1C

1 MR. BARBER: -- let's say portion of the
2 industry, and what is the most recent is the
3 deregulated portion, and I guess I would like to ask
4 your opinion of where you see the effect or the change
5 and how it affects operations, and in what way it
6 affects operations.
7 [redacted] That is not a part of my
8 routine thought process on the impact of regulation
9 and deregulation. It is kind of a topical area that
10 is an after hours conversation, and I don't think
11 about that, and I don't have time to think about that.
12 But looking back on it, in a regulated
13 industry whatever you needed for your facility you
14 got, and passed the costs on to the customer, and had
15 your profit on top of that.
16 The concept of having and that making the
17 nuclear industry be a competitive industry just like
18 the rest of the United States and other commercial
19 endeavors is -- my personal opinion is that that is
20 unfortunate. That is unfortunate that nuclear
21 power has to be competitive, because I don't want to
22 be in the position where I ever have to take my SRO
23 hat off and have a discussion about dollars.
24 I don't want any of the decision that I
25 make to be influenced by dollars, and so I try to stay

1 out of that arena. I try to say that this piece of
2 equipment doesn't work and I want it fixed, and this
3 is why.
4 But you can't -- but I also can't be that
5 naive about things, and I can't make unreasonable
6 demands on an organization that is budgeting and
7 financially controlling itself, because now we have to
8 -- this is what we want to do, and let's grade it, and
9 let's rank it, and let's prioritize it, where you
10 never had to do that before.
11 And what you asked for you could have
12 because you asked for it and justified the need for
13 the power plant. So I think it is unfortunate that
14 the nuclear industry, the electric industry, has
15 become deregulated. I think we should be outside of
16 that.
17 MR. BARBER: Have you ever sensed a direct
18 effect on something that you wanted to do, and maybe
19 not so much on safety related equipment, but maybe
20 non-safety related valves to the plant?
21 TC [redacted]: Absolutely, Scott. I
22 participate in the plant health prioritization
23 committee, and people come to that committee with we
24 want to do this design change to the facility, and
25 this is why, and I say absolutely, let's get that

1 done.

2 It will make my life better for my

3 operators, and it will make the reliability of the

4 system easier, but what is the safety impact of that?

5 What is the system health impact to that? You know,

6 the safety impact is not that high. So it gets a low

7 score.

8 But it might be something that drives the

9 operators insane with how they have to operate that

10 system, or maybe even do compensatory actions to the

11 system, and that could be on a non-safety related

12 balance of plant piece of equipment, and it is down

13 here in the prioritization because the facility is

14 operated out of a checkbook.

15 There is a set amount of money for doing

16 improvements to the facility, and with a facility that

17 is as old as this one is, and when you look at how the

18 facility has been maintained over its lifetime, and

19 the number of obsolete spare parts that the technology

20 was great 20 years ago, or 15 years ago, and it is

21 woefully behind the times now, it is very frustrating,

22 very frustrating.

23 And I see it with some kind of regularity.

24 There is only so much money in the pot to go out and

25 do things. So it is important for us to provide the

justification that says that this one really needs to be done, and we need to find the money someplace, and we need to reprioritize other things and the list changes as to the top things that we are going to go tackle.

MR. BARBER: Were you aware that the company is supposedly allocating an additional $750 million for capital projects over the next 5 years?

[redacted] No.

MR. BARBER: That was sent to us in a letter in January.

[redacted] Well, here is some feedback that I got from my [redacted]. He said that there are other facilities out there that operate on budgets of $90 to $110 million per unit.

So on a 3 unit facility like we have here, that is $300 million. Our budget this year is $435 million. He said where is all that money going, and I said I don't know.

Money is always an issue for making improvements. He said you have a lot of money, and we need to find out where it is being spent so that you can ensure that it gets invested in the equipment reliability of the facility, versus wherever it is going now.

All 1C

1 Well, that was a big shock to me. That is
2 a fourth unit's worth of money that should be
3 available to do the things that you need to do at a
4 facility like ours that appears to be spent somewhere
5 else.
6 So the feedback from NRB was that you have
7 plenty of money here, and you are not spending it
8 right.
9 MR. BARBER: You know, this is something
10 that we don't usually get involved with, and nor do we
11 necessarily want to, but I am just mentioning it just
12 as a way of providing some feedback to you that the
13 company at least at the highest levels is now saying
14 that we are committing a lot of resources here.
15 And that these are dollars that we are
16 going to provide for capital improvements, and I don't
17 know of any limitation or overhead, and whether it is
18 going to go to O&M, but the implication is that we are
19 committed to this facility, and we are going to open
20 the purse strings to address a lot of these issues
21 that have been outstanding.
22 And we don't know if that had been
23 communicated to you, but I think it --
24 [redacted]: It has not.
25 MR. BARBER: Okay. That may be in-part be

1 offered as a result of something that was already
2 under way, or could be attributed to some of the
3 insights that have come out recently as far as the way
4 the equipment is operating, and as you point out the
5 repairs, and replacing obsolete equipment, and things
6 of that nature.
7 And which kind of leads us into the next
8 item of discussion, which is the January 28th letter
9 that we sent. Did you get a chance to read that?
10 [redacted] Yes, I did.
11 MR. BARBER: And what did you think of the
12 letter?
13 [redacted] Initially or --
14 MR. BARBER: Initially. What was your
15 reaction?
16 [redacted] I was disappointed that the
17 NRC found the necessity to communicate that to us in
18 a formal letter of that nature and public awareness.
19 (Brief recess.)
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We are back on
21 the record. It is 5:23.
22 [redacted] So I was disappointed that the
23 NRC found the necessity to ring our bell on that one.
24 I was personally embarrassed, and I was not in denial
25 about the issue as much as other people in the

All 7c

1 organization were, because I have had some -- because
2 since [redacted] is here, we have had some sitdown
3 coaching and philosophy kind of conversations, and
4 understanding some of that.
5 TC [redacted] comes to us with a lot of
6 battle scars. He has learned a lot of things by
7 having lived through what we are talking about here
8 now. So he shares that, which is good. He is the one
9 that helped me see the difference in the impact of the
10 previous management organization had the potential
11 impact on the employees in addressing issues.
12 And without realization that that was
13 actually what may have been taking place. I was
14 embarrassed when it was rolled out to us, and people
15 said -- people in the audience said that we heard you
16 say don't be in denial, and that we need to embrace
17 this and move forward.
18 And a guy said, I'm sorry, but that I
19 don't really see this in my organization, and I don't
20 know of anything that would indicate that we have a
21 safety conscious work environment issue. And that the
22 only example that the Vice President provided,
23 although he said that there were many, was the diesel
24 generator exhaust leak issue.
25 And that pulls it all in for me. I mean,

All TC

1 that one is a big challenge for me, and the 75 FTFM,
2 and I said that I have learned from that, and the
3 reactivity event was painful beyond, but the problem
4 with diesel is painful on a day to day basis, because
5 it is a challenge to employee safety.
6 So that one hurts when you think about
7 talking about that one, and with that being the
8 example of we have a safety conscious work environment
9 issue here, that is a big challenge for me, because
10 when I look back at some of the events that we talked
11 about, let's say, what is the commonality here, and
12 oh, I was part of that decision; and, oh, I was part
13 of that decision.
14 So I look at the effectiveness of where my
15 mind is in the safety conscious work environment, and
16 I think that I told you earlier that my issue ont he
17 Bravo diesel was to make it safe for the operators to
18 perform the task.
19 And not make the operators do the task and
20 what do I need to do to make them do it. So it
21 provides a different perspective, and to think that we
22 had an organization that we haven't been branded with
23 the industry chilling atmosphere, and god forbid that
24 we go there, but those words strike fear in me that an
25 organization would have a chilling effect on its

1 employees when they don't address issues.

2 And I look at my own organization and I

3 think that my operators say plenty. They don't seem

4 to be shy about addressing issues and concerns, and so

5 I said that is not a problem with my people.

6 But when you look back on an organization

7 that challenges people when they address concerns, to

8 the point where I spent 3 or 4 hours in trying to

9 provide a justification for doing the right thing to

10 the facility, I would say that could challenge

11 individuals in our organization to not stand by their

12 convictions and do what they need to do.

13 And so I would say, okay, I am sorry that

14 the NRC has gotten involved, but I would tell you that

15 PSEG recognized it before the letter, and that's why

16 [redacted] was hired, and that's why [redacted] was

17 hired.

18 And so I think the organization recognized

19 and said okay, we are going to do something about

20 this, and then it got -- and, oh, by the way. Here is

21 a regulatory concern that you need to tell us that you

22 are going to do the right thing.

23 So we did not get the opportunity to make

24 it right all by ourselves, and now we have some

25 assistance to demonstrate that we are doing the right

All 7C

1 thing, and we are going to fix the problem.

2 So now you will never know whether or not

3 we will fix the problem by ourselves. We are going to

4 fix it because we have the attention of the regulator,

5 and you won't know whether or not we had the strength

6 of our convictions in our own organization to fix it

7 before we got the letter.

8 So that is the painful part of it. So I

9 am not denying that there is a challenge to the safety

10 conscious work environment here. When I look at the

11 initial Centergy survey data, I see that the

12 professional people on the island, my day worker

13 people, the engineering groups, they have high

14 positive scores and think that life is a bowl of

15 cherries.

16 When you look at the organizations of the

17 people that have technicians, and operators, and

18 mechanics working, and the plant manager at Salem, and

19 the plant manager at Hope Creek scores, and for all

20 the people who work at the facilities hands-on, the

21 scores are considerably less.

22 And they are challenging, and they say

23 that you have an issue here. So there is a big break

24 in where you work in the organization, and your

25 perception of do you have a problem or not.

1 And the professional people don't
2 recognize that we have a problem, and the people who
3 deal with workers say we have a problem. So that was
4 my take on the letter.
5 MR. BARBER: That is good insight. You
6 know, one of the things that has come out in the
7 review is this concept of production over safety, and
8 listening to the way that you describe what the
9 Centergy results were, I was just kind of struck by
10 the fact that the groups that seem to have the most
11 issues as you have described them are the production
12 folks.
13 [redacted] That's correct.
14 MR. BARBER: I mean, they are responsible
15 for a product of some sort, whether it be generation
16 from operations, or maintenance for repairs in the
17 power plant, and for the outage group for planning and
18 implementing effective outages, whether it be short
19 duration or long term.
20 And that the further that you get away
21 from the plant -- you know, you talked about kind of
22 the day shift engineering groups, and the less they
23 feel the production pressures.
24 [redacted] Well, you can talk a lot about
25 production pressures and following a schedule, but the

All TC

1 basic premise behind following a schedule is that work
2 is bucketed and sequenced so that it is performed at
3 the right time so that when I do this job, and it ends
4 now, and I start this job, that these two jobs are not
5 happening at the same time.
6 Following the schedule is -- the premise
7 of that is to safely perform maintenance at the
8 facility in a sequence that has been thought out by
9 people ahead of time, instead of at the point of
10 contact.
11 Just like my expectations are for people
12 in following procedures; follow what is in the
13 procedure and don't be making your own decisions when
14 you are challenged at the point of contact or
15 execution.
16 That concept of following the schedule is
17 convoluted into production pressure in different
18 people's minds. I am not telling you that there isn't
19 production pressure.
20 I am telling you that when I tell you that
21 this job is supposed to be done at 10 o'clock, and I
22 want us to work to accomplish that, then I am having
23 confidence in the schedule that we have properly
24 looked at, and we know how long it takes and it takes
25 this many people, we should be able to accomplish it

1 in that amount of time.

2 And when you tell people that it is

3 supposed to be done at 10 o'clock in the morning,

4 without explaining the rationale behind following a

5 schedule for a safety impact result, it is

6 communicated as get the job done.

7 It is production pressure.

8 And I have never seen anybody in my entire

9 career who doesn't self-impose production pressure on

10 themselves for whatever reason. I want to look good

11 to my boss, and I want to be recognized as a go-

12 getter.

13 Doing the balancing act -- and I have said

14 that enough times haven't I? But doing the balance

15 between I want the job done and I want the job done

16 right, and if it takes long, and it takes longer, are

17 words that we say.

18 But they are not sent by the field

19 operators, and they are not sent by the mechanic.

20 They always feel the pressure of getting the job done,

21 and I don't know how you change that, and I have

22 looked at it right in the face, and I said that if it

23 takes you longer to do this, we will fix it the next

24 time, and I will write in here as feedback this job

25 takes two people and it takes four hours, and not one

1 guy and two hours.

2 And the next time the schedule will be

3 right, and it will reflect what it actually does take

4 to do the job. And, oh, by the way, it does take this

5 much longer to do the work than it used to.

6 The standards expectation, the peer

7 checking, the number of activities that we ask people

8 to do to make sure that they do things safely and

9 don't get hurt take longer with standards expectation

10 and peer checking.

11 So those were not activities that we did

12 when I got into the industry in 1978, and I would

13 SCRAM a unit on day shift, and I would have it started

14 up by night, and there would be two operators in the

15 control room in 1880.

16 The industry has significantly changed in

17 the oversight and execution of our duties to make sure

18 that we do things to protect the health and safety of

19 the public.

20 But I am telling you that production

21 pressure is sensed at every level and every job, and

22 you have to do something different and extraordinary

23 to communicate a different message to people so that

24 it doesn't have a negative impact on what you are

25 trying to do. It is tough. It is tough.

1 MR. BARBER: Have you had the opportunity
2 to go out and talk to some maintenance workers
3 firsthand just informally about what they think about
4 the job that they are doing, and how it is going, and
5 getting feedback on it?
6 [redacted] Yes, I would love to tell you
7 that I do that, Scott, but I don't. It is a challenge
8 enough for me with the recovery from five forced
9 outages, and a reactivity event, and a subcriticality
10 event, that it challenges me to make sure that I do
11 that function in my own organization, let along share
12 my interests in the other technical crafts here.
13 MR. BARBER: I understand. You know, that
14 is a really interesting area for us because like I
15 said, we have talked to all others in the
16 organization, and I think that one thing that we
17 picked up is that there is not enough interaction
18 necessarily between the supervisors and the workers.
19 The supervisors don't know what the workers are doing.
20 [redacted] You know, I hear that, and I
21 will tell you that there may not be enough. There
22 still may not be enough, I am going to tell you that
23 my supervisors are engaged with their operators at a
24 higher level than they ever have been before.
25 But having instituted the field supervisor

All 1C

1 positioning operations, and to put a management face
2 in the field, and I went out of my way to make sure
3 that -- well, I don't know if that has been
4 successful, but I went out of my way to make sure that
5 the field supervisors understood that their job is not
6 to be out there cracking the whip.
7 Their job out there is to be removing
8 obstacles for their people and the hurdles that they
9 have to climb over to accomplish their work, and that
10 my field supervisors are supposed to be out there
11 championing the things that the equipment operators
12 have as issues.
13 And I am going to tell you that I think
14 that you can question my people, and I think you could
15 find some people who would say that, but I don't know
16 that they would say that across the board.
17 I think that you could ask all my
18 operators do they see the field supervisor and do they
19 see supervision in the field, and I would think that
20 they would tell you, yes, considerably more than we
21 ever did before.
22 I think that they see management out in
23 the field now more than they ever did before. It is
24 still not enough. It is still not enough, and that is
25 something that we are working on to make better.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything further?

2 MR. BARBER: No.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We have been

4 with you for a good deal of time, and is there

5 anything that we are not covering that is of concern

6 to you, and that you would like to discuss, or

7 anything that you have to offer that we somehow have

8 not gotten into?

9 [redacted] I think that I mentioned to

10 you that I had some personal -- and not public, but

11 some personal push back in the you have a problem with

12 a safety conscious work environment.

13 And I think that I am over that to the

14 point where I am kind of embracing what we need to do

15 and trying to move the organization along that vain.

16 And I told you a number of situations that the

17 understanding of what you have now, and what you have

18 now, and what you have now, is a maturing thing.

19 So back in the bad old days and before

20 this new management team showed up, do I think we were

21 unsafe? I am going to tell you no. No, absolutely

22 not. And then as we matured some more, but still not

23 where we are today, did I think that we were unsafe?

24 No, absolutely not.

25 Where I am today and where I need to be

1 later, do I think I am unsafe today? No, I don't. So
2 I think there is a line in the sand saying are you
3 upgrading your facilities safety, and I think that we
4 have always been on the right side of the line, but I
5 think we have matured in our understanding of the
6 margin that we want to have to that line, and we are
7 working to consistently increase it.
8 I think that as the industry has grown
9 that we have changed our opinion and our decision
10 about what is a safe way to operate facilities, and I
11 think we have consistently moved forward to the right
12 where it is safe all the time.
13 So even though I talked about these other
14 events, do I think that operating at 75 FTFM is
15 unsafe? No, I don't. Do I think that type of
16 procedure of use adherence is acceptable? Well, no,
17 I don't.
18 However, the comeback to that would be
19 that if you don't think that is the right way to
20 operate the facility, and that type of procedure where
21 you use adherence is not applicable, then that is not
22 safe.
23 It is not that easy of a conclusion to
24 make, and I don't think that one justifies -- that if
25 you are not using your procedures, then you are unsafe

1 is the conclusion that you come to.

2 So I think we are progressing and I never

3 had a realization or a sense that we were an unsafe

4 organization. I didn't. But I can look back, and I

5 can look at these events and see how they raise flags

6 individually, and now in aggregate, where they say you

7 were not right about the way that you executed those

8 things, and that that needs to be different now.

9 But I think there are different levels of

10 safety and I think that we have always been on the

11 proper side of it.

12 MR. BARBER: Just so you know, we wrote

13 the letter to Salem and Hope Creek, and that was

14 intentional. So we have talked about issues just here

15 at Hope Creek here today, but there are other things

16 that have gone on at Salem that we have called

17 attention to, and we have talked to the people at

18 Salem.

19 [redacted] And so that brings in the

20 commonality of the type of management organization

21 that we had, but I would tell you that the issues of

22 interest that I have to wear on my sleeve on a daily

23 basis are at Hope Creek.

24 MR. BARBER: Absolutely.

25 [redacted] And I certainly don't want my

All 1C

1 sister unit to be giving me a black eye, but we could
2 certainly put up a fence between the two of us and it
3 would not bother me at all, because I have plenty to
4 do to be focused over here to make sure that we are
5 doing the right thing.
6 So I understand that when you look at this
7 in totality and you talk about it as being not just a
8 Hope Creek issue, and an island issue, and I have
9 heard stories about things that have done on over
10 there that we have issues with, and are addressed from
11 that viewpoint.
12 But I will tell you that my day to day
13 life is about Hope Creek, and I have a half-a-dozen
14 issues that we talked about here that have been
15 painful to me for the last two years.
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you have
17 anything further that you would like to add?
18 [redacted] No, I don't think so.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. I have a few
20 closing questions. Have I or any other NRC
21 representative offered you any promises of reward or
22 threatened you in any manner in exchange for your
23 information today?
24 [redacted]: No, not at all.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And have you appeared

All 7C

1 here freely and voluntarily? 7C

2 [redacted]: Yes, I have.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. At this point,

4 we will just thank you for your time, and it is

5 approximately 5:43 and we will go off the record, and

6 I have to thank you for the significant portion of

7 your time today.

8 (Whereupon, at 5:43 p.m., the interview

9 was concluded.)

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of [redacted] -7C

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F and [redacted]

Location: Hope Creek NPS

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.

Paul Intravia
Official Transcriber
Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.