

Official Transcript of Proceedings
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

X Interview of [REDACTED]

TK

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey

Date: Thursday, November 13, 2003

Work Order No.: NRC-1217

Pages 1-65

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


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OFFICE OF THE INVESTIGATOR GENERAL
INTERVIEW

-----x

IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.

 : 1-2003-051F

(CLOSED) :

-----x

Thursday, November 13, 2003

PSEG

NRC Resident's Office

Hancock's Bridge, NJ

The above-entitled interview was conducted
at 2:10 p.m.

BEFORE:

Special Agent EILEEN NEFF

ALSO PRESENT:

Senior Project Engineer SCOTT BARBER

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2:10 p.m.

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3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is
4 November the 13th. The time is approximately 2:10
5 p.m. Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC
6 Region I, Office of Investigations. Also present from
7 Region I is Senior Project Engineer Scott Barber, and
8 this interview is going to be with [REDACTED] And
9 the interview concerns the safety conscious work
10 environment at Salem Hope Creek.

11 [REDACTED] I've explained to you that
12 the situation involves no specific potential violation
13 and that you're being interviewed for your assessment
14 of the work environment on site. Is that accurate?

15 [REDACTED] I understand, yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And that also
17 we would conduct the interview under oath.

18 [REDACTED] I understand.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. At this point,
20 if you would raise your right hand. Do you swear that
21 the information you're about to provide is the truth,
22 the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
23 God?

24 [REDACTED] Yes, I do, so help me, God.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Thank you.

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1 Would you please state for the record your full name
2 and your date of birth and social security number?

3 [REDACTED] My full name is [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED]

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And a home
7 contact number for you?

8 [REDACTED]

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And a work contact
10 number.

11 [REDACTED]

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And now can
13 you briefly summarize your work history?

14 [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED]

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What year was that?

20 [REDACTED] That was [REDACTED]
21 It would be, oh, about [REDACTED] or so time frame.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]

24 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: What's -- I mean
25 you said you were a [REDACTED] How long were you a

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]: I was a [REDACTED] I don't
know, [REDACTED]

SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[REDACTED]

SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: So you're a

[REDACTED] now?

[REDACTED]

SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What is your specific
2 job title?

3 [REDACTED] I'm in the Union, so the job
4 title is [REDACTED]

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]
6 Okay. And [REDACTED] has been for how long?

7 [REDACTED] Sixteen years now?

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Is all your
9 experience on the Salem side or the Hope Creek side?

10 [REDACTED] Probably 97 percent Salem
11 side and three percent Hope Creek.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Okay. That's
13 a lot of experience since [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED] Been here a long time.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes. Yes. And what
16 I'll do is start with some general information. And
17 as part of this assessment what I'd like to get is
18 what your opinion is and I won't go back to [REDACTED]
19 we'll talk with recent times. Let's consider the past
20 year to two years or so. What would your opinion be
21 of the work environment here on site or the safety
22 culture, put it that way, the safety culture?

23 [REDACTED] Being here a long time, and
24 I'm primarily in contact with field people -- field
25 supervisors, field workers -- many of the people have

1 been here a long time. From them I get the impression
2 that they really don't care anymore. They're fed up
3 with the five-year management teams coming in shaking
4 the world, changing policies and philosophies, and
5 they feel as though they're not listened to.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And when you say the
7 field supervisors, what kind of positions do you put
8 in that category?

9 [REDACTED] First-line supervisors.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And is that in
11 any one particular department or is that across the
12 board?

13 [REDACTED] That's broad, yes.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So name where you see
15 that kind of attitude.

16 [REDACTED]: Well, in Mechanical area,
17 Electrical, I&C, I mean it's just broad.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

19 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: These people
20 you're dealing with, have they been around a long time
21 also?

22 [REDACTED] Salem, yes. I guess the
23 average age of the work force is I think 48 now.

24 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

25 [REDACTED] So a lot of guys have been

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1 here a long time, and they've seen the VP levels and
 2 the managers come and go and do their shake-up and
 3 bring all their buddies in and then their buddies go.
 4 The joke out there now is we've got the right people
 5 in place for the sixth time. So these people bring up
 6 concerns, more efficient ways to do business, better
 7 ways, better things and they're just not listened to.
 8 And that bothers me because that affects the work
 9 force.

10 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, what kind of
 12 concerns do they have that they feel aren't getting
 13 addressed?

14 [REDACTED] For example, they'll take a
 15 diesel generator out of service three times when they
 16 only have to do it once if they would group the
 17 breakers together. Concerns like they go into
 18 containment four times to do a job they would only
 19 have to go in once if they would have taken other
 20 actions. People -- a couple weeks ago we had a --
 21 well, about two months ago we had a CRD vent fan
 22 failure, and not one of the people in the POD knew
 23 what that fan looked like. They were talking about
 24 adjusting the clutch on it. It doesn't even have a
 25 clutch. And there were 30 people in this room from

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1 the new regime and not one person knew how this
2 machine functions. So they make a management decision
3 on something they know nothing about, and it's
4 commonplace.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I mean did somebody
6 speak up and correct that? Did they say, "Wait a
7 minute. You're not even talking about the right --

8 [REDACTED] Nobody knew.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- parts and pieces
10 here."

11 [REDACTED] Nobody knew. Somebody came
12 out of the meeting and said, "Hey, grab a work order,
13 go adjust the clutch." I said, "Guys, there is no
14 clutch." "Oh, oh. Okay."

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So what happened
16 then?

17 [REDACTED] So then I contacted field
18 people and we write the work order to go do the right
19 thing and rebuild the fan and do what we have to do to
20 get it back in service.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I mean it does it
22 happen that way? Does it happen satisfactorily get
23 fixed?

24 [REDACTED] Oh, absolutely, absolutely.

25 I mean the guys in the street are very aware of

1 configuration issues.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] act
4 as policemen to a degree.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

6 [REDACTED] Because they know many
7 decisions won't come down correctly, and they know some
8 field guys won't necessarily do the right thing. So
9 we are the police force. You know, a lot of guys feel
10 that way, a lot of planners and schedulers.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, when you say
12 that some are -- the directions aren't going to come
13 down correctly, is it that it's an issue where they
14 don't know the piece of equipment that they're dealing
15 with or is there more to it than that?

16 [REDACTED] Most of it's knowledge
17 issues, some experience issues.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] Some of the people who make
20 these decisions have never been there. Not that
21 that's a necessity but for anyone to make a logical
22 management decision you need to have the correct
23 information to have a basis to make a decision. TC

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, what happens
25 when you have to act as the police force? What kind

1 of response do you get to that?

2 [REDACTED] In the past, I've had my job
3 threatened because of it.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Specifically over
5 what?

6 [REDACTED] A specific example would be
7 in five years ago [REDACTED] (phonetic), one of the
8 best NCOs we have in the control room, experienced
9 guy, I was in a position where I was working in
10 [REDACTED] and I would take the place of the [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED] at the time. So he would call me with
12 an issue and at the time my supervisor asked me, "What
13 are you working on," and I said, "Well, [REDACTED]
14 has an immediate concern and I'm running on it." And
15 he made the point, "Well, that's not what I told you
16 to do." I said, "Well, then you need to discuss that
17 with him because he's in command of the station." And
18 that evolved into they offered me [REDACTED]

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was the person
20 that was going against [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED] (phonetic).

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: his direction? [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]

24 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: What was his
25 position?

1 [REDACTED] His position at the time
2 they had just made him [REDACTED] because
3 he had prior SRO experience, and someone made that a
4 requirement for that position.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is he no longer on
6 the site?

7 [REDACTED] He's a guy who goes from job
8 to job to job, because he can't find a home.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where is he now?

10 [REDACTED] Now he's at Materials
11 Engineering, I think.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So this seems
13 like there must be more to that situation. I mean you
14 must have more detail. [REDACTED] is giving you one
15 direction, somebody is challenging that, and somehow
16 they're offering you [REDACTED] So
17 how did you get there?

18 [REDACTED] I've always been self-
19 motivated, self-directed kind of person. And I asked
20 [REDACTED] as a follow-through, "Why did you call me
21 directly? Why didn't you call my immediate
22 supervisor?" And his response was, "Because he
23 doesn't respond. You do." And to me that's job
24 satisfaction and I'm happy to serve the guy. Career
25 threatening in the fact that [REDACTED] I guess he was

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1 intimidated by the fact I was self-directed and I
2 didn't need him as a supervisor.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was the basis
4 for them coming to you and saying -- was it a
5 termination, they were hoping you'd --

6 [REDACTED] Oh, yes. They were hoping
7 I'd resign.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. They were
9 looking for you to resign and they were offering you
10 a package.

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what was the
13 basis for the termination? Do you recall what they
14 were telling?

15 [REDACTED] They were telling me I was
16 a [REDACTED]

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Which meant?

18 [REDACTED] And that was -- yes, you're
19 garbage. You don't meet any of the requirements. You
20 have no technical knowledge, no basis, and it boiled
21 down to a personality issue. I mean I've been at
22 [REDACTED] prior to that.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes. This is 1998,
24 so it's [REDACTED] after you've been on site?

25 [REDACTED] Yes. Yes. So that just go

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1 ugly.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And how did that go
3 then? How did that get resolved?

4 [REDACTED] How did it get resolved? I
5 fought it. There was an appeal process later.

6 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Was this through
7 the Union or was it through the Company?

8 [REDACTED] No. We were all company
9 people at the time.

10 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] This was before we
12 unionized.

13 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] And I fought it, pointed out
15 that I was the largest award winner in the history of
16 this company, I saved them tens of millions of dollars
17 in doing things better, and finally I ended up going
18 outside to a lawyer who's sued this company many, many
19 times, and pulled in the appropriate chain of command
20 into a room and told them, "Either you get off my back
21 or I'm going to sue you for harassment." And I dialed
22 the lawyer's phone number and finally, low and behold,
23 two weeks later I have successfully passed my
24 performance improvement program. So, hooray, hurrah,
25 that's the end of that story.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How did things
2 continue from there? Were you working for the same
3 individual, for [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]: Yes.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They left you under
6 --

7 [REDACTED]: They backed off.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But they left
9 you under him.

10 [REDACTED]: He found another position
11 quickly.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

13 [REDACTED]: Whether that was on him or
14 a move by the Company, I don't know.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

16 [REDACTED]: That's just my personal
17 story.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, what about since
19 then, though? Have you had instances since then?

20 [REDACTED]: Since then, no. I'm highly
21 regarded and highly respected, as far as I know, by
22 the field guys. Some of the management folks don't
23 like me because I present them with ideas on how they
24 could do their jobs better and make better decisions.
25 I like to think, I like to create, I'm an SAP

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1 advocate, which many people aren't. I've learned how
2 to do many, many things that could make Work
3 Management large improvements. And in particular,
4 since we're on that subject, I pushed the issue of
5 becoming a

6
7 and I interviewed with them
8 all. I got back to [REDACTED] I said, "Well, how did it go,
9 because I know how to fix this process. You people
10 can't stabilize the schedule. All the other plants do
11 it, impose provided guidelines. [REDACTED] has provided
12 guidelines, there's lot of good data out there. We
13 need to do that. I know how to do that."

14 So I interviewed and [REDACTED] got back to me
15 and there's a comment on an email that he wrote to me.
16 I'll read the comment, but I mean he was all for it
17 and all the interviews came back very positive that
18 this guy can do it, but they chose someone else. So
19 I'll just stay in the Union where I'm relatively safe
20 as long as I do my job every day and just ride out the
21 rest of my career, the remaining [REDACTED] that I
22 have.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You said a couple
24 things I wanted to question. Go ahead, Scott.

25 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, me too.

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1 What was the comment?

2 [REDACTED] Well, this was an email that
3 one of the Hope Creed senior supervisors sent to [REDACTED]
4 It reads from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] copy [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED] and also copy to me, which was nice of them.
6 It was from [REDACTED]. It says, [REDACTED] I wanted to
7 drop you a note that I was extremely happy and
8 impressed with [REDACTED] performance this past weekend as
9 the [REDACTED] at the morning POD.
10 He demonstrated accountability and ownership,
11 something that is lacking throughout this
12 organization. Please thank [REDACTED] personally for me by
13 demonstrating these winning behaviors. [REDACTED]."

14 And [REDACTED] writes a comment on here
15 and says, "I'm glad to see change. This behavior from
16 [REDACTED] seems to match his desire he is expressing to be
17 manager in our organization. What do you guys think?
18 How did he do in the interviews? Have we talked to
19 him and obtained feedback from those he talked with?"
20 I got back to him about two weeks later and he said,
21 "Yes, all the interviews went great." I said, "Why
22 don't you do this, why don't you fix this place and
23 fix the Work Management?" Never heard another word
24 from him.

25 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Did you think you

1 had the job?

2 [REDACTED] I would have liked to think.

3 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Based on the
4 feedback you got?

5 [REDACTED] Not just this feedback but
6 many other aspects.

7 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: But I mean, yes,
8 it sounds like you had good interviews and all. So
9 you thought you had a --

10 [REDACTED] Yes. Oh, yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How many people were
12 in for it?

13 [REDACTED] I don't know that.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the person that
15 they selected, how do they compare to you in terms of
16 experience?

17 [REDACTED] The person they selected was
18 [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] He has zero experience in Work
20 Management.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And at that point in
22 time, how much experience had you had in Work
23 Management? When was the -- when were you
24 interviewing for the management position?

25 [REDACTED] This was February time

1 frame, February-March.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Two thousand three.

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: So it was this
5 year.

6 [REDACTED] Oh, yes, very recently.

7 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes. For the record,
9 we're looking at an email. The title on top is
10 headed; [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] dated Friday, February 21, and this is
12 unrelated?

13 [REDACTED] That is unrelated.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. In terms of
15 the selection for that position, the way you just
16 presented it was, well, okay, so I'll go on and I'll
17 stay with the Union, I'll go till I retire [REDACTED]
18 from now. Seems like there might be more to it than
19 that than what you're saying. Is there more to the
20 reasons for the selection that you believe or is it
21 just something you can't explain or don't understand?

22 [REDACTED]: I don't know why they chose
23 who they did but it fits in line with most previous
24 decisions at that level, and I'm 99 percent sure that
25 those problem issues regarding Work Management will

1 continue.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where the schedule is
3 just not stabilized?

4 [REDACTED] That's correct.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what kind of
6 decisions are you seeing made in that Department where
7 you say it fits right in with them? Are they just not
8 putting the right people in the right position to get
9 it?

10 [REDACTED] They don't have the right
11 people in the right jobs. They don't know what the
12 day-to-day interface is. They don't have the SAP
13 knowledge or the prima vera knowledge or know the
14 tools well enough to interact with other departments
15 to make it work. It seems to me that everyone -- all
16 the departments here, Maintenance, Materials,
17 Projects, Planning/Scheduling, they all have their
18 pyramid and budget structures are set that way,
19 meaning that Maintenance has their budget and they
20 can't touch anyone else's money. And because of that
21 structure, they have not collaborated with other
22 departments to make the work flow process an efficient
23 -- anywhere near as efficient as it could be. TC

24 For example, T5 week or T3 week, any week
25 in particular, most other plants I mean they're 90

1 percent accurate down from T12. It's not hard to do.
2 There's not any rocket science to it. At T0 we have
3 30 percent additions because an operator that wants
4 this piece of equipment fixed now, because -- and he
5 doesn't know that, hey, because he wants that fixed
6 now we need to get a plane from wherever, so there's
7 cost there. Materials people don't understand the
8 impact they have when they don't order something in a
9 timely fashion.

10 There's a lot of people here that don't
11 have SAP access in order to prioritize the work of
12 1,800 people. They wait for somebody to come bang on
13 their desk. It's ridiculous to work that way. SAP is
14 structurally designed in a work flow to where someone
15 identifies an issue, [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED] It's all designed to work
17 that way. I've read a couple of books on the side
18 about SAP and talked to some other companies, but
19 PSE&G has designed that process to keep the pyramid
20 structure in place. So there is walls on every aspect
21 of it. It's very inefficient, it's very time-
22 consuming, it's --

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not user friendly?

24 [REDACTED] SAP is user friendly once
25 you get to know it a little bit.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think there might
2 be others that would differ with you on that.

3 [REDACTED] I agree. I agree. And it
4 is true.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You might have a
6 different level of experience with working with it.

7 [REDACTED] Yes, I do. Yes, I was
8 involved with conversion and start-up, so I do have a
9 lot of knowledge on it. And I've read some on my own
10 quite a bit. The [REDACTED] where I'm
11 sitting now there are people -- most people, the
12 culture, I mean they don't go out to the plant, they
13 don't know, the don't interface. They just stay in
14 their own little world and shuffle these things
15 around, and the next day get shuffled again.

16 I mean how many years has INPO and the NRC
17 told us we can't manage this work correctly? I mean
18 it's a reoccurring -- and the same people are still in
19 place. They're still in place. It just seems
20 ludicrous to me. I've talked to Calvert Cliffs and
21 Peach and I know people at TMI and it's like, "Do you
22 guys have this problem?" "No." "Well, how do you do
23 it?" "Oh, we do this." Seems simple to me. Why is
24 it so hard here? So we bring a new guy in and he
25 brings his regime of guys in and the prior regime goes

TC

1 out and we just change people at the top and it's sad
2 to see, because, personally, I've been here [REDACTED]
3 this is my company. I've watched these people rip
4 this place to shreds. I've watched extremely
5 knowledgeable, good people walk out the door and they
6 don't even know who these people are, what they can
7 offer, what they do. It's sad. It's heartbreaking.
8 There's guys that stay here till three o'clock in the
9 morning, they can't be with their families on
10 Christmas Eve because some scheduler didn't schedule
11 something right. And that's crazy to me.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Seems like you
13 attribute most of that to the management change or the
14 constant management changeover.

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Because every time
17 they come in they just start from scratch and they
18 don't know -- they don't recognize what they're
19 dealing with here.

20 [REDACTED] Exactly. I mean the last
21 layoff they had a couple weeks ago the President of
22 the Union goes up and talks to [REDACTED] who's
23 [REDACTED] because they were
24 talking about they want to cut Union people and no
25 Union people leave until all the contractors are gone.

1 And then [REDACTED] thinks to himself, "Well, geez, how
2 many management people did we just let go and who were
3 they? We don't know. How many temporary people do we
4 have?" [REDACTED] says, "I don't know." That's
5 heresy. I don't want to say that's a fact, that is
6 heresy. So they brought some of these people back
7 after they realized, "Hey, we shouldn't have let these
8 people go because they provided this function." And
9 that's --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They made too quick
11 of a decision in some cases?

12 [REDACTED] Oh, yes. So far [REDACTED] put a
13 letter out saying they brought 23 back out of the 104
14 or so, I believe. -K

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In what you're
16 outlining pretty much here, poor management practices,
17 they can't get it together to control the Work
18 Management schedule and it leads to problems right on
19 down the line to why somebody has to work at a certain
20 point in time or why something doesn't get it done.
21 In all of that, I mean that's a very broad criticism
22 in terms of site management, in all of that, are you
23 aware of any -- do you have any concerns of a nuclear
24 safety nature that's caused by that, what you're
25 looking at as mismanagement of this process?

1 [REDACTED] Yes, because when I read the
2 Davis-Besse reports on the reactor head it was a very
3 similar culture.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

5 [REDACTED] And that frightens me.

6 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: One thing that
7 would be helpful for us is if you could point to
8 specific instances. You kind of highlighted a few
9 very early on in the interview where you talked about
10 -- I think you said something like making four
11 containment entries when only one would do. That's
12 potentially an ALARA issue.

13 [REDACTED] It's an ALARA issue, sure.

14 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: I think there
15 might have been a couple other things you mentioned
16 too about just different conduct and work activities.
17 What would be helpful for us is if you could provide
18 more specificity around those examples, and if there
19 are other examples that talk in terms of maybe
20 equipment that wasn't properly maintained from a
21 nuclear safety standpoint if you have any examples of
22 that or if there were surveillances that were shortcut
23 or like the thing -- I think you talked about the
24 diesel, in and out of the diesel maintenance window
25 for three separate occasions. I mean if that's an

1 abuse of the LCR or if it's just poor planning, I'm
2 just trying to better understand what those comments
3 are about.

4 [REDACTED] Yes. From an ST point of
5 view, I monitor the STs. We miss very few, if at all.
6 Most of that relates to poor management of the work
7 wherever you take a piece of equipment out more times
8 than it needs to be. What I did provide for you, I do
9 have a list of commitment items that I ran this report
10 yesterday, yesterday being the 12th, showing hundreds
11 of work orders and it shows their due dates and their
12 overdue dates along with their schedule dates, along
13 with how many days we have it scheduled past its due
14 date and also how many days schedules past its overdue
15 date.

16 And after reading this report, I'd like to
17 know a few specifics. Most of this work where it
18 falls close to the overdue date where if we have a
19 window of 90 days to schedule it from its due date to
20 its overdue, this Company tends to put it towards the
21 end of that 90-day window, and that to me is just poor
22 Work Management philosophy.

23 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] So I'll provide you with
25 that list and you're welcome to keep that.

1 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Is there
2 any issues in there that are tech spec related or have
3 other nuclear safety implications that are -- because
4 of the fact that work hasn't been done, there's an
5 impact on system operation or the plant operation?

6 [REDACTED] These are -- I would say no
7 to that, digitally a no.

8 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.

9 [REDACTED]: But like I say, these are
10 all commitment-type items.

11 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. You
12 mentioned I think earlier you talked about INPO and
13 LANO and what they've seen and maybe some of the
14 guidelines, some of the guidance they've put out. Has
15 LANO or INPO looked at any of this, any of the -- you
16 know, like for example, this work list that has a
17 listing of work that's overdue? Have they shared any
18 insights on that? Have they given any feedback that
19 you've heard of either to yourself in your role or to
20 managers where you've been present regarding this?

21 [REDACTED] Not where I've been present.

22 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Have you
23 heard any feedback at all on this?

24 [REDACTED] One particular issue
25 regarding this is I recently got involved with some

1 breaker sampling issues, not tech spec breakers but
2 commitment type breakers.

3 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

4 [REDACTED] That PS volunteered to test
5 random breakers percentage of a certain design every
6 so often, and we agreed to do 18 to 23 of a specific
7 type each fuel cycle.

8 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

9 [REDACTED] So in my job I just started
10 doing this breaker stuff about a year ago. In doing
11 research into that specific issue, I found that in the
12 last three cycles, four cycles for both Salem 1 and 2
13 we didn't do the work that we committed to do. And I
14 made sure that the work we committed to do at the
15 current cycles that we are doing that.

16 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

17 [REDACTED]: But in the past the
18 engineers who were involved said, "Hey, we haven't had
19 a specific failure of this design, so no need to go
20 back and do the ones that we committed to do prior to
21 this."

22 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

23 [REDACTED] All right? So engineering-
24 wise, they probably justified it, but the point is if
25 you commit to do something, you should do it. And I

1 have a specific Excel report that details that data
2 and that involves hundreds of work orders, hundreds of
3 breakers that we did not check that we said we were
4 going to.

5 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: And who was the
6 commitment made to?

7 [REDACTED] NRC.

8 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: But you said it
9 wasn't a regulatory commitment? I didn't understand
10 --

11 [REDACTED] I was not a technical
12 specification commitment.

13 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] It was a generic letter
15 commitment.

16 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Do you
17 have that available here or is it something you could
18 get for us?

19 [REDACTED] It's something I can get for
20 you.

21 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. I think
22 we'd be interested in taking a look at that. Do you
23 happen to know what the generic letter was? It's all
24 right if you don't.

25 [REDACTED] Fifty-three, seventy-two.

1 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: What was it?

2 [REDACTED] Fifty-three, seventy-two, I
3 believe is the letter, and 5311.

4 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Those are docket
5 numbers.

6 [REDACTED]: Docket numbers.

7 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Yes. That's just
8 a Salem Unit 1 and Salem Unit 2 docket numbers.
9 Fifty-three, seventy-two is Salem Unit 1; 5311 is
10 Salem Unit 2.

11 [REDACTED] Okay.

12 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: But the generic
13 letter would be like a year. It would be like --

14 [REDACTED] Eighty-nine, thirteen?

15 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, 8913, like
16 service water. Eighty-nine is obviously the year and
17 13 is the 13th one in the sequence.

18 [REDACTED] Okay.

19 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: But what happens
20 is the more common ones we tend to know. Like as an
21 inspector I know 8913 is service water, 8910 is MOVs.
22 There are others, 9005 has to do with ASME co-class
23 components having leaks from and how do you deal with
24 them. And there's things like that that are more
25 commonplace.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And this is recent,
2 a recent year you're talking about?

3 [REDACTED] Oh, yes. What I'll do I'll
4 print out the Excel report that shows what cycle we
5 were supposed to do what breakers with their work
6 order numbers.

7 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Normally, under
8 those circumstances, I mean the licensee can make any
9 kind of changes to their commitment but there's a
10 process for them to follow to do that. And, in
11 general, the generic letter that they're following may
12 have a description of what that takes. Or if not, you
13 would use something similar, like a 5059 process and
14 tax.

15 [REDACTED] Okay.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you say that
17 Engineering could have justified not having done what
18 was committed to, when you raised the concern saying,
19 but, yes, if you committed to it, then it should be
20 done, who do you have those discussions with?

21 [REDACTED] Those discussions take place
22 with my immediate supervisor. It was [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED] (phonetic) was involved in
24 that.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You work for [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] Well, I'm not sure. At the
3 moment I'm working for like six different people.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oh. What title do
5 you generally report to? Or has all that changed
6 recently?

7 [REDACTED] No, my job title is still
8 [REDACTED]

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

10 [REDACTED]: But [REDACTED] (phonetic)
11 asks me to do things, [REDACTED] (phonetic) asks
12 me to do things, [REDACTED] asks me to do things,
13 [REDACTED] asks me to do things.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For purposes of
15 evaluating you in your work performance, who does
16 that?

17 [REDACTED] No one.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't get an
19 evaluation annually?

20 [REDACTED] I got an evaluation recently
21 from [REDACTED] (phonetic) who I haven't worked
22 for ever.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why is that?

24 [REDACTED] That's the way they do
25 business.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was your appraisal
2 accurate? I mean was it able to capture what you'd
3 done.

4 [REDACTED] I wrote it. They asked me
5 to write it, actually.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

7 (Laughter.)

8 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: It must have been
9 good.

10 [REDACTED] Absolutely.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Accurate. Okay.
12 When you raised the issue to these two people, you had
13 mentioned [REDACTED] is it?

14 [REDACTED]
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What kind of response
16 did you get from them?

17 [REDACTED] When I presented the data,
18 and I presented data in full, I was asked to reshuffle
19 so they could understand it better: Put a list this
20 way, put a list that way, rearrange in Excel this way.
21 My jaw just dropped to the floor when they asked me to
22 do that because it was very simple how it was
23 displayed. I just kind of sidelined [REDACTED] and
24 discussed it with the engineer, and he validated the
25 concern. I took the action to follow through with it.

1 I wanted to see the dates for all the future breakers
2 for the rest of the plant.

3 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Did you write a
4 notification on that?

5 [REDACTED] Yes, sir. Wrote a Level 2
6 notification on it. They --

7 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Did you prescribe
8 this Level 2 or was it somebody else that put the
9 level --

10 [REDACTED] I got concurrence from [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED] (phonetic), the [REDACTED] that it
12 should be a Level 2 and put it in the box accordingly.

13 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Could it
14 have been considered a Level 1? I mean is this
15 symptomatic and weaknesses in the work scheduling and
16 planning a process such that I mean it has broad
17 implications. Even though it's just this generic
18 letter and this set of breakers, is there something in
19 the way that the commitment system's being managed
20 that are broader sweeping implications? Could you
21 even think of it like that?

22 [REDACTED] That's a very good question.
23 I would like to think not, but I would say that that
24 is possible due to all the new people that we have.
25 Because of this specific issue we have two new

1 engineers addressing it and doing the background on
2 how this particular event occurred, we had an expert
3 panel defer the administrative order to do these
4 things past the date of when the actual work was to be
5 done. So the administrative order was just put off,
6 so, no it drove no one to take the action that needed
7 to be taken to address the breaker work.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, did you follow
9 the Level 2 -- were you able to track that through?

10 [REDACTED] Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where does that --
12 how did that get resolved?


13 [REDACTED] It's still open, actually.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. It's an open
15 item?

16 [REDACTED] Yes. And I'm following it
17 because I'm not confident that the people who are
18 supposed to be doing the right thing.

19 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: It seems like
20 something very basic is missing here. I mean there's
21 -- seems like there's responsibility and
22 accountability issues that -- and I don't know where
23 they are but how could something -- it sounded like no
24 one was accountable for getting this done or
25 responsible for getting it done or it just was kind of

1 the ether in the planning system. Was there someone
2 that should have owned the issue or owned the work
3 such that --

4  Yes. The person who used to
5 own the work whose work center it was assigned to had
6 no clue what it was. So he called me and asked me
7 what it was about a year ago, and I talked to him, and
8 I said, "Yes, you need to kick this off because this
9 is what drives commitment work orders to be developed
10 for different cycles of the plan. And it ended up
11 next thing I knew was deferred out past the due dates
12 of the work orders that needed to be done.

13 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Is there
14 something wrong -- structurally wrong with this
15 system, though, that -- it seems like you could find
16 out what the story was, and I don't know how much
17 research you did to do that, but it seems like
18 whatever you did you were able to get to the bottom
19 and knew what the issue was. Is it an expectation
20 that people that if they're assigned work of that
21 nature that they do that kind of research on their own
22 and come up with what's needed to do the -- schedule
23 the work and get the work done or is it one of these
24 things that's passed down from word of mouth to word
25 of mouth and -- I'm trying to understand where the

1 breakdown was, I guess, is where I'm at.

2 [REDACTED] Accountability is a serious
3 problem here.

4 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

5 [REDACTED] Yes, it is. If it was my
6 company, yes, someone whose work center that is and
7 that's attached to a name would be held accountable to
8 do that.

9 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Was it in the
10 right place or should it have been somewhere else?

11 [REDACTED] It was in the right place at
12 the time.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The issues of SAP,
14 and I know you say you're comfortable and you're
15 familiar with it, for somebody who doesn't have your
16 level of knowledge of SAP, would that have contributed
17 to something like this falling through?

18 [REDACTED] No.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's not part of --
20 you can't attribute this to that tracking.

21 [REDACTED] Most people that I talk to
22 say one of the first things they do is look at what's
23 in their work center and what date it is due to be
24 done. Some abide by that, some do not.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So this is coming

1 back to an accountability issue.

2 [REDACTED] Absolutely.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And now that you've
4 written it up as it's gotten Level 2 attention, you
5 say you're not confident that it's going to be handled
6 the way it should be. Who's got it, who's got control
7 of the issue?

8 [REDACTED] At the moment, [REDACTED]
9 has a piece of it and [REDACTED] has a piece of it.

10 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Is this something
11 these breakers that need to be tested were they not
12 tested in the current Salem Unit 2 outage? Have they
13 not been tested yet?

14 [REDACTED] I looked about two weeks
15 ago. Most of them have already been tested, and the
16 others will be tested before the outage is over.

17 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So you
18 think that at least for this point in time, for this
19 outage, that the problem will be addressed.

20 [REDACTED] For this cycle, yes.

21 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: But it was not
22 addressed previously. I think you alluded to at least
23 two previous cycles where --

24 [REDACTED] At least two previous
25 cycles.

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1 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: -- it should have
2 been done, the work should have been and it wasn't
3 done.

4 [REDACTED] That's correct.

5 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. And that
6 would constitute a miscommitment if it wasn't
7 communicated, if it wasn't communicated as a change to
8 the NRC, potentially.

9 [REDACTED] That is correct.

10 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay. Do
11 you have anything else that's like that?

12 [REDACTED] Well, one issue that is a
13 different issue than what we discussed, once in a
14 while I look at the notifications when I get time.
15 One that concerned me last week, written by [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] talks about guidelines
17 for SORC member periodic training.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What's the date on
19 that again?

20 [REDACTED]
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It couldn't be.

22 [REDACTED]: That's the end date, I'm
23 sorry, [REDACTED] is the date, I'm sorry.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED] Yes.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED]

3 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Is he a [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED] I know he's at least --

6 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Or an [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] I know he's at least -- yes,

8 I think he is an [REDACTED]

9 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Is he?

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What side is he?

11 [REDACTED]: Salem.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Salem side?

13 [REDACTED] Salem, yes.

14 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: This is what, did
15 you say training qualifications for SORC members?

16 [REDACTED] Yes.

17 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: And is there some
18 implication that people are overdue?

19 [REDACTED] That's how I read this.

20 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] And I'll leave this with
22 you.

23 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Does it
24 say how many are there or is it just --

25 [REDACTED] It says, "Description of

1 condition, procedure, SHOPDGZZ0004, Guidelines for
2 SORC member of periodic training specifies continued
3 training for SORC members and annual training plan and
4 records of this training. This training has not
5 occurred recently in the last several months nor is
6 there a training plan. Impact on plant personal
7 safety, no immediate safety impact. SORC is made up
8 of knowledgeable and experienced personnel. Specified
9 training is to keep SORC personnel current on lessons
10 learned relevant to their duties, et cetera, et
11 cetera." To me that's a serious issue. The people
12 making the decisions on when we can start, when we
13 can't start, what plant safety issues are and they're
14 not qualified to make those decisions. That's a
15 worry, and I'll leave that with you.

16 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Any other
17 issues that you have?

18 [REDACTED]: Other issues I have. I just
19 want to see this place get better and work better and
20 not violate any NRC commitments or tech specs and
21 voice specific issues not at the moment. As I do get
22 them I will volunteer them.

23 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Let me ask
24 you about some things that we've become aware of just
25 through the residents, through interviews, and maybe

1 you could help shed some light on them. One was I
2 think it was 23SW20 there was a problem with a valve
3 and the way we understand it, at least the way I
4 understand it, was that's a service water valve. It
5 was scheduled to be VOTES tested and there was a fill-
6 in vent evolution that was also supposed to go on it.
7 And my understanding was it was supposed to be VOTES
8 tested first -- and I don't know if you're familiar
9 with the testing --

10 [REDACTED] Extremely.

11 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: -- but usually
12 you set the limit switches and torque switches and
13 then they control when the valve stops. And my
14 understanding was the fill-in vent was done before the
15 VOTES testing and because the limit switch and the
16 torque switches weren't set properly, the valve
17 actually drove up through the actuator. Are you aware
18 of that?

19 [REDACTED] That is a correct statement,
20 and I'm intimately involved and knowledgeable on those
21 valves.

22 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. And the
23 thing that I was trying to personally understand is
24 how that could happen, how that could be done out of
25 sequence.

1 [REDACTED] The reason I heard was
2 scheduling pressure to get that header filled.
3 Whoever made that decision, I didn't get a name on who
4 made that decision but someone in the Outage Group
5 made that decision and didn't understand what VOTES
6 was, didn't understand the condition of that valve
7 prior to that decision.

8 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So the
9 made a decision without understanding the implications
10 of the decision.

11 [REDACTED] Correct.

12 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. And would
13 there be a record of that somewhere? I mean is that
14 something that can be identified who made that
15 decision?

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or do you know who we
17 should talk to to get a more clear --

18 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Or do you know
19 who made the decision?

20 [REDACTED] I would talk with [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED]

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What's his position?
25 [REDACTED]

He's [REDACTED]

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Anybody else
2 involved that you know of?

3 ~~REDACTED~~ Just to present that exact
4 example and that type of decision happens here all the
5 time, and it's not right.

6 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: See, one of the TK
7 struggles that we have as a regulator is when there
8 are allegations made that there is inappropriate
9 management or undo scheduling pressure or production
10 over safety, we have to be able to point to a
11 consequence and it has to have a safety impact, and it
12 has to be a nuclear safety impact for us to get our
13 attention. We don't discount the other things, but it
14 ends up being more of information that we might share
15 at the conclusion of our review. Whereas if something
16 leads to a violation, say, like for example if you
17 said because of our scheduling practices and because
18 we do things a certain way, we've missed surveillances
19 and especially if you've identified it, let's say. If
20 you said, "I've identified that our practices are such
21 that we miss surveillances on equipment," that's
22 something we can say --

23 (END TAPE 1, SIDE A)

24 (BEGIN TAPE 1, SIDE B)

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're on Side

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1 B. It's approximately 2:59 p.m.

2 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: We're talking
3 about surveillances and you get 24 hours to make one,
4 it says right in the spec, like 403 says that. If
5 there was something like that that we could point to
6 and say, "Look, this is how ineffective Work
7 Management has led to tech spec violation or this
8 problem has led to something else." I mean what you
9 described with the breakers is good. I don't have
10 enough knowledge to say whether that's a violation or
11 not. It may or may not be, I just don't know. We'll
12 have to look into the details of that. But that's the
13 kind of threshold we're looking for, just somewhat of
14 a high threshold but that's what we're looking for.
15 And those are the kinds of issues that we could do
16 something about.

17 But if we find something like that, then
18 we can point to other things and say, "Look, here are
19 other examples that didn't reach this threshold but
20 they're still there and they're still occurring." I
21 think it's pretty interesting that you mentioned the
22 fact that an individual that came out of Finance that
23 took over, what was it, what was his title?

24

25

SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: 

1 [REDACTED] okay. I don't understand that, but there may
2 be a reason for that.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What you just said so
4 we don't get away from it was you're kind of saying
5 that this is typical of decisions that are made, that
6 you're attributing to schedule pressure. Can you
7 think of other ones that go along that line that come
8 to mind?

9 [REDACTED] Off the top of my head, no,
10 but over time I could get specific examples and get
11 you more detailed things that you're asking for.

12 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And one of the
14 specific questions that we're interested in probing
15 with you is had you ever seen or felt or heard of a
16 directive or pressure that placed production over
17 safety? And you're smiling a little bit.

18 [REDACTED] A few weeks ago, one of the
19 supervisors did tell one of the workers -- he had an
20 issue, I'm trying to remember exactly what it was, but
21 his supervisor said the words, "If you bring that up
22 as a safety issue, I'm going to discipline you." And
23 that went immediately up through the chain of command
24 and finally got to our new guy that we hired, VP
25 level.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

2 (phonetic)?

3 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED] personally. He said, "Do
6 something now," and then [REDACTED] awaited -- you
7 know, word got down, trickled down quickly, "You don't
8 say that."

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] one of
10 your lead union people here?

11 [REDACTED] Yes. Yes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

13 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: And this is a
14 conversation between [REDACTED] Is
15 [REDACTED] that supposedly said, "I'll discipline --
16 [REDACTED] No. [REDACTED] is the one
17 who said that --

18 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] -- to a union guy named [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] who's a [REDACTED].

21 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

22 [REDACTED]: And [REDACTED] he went to
23 [REDACTED] first. [REDACTED] didn't respond, so he went
24 to [REDACTED] and that was within 24 hours because
25 that's something that deserves an immediate response.

1 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: What did --

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was the issue?

3 [REDACTED] I don't remember off the top
4 of my head, I apologize.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just that he was told
6 to do something and said, "If you bring that back as
7 a safety issue, I'm going to discipline you."

8 [REDACTED] Oh, yes, I do remember the
9 issue now. It was a work order that had missing
10 operations on the work order. So the question arose
11 are we doing what is necessary to declare this
12 equipment operable despite its missing operations,
13 it's missing activities on the work order?

14 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: What was the
15 piece of equipment?

16 [REDACTED] I don't remember. It was a
17 safety-related tech spec piece of equipment. So from
18 an SAP point of view, I looked into it and how it
19 happened. Come to find out it was not an issue but
20 when the question was raised is it safety or is there
21 going to be a safety consequence, [REDACTED] told this
22 guy, "Don't you even say that or I will discipline
23 you." And that was a very wrong comment to make on
24 his part.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was the employee

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1 involved?

2

3

[REDACTED]
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you just spell it

4

for me?

5

6

[REDACTED]
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And his position?

7

[REDACTED] He's a [REDACTED]

8

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

9

[REDACTED] I think that issue has been
resolved, though.

10

11

SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Do you know how

12

it was resolved?

13

[REDACTED] When [REDACTED] heard of it,
he went to, I keep forgetting the guy's name, [REDACTED]

15

SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: [REDACTED]

16

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: After he went to

17

[REDACTED] and didn't get a response you said.

18

[REDACTED] Right. He went up the old
chain of command, including [REDACTED] and didn't get a
response, so he went to [REDACTED]

19

20

21

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then [REDACTED]

22

got back involved and said [REDACTED] -- this is

23

heresy where you weren't present for this, right?

24

[REDACTED] No.

25

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So this is what

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1 you're hearing is that after [REDACTED]

2 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Well, we don't
3 know if anybody said anything to [REDACTED] yet. You
4 haven't said, have you?

5 [REDACTED] As far as I know, well, [REDACTED]
6 told me that after he got done talking to [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED] was waiting for him on the floor over
8 here and he asked, "How much trouble am I in," and I
9 guess they conversed after that, and I don't know what
10 was said.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You know [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] talked. You don't know if [REDACTED] talked to
13 [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED] I don't know that.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

16 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Is [REDACTED] a
17 steward?

18 [REDACTED] He is a [REDACTED] He's
19 on the [REDACTED]

20 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So that
21 would -- you mean he's above a steward, right?

22 [REDACTED] Yes.

23 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: I don't
24 understand all the hierarchy.

25 [REDACTED] That's all right. Yes, he's

1 a real obnoxious go-getter who does what has to be
2 done guy.

3 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

4 [REDACTED] Very aggressive.

5 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Was this a Salem
6 or Hope Creek issue?

7 [REDACTED] Salem.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was just last
9 week?

10 [REDACTED] Within the last two weeks.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Two weeks.

12 [REDACTED] And I know there were union
13 meetings, union discussions with [REDACTED] and other
14 people regarding that, and as far as I know, it is a
15 dead issue.

16 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Why do you think
17 he reacted that way, [REDACTED] I mean what do you
18 think -- is it because he just doesn't know how to
19 interact with people or interact with the union or
20 what was behind that? Is there some -- is there a
21 personality conflict? I mean what's at that root of
22 that?

23 [REDACTED] In reality, [REDACTED]
24 knows much more about the plant than [REDACTED] does,
25 because he used to be an operator.

1 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

2 [REDACTED] He used to be a [REDACTED]
3 actually. And [REDACTED] is from Hope Creek. [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED] is a Salem guy. It was a Salem issue. I
5 think [REDACTED] is so overworked and so many fire
6 drills all the time, he didn't really listen to what
7 was being said. I think it's such a hectic, day-to-
8 day, fire drill scenario he didn't understand before
9 he opened his mouth.

10 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

11 [REDACTED]: That's the impression I got.
12 And I've seen that time after time after time..

13 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Do you think he
14 generally knew there wasn't a safety issue and he just
15 told him that? I mean maybe he had been at meetings
16 where this discussion had taken place and he just
17 didn't want to repeat it again. Is that possible or
18 do you think he just was overwhelmed and it was just
19 a kneejerk response?

20 [REDACTED] I'd like to think it was
21 kneejerk but I don't know that.

22 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You started -- I'm
24 sorry, go ahead.

25 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Well, I just --

1 what I'm trying to understand in that interaction is
2 where the hard spot is, if it's a lack of knowledge,
3 if it's poor human interaction skills.

4 [REDACTED] It's a piece of both.

5 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: If it's -- okay.

6 [REDACTED]: Yes. He's not a real
7 personable guy.

8 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

9 [REDACTED]: Kind of both.

10 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. All right.
11 Thanks.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This is something
13 that you went to when I asked you about production
14 over safety issues. Does anything else come to mind?
15 Are you aware of any other issues? Some people would
16 term it a megawatt mentality --

17 [REDACTED] I understand.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- pushing non-
19 conservative decision making. Does anything else that
20 you're aware of come into that area?

21 [REDACTED] I would say no at this time
22 based on most of the field guys know what needs to be
23 done. They don't really bend to schedule pressure.
24 They genuinely are safety conscious but that's
25 contrary to the number of accidents we have so far

1 this year. I think most of the guys really know the
2 day-to-day real necessary stuff. I don't get that
3 impression from many of the management people. I
4 don't think there are serious nuclear safety issues
5 here. I think once in a while something -- someone
6 will make a wrong decision, does get corrected before
7 it gets to this level. It's rare that -- I don't
8 think you'll ever see a Davis-Besse here because
9 enough guys and myself, [REDACTED] will scream to a
10 level high enough to where something will get
11 addressed quickly.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think that
13 across the board you identified two people who would
14 raise a concern. Is that -- do you see that go across
15 the board? Do people raise issues when they see an
16 issue that causes them some concern?

17 [REDACTED]: I think for minor stuff, no.
18 I think if it was something genuinely threatening to
19 someone's life or the public or destruction of the
20 plant, absolutely,

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Minor stuff there's
22 a hesitancy?

23 [REDACTED]: Yes. Yes. Kind of the
24 mentality of, hey, the guy made a wrong decision, let
25 him burn for it if he's that stupid. They have the

1 wrong people in the wrong jobs, just like they have a
2 Finance guy doing Work Management. They have -- it's
3 just broad throughout this company, this site.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They're making it
5 hard on themselves in the way --

6 [REDACTED] Absolutely.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- they're operating.

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So in terms of
10 concerns that I'm looking at that would involve a
11 public health and safety nature, you're saying
12 automatically they're going to be -- they'll be raised
13 and nobody's going to let that fall through the
14 cracks. But if there's something that is minor or can
15 make somebody's job easier or something where they
16 would make a suggestion, they may not make it because
17 they're just tired of dealing with the wrong people in
18 the wrong positions?

19 [REDACTED] I think those are much
20 better words. Thank you. Yes, that's accurate.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I don't know if it's
22 coming out straight, but I'm trying to get what you're
23 saying.

24 [REDACTED] That's exactly right.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The serious issues

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1 are going to be raised, they're not going to let them
2 falter on that, but they're going to maybe not help
3 them out in other areas.

4 [REDACTED] That is correct.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And it seems to me
6 you've given a couple examples where you say, "Look,
7 this isn't right, this shouldn't happen," so you
8 personally feel you can raise issues?

9 [REDACTED] Me, yes, because I'm
10 obnoxious, outgoing kind of guy.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And do you --

12 [REDACTED] And I'll do what I've got to
13 do.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And can you be that
15 way without fear of retaliation on-site?

16 [REDACTED] I can now because our group
17 unionized six years ago.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. You had
19 indicated before that about five years ago you would
20 have had a problem with that.

21 [REDACTED] Five years ago I would have,
22 yes. Absolutely. 7C

23 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Was the union
24 here before that six years but just a different -- for
25 different positions?

1 [REDACTED] A lot of the guys that had
2 my position graduated from the union because they have
3 -- they've been there and done their job, so who
4 better suited to plan the work orders to do that?
5 When they came out with, "We're not paying you for
6 anything over 40 hours but we expect you to work 60,
7 70, 80 hours a week for nothing," we're not doing
8 that. You've got to be out of your mind. So our
9 group unionized, 65 guys unionized so that when you
10 force us to work overtime we're going to get paid for
11 it, unlike their supervisors and other management
12 people who don't get paid for it and are expected to
13 work all kinds of killer hours for nothing. We
14 weren't going to do that. And I'm sure there are
15 several company employees who have talked to you guys
16 and won't do it on site, that have asked to talk
17 outside of here, so that kind of answers your
18 question.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In terms of fear of

20 --

21 [REDACTED] Yes. Management people are
22 fearful of raising issues for their jobs, because none
23 of the management people, and I've talked to quite a
24 few of them, know who's the next to go because they do
25 it so randomly and so haphazardly they don't know if

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1 they're going to be able to feed their kids tomorrow
2 morning.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware of --
4 you're saying that doesn't apply to the union in
5 general, this is management where you would see that
6 concern?

7  That is correct.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For purposes of what ^{7C}
9 we're trying to accomplish here in looking at where
10 some concerns could lead to some serious problems, are
11 you aware of anybody that we should be talking to that
12 if we haven't addressed them, we should talk to them,
13 no matter where they want to be interviewed, that may
14 have issues regarding pressures, decision-making
15 issues?

16 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: If they have any
17 knowledge of any violations, any kinds of safety
18 issues, any kinds of problems on backshifts that
19 happen that just don't get publicized. I know those
20 things happen and some things get addressed and some
21 things don't. Some things get addressed at a low
22 level and they should be elevated. Are there people
23 like that that are out there that you're knowledgeable
24 of that you think we should go talk to, provide some
25 insight, either union or management or SROs, ROs,

1 maintenance technicians, foremen, superintendents,
2 whomever?

3 [REDACTED] For the record, I'll say no.

4 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

6 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: I wanted to ask
7 -- I wanted to just kind of go back and I want to try
8 and pick your brain a little bit about maybe this
9 current outage. There was also another event, I don't
10 think there was any consequence, and I'm trying to
11 remember the system it was, I think it was either
12 Service Order or maybe Aux Feed where there was a big
13 push to get a pump started, and there was all this
14 work activity. And then the operator went to -- I
15 think it was Aux Feed maybe -- went to start the pump
16 and he realized he didn't have -- the bus was dead
17 that was supposed to power the pump.

18 [REDACTED] Oh, yes, yes.

19 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Did you --

20 [REDACTED] I heard about that, yes. It
21 was Bravo Bus was out of service at the time.

22 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

23 [REDACTED]: That was a scheduling issue.

24 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Now, was that a
25 schedule pressure issue or what exactly was that?

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1 That just seemed like a real oddity. Seemed like
2 there was a big push, just the way it was described.
3 Big push, big push, got to get the system back up, got
4 to do this, get it done. It was one of the motor-
5 driven aux feed pump.

6 [REDACTED] As far as I know, that would
7 be in the bucket of a scheduling issue. They just put
8 it in the wrong place, that's all.

9 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Because I
10 think there was some knowledge of it in shift turnover
11 but there was some thinking that the work was going to
12 be done in parallel. Is there a lot of things like
13 that? I mean if we were to -- if you were to sit down
14 and say do a -- look at some of the condition reports
15 that were, I don't know, that have been written over
16 the last month or so, do you think you'd see a lot of
17 those kinds of things showing up?

18 [REDACTED] Yes. I try to at least once
19 a week read all the notifications written for the
20 previous week and there are just a lot of nonsense
21 issues. 7C

22 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Do you think
23 there's any of those that could be left, I mean that
24 there are conditions that are really undesirable that
25 just through maybe the condition reporting system that

1 might get left unattended? I mean is there any things
2 that are written say in the second or third week of
3 October, which is when you were just getting started
4 in the outage, there may be things like this that
5 there was some follow-up that was planned and maybe
6 the follow-up hasn't been done?

7 [REDACTED] I'm sure there are things
8 out there that are -- that will remain open.

9 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: I'll tell you
10 what I'm concerned with. I'm concerned with there's
11 a piece of safety-related equipment that there's a
12 problem with and like this 23SW21 I'm fairly certain
13 they probably had to replace the valve in the
14 operator, probably lock, stock and barrel, take the
15 old one out, put a new one in, but there's something
16 else out there that's like that where there's a piece
17 of equipment that's either is broken or in some way
18 degraded that's in the condition reporting system,
19 that there's some problem with it and somebody's going
20 to work on it and it's not going to get worked, and
21 it's going to get forgotten. And is there any way
22 that you could look --

23 [REDACTED] That usually does not happen
24 here. Is there a way I can learn that, retrieve that
25 data?

1 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Yes.,

2 [REDACTED] Yes. Yes, there is, and
3 I'll commit to you that I will look for some of those
4 things.

5 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

6 [REDACTED] But usually when we come out
7 of an outage the individual components and systems are
8 tested independently and usually very surprising to
9 see the 23SW20 valve. That was an exception.

10 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything else?

12 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: No.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is there anything
14 else you would like to add that either we haven't
15 brought up to you or you think you would like to get
16 on the record?

17 [REDACTED] Just one comment of
18 management employees, them being in fear of bringing
19 issues to their leaders in fear of retribution for
20 their jobs. That scares me. You know, I can read
21 Davis-Besse, I can see what happens in my day-to-day
22 world, but I can't be everywhere to see everything at
23 all levels, no one can. There are hundreds of these
24 people out there, management, that are afraid to speak
25 for their jobs. And that worries me because at three

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1 in the morning when something happens I would like to
2 think that it doesn't get swept under the carpet, I
3 don't think it does, but or at least one way or
4 another those issues get identified somehow, but all
5 management people here are in fear for their jobs, and
6 that's not conducive to safety conscious work
7 environment when that fear exists.

8 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Has anybody
9 actually told you that? Do you have like management
10 that's come to you and said, "I'd like to do something
11 about this but they're getting rid of people and I
12 don't want my name to appear on a list somewhere."

13 [REDACTED] I've talked to some people
14 that their attitudes are they'll do what they have to
15 do to make sure this place is correct in configuration
16 and runs right, whatever means that may be, but they
17 are afraid to bring issues to their immediate
18 supervision. Most things are resolve covertly but
19 they do get resolved.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How do you mean
21 covertly?

22 [REDACTED] Meaning the Level 2 that I
23 wrote with the breakers I'm going to watch it, I'm
24 going to see who answers what and how they answer it.
25 I'm going to follow through with Engineering to make

1 sure they address the future issues. Am I confident
2 my boss is going to answer it correctly? No, I'm not.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're at the
4 end of your time. I just want to take one minute of
5 your time off the record here. I just have a concern
6 I wanted to explore.

7 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
8 the record for a short period of time.)

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're back on
10 the record after about, oh, a four-minute break there.
11 In summary, what we decided to do is [REDACTED] is
12 going to provide some additional information to us
13 regarding this assessment involving some people to
14 talk to, but there are a few steps he wants to take
15 first, and we'll leave it at that for now. Time frame
16 for that? We didn't establish one.

17 [REDACTED] By Wednesday, next week?

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. All right.
19 That will be great.

20 [REDACTED] I'll also provide an Excel
21 report for the previous cycle breaker testing.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. I think that
23 was the only documentation?

24 SENIOR ENGINEER BARBER: Well, and if
25 there's any other issues -- you said you think there

1 probably won't be, but if there's any issues that came
2 up during the outage that related to safety-related
3 equipment that were degradations or problems with --
4 that there's a possibility that they will not get
5 corrected or if there's still work outstanding, we
6 just want to have the opportunity to be able to go
7 back and look.

8 [REDACTED] I'll look.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And this is our copy?

10 [REDACTED] Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. [REDACTED]

12 have I or any other NRC employee offered you any
13 promises of reward or threatened you in any manner in
14 exchange for your information today?

15 [REDACTED] No.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you appeared
17 here freely and voluntarily?

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And at this
20 point, we have decided nothing further to add to the
21 record right now.

22 [REDACTED] That's correct.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Well, thank
24 you for your time.

25 [REDACTED] Great. Thank you.

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The interview is over. It is about 3:26 p.m.

(Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the Interview of

~~_____~~ was concluded.)

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