

Diversity and Defense-in-Depth for Digital Systems



NRC Regulatory Information Conference
Session Th5D: Digital Instrumentation and Control
March 9, 2006

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Why is diversity and defense-in-depth important?

- **Unexpected events arise that challenge safety**




- **Robust designs can meet those unexpected challenges**





What is defense-in-depth?

- Multiple protective barriers or means, usually layered
- All barriers must be breached to have an adverse effect on human beings or the environment
- **EXAMPLE:** The classic three physical barriers to radiation release in a reactor:
 - Fuel cladding
 - Reactor coolant system pressure boundary
 - Containment





What is diversity?

- **Diverse instrumentation systems provide several ways to detect and respond to significant events:**
 - Sense different parameters,
 - Use different technologies,
 - Use different logic or algorithms, or
 - Use different actuation means
- Defenses at different levels of depth may also be diverse from each other



What are the concerns with digital systems?

- **Vulnerable to common-mode failures caused by software errors**
 - Defeats the redundancy achieved by hardware architecture
- **This concern applies to both new reactors and retrofits in existing reactors**
- **Complex systems with unique configurations possible**
- **Software cannot be proven to be error free**



Operating Experience

- **Digital systems at Nuclear Power Plants have caused:**
 - Reactor trips
 - Transients
 - Systems inoperable
- **Problems caused by:**
 - software design errors
 - inadequate control of modifications
 - personnel errors



U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Position

- **SRM to SECY-93-087**
 - Applicants shall assess the defense-in-depth and diversity of the proposed instrumentation and control system to demonstrate that vulnerabilities to common-mode failures have adequately been addressed.
- **SRP Branch Technical Position HICB-19:**
 - Guidance for assessment of defense-in-depth and diversity.



What is the path forward?

- **Ongoing research to address digital systems**
 - Identify sets of NUREG/CR-6303 CMF coping strategies
 - Identify configuration-specific CMF vulnerabilities in currently approved COTS digital system configurations
 - Develop and validate a fault injection tool and methodology to identify diversity requirements
- **Work by the industry**
 - EPRI initiative use risk insights for defense-in-depth and diversity evaluations