

# **RIC 2006**

## **Session W3GH**

# **Safety Culture Initiatives & Implications**

**Safety Culture & the ROP**

**David Lochbaum**

**Director, Nuclear Safety Project**

**Union of Concerned Scientists**

**March 8, 2006**



# What were the problems?

- Safety culture problems contributed to unacceptable performance levels at nuclear power plants
- ROP's processes for flagging and fixing safety culture problems were ill-defined and ad hoc

# What are the solution options?

- Routinely assess safety culture as part of the baseline effort to correct problems before they contribute to unacceptable performance levels
- Explicitly determine whether safety culture problems factored into detected unacceptable performance levels

# What are the solution's problems?

- Routinely assess safety culture as part of the baseline effort to correct problems before they contribute to unacceptable performance levels
  - ☹ Diverts resources away from detecting unacceptable performance levels
  - ☹ Lacks regulatory basis and thus represents undue regulatory burden
  - ☹ Leads to pointless, counter-productive debates when safety culture flags are raised absent corresponding performance problems

# What are the solution's problems?

- Explicitly determine whether safety culture problems factored into detected unacceptable performance levels
  - ☹️ “Lagging” indicator because unacceptable performance levels must be present
  - ☹️ Hasn't been implemented yet

# What are the solution's attractions?

- ☺ If all-Green, no safety culture safaris
  - “Credits” efforts undertaken by industry and NRC in wake of Davis-Besse
- ☺ If not all-Green, questions – not conclusions – about safety culture being a factor in the performance decline
  - Formally raises a flag about a possible safety culture dimension to a detected performance decline
- ☺ If safety culture determined to be factors, timely fixes
  - Formally tracks resolution of identified safety culture problems