


Official Transcript of Proceedings
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

Interview of 

Docket Number:

1-2003-051F

Location:

Salem, New Jersey

Date:

Wednesday, March 10, 2004

Work Order No.:

NRC-1373

Pages 1-76

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
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
+ + + + +
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS
INTERVIEW

----- x

IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF : Docket No. 1-2003-051F



(CLOSED) :

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----- x

Wednesday, March 10, 2004

Training Center

PSEG Nuclear

Salem, NJ

The above-entitled interview was conducted
at 9:13 a.m.

BEFORE:

SPECIAL AGENT Eileen Neff

SR. SPECIAL AGENT Jeff Teator


ALSO PRESENT:

Project Engineer Ted Wingfield

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APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of PSEG Nuclear and the Witness,



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JEFFRIE J. KEENAN, ESQ.
PSEG Assistant General Solicitor
Nuclear Business Unit--N21
P.O. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

9:13 a.m.

1
2
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is March
4 10th, 2004. The time is approximately 9:13 a.m.
5 Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, with the NRC
6 Office of Investigations, Region 1. Also present from
7 the same office is Sr. Special Agent Jeff Teator, and
8 from the Division of Reactive Projects, Project
9 Engineer Ted Wingfield.

10 What follows is an interview of [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] That's correct.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- who is currently
14 employed by PSEG Nuclear as the [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED] That's correct.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. PSEG Nuclear
17 Assistant General Solicitor Jeffrie Keenan is also
18 present, and will describe the purpose of his
19 appearance today, shortly.

20 As agreed, this interview is being tape
21 recorded. The location of this interview is the PSEG
22 Nuclear Training Center at Salem, New Jersey.

23 The subject matter of this interview
24 concerns the safety-conscious work environment at
25 Salem and Hope Creek. [REDACTED] it's been

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1 explained to you that you're being approached as a
2 witness in regard to the work environment, and your
3 assessment of it, and that there is no potential
4 violation associated with the safety-conscious work
5 environment. You understand that?

6  Yes, I do.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And you agree
8 to appear here voluntarily today?

9  Yes, I do.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What I'd like
11 to do before we get into any other questions is place
12 you under oath.

13  Okay.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If you would, raise
15 your right hand, please.

16 Whereupon,

17 
18 having been first duly sworn, was examined and
19 testified as follows:

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Jeff, could you
21 please state the purpose of your appearance here
22 today?

23 MR. KEENAN: Yes. My name is Jeff Keenan.
24 I'm counsel for PSEG Services, assistant general
25 solicitor. Today I'm representing PSEG Nuclear and

1 (Carl) in a dual capacity. I don't have any reason to
2 believe there's a conflict of interest.

3 We understand we're here to address issues
4 relative to the safety-conscious work environment,
5 both an assessment of strengths and weaknesses, so we
6 appreciate the opportunity to provide our views.

7 We would like to review the transcript
8 when it's available. We understand it will be done
9 under the purview of the NRC.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you.

11 [REDACTED] do you understand the purpose of the
12 representation as explained to you?

13 [REDACTED] Yes, I do.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Does your
15 employer require you to have an attorney present when
16 you are questioned by -- when you're interviewed by
17 the NRC Office of Investigation?

18 [REDACTED] Absolutely not.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Were you in
20 any way threatened with any adverse action if you did
21 not request corporate counsel?

22 [REDACTED] No.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Will the presence of
24 Mr. Keenan hinder your testimony in any way?

25 [REDACTED] None whatsoever.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you
2 understand you have the right to an interview, a
3 private interview with me, at your convenience?

4 [REDACTED] Yes, I do.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And with that
6 understanding, do you wish to continue at this time?

7 [REDACTED] Yes, I do.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

9 Let's establish just some identifying
10 information for you. Date of birth, Social Security
11 number, please.

12 [REDACTED] I was born [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Social
15 Security number.

16 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Home address.

18 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED]

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And home
21 telephone, please.

22 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. And a
24 brief summary of your education, please.

25 [REDACTED] Went to the [REDACTED]

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graduated in [REDACTED]

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] What did I say?

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I wanted to be ten years younger. Okay, [REDACTED] And in [REDACTED] I got a

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And your work history, nuclear.

[REDACTED] Nuclear work history: after graduating from the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

MR. KEENAN: What year was that when you left the [REDACTED] --

[REDACTED]

MR. KEENAN: [REDACTED] Okay. You said [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Did I say [REDACTED] Okay.


SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We got it clarified.

[REDACTED] Thank you.


SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you licensed on Salem?

 No, I was not.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. Are you familiar with the letter that the NRC issued --

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[REDACTED]

Yes, I am.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- last January?

[REDACTED]

Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was your assessment of that letter?

[REDACTED]

My assessment of the letter was that we have had, over the years, some long-standing equipment problems that we have not in a timely manner addressed or fixed, and that we also got the same kind of feedback from some surveys we've done of our employees, a synergy survey we did in December, as well as some other surveys and assessments we've done, that our people don't feel, and rightly so, that we don't -- we don't address some equipment problems in a timely fashion, as well as some industrial safety-type problems that were not addressed in a timely fashion. And to me, that was the main -- when I looked at the letter, that was some of the things that were the main drivers to recount behind the letter, and some of the reasons why you all felt it necessary to ask us to investigate that.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There was a point in the letter that had to do with noted disagreements among operators and senior management in terms of how the plant would be moved and directed.

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[REDACTED]

Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you -- do you remember that part of that?

[REDACTED]

Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How did that strike you? How did you react to that?

[REDACTED]

There was one instance that came to mind for me that made me -- that I was aware of, that could have been part of the basis for that, and that was in starting up Salem Unit 2 last spring, after a trip from some problems that we had in our circulating water system. And there was some disagreement at the time that we were starting up on what -- what necessary equipment we -- was available for starting the plant up at that time.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're saying that was one issue that you recognize may have been a part of that?

[REDACTED]

Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there anything else?

[REDACTED]

That was the only thing --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there more than one?

[REDACTED]

That was the thing that came

Handwritten mark resembling a stylized '2' or 'C'.

1 into my mind when I read that.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You were the

3 [REDACTED] at that point?

4 [REDACTED] Yes, I was.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Spring '03?

7 [REDACTED] Yes; March.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's talk about that
9 and --

10 [REDACTED] Sure.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- the handling of
12 that. In general, if you can set up, I mean, what you
13 were dealing with at the time --

14 [REDACTED] We -- last spring was -- we
15 measure the amount of detritus, or just debris that's
16 in the river, so that we can ensure that we're ready
17 to handle that at our circulating and service water
18 systems, and we were monitoring that in the spring.
19 It was the heaviest, perhaps, loading we had seen,
20 that we had ever seen, actually, since we've been
21 recording it in the early '90s. So we were having
22 some challenges with the circ-water system. Had no
23 challenge with the service water, which is the
24 safety-related cooling system. And I don't remember
25 the exact date. It was in March. It was a

1 particularly bad time for the river grass, and we lost
2 several circulating water pumps in succession, and
3 that caused us to manually take Unit 2 off-line, and
4 had to reduce load on Salem Unit 1.

5 As our practice, we have an immediate
6 response team -- at the time, we called it a TARP team
7 -- investigated what happened. They came up with some
8 recommendations.

9 We also -- whenever we trip the plant, we
10 have a Station Operations Review Committee, SORC,
11 meeting that reviews the response to the trip and
12 post-trip response, and also agrees upon what kind of
13 work we have to do and what's necessary to restart the
14 plant back up.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What's the
16 difference between the TARP and the SORC at that
17 point?

18 ~~REDACTED~~ TARP is an immediate
19 response team that looks at -- is the -- have we taken
20 the appropriate immediate actions, do we have the
21 right people on site to respond to the events ongoing.


22 SORC is more of an after-the-fact
23 oversight. It's a -- it is a safety committee that
24 advises -- at the time, it advises the ops director,
25 and in our current organization advises me on the safe

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
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1 and efficient and reliable operation of the plant.


2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So when did
3 this SORC begin looking at this? How far after the
4 fact?

5  I don't remember exactly,
6 but it would have been a day or two after the fact.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8  We have the minutes. We
9 could record minutes for those meetings so we can get
10 the exact dates for the -- if you need that.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You have TARP
12 team reports, too, I think --

13  Uh-huh. Yes, we do.


14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- on each of
15 the issues.

16  Yes.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
18 Okay.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So you were
20 saying that they had made some recommendations.

21  Yes. And we agreed on --
22 and I believe we -- at that meeting we set some
23 parameters on what equipment we wanted to make sure
24 was in good condition prior to starting the plant up.
25 Specifically dealing with circ-water, we agreed that



1 we wanted to have -- I believe it was five circulating
2 water pumps available when we started the plant up.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Out of six?

4 [REDACTED] Out of six. That's correct.

5 And that's above and beyond our procedural
6 requirements. Procedurally, we can actually, I
7 believe, start up at three or four. I don't remember
8 if it was three or four, but something less than five.
9 But that's what we had agreed upon.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was in
11 agreement on that? What group of people are you
12 talking about?

13 [REDACTED] That was -- would have been
14 myself, plus the SORC body, and -- and I provided that
15 to my boss at that time, which was [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Can
18 you give us the names who were in agreement that you
19 needed five to start up?

20 [REDACTED] I would only be guessing to
21 say who was on that.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about
23 titles?


24 [REDACTED] It would have been -- on the
25 SORC, we have someone from maintenance, someone from

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1 operations, someone from engineering, someone from
2 licensing, someone from QA, someone from chemistry,
3 someone from radiation protection. We have to have at
4 least four, the chairman plus four of those.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And those names
6 would be on the SORC meeting minutes?

7  Yes. We would definitely
8 have those.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

10 MR. KEENAN: If that would be helpful,
11 we'd be glad to provide the SORC meeting minutes.


12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.


13 MR. KEENAN: We do not have those today,
14 though.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. All
16 right.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.


18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So are you --
19 in your position as  are you the head of
20 the SORC?

21  At the time, I was a 

22  And I should remember this, but I don't
23 remember if I was chairing it or -- I was at the SORC.

24 I don't know if was the 

25 



1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

2 Okay.

3 [REDACTED] If I was not the chairman,
4 it would have been [REDACTED]

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. So the
6 SORC agreed that they wanted five --

7 [REDACTED] Right.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- before
9 starting up Unit 1.

10 [REDACTED] Right.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And you were
12 about to go into SORC presenting that to your senior
13 management, right?

14 [REDACTED] Yeah, that was what we
15 agreed upon. And then we -- we were down a few days
16 while we fixed some equipment. And we were in the
17 process of starting the plant up, and we were at the
18 point where it was -- we -- it would have been the
19 time where we needed a fifth circulator to get to the
20 agreed-upon equipment to start the plant up. We had
21 four, and we had said we wanted five. And there was
22 -- procedurally, we could have -- we could have
23 started the plant up with four, and there was no
24 nuclear safety impact for starting the plant with four
25 circulators. But we had said we were going to start

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1 with five, so we were waiting for the fifth
2 circulating water pump.

3 And it was the middle of the night. My --
4 my boss at the time was [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] requested that we have a conference
7 call to discuss starting the plant up, and on that
8 call was myself, [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] That's who I recall
12 was on the conference call.

13 In the -- and basically, we had a
14 conversation about why -- should we or shouldn't we
15 start the plant up in the current condition, and there
16 was -- there was disagreement on the phone call as far
17 as starting the plant up. Should we start the plant
18 up with our current configuration of four? Our
19 procedures tell us we can. Yet at the same time, we
20 said we needed five to do that. And in the end, we
21 decided to start the plan up with four.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where is -- who's on
23 what side here? Where's the disagreement?

24 [REDACTED] was basically
25 asking us "Why aren't you starting the plant up? You

1 have what your procedures say you're required to have
2 to start the plant up." And the shift manager, as I
3 would expect him to, said -- was -- wanted to ensure
4 that we had some redundancy. And some agreed -- we
5 agreed upon a certain plant configuration to start the
6 plant up, and so we were talking about that, the pros
7 and cons of doing both. And in the end, we did start
8 the plant up with four. It was not an unsafe thing to
9 do.

10 However, I think where -- you know, when
11 I reflected on that, that phone call, what -- I think
12 where it could have gone better was, we shouldn't have
13 had the conference call with all those people on the

14 phone call. I should have had -- I should have had
15 the conversation myself with [REDACTED] come to a
16 consensus on the direction we were going, and then I
17 could separately have a conversation with the
18 operators to -- to get their input, to discuss the
19 pros and cons of starting up with four circulators
20 versus five, and then proceeding that way.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why? Why would it
22 have gone better if you had separated it out?


23 [REDACTED] At the time, I was -- when
24 the phone call came together, my -- my mind was still
25 -- we were going to -- we had said we were going to


1 wait for five circulators: let's wait, let's get the
 2 fifth circulator back, and start the plant up. So I
 3 think it's always best to -- if I have people that
 4 work for me, before I go ask questions of those that
 5 work for them about why aren't they doing or not doing
 6 something, I would want to make sure I talked to the
 7 person that worked directly for me first, to make sure
 8 we are on the same page before -- and actually let
 9 them have the conversation with those that work for
 10 them. It's chain of command, and you don't -- you
 11 can't -- you don't under- -- there's a potential to
 12 undermine people's leadership if you go around them
 13 like that.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You already had
 15 an agreement, though, in SORC, which you were a member
 16 of, that you wanted --

17  Yes. Yes.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That SORC
 19 decided we wanted five before startup.

20  Yeah. And it is still our
 21 -- we are able to change our decision, based on
 22 current plant conditions, where it's -- and the
 23 procedures allowed us to do that. So there was no --
 24 no, we didn't violate procedures by doing what we did.
 25 There was just a -- the interaction could have gone



1 much better. They -- and for me personally, I should
2 have stopped the conversation immediately myself, and
3 then -- and had those separate conversations.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If the interaction --
5 at what point would you have stopped it? I mean, what
6 -- was there something objectionable going on, or in
7 what way could it have been better, the interaction?

8 [REDACTED] It could have -- I should
9 have stopped it at the point when I knew that --
10 probably from the -- near the beginning, when I knew
11 that I wasn't -- where [REDACTED] asking us to do something
12 that we're -- we haven't -- is different than what our
13 plan was. So I wasn't yet aligned with where his mind
14 was, so I should have stopped it at that point to make
15 sure that myself and my boss and [REDACTED] were on the same
16 page before -- and then allowed me to have the
17 conversation with the people that worked for me.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It sounds -- based on
19 what we've heard about it, it sounds like it got
20 pretty contentious and pretty frustrating --

21 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- for some of the
23 individuals present.

24 [REDACTED] Yes.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The -- what were you

1 hearing? What caused them to get to that level of
2 frustration? I mean, in what way were they being
3 directed or interacted with that caused that angst
4 over it?

5 ~~_____~~ I think the -- well, part of
6 the angst was that we're changing the plan without,
7 you know, making -- we were basically having a
8 conference call to get the different inputs on
9 changing the plan. It's just an unusual -- it was an
10 unusual phone call, the VP ops through the shift
11 manager all on that same conference call discussing
12 how to change the plan and how we're going to maneuver
13 the plan. And from ~~_____~~ point of view, his position
14 was that if there's no nuclear safety impact or we're
15 within our procedural guidance, if we want additional
16 equipment to maximize reliability of that plant, that
17 becomes -- that decision to either wait or not wait
18 becomes his decision, as opposed to the SRO's
19 decision. The SRO's decision is, you know, if the
20 plant's operating and we have all the required
21 equipment, if we were to lose some -- one of the
22 required pieces of equipment, or tech specs direct
23 shutting the plant down, or in their opinion, based on
24 plant conditions, they needed to take -- to remove the
25 plant from service for nuclear safety reasons, that's

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1 absolutely the SRO's responsibility, and he's required
2 to take that action. If it was from an additional
3 equipment -- from a reliability point of view, [REDACTED]
4 position was that that was his, his decision to make,
5 and there was contention about that.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Between who?

7 [REDACTED]: I think between all of us.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So he's -- he's the
9 one person arguing, and he's engaged you and [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] and the shift
11 manager. And all of you, at least four people, are
12 arguing for a comfort level on the safety margin that
13 you're looking for, is what you're talking about here.
14 You're saying, "Yeah, we meet the minimums, but we
15 would like more."

16 [REDACTED] And it wasn't safety margin
17 at all. It was more -- it was plant reliability. We
18 had -- there was no impact to safety margin
19 whatsoever.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So it's a
21 comfort level --

22 [REDACTED] Sure.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- is what's being
24 expressed to him?

25 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's "I would rather
2 have this, as agreed upon, as we all agreed upon" --
3 [REDACTED] Right.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- "through a TARP
5 and SORC process" --
6 [REDACTED] Right.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- "that we want
8 that." And yet, in that -- in the face of that, he's
9 saying, "No, you need to start up with four, and this
10 is my decision; it's a management decision."
11 [REDACTED] Right.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NESS: It's not a safety
13 decision, so he's going to make --
14 [REDACTED] Right.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He wants it to go
16 that way. Was he listening to the concerns at all?
17 Was he at all responsive to what he was hearing from
18 you?
19 [REDACTED] Yeah, he was listening to
20 the -- he was -- and [REDACTED] point of view has always
21 been, he -- and I think this was his thought process
22 that night. He always challenges us to think through
23 all aspects of a decision that we're making, in that
24 if -- if it looks like we are coming from the point of
25 view that we wanted to get the plant on-line to -- for

1 production reasons, he'll ask us to -- lots of
2 questions about the safety aspect of the decision. If
3 we are -- he wants to make sure we're looking at the
4 decision from all points of view.

5 And I think that's what -- that was what
6 he was doing that night, but I think it came across --
7 the way it came across was, I understood -- I
8 understand that that's what he does, but I don't think
9 that those that worked for me always understood that,
10 and I don't think they understood that that night,
11 that he always is coming from making sure that we're
12 looking at all angles.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, how did
14 they view it? I mean, I -- you're not being clear.

15 [REDACTED] Okay. How did they view it?

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah. How do
17 you think they viewed it? I mean, you said that they
18 may have viewed it a different way.

19 [REDACTED] I think they --

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What way?

21 [REDACTED] I think they viewed it as a
22 -- that he was making the decision. There was no --
23 there was not a safety impact, so he was making the
24 decision.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's what he

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1 said?
2 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Isn't that what
4 he said, "This is my call"?
5 [REDACTED] I mean, he did say it.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he?
7 [REDACTED] Yeah.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But I mean,
9 SORC had met a couple days before, correct?
10 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And you're on
12 SORC. SORC decides, "We're not going to start up
13 until we have five," correct?
14 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: SORC meeting
16 minutes issued?
17 [REDACTED] Yes.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or SORC
19 decision -- it must have been -- was that SORC
20 decision shared with management to [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They had to
24 know?
25 [REDACTED] Yes.

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So I'm thinking
2 this isn't -- this should not be a surprise to
3 [REDACTED] that SORC had decided, "We need
4 five to start up." Right?

5 [REDACTED] Yes, that's true.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
7 After SORC made that decision, did you get any
8 push-back from [REDACTED] before this phone
9 call?

10 [REDACTED] No.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why not? Do
12 you know?

13 [REDACTED] Why did I not get push-back?

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I'm just
15 -- you know, I'm wondering what precipitates the call
16 then. The SORC decision is known at that level, two
17 days before, two -- a couple days before, according to
18 you. Right?

19 [REDACTED] I don't -- I don't know if
20 it was one or two days, but, yeah.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

22 [REDACTED] We made it known.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, they had
24 other equipment they had to fix before they could go
25 to startup?

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[REDACTED]

Uh-huh.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So the SORC decision is out there. Is this the first time you had push-back from [REDACTED] on this issue during this phone call?

[REDACTED]

Yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know why he made the call, what precipitated him calling this group of people together to discuss this?

[REDACTED]

No. I don't know what caused him to do it, no.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I mean, you made -- you made a point that it was a plant reliability issue, not a safety issue.

[REDACTED]

Uh-huh.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But isn't plant reliability really a safety issue? I mean, if something happens with plant reliability, that could challenge the operators in the control room, correct?

[REDACTED]

That's true.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. So in the end, really, could it not be a safety issue, plant reliability? Or isn't it a safety issue? I'll ask it that way, so it's more clear.

[REDACTED]

Is plant reliability a

1 safety issue?

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah.

3 [REDACTED] Yes, plant reliability -- if
4 the plant's not reliable, and there's lots of
5 transients, then that is a safety issue, yes.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is that where
7 SORC was coming from in making their decision to want
8 to have five before beginning startup?

9 [REDACTED] SORC was coming from the
10 point of view that we wanted to minimize the
11 challenges to the operators.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Okay.
13 And during this conference call was that position

14 explained to [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]: I don't remember if it was
16 explained explicitly, but that was understood.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was the --
18 okay, I want to get back to who the disagreement was
19 between during this phone call. Who was [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED] talking on one side, correct?

21 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He is
23 challenging the group.

24 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who's speaking

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1 for the group? Is it you? Is it [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] I think it was the -- I
3 don't know. Like I said, I don't remember if it was
4 [REDACTED] that was the [REDACTED] on the phone,
5 but it was the [REDACTED] and the shift
6 manager.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you all in
8 the same room together, and [REDACTED] was someplace
9 else?

10 [REDACTED] I was on the phone.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: With [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] present with you?

13 [REDACTED] Not with me, no. I was on
14 the phone at my house.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, okay. All
16 right. You did say it was in the middle of the night.

17 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Sometime at
19 night. Okay. So who's putting forward the group's
20 position to [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED] Again, I don't remember if
22 it was [REDACTED]. It was the [REDACTED] on the
23 call that -- I had two. It might have [REDACTED] I'm not
24 sure. I believe it was that person, though.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, you

1 mentioned (redacted) was on the call. You didn't mention
2 another (redacted) I don't think.
3 (redacted) I believe I said that there
4 was the shift manager (redacted)
5 (redacted) I don't know for sure if it was
6 (redacted) I think that's what I said.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But you're
8 clear that it was the (redacted) talking?

9 (redacted) Yes.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Discussing it
11 with (redacted)

12 (redacted) Yes.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did it get
14 heated between those two individuals, this discussion?
15 "Heated" is my word.

16 (redacted) Heated? I would say yes.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. In
18 what way? What was said?

19 (redacted) I don't remember the exact
20 words that would cause me to say it was heated, other
21 than there was disagreement.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Did it
23 become personal between (redacted)

24 (redacted) No, I don't believe it
25 became personal.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was it insulting to
2 anybody?

3 [REDACTED] I -- nothing sticks out in
4 my head that would cause me to say it was insulting.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall
6 anybody's manhood being challenged, in terms of making
7 this decision to run with four or five circulators?
8 In that way, insulting?

9 [REDACTED] I don't recall that.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall
11 anything close to that?

12 [REDACTED] No, I don't.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were any names used,
14 any kind of name-calling, any profanity?

15 [REDACTED] I don't remember
16 specifically if there was profanity. [REDACTED] method --
17 or [REDACTED] often used profane words in his conversation,
18 so that not occurring here, not sticking out in my
19 mind, doesn't -- it could or couldn't have happened.
20 Probably there were some profane words used, but it
21 doesn't stick out in my mind, because that was part of
22 his normal way of talking.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you recall
24 if the [REDACTED] got up and left the phone call?

25 [REDACTED] I believe he did, for part

1 of the phone call.


2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Excuse me?

3  I believe he did, by -- as
4 part of the phone call.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Believe he did
6 what?

7  Left, left the phone call,
8 for part of the phone call.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know
10 what caused that person to leave the phone call? Was
11 there something said?

12  I don't remember
13 specifically what caused them to leave, no.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How would you
15 be in a vantage point to know if somebody left the
16 call or not,  I mean, if you were participating
17 by --

18  I don't know if he said it
19 or -- they were in the shift manager's office, I know,
20 and I -- I do remember knowing that he left for a
21 while and came back, but I don't -- I don't know how
22 I knew that, if he said he's leaving or -- I don't
23 know.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have some
25 follow-up with the  on this, do you recall,

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1 regarding that meeting?

2 [REDACTED] We talked about it, yeah.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And what was
4 talked about?

5 [REDACTED] We talked about the -- just
6 how the conversation -- I was -- the main follow-up I
7 had was that I -- I think it was my responsibility to
8 end the call much sooner than -- right at the
9 beginning of the conversation, so, as I said, I can
10 get in line with my bosses and then have a separate
11 conversation with the people what work for me. We
12 shouldn't have that debate in that -- in that -- on a
13 conference call like that. And that's what I talked
14 about with him. I said -- in the end, we talked
15 about, you know, was it -- from a plant safety point
16 of view, was it safe to start the plant up? And we
17 all agreed after the fact that it was. Before, we did
18 agree that it was safe to do, but we should have had
19 that -- it shouldn't have been a decision that we make
20 in a conference call with that -- with that number of
21 people in the call.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did the [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED] and after -- I guess the next day, did
24 the [REDACTED] in your presence to talk about
25 the phone call the night before?

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[REDACTED] That's possible. I don't remember that. That's possible, but I don't remember that.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you direct the [REDACTED] and apologize?

[REDACTED] No.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You're positive of that?

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you talk to --

[REDACTED] I think I asked him -- I said -- I think I said that they should talk about the interaction. They should talk, you know, make -- talk through how the conversation went. I think I told him to do that, but I didn't tell him to apologize, no.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, why did you do that? Was that a concern that you had, or was that coming to you from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]: That was me, I believe. I wasn't directed from [REDACTED] to have him talk to him, no.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I'm thinking it was [REDACTED].
Again, I'm -- I'm sure it was [REDACTED] Well, not sure.
I think -- I'm pretty sure it was [REDACTED]

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're thinking -- your recollection is, you weren't prompted by [REDACTED] call him with an apology?

[REDACTED] No.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But you thought it might have been a good idea for those two to talk --

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- about the interaction from the night before.

[REDACTED] Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you give him any direction on specifically what they needed to -- you know, to hash out there?

[REDACTED] I don't recall that I did. Just that -- just from a -- how can we improve and how can we do it better next time?

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was his reaction to that, to your suggestion?

[REDACTED] I don't remember the specific reaction.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's go back to the phone call, if we could, for a few minutes,

1 okay?

2  Sure.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can we just do one
4 thing on that phone call? What time of day is this?
5 You're saying middle of the night?


6  That's my recollection.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not earlier, like
8 dinnertime, 6:00, 7:00 o'clock at night? Middle of
9 the night? Did you get woken up with a phone call for
10 this?

11  I don't think I was woken
12 up. It was at night. If it was around dinner, that's
13 possible. I know I was at home. I'm sure we can
14 figure out the time, 'cause it was a AT&T conference
15 call. I'm sure we could get the records for that, if
16 that's necessary.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Sorry to have
18 interrupted you on that.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'll talk about
20 the call, too. How long do you think the call lasted?
21 Around --

22  I would say probably forty-
23 five minutes or so.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. At what
25 point during the call did the decision change to allow

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1 the plant to start up with four circulators instead of
2 five, which is what SORC had decided previously?

3 [REDACTED] The decision was -- the
4 ultimate decision was toward the end of the phone
5 call.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And how
7 did -- how was that decision reached? On what basis
8 was that decision reached?

9 [REDACTED] The basis was that the shift
10 manager agreed that it was within our procedural
11 guidance, and from a nuclear safety point of view,
12 there was not a challenge to nuclear safety by not
13 having that fifth circulator.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Hadn't SORC
15 already weighed all of that, those possibilities, and
16 come to a conclusion that they wanted to start with
17 five, though? Hadn't that already been weighed and a
18 decision reached?

19 [REDACTED] SORC's role was to advise.
20 At the time, it would have been [REDACTED]

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That the --
22 what?

23 [REDACTED]: SORC's role is to advise.
24 SORC doesn't make the decisions.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

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[REDACTED]

SORC advises the operations

director.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED]

Which -- that's what SORC

advised. It is still -- we still -- as a management team, we're able to change, change the decision.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. I

understand that.

Had something changed physically in the plant which made it more wise or -- to start with four instead of five? Had something changed physically in the plant?

[REDACTED]

I don't --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or in the

grassing, or anything?

[REDACTED]

No.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So as part of the

SORC, it was considered that this -- what you described as a particularly bad part of the season, in this part of March, was that documented? That was known? That was -- that was part of the SORC's decision, what you were dealing with at that particular time?

[REDACTED]

I believe so.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was understood

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1 by your senior management?

2 [redacted] Uh-huh, yes.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Had that
4 condition changed up to this phone call?

5 [redacted] It was -- that time period
6 was a particularly bad time period for grassing. It
7 was -- the peak had come down before we started up.
8 It was -- the grassing was better, yes.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How much?

10 [redacted] I -- we have the data. I
11 don't know exactly, myself, right now, but we do have
12 the data.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. I'm
14 trying to get to what caused the decision to be
15 changed during this phone call to allow startup with
16 four. Can you get us to that, and tell us how that
17 happened, why it happened?

18 [redacted] asked that -- [redacted]
19 challenged us to look at what was re- -- what was
20 required to start the plant up, and we reevaluated
21 what we needed, and we agreed that that was -- that
22 four circulators was okay. We reassessed the plant
23 conditions and reassessed the equipment necessary.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were you comfortable
25 with that?

1 [REDACTED] I was comfortable with the
2 equipment lineup and starting the plant up, yes. I
3 was not comfortable in that whole conversation. As I
4 stated, I should have -- I should have personally
5 handled it completely differently.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What made you
7 change your comfort level, though? You were a member
8 of the SORC --

9 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- that came to
11 a conclusion, or an advisement that we need -- we
12 think we should start with only -- with five. What
13 made you change your position? I mean, you're the [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED]: Right. When I looked at it
16 from the point of view that [REDACTED] was presenting, which
17 was, you know, it was my responsibility and SRO's
18 responsibility to operate the plants in accordance
19 with the procedures safely, and to protect the health
20 and safety of the public from operating a nuclear
21 plant, and if there is economic or reliability
22 decision on top of that, to make that -- it's his
23 decision. So when I looked at it from that point of
24 view, I looked at what was necessary to safely operate
25 the plant, and I looked at it from a different point

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1 of view.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did [REDACTED] as
3 part of his argument, argue that it was an economic
4 decision?

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What did he
7 say?

8 [REDACTED] I don't remember the exact
9 words, but it was something along the lines of, it's
10 a -- again, the procedures say you can do it. It's --
11 from a nuclear safety point of view, it's okay to do
12 it. Additional equipment above and beyond that for
13 reliability is -- it's his decision to make, because
14 it's a reliability and economic impact, or decision.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But it really
16 wasn't his decision to make, because [REDACTED] had
17 to make the decision. Is that correct?

18 [REDACTED] had to make the
19 decision because he was directing the operators, yes.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. So
21 whose call was it, [REDACTED] in
22 the end?

23 [REDACTED] In the end, if [REDACTED] did not
24 believe that it was the right thing to do, it was --
25 it's his decision, to operate the plant.

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Then, in your
2 opinion, did [REDACTED] put any undue pressure upon him
3 or others to -- during this conference call, to start
4 up with four instead of five?

5 [REDACTED] "Undue pressure" in the
6 sense that that was the wrong forum for that decision
7 to be made, the conversation to be had. That should
8 have -- again, I should have stopped that conversation
9 right at the beginning, got in line with my bosses,
10 had a separate conversation with [REDACTED] and the
11 operators to get their input, and approach it
12 differently. So, was there undue pressure? It was
13 ~~undue pressure in that it was -- the conversation was~~
14 -- it was just the wrong forum for that, for that
15 conversation and decision.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The wrong
17 forum, or the wrong things being said? Which was it?
18 [REDACTED] I think I said the wrong
19 forum. That's what I believe.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, I know.
21 Well, I'm asking you the question: were there wrong
22 things also said during that call that shouldn't have
23 been said in front of these people? And if so, what
24 were they?

25 [REDACTED] You may -- you asked

1 questions about some things that I don't recall, so --
2 I don't remember a wrong thing being said like that,
3 so I don't recall that.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If you had had a
5 separate conversation with [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] and then gone to your shift management,
7 would anything have come out differently?

8 [REDACTED] I think it would have -- I
9 think we would have, in the end, made the same
10 decision. I think that there wouldn't have been the
11 perception that, you know [REDACTED] making this decision,
12 and I think the relationships between everyone would
13 not have -- there was some -- there was some damage to
14 some of the relationships between people in that
15 conversation. And I think that would not have
16 happened, had we handled the whole decision-making
17 differently.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where was the damage?
19 Between who?

20 [REDACTED] I think -- I think all
21 people involved in the conversation. Me, personally,
22 I think I grew from it, and that I learned that I
23 needed to interject and intervene sooner to -- if that
24 were to happen to again, to stop it. I just think, as
25 you said and as I said, it was a contentious

1 discussion, that I think everyone recognized after the
2 fact that we shouldn't have had that -- made that
3 decision on a conference call like that.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have
5 conference -- conversations with [REDACTED]
6 afterward on how he felt about it?

7 [REDACTED] I remember talking to [REDACTED]
8 about the -- about his assessment of, was it safe to
9 do, and all that. And he agreed that it was.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Moving forward with
11 the four?

12 [REDACTED] Yeah.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in terms
14 of how he felt as being part of that conference call,
15 any pressure felt by him on the decision-making? Did
16 he weigh in with any concerns there?

17 [REDACTED] I don't remember him saying
18 that to me. I remember telling him that I should have
19 ended the call sooner, and we should have had a
20 separate conversation. But I don't remember that.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That he felt any
22 pressure because he was a part of [REDACTED]
23 conversation, and what he was pushing for?

24 [REDACTED] I don't remember him saying
25 that. I don't remember.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't remember.
2  He could have, but I don't
3 remember him saying that.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let me ask a
5 question here.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Uh-huh.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you think
8 of any other occasions where  disagreed
9 with a SORC decision on what equipment was needed
10 before restart?

11  No.

12 MR. WINGFIELD: Can I ask a technical
13 question about the grassing and the number of
14 circ-pumps? What -- so you went ahead and started up
15 with four, right?


16  Uh-huh.

17 MR. WINGFIELD: If you lost one, what
18 would the impact be? Was it a procedural requirement,
19 or is like the effect on vacuum that would, you know,
20 drive you to taking the units off, or --


21  At the time, our procedures,
22 if we were at 100 percent power and we'd either take
23 one out or lose one, then it's not zero impact, and we
24 lose a couple megawatts. If we were to lose -- the
25 procedural requirement is, if we were to lose two on

1 the same condenser, at the time, it said we had to
2 reduce power immediately to 850 megawatts. After
3 that, it's based on -- it was based on condenser
4 parameters that -- and then it's a operator decision
5 to make, whether to take the unit off-line or not.


6 MR. WINGFIELD: Okay. I was just curious
7 about the mechanics of it.

8  Okay.

9 MR. WINGFIELD: And the -- and like you
10 were saying, the -- where SORC was, and the potential
11 to lose one of the four, and that's why they went with
12 five, but procedurally it was allowed for four. And
13 I just wanted to get an understanding of how far apart
14 was that thought process.

15  Okay.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Of the four
17 that you had that night available --

18  Uh-huh.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay? Were, of
20 those -- do you remember if any of those were in
21 danger of losing one of those? Was there a question
22 about one of them?

23  I don't recall any. I don't
24 recall any.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. You

7c

1 said something about if you had two in the same
2 condenser.

3 ~~condenser~~ X Yeah.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that -- was
5 that an issue during this conference call? Were there
6 two in the same condenser that were not operating?

7 ~~condenser~~ I don't recall that. That's
8 possible, but I don't recall that.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

10 MR. WINGFIELD: Do you remember where --
11 which unit was this? Was this 2 or 1?

12 ~~condenser~~ This is 2.

13 MR. WINGFIELD: Do you remember where Unit
14 1 was?

15 ~~condenser~~ Unit 1 was at -- I don't
16 know at that -- at the conference call time, what --
17 where Unit 1 was. But in the same time period we had
18 to reduce load on Unit 1 because of some challenges
19 with circ-water. Unit 1, now, that season -- and
20 traditionally, Unit 1 is more impacted from grass just
21 because of the nature of where the intake structure
22 is, and we had had to do some down-powers on Unit 1
23 because of grass. Unit 2 was -- actually was
24 performing very well up until the point where we --
25 that night, where we had to take it off-line.

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
MR. WINGFIELD: Okay.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How many circulators was Unit 1 operating with at that point? Do you remember?


 No, I don't remember.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Complete on that issue, then? Okay.

One of the things that you mentioned was that  -- I'll call it style -- was that he would challenge you to think through all aspects of your decision, and that --

 Uh-huh. He would take the opposing view, basically, to make sure you're thinking from all points of view.


SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So if you're -- in this instance, this particular instance, which is the only one that you're saying came to mind when you saw the letter in terms of potential damage, that was done for operator disagreements with senior management --

 Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The NRC letter, I'm referring to. This is the only instance that comes to mind. What about in terms of, here you're taking the conservative position and he's coming at you with a

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1 less conservative --


2  Uh-huh.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- position. What
4 are instance where he took the more conservative
5 position?

6  On that same -- in the same
7 time period, like I said, I mentioned on Unit 1 that
8 we had to do some down-powers because of circulators
9 and -- let me think through the specifics.

10 We had lost two. It's around that time
11 frame, but it was before then, I know, but as to the
12 specific dates, I don't recall. We had lost two
13 circulators, forced us to do a down-power to 850
14 megawatts. We did some maintenance, got one of the
15 circulators back, was in the process of still doing
16 the maintenance on the -- the sixth one, and we made
17 the decision to raise power back up. And he
18 challenged us at that point: "Well, why did you make
19 that decision when you didn't have a full complement
20 of circulators available to support 100 percent
21 operation?" And so he challenged us from that point
22 of view.


23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had five?

24  Yeah, that's --


25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Maintenance on the

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
1 sixth?

2  Maintenance on the sixth.


3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Ongoing?

4  Right.


5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you would need
6 how many for 100 percent? Do you have to have the
7 sixth?

8  Have to have five.


9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You have to have
10 five?

11 : Right.


12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you had --

13 : Well, I mean, it could
14 actually be at four, if the two circulators that are
15 out are not on the same condenser.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: While at 100 percent?

17  Correct.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But you
19 started back up, so you're not at full power when you
20 have -- you're starting --

21 : We had -- we lost two in the
22 same condenser, forcing us to reduce load to 850
23 megawatts. We got one of them back, and we raised
24 power, which we're allowed to do, while we were still
25 doing the repairs on the sixth one.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And who was in
2 that discussion?

3 [REDACTED] and myself.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who?

5 [REDACTED] and
6 myself.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

8 right?

9 [REDACTED] Yeah.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And this was before
11 the other incident that we just talked about?

12 [REDACTED] Yes, it was. Yes. I don't
13 recall what -- it would have been sometime between
14 January and March of last year.

15 And other things that are similar to that
16 would be -- I'm trying to think what outage -- coming
17 out of a refueling outage. I don't recall the
18 specific equipment, but we had to -- we always make
19 decisions, okay, what -- we did all the work we had
20 planned to do. There was a couple of outstanding
21 items that we were not able to get completed, still
22 meeting all our procedural requirements and tech
23 specs. We have to decide, is it the right thing to do
24 to continue starting the plant up or not, without this
25 equipment. And he challenged us, are we making the

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1 right decision by starting the plant up with this
2 equipment still out.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Going back to that --
4 [REDACTED] And he'd come at it at both
5 ends.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That -- the other
7 challenge, with the circulators?

8 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At the point that
10 you're talking to him, has the startup occurred with
11 the circulators, with the five circulators?

12 [REDACTED]: Raising it back up to 100
13 percent?

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

15 [REDACTED] It wasn't a startup. It was
16 just raising power.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you were raising
18 power?

19 [REDACTED]: Yes. We had already done
20 it.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had already done
22 it.

23 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then he asked
25 about why you would, with the number available?

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[REDACTED]

Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then in this other -- in this instance, I guess what I'm looking at is -- I'm looking at this a little differently. The decision's already made, the movement's already taken place, right, and then he's questioning it?

[REDACTED]

Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In this other instance that we're looking at, the challenges that you were getting was before you made the decision. You were holding up, right? You were holding up --

[REDACTED]

Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- the movement of the plant?

[REDACTED]

Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the challenge was to go and to move it --

[REDACTED]

Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- with the less number. But in this case, you had already done it, so after the fact, he's asking you --

[REDACTED]

Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- was it a wise thing to do, with the number that you had. He asked about that?

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1 [REDACTED] Yeah.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So, in the
3 refuel outage with the outstanding items, is he
4 questioning after the fact, or before the decision's
5 being made is he raising these challenges? What's the
6 timing there?

7 [REDACTED] I think -- I think that was
8 before, before we actually maneuvered the plant.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What was the
10 particular item then? What was outstanding?

11 [REDACTED]: I don't recall the
12 particular items.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the outage, which
14 one was that?

15 [REDACTED]: That would have been, I
16 think, the one in the fall of 2002, I believe, as I --

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Fall of 2002?

18 [REDACTED] That would be the 1 outage.
19 Yeah, Unit 1, fall 2002.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Any others?


21 [REDACTED]: Those are the -- what come
22 -- that's what come to mind.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I've got a
24 follow-up for you, on the -- on the one where [REDACTED]
25 questioned why you were going back up with -- with not

1 all the circulators operating --

2  Uh-huh.


3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you come
4 back down in power based on his challenge and
5 questioning of that?

6  No, because it was -- there
7 was -- that was in the past.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, how long
9 into the startup did he raise the question?

10  I don't recall the exact
11 timing.


12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: A couple of
13 hours? A day? Two days?

14  It was about, I think, the
15 next day.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The next day.
17 All right.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything
19 else on that, Jeff?

20 I want to go into something that I read.
21 We had the opportunity to review your interview with
22 Winston and Strahn (phonetic), which was April of
23 2003.


24  Okay.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Some of these issues


1 come out in that interview.

2  Uh-huh.


3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And it looks as
4 though -- I'm just showing you that. You had a chance
5 to review it?

6  Yeah.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And there were some
8 minor penciled-in corrections on here.

9  Okay.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But there was
11 something toward the end that we wanted to ask you
12 about. You talk about "This recent trip that we
13 manually did on the Salem" -- and I'm reading directly
14 from page 48 of this particular transcript -- "recent
15 trip that we manually did on the Salem Unit 2 on the
16 29th." And I believe that's the 29th of March, 2003.

17  Okay.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: "And the full support
19 of all levels and management with the decision to trip
20 Salem Unit 2 is a testament that we do take nuclear
21 safety very seriously, and nuclear safety comes first.
22 There was no question with regard to the shift
23 manager's decision to take the unit off-line. In
24 fact, after the fact, I personally congratulated the
25 individual, as well as the senior vice-president of

1 operations [REDACTED] sent him a letter expressing
2 his thanks and congratulations. They fully met all
3 our expectations with regard to nuclear safety." And
4 then you state, "That's in stark contrast to the
5 history of Salem in the early '90s."

6 Who is the [REDACTED] here that we're
7 talking about?

8 [REDACTED]
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. The fact that
10 the shift manager's decision to take the unit off-
11 line, and that he fully met your expectations with
12 regard to nuclear safety, is that so unusual that it
13 requires a special recognition from the VP of ops and
14 from you at that particular time? It seems like it's
15 an unusual event that you're pointing out to them that
16 "He did this, he did what he's supposed to do" --

17 [REDACTED]: Uh-huh.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- "but I and the VP
19 recognized it," at that time frame.

20 [REDACTED] I think why it's pertinent
21 for Salem is because of the Salem history, in that --
22 April 7th, 1994, before I was here, Salem was famous
23 for doing the exact opposite: the shift manager
24 actually doing things himself in the field to keep the
25 unit on the line. And this, it's noteworthy, in that

1 we've come a long way from that, and the -- the
2 culture has completely changed, and the full support
3 that he made the right decisions, that's why it was
4 noteworthy.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's about ten
6 years after the early to mid-'90s issue which you
7 mentioned, though, right?

8  Uh-huh.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It just strikes
10 us as a little unusual, reading that a guy does what
11 he's supposed to do, and he's recognized for just
12 doing his job. It just strikes us the opposite, kind
13 of.

14  Okay.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was it so --
16 was that in '03?

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yeah.

18  Yeah.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that type
20 of behavior by a shift manager so unusual in '03 that
21 you felt it needed to be recognized the way it was?
22 I mean, it's way -- well-removed from the --

23  Yeah, I can see -- I'm
24 thinking --

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- April '94.

1 [REDACTED] Thinking from your point of
2 view, I can see how you're -- why you're asking that
3 question. Every time, as the [REDACTED] -- I wasn't
4 the [REDACTED] for about a year, so there was some
5 time, again -- I think I'd been [REDACTED] for about
6 six months. I'm always looking for opportunities to
7 reinforce when people are meeting my expectations, and
8 that was one of them.

9 MR. WINGFIELD: Was there a lack of --
10 like a historic lack of -- say, 2000 to 2003, like a
11 lack of recognition, and this --

12 [REDACTED] We haven't --

13 MR. WINGFIELD: that was the intent, to --

14 [REDACTED] We have done a poor job of
15 recognizing our -- recognizing employees over the
16 years, yes.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And was a
18 vehicle that you saw to --

19 [REDACTED] Yeah.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- try and
21 change that?

22 [REDACTED] Yeah. Absolutely.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have
24 conversations with [REDACTED] Was that coordinated
25 with him, what you did there?

1 [REDACTED] I -- hmm. I don't recall.
2 I think that he told me he was going to write a
3 letter, that I had already -- I believe I had already
4 met with the crew and said, you know, I appreciated
5 them doing what they're doing, they did the right
6 thing, met all my expectations. And I think [REDACTED] told
7 me he was going to write the man a letter saying the
8 same thing. I don't know that we coordinated or not.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk
10 about the event a little bit. Was the decision to
11 shut the plant down agreed upon by [REDACTED] before it
12 actually happened?

13 [REDACTED] No.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The plant was
15 operating and something came up, and they did an
16 unscheduled shutdown. Is that happened?

17 [REDACTED] Yes.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Let's just
20 take a quick break, all right? It's 10:14 a.m.

21 (Whereupon, at 10:14 a.m. off the record
22 until 10:32 a.m.)

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're back on
24 the record. It's approximately 10:32, after a brief
25 break.

1 [REDACTED] an area I'd like to cover now with
2 you, along the lines of disagreements you may not have
3 been aware of, at any point did you become aware that
4 there were disagreements or there was some level of
5 concern expressed by the senior operators over -- and
6 this would be between them and senior management --
7 regarding the threshold for making operability calls?

8 [REDACTED] No.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't recall
10 anything that falls into that?

11 [REDACTED] The threshold for making
12 operability calls?

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yeah.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Maybe feeling
15 that something had to be proven inoperable before an
16 action could be taken?

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or the length of the
18 discovery phase that was to be involved?


19 [REDACTED] I don't remember anything in
20 specific about that.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. The -- how
22 about this term? Had you ever heard this before?
23 It's a quote, but I'm talking to the effect of "Why
24 are you holding the plant hostage?"

25 [REDACTED] I think I've heard that term

1 before.


2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And how have you
3 heard it?

4  I don't remember a specific
5 incident, but I can remember that term being used when
6 -- if a piece of equipment comes back and it passes
7 all its testing, but maybe the job site doesn't meet
8 all the maintenance standards as far as either
9 cleanliness or preservation of equipment, I mean, we
10 will at times say, "Well, okay, we're not considering
11 it back to operations until it does meet all the
12 standards, and as such, we can't move the plant until
13 it is -- has met that standard." And someone might
14 say, "Well, why are you holding the plant hostage for
15 one group of people, not -- you know, the equipment's
16 operable, it'll meet all its design and safety
17 functions. Why hold the plant hostage while we clean
18 up the area?" Or something.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Someone where?
20 Someone might use the term. Who would use the term?

21  I don't remember a specific
22 person using that term.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you --

24 : But that's the context that
25 I have heard it in the past.

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that when
2 you were in the maintenance arena that you heard that?
3 Because you talked about maintenance type of things.
4 ~~_____~~ Yeah. I don't remember. I
5 can't tell you I remember a specific piece of
6 equipment and time when I've heard that, but I have
7 heard that, and that was the context of how I heard --
8 I've heard that. Or an inci- --

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or an incident or a
10 particular --

11 ~~_____~~ Actually, I can talk about
12 an incident that occurred just a couple of days ago,
13 or yesterday. We've had -- as to circ-water, we've
14 had a circ-water pump out of service since before
15 Christmas because of a problem. And we did a lot of
16 work to fix it, and we got it back to operations two
17 days ago. And the shift manager wouldn't release it
18 because the job site didn't meet the standards, and --
19 and we had a big discussion between maintenance and
20 ops, and I was involved, and we kind of -- we met half
21 way, and we got a lot of the area cleaned up, and
22 maintenance agreed to continue cleaning the area up as
23 we started the pump up. So that was kind of a -- the
24 same kind of discussion: are we holding the plant
25 hostage to make a point? Is that the right thing to

1 do? That kind of discussion.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that piece
3 of equipment causing the plant to not be at 100
4 percent power?

5 ~~REDACTED~~ No, but it did cause us --
6 that part is -- 13 Alpha and Bravo are two circulators
7 in the same condenser, and I talked about if we had
8 two out on the same condenser, we'd have to reduce
9 power. With the 13 Bravo being out since before
10 Christmas, every -- particularly in the spring, every
11 three to four days we have to remove those
-- 12 circulators, partic- -- 13 Alpha and Bravo tend to be
13 the worst, because they're at the end of the intake
14 structure. We have to remove those every few days to
15 clean the tube-sheet of the condenser. So with that
16 being out of service, every time we took 13 Alpha out,
17 we would have to reduce power to 83 percent. But we
18 were not -- we were not in -- you know, within any
19 near-term need to do that.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about in terms of
21 the specific use? And this would be from senior
22 management, and this is either from ~~REDACTED~~

23 ~~REDACTED~~ In terms of -- and the
24 way it was applied and defined for us is, "holding the
25 plant hostage" meant operations is making some sort of

1 an unreasonable demand, and it was -- the term
2 "holding the plant hostage" was used by senior
3 management, one of those three individuals. Do you
4 recall anything that goes to that?

5 [REDACTED] I can't remember a specific,
6 but again, it's -- that wouldn't surprise me if one of
7 them said that.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Another thing
9 that comes out through some of these interviews is in
10 operations, particularly at Salem, there was a concern
11 at the ops management level that when senior
12 management is questioning you, it's not that you're
13 explaining your position to them in terms of what you
14 plan to do, it's that you're defending your position.
15 Do you recall instances that would tend to support
16 something like that, that your senior operators felt
17 to be on the defensive against senior management? I
18 know we discussed the one incident.

19 [REDACTED] If it's -- to me, it was, I
20 mean, if you get questions, you're always defending
21 your position, so -- or explaining your position. I
22 don't -- I mean, I was [REDACTED] for a year, and
23 whether I'm defending my position or explaining my
24 position, I don't --

25 MR. KEENAN: You don't see any distinction

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1 between the two?

2 [REDACTED] I see a distinction, but --

3 MR. KEENAN: Oh, okay.

4 [REDACTED] I mean, if I work for Jeff,
5 and he is asking me to talk about a decision I made,
6 I mean, I'm explaining it and defending it at the same
7 time. I mean, I do see a distinction, but --

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did any of your
9 licensed operators express that distinction to you,
10 that they thought they were having to -- instead of
11 explaining their position, they were having to more
12 defend it? Did your people come to you with "This is
13 how I feel"?

14 [REDACTED]: Not that I recall.

15 MR. KEENAN: Back on the explaining, is it
16 that the same -- you're using the same words, it's
17 just the emotional baggage or background or whatever
18 that's behind it, when you're using the same words?

19 [REDACTED] Yeah, that's how I would
20 differentiate it.

21 MR. KEENAN: Okay.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you have
23 more on the machine there, Jeff?

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No, I just --
25 I guess a little follow-up to just some of these

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1 things.


2 Can you recall if there were any occasions
3 where you participated in a debate or a potential
4 safety issue or equipment issue for an inordinate
5 amount of time, where the issue was real black and
6 white, yet the debate continued more than it should
7 have, excessive debate?

8 ~~Excessive debate.~~ Excessive debate. Well, it
9 -- after the fact, oftentimes we'll look back at
10 things and say, you know, in looking back, we had
11 information that, had we recognized it at the time, we
12 should have made a decision quicker.


13 What comes to mind there is, in this past
14 fall we had a feed reg. Valve 14BF19 was -- ended up
15 being, because of a foreign material -- a piece of
16 foreign material was stuck in position, and it was --
17 had we recognized -- the point at which we recognized
18 that it was immovable, it put us into a certain tech
19 spec, or actually put us outside of tech specs, which
20 put us in Tech Spec 303, which gave us an hour to shut
21 the plant down. And it took us about ten to twelve
22 hours to come to a conclusion. At that -- you know,
23 in the heat of the moment, while we were looking at
24 it, evaluating and troubleshooting it, we had --
25 everything was pointing to us that it was not stuck,

1 it was a control problem, and the valve would still
2 perform its safety function, which is to fail closed
3 on a feed-water isolation. And as soon as we
4 concluded that, no, it's not, it's actually immovable
5 and won't close, that we entered the action statement
6 to shut the plant down. Because that was the time
7 when, after the fact, we looked back and said, yeah,
8 if we would have put these three or four things
9 together, we should have made our conclusion sooner.


10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did anybody
11 raise that? Do you recall anybody raising that issue
12 during the course of that debate?

13  Not during the debate.
14 After the fact, one of the operators, you know, one of
15 the reactor operators, told me that he thought we
16 should have made the decision a lot sooner.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: After the fact.

18  Uh-huh.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did that person
20 offer that up during the debate?

21  Not to me. I don't -- no,
22 I did not hear that during the debate.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about an
24 issue where there has been some type of debate, and
25 people think it's a clear issue where this piece of

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1 equipment is inoperable, yet the debate continues
2 beyond that, when people have already reached that
3 conclusion? Can you think of an instance where that
4 occurred?

5 [REDACTED] Nothing specific comes to my
6 mind. We all -- oftentimes we will have a piece of
7 equipment that's degraded, and they'll -- you know,
8 we'll try to look at all angles and make a decision.
9 So there might be somebody that says, "Hey, I think
10 it's inoperable because of this," and then, you know,
11 we talk about what do we see, and --

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I guess what
13 I'm --

14 [REDACTED] It's the licensed operator
15 that makes that decision.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. I guess
17 what I'm thinking about is the group below senior ops
18 management level, [REDACTED] level,
19 that the group below that had reached a conclusion
20 that "Hey, you know, this piece of equipment is
21 inoperable, it can't perform its function," and yet
22 the debate continues via that upper level, [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED] challenging, continuing to challenge.

24 [REDACTED] For the operability of a
25 tech-spec-required piece of equipment?

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah.
2 [REDACTED] No. I don't recall anything
3 like that.
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
5 [REDACTED] It is the licensed
6 operator's responsibility to make that decision.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And whether the -- I
8 don't have any other incidents.
9 Ted, do you have anything further on that?
10 MR. WINGFIELD: Nope.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] I guess what
12 we'd like to ask you at this point is, you know about
13 the letter. You've read the letter?
14 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You hear the kind of
16 concerns that we're exploring with you here today. Is
17 there something we haven't talked about, something we
18 just didn't get to, or something that might be
19 relevant that we should talk about in terms of this
20 inquiry, that goes to the kind of issues that we're
21 talking about here, and that the -- the damage in the
22 work environment that has been noted to date? Is
23 there anything that we've not covered?
24 [REDACTED] I don't think so. I look at
25 -- I look at the things that we're doing, that we've

1 done since [REDACTED] came and realigned the organization,
2 the personnel changes we've made, as all -- they're
3 all things that I think are going right at some of the
4 issues that you're investigating, that we're focusing
5 on fixing the equipment, that -- making sure we're
6 resolving our long-standing equipment issues. The VP
7 of ops, now [REDACTED] is much more -- is a -- has
8 a completely different personality than the previous
9 one had.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In what way?

11 [REDACTED] In that he -- it's my job to
12 [REDACTED] and I make the decisions on
13 how we [REDACTED] If I make a decision, I'll
14 definitely talk to him about it and he'll give me some
15 input, but he has never said, "Don't do that, do
16 this." He'll ask me questions and ask me to think of
17 things from a different point of view, but I make the
18 decisions, and I do that with input from my people.
19 It's just a completely different -- different mindset.

20 In the past, before the reorganization,
21 the operators always had the responsibility, the
22 obligation, and were supported in it if the plant were
23 to -- or if there was to be equipment problems or a
24 need, they were -- it was their authority to remove
25 the unit from service if necessary. If we had a

1 scheduled down-power, it was -- we followed the
2 schedule and raised power back up. However, if we
3 were to have an unplanned down-power or unplanned
4 trip, I did not have the authority to bring the plant
5 back. I had to get permission. We had to go all the
6 way up to the vice-president of operations to get
7 permission to bring the plant up. And now it's, you
8 know, I make the decision based on the input from my
9 people, so it's different in that regard.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Empowerment.

11 [REDACTED] Empowerment, yeah.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Any other personnel
13 changes? I mean, you're talking about [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED] at that level.

15 [REDACTED] At that level, and our whole
16 structure.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

18 [REDACTED] Before, we did not have
19 plant managers. We had a site organization such that
20 there was no dedicated maintenance engineering. The
21 only dedicated groups were basically operations and
22 chemistry, because they -- they're basically licensed
23 on the plant, so they couldn't work at both Salem and
24 Hope Creek. All the other organizations worked at
25 both, so that we kind of lost some ownership of the

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1 plants. That's, I think, what led to or aided in
2 leading to some of the equipment being degraded.
3 You know, we have dedi- -- I'm responsible
4 for Salem. I have dedicated maintenance engineering,
5 all the support I need to make improvements, so it's
6 -- that structure has helped quite a bit. I think
7 that I've gotten feedback from the people; they see
8 that. We've changed some people at lower levels from
9 superintendent and manager people as well, but I think
10 it's all in the -- it's all helping to alleviate some
11 of the -- some of the reasons why that letter was
12 generated.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Anything else?

14  No.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I have one
16 follow-up.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Go ahead, Jeff.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Go back to
19 before the reorganization, okay?

20  Uh-huh.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Had you ever
22 got a sense of an instance where corporate management
23 out of Newark provided direction or supervision to the
24 plant regarding a startup or shutdown, or a safety
25 issue?

1 [REDACTED] No, I've never had that
2 sense at all.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did anyone ever
4 tell you that they had a sense that that was
5 occurring?

6 [REDACTED] No.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. I
8 don't have anything further.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Just some
10 closing questions on the issues.

11 Have I or any other NRC representative
12 offered you any promises of reward or threatened you
13 in any manner in exchange for your information today?

14 [REDACTED] No.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you appeared
16 here freely and voluntarily?

17 [REDACTED] Yes, I have.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you. I thank
19 you for your time.

20 [REDACTED] I have one question.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I'm sorry. Go ahead.


22 [REDACTED] You had asked -- you both
23 have asked some general questions that I didn't have
24 any specific recollection of. If you have specific
25 examples, that might help jar my recollection. It

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1 seemed like I didn't -- I didn't have any examples, or
2 couldn't recall any example, but oftentimes if you'd
3 remind me of something that you have a specific
4 question about, it would aid my memory, and I might
5 have some information on it.


6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right, let's --
7 on that thought, we'll just take a quick break. It's
8 10:50. We'll just review something, and get back on
9 the record if we need to.

10  Okay.

11 Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m. off the record
12 until 10:54 a.m.)

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're back on
14 the record; it's 10:54.

15 After going over some incidents, we
16 reviewed with  two, after your offer of, if we
17 could refresh your recollection you might be able to
18 discuss these incidents further. And we were talking
19 about the SJ check valve. You don't have any specific
20 recollection of that --

21  That's correct.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- being an issue.

23 And another one having to do with reactor
24 head vents, the indicators that were in the control
25 room in regard to that and any issues surrounding

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1 making on-the-spot changes to get around this damaged
2 indicator, you indicated --
3 [REDACTED] I know that we've talked
4 about that before, like what is the real requirement
5 to -- or what is the -- what's the requirement to have
6 indication, but I don't remember anything specific to
7 on-the-spot changes that you had asked about, or you
8 mentioned.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And there's
10 potential that that's just a time frame issue in terms
11 of when you came on as the [REDACTED] But we
12 wanted to clear that up.

13 [REDACTED] Okay.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's -- we'll go off
15 the record. I thank you for your time on this issue.
16 It's 10:55 a.m.

17 (Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m. the interview
18 was concluded.)
19
20
21
22
23
24
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
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of



Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Salem, NJ

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Bill Wagner".

Bill Wagner
Official Transcriber
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