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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS
INTERVIEW

-----x

IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF: : Docket No.1-2003-051F

[REDACTED]

7C :

(CLOSED) :

-----x

Thursday, January 22, 2004

Salem Hope Creek
Resident's Office.

The above-entitled interview was conducted at
1:26 p.m.

BEFORE:

Special Agent EILEEN NEFF

Sr. Project Engineer SCOTT BARBER

Information was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions
FOIA- 2005-194
(202) 234-4433

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N-18

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

1:26 p.m.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is January the 22nd, 2004. The time is approximately 1:26 p.m.

Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, USMRC Region 1, Office of Investigations. And also present from Region 1 is Senior Project Engineer Scott Barber.

The location of this interview is the Residence Office at Salem and Hope Creek. The interview is being conducted with [REDACTED] spelled [REDACTED] who is currently employed on site as a [REDACTED] (phonetic), as a [REDACTED]

Your work history on site included, it actually started in [REDACTED] where you came and for the purpose of [REDACTED]

You were [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] time frame, and then worked as an [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] from in the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] you had gone off shift to work management, at which point you were handling the [REDACTED]

And the [REDACTED] you were a [REDACTED]

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1 [REDACTED], back on shift? [REDACTED] you
2 went from, you went into [REDACTED] again and
3 then at sometime around [REDACTED] you were

4 [REDACTED]

5 You remained in the position approximately
6 until, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] where you remained

8 [REDACTED]

9 where you took [REDACTED] Is
10 that accurate?

11 [REDACTED] That is correct.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, what I would
13 like to do, before we get into your previous work
14 history, is I'll place you under oath at this point in
15 time. If you would raise your right hand, please.

16 [REDACTED] Okay.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you swear that the
18 testimony you are about to provide is the truth, the
19 whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
20 God.

21 [REDACTED]: I do.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For the record, if we
23 could have your date of birth and social security
24 number, please.

25 [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you. And your home address, please?

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And one other thing I'd like to cover, before we keep going. We discussed it before going on the record, but the subject of this interview is the safety conscious work environment on site.

Primarily, your experience, primarily is at the Salem Site. You may have more overall site experience more recently, it would appear as in your

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I'm still, circ water, the project I'm working on is circ water for sale.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So it's -

[REDACTED] So I'm it still involved, right now, strictly with sale.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Okay, so your perspective is sale.

[REDACTED] Correct. That would be correct.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and we're going to stick with that. And I explained to you, as such,

670

1 that you're not the subject of any investigation and
2 that there is no potential violation associated with
3 the safety conscious work environment.

4 [REDACTED] I understand.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We've approached you
6 for your perspective and your assessment of the
7 environment on-site, particularly in view of the

8 [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED] Okay.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What I would
11 like you to do, is could you, for a summary of your
12 education, please?

13 [REDACTED] I have a [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] and about [REDACTED] at

15 [REDACTED] And I was in the [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]

18 And I have been -

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What were your [REDACTED]
20 years?

21 [REDACTED]
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

23 [REDACTED] And I left the [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED] And

25 then, beyond that, then I was a [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

It was [REDACTED] the equivalent to [REDACTED] and also an [REDACTED] it was called, because the [REDACTED] was under the auspices of [REDACTED] so we had a license under the NRC.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oh, okay.

[REDACTED] Then I was [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What unit was that?

[REDACTED] That would have been in [REDACTED] where I was [REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[REDACTED] - as an [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and was actively [REDACTED] there until [REDACTED] when I came here.

I started at [REDACTED] I guess, do you want me to start backwards from when I first came here? I was at [REDACTED] prior to my employment with [REDACTED] or from [REDACTED] back to, I think it was [REDACTED] time frame at [REDACTED].

And there I was [REDACTED], I was a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and was a [REDACTED] and a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] And other jobs as, related to [REDACTED]

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[redacted] Always in operations
And then from the [redacted] time frame, back

to [redacted] I worked at [redacted]

And I started there as a [redacted]
[redacted] and then was [redacted] then [redacted]

I was a [redacted] and also a
[redacted] for a period of time. After the shut
the plant down they split the Operations groups in
half and took the senior people to [redacted] so
that they could license them on Unit 1.

They kept the junior people behind and
went to one supervisor in the Control Room. And they
made that one supervisor a Shift Manager instead of a
Control Room Supervisor.

And that's where I spent the, from like
[redacted] whenever we went over to Unit 1, I was
a [redacted] for the final
refueling and the preparation for decommissioning.

And then from [redacted] I was in the
[redacted] And then [redacted] I just, I worked like
[redacted]. And then prior to that I was in
[redacted]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[redacted]: So like from [redacted]
I was in [redacted] and then [redacted]

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and the work history after that?

[REDACTED]: Right, right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yeah. It's lengthy experience in the nuclear industry.

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The, I guess what we'd like to do is look at the safety conscious work environment broadly, we'll look at it broadly. And part of the focus is, you know, people's comfort levels with raising concerns.

And do they raise concerns individually? Do they hesitate to raise concerns or is there no hesitation for that? And, I guess, for the time period that we could look at here, in that [REDACTED] when you're [REDACTED] and then going into your [REDACTED] experience.

I guess what I'd like to do is, let me get your management structure at that point. [REDACTED] who was your [REDACTED] then?

[REDACTED] Let's see, I think [REDACTED] (phonetic) was the [REDACTED] and I think the [REDACTED] at that time would have been [REDACTED] (phonetic).

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and then who

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1 comes in after that?

2 [REDACTED] And [REDACTED] (phonetic) was
3 also in there.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: (inaudible)

7 [REDACTED] Yeah, [REDACTED] I
8 believe is how you spell it.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

10 [REDACTED] was, yeah, [REDACTED] was
11 just before me.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then when, so
13 [REDACTED] left, and you replaced him? Were you
14 on shift with [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED] and I were on shift for
16 a period of time. But in the '99, in that '99-2000
17 time frame, [REDACTED] was off shift and he was, he was an
18 [REDACTED] at the same time as [REDACTED] actually.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

20 [REDACTED] And they kind of, there was
21 no real distinct duties, I don't believe at the time,
22 that I can remember, anyway.

23 But I think [REDACTED] leaned more toward, he
24 was more involved with outages, and [REDACTED] was kind of
25 involved with the shifts.

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[REDACTED]: Until toward the end. It must have been in 2000, and I think they defined, like okay, [REDACTED] got the shift, he's the [REDACTED]

Because whenever they, whenever I got the position, I relieved [REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In 2001? X

[REDACTED] Yes. In the 2000-2001 time frame [REDACTED] So I think he had it for about a year or so, in that time frame.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[REDACTED] Up until the 2001, March/April time frame, we were in a year two outage, I think it was. And when we came out of that outage, then I relieved him as the [REDACTED] for shift.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And then your

[REDACTED] is then [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]: Umm hmm.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: After him was who?

[REDACTED]: Umm let's see. After [REDACTED] left, actually what ended up happening was, see [REDACTED] left in 2001. We had a [REDACTED]

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] phonetic)?

1 [REDACTED] Yeah, [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] of
2 [REDACTED] in, that's kind of like when they went to
3 the [REDACTED] and there was no Officer Manager then.

4 They went to the structure where there
5 was, they had the, there was an EP of Operations and
6 then were was, what the heck would that have been?

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So what are you
8 thinking of, the Ops Manager?

9 [REDACTED]: It's embarrassing, the Ops
10 Manager, yeah.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I know some of the
12 people that have been there [REDACTED] (phonetic)
13 [REDACTED]: [REDACTED], but he didn't
14 immediately, there had to be an interim in there.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there --
16 [REDACTED] [REDACTED], I thought,
17 became the [REDACTED] in 2002. He was -- oh, [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] (phonetic), I'm sorry. He was only there for
19 about a year.

20 They brought him in to replace [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED] and then [REDACTED] left shortly after.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So what was
23 that time frame again. [REDACTED] left in when,
24 roughly?

25 [REDACTED]: He left in, I think it was

1 like April/May time frame of 2001.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you got in and he
4 moved.

5 [REDACTED] But he went to -

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you got on he
7 moved out? When you were promoted.

8 [REDACTED] He was, well, we didn't hold
9 the same position.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No, but in that time
11 frame he moved.

12 [REDACTED] Right, right. Around that
13 same time, yes. Around that same time. And [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED]. That's who was the [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and then it went
17 to [REDACTED] in 2002?

18 [REDACTED]: And then [REDACTED] yes.
19 In 2002, May/June time frame of 2002.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The [REDACTED]
21 then, you've been dealing, that would put you with,
22 for that time frame, [REDACTED] (phonetic)?

23 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] of
24 [REDACTED] yes.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then also 2002,

1 were you not in position with, umm, if you left in
2 [REDACTED] would you have worked under [REDACTED]
3 as [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]: No, no.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

6 [REDACTED]: That was after I left, I
7 believe he became [REDACTED]

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And then you
9 had [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]: Right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Okay.

12 [REDACTED] was only here for about
13 a year. He left like in the April time frame of 2002,
14 is when he left. He started in, early in, like
15 February of 2001, I think was when he came in, or
16 thereabouts.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And left in about a
18 year or so?

19 [REDACTED]: Yes, he was only here for
20 about a year. And he was brought in to replace [REDACTED]

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And he stayed
22 a year. Why didn't that work out, do you know?

23 [REDACTED]: I think that the hours were
24 killing him. He came here as [REDACTED]. And I
25 think he wanted to be the Training Manager or the Ops

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1 ~~Training Manager~~ for one thing.

2 At least he took a big ownership in the,
3 and spent a lot of time out there. But also, the
4 hours that we work were, it was very demanding. He
5 worked ~~60~~, 70 hours a week ~~in~~ those positions.

6 And I just don't think he was expecting to
7 work those kind of hours and I think he might have
8 been having some problems with his family.

9 So, he found another position. He went up
10 to (inaudible). And he went up there originally as
11 the [REDACTED] or no, he went up there, I
12 think, as the [REDACTED]. He handled all
13 ~~training~~, I believe.

14 And now I think he's the [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED] for (inaudible). So, as far as I know, he's
16 still there.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

18 [REDACTED]: But, that seemed to be what
19 -

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It didn't suit him?

21 [REDACTED] No. The hours were, I can
22 remember him saying, you know, that he needed, he
23 wasn't used to spending as many as hours and late in
24 the days, 7:00 at night and Saturdays and Sundays.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, the, we'll get

1 back to, where I had started before in looking at the
2 environment, one of the aspects that we're looking at
3 would be in terms of raising concerns.

4 From what you've seen, do, did, I should
5 say, the individuals on shift raise concerns if they
6 had concerns, and did they do so comfortably? And I
7 know that you're looking at it from shift management
8 level.

9 What kinds, another thing would be what
10 kinds of concerns would be raised to your level?

11 [REDACTED]: I guess the first part of the
12 question, I believe, that when I was [REDACTED]
13 , you know, on the shift and that, that people didn't
14 have a problem with raising concerns.

15 Whether that would be a Control Room
16 Supervisor or a Control Operator or Non-licensed
17 Operator. And usually the concerns would be about,
18 well, I don't know if they fall, you know, equipment
19 not working, perennial problems with equipment, trying
20 to get it fixed, you know, get it, take it to the
21 meeting, talk to people about getting, you know,
22 getting these, get a pump fixed, those kind of things.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] Questions about is a piece of
25 equipment operable, not operable? You know, is it

1 really operable or not operable?

2 The people would, you know, healthy
3 discussion about a decision on whether a piece of
4 equipment really should be called operable or should
5 it be called inoperable, based on the status of the
6 equipment. Those kind of things.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And those operability
8 discussions, you're saying healthy discussion. Is
9 that at the Operator level, CRS, Shift Manager, is
10 that across the board?

11 [REDACTED] That would be across the
12 board. It would be as a crew.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] I mean I tried to encourage
15 that to get everybody involved in the discussion to
16 use everybody's knowledge of the systems to be able
17 to, you know, get as many facts about a piece of
18 equipment.

19 Whether, we, you know to make sure we had
20 enough information, enough facts to say whether the
21 equipment was operable or not operable.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

23 [REDACTED] Because, I mean, I was only
24 there from [REDACTED] My [REDACTED] was, it was a [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED] So there was a lot of experience in

1 the Operators, a lot of experience in the CRSs to pull
2 from. So I always tried to take advantage of that and
3 keep the whole crew involved.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you're saying that
5 from what you had seen when you were there on shift,
6 and I guess primarily we'll be speaking to this [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED] when you're back on shift.

8 You're off the steam generator project and
9 you're back on shift [REDACTED] until you left [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED] This is the way it worked in terms of what
11 you were observing. That people were comfortable. If
12 they had an issue they'd raise an issue?

13 [REDACTED]: I believe that, yes. When I
14 was on shift, as [REDACTED] I don't believe that
15 anybody felt like they couldn't come talk to me or
16 come, you know, go talk to the CRS or whatever.

17 And I didn't hesitate to go up, you know,
18 and talk to the AOM and talk to the Office Manager,
19 about concerns.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so for you
21 personally, too. You would, your comfort level in
22 taking something to the next level of management.

23 [REDACTED] If I had to go to talk to
24 [REDACTED] I would go talk to [REDACTED] And if I had to go
25 talk to [REDACTED] I would go talk to [REDACTED]

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[REDACTED] I didn't have a problem with that.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware of any, anything that would indicate that people would hesitate, from having received a poor reaction, to raising a concern? Does anything come to mind in that area?

That, an individual would hesitate or feed their concern to somebody else to push it forward because they weren't sure about the response they would get?

[REDACTED]: With me personally, you mean? Are just -

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware of anything, you personally, and then anything that you became aware of?

[REDACTED]: Well, I'm not aware of anything personally. We, with, we had a problem, we were doing a test with a, I've got to drag it back on my memory. With some check valves and we thought that we might have, oh, I'm trying to remember the test and all we were doing.

It actually was when I was [REDACTED] I think it was early on when I was [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was the

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[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: ~~check valve testing?~~

[REDACTED]

Yeah, it was ~~check value~~

~~testing related to safety injection system~~

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: SJ, umm, that issue?

Do you know the time frame for that?

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I'd say

four, five, 12 and 13?

[REDACTED]

Yeah, that might be.

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: (inaudible)

did it?

[REDACTED]

Yes.

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: They had

other ~~outlet valves~~, like one of them was, one set was
~~kept open and the other one closed~~ or something?

[REDACTED]

: Right, right. And we had to
do the test and, yeah, those were not ~~check valves~~
those are MOVs that we were ~~testing~~, because you had
to do periodic testing to verify that those ~~valves~~
didn't ~~leak~~ by, for any thermal stress on the nozzles
where the (inaudible) ~~safety injection penetrated~~ the
RCS, to make sure we weren't working that ~~penetration~~

We had to demonstrate that there was no
leakage. And that was a pretty, a pretty hard test to
do, to get set up for and to accomplish it.

1 And the issue that I recall was that we
2 started it on a, we started like on a night shift on
3 a Friday, going into the weekend, and we ended up with
4 a problem where we couldn't get good results on the
5 test.

6 And we thought we had isolated a problem
7 where we believed that there was a check valve
8 leaking. And there was some discussion back and forth
9 of what the function of that check valve, you know,
10 what -

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: The check
12 valve is on the reactor vessel side or on the down
13 (inaudible) side?

14 [REDACTED] Yes, yes.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Back leakage
16 to the check valve is what you're saying. Coming off
17 the -

18 [REDACTED] There would be back leakage
19 from the RCS back into the, because we were getting
20 hot water in the test line.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

22 [REDACTED] And back into the, into the
23 (inaudible), when you're bleeding it off. And we
24 thought that that was an issue and then there was, we
25 got engineering involved. [REDACTED] was involved with it.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you say we
2 thought that was an issue, who was that?

3 [REDACTED] Operations, myself and the
4 Shift Manager, at the time, that was doing the test.
5 I think it was, I think it was [REDACTED] was the
6 guy, who was the [REDACTED]

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] And [REDACTED] would have
9 been the [REDACTED] at the time. And so when we saw,
10 the results we saw, we thought there needed to be some
11 corrective action taken.

12 Engineering looked at it, [REDACTED] got involved
13 in it and there was a discussion. And based on all
14 the information he was provided by Engineering, that
15 he made a decision that it was not a safety issue, and
16 therefore we didn't really need to do anything about
17 it at the time.

18 And so we went forward from there. And I
19 think that, to some people, that was like a signal
20 that they would be, I guess they wouldn't, they would
21 be reluctant to talk to [REDACTED] because they didn't feel
22 like they got the support that the, that he should
23 have given him.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You went to this
25 incident when I asked if you were aware of anything,

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1 any reason why somebody would hesitate to raise an
2 issue, this is what comes to mind -

3 [REDACTED] That's the one that comes to
4 mind, yeah.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: - on that? Now when
6 you say some people would -

7 [REDACTED]: Well, like the [REDACTED]
8 became -

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So, [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] Yeah.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He had a problem with
12 that?

13 [REDACTED] Yeah.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he disagree with
15 this engineering evaluation and [REDACTED]'s
16 position, then? I mean did it, what kind of debate
17 happened?

18 Was it, you know, you're going this way
19 and you're wrong? Or, did one side sway the other or
20 how did that go?

21 [REDACTED] Ah, let's see, to bring it
22 back. Engineering presented what they believe to be
23 the potential problem, and that it wasn't really a,
24 you know, that it wasn't really a safety concern or
25 a safety issue.

60

1 And I think we, Operations, [REDACTED] and
2 myself, were kind of leaning the other way. And [REDACTED]
3 just stepped in and said, well based on this
4 information, this is, there's no reason to call this,
5 call anything here inoperable and we're just going to
6 go forward.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Going forward, meant
8 what? What actions would be taken?

9 [REDACTED] That we were done. It would
10 be entered into the, you know, there was notification
11 and then it would be like put into an outage to
12 inspect the valve.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But it was going to be
14 considered operable then?

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not inoperable?

17 [REDACTED] Right.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: The valve in
19 question, isn't, wasn't so much those valves you were
20 testing -

21 [REDACTED] No.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: - it was
23 this downstream check valve that had back leakage?

24 [REDACTED] Correct.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was it one or

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1 more check valves do you recall?

2 [REDACTED] I think there had to be more
3 than one check valve actually leaking, to get to where
4 we were, if I can remember the drawing correctly.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Isn't there,
6 wasn't there, isn't there a tech spec for leakage
7 between the RCS and connected piping?

8 [REDACTED] Umm hmm.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Or a program
10 for that?

11 [REDACTED] Umm hmm.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Then was
13 there any kind of checks that the program asked you to
14 do? And is there any kind of like comparison to say,
15 okay, you know, these are the kind of checks we were
16 doing for the valve for this program, and we would
17 come up with this result?

18 We're not in the program but we could use
19 our knowledge of that and make some judgements about
20 whether we think we're okay or not?

21 [REDACTED]: I think that, I think that
22 what it came down to was the way that, I think the
23 test methodology became suspect and we were setting up
24 some kind of hydraulic where we could allow that thing
25 to float, that under normal circumstances there was no

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1 reason to believe, you know, under normal
2 configuration, that there was no reason to believe
3 that it would ~~break,~~ ~~it would~~ ~~lead backwards~~

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So, it was
5 kind of attributed to a test set up problem?

6 [REDACTED] Yeah. I think is what it,
7 that was, I think that's what the argument came down
8 to.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And was that
10 a, was that something that you and, I think you said,
11 what did you say, [REDACTED] Is that something you
12 and [REDACTED] bought into?

13 [REDACTED] Somewhat reluctantly, I guess
14 we did, yes. We must have. We had to buy into, all
15 right, because we, that was, we ended it right there.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, you
17 went away, you know, dissatisfied with the outcome.

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I mean, you
20 know, Engineering is espousing one explanation and one
21 approach, and you're espousing something different.
22 And [REDACTED] is kind of the tiebreaker and he says; well,
23 let's do what Engineering wants to do.

24 [REDACTED] Right, right.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was your

1 reaction to that? I mean, at the time, do you recall?
2 I mean were you, did you and [REDACTED] talk about it?
3 [REDACTED] We did have some discussion
4 about it afterwards, and that's where I got the sense
5 that, you know, he would not be real keen on bringing
6 issues forward to [REDACTED]

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So he viewed
8 -
9 [REDACTED] But that didn't deter him
10 from -

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: - it as a
12 problem with the way [REDACTED] handled the issue, not so
13 much with, well, I don't know, I'm putting, I don't
14 want to put words in your mouth. Did he have any
15 reactions to the way -

16 [REDACTED] Well, there was issue in the
17 way it was handled.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] And then there was the issue
20 of the technical explanation of what we saw. And I
21 guess we, I shouldn't say I guess. We finally
22 accepted it but with some skepticism is what I would
23 say.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What
25 eventually happened with that valve?

1 [REDACTED] That's what I'm trying to
2 remember. If we went into that in an outage and we
3 found the problem? Because I think part of the
4 problem was that it wasn't always repeatable, that
5 effect wasn't always repeatable.

6 So, I think, my memory is failing me on
7 this. I think, I think we might have gone into that
8 valve and we didn't find any problem with it,
9 ultimately.

10 But, that's, I mean that's just on my
11 memory, and that's a couple years ago, now.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So that
13 would, that would add credence to the Engineering's
14 explanation of saying -

15 [REDACTED] Right, right.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: - it's just
17 not, it's not a simple answer.

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just to go back and
20 cover one other issue there. You were talking about
21 the affect this had on [REDACTED] You were
22 indicating it would, you saw it as something that
23 would deter him or have him hesitate in terms of
24 approaching [REDACTED]

25 But would he, you were also kind of

1 saying, did he bring issues to you?

2 [REDACTED] Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He would still raise
4 issues if he had concerns?

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But he had an aversion
7 to dealing with [REDACTED] on this?

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that, I mean
10 because he's taking Engineering's evaluation over you
11 Licensed Operators? Or -

12 [REDACTED]: I think partly -

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: - difference of
14 opinion on that?

15 [REDACTED]: I think it was a difference
16 of opinion and just the way, the manner in which the
17 whole situation was, well, this is the decision, there
18 will be no more discussion, the valve is operable. And
19 that's that, that was [REDACTED]

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Didn't want to hear
21 any further discussion on it?

22 [REDACTED] Right, right.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so that's why he
24 was deterred.

25 [REDACTED] Right.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you get
2 the impression that [REDACTED] made the decision on his own?
3 Was there, was this something that he just got
4 involved with at the decision making point in the
5 process where, you know, he know there was maybe an
6 issue out there, maybe he didn't know the details, and
7 just came and heard what Engineering said and what you
8 said now, and made a decision, or was this something
9 that had been ongoing for a period of time.

10 There had been, you know, a number of
11 different interactions with him or with others. And
12 then there was interactions between himself, and maybe
13 somebody like [REDACTED] (phonetic) or it would have
14 been [REDACTED] (phonetic) at the time.

15 [REDACTED] There was, if I recall
16 correctly, this happened on a midnight shift. And I
17 got called (inaudible) I came in like 3:00, 4:00 in
18 the morning on Saturday morning.

19 And I think [REDACTED] did, [REDACTED] was
20 relatively new as the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was involved.
21 He was there. It wasn't like he just walked in,
22 listened, called to this side and this side and then
23 said, you know, make a decision.

24 He was in the Control Room when we were
25 doing the testing and he was looking at the data. So

1 he would have been involved with [REDACTED] as the [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] and I'm certain that he would have been
3 involved with both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in an interaction.

4 Maybe not directly in that room, but
5 outside of there. Because the, the expectation was
6 that Shift Manager called me, I called the Ops
7 Manager.

8 The Ops Manager would then call [REDACTED] and
9 [REDACTED] was expected to call [REDACTED] at least [REDACTED], and
10 there would have been a maintenance issue, so he would
11 have gone up to [REDACTED] also.

12 And, you know, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] talk all the
13 time, back and forth.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] Correct, correct.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] Correct.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

20 [REDACTED] Correct. So, you know, none
21 of this happens at that, you know, just at the direct
22 level below, or the Ops Manager level and below or my
23 level and below. Almost anything that has some, some
24 discussion about operability or where the plant would
25 be of whatever, that always, through that chain, went

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1 all the way up, at least to [REDACTED]

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was,
3 okay. What would the consequence of the action have
4 been had the decision gone your way? In other words,
5 to ~~declare~~ the valve inoperable ~~what~~ what would have
6 happened as a result of that?

7 [REDACTED]: Well, the only way to repair
8 that would have been to go to ~~core~~ shutdown to fix
9 that valve.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] If it would have been decided
12 that that ~~valve~~ ~~was~~ indeed a problem or created a
13 safety issue.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So
15 that would have been the consequence. And was that,
16 was that, I mean, although probably many of the people
17 involved were familiar with the tech specs, was that
18 overtly mentioned?

19 Was there any discussion related to the,
20 you know, well, it's really not that bad or, you know,
21 maybe it's, maybe it's something, I mean, what kind of
22 discussion was there really to that aspect of, if the
23 decision went your way? Did that even come up?

24 [REDACTED] You mean as far as ~~shutting~~
25 down the station?

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yeah.

2 [REDACTED] No, there was no, there was
3 no direct discussion about, we're not going to shut
4 the station down or, you know, if we call this
5 inoperable, you know that means we're going to, that
6 kind of -

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

8 [REDACTED] - connotation or annotation
9 in the term. It wasn't, I don't remember it being
10 like that. You know, where it was, well, there's no
11 way we're going to shut this station down, so whatever
12 we do, we're going to figure out how to call this
13 thing operable.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If not directly
15 discussed, do you think it factored into the decision
16 making?

17 [REDACTED] Yeah, it probably did. I'm
18 sure it did.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think that the
20 Engineering evaluation, you didn't agree with it. Do
21 you think they had enough information and what it was
22 based on was an adequate decision?

23 I guess in hindsight, you know that it
24 turned out not to be an issue. But with what they
25 were working with and what they were seeing at the

1 time, was that an adequate decision?

2 [REDACTED] I think -

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was it justifiable?

4 [REDACTED] Umm, at the time, I had a
5 hart time with that decision. I didn't believe it was
6 justifiable. But I can't remember enough details, off
7 the top of my head right now, to say, to say
8 specifically why.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why -

10 [REDACTED] We just had -

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you make
12 any statements to that affect? I mean it sounded
13 like, you know, you may not recollect the details, but
14 you recollect how you felt about the decision.

15 [REDACTED] Right.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You were
17 disappointed and you felt like the Management was
18 pushing the station to make the wrong decision. Did
19 you vocalize that to either to [REDACTED] or to -

20 [REDACTED] I talked to [REDACTED] about it.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And what did
22 he say? What was his reaction?

23 [REDACTED] That was his decision to
24 make.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was it his

6

1 decision?

2 [REDACTED] He was [REDACTED]

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was he, who
4 was the License Holder at the time? Who held the
5 license for the facility?

6 [REDACTED]

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So, I
8 mean, was that even part of the discussion? ~~IT~~ really
9 wasn't his decision to make, was it?

10 [REDACTED] No, it wasn't. ~~I~~ I understand
11 that.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I mean if [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]

15 or whatever -

16 [REDACTED] Right.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: - that was
18 really, from a regulatory viewpoint, that [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED] to make. I mean obviously you have to take
20 his input -

21 [REDACTED] Right, right.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: - from a
23 company's standpoint.

24 [REDACTED] Right.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But did you

1 ever, did you ever think of that at the time, did you
2 think about that at the time?

3 [REDACTED]: Yes.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And say, hey
5 look, you know, it's really not your decision, it's [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED]: Right. I didn't have that
8 specific conversation at that time with him. The
9 Engineers with the data were, you know, from a
10 technical standpoint, I respected them, had a high
11 regard for their knowledge of those valves and that
12 system.

13 And so, I mean, I don't know everything.
14 So I was, I reluctantly accepted that decision, I
15 guess, is the best way to put it.

16 I've been deemed to be too conservative,
17 so in, you know, that particular situation maybe that
18 was a case where I was leaning too much in the wrong
19 direction, you know, too conservative.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When were you deemed
21 to be too conservative?

22 [REDACTED]: Well, I think that's what, I
23 think that was my, I think that's probably the way I
24 was described. ~~X~~ As just a person who is, you know, a
25 very conservative Operator.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so that was just
2 throughout and consistent, it was like [REDACTED]
3 had an opinion at what point in time and then it
4 became, you're too conservative? It wasn't a change
5 in his opinion or anything?

6 [REDACTED] No, that's, no.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's the way you
8 operated?

9 [REDACTED] No, no, right, that's the way
10 I was.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

12 [REDACTED] At that was in one of the
13 reasons that, one of the reasons that I was put in the
14 position of ([REDACTED]) was because of my
15 standards and conservative operation.

16 That was one of the reasons I was put in
17 that job. Or those were the reasons that I was put in
18 that job.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And who was, and how
20 do you know that?

21 [REDACTED] It's in [REDACTED] when [REDACTED]
22 asked me if I would do the job, if I wanted to do the
23 job, he was going to make the change and he said this
24 is why I want you to do the job. This is way I want
25 you there, you know, standards and conservative

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~~operation~~

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] input directly to you, ~~is~~ that he valued
that conservative input? ~~X~~

[REDACTED] Right, right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I see. In this
incident, did you consider or did you go around [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] at any point?

[REDACTED] No, I didn't.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have
discussions with [REDACTED] about it?

[REDACTED] and I did discuss, we
discussed this. Because he was, I mean he was there
at night, the same as I was. We were looking at the
results. We had discussions on what we believed the
potential outcome, you know, the question about the
operability of the valve.

We had discussions before, I'm trying to
remember, I don't think he was at that meeting that
day. But we had discussed it prior to going to the
meeting. [REDACTED] and I talked about, you know, where we
were with it.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was he in a position
that you were, where you ultimately reluctantly
accepting what Engineering had put together?

1 [REDACTED]: Umm, I really don't want to
2 speak for [REDACTED] He was so new at the time, to the
3 whole, you know, new to the, as an ([REDACTED]) to the
4 plant and everything, that I think he had to pretty
5 much, way more than I did, rely on what Engineering
6 was telling as far as that goes.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you say this was
8 Spring, 2001? Or did we put a time frame on here? I
9 thought it was 2001 some time.

10 [REDACTED]: It was 2001, but I think it
11 was in the, it was sometime in the summer, I think.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And he had gotten on
13 around March or so?

14 [REDACTED]: Right, he was the [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED] I was the [REDACTED] and I think it was in the
16 summer time.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Are you okay
18 with that issue?

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Umm hmm.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can we go on?
21 Considering you to be too conservative, if this is an
22 incident where that was pointed out to you, do you
23 have other incidents where that became evident that
24 you would have been too conservative?

25 [REDACTED] So the unit, we were in an

1 ~~outage~~ actually, okay, let me see if we were. We
 2 were doing a dilution to, in the ~~RCS~~ to get down to
 3 where we could do it, you know, get to where we could
 4 start it up. We had a hot (inaudible) concentration
 5 in the ~~RCS~~ from a ~~cold shut down~~. I can't remember if
 6 it was coming out of a, I think it was ~~coming out of~~
 7 a ~~refueling outage~~.

8 And we had, we ~~diluted~~ and ~~the samples~~
 9 didn't agree with the ~~amount~~ of water that we put in
 10 and your calculations ~~prior to do~~, I mean, we followed
 11 the procedure where, here's where you (inaudible)
 12 ~~concentration~~, here's where you want to go.

13 Go back to the tables, do your
 14 calculations, this is ~~how much water I need to put in~~.
 15 I'm going to ~~put it in in batches~~ and I'm going to get
 16 samples as I go.

17 I'm not going to try to say, you know,
 18 ~~turn the dial~~, put 10,000 gallons of water in ~~because~~
 19 that's what I need, and magically I'm going to be
 20 there.

21 Well, we did a dilution of about one-third
 22 of the amount of water ~~thereabouts~~. ~~The numbers~~
 23 didn't correlate. This, ~~reactor coolant system~~
 24 samples didn't correlate to what we had calculated
 25 based on reactor coolant system (inaudible) before and

1 after any amount of water we put in.

2 We had had a similar problem to that, I
3 think, on the other unit and we thought we fixed it,
4 but evidently we didn't. So, my reaction was we're
5 not going to add anymore water until we understand
6 this problem.

7 Because I'm just not going to go forward,
8 it's a reactivity issue. We're not going to go
9 forward because, until we understand the problem.

10 And there was a lot of pressure to just
11 continue with the dilution to get the plant started
12 up, even though we didn't totally understand what was
13 going on.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And -

15 [REDACTED] And that was me directly
16 standing in front of we're not going to put any more
17 water in the reactor coolant system.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What time
19 frame was that?

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yeah, time frame?

21 [REDACTED] This is, let's see, that
22 would have had to have been in, it could have been
23 late 2001 or early 2002. I'm struggling with that
24 one.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Didn't you

1 say you think it was coming out of an outage?
2 [REDACTED] Yeah, we were we were coming
3 out of Mode 5. It was either a refueling outage or
4 there was, one of the, we got, we ended up doing the
5 shut down. I think for something else. And then
6 because we went to Mode 5 we had to do safety
7 injection and arch our check valve testing.

8 And the check valve testing didn't go
9 well, and we were, you know, we were struggling
10 getting out of that. And we were doing dilution so,
11 I'm trying, I can't remember precisely if it was that
12 type of an outage or if it was a refueling outage.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] I think it was on Unit 1.
15 And that was a big deal.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How so?

17 [REDACTED] Because -

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're saying, you're
19 taking the stand that there was a great deal of
20 pressure. Where was the pressure coming from? Who
21 were you dealing with individually?

22 [REDACTED] And he was
23 dealing with, I presume, [REDACTED]

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have any
25 firsthand discussions with [REDACTED]

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1 [REDACTED] No.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: During this it was [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED] Not that I recall. I was
5 dealing with [REDACTED] all the time.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What about
7 [REDACTED] where was he in this? Was he
8 involved?

9 [REDACTED] was, that's
10 why I have a hard time remembering his name, because
11 he seemed to be kind of, he was there and I kind of --
12 I can't place where [REDACTED] was in the whole scheme of
13 things because I pretty much remember dealing with
14 [REDACTED]

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yourself?

16 [REDACTED] Right.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So the
18 interaction was primarily between the two of you?

19 [REDACTED] Right.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anybody else in
22 there? Was anybody else present?

23 (Pause.)

24 [REDACTED] Um -- shift manager, but I
25 can't remember who --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Late 2001?

1
2 [REDACTED] Might have been [REDACTED]
3 I'm trying to remember if it was [REDACTED] shift that
4 was on my shift that did this and then I came in on
5 day shift because it happened like late at the end of
6 the night shift. And then I was in on day shift and
7 if I remember who the shift manager would have been
8 because -- I think [REDACTED] was the night shift guy. It
9 was his crew that did the dilution and then they
10 stopped.

11 When I saw what was going on, I told them
12 we're not going to add any more water. We can figure
13 this out. We had the OCC in place and [REDACTED]
14 (Phonetic) was [REDACTED] We put together a
15 tech issues team to gather all the data and figure out
16 what the problem was so we could say well, okay, this
17 is the problem and here's how we're going to solve it
18 and so we can continue on.

19 So I mean it kept us from being able to
20 pull shutdown banks and get into the start up
21 sequence, pretty much that whole day.

22 I just told them we're not going to --
23 they were like there's no reason that you can't -- you
24 can watch your indications. You can put the water in
25 and then go ahead and pull shutdown banks and

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1 (Inaudible).

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you're saying
3 "they", let's talk camps here. Who is -- you're
4 taking a stand. Who is with you, your shift manager?

5 [REDACTED] Shift manager.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And your crew?

7 [REDACTED] And the crew. Well, I
8 wasn't the shift manager at the time. I was the [REDACTED]
9 so the shift manager --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Your shift manager
11 was with -- was in line with your thinking?

12 [REDACTED] Right.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who were you kind of
14 -- who was the argument with other than [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] Right, [REDACTED]

19 (Phonetic).

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So their push was to
21 go ahead ~~and~~ add the water? ~~X~~

22 [REDACTED] Yes. ~~X~~ Stay with the
23 schedule ~~add~~ the water, shut down banks ~~X~~

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Stay ~~X~~ with the
25 schedule pressure? ~~X~~

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[REDACTED] Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So what as to be gained here ~~was~~ time on start up?

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I mean were you able to lay out your concerns?

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: To them so that they understood them? Do you think they understood what your logic was?

[REDACTED] I think it was very clear and they really didn't have a technical argument to support the push to continue ~~with~~ the boration ~~(Phonetic)~~.
(Phonetic).

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did they offer? Was it just a schedule?

[REDACTED] Well, it was -- we had an indication, just ~~do~~ the dilution and watch your indication and you know whether the plant is going to change from a power standpoint, ~~watch~~ your source range instrumentation and see what happens.

Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you're laughing and I'll just point that out for the record because sometimes it doesn't get in.

1 To me, it looks to me like that strikes
2 you as odd and funny, that they would suggest that
3 then.

4 [REDACTED] Yes.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do it and see what
6 happens kind of thing.

7 [REDACTED] Right, and incorrect.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Incorrect, okay. In
9 the situation, were you able to get it accomplished
10 the way you wanted to?

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What did you
13 see as the problem?

14 [REDACTED] There was a timing issue
15 with the -- it started back, I believe what happened
16 was it started back at the beginning where used -- the
17 timing of the ~~initial~~ boron concentration ~~that~~ was
18 used to start the calculation from was one of them.
19 And then ~~the~~ sample time, to allow the recirculation
20 of the reactor coolant system ~~there~~ was a lot of
21 timing issues and we put a lot of changes in the
22 procedure to address specifically ~~what~~ boron
23 concentration you should use as your initial sample
24 point ~~.~~

25 And then the communication required and

1 the time delay that should be allowed for the reactor
2 coolant system to recirculate so you could get good
3 mixing so you could get accurate samples and flushing
4 of the sample lines and those kind of things.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So it
6 was a number of things that were improvements to the
7 process to make sure that the sample was, in fact, an
8 accurate reflection of what was inside the OCS?

9 [REDACTED] Right.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Once that
11 was done did it correlate fairly well with what your
12 prediction was?

13 [REDACTED] I believe so, yes.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: How long a
15 delay was that? I mean from -- you said it was like
16 -- I think you said it was like a Monday day shift
17 when you started the --

18 [REDACTED] I don't remember a specific
19 day of the week, but it was like night shift going
20 into day shift and they were doing the dilution, an
21 initial dilution to get down to where you could start
22 up, a start up sequence and I got involved -- well,
23 very early at the beginning of the shift and we
24 probably lost -- I think the event happened like maybe
25 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning, somewhere around there

1 and we lost probably that whole day shift.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] Didn't get to ~~where~~ where we could
4 pull shut down banks, I think until the end of that
5 day.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] Or maybe even on night
8 shift, the beginning of the next shift.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So 12 hours,
10 maybe, something like that?

11 [REDACTED] I think that was about what
12 it was, yes.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, so you
14 lost a shift.

15 Was there any adverse consequences to you
16 as a result of that? Maybe not right at the time, but
17 how about later? Was there anything, ~~performance~~ performance
18 appraisal or --

19 [REDACTED] No.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No. Did you
21 expect there to be something?

22 [REDACTED] No, I didn't. To be honest
23 with you, I thought I was doing my job. I believe I
24 was doing the job that they expected me to do, whether
25 they agreed at the time. I mean I tried to be

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1 technically accurate and not --

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: How about
3 later? Did anybody come back a week or a month or
4 three months later and say you know, we were thinking
5 about what you did there, [redacted] good job, you know,
6 you kept us on track and -- did anybody come back, a
7 week or more later and have any other things to say
8 about that incident or the other?

9 [redacted] I think it was that outage
10 There was a notification put in the system about
11 operations, conservative, conservative decision making
12 or conservative approach -- a conservative approach
13 I think that's -- conservative approach to operations,
14 sometimes gets in the way of productivity. Some words
15 along those lines.

16 There was notification that was written
17 and delineated I forget, maybe half a dozen line
18 items related to an outage that this decision was made
19 that cost us this much -- things like that.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who wrote
21 that?

22 [redacted] I think it was out of that
23 and -- I think it was written by [redacted] at
24 the time.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who was

60

1 that?

2 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (Phonetic), I
3 believe it was.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The items that he
5 outlined were issues that what, that you -- they were
6 decisions that he took exception to?

7 [REDACTED] Yes.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that cost the
9 company money?

10 [REDACTED] Right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In terms of
12 productivity?

13 [REDACTED] Yes.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And he wrote the
15 notification for that?

16 [REDACTED] Yes.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you ever seen
18 that before, a notification written for --

19 [REDACTED] No.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Conservative decision
21 making replacing productivity or eating into
22 productivity?

23 [REDACTED] No.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who was
25 behind that? Why do you think he wrote that?

1 [REDACTED] I have no idea. I'll be
2 very honest with you. I don't know what the
3 motivation for that was. I think that the -- the
4 explanation was that it was like a lessons learned,
5 here's where we made mistakes and this is where we
6 could do better kind of thing but the way it was
7 worded was just -- it was -- it came across as
8 production over conservative decision making for the
9 operation of the station.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was the message
11 that was sent?

12 [REDACTED] Yes. That was the message.
13 And it wasn't just me that -- it was several other
14 operators. I think [REDACTED] (Phonetic) as a
15 [REDACTED] took exception to that.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Got the same message
17 you got?

18 [REDACTED] Exactly.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Some of your shift
20 managers did.

21 [REDACTED] Yes.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were those words used
23 literally, "conservative decision making is affecting
24 productivity"? I mean was he using the words
25 "conservative decision making" or was he showing bad

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1 decisions --

2 [REDACTED] Conservative -- it was
3 conservative operation of the station or -- it didn't
4 say bad decisions. And I may be putting the words
5 that I want them to say and they'd be using the words
6 that I interpret them to say, but it was very clear,
7 the message was very clear that you guys ~~in~~ the
8 control room ~~are~~ screwed up.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Too conservative?

10 [REDACTED] Too conservative, making the
11 decisions that cost us this amount of time.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's on him ~~if~~ the
13 outage goes longer ~~right~~? They're going to look at
14 that ~~outage~~ control for ~~that~~ in terms of why didn't
15 you ~~hit~~ the mark here? ~~Y~~

16 [REDACTED] Right.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So he responds ~~with~~
18 a notification after this outage? ~~Y~~

19 [REDACTED] Yes, it was some time lag
20 after the outage, ~~so~~ -- I can't get the time frame on
21 it.

22 I remember when I was out at requal. with
23 that crew at that time and [REDACTED] saw that in the box
24 and he brought it to my attention.

25 I was [REDACTED] at the

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1 time. [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED]

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're thinking it
3 was late 2001 time frame or early 2002?

4 [REDACTED] Yes, it either had to be the
5 fall of 2001 because we would have had an outage and
6 I'm pretty sure we got an outage on one of the units
7 then and then we had a spring outage. We had -- it
8 would have been a Unit 2 outage in 2002. It could
9 have easily -- it was -- it could have been the spring
10 of 2002.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Possibly around
12 there.

13 [REDACTED] Yes.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you hadn't seen
15 anything like that written up before?

16 [REDACTED] Never in my --

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Before or since?

18 [REDACTED] Career.

19 (Laughter.)

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I mean the purpose of
21 a notification is I mean you're looking for some sort
22 of corrective action, right?

23 [REDACTED] Right.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was the
25 recommended corrective action here?

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What was recommended and what was the end result? Can you recall that? I'm assuming we can

look at this document. It's in the system.

[REDACTED] It's in the system. Yes, it's a notification.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But do you recall what the recommended corrective action was?

[REDACTED] Well, the corrective actions then were to like fix the problems or change the procedures that led us to make those decisions.

Either fix a piece of equipment or make a procedure change. Maybe the procedures weren't appropriate that led me to make that decision, you know.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or whatever it was that contributed to holding up the end of the outage.

[REDACTED]: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So whatever these six decisions were that -- he outlines six that he took exception to --

[REDACTED]: That's an approximation from recollection.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right, right. And targeted them because in some way he thought there was some poor decision making going on?

1 [REDACTED] I believe that's the message
2 that came through, yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was the result
4 of that? What kind of discussion did that get?
5 Obviously, [REDACTED] (Phonetic)
6 came to you. Any other [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] It became a discussion of
8 the shift managers, that that was -- it kind of led to
9 like an us against them kind of thing. It was --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was their
11 decisions that were being criticized, right?

12 [REDACTED] Right.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was at their
14 level?

15 [REDACTED] Right.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I mean was it [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED] who took that message or were you saying
18 that was across the board?

19 [REDACTED] It was across the board,
20 pretty much with the shift managers and -- yes, it was
21 pretty much across the board, shift managers
22 (Inaudible), that was I.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what about
24 anything further? Did you see it have an effect on
25 conservative decision making?

1 [REDACTED]: Not as long as I was there.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Which was half a
3 year?

4 [REDACTED] If it's the outage that I'm
5 thinking -- yeah, it was at most, it would have been
6 like from November of 2001 until the end of June 2002.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Interesting.

8 [REDACTED] So --

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think I might have
10 gone over your question.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That's all
12 right.

13 So you said it kind of created an "us
14 versus them" kind of mentality?

15 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there
17 any attempt to communicate the dissatisfaction that
18 the shift managers felt to [REDACTED] (Phonetic) or
19 [REDACTED] in some formal setting or semi-formal
20 setting?

21 [REDACTED] Yes.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And what was
23 that?

24 [REDACTED]: We had routine shift manager
25 meetings.

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1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

2 [REDACTED]: So at one of the shift
3 manager meetings we pulled together specifically for
4 the purpose of having this discussion. It was after
5 this notification and after this outage.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was that the
7 only thing that led to this meeting you're talking
8 about? Was there anything else?

9 I mean it highlighted some things. A
10 handful of items.

11 [REDACTED]: Yes.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Were there
13 other issues to that where people felt pressured to do
14 things a certain way?

15 [REDACTED]: It was the general tone, the
16 way -- it comes back to your discussion about who
17 holds the license, who really should be making the
18 decision and it got to where [REDACTED] was coming into the
19 control room and trying to tell people what to do or
20 make decisions where he really wasn't -- they weren't
21 decisions for him to make. I mean there's no polite
22 way to say it, right? It's not his decision to make
23 ultimately from a licensing standpoint without first
24 getting the input, at least getting the input from the
25 licensed people.

1 And that was -- I mean he would just come
2 into the control room and -- I'm trying to remember --
3 he might suggest or tell a shift manager to just
4 ignore an acceptance criteria or something along those
5 lines.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: (Inaudible)

7 [REDACTED] Not ignore it, but --

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: N/A it?

9 Skip over it?

10 [REDACTED] I'm trying to dredge up the
11 specific issue.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Some of the
13 ~~X~~ reactor vent valves? ~~X~~

14 [REDACTED] Yes, that's it. That's it.
15 That's the one. And there was something about the
16 strobe time involved and it was like why do we need
17 them is what the issue was.

18 Well, there's a design basis. There's a
19 licensing document. There's a tech spec. There's all
20 the reasons we need them. We're doing the
21 surveillance tests. This is their acceptance criteria
22 and I don't think I was directly involved in that one.
23 I don't know where I was at the time, but I remember
24 hearing about it, so that was one of the issues that
25 was brought up at this shift manager's meeting.

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SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED] With -- [REDACTED] was there.
[REDACTED] was there. And [REDACTED] was there.

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And all the other shift managers?

[REDACTED] And all the shift managers.

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you remember who those -- who [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Should have been [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

(Phonetic)?

[REDACTED] (Phonetic). I'm trying to remember if he was there or not. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] I think he was there.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think he might not have been there?

[REDACTED] I'm trying to think if [REDACTED] was there or not. He's always so quiet that we --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] He was [REDACTED] in that time frame, wasn't he?

[REDACTED] Uh --- who had the shifts. It was [REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you say [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
I think were the five on shift, shift managers, and [REDACTED] I believe was promoted to [REDACTED], but wasn't -- he was working on his qual. card. I don't believe he had a shift yet when I left.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and there's a fifth and it might have been [REDACTED] (Phonetic) who was present?

[REDACTED]: Yes.

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And who did you say was present from management? It was [REDACTED] -- who else?

[REDACTED]

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So this leads to a meeting or you're saying it was like a regular shift manager meeting, but this one -- was it normal for all those --

[REDACTED] The discussion, the purpose of that -- I'm sorry.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just for [REDACTED]

1 to be there and okay -- this is a special kind of a
2 meeting?

3 [REDACTED] The typical attendance was
4 the shift managers, people who held the title of shift
5 managers try to get all the guys on shift because that
6 was really trying to get everybody together there and
7 then you had guys like [REDACTED] (Phonetic),
8 [REDACTED] (Phonetic), [REDACTED] (Phonetic) would be
9 there and [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] (Phonetic). [REDACTED] (Phonetic) was at
11 that meeting. He was [REDACTED] at the
12 time.

13 I don't remember [REDACTED] (Phonetic) was
14 there or not. But typically that was the attendance
15 and the [REDACTED] would be there at the meeting,
16 but we wouldn't have like [REDACTED] there --

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would not be
19 at that meeting unless they had a reason to be there
20 on their own, they wanted to be there or we invited
21 them to be there.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were they invited or
23 did they want to be there for this?

24 [REDACTED] We invited them for this
25 one.

1 [REDACTED] No, I don't recall that. I
2 don't recall that being part of the --

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall that
4 ever being an issue in that there was direction that
5 operability calls would be made by a consensus as
6 opposed to what the shift manager was observing and
7 the facts that he had at hand, you would wait and
8 delay?

9 [REDACTED] There was an attempt to try
10 to get to that, I think. But I did the best that I
11 could to prevent that from happening by empowering the
12 shift managers to make the call. You have the facts
13 in front of you. Make the call.

14 Well, you have operability, on/off. It's
15 operable. It's inoperable. Then you have other areas
16 where it could be inoperable. It might be inoperable.
17 It might require an inoperability determination.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Operable, but
19 degraded?

20 [REDACTED] But degraded, can't, you
21 know, you can't really say it's indeterminant, so you
22 got to make a call that you can say it's operable, but
23 degraded and then you would need some other support.
24 That's always been there and we didn't really jump to
25 the immediate conclusion this piece of equipment is

1 inoperable, but I think there might have been some
2 attempt to expand the concept of operable, but
3 degraded beyond where it really should have been,
4 beyond the envelope that it really belonged in. That
5 kind of thing.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that a part of
7 this meeting, do you recall?

8 [REDACTED] No, I don't think it was.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Could that have been
10 a separate meeting?

11 [REDACTED]: Um, I don't remember having
12 that kind of a meeting to be honest with you.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] Unless it was lumped into
15 this one here. The primary focus of this one, this
16 meeting that I recall was to get everybody sitting
17 around the table and get -- and try to get back to the
18 -- break down the -- it's us in the control room
19 versus you guys on day shift kind of thing, you know.
20 And try to explain what our thoughts were about having
21 like [REDACTED] trying to be the license holder when he
22 wasn't the license holder and kind of intervening in
23 decisions and things like that. That was the whole
24 purpose of it.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there

1 any discussion ahead of the meeting on the part of the
 2 shift managers, either with you present or that you
 3 were aware of where there was some attempt to rehearse
 4 or discuss what the points were that you wanted to
 5 make? Whether it was something just informal like
 6 okay, this is kind of what we want to bring out. This
 7 is how we want to say it. This is how we are going to
 8 portray things. Did you have discussions with them or
 9 to your knowledge, did they have any discussions
 10 amongst themselves?

11 [REDACTED]: I believe there was some
 12 discussion ahead of time. We didn't want to just go
 13 into this cold. There were items that we wanted to be
 14 able to discuss like specific things and one of them
 15 was like the vessel let (inaudible) the thing about
 16 the dilution. I'm trying to remember what else we
 17 were going to talk about in there.

18 And so there wouldn't be -- so there
 19 wouldn't be like just a very vague nebulous finger
 20 pointing kind of thing. It was like, you know, this
 21 is here's the issue as we see it. Here's some
 22 examples why we believe it's going on and what can we
 23 do to go forward so we can get beyond this and get
 24 back into the correct line, correct alignment, is what
 25 the meeting was about.

1 The outcome was that we were all victims
2 and --

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How was that --

4 [REDACTED] The outcome of the meeting
5 was that we were all behaving as victims.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That's what
7 they said?

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That's what
10 management said?

11 [REDACTED] Yes, that's what we were
12 told.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What did
14 they mean by that?

15 [REDACTED] I don't know. I guess it
16 was their way of just like -- turning the tables
17 around on us, it seemed. It was that we weren't -- I
18 guess we weren't -- we didn't understand the chain of
19 command or we didn't understand our behavior or you
20 know, the correct behavior or whatever.

21 I'm not sure what they meant by that. I
22 know that it -- it caused me a lot of grief
23 internally.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When they called you,
25 you turned to victim (Phonetic)?

1 [REDACTED] Yes.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I mean a victim is
3 another word for like a complainant. Was it
4 complaining, they just don't want to hear the
5 complaining?

6 [REDACTED] I guess that's a good way to
7 put it, yes. It's just like whining.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was the whining
9 that they didn't -- I don't want to put words in your
10 mouth, but is that what the message was, stop being a
11 victim, you're whining?

12 [REDACTED] Yes.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Uh --

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was the
15 reaction to that? I assume you said that's the
16 outcome of the meeting and I'm sure it didn't take
17 place in just a matter of a few minutes. It probably
18 took some time to go through what the issues were.
19 And was there a reaction like as they were discussed
20 or was there managers just sat back and listened? And
21 the shifts and yourself and you all laid everything
22 out and they reacted to it, or was there a lot of
23 dialogue back and forth?

24 [REDACTED] There was discussion back
25 and forth. There was discussion about conservative

1 decision making. And operation of the station and the
2 need to be -- to bring the two together because the
3 whole -- the bottom line is we're here to make
4 electricity to make money. The fact that we money
5 with nuclear power brings a whole different aspect
6 into it of decision making and operability and
7 conservatism that you don't necessarily have with
8 other forms of power generation.

9 But still, in all, that has to be factored
10 into the business model and the bottom line is we're
11 here to make money. That's why -- because if we
12 couldn't make money running these generators, they'd
13 be shut down.

14 So there was a lot of discussion around
15 the -- not that we're here to make money at all costs.
16 And we're going to ignore conservatism and tech
17 specs and license (Inaudible) and that stuff, it was
18 just that we needed to come to some -- I guess some
19 middle ground on some -- the way we ran the plant is
20 what the discussion revolved around.

21 The thing about being victims I think came
22 out after it was over and that came back down through
23 the ops manager. That wasn't -- vocalized in the
24 meeting, that piece of it.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was vocalized in

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the meeting by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I think most of the
discussion was handled by [REDACTED] and I think he was
trying to listen to what we had to say and he was
trying to defend his actions. And [REDACTED] I don't
remember [REDACTED] saying anything really outstanding other
than to be involved in the discussions about -- he
supported the idea that 'we're here to run the station
safely. That's what our function is, along with the
fact that we need to make -- we're here to generate
revenue by making electricity.

And most everything, if I recall
correctly, most of the discussion was with [REDACTED]
because a lot of it was revolving around [REDACTED]. He was
kind of [REDACTED]. He was [REDACTED].
[REDACTED] He was the guy that you always
saw in the control room and he was the guy that was
always on the phone.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He was the one whose
intervention you were objecting to?

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: His presence and his
direction?

[REDACTED] Right, right. And you know,
his style. So that was -- and the idea was to try to

1 get alignment from the shift managers that were here
2 24/7. They're senior management representation and
3 the license holders way up to the ultimate, the VP,
4 the guy that we ultimately report to and that whole
5 chain, is to try to get everything on the table and
6 get an understanding of what -- just what it is that
7 was perceived that we were doing wrong. We wanted
8 them to explain to us what it was that we weren't
9 doing that we were or were not doing and we wanted to
10 explain to them what we believe was a barrier in the
11 form of [REDACTED] behavior.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you get that?

13 [REDACTED] Not really. I don't believe
14 we ever got to that.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Any kind of a
16 resolution?

17 [REDACTED] No. Because it was like at
18 the end of the meeting it was okay, this is what you
19 presented us. [REDACTED] interacted during the discussions
20 and that it was okay, we understand this. We'll go
21 away and then we'll need to have another meeting.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did another meeting
23 occur?

24 [REDACTED] No, not that I remember.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So what was the net

1 effect of this discussion? Did anything change? Did
2 [REDACTED] stop coming in or did the shift managers do
3 anything differently?

4 [REDACTED]: We pretty much continued to
5 do business as usual.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And this is part of
7 that notification that was [REDACTED]
8 (Phonetic), part of that was discussed at this
9 meeting? Here's the notification showing we did six
10 things the wrong way?

11 [REDACTED]: I'm trying to get it in the
12 time frame. I think that that was part of that
13 discussion, yes.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think that
15 contributed to what are we doing wrong?

16 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If you're writing a
18 notification, that indicates there's a problem, right?

19 [REDACTED] Yes. What are we doing or
20 what are we not doing, you know, that's not meeting
21 your expectations? Why are we here? Why are we where
22 we are? The perception is we don't want to run the
23 station. That was that discussion.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I guess it leads you
25 think -- I'm trying to look at it from both points of

1 view. Was there -- in your opinion were there
 2 decisions that were being made to arbitrarily take the
 3 units off line that really were not justified
 4 opinions, they were just being ~~the~~ the shift manager,
 5 whoever had that input was moving in a way that they
 6 shouldn't have been moving and costing money? Is
 7 there something that was going on there that
 8 justifiably they could say you shouldn't be behaving
 9 this way. You shouldn't be operating that way?

10 ~~_____~~ No. I don't see anything.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So the instances that
 12 you're aware of, including whatever was listed on this
 13 notification at that time frame and these other
 14 incidents that we're talking about were operability
 15 calls or decision making that was good decision
 16 making? It was responsible decision making?

17 ~~_____~~ Let's go to the example of
 18 ~~the~~ the dilution for the RCS, ~~the~~ dilute (Inaudible) of
 19 ~~the~~ the boron concentration prior to pulling the shutdown
 20 ~~banks.~~

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

22 ~~_____~~ I guess I could see that you
 23 might make an argument that you can ~~meter~~ meter out how much
 24 water you put in and you could watch all of the rods
 25 ~~are~~ are inserted so you have that shutdown margin. You

1 have some idea what ~~your~~ boron concentration is. So
2 I guess you could make an argument to go ahead and
3 dilute in small batches, get samples, watch your
4 nuclear instrumentation and use that approach to get
5 to the boron concentration that you want to be at.

6 But I just didn't see that as the way to go. That was
7 not the correct thing to do because it was a
8 reactivity. It was a question of reactivity with the
9 core and we had -- we performed a function. We had an
10 outcome that we didn't understand. It didn't make
11 sense to proceed with that. That goes against all the
12 principles, particularly when you're dealing with
13 reactivity. So there's the difference of opinion,
14 right?

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

16 [REDACTED] So my position as the
17 [REDACTED], my position from my experience back to
18 [REDACTED] was we shouldn't go
19 for it. We should understand what we're doing and it
20 really shouldn't take that long for us to understand
21 what we're doing. It can't be that hard to figure
22 out, but the time spent figuring out ahead of time is
23 much more productive than it would be to go forward in
24 the face of not understanding what you're doing, have
25 some outcome that is worse than the first outcome and

1 then you're going to spend days explaining why you did
2 that or months. You don't know.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.

4 ~~REDACTED~~ You know, so in my mind, the
5 hours spent, that was a correct decision and the guys
6 with the shift managers, we all pretty much saw eye to
7 eye. I'd say probably 90 percent of the time and it
8 wasn't -- I don't think that I'm that over influential
9 that I commanded that kind of loyalty that if I was
10 wrong, somebody was going to just blindly follow me or
11 whatever. We always have discussions, pull out the
12 book. They call me at home. I had a set of tech
13 specs, a set of drawings and everything. I didn't --
14 I wouldn't challenge what the discussion was about and
15 I would try to verify it with the documentation that
16 I had at home versus what they were reading and I
17 wasn't going off the top of my head. Those kind of
18 things. And if I'm wrong, I'm wrong.

19 But -- so I can see if you take that
20 example that I can see where there would be some
21 consternation from senior management that it's no big
22 deal. You have other indications, go forward with
23 what you're doing.

24 So I guess I can see where he might have
25 believed that we were being too much on the side of

1 conservatism at the expense of meeting the schedule
2 deadline.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The picture that
4 you're showing is that your shift management, you're
5 licensed senior management is in line with your
6 thinking. You've got independent thinkers and they're
7 thinking the way you're thinking, so it was time to
8 push back.

9 [REDACTED] Yes.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: On this direction
11 with [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED]: Yes.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that's what it
14 evolved into.

15 [REDACTED] And I guess the other thing
16 that needs to be -- or should be clear is that these
17 guys -- okay, [REDACTED] (Phonetic) is a long-time
18 Salem employee, operations, been [REDACTED] for
19 a number of years. But then when you go to the other
20 guys who [REDACTED]
21 are [REDACTED] So they brought a
22 perspective from a plant. They work in operations and
23 they brought a perspective from a plant that I think
24 during the time when they were getting licensed, it
25 was in the process of recovering from some hard times.

1 for them and they went through a standards improvement
2 and a conservative decision making process.

3 [REDACTED] has been here all the time,
4 but he got into operations licensing at the time,
5 1995, 1996, 1997 time frame whenever the change in
6 management was here and the shift to the conservative
7 decision making, the shift that's going to run, the
8 shift has the responsibility, the shift manager is the
9 manager of the station.

10 [REDACTED] was the same way. He was
11 licensed as an SRO under that philosophy. So you had
12 somewhat diverse backgrounds. I was [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] So the management of the crews, it wasn't
14 like we were ~~out~~ drinking together every night from
15 day one. We had diverse backgrounds, different
16 managements, nuclear power plants. And we pretty much
17 all came to the same conclusion most of the time on
18 conditions of equipment, where a piece of equipment
19 should be operable, not operable. What is
20 conservative, what isn't conservative. Everyone is
21 not always going to agree. I'm not trying to say that
22 I'm 100 percent right, that maybe not -- maybe I do
23 lean too much to one side, but that's the way -- once
24 you get into that pattern of behavior, that's the way
25 that I was trained [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

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1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That sounds
2 like one of the reasons you were selected for the
3 position.

4 [REDACTED] I was put back on shift in
5 1999 because we were having events. Human performance
6 events, not following procedures, not controlling
7 evolutions. That [REDACTED] was removed from the
8 crew. I was put in there. We brought everything in
9 lie. Followed procedures and stopped having events.

10 And when they needed somebody, I was on
11 two different crews for that very reason. And the
12 results were, was able to convince people that you
13 follow procedures and you communicate and you follow
14 these standards and we won't have those kind of events
15 and you have the safe operation of the station.

16 That's why I was put on two different
17 crews on shift and then [REDACTED] that's what [REDACTED]
18 explained to me was that operation or my leadership
19 style, management style, whatever you want to call it,
20 that was why I was selected to be [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED] So I had all the groups then. I
22 had [REDACTED]

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: After this meeting
24 where the message came back and you said it didn't
25 come back at that meeting, that it came back after the

1 follow-up to it from ops management, where were you
2 getting that from? Was it [REDACTED] was
3 translating that for you and they wanted you to stop
4 being the victim? Where was it coming from?

5 [REDACTED] No, it was [REDACTED]
6 that delivered that message that we were behaving as
7 victims and we needed to stop that behavior.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When he delivered it,
9 delivered the message, was it his belief that that's
10 what was going on or was he delivering the message for
11 [REDACTED] or above?

12 [REDACTED] He portrayed it as if it was
13 his belief.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So the rift here then
15 would be between, at your level, [REDACTED] and down and then
16 OM and up on this big issue?

17 [REDACTED]: Yes. It would appear that
18 way although I could still go to [REDACTED] and talk to
19 [REDACTED] about issues and concerns and he didn't hesitate
20 to get on the phone I'd sit there right in his office
21 and get on the phone with [REDACTED] or get on the phone with
22 [REDACTED] on the speaker phone and we'd have discussions.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So in practice, he
24 was approachable and you could engage him in decision
25 making?

1 [REDACTED]: Yes.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's just that they
3 didn't want to have meetings about this any more.
4 They didn't want to hear the collective whining?

5 [REDACTED]: Right, that's correct.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So he was still --
7 was he acting reasonable?

8 [REDACTED]: Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Conservatively,
10 reasonable. It's just that there weren't going to be
11 meetings any more? Because you said there wasn't a
12 follow up --

13 [REDACTED]: Not only those subjects.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There wasn't a follow
15 up. There was supposed to be, but there wasn't one?

16 [REDACTED]: Right.

17 (Laughter.)

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's a message in
19 itself, I would think.

20 (Laughter.)

21 Okay.

22 [REDACTED]: Right.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, I think we
24 pretty much covered the effect that that had. I think
25 you said it was -- the end result of this meeting was

1 what? Did people do anything differently?

2 [REDACTED]: No. No, we continued to
3 operate the way we had prior to that meeting.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This meeting, I'm
5 thinking from what's been reported it was spring 2002?

6 [REDACTED]: I think that that's where it
7 falls into.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: April, May, 2002.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was it a
10 factor in your decision to leave the station?

11 [REDACTED]: I would say that it was a
12 very small factor, very small. I wanted to go -- I
13 had been in operations since [REDACTED] always in
14 operations and I wanted to try to do something
15 different and so I had an opportunity to go up there
16 to [REDACTED]
17 but that wasn't going to happen here. And I didn't
18 see them taking me out of operations to go like to
19 maintenance or -- because in the past I had asked to
20 go to maintenance and that just never happened. I was
21 an operator. That's where it looked like I was going
22 to stay.

23 So when I had the opportunity, I thought
24 I'd go there and give that a try, be [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] for a while and learn something different.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Rather than
2 maybe saying --

3 (Whereupon, the tape was flipped.)

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's approximately
5 3:07 p.m., after a brief break. At the time when you
6 [REDACTED] did you, do you maintain any
7 contact with the people?

8 In the time that you were gone that year
9 plus, that you were gone, were you maintaining contact
10 with people here on-site? To the extent that you
11 would know questions along the line of where we are.

12 Day-to-day decision making. Did the
13 situation change? Did it better? Did it worsen? You
14 know, anything along those lines?

15 [REDACTED] No, I had infrequent contact,
16 occasional conversation with maybe [REDACTED] (inaudible) or
17 [REDACTED] (phonetic). Just infrequent phone calls
18 because both of us worked so many hours, there just
19 wasn't an opportunity to be in touch.

20 So, I get, the sense I get is that it's
21 pretty much the same as when I left, from a decision
22 making standpoint or an overall management standpoint.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The sense that you get
24 today?

25 [REDACTED] Well, no, today, no. Back

1 with the new, with [redacted] here and then [redacted]
2 I think that there is some belief that things will
3 change.

4 Because when, when [redacted] and [redacted] were
5 here, you know running Operations, it was more of a,
6 more of an Operations, I think it was more of an
7 Operations, that organization, but decisions of the
8 shift. They were in the process of training the
9 shifts to be decision makers, to lead the station.

10 And I think there's a belief that things
11 will shift back in that direction.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Under [redacted] and
13 [redacted] (phonetic)?

14 [redacted] Yes.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The, in that time
16 frame there was a changeover with the [redacted] Mr.
17 [redacted] went out and [redacted] came in. Do you
18 have, did you get a sense of anything that, in that
19 time frame was anything done differently or worse, or
20 do you have any basis to evaluate it?

21 [redacted]: I don't really have the basis
22 for evaluation.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Infrequent contact and

24 -
25 [redacted]: Yeah, right. We really

1 didn't talk shop very much really. I shouldn't even
2 say very much. I mean we'd call, we'd just like how
3 are you doing? How are things going here, how are
4 things going there?

5 A real broad sense. No specifics. Nobody
6 was calling me and saying, hey, you won't believe what
7 was, what we did today or that kind of thing. There
8 was none of those conversations.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You didn't have that
10 kind of input then?

11 [REDACTED] No, no.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in terms of you
13 being on-site here since [REDACTED] what your sense
14 is, is that it's going in an improved direction and
15 that shift management will be the decision maker on
16 site, is that what you're saying?

17 That's, that's a sense I get, yeah, that's
18 a feeling I get. From, you know, just from, again,
19 like you know, general conversations. Everybody is
20 glad to see that [REDACTED] is back.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

22 [REDACTED] And that's not just from
23 operations standpoint. I think the workforce in
24 general, the Union guys, that includes maintenance,
25 felt like they had a better rapport with [REDACTED] in a

1 Senior Management position than some of the other
2 people that have been here.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. We had
4 some other incidents that we wanted to bring up,
5 right? Do you have anything that you needed to cover
6 on territory that we've been to?

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I don't think
8 so.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. There's, there
10 were a couple, I'm wondering if you can recall, and if
11 you do, we can get into it from there.

12 I'll go to something that goes pretty far
13 back. Roughly around December of 2001. We're
14 thinking late 2001.

15 [REDACTED] Okay.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: ~~An~~ underground leak in
17 a service water nuclear header near the building. ✓

18 [REDACTED] Okay.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: ~~Water~~ reportedly ✓
20 gushing off the header. ✓

21 [REDACTED] Right.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall that
23 situation?

24 [REDACTED] Yes, yes.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall, I mean

1 can you describe what went into, in terms of
2 operability and decision making to fix what was going
3 on there?

4 Can you recall what went into that?

5 We, we had Engineering,
6 Design Engineering involve, some engineering
7 involvement in the assessment of the pipe.

8 And we brought in an outside Contractor to
9 do an assessment of the ground, to try to determine,
10 you know, to get some feel for whether there was,
11 whether the leak was to the extent where it was like
12 voiding under the ground.

13 A loss of fuel in the area of the pipe
14 because there are other headers that come out of there
15 and we wanted to make sure that we weren't undermining
16 the pipe and losing some structural capability because
17 there were no, essentially there was no pipe support,
18 it was just the fuel, the aggregate around the piping
19 that provides the support for the pipe.

20 So we brought in an outside Contractor.
21 We had design, we had to do that function. They had
22 some kind of ground sonar that they used to determine
23 voiding.

24 It was able to actually, it was some
25 pretty interesting maps that he came up with that he

1 could actually show the, how far out the water was in
2 to the soil from the leak around the pipe.

3 And the design guys were, you know, we
4 spent a lot of time getting the drawings,
5 understanding the design, understanding the joint.

6 We got pictures from construction prior to
7 the fuel, to see what the pipe looked like in the
8 ground. And based on all that input, came to the
9 conclusion that the, that we were, well, we had
10 inoperability.

11 We wrote an operability determination
12 based on the leakage and did calculations on what size
13 leak we could withstand with that piping service and
14 the pump running before we have to say that we were
15 robbing enough flow that you'd have to shut the unit
16 down.

17 And we made the best determination we
18 could of like the structural integrity of that
19 pipe, knowing what we knew about the type that's, it's
20 like a high density concrete wire-wrapped pipe.

21 And then the fittings that, the joint that
22 was there. And then we monitored the water coming out
23 of the ground, you know, to keep track of how much
24 water was coming out so we could, so that we could
25 make a determination as best we could that the pipe

1 was not leaking at any greater rate than was, than we
2 thought it was.

3 And we put that all together and it's
4 documented in the operability determination, so that
5 we were okay there.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Personally, were you
7 comfortable with the actions that were taken to affect
8 that repair? Time frames and the decision making on
9 that?

10 [REDACTED] It was, it was testing my
11 comfort level, I would say. With that particular,
12 with that particular one.

13 But we had a lot of different inputs to
14 assess the pipe and so I was somewhat comfortable with
15 where we were, I'd say.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What part of it, what
17 aspect would have been testing your comfort level?

18 [REDACTED] I think that, go back to
19 [REDACTED] Past experience [REDACTED] we
20 had a leak on a service water, a piece of service
21 water pipe that serviced a diesel and we ended up
22 shutting the unit down on a much smaller leak.

23 Different kind of pipe. It was a
24 different, you know, so the decision made there was
25 the unit should be taken offline and repair the pipe.

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1 and there was (inaudible) corrosion on the pipe and
2 they ended up replacing it with an entirely different
3 material and everything.

4 So, experience might have driven me to be
5 more, well let's, we should just shut the unit down
6 and fix this pipe, you know, and quit trying to
7 engineer it away.

8 But we had it, you know, so we had a
9 pretty good team of people that were looking at the,
10 you know, looking at it, and I felt we were monitoring
11 the leakage on a continuous basis.

12 And it, before we got to the repair,
13 before we shut it down, the leakage got like right on,
14 right on the edge of where we were, you know, we were
15 forced to shut down because of the amount of leakage
16 that we had out of that pipe.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You couldn't have gone
18 much longer without it?

19 [REDACTED] No.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Without shutting down?

21 [REDACTED] No.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If it's, could you see
23 the situation as one where people could come away with
24 the idea that there's a message being sent. That, you
25 know, if it's safety first, how are we operating with

1 water gushing off the header outside?

2 [REDACTED] Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just in terms of
4 whether it was true inoperability or not, the message
5 was this is unusual. It's not something that you
6 should be seeing, but we're operating along with it?

7 [REDACTED] Yes, I could see that.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was your
9 initial instinct on this to think that you should be
10 taken offline? Based on what you, what your
11 comparison to the [REDACTED] situation?

12 [REDACTED] Yeah, my initial instinct
13 would have been, well, we have, once we saw it was a
14 nuke header, my initial instinct would have been to
15 just take the unit off.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. And
17 then affect whatever kind of repairs were necessary?

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Dig the pipe
20 up and replace it?

21 [REDACTED] Right, right.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

23 [REDACTED]: And reality was that we
24 didn't have, we would not have had a good plan in
25 place to do that--I'm sorry, I didn't mean to

1 interrupt.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No, go ahead,
3 go ahead.

4 [REDACTED] So to, the outcome was that
5 we had the opportunity to understand the nature. I
6 think, by the time we got to where we actually took
7 out of service, we had a real good understanding of
8 the nature of what we had to do. We had a real good
9 plan in place to repair it and we worked with the NRC
10 to get a tech spec extension, from the 72 hours, I
11 think, I think it was seven days, we got an extension
12 out to seven days to allow us to be off.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] And, you know, we put
15 together a time line and all the contingencies and
16 everything. And as it turned out, we were able to
17 ~~repair the pipe~~ in 72 hours.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] We would have never been able
20 to do that, and I don't think we'd have fixed it in
21 seven days, if at the first indication ~~of~~ water coming
22 ~~up through the ground~~, we'd have just said, oh, we're
23 going to shut down and figure out what it is.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Well,
25 that's a good perspective. Do you feel that there was

1 a lesson learned for you coming out of that?

2 I mean is this something we thought, well,
3 maybe I would have, that would have been an
4 overreaction if we would have taken the unit offline.

5 The fact that we took the time to do the
6 investigation, to do the review, to get the people
7 ~~under~~ the ground penetrating radar and all these other
8 special capabilities. And to do, you know, thorough
9 review up front, we actually had a much more
10 methodical, concise, well executed plan that we were
11 able to implement and get, you know, put into place to
12 get the unit, you know -

13 ~~_____~~ Right.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: - back in
15 line, where, I guess it really never came offline,
16 right?

17 ~~_____~~ No, we never did have to take
18 it offline.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But, were you
20 actually able to justified getting a Notice of
21 Enforcement Discretion, it sounds like?

22 ~~_____~~: Yes, yes, we were. We worked
23 with, the body of the work we did with the Design
24 Engineering on, you know, understanding ~~the pipe~~ and
25 the repair that we were going to perform, and

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
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1 explaining the system, you know, the way the system
2 laid out and with the PRA and what we would, what
3 equipment we would control during the time of the
4 outage, we were able to get that NOED.

5 And then because we had the plan laid out,
6 and everybody assigned responsibilities and everything
7 here available to affect the repair, we actually did
8 the round trip on the header in, I think, it turned
9 out to be 70 hours or somewhere right, it was under
10 the 72 hour original action statement for the service
11 water tech spec.

12 And, yes, it was a good, it was a good, it
13 was a learning, it was a good learning experience, you
14 know, to take the opportunity to do what we did. God
15 bless you.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you say it was a
17 good learning experience, is it possible it was, for
18 someone at your level, seeing that overall how it was
19 handled, that was a good learning experience for you,
20 but maybe misunderstood at levels below you?

21  I can see where, I could see
22 where it would be, yeah. And I try to keep the shifts
23 up to, you know, communicate the status as best I
24 could where, you know, what we were doing, where we
25 stood with the plan.

1 And what the plan was. And we had, we had
2 parameters. You know, we were ~~measuring~~ measuring that leakage ~~X~~
3 on a very frequent basis and we had guidelines for if,
4 you know, if you're going to, if you hit these numbers
5 we're just going to start shutting the unit down.

6 There were guidelines in place. I could
7 see where it could be conceived and perceived that,
8 you know, we were probably beyond where we should have
9 been. I can see that.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But for you, it
11 didn't get there? IT was approaching it and then it
12 got to it -

13  Right, right.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: - at the tail end?

15  Right, it was, it was
16 different behavior for me and I'll admit that. And
17 the, and it was pushing my comfort level, but I guess,
18 you know, that's what, that's part of being on that
19 job.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What made, going into
21 that incident, if that's different behavior for you,
22 is that a response to the fact that you're termed too
23 conservative?

24 What made you look at it differently in
25 that particular instance?

1 [REDACTED]: Because I, it was just, I was
2 trying to be open-minded and take the approach that,
3 that you needed to have, you know, a good case to say
4 what is operable or inoperable.

5 And, so, you know, when we started off
6 down the evaluation, the evaluation path, and I saw
7 what, you know, the results we were getting, I was,
8 you know, I became more comfortable with where we
9 were. But there was nothing that anybody said to me
10 or it wasn't, on my part, I don't believe it was a
11 reaction to anything else.

12 Because it didn't, it really didn't, I
13 don't think it changed my behavior, after that.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

15 [REDACTED] Because that was in the
16 winter of 2001. That was 2000, I'm pretty sure that
17 was 2001. That's the time frame you have for it,
18 isn't like the December time?

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I have late 2001, the
20 holidays.

21 [REDACTED]: Yeah, December. Because it
22 was, we repaired that, I'm pretty sure we repaired
23 that in the week between Christmas and New Years.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, that would be
25 around, you think that year, 2001?

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1 [REDACTED] Yeah, I'm pretty sure when
2 that's when that was. I'm pretty sure that's when
3 that was.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so overall -

5 [REDACTED] Yeah, it had to be. Because
6 I was [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]
7 because I can remember walking out there in the
8 mornings with him.

9 We'd come in like 6:00 in the morning and
10 walk out, check this out and make sure, you know, see
11 what the status was. Talk to (the shift) see what was
12 going on with the night shift.

13 And it was in the winter time. So it had
14 to be 2001, because I wasn't here in the winter of,
15 2002. So that is when it was. And we repaired it the
16 week, because I worked that week.

17 As part, to help coordinate this from an
18 operations standpoint. Because I worked with, I
19 worked with putting the procedures together and
20 locking points and everything and, you know,
21 coordinate so everybody, so that, and do the briefings
22 with the shift so everybody knew what we were going to
23 do and when we were going to do it, and try to help it
24 move along so we could get it done.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have one?

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1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: A general
2 one. You know, you recounted a number of instances
3 where there were issues that came up that they were
4 personally frustrating.

5 You mentioned the ~~dilution~~ event and how
6 you felt like you had to kind of stand tall against
7 management and, you know, you had to kind of say, you
8 know, we're going to, we're going to operate
9 conservatively and we're going to take a stand here.

10 And there were other instances where you
11 mentioned, you know, this one, you know it maybe
12 pushed your buttons a little bit, but you kind of
13 worked your way through it.

14 And there may have been others that have
15 come up. And was there ever any instances when you
16 just felt like you were just so fed up or disgusted
17 where you just said, you know what, I need to some
18 time think.

19 And you just, like either get out of your
20 office, or go somewhere on the site or head off site
21 for a while? Do you ever have situations like that
22 where you just felt like I need to kind of get away
23 from this place?

24  Yeah, I'd have to say that
25 there are times like that. And that (inaudible) not,

1 you know, not just that, but just you figure working,
2 coming in at ~~6:00~~ in the morning ~~and~~ don't leave until
3 ~~7:00~~ or 7:30 at night ~~and~~ a lot times here on
4 Saturday, sometimes on Sunday, ~~phone~~ calls 3:00 in the
5 ~~morning.~~

6 It just, you know, just that in itself
7 drives you to the point where you've got to kind of
8 like sit back or go for a walk and think things
9 through.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you ever
11 feel like the pressures of the job are just so intense
12 it's overwhelming. You just like took time off just
13 to kind of get away.

14 You know, and you know, like it was during
15 the week, like if something was bothering you on a
16 Tuesday or a Wednesday, that you just took a day or
17 two off?

18 ~~REDACTED~~ Never do that.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No, no.

20 ~~REDACTED~~ No.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No. How
22 about -

23 ~~REDACTED~~ I always ended up, this time
24 of year, with last year's vacation that I had to take.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Oh, is that

1 right?

2 [REDACTED] Yeah, yeah. I never, never
3 just, [REDACTED] did that a lot.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did he?

5 [REDACTED] did that a couple of
6 times, but he may have had a family issue, too, so I
7 don't, I don't know that it was job related.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It might not have been
9 driven by work?

10 [REDACTED]: Yeah, it's not a fair
11 statement to say that it was work that would make him
12 do that.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't think that,
14 you don't recall any situation where your level of
15 frustration got to the point where you just left and
16 came back later?

17 We're getting this from somewhere, that it
18 was over some incident. We're just wondering if you
19 recall, maybe?

20 [REDACTED]: Well, during one of the
21 outages, I was working nights. That had nothing to do
22 with work. I left and went home.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Personal reasons?

24 [REDACTED]: Right.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

1 [REDACTED]: It was not work-driven.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But that's the only
3 incident that you can think of?

4 [REDACTED]: Yeah, I can't remember. I
5 can remember thinking tonight when I walk out the
6 gate, I'm not going to come back, but I always came
7 back.

8 You know, how you get to that sometimes.
9 You just say, well, you know, this just isn't worth it
10 anymore, 7:30, 8:00 at night, long day.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It sounds like a lot
12 of long hours.

13 [REDACTED]: And I do remember going, on
14 night shift during an outage, I was working in the
15 OCC. I was the, what do you call it, the Operations
16 Outage Manager.

17 But that was not related, that was
18 something that was going on at home. It had nothing
19 to do with, it wasn't really work driven. I don't
20 remember doing that through the day.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I guess if -

22 [REDACTED]: Unless they saw me leave to
23 make a phone call whenever I was talking to the guy
24 that was [REDACTED] I just went out in
25 the parking lot.

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1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You never
2 know.

3 [REDACTED] You know, it could be that.
4 Because whenever, I mean whenever I was talking with
5 [REDACTED] about that job, I wasn't making those phone
6 calls in my office.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Sure, understood.

8 [REDACTED] I would go out to the parking
9 lot and talk on my cell phone.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I guess the bigger
11 question would be not, not so much did you leave site
12 and take care of personal business, you know, whatever
13 you had to do.

14 [REDACTED] Yeah, yeah.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did it get to a point
16 in any direction you were receiving or your level of
17 frustration with that, that you felt like you were
18 going, you know, leave, leave a meeting, leave site,
19 you know, can you recall any incident getting you that
20 frustrated, in terms of dealing with the direction you
21 were receiving from senior management, is the way -

22 [REDACTED]: Well, I can, there was a,
23 there was always a morning meeting that was like 7:30,
24 8:00. A morning, plan of the day, management type of
25 a meeting.

1 And I went to, we, and it was, again, it
2 was over the weekend. We were doing some ~~valve~~
3 ~~testing~~ on the service water for diesels ~~X~~

4 And we didn't ~~get~~ the flow ~~X~~ we were
5 supposed to be getting and we were getting pushed into
6 saying that there was a problem with the procedure,
7 there was nothing wrong with (inaudible) path, all
8 different kinds of things.

9 And it was just like, no, there's a
10 problem here. You explain it to me. We're not
11 getting the results. This procedure is a surveillance
12 procedure, we may need tech specs if we don't get the
13 results.

14 This is inoperable. And it was like why
15 are you in this tech spec, why are you doing this?

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where was that?

17 ~~REDACTED~~ Pardon me?

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where was that coming
19 from? Why are you in the tech spec?

20 ~~REDACTED~~ From ~~REDACTED~~

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: ~~REDACTED~~

22 ~~REDACTED~~ Yeah, from ~~REDACTED~~ So, we
23 finally pushed him into saying, we finally convinced
24 him that there had to be a problem with ~~the valve~~
25 There was no other, you know, it was like either

1 there's a problem with the valve or this line is
2 plugged full of mud.

3 Either case, you're not going to get the
4 service water you need to the diesel. It's
5 inoperable, that's why we're here.

6 And I don't even want to hear that it's
7 plugged with mud, you know. That's, that's not the
8 reason, it's this valve. So, we finally made them, we
9 tagged it out, we made them go in and the valve was
10 broken.

11 Just flat out, the valve was broken. So,
12 we fixed it and [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] at
13 the time. He was the [REDACTED]
14 I'm trying to remember who was [REDACTED]. It might
15 have been [REDACTED] (phonetic).

16 And this was over the weekend. This
17 started over the weekend. It might have been [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] (phonetic), [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] man, because I'm
19 trying to remember the CRS I was talking to.

20 So it got pushed to the point where I just
21 flat out told Maintenance and I told [REDACTED] we're going
22 to tag this out. They went in and they had a valve,
23 if you pulled the valve off, the valve internals was
24 disconnected from the handle.

25 The valve wasn't turned, it was closed.

1 And that's why we didn't ~~get~~ the flow, it was blocked.

2 Just flat out, that's what it was. There was ~~no mud~~

3 ~~in the water,~~ there was ~~nothing~~ along those lines.

4 ~~They get flushed.]~~ We do a periodic ~~flush~~

5 to make sure that those ~~lines~~ don't get sewerred up.

6 ~~They open and inspect the drain outages]~~ And so the,

7 the solution to that was to change the procedure.

8 I don't remember exactly what it was he

9 wanted to change in the procedure, but there had to be

10 a procedure change.

11 And, not only did there have to be a

12 procedure change, but it had to be at ~~3:00~~ in the

13 ~~morning on Sunday.]~~ Change the procedure.

14 So, when I found that out, I went to a

15 meeting. I went to the meeting that was over here in

16 a room upstairs. And I sat in there and I listened to

17 them talking, and then I just, I just blew up.

18 You know, it's like, hey, you know, you

19 can't go around, you can't continue to change

20 procedures because they don't meet what you want them

21 to meet.

22 And if we continue down this path, you

23 know, we'll be lucky to be an (inaudible) four a

24 little longer, than stay at (inaudible) three.

25 And then I told ~~_____~~ that I

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1 wanted to talk to him.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who were the people
3 that you got upset with?

4 [REDACTED] and I think [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED] (phonetic) was [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] those
6 guys.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]: Yeah, yeah.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Any VPS?

10 [REDACTED] I don't think there were any
11 VPs at that meeting. I don't think there was a VP.
12 [REDACTED] talked to me at length afterwards, but I
13 don't think he was, I don't remember him being in the
14 meeting.

15 And I just went and talked to [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] (phonetic) and you know, said I didn't like
17 what was going on. I didn't like that particular
18 decision that, you know, I thought that that decision
19 was a bad decision.

20 And we did the right thing. Change this
21 [X] valve, [X] find out, you know, who is being told there's
22 nothing wrong, there's nothing wrong. [X] We tagged it
23 [X] out, and find out the valve is broken. [X]

24 And then I come in the next morning and
25 the procedure was changed.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that was
2 wanting that procedure changed at 3:00 a.m.?

3 [REDACTED] Yeah, I was here. Yeah, I
4 think it was like 3:00 a.m. Sunday into Monday, I
5 think it was.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What do you gain by
7 that, that immediate change to the procedure there?

8 [REDACTED] So that next time we do that,
9 we wouldn't have to, we wouldn't have to meet that
10 criteria that was in there.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Can we take
12 a break now?

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Sure.

14 (Whereupon, the proceedings briefly went
15 off the record.)

16 [REDACTED] - that wasn't [REDACTED]
17 that I talked to, because he wasn't here at the time,
18 it was the QA Manager! The QA Manager at the time,
19 who's name currently escapes me, but he's still here.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But it wasn't [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] No, it wasn't [REDACTED]
23 because he wasn't here in that time frame.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Initially, when you
25 said that, I thought that meant you were on the phone

1 [REDACTED] or -

2 [REDACTED] No, no, no. no.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: - the other company,
4 at that point.

5 [REDACTED] No.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so not [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right, the time is
10 3:40 p.m., we're back on the record after a brief
11 break. All right, so we have some follow up to that
12 issue.

13 The, so what they were looking for to gain
14 was to not have to go through the criteria of what you
15 were following?

16 I mean you had this particular valve ~~valve~~
17 [REDACTED] For that branch, right.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So, what I
20 wanted to explore with you a little bit, and it's kind
21 of probably right at the point of your frustration was
22 [REDACTED] has decided to change the procedure.

23 It almost appeared that you had a
24 situation where you're challenging the operability of
25 the equipment or challenging its ability to meet its

1 design.

2 [REDACTED] Right.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And, in your
4 eyes, you're saying let's go find out what the basic
5 problem is that's preventing this system to function
6 properly.

7 And in his eyes, he's got a totally
8 different approach in let's go change the procedure so
9 we don't, we can ignore this part of the system and
10 make its performance moot.

11 So that if we use, you know, look at the
12 rest of the system and it's working fine, we don't
13 have to deal with this.

14 [REDACTED] Right.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is that the
16 gist of it?

17 [REDACTED] Yes, that's correct.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was that his
19 general approach to these kinds of issues when they
20 came up? To figure out a way, an angle that would
21 either maximize production or minimize downtime or
22 reduce the likelihood of a plant shutdown?

23 [REDACTED] Yes.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was typical for
25 him?

1 [REDACTED] Yes.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And would,
3 other than the instances we've already mentioned, were
4 there other examples of that, that you can recall?

5 [REDACTED]: Those are the big ones that
6 come to mind.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

8 [REDACTED]: Those are the big ones.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
10 Eileen.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I have one other
12 incident. It's a situation where individual comfort
13 levels have been reportedly uncomfortable with the
14 situation.

15 Similar to some of the things that we were
16 talking about in Operations. It goes into a spring
17 outage in 2002, for Salem Unit 1. There was some
18 issues with the (inaudible) seals being packed in
19 order to create a vacuum.

20 [REDACTED] Right.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And a question of
22 whether or not you could start up and do some low
23 power physics testing. You were coming out of the
24 outage and there was some concern about that.

25 In that it wouldn't, it wouldn't have been

1 side worked, to see if you had any problems, in and of
2 itself, probably isn't that big of a deal.

3 But then the next challenge was to heat up
4 the plant and use, and depend on the vacuum as a heat
5 sync to go up to normal operating pressure temperature
6 and do low power physics testing.

7 And that's, you know, that's where, just
8 about everybody drew the line. It was like, no, you
9 can't, you're not going to, you can't count on this

10 teflon -

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Teflon tape to -

12 [REDACTED] Yeah, this packing material
13 to hold vacuum for you. It's not the correct
14 configuration for the plant to be in.

15 You're not designed to be there, why would
16 you think it's okay to do that.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where was that coming
18 from? Who was pushing for that and thinking it was
19 okay to do that?

20 [REDACTED] It would be [Outage]
21 Management, so that would be like, [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] (phonetic) was the [REDACTED] at the time.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I don't know if this
24 would refresh your recollection or if maybe your
25 recollection is accurate. [REDACTED] (phonetic), was

1 he involved in that?

2 [REDACTED] was, would have
3 been the, yes, he was involved. And he would have
4 been, he wasn't the outage, you know, [REDACTED] is the

5

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] And then [REDACTED] was like
8 a, I don't if they call him a [REDACTED] or
9 whatever. He owned that Unit's outage. [REDACTED] owned
10 all the outages and [REDACTED] directly reported to him.

11 So [REDACTED] was the guy that was there on day
12 shift, day-to-day. He was, he would have been one of
13 the proponents of that position.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What kind of, in terms
15 of length of debate. I mean is this five minutes, no
16 you can't do that, we're not going there?

17 Or is this lengthy? What kind of
18 resistance and what does it take to convince them
19 that, you ultimately didn't do that?

20 [REDACTED] It's very persistent. It's
21 not like, you know, this is why we shouldn't do it,
22 end of discussion, type of debate.

23 You know, okay, yeah, we agree, we see
24 where you're coming from. It's always, these
25 discussions were always, you would talk to this person

1 and then that person would go away and then they'd
2 come back.

3 And then the next person would come up
4 with them, you know, and it was like you always got
5 the sense, you always got the sense that it was
6 either, that it was either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] who ultimately
7 was pushing it, but you never, you never really had
8 that direct conversation with him. You know, you
9 always dealt with more on your own peer or with [REDACTED]

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
11 is where you thought it was coming from?

12 [REDACTED]: That was the sense that you
13 got, yeah.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not through firsthand
15 conversations with them?

16 [REDACTED]: Correct.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This is what you're
18 saying is your sense. In discussing things with [REDACTED]
19 does he say, does he attribute any of it to them, or
20 is it just coming from [REDACTED]?

21 [REDACTED]: It's coming from [REDACTED].

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And how long did it
23 go? You're indicating that it was, you'd have a
24 discussion and they'd go away.

25 [REDACTED]: It probably went on for a

1 couple of days. I mean for this particular one, it
2 went on, it was, it probably went on for a day or two.

3 You know, to say, no, we're not going,
4 we're not going to do that. To finally convince him
5 that that's not, that's not the space to be in to do
6 ~~low power physics testing~~ with your machine configured
7 that way.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the gain here
9 would be, if you did do it, the gain would be shorter
10 outage time?

11 ~~██████████~~ Right. Because you could do,
12 you could do your ~~low power physics testing~~ in
13 parallel with generator repair so that, and that's
14 exactly the final outcome, is the events occur in
15 parallel.

16 So then you can start up sooner, rather
17 than fix the generator, do the ~~low power physics~~
18 ~~testing and then start up.~~

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A head start?

20 ~~██████████~~ Right, right. And it's
21 always couched in, well, it gives us the opportunity
22 to identify any problems that may exist.

23 So, okay, we'll go back and say, well, I
24 want to start up a secondary (inaudible) and see, you
25 know, make sure I don't have any leaks, my pumps are

1 working and I can get everything, get the water and
2 stuff cleaned on the secondary plant.

3 Well, I think you can make a case that
4 it's okay to have ~~Evacuum~~ ^{under} those conditions,
5 because you're still on RHR at that time. So the
6 function of the secondary plant is separated from the
7 requirement as a heat sync from the primary plant at
8 that time. So, you can, you can make a pretty good
9 argument that it's okay to go ahead and do that. Pull
10 back on the secondary side.

11 But then to say, okay, now my secondary
12 side is intact, it's in good shape, I want to go ahead
13 and, I want to go off of RHR and go all the way up to
14 (Inaudible) pressure and temperature with the
15 condenser as my heat sync with the steam dumps,
16 because I'm not allowed to use the MS-10s.

17 We don't want to use the MS-10s to control
18 temperature except if, you know, as a last resort.
19 And then go one step beyond that and actually take the
20 reactor critical when you're in that configuration.
21 It's just, it's too much of a stretch for me, you
22 know.

23 And it gets back to the reactivity, you
24 know, do I really want my plant to be critical, low in
25 the intermediate range or, you know, low in the power

1 range? And I don't. I don't have, I'm not in the
2 right configuration.

3 My secondary plant isn't in the
4 configuration that it's designed to be in when I'm
5 doing that. I don't think anybody ever intended for
6 us to be there.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did anyone
8 ever bring up the argument that because of the
9 configuration, it was almost like you were doing an
10 experiment? And that, I mean, 50/50 (inaudible) would
11 apply.

12 And you have to go through the safety
13 evaluation requirements of 50/50. Did you do that?

14 [REDACTED] Umm, I mean I particularly
15 didn't bring it up, but I mean, that is a good point.
16 And that's, that's a good place -

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I mean it's
18 kind of like you're doing an experiment on a power
19 plant.

20 [REDACTED] Right.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Because, as
22 you said, it's not, it was never designed to be
23 operated that way.

24 [REDACTED]: Right, right.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This incident was a

1 spring, 2002, Salem One incident. The ~~notification~~
2 that was put out by [REDACTED] regarding conservative
3 decision making is costing us on the production end
4 was also spring, 2002.

5 Was this on his list -

6 [REDACTED]: I think that might have been
7 on of the things that was on the list.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: One of the six
9 decisions -

10 [REDACTED]: Yeah, I'm trying to put this
11 all, all this stuff together and build a time line in
12 my head. And that might have been when I think we had
13 all that stuff going on.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The good thing about
15 that is, I mean it's documented there. But he offered
16 it and it would be under his name?

17 [REDACTED]: Yeah.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or at least in the
19 Outage (inaudible)?

20 [REDACTED]: I'm pretty sure he was the
21 guy that wrote it. I'm pretty sure it was under
22 whatever his user name is.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But it would be, are
24 they grouped by function? Would it come in ~~under~~
25 ~~outage~~ or is it just going to be assigned a number and

1 go to a main control?

2 [REDACTED] The notification would have
3 a number assigned to it, but you can, I'm pretty sure
4 you can do a search, an SAP by -

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A key word thing?

6 [REDACTED] - initiator and, you know,
7 the user and do a search of all notifications that
8 were generated by a specific person. And I think you
9 can do key word searches in the text too.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. That might have
11 been a part of it?

12 [REDACTED] I think that that, see
13 there's a piece I'm trying to put in there. [REDACTED] was
14 still the [REDACTED] at the time.

15 And so that's what makes me think that the
16 notification might have been before that, because I'm
17 thinking that he left, he left before, I thought that
18 he left before that outage was over.

19 In 2002, I thought that he left before
20 that outage was over. And he was still here when that
21 notification was written. Because I talked to him
22 about that notification being written.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] So it might not have been
25 captured in there, that's what I'm trying to get it

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1 all straightened out.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think we have in
3 here that he was gone mid-outage. So it was before he
4 left mid-outage, are you sure?

5 [REDACTED] Yeah, and it was 2002, is
6 when he left. And I'm pretty sure that it was during
7 that outage that he left.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so that may not
9 be an issue. Even though [REDACTED] offered that,
10 regarding conservative decision making, this may not
11 be one of his issues.

12 [REDACTED] No, I don't think so. I
13 think it was -

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think it came,
15 so [REDACTED] was here when it came out?

16 [REDACTED] Yes, because I had a, I had
17 a conversation with him about it and I had a
18 conversation with [REDACTED] about it.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] (phonetic)?

21 [REDACTED] Yes.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, that's
23 interesting. How did that go?

24 [REDACTED] tried to explain it as,
25 well, it was, you know, it was a lessons learned type

1 of a, it was a lessons learned.

2 The intent of it was to capture lessons
3 learned ~~notification~~ that was the intended
4 ~~notification~~. And that, that's the way he saw, that's
5 the way he saw ~~the notification~~.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Lessons learned in
7 terms of -

8 ~~REDACTED~~ From a, you know, you do a
9 ~~post-outage critique~~. You capture lessons learned to
10 try to improve performance going forward, kind of
11 thing.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So a lessons learned,
13 on these six incidents we could have done something
14 smarter or better?

15 ~~REDACTED~~ Yeah.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or improved, but not
17 an attack on conservative decision making?

18 ~~REDACTED~~ No, no, not directly. There
19 was, we, we had some discussion around that, that
20 revolved around that. And we didn't necessarily see
21 eye-to-eye on that particular subject.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was his take on
23 it?

24 ~~REDACTED~~ I'm just trying to remember
25 the -

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, let's go back
2 to, I mean how did you approach him with it? And is
3 it normal that you would, you know, take something to
4 him? Is it a routine incident for you?

5 [REDACTED] is, made a point to
6 make himself available to everybody. And so -

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, we're on Side B,
8 it's approximately 3:56 p.m.

9 [REDACTED]: So when, he made tours of the
10 plant, he'd just stop in and talk to people. He would
11 go, he would be in the Control Room. It was not
12 uncommon for him to show up and talk to the Shift
13 Manager.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So he made himself
15 available?

16 [REDACTED]: He made himself available.

17 So he, he stopped by my office after ~~this notification~~
18 ~~was written~~ and we were just talking, and he asked me
19 if there was anything, you know, just if there's
20 anything that was on my mind, or whatever.

21 And so I just brought it up and talked to
22 him and said I didn't think it was appropriate. I
23 said I thought it sent the wrong message.

24 And he said that, you know, his position
25 was, well, he believed it to be written in the context

1 of a lessons learned type, like a post-critique
2 lessons learned type of, type.

3 And there was some discussion about
4 concern of decision making, and they, you know, they
5 can have an impact on productivity. And that's pretty
6 much where our, you know, it was that kind of
7 conversation back and forth.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about, in terms
9 of that, what was his thinking on, first, conservative
10 decision making having an impact on productivity.
11 What was he feeding back to you?

12 ~~REDACTED~~ Well, that the, I guess the,
13 what he, you know, was like you can't go too far, I
14 guess, is what, you know. In some cases it is
15 possible to go too far with conservative decision
16 making or to the point where it can impede
17 productivity.

18 He said that the idea behind the ~~notification~~
19 ~~notification~~ was to try to capture opportunities to
20 see where the decision making and help improve
21 decision making, I guess.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you get the sense
23 that he was familiar with ~~this notification~~ or was it
24 something you brought to his attention?

25 ~~REDACTED~~ I don't know if he read it

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1 before I showed it to him, but I had a copy of it and
2 I gave it to him to read right there on the spot, and
3 then we talked about it.

4 So, I don't know that he was aware of it,
5 prior to our discussion.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was it -

7 ~~_____~~ I don't know.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: - the discussion to
9 the degree that you picked apart the, let's call it,
10 six incidents on there where the decisions were made?
11 Did you get into that level?

12 Or was he talking about the overall this
13 is what I think he was trying to do?

14 ~~_____~~ I think ~~_____~~ was trying to
15 keep it on the 50,000 foot level, you know, the grand
16 view. And I tried to take it down to this is why we
17 made this decision, this is why we made this decision.

18 And there was, there was somewhat of a
19 difference of opinion there, in some cases.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He was calling it a
21 lessons learned, and -

22 ~~_____~~ Yeah, right.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- you were looking on
24 it as a negative message?

25 ~~_____~~ Right. And I tried to

1 explain to him that I thought that I was doing the job
2 that I was hired to do and was doing my best ~~to keep~~
3 ~~us~~ out of trouble, you know.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you feel,
5 as a result of that discussion, and maybe other
6 discussions, that maybe over the last, I don't know,
7 so many number of years, that maybe some of this is
8 attributable to the new environment from the
9 deregulated, you know, the deregulated environment and
10 new competitive pressures that are being put on the
11 station to perform in that environment vice, you know,
12 the early '90s, say, mid '90s, when things were not
13 under that environment and money was more available?

14 I mean is it a situation where the
15 paradigm has shifted now, where you're saying, you
16 know, why can't we do something?


17 You know, rather than is this safe? The
18 first question is, is this safe? It's why can't we do
19 this? Why can't we do this, take this action that
20 will increase productivity and will, you know,
21 minimize our downtime that will enhance our generation
22 time, things like that?

23 Is there any of that do you think that
24 goes to the, kind of the new way of doing things?

25 ~~_____~~ I think that that's, I think

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1 that that is part of it. That it's, there's a,
2 there's a much bigger emphasis on the utilization of
3 the facilities to make money.

4 And to make money you have to be online,
5 and you have to be as high a power as you possibly can
6 to do that. And there's non relief from the customer
7 anymore, right?

8 There's no rate (inaudible) relief. Under
9 the old, prior to deregulation where, you know, we
10 could just go back to your rate base and pass it along
11 with your cost and percentage.

12 So that, that is part of what makes you
13 look at decisions in a different light. Or look at
14 equipment availability in a different light.

15 There's no, there's no doubt that that's
16 part of the decision that you have to make. But you
17 can't lose track of the fact that it's still nuclear
18 power that you're generating electricity with.

19 And that you have to respect that.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right. Now,
21 do you think in the instances that were, that we've
22 gone over, if you were to characterize them as having
23 some sort of competitive pressure behind them, some,
24 you know, some spinoff effect of deregulation where
25 you have to compete in the marketplace to make money.

1 and maximize generation.

2 Do you think you could say that maybe the
3 pressures that were involved were excessive?

4 [REDACTED] You mean in the working
5 relationship that existed there?

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No, I'm
7 saying that if we were, let's say that, let's just
8 make it a given that you were going to operate
9 differently in a competitive marketplace, that's just
10 a given.

11 [REDACTED] Right, right.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Say that's a
13 given. But you have to, and because of that there may
14 be more pressure than there was before.

15 But at some point you have to say, okay,
16 I'm going to acknowledge there's going to be more
17 pressure, but at some point it's going to be
18 excessive.

19 I mean, you know, and that threshold may
20 be different for different people. I mean you may,
21 you may feel comfortable with putting the plant in
22 unusual circumstance, others may not.

23 [REDACTED] Right.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Or you may
25 not feel comfortable, others may. So you know to wrap

1 teflon tape around a (inaudible) seal and pack it fully
2 of material and roll the turbine, you know, with, but
3 not too fast. And try to low power physics testing.

4 Someone may feel comfortable with that.
5 I think you said that, no, I don't feel that
6 comfortable with it.

7 [REDACTED] Right, right.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Would you
9 say that the production pressure under that instance
10 and other instances you've mentioned, the dilution
11 issue. Would you say those pressures were excessive?

12 [REDACTED] I would categorize them as
13 excessive, but let me put it your, let me frame that
14 in that when I was [REDACTED] we were, as a
15 [REDACTED] I felt like I had way more, I had a lot
16 of responsibilities as [REDACTED] everybody does.

17 But I felt like I had a lot more authority
18 there, at that Unit, to make decisions and we, we had
19 a lot lower threshold, or I felt like we had a lot
20 lower threshold than maybe existed here, even prior
21 to, especially prior to the change over in '95.

22 Now, all my experience has been based in
23 a rate-based regulated industry prior to being at this
24 level. So I didn't, when I was at [REDACTED] as a
25 [REDACTED] if I made a decision, I mean we, don't

1 get me wrong, I couldn't just say I'm going to shut
2 the unit down on a whim.

3 I had to be able to prove, you know, I had
4 to be able to back up what my decision was, it wasn't
5 just me, it was all the [REDACTED] were in the
6 same position.

7 When I made a decision, I was backed up by
8 Management. So, I felt, part of my pressure that I
9 felt here, I'm sure, was because I'm going from a
10 [REDACTED] who owns
11 all the shifts, and here, most of the time, I was
12 backed up on my decisions.

13 (Phone is ringing.)

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Stop the tape
15 for a minute.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on the
17 record after about two seconds.

18 [REDACTED] So, at that level, I mean,
19 I'm backed up on most of my decisions and I have that
20 level of authority. And then I come here and I'm a
21 higher position and I'm constantly being pushed back
22 on it.

23 I really haven't changed. I haven't
24 changed the way I do business from this place to this
25 place. So, just that alone, is a different

1 environment and a different level of pressure than
2 what I was used to.

3 And then the fact that we were
4 deregulated, you know, from here to, from [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED] to being here at Salem, the deregulation I
6 think added to that.

7 There's a difference in, under different
8 management. I mean, so there's a lot of factors that
9 go into that.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.

11 [REDACTED] The answer I'm saying, yeah,
12 the pressure felt like it was (inaudible) excessive.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right, and you framed
14 that in terms of what you were dealing with before and
15 what you're dealing with -

16 [REDACTED] Right.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: - a different set of
18 circumstances. Do you have anything else? No. I'm
19 at the point where I can wrap it up, unless you wanted
20 to add anything to what we've discussed further. You
21 have an opportunity to add anything in here.

22 But I had a question for you overall, in
23 that you kind of, you can see the direction, you know,
24 that we're going with the interview. You can see the
25 issues and the kind of issues that we're exploring

1 here.

2 [REDACTED]: Umm hmm.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And in that, is there,
4 if there's something that we're either not asking or
5 we're missing that you would like to bring to our
6 attention in terms of the operations on site, as you
7 experienced it or anything that you have knowledge of
8 now, I'd like to ask you for that? If we haven't
9 covered something that would be of concern to you, if
10 you could bring that to our attention?

11 [REDACTED]: No, I think we did a pretty
12 good job of covering that, that time span when I was
13 here and, you know, the significant, the significant
14 events, I guess I don't want to call them issues, the
15 significant occurrences while I was here.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

17 [REDACTED] And that I think that, you
18 know, for the organization to be healthy there has to
19 be some discussion back and forth, right?

20 Between, everybody can't be yes men and
21 you can't lean in one direction. And so I'm glad you
22 gave me the opportunity to, you know, to talk about,
23 you know, to frame why I felt the way I did, based on
24 past experience and then experience here.

25 So, I think we did pretty good in covering

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1 everything. I don't really have anything else that I
2 can think of right now to add.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I just have a couple
4 of closing questions for you. Have I, or any other
5 NRC Representative, offered you any promises of reward
6 or threatened you in any manner in exchange for
7 today's information?

8 [REDACTED] No.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Have you
10 appeared here freely and voluntarily?

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes. And we, I
13 contacted you. I asked you for some time, and you
14 agreed to cooperate and meet with us and I thank you
15 for that.

16 You gave us a significant portion of your
17 time today. So, thank you very much and we will go
18 off the record if you have nothing else to add.

19 [REDACTED] Yes, that's fine.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, it's
21 approximately 4:10 p.m.

22 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter
23 was concluded at 4:10 p.m.)

24


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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of



Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Salem, NJ

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.

Francesca Zook

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