

**Official Transcript of Proceedings**  
**NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

ORIGINAL

Title: Interview of [REDACTED]

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: ~~Salem, New Jersey~~

Date: Wednesday, December 31, 2003

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Pages 1-151

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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OFFICE OF THE INVESTIGATOR GENERAL

INTERVIEW

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IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.

 : 1-2003-051F

(CLOSED) :

-----X

Wednesday, December 31, 2003

The above-entitled interview was conducted  
at 9:14 a.m.

BEFORE:

Special Agent EILEEN NEFF, NRC/RI/OI  
Senior Special Agent JEFF TEATOR,  
NRC/RI/OI

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

9:14 a.m.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is December 31, 2003. The time is approximately 9:14 a.m. Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC Region 1, Office of Investigations. Also present is Senior Special Agent Jeff Teator from U.S. NRC Region 1, Office of Investigations. This interview is being conducted with [REDACTED] spelled, [REDACTED] who currently is employed as a [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The subject of the interview concerns the safety conscious work environment at Salem and Hope Creek, the focus being your experiences at Salem. We'll be discussing Salem today.

As I explained to you prior to going on the record, you're being approached as a witness to the inquiry. You're not being approached as the subject of any investigation. Also, you had indicated you had no objection to swearing to the information that you're about to provide. If you would raise your right hand please.

Do you swear that the testimony you're about to provide is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

[REDACTED]: I do.

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TC

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. For the  
2 record, would you give me some date of birth and  
3 social security number information.

4 [REDACTED] Okay. I was born [REDACTED]  
5 Social security number is [REDACTED].

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And education  
7 history?

8 [REDACTED]: Let's see, I have a [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED] from the [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What year?

12 [REDACTED] Around -- I finished in [REDACTED]

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Anything  
14 further?

15 [REDACTED] No.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So then your  
17 employment history.

18 [REDACTED] I was in the [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] From [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED] I was employed by [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. I

22 started as an [REDACTED] I [REDACTED] there as

23 a [REDACTED]

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In what year was

25 that?

1 [redacted] I believe, is  
2 when I [redacted] as a [redacted] at [redacted]. In  
3 [redacted] of [redacted] I started with [redacted]  
4 at [redacted]. I went to [redacted], got my [redacted]  
5 [redacted] served as a [redacted]  
6 [redacted] until I was promoted to my current position  
7 in [redacted] time frame of [redacted]

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted] as [redacted]  
9 [redacted] then.

10 [redacted] That's correct.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When did you  
12 become [redacted] at [redacted] Salem?

13 [redacted] [redacted]

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. About a  
15 year after you got on board there.

16 [redacted] Right.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you  
18 immediately go into [redacted] license class pretty much?

19 [redacted] Yes. There was a short-end  
20 indoctrination period, between [redacted] six and nine months,  
21 and then I went into [redacted] license class.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [redacted]

23 [redacted] Yes, for [redacted] Salem.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So in, let's say,  
25 from [redacted] when you were [redacted] what was your

dc

1 management structure there with your [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED] there, who were you working with?

3 [REDACTED] See, when I was [REDACTED] promoted to  
4 [REDACTED] (shift) -- no, when I [REDACTED] -- sorry, for the delay,  
5 I'm trying to --

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's okay.

7 [REDACTED] I'm trying to remember who was  
8 the --

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes, and there's been  
10 some changes, so you have to think back.

11 [REDACTED] Let's see, I can just -- I  
12 don't know the exact years --

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

14 [REDACTED] -- off the top of my head, but  
15 since I've been employed there in [REDACTED] let's see,  
16 [REDACTED] (phonetic) was the [REDACTED]  
17 [REDACTED], when I was initially hired. He  
18 was only [REDACTED] for a short time and he was  
19 promoted. An individual named [REDACTED] (phonetic)  
20 became the [REDACTED]. He lasted six months.  
21 Then [REDACTED] (phonetic) who had been a [REDACTED]  
22 [REDACTED] was promoted to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was  
23 [REDACTED] probably three years or so. When  
24 [REDACTED] left [REDACTED] (phonetic) was hired from  
25 outside the Company as the [REDACTED]

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So this would be  
2 somewhere around 2001 then?

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

5 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] about a year,  
6 maybe a little over a year was the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] (phonetic) was then [REDACTED] for a little  
8 over a year. And presently the [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]  
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Spell his name.

11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] And he's been  
12 with the Company for a short time, since September or  
13 October.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Where  
15 did he come from, do you know?

16 [REDACTED] A plant in [REDACTED]

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And  
18 which one's down there? It's not Surrey (phonetic),

19 Surrey's in Virginia.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is it Okonee?

21 [REDACTED] It's the one that had the hot  
22 lead cracking issue [REDACTED]

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED] plant.

OC

1 [REDACTED] Before that I believe he was

2 [REDACTED]

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: (Florida)

4 [REDACTED] So [REDACTED]s been here a short  
5 time.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Is that  
7 who you report to now?

8 [REDACTED] There is an [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED] between me and the [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED] let's see, it ranged from  
11 [REDACTED] (phonetic), [REDACTED] (phonetic), and  
12 it's currently [REDACTED] (phonetic).

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How long has [REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED] been in place?

15 [REDACTED] As the [REDACTED]  
16 I'm terrible with dates, I'm sorry. A couple years,  
17 probably.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Has he been the [REDACTED]  
19 since you've been a [REDACTED]?

20 [REDACTED] No.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You were also under  
22 [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]?

23 [REDACTED] I'm not sure if [REDACTED]  
24 [REDACTED] I know under [REDACTED] Possibly a short time  
25 under [REDACTED] Actually, yes. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]

DC

1 when I was -- or [redacted] when I was  
2 promoted.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

4 [redacted] Then [redacted], then [redacted]  
5 [redacted]

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So I guess  
7 we'll look at in terms of when you were [promoted] to  
8 [redacted] in the [redacted] time frame,  
9 at that point, if your [redacted] is [redacted] and then  
10 your -- was it [redacted] or [redacted]?

11 [redacted]  
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [redacted]

13 Okay, in that time frame. In your observance of the  
14 safety culture or anything you noted about the safety  
15 culture at that time, and that being what I explained  
16 being pretty broad, employees raising concerns, what  
17 are the kinds of concerns that get raised, their  
18 comfort level with doing that, and how are they  
19 handled, and in addition to that, the decision making  
20 that goes into the operations and the production of  
21 the plant, there's a lot there.

22 [redacted] Right.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But if maybe we break  
24 it down a little bit. Why don't we look at the kind  
25 of things that people raise, and have you seen changes

RC

1 in the issues that are brought to you for handling or  
2 frequency or number of issues or anything like that?

3 [REDACTED] I've never noted a reluctance  
4 of employees to raise concerns, safety concerns,  
5 either industrial, nuclear, radiological. I've never  
6 noted any retaliation against employees for raising  
7 such concerns. As for the number and types of  
8 concerns, generally they haven't changed. They're the  
9 typical concerns operators have. Most of the concerns  
10 I hear are from the equipment operators who work for  
11 me or the reactor operators or senior reactor  
12 operators.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's been pretty  
14 consistent? You hear the same kinds of things? Are  
15 you aware of any event or any reason why anyone would  
16 hesitate to raise concerns on site?

17 [REDACTED] No, not at all.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Not just people  
19 [underneath] you but you and/or your contemporaries at  
20 the [shift manager] levels also. We're really  
21 interested in -- because you're seeing it all, and  
22 you're operating the Plant when you're on shift,  
23 You're getting things fed up to you [from the shift,  
24 and you have to deal with management above you, in  
25 that. So we're interested in those interactions also.

1 [REDACTED] Yes. I've never noted a  
2 reluctance on any of my ~~peers~~ in raising safety  
3 concerns.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about  
5 yourself?

6 [REDACTED]: No. I've definitely never had  
7 a reluctance to bring up safety concerns.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in terms  
9 of how the concerns or the issues are received? Has  
10 there been a period where you've noticed a difference  
11 in terms of how your concerns are responded to?

12 [REDACTED]: As you can tell from the list  
13 of operations managers there, I guess I've been  
14 employed there it will be [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] and  
15 this is the sixth operations manager I've worked for.  
16 So, obviously, there's a difference in everyone's  
17 approach in how they address safety issues, but never  
18 have I observed anything I perceived as being  
19 inappropriate.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. In terms of  
21 how they responded to your issues.

22 [REDACTED]: My issues or issues I presented  
23 that were presented to me from other individuals.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Well, while  
25 we're on that, is there some reason for such a high

1 rate of turnover in that position? Is there something  
2 you attribute that to?

3 [REDACTED] I could only guess as to why  
4 the Company, Public Service, and its board of  
5 directors would wish to operate a nuclear plant like  
6 that.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: With that much  
8 turnover? Is that what you mean by "like that?"

9 [REDACTED] Yes. Well, obviously, it's  
10 very difficult to maintain any long-term course of  
11 action because everyone who comes in has a -- I mean  
12 overall the message has been the same.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which is what?

14 [REDACTED] Safety first. That's never  
15 changed. Obviously, though, the approach and how  
16 that's implemented has changed, and it's unavoidable  
17 when you bring in that many different people who are  
18 driving the ship, so to speak.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How does the approach  
20 differ, though? Can you think of something that  
21 exhibits that?

22 [REDACTED] I mean just the general  
23 individual management techniques of each of these  
24 operations managers. Now, above the Operations  
25 Manager the senior leadership team has changed often

1 also. I mean it's just a difference in management  
2 styles which are unavoidable when you bring in  
3 different people.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Different  
5 personalities.

6 [REDACTED] Right.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about with the  
8 change in the senior management does that have an  
9 effect on what the message is, safety first, or has  
10 that been consistent?

11 [REDACTED] That has been consistent. I  
12 think it's prevalent throughout the industry, right?

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That might be  
14 the message, though, that you're getting, but in  
15 reality is that what was really going on? That's the  
16 issue. Everybody has their corporate --

17 [REDACTED] Right.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- information  
19 they put out, but the issue is what really happens at  
20 the plant?

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What's the practice?

22 [REDACTED] With the current --  
23 specifically, with the current, I'll call it, regime

24 --

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

1 coming back?

2 [REDACTED] Well, [REDACTED] is a -- he's

3 [REDACTED]

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

5 [REDACTED] ([REDACTED])

6 [REDACTED])

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

8 [REDACTED] It's the same message, safety,  
9 reliability, costs, those things, but now the message  
10 is more of it's a balance, all right? It's a balance  
11 between those individual aspects of operating the  
12 Plant.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which is what  
14 it should be. There should be a balance.

15 [REDACTED] I don't disagree.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If it was out of  
17 balance before, where was it out of balance?

18 [REDACTED] Well, I think what maybe has  
19 caused a perception that maybe could have resulted in  
20 this investigation you're conducting is how the  
21 message is presented, right, and that's what you're  
22 alluding to. The message has always been safety over  
23 production, those type things, but the bottom line of  
24 the business is we're there to produce. If we don't  
25 produce, we don't operate safely or unsafely. So it's

1 more, like you said, more of a balance. You've got to  
2 produce safely. So how the message has been put out  
3 in the past has led to the perception of not really  
4 walking the walk from senior management and even my  
5 level and maybe right above my level on up is that we  
6 say one thing and do another. That's the perception  
7 at the Plant from individuals below me, the equipment  
8 operator, the technicians, the union personnel; that  
9 senior management just gives lip service to safety  
10 because of the way operations are conducted, that  
11 people don't understand the decisions that are made.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you're saying  
13 that that's from not at your level but from below your  
14 level, at the operator level, is the perception or  
15 does that exist at your level too, or formally?

16 [REDACTED] At my level, I don't think any  
17 of my peers, [REDACTED] believe Salem is being  
18 operated unsafely. I mean that's our charter.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, it is.

20 [REDACTED] doesn't operate  
21 the Plant. [REDACTED] none of those [REDACTED]  
22 I just listed or the (senior license holders on shift)  
23 that operate the Plant. If that Plant was being  
24 operated unsafely, it wouldn't be [REDACTED]'s fault  
25 or [REDACTED] fault; it would be my fault. That's

1 what I'm licensed to do. And never have I felt that  
2 I was being coerced or directed to operate the Plant  
3 in what I thought was an unsafe manner. I mean there  
4 are decisions that are made that some could perceive  
5 as production over safety, I guess.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or non-  
7 conservative.

8 [REDACTED] Or non-conservative.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you give us  
10 an example?

11 [REDACTED] I mean just equipment  
12 reliability issues that go unresolved. The Corrective  
13 Action Program at Salem is in need of improvement, and  
14 it has been since I've been there, and it continues to  
15 be a sore spot with me, and that's what led to the  
16 perception in the, I'll say, the overall culture there  
17 is that we don't operate the Plant safely because of  
18 the ineffectiveness of the Corrective Action Program  
19 in resolving long-term issues.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that also the use  
21 of -- extensive use of temporary logs and that type of  
22 thing?

23 [REDACTED] Yes. All of those are  
24 indicators of equipment reliability issues that Salem  
25 struggles with. I wish I had the answer.

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, we're  
2 looking to you to give the Commission some answers,  
3 frankly, about what is going on down there. And this  
4 is -- I mean the safety conscious work environment is  
5 not a black and white issue. We're trying to -- well,  
6 we've talked to a number of people. I don't know if  
7 you know that or not, but I would think you probably  
8 do. We've talked to people at different levels at  
9 both sides, Hope Creek and Salem, to try and get our  
10 arms around this to see if there is a problem where  
11 the balance was out of whack.

12 [REDACTED] No decision is black and white,  
13 and some of the --

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Incidents?

15 [REDACTED] Well, given certain equipment  
16 failures or things of that nature, the decision  
17 whether it's operable, inoperable, you continue to  
18 operate, you shut down the Plant, do you defer to the  
19 next outage, do you look at this outage, none of that  
20 is black and white.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But there are  
22 certain areas where you're supposed to operate in  
23 which I guess generally across the industry are  
24 considered regulatory.

25 [REDACTED] Right.

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And there's  
2 also general safe practice in operating nuclear power  
3 plants.

4 [REDACTED] Okay.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm talking  
6 about some things that maybe were not where they  
7 should have been in those areas.

8 [REDACTED] Maybe it would help if you have  
9 -- I mean if you have specific incidents that may job  
10 my memory or specific --

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

12 [REDACTED] Speaking in general terms is  
13 hard, because --

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can we take a  
15 short break off the record?

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Sure. It's  
17 approximately 9:34.

18 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off  
19 the record at 9:34 a.m. and went back on  
20 the record at 9:39 a.m.)

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on the  
22 record. It's about 9:39 a.m. What we were talking  
23 about from where you stand have you observed  
24 situations where managers at your level have had to  
25 question upper level management, direction coming from

1 upper level management, either question it or resist  
2 it, things along those lines?

3  Certainly. Almost on a daily  
4 basis do we question things. I think that's part of  
5 the job. There have been cases where I may have  
6 disagreed personally with management decisions. I can  
7 think of a couple incidents since my just over ~~three~~  
8 years as a  I can think of -- there was  
9 a -- I think this was when  was the  
10  and we had a ~~leak~~ on ~~Number 12~~  
11 service water nuclear header. It was an ~~underground~~  
12 ~~leak~~ where the ~~pip~~ing header ~~ran~~ from the ~~service~~  
13 water structure by the river into the Plant. It was  
14 an ~~underground~~ leak. It was my opinion that we  
15 ~~rationalized~~ operation with that ~~leak~~ far too long.  
16 We eventually did shut down and repair ~~the~~ ~~leak~~. I  
17 think we waited a little bit too long. I thought it  
18 should have been addressed much sooner.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How long was the  
20 wait?

21 : It pretty much as ~~the~~ ~~leak~~  
22 continued to worsen, I'm not sure as a duration but we  
23 waited until ~~the~~ ~~leak~~ forced us. Instead of being  
24 proactive and taking action to repair ~~the~~ ~~leak~~ at an  
25 earlier time, we waited until ~~the~~ ~~leak~~ got to such a

1 magnitude that we had no choice.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you in an  
3 action statement situation with that?

4 [REDACTED] No. I guess via piping system  
5 flow analysis they determined a maximum amount of  
6 leakage.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

8 [REDACTED]: But you're trying to estimate  
9 leakage that's coming up from the ground.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

11 [REDACTED] As far as operability was never  
12 -- I believe there may have been an operability  
13 determination per 9118 where it's declared operable  
14 but degraded, but --

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When was this?  
16 When was this around? [REDACTED] tenure was there  
17 about a year. Early in his tenure or late in his  
18 tenure?

19 [REDACTED]: It may have -- I remember it  
20 was during this time of year.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

22 [REDACTED]: I think it may have been right  
23 before Christmas or right before New Year's that we --

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

25 [REDACTED] -- did address the leak.

PC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How many days  
2 are we talking about? Is it a week?  
3 [REDACTED] Weeks. Then we actually -- it  
4 got to the point where we built a structure over the  
5 (leak outside) and had operators stationed monitoring  
6 this leakage from the ground. It was -- if it wasn't  
7 my first year, which would have -- my first Christmas  
8 would have been September -- I started as a [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] It may very well have been  
10 that first -- it was either December 2000 or December  
11 2001.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. At what  
13 point during this duration --

14 [REDACTED] Probably 2001.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: December 2001.

17 [REDACTED] I believe.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Under, you thought  
19 [REDACTED] was there, right?

20 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That puts him in that  
22 time frame too.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At what point  
24 in this duration did you think that they should have  
25 declared it inoperable?

1 [REDACTED] I don't know the exact --

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Around. Early  
3 into it or near the end?

4 [REDACTED] I came on shift one night for  
5 a night shift and I walked up, after turnover I walked  
6 down the condition, went out and sat in the yard area  
7 and I walked back and called [REDACTED] and I said,  
8 "I'm uncomfortable with this." This is -- I mean it's  
9 similar to the analogy of a frog in a boiling pot of  
10 water. If you toss the frog right in the boiling pot  
11 of water, he's going to jump right out, right, and  
12 survive.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

14 [REDACTED] If you put him in the cold  
15 water and slowly heat it up, the frog will sit there  
16 until he's dead. So I thought that was the case here.  
17 We had slowly let this leak get worse and worse and  
18 worse, and it was to the point where we needed to do  
19 something about it.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Did they  
21 have to shut the Plant down to fix this?

22 [REDACTED] No. I believe we managed to  
23 effect the repair with a contractor, an internal pipe  
24 repair.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Really?

1 [REDACTED] -- going in -- got a special  
2 name to this seal, they go in and repair it.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's a  
4 specialty firm that does -- that can do that kind of  
5 repair?

6 [REDACTED] Yes. It's a large diameter  
7 pipe where individuals can actually access it  
8 internally and put a temporary or repair it.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What was the,  
10 I'm going to say, reluctance. If it could be fixed  
11 while the Plant's on line, why not go in and do it  
12 earlier?

13 [REDACTED] I don't know. I don't know  
14 whether it was because around the holidays, but we  
15 ended up having to do it during the holidays.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

17 [REDACTED] Sometimes it seems like at the  
18 Plant we're slow to come to develop and formulate a  
19 plan for making some of these repairs.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

21 [REDACTED] The BF19 issue, you probably  
22 heard someone talk about that.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Recently.

24 [REDACTED]: That's a recent issue.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: October or so?

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's finish  
2 with this one, then we'll go to the BF19.

3 [REDACTED] I don't know if you've heard of  
4 the [service water] one but it was probably the most  
5 troubling --

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

7 [REDACTED]: -- incident with me. J 7c

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, we're

9 hearing stuff like this from a lot of people we talk  
10 to.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, you're saying  
12 that it -- was it ultimately declared inoperable or  
13 was it --

14 [REDACTED]: Correct.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- did it remain  
16 operable but degraded?

17 [REDACTED]: It was ultimately declared  
18 inoperable, I believe.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, who did that?  
20 Who was the shift manager who made that call, do you  
21 know?

22 [REDACTED]: It was probably declared  
23 inoperable as a result of removing it from service and  
24 isolating [the leak]

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But it doesn't

1 lead to any kind of a tech spec shutdown or --

2 [REDACTED] No. It's a 72-hour LCO, so it  
3 would -- declaring that service water header  
4 inoperable results in a 72-hour shutdown LCO, repaired  
5 in 72 hours or --

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or else.

7 [REDACTED] -- shut down.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They were able  
9 to do that?

10 [REDACTED] I believe so.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Wow.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Would this have been  
13 also categorized as an RWST Week? Could that be the  
14 same thing?

15 [REDACTED] No.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Those are two  
17 different issues then.

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When you called  
20 [REDACTED] on the phone that night after walking down the  
21 -- and you said you were uncomfortable with continuing  
22 --

23 [REDACTED] Right.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- how did he  
25 respond to that? He's the [REDACTED] boss for both units at

1 that time, right?

2 [REDACTED] Right. Well, it's the  
3 rationalization that Engineering has looked at it and  
4 has evaluated it. We can have X amount of leakage  
5 before it's technically inoperable and we don't have  
6 that amount of leakage yet, so it's still operable.  
7 It was that type of rationalization.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he give you  
9 any indication at all that he was getting direction  
10 from above him to --

11 [REDACTED] No.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- tow that  
13 line, to push that?

14 [REDACTED] No. No. No indication at all  
15 of that.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How long after  
17 that do you think they were forced to declare it  
18 inoperable?

19 [REDACTED] Maybe a week.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Another week?

21 [REDACTED] Yes.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Wow.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that was based on  
24 the amount of the leak, the increase in the leakage?

25 [REDACTED] Correct. It had worsened to

DC

1 the point where it was eroding the ground around the  
2 pipe. The pipe was buried. Like I said, it was an  
3 underground pipe and water was coming up.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you attend  
5 any of these operability meetings regarding what we're  
6 going to do with this pipe, how we're going to address  
7 it? Do you recall attending them?

8 [REDACTED] I remember discussions  
9 concerning it and the repair options. I think for a  
10 long time it was pretty much thought it was absolutely  
11 we had to shut down to make the repair --

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] -- until this contract company  
14 was located that could make this type of internal  
15 repair. And the internal repair was eventually made  
16 and then a permanent repair done in the outage.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: During the  
18 outage.

19 [REDACTED] But it also has impact not only  
20 from tech spec but from probabilistic safety analysis  
21 where we normally don't take a service water nuclear  
22 header out of service online. It results in what we  
23 called a red PSA risk condition for increasing core  
24 damage frequency as unacceptable and we don't do that  
25 online.

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

2 [REDACTED] Unless something breaks and we  
3 have to do it, then we have to do it in management,  
4 but we don't routinely take out equipment that results  
5 in that increase in core damage frequency.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But you didn't  
7 take out until you had to and then they were able to  
8 fix it during this 72-hour window.

9 [REDACTED] Correct.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was -- I  
11 mean we're going to talk camps here.

12 [REDACTED] Okay.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Who  
14 was in the group that resisting making the operability  
15 call earlier? Someone must have been on that side of  
16 the equation.

17 [REDACTED] I think pretty much -- I won't  
18 speak for every [REDACTED] at that time, but I  
19 think the majority of my peers thought we should have  
20 addressed the leak earlier.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

22 [REDACTED] And, obviously, from -- it's  
23 almost always like this but from my position down we  
24 thought the general consensus was that the condition  
25 should have been addressed earlier. I mean picture

1 this: Your service water system is your ultimate heat  
2 seek for the Plant.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 [REDACTED] Right? And you've got a  
5 makeshift structure built out in your yard area with  
6 operators assigned 24-7 to sit out there and monitor  
7 the leakage and keep this, because they partially  
8 excavated the area, to keep this area pumped out with  
9 temporary pumps. It's just indicative of living with  
10 a problem too long. But from my position down the  
11 consensus was we need to fix this, let's do it  
12 whatever it takes, whether it's shut down, cool down,  
13 go to Mode 5 where you only need one nuclear header  
14 operable.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

16 [REDACTED] Or if you can fix it online,  
17 fix it online, but let's fix it. It's sat out there  
18 and festered for --

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

20 [REDACTED] -- until it became of such a  
21 magnitude that maybe from engineering perspective and  
22 whatever flow modeling they do on the system it was  
23 operable, okay, operable, but water was gushing up out  
24 of the ground off your nuclear header. So the  
25 perception there is the message that gets sent.

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

2 [REDACTED] Everybody's saying this is  
3 crazy.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Even to the  
5 operators.

6 [REDACTED] Whether it's operable or not is  
7 a moot point. The point is senior management, safety  
8 over production, and then this.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: There's the  
10 message.

11 [REDACTED] You see, what message does that  
12 send? So that's why I'm saying sometimes it -- I said  
13 earlier it isn't perceived as though senior management  
14 really practices what they preach.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. You  
16 talked about [REDACTED] a little bit on this. Who else  
17 -- so --

18 [REDACTED]: I believe [REDACTED] was the  
19 [REDACTED] at the time.

20 [REDACTED] Was he on your guise?

21 [REDACTED] I believe he was on the camp of  
22 it needs to be addressed before it came to the point  
23 where --

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He would have fixed  
25 it quicker?

1 [REDACTED]: Yes.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So from [REDACTED] level  
3 down then you're on the same page.

4 [REDACTED] I believe. I hate to speak for  
5 something that's [three years] ago and speak for other  
6 -- ~~two~~ or three years ago and speak for other people,  
7 but, yes, [REDACTED] was generally of the mind that we need  
8 to address those type issues. And that's just one  
9 issue that lead or had led and repeatedly over times  
10 led to the question concerning the safety conscious  
11 work environment.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: There we go.

13 [REDACTED] Now, whether I believe it was  
14 ever unsafe --

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, did you  
16 think it was unsafe?

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You indicated this  
18 was a big one for you.

19 [REDACTED] I guess in a way, yes. I [REDACTED]  
20 personally, thought it was unsafe. I wouldn't have  
21 called my boss in the middle of the night and said,  
22 "Hey, [REDACTED] this has gone too far."

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Sounds like it.  
24 But was there -- were the people above [REDACTED] --

25 [REDACTED] I can't speak --

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know?

2 [REDACTED] I can't speak to that.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're talking about  
4 senior management with just sort of broadly, but was  
5 there -- do you associate one individual with the hold  
6 up on this or was there --

7 [REDACTED] Yes.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In these meetings, in  
9 the operability meetings, there was --

10 [REDACTED] I don't think there was any  
11 malicious intent in any of these. I think it's an  
12 issue of organizational inability to address these  
13 issues. Does that make sense? There's no like,  
14 "Well, we know what to do with this issue. Let's go  
15 -- let's just not do it right now because we don't  
16 want to do it because we want to produce electricity."  
17 We just seem to be organizationally inept at dealing  
18 with these issues, and maybe that's why they fester  
19 for so long.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In this situation,  
21 where's the breakdown? Why couldn't they get it  
22 together to fix that quicker?

23 [REDACTED] I don't know.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was there a  
25 plant manager at each of the units then?

1 [REDACTED] No. I don't believe the  
2 organizational structure at that time -- I believe  
3 [REDACTED] may have been the [REDACTED] and  
4 the reorganization resulted in elimination of that  
5 position, and we had a -- we may have had what they  
6 called a Director of Operations who is now a Salem-  
7 Hope Creek. Before that there was Plant Manager,  
8 Salem, Plant Manager, Hope Creek, which is now back to  
9 the way the current structure is, but at that time  
10 there was a VP Operations.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was who  
12 then?

13 [REDACTED] (phonetic), I  
14 believe.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And who was the  
16 [REDACTED] for Salem, do you remember? Would it  
17 have been [REDACTED] Would he have been the --

18 [REDACTED] No. [REDACTED] was the  
19 [REDACTED] --

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Probably [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED] (phonetic).

22 [REDACTED] I think [REDACTED] may have been the  
23 only individual ever in that position.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The one that covered  
25 both sides --

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1 [REDACTED] Right, the [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED]

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- as the [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So whose call  
6 was that then, ultimately? Where did the decision-  
7 making authority sit with this issue then?

8 [REDACTED] I have to say with the [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

11 (phonetic)?

12 [REDACTED] Sure. He's --

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. That's  
14 fine.

15 [REDACTED] That's what I would think.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Did  
17 you participate in any meetings where you heard him  
18 discuss his position on this particular issue?

19 [REDACTED] No, not to my recollection.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. All  
21 right.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Anything  
23 further?

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Anything more  
25 on that?

1 [REDACTED] No.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When they went  
3 in to fix it, did they discover then that the leak was  
4 more than what Engineering had analyzed in their flow  
5 analysis?

6 [REDACTED] No.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was it worse  
8 than they thought once they got in there? Do you  
9 remember, do you know?

10 [REDACTED]: No.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No, you don't  
12 remember, no --

13 [REDACTED] I don't remember. No, I don't  
14 believe it was any worse but it was definitely a  
15 degradation in the type of structural joint between  
16 the piping header in the buildings where -- it  
17 occurred right outside the building where the piping  
18 header was joined, where it penetrated the building  
19 into the main piping header that went out. It was  
20 definitely a degraded seal, obviously.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

22 [REDACTED] And like I said, they went  
23 internal to the pipe, did a, I think it's a called, a  
24 recko seal internally and then during the outage they  
25 repaired it permanently from the outside of the

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header

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Any more problems with that pipe since then that you're aware of?

[REDACTED] No.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, this incident, December of 2001, and you've been on since [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is this the first incident that you see that creates where that perception's coming from?

[REDACTED] No. Actually, just recently the BF19, which is a --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And I understood you had a recent but prior to December 2001 had you seen anything else that you thought could have been handled better? You're about a year and three months into it, right?

[REDACTED] I can't think of anything specifically, no.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about the grassing and the circulators in spring 2001, 2002, 2003?

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You're laughing.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Going back into the

DC

1 spring of 2001.

2 [REDACTED] Well, let's see, in the spring  
3 of 2003 I'll go back, during then it was from the  
4 March time frame, we had heavy grassing, heavier than  
5 I think ever, ever recorded.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This is this year.

7 [REDACTED] This past spring

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This past spring

9 [REDACTED] Correct. Environmental  
10 Licensing they do samples in the river to determine  
11 the amount of, we call it, detritus grass and other  
12 stuff in the river, detritus loading. But in March (my)  
13 crew was on where we actually tripped, manually  
14 tripped Salem Unit 2 in response to degrading  
15 conditions at circ water. There was no reluctance  
16 whatsoever on our part to do so. The same night Salem  
17 Unit 1, which was already operating at reduced power  
18 levels because of previous grassing issues, power was  
19 reduced further on Unit 1 that same night.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Any reluctance  
21 to do that?

22 [REDACTED] No.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was the response  
24 to it when you did it? Was there any pushback, any  
25 questions?

1 [REDACTED] No. Me and my crew were  
2 applauded and recognized for taking appropriate --

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You made that  
4 call? That was on your shift to do both of those  
5 things?

6 [REDACTED] Sure.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 [REDACTED]: It got done.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you got a pat on  
10 the back for taking it down.

11 [REDACTED] Got a trip to the Blue Rocks  
12 game or something for the whole crew, something like  
13 that.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Really?

15 [REDACTED] Yes. We got -- from [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware of any  
18 other issues on some of the calls that were made with  
19 the number of circulators that were in use or --

20 [REDACTED] No.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- for somebody else  
22 -- another shift at that time, that there was some  
23 questioned use of how many circulators you had and how  
24 many you should have? Were you aware of anything like  
25 that?

1 [REDACTED] No.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there anything  
3 that you had any firsthand experience with, like if  
4 you wanted to have six or five, were you ever directed  
5 that you could -- you know, you can and procedurally  
6 you can use less and you should do so?

7 [REDACTED] No. I remember some -- maybe  
8 I wasn't on for it, but maybe during the start-up.  
9 Every spring we've had issues, so if I get them mixed  
10 up, I'm sorry, but let's say in the spring of 2002 we  
11 also -- I was on for that. We shut [Unit 1] down in  
12 response to [degrading conditions at circ water]. That  
13 wasn't as pretty because of the fact that it wasn't a  
14 -- we were in a condition where the [configuration of  
15 the circ water pumps] required not a unit trip but a  
16 unit to be removed from service, right, a normal  
17 shutdown, remove the turbine from service, you don't  
18 have enough pumps supplying cooling water to your  
19 condenser. And we commenced the shutdown and there  
20 was ongoing maintenance on one of the circulators, and  
21 during the shutdown I received calls from -- I  
22 remember talking with [REDACTED] I remember one of  
23 the maintenance managers coming in the control room  
24 saying, "Hey, you've got 13 Bravo, you can have it  
25 back. Thirteen Bravo's good." It wasn't. There was

1 a lot of misinformation. [REDACTED] never -- right  
2 on the phone he never questioned the decision that I  
3 had made to remove the unit from service. I think  
4 that spring we ended up with both units shut down or  
5 at least Unit 1 shut down doing major work at Circ  
6 water.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You mentioned  
8 [REDACTED] phone call. Why did you mention that?

9 [REDACTED] Well, it's just to show that  
10 [REDACTED] called and he said he supported removing the --  
11 he called while the unit was being removed from  
12 service, shut down in accordance with abnormal  
13 operating procedures where it was in progress. He  
14 called and offered any assistance and said that he  
15 supported the decision, don't hesitate.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why would he  
17 have to call to say something --

18 [REDACTED] He wouldn't have to.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, but do  
20 you know why he did? I support -- you know, you're  
21 using words that -- do you understand? I mean you're  
22 -- why is he calling? Do you know why he's calling  
23 you and telling you that -- could there have been  
24 occasions where he would have called and not supported  
25 the decision --

1 [REDACTED] No.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- to do what  
3 should be done?

4 [REDACTED] No. I think --

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm looking at  
6 it from the flip side of that.

7 [REDACTED] The only time [REDACTED] gave me  
8 feedback on maybe he didn't agree with a decision was  
9 an operability call on service water once again. But  
10 the grassing issue -

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, let's  
12 finish with that.

13 [REDACTED] -- I mean we're dealing with  
14 that right now. Right now Salem Unit 1 is at 83  
15 percent power, one of the circulators is out of  
16 service, its adjacent one is out, we're at reduced  
17 power levels, heavy grassing right now.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Really?

19 [REDACTED] So it obviously raises the  
20 question of why haven't we resolved this after 20  
21 years of operation?

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Maybe  
23 they didn't want to spend the money, I don't know. Is  
24 that what it is? Is it a money issue to do the  
25 permanent fix?

1 [REDACTED] I can't say.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is it possible that  
3 [REDACTED] would have called you in that time frame  
4 because you might have been getting a different  
5 message from somebody else in management?

6 [REDACTED] Well, I think the maintenance  
7 manager who was on shift -- we had around the clock  
8 maintenance management onsite because of the ongoing  
9 delayed return of one of the circulators which was  
10 necessitating the entire -- driving the whole issue,  
11 same as right now, same pumps out of service right now  
12 driving the problems we're having right now. So based  
13 on the information that I had gotten during the rapid  
14 load reduction, that maintenance manager came into the  
15 control room, said, "Work's complete on 13 Bravo.  
16 We're returning the pump to operations." If that had  
17 been accurate and I could have gotten that pump back,  
18 I could have halted the power reduction and not taken  
19 the unit offline. Well, it turned out -- so that was  
20 affecting my decision making. I was getting incorrect  
21 information.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: On the input from the

23 [REDACTED]  
24 [REDACTED] From the [REDACTED]

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who? OC

1 [REDACTED] Pardon?

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was that?

3 [REDACTED] His name is [REDACTED]  
4 (phonetic).

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why would he  
6 tell you that? I mean if he's the [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED] he should know if that pump's ready to go.

8 [REDACTED] I know. Well, it turned out  
9 the pump wasn't ready to go. I don't know why he told  
10 me that or what information he had, but the pump in no  
11 way was ready to be returned. It wasn't returned for  
12 days after that.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What were your  
14 actions based on what he told you then?

15 [REDACTED] Well, based on what he told me,  
16 then a call to I think --

17 (END TAPE 1, SIDE A)

18 (BEGIN TAPE 1, SIDE B)

19 [REDACTED] So based on that, I had put out  
20 the information that this pump was coming back and I  
21 could halt the power reduction. Well, I guess once  
22 that trickled up to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] just wanted to call --  
23 [REDACTED] must have felt he wanted to call me and say,  
24 "Hey, I fully support you taking the unit offline if  
25 that's what's required." So he must have seen from

61C

1 that communication -- because the first communication  
 2 we were taking the unit offline. Then the  
 3 communication, "Hey, we may not have to because 13  
 4 Bravo circulator is coming back," may have led [redacted] to  
 5 have thought there was a reluctance on our part to  
 6 take the unit offline, so he was just reinforcing his  
 7 expectation that he didn't care if we took the unit  
 8 offline if that was the right thing to do. So that's  
 9 what I think -- that's why I think [redacted] called.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Would you say that  
 11 was typical for [redacted] Was that typically the  
 12 way he approached the decisions?

13 [redacted] Yes, for [redacted] I mean I'm sure  
 14 you've probably heard of the MS44, I believe it's  
 15 MS44, main steam leak on Salem Unit 2. I was on for  
 16 that. But during that event he vocally supported  
 17 removing the Plant from service if that was the right  
 18 thing to do. So he just wanting to make sure there  
 19 wasn't a reluctance on my part to remove the Plant  
 20 from service if that was the correct thing to do.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When was this  
 22 MS44 main steam leak?

23 [redacted] I don't remember the date.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Year? You got  
 25 a year?

1 [REDACTED]: Maybe.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The MS44

4 [REDACTED] I don't know if that's the  
5 right valve. It was a main steam leak.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Main steam  
7 leak, Salem 2.

8 [REDACTED] Salem Unit 2.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this with the 20,  
11 25-foot plume, rather large steam leak?

12 [REDACTED] Correct. That was ultimately  
13 isolated by the [REDACTED]

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. September  
15 2002, around there?

16 [REDACTED] Maybe, don't know.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think it's pretty  
18 close to in that time frame. Before we get there,  
19 though, let me just ask you some questions about --

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And I've got an  
21 issue too when you're done with this.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have a follow-  
23 up on that last one, because I'm going to that time  
24 frame?

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I've got an

1 earlier one.

2 ~~██████████~~ But you can see why the  
3 ~~(~~grassing is a big issue. I'm going to be dealing with ~~)~~  
4 that tonight.)

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Recurring, yes.

6 ~~██████████~~ It's a recurring problem, so ~~)~~  
7 anyone could -- it would leave any person to question  
8 Salem's ability to operate if we continue to have  
9 recurring problems.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You have to  
11 keep dealing with that same issue. ~~)~~

12 ~~██████████~~ Right.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And how it  
14 affects the Plant, yes.

15 ~~██████████~~ And you can question, well, it ~~)~~  
16 is an economic reason we don't resolve it? I don't  
17 know.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In ~~(~~spring 2002, in  
19 this time frame, and I can't do better than that with  
20 a month but it goes along with an outage, and I think  
21 this is an outage on the Salem 1 side, at a point in  
22 time do you recall if -- while the ~~(~~condenser steam  
23 pumps were under manual control, there was a push to  
24 conduct some ~~(~~lower power physics testing. This is at  
25 the point where you're ready to start up or near ready

1 to start up, but you don't have normal conditions.

2 [REDACTED] Okay. Is this when we wrapped  
3 the turbine glands?

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes. They were  
5 packed. To create the vacuum?

6 [REDACTED] Correct.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. At that point,  
8 around this start-up, do you recall I mean what the  
9 circumstances were and anything unusual?

10 [REDACTED] No. I thought that was part of  
11 the plan, and I don't think we're the first plant to  
12 have done that. I don't recall anything unusual about  
13 that.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall -- I  
15 mean as we understand it, this push for the low power  
16 testing did not occur and that it was resisted by  
17 shift management.

18 [REDACTED] The actual going critical, yes,  
19 we did draw vacuum and did -- which allowed us to use  
20 the steam dumps to the condenser to heat the Plant up  
21 --

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

23 [REDACTED] -- and remain in Mode 3. Okay,  
24 now I remember. I do remember there was some  
25 suggestions to, well, why can't -- we can just go

1 ahead and do low power physics testing which means go  
2 critical with what we considered was a degraded heat  
3 sync, which our condenser was the heat sync at that  
4 time, and we considered it degraded because of the  
5 fact that we didn't have normal glands sealing steam;  
6 we had the glands seals wrap.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. That's out  
8 understanding too.

9 [REDACTED] Right. And there was some  
10 push, I'll call it a push, that --

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Suggestion? Push?

12 [REDACTED] Right. There was  
13 recommendations or consideration given to going ahead  
14 and doing low power physics testing, which would mean  
15 to make the reactor critical and that was resisted and  
16 it wasn't performed, if I remember right. We did not  
17 go critical with the condenser in that condition.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that's my  
19 understanding as well. But the pressure and the push  
20 where was that coming from?

21 [REDACTED] The outage, outage management.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. At that time,  
23 it would have been [REDACTED] (phonetic).

24 [REDACTED]: Okay. But I believe it was --  
25 I mean [REDACTED] wasn't -- all those people that come in

1 that short time frame they're not technically -- they  
2 don't have the technical knowledge of the Plant. I  
3 believe this came from [REDACTED] (phonetic).

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The suggestion to do  
5 the start-up that way?

6 [REDACTED] Right. Maybe [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED] is in the outage organization  
8 with operations experience at Salem. He's now the [REDACTED].

9 [REDACTED]  
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why would he  
11 want to do it? I mean what was the benefit?

12 [REDACTED] Outage duration.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Shorten the  
14 outage.

15 [REDACTED] Correct.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: By days, hours?

17 [REDACTED] Couple days maybe.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you remember if  
19 [REDACTED] had any input or any influence on that?

20 [REDACTED] No. I remember [REDACTED]  
21 was a strong advocate of not doing it, and he  
22 supported the [REDACTED] because we weren't  
23 comfortable with doing it.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Including  
25 yourself?

1 [REDACTED] Correct.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But you think that  
3 the push was more from the outage management team.

4 [REDACTED] Correct.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So [REDACTED] would  
6 have been on that side at that point, working outage  
7 management?

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And [REDACTED].

10 [REDACTED] Right. It was his suggestion,  
11 and a lot of times [REDACTED] does that. [REDACTED] a very  
12 technically competent individual. He thinks outside  
13 the box, so to speak. He's made a lot of  
14 recommendations like that. Sometimes what he -- many  
15 times what he recommends is a smart way to do it. In  
16 this case, we weren't comfortable with it and didn't  
17 proceed.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So who shut  
19 down that suggestion? Who made -- was it [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED] I think so. I believe it was  
21 [REDACTED] stand on it.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about [REDACTED]  
23 [REDACTED] because you were kind of saying that in some  
24 cases the lack of the technical experience with the  
25 unit contributes to a push for something. What about

1 [REDACTED] how do you rate him?

2 [REDACTED] He's an [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED] so he's very technical.  
4 He's on the technical side, so he knows the Plant  
5 technically.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What about  
7 overall? I mean in terms of -- I mean was this a  
8 great debate? Was this a half-hour discussion? How  
9 long did this carry on?

10 [REDACTED] I don't really recall. I don't  
11 recall it being too contentious of an issue to be  
12 honest with you. I do remember it being discussed.  
13 I remember [REDACTED] opinion that it was not the correct  
14 thing to do, and then I remember it not being done.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It didn't go that  
16 way.

17 [REDACTED] There are things like that that  
18 happen all the time. I mean this past outage the  
19 outage -- any time the outage duration starts to slip  
20 you get the smart people together who try to pull the  
21 outage back into its scheduled duration. How can they  
22 do that?

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The "think outside  
24 the box" people?

25 [REDACTED] Right.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then come up with  
2 suggestions that may or may not fly?

3 [REDACTED] Right.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you ever seen it  
5 go in a direction that you really didn't care for,  
6 that you were not comfortable with? In this case  
7 you're saying it didn't go that way.

8 [REDACTED] No, but I'll continue to think  
9 about it.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You look like  
11 you thought about something.

12 [REDACTED] Well, I was just trying to --  
13 I can't remember anything specifically where a  
14 decision during an outage to shorten duration.  
15 There's always a debate, there's always weight the  
16 pros and cons. I think we as operators are kind of  
17 set in our ways and we're used to doing things, and if  
18 somebody suggest a new or better way of doing it,  
19 we're going to -- it's our nature to question it and  
20 whether we agree or disagree we'll go from there, but  
21 I can't remember any specific case.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Where you  
23 disagreed.

24 [REDACTED] Where I disagreed and went  
25 forward.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think that's  
2 a strength that works onsite that, I'll call it, a  
3 line of defense, whether the suggestions are being  
4 made or fronted, the (shift managers) are fairly good at  
5 questioning?

6 [REDACTED] Absolutely. And we get a --

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Analyzing that?

8 [REDACTED] We're not on an island by  
9 ourselves either. We have some very experienced  
10 senior reactor operators that work for us who keep us  
11 in line, so to speak.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you have a lot of  
13 input.

14 [REDACTED] Absolutely. I have a very,  
15 very competent crew with years and years of  
16 experience.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who's the [REDACTED]  
18 on your crew right now?

19 [REDACTED]: I have [REDACTED] (phonetic)  
20 who's been there [REDACTED] plus years; [REDACTED]  
21 (phonetic), the same; [REDACTED], who's been there  
22 maybe [REDACTED] he's an [REDACTED]  
23 [REDACTED] and I have a new upgrade, it's been about  
24 [REDACTED] He was an [REDACTED] for many years.

25 Now he's a [REDACTED]

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you have a lot of  
2 experience.

3 [REDACTED] Yes. I have a very good crew.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's nice to  
5 have a good crew, isn't it?

6 [REDACTED] Yes.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In this time frame,  
8 spring 2002, on this incident that we were discussing  
9 regarding start up after the outage, do you recall  
10 having a meeting specifically called by the [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED] at Salem with [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED] I don't recall anything. If  
13 you could --

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's a reportedly  
15 unique situation in which the shift managers at Salem  
16 got together and said, "We don't agree with the  
17 direction that we're getting from senior management,  
18 and we want to meet with [REDACTED] to discuss this  
19 further." And it was in the spring of 2002, and as I  
20 understand it, it was tagged to the kinds of things  
21 that you're describing, the December 2001 issue with  
22 the decision making. Our understanding is that  
23 operability decisions were questioned in terms of  
24 length of how long you were taking to make them.

25 [REDACTED] This is when I was -- I had

1 mentioned previously where [REDACTED] seemed to give me,  
2 I'll say, negative feedback on a decision I made one  
3 night on shift when a piece of equipment fell during  
4 surveillance testing. It resulted in my declaring a  
5 service water nuclear header inoperable based on  
6 failure of the surveillance. It was an indication of  
7 check valve back leakage on one of the diesel  
8 generators. And me and my crew we felt the procedure  
9 and the actions were conservative, appropriate, but it  
10 resulted in entering into a 72-hour shutdown LCO,  
11 middle of the night, and so the organization had to  
12 respond and get this condition fixed, and it was a  
13 ~~defective check valve~~

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was this a  
15 consequence of ~~that leaking?~~

16 [REDACTED]: No. Completely separate from  
17 ~~the leak.~~

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Separate?

19 [REDACTED]: Completely different.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was it before or  
21 after the December 2001?

22 [REDACTED]: After.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] So in that case, [REDACTED]  
25 and the organization at his level, I guess, didn't

1 agree with me calling it inoperable, and he kind of --  
2 I think he put out to everyone that in cases like that  
3 we need to fully understand and comprehend the issue  
4 and get licensing and get everyone on board and then  
5 make the call of operable or inoperable. Well, that's  
6 not the way it works. Only licensed operators  
7 determine operability, and it's not operability by  
8 consensus, and that's what the shift managers  
9 disagreed with. We are the licensed operators at  
10 Salem, it's our license duty to determine operability  
11 to the best of our ability. In this case, procedural  
12 compliance dictated it. It was pretty clear in the  
13 procedure, if this is failed, then this is inoperable.  
14 To us on shift it wasn't a -- now, whether that  
15 procedure was right or wrong, whether Licensing might  
16 be able to analyze and pencil whip that, who knew, but  
17 it was pretty clear cut.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was the procedure  
19 that governed your call.

20 ~~Right.~~ Right. It was the surveillance  
21 test on these check valves and service water. So that  
22 coupled with some other things that I don't recall led  
23 to us have this meeting, if I recall correctly.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So when did this  
25 incident happen with the --

1 [REDACTED] I don't remember a date, I'm  
2 sorry.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And what's the  
4 piece of equipment again?

5 [REDACTED] It's service water to diesel  
6 generators.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If the meeting  
8 occurred reportedly in spring 2002, you're somewhere  
9 after the 12-2001 incident.

10 [REDACTED] Right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're January,  
12 February, March, in there, does that sound accurate?

13 [REDACTED] I can't recall.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I guess it could have  
15 gone from January to May, in that time frame. Okay.  
16 You're just not sure. You think it was 2002?

17 [REDACTED] Yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED] Yes.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So his  
22 disagreeing with that call and him putting out to the  
23 shift that this is how we need to -- we need to more  
24 fully understand operation by committee kind of thing,  
25 that in itself caused this meeting with [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED] I don't think that was all of  
2 it.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that the  
4 straw that --

5 [REDACTED] I think that was one of the  
6 major things.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- broke the  
8 camel's back kind of -- or no?

9 [REDACTED] I believe so.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

11 [REDACTED] I believe that was it. And

12 [REDACTED] was an [REDACTED] then. And, see, what was

13 unique -- well, not unique but what happened there

14 that was (my crew's) last night on shift. It was two or

15 three o'clock in the morning when the surveillance

16 failed. We didn't immediately call it inoperable. It

17 was -- because of the piping configuration, it was

18 kind of a complicated technical issue at the time. In

19 the middle of the night and me and [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], who is my

21 engineering person on shift, said, "It's inoperable."

22 But now that resulted in what we call a 72-hour

23 shutdown LCO. So we had called [REDACTED] to

24 explain it to him. It's not an easy thing to explain,

25 so that was my line or my chain of command. I call

1 [REDACTED]  
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.  
3 [REDACTED] -- who was the [REDACTED] at the time.  
4 [REDACTED] completely backed the decision, and he initiated  
5 what we call a TRT at that time, a transient response  
6 team, and they came and dealt with it. Well, they  
7 dealt with it on the days I'm off now, I'm on my days  
8 off. But I kept in touch with what was going on, and  
9 I guess a lot of feedback to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is back at  
10 the Plant as a [REDACTED] but he got a  
11 lot of negative feedback, I believe, from his bosses,  
12 from Licensing that they really didn't have to declare  
13 that inoperable, that kind of thing.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have to enter  
15 -- did you shut down on that?

16 [REDACTED] No. They repaired it.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So they  
18 repaired it within the 72-hour --

19 [REDACTED] Correct.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- time frame. It  
21 was just --

22 [REDACTED] Replaced a check valve.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But the  
24 declaration is what the scramble.

25 [REDACTED] Not too difficult, I think, to

1 repair.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did [REDACTED] tell  
3 you who he was getting this feedback from? You said  
4 Licensing, senior management?

5 [REDACTED] I think Licensing was --

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's [REDACTED]  
7 wasn't it, [REDACTED] at that time?

8 [REDACTED] It was at that time. I think  
9 [REDACTED] gone now. But I'm sure it was from -- I can  
10 only believe it was from [REDACTED]

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You said something  
12 when you were talking about that based on the  
13 information that you had this is the direction that  
14 you went, and that if Licensing had looked at it, they  
15 may have, I think your words were, pencil whipped it.  
16 Have you experienced that, do they get around these  
17 procedures --

18 [REDACTED] Sure.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- on a regular  
20 basis, legitimately?

21 [REDACTED] My background and my -- from  
22 [REDACTED] was you took the stance when it came to  
23 operability pretty much the old saying there was when  
24 in doubt call it out.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Be

1 conservative.

2 [REDACTED] Yes. If you've got a doubt on  
 3 its operability, call it inoperable and then allow  
 4 your processes and your support organizations who  
 5 aren't there around the clock to come in and they  
 6 perfectly can justify operability. But at that point  
 7 in time it's inoperable, and then you prove it  
 8 operable. It's not the reverse, right? It's not it's  
 9 operable until somebody proves it inoperable. That's  
 10 not conservative. And here it seems to have been that  
 11 way. I don't think it's as bad now, but during that  
 12 time frame it was that type mentality that got the  
 13 shift managers and operators kind of upset, so to  
 14 speak.

What's  
in  
this  
case

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was there a  
 16 change in senior leadership where after that person  
 17 got into his position you started to see more of that?

18 [REDACTED] I think during the [REDACTED]  
 19 (phonetic), when he was the [REDACTED] and  
 20 [REDACTED] with that group there.  
 21 Now it's going back the other way.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Balance, right?

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about for  
 24 [REDACTED] position on this that caused the shift  
 25 managers to say, "We want to make the call based on

nc

1 what we're looking at at the time." Had you heard  
2 something like this from him before or was this a  
3 change for him? Was this the first instance where  
4 you're seeing this, "Hey, I need you to delay your  
5 discovery phase."

6 [REDACTED] I can't recall whether there  
7 were other incidents. For me it was the first.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In this part of 2002.

9 [REDACTED] Correct.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It seems like it's  
11 early 2002.

12 [REDACTED] You know, it might be very,  
13 very close to the same time that Salem Unit 1 and 2 we  
14 had a loss of the portion of the switchyard, 500 KV  
15 switchyard that resulted in a loss of half the  
16 circulators on both units. Unit 1 had one circulator  
17 out of service at the time. So we were down to two  
18 circulators on Unit 1, three on Unit 2. That gave --  
19 I guess training-wise we would have been expected  
20 probably to trip Salem Unit 1. It had two circulators  
21 in service at 100 percent power. However, I was the  
22 [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] during  
23 the transient, he had started a rapid load reduction,  
24 turned around to me and he said, "Hey, we've got two  
25 circulators running. Should we trip the Plant? And

1 I told him, I said, "No. The procedure requires  
2 tripping the Plant based on certain parameters of  
3 condenser back pressure, condenser Delta T," and we  
4 had not exceeded any of those limits. So I said, "No,  
5 don't trip the Plant. Follow the procedure, continue  
6 the rapid load reduction and trip based on the  
7 parameters."

8 Unit 2 was down to three circulators so it  
9 was not quite as bad but Unit 2 reduced power rapidly  
10 also. Now, that decision was questioned by Training.  
11 There was obviously a big team brought in after that  
12 transient, but --

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Questioning --  
14 [REDACTED] Why I didn't trip it.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- that you  
16 weren't conservative enough.

17 [REDACTED]: Why didn't you trip Unit 1?

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that came from  
20 Training.

21 [REDACTED]: That came from Training.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So who was that, the  
23 training manager or --

24 [REDACTED]: Well, [REDACTED] who's one  
25 of the [REDACTED]

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.  
2 [REDACTED] -- was part of the TRT team  
3 that came in after that. They really questioned that.  
4 "Why didn't you trip that? You would have done that  
5 in the simulator." I said, "No." Simulator scenarios  
6 are normally the grassing scenarios where if you lose  
7 one, two, three conditions are degrading, it's an  
8 environmental condition over which you have no  
9 control, then you trip the plant. Conditions are  
10 degrading. In this case, you have loss of electrical,  
11 three pumps go away just like that, one's already out  
12 for maintenance. Nothing's degrading any further.  
13 The procedure allowed it, it's a parameter-based trip  
14 at that point. So I thought it was different.

15 But that decision was questioned by  
16 Training; it was pretty much applauded by senior  
17 management. Unfortunately, that was the first of  
18 switchyard station power transformer failure. We  
19 experienced two others. [REDACTED] was on for the  
20 last one where they did have to trip the Plant.  
21 Conditions were degrading at circ water and I don't  
22 know if you -- you probably spoke to [REDACTED] but I think  
23 [REDACTED] received some pretty negative feedback because  
24 conditions were different then and he had lost a unit.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Time frame for that?

1 [REDACTED] I'm sorry, I'm bad with times.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just recently?

3 [REDACTED] No. No.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Couple months ago or  
5 longer?

6 [REDACTED] A year.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Over a year ago.

8 [REDACTED] Yes. But that was -- the first  
9 one happened when my crew was on that I spoke to.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] That was the loss of Number 2  
12 station power transformer. And once again you have to  
13 question corrective action because it happened a  
14 second time. The crew responded -- because you lose  
15 certain equipment that if river conditions aren't  
16 benevolent or benign at the time, the grassing levels  
17 can cause you to lose all your circulators. So the  
18 second time we lost it we stayed online. The third  
19 time when [REDACTED] was on Salem Unit 1 had to trip.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. Now, just  
21 so I don't -- I don't want to get confused but the  
22 time frame for the first one was when? The first one  
23 that you handled.

24 [REDACTED]: Sometime early June, July of --  
25 I don't recall, I'm sorry. I mean I can get back to

1 you with dates on this stuff, but I don't want to --

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Specific dates and  
3 times are --

4 [REDACTED] I don't want to under oath give  
5 you a date --

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No, and I understand  
7 --

8 [REDACTED] -- because I'm not really good  
9 on the dates.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I understand your  
11 hesitancy to be specific about it, but if you look at  
12 the one -- the most recent one that [REDACTED] was  
13 involved with, was there a year between the other two  
14 in that one or two years or --

15 [REDACTED] Probably all happened within  
16 about six- to nine-month time frame.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They're fairly close  
18 together then?

19 [REDACTED] Correct.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Now, are you  
21 -- and you think the last one was about a year ago.

22 [REDACTED] Maybe a year and a half ago.  
23 I think it might have been in the summer of --

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Two thousand two.

25 [REDACTED] -- 2002. And the one that I

1 spoke of when I was on where it didn't trip the units,  
2 that happened around the same time the decision on the  
3 service water inoperability that got questioned that  
4 led to the meeting. Because I remember hearing [REDACTED]  
5 speak of both of those, quote, "decisions," together,  
6 the decision to call it inoperable, the decision to  
7 stay online.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. He's  
9 comparing the two or bringing --

10 [REDACTED] Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was he saying  
12 about them?

13 [REDACTED] Where one decision was  
14 supported, positive feedback, where I didn't trip the  
15 Plant.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: By [REDACTED]  
17 [REDACTED] Right. And one was negative  
18 where I declared the service water header inoperable  
19 in the middle of the night.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So he brought them up  
21 as examples of one being a good decision and one being  
22 a bad decision.

23 [REDACTED] Correct. On trip decision  
24 making.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I see. The second

1 transformer loss, who was on for that?

2 [REDACTED] I don't recall.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that a decision  
4 where you stayed online or just reduced --

5 [REDACTED] In that case, it wasn't  
6 complicated by the fact that another circulator was  
7 already out of service.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had one out for  
9 maintenance in the first incident.

10 [REDACTED] Right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But that was  
12 a remain online.

13 [REDACTED] Correct.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And was that  
15 supported by senior management?

16 [REDACTED] Yes.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So there was  
18 no negative reaction to that.

19 [REDACTED] Correct. But it was a  
20 reoccurrence of --

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Of the same issue,  
22 the same problem.

23 [REDACTED] Correct.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So now in this third  
25 incident, is there anything different? Is it the same

1 thing happening again, same circumstances?  
2 [REDACTED] What's different is the river  
3 conditions. Because the same electrical loss of some  
4 of the equipment you lose, in this case he lost all  
5 the traveling screens. Although you only lose three  
6 pumps, you lose the traveling screens which are the  
7 big conveyor belt type screens in front of the  
8 circulators that filter the grass from the river.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

10 [REDACTED] You lose power to all six of  
11 them on Unit 1 in his case.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So his is more  
13 dramatic.

14 [REDACTED] All of them you lose all the  
15 screens in one of the units, but what's different in  
16 [REDACTED] case was that at that time the grass was heavier  
17 in the river and he couldn't withstand a loss of power  
18 to those screens. Those screens stopped turning. One  
19 hundred eighty thousand gallons a minute of water was  
20 being drawn through the three that remained online.  
21 Those pumps still running and the grass builds up on  
22 those screens. In my case, I was very lucky because  
23 the screens didn't foul. The river was --

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They were still  
25 functioning.

1 [REDACTED] -- flowing at the time. In  
2 [REDACTED] case, the screens [did foul] so [REDACTED] was  
3 questioned severely. I guess from talking to [REDACTED] he  
4 was really given negative feedback on the time it  
5 required him to cross connect power supplies, get  
6 power back to those screens so that he didn't have to  
7 trip the unit.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But he tripped.

9 [REDACTED] Correct.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And I guess to get  
11 this, what you're portraying here, to be accurate, is  
12 that in the first incident you took some criticism  
13 from the TRT team for not tripping.

14 [REDACTED] From Training.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: From Training who was  
16 a part of the TRT team --

17 [REDACTED] Correct.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- was what I was  
19 understanding. So Training had some questions there  
20 on why wouldn't you have tripped because this is what  
21 we train for, this is the way we go. But you had a  
22 reason why you made your decision. By the time he's  
23 in his third scenario here six to eight months later,  
24 he's dealing with conditions that are worse than what  
25 you were dealing with.

1 [REDACTED] Correct.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Significantly or I  
3 mean how do you compare them?

4 [REDACTED] Significantly different because  
5 of the ~~river grass~~.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So his are  
7 significantly worse conditions and he does trip and  
8 gets criticism for it.

9 [REDACTED] Correct.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now there's a mixed  
11 message.

12 [REDACTED] Right.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Because I mean any  
14 other [REDACTED] would have seen what you went  
15 through in your first one, I don't know who was on for  
16 the second transformer loss --

17 [REDACTED] I don't recall. It might have  
18 been [REDACTED] (phonetic) but I don't recall  
19 specifically. But that's the point I'm trying to make  
20 is that it's my opinion that if a shift manager or a  
21 crew under those type of stressful conditions,  
22 degrading conditions, that senior management should  
23 never publicly criticize their decision to trip the  
24 Plant. It brings into question the safety culture,  
25 the whole thing you're talking about, right?

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. Does it also  
2 -- do you see if having any effect on future decisions  
3 that you make?

4 [REDACTED] Well, sure it would, right?  
5 Sure it would. It would have the potential to affect  
6 your decision making in other events.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: To sway you to be  
8 less conservative.

9 [REDACTED]: Correct.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I don't want to put  
11 words in your mouth, but that's I think what we're  
12 saying is that it would have an adverse effect on  
13 decision making --

14 [REDACTED] Correct.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- and that you're  
16 not making conservative decisions because this is the  
17 back of your mind.

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But let me ask you  
20 this: Have you seen situations onsite in this same  
21 time frame, we'll just look at the 2002 year for now,  
22 have you seen under that senior management situations  
23 where you took a more aggressive approach and they  
24 took a more conservative approach?

25 [REDACTED] No.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you're laughing.  
2 That doesn't pick up for the record all the time, but  
3 you kind of chuckled at that. And your response was  
4 pretty quick.

5 [REDACTED] Obviously, I've discussed -- I  
6 haven't really discussed this investigation much with  
7 my peers I know you've interviewed, but obviously I'm  
8 good friends with some of my -- the [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED] and we've discussed this kind of thing. [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED] and I both came from [REDACTED] and it  
11 was just the opposite type there where I wasn't a  
12 [REDACTED] there but that equivalent position there  
13 was more of the position that said, "Well, let's do  
14 this, let's try this," where senior management -- and  
15 senior management was, "No, let's do the conservative  
16 -- more conservative." Obviously, there are degrees  
17 of conservatism but it was the shift manager level  
18 being the guys outside the box and recommending or  
19 wanting to be more aggressive, and senior management  
20 saying, "No, no. It's all right. Conservative,  
21 conservative."

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They would temper  
23 that.

24 [REDACTED] And here, just like you just --  
25 your question was had there been incidents where our

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1 recommendations or decisions have been the aggressive  
2 and senior management said, "More conservative?" It's  
3 just the opposite of that at Salem. [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED] feel like we're having to be the ones who say, "No,  
5 no, let's be more conservative." Do you see what I'm  
6 saying, the difference there?

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In the face of a less  
8 conservative push.

9 [REDACTED] Right.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And, granted, a lot  
11 of your decision making goes on in what can be termed,  
12 I guess, a gray area.

13 [REDACTED] Right.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And if you're over  
15 here on the right side, you're saying senior  
16 management will come in over on the less conservative  
17 left side of that.

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have any other  
20 examples of that, any other instances? We talked  
21 about a couple and I know we didn't get to the ~~BF19~~  
22 yet.

23 [REDACTED] I can't think of anything off  
24 the top of my head specifically, but almost in every  
25 -- that's what [REDACTED] and I have discussed. Almost in

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1 every decision, major, minor, some of these may not be  
2 major, Earth-shattering decisions, but were very  
3 contentious, highly contentious decisions, you know,  
4 where there's a lot of debate about it, but the  
5 reduction in the margins of safety comes from above my  
6 position instead of from my position and below, which  
7 is different than the philosophy I was used to at  
8 [REDACTED] It was the operators wanting to be -- and  
9 when we say less conservative or more conservative,  
10 please understand that being less conservative is not  
11 always wrong provided you maintain an adequate margin  
12 of safety.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] That's what you were saying  
15 about this gray area there.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

17 [REDACTED] Being less and more  
18 conservative is not synonymous with good or bad, but  
19 like I said, at [REDACTED] it was at the shift manager  
20 level and below that would make the recommendations to  
21 maybe operate more efficiently but reduce the margin  
22 of safety, whereas at Salem it seems to be the  
23 opposite.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Comes from the  
25 opposite direction.

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have you seen  
2 a change at Salem since the new senior management team  
3 has come in, the [REDACTED] the [REDACTED]  
4 coming back? Have you seen a shift in that?

5 [REDACTED] It's too soon to say, but once  
6 the last organization change occurred in September,  
7 late September, right after that we went right into an  
8 outage and so we were in an outage. Now, we finished  
9 the outage in late November, so it's really too soon  
10 to tell.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For normal operating  
12 conditions you haven't got that much experience under  
13 the new so-called regime, I guess.

14 [REDACTED] Correct. [REDACTED] in the  
15 reorganization went from [REDACTED] to the  
16 newly recreated [REDACTED] position.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

18 [REDACTED] So the -- he's pretty much  
19 still the same. He's now the driver at Salem, [REDACTED]  
20 [REDACTED] He's the [REDACTED] He reports to [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED] who is Salem-Hope Creek, right, but I think  
22 [REDACTED] is the focal decision maker at Salem right now,  
23 [REDACTED]

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Before we move  
25 on, I don't know if we finished with the shift

1 managers' meeting with [REDACTED] Did we finish with  
2 that, what happened during the meeting?

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No. We got to the  
4 point where we understand why it came about, but I  
5 think we can go a little further on the results of  
6 that, I mean specifically what he wanted versus what  
7 the shift managers wanted.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And what  
9 happened during the meeting?

10 [REDACTED] I think the meeting was not  
11 effective.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you there?

13 [REDACTED] I don't think he got the  
14 message. Yes.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who else was there?  
16 Sorry? Can you recall anybody else who was there? Or  
17 who were your peers at that point in time?

18 [REDACTED]  
19 [REDACTED]  
20 [REDACTED] I'm sorry, I don't recall which ones were  
21 there. I believe the majority of them were there.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And [REDACTED] was  
23 there.

24 [REDACTED]  
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

1 Anyone else from [REDACTED] level?

2 [REDACTED] I believe there was. I don't  
3 recall specifically, though. I just recall --

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was [REDACTED] there?

5 [REDACTED]: Yes.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Licensing,  
7 [REDACTED] there?

8 [REDACTED] No.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED] I don't believe [REDACTED] was  
11 there.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] I believe he was the [REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED] at that time.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But you're  
16 saying you didn't think the meeting was effective or  
17 he didn't understand your message.

18 [REDACTED] He didn't get the message.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So what was the  
20 result of that then? I mean what --

21 [REDACTED] The shift managers pretty much  
22 just collective said, okay, we understand what he  
23 wants but we understand what we are licensed to do,  
24 and we continued to operate as we had.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did that cause a

1 problem for anybody?

2 [REDACTED] No. It wasn't something we  
3 just --

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, I understand  
5 it's not --

6 [REDACTED] We didn't go right to [REDACTED] and  
7 say, "Oh, [REDACTED] we're not about to do what you said."

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No. It wouldn't be  
9 as blatant as that.

10 [REDACTED] We pretty much just said, okay,  
11 we think we understand -- we understand what [REDACTED]  
12 saying, we don't agree with it. It's completely  
13 against our training and everything we know as  
14 operators, dealing with operability calls and things  
15 like that.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What did he say  
18 that you guys disagreed with in that area?

19 [REDACTED] Just what we talked about  
20 earlier that when situations arise like that where  
21 there's a question on operability, you maintain it  
22 operable until you can get the right people together  
23 to determine that it's inoperable. That's contrary to  
24 what we thought was the appropriate conservative. If  
25 we have a question on operability, a clear question --

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. Right.  
2 [REDACTED] -- in this case it was a failed  
3 surveillance test. In the case I spoke about it was  
4 a failed surveillance test. Surveillance tests are  
5 tech spec, licensed driven testing to determine  
6 operability.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.  
8 [REDACTED] At [REDACTED], a failed  
9 surveillance black and white, the equipment is  
10 inoperable. Now, if Engineering and somebody else  
11 wants to come back and make a case for operability,  
12 they did so, but a failed surveillance automatically  
13 made the equipment inoperable.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Shift's call to  
15 do that.

16 [REDACTED] I mean it wasn't a question.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. And  
18 here it was.

19 [REDACTED]: Here a failed surveillance  
20 test, well, you know, you might -- this was at Salem.  
21 So [REDACTED] opinion and the message he was sending to us  
22 was we consider the equipment operable and then follow  
23 up with an investigation. That's not the way you  
24 should do it, we thought.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And this was the

1 decision he held up as a negative example of  
2 operability decisions.

3 [REDACTED] Correct.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This is the one he  
5 didn't like.

6 [REDACTED] This is the one I made that he  
7 didn't like. I completely disagree with that.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have you seen  
9 that attitude under the new management? I know you  
10 said that it's too soon to tell, but have you seen --

11 [REDACTED] No.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- evidence of  
13 that?

14 [REDACTED] No.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Evidence  
16 contrary to that, that maybe we're going to go back  
17 towards if there's a question, we'll call it inop,  
18 bring the experts in and see what happens?

19 [REDACTED] We never stopped doing that.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You guys never  
21 did.

22 [REDACTED] Yes.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm talking  
24 about direction from above.

25 [REDACTED] We've gotten no direction from

1 above contrary to our -- with the current leadership  
2 team, we've gotten no direction contrary to our belief  
3 on calling a piece of equipment inoperable until you  
4 can prove it operable not operable but degraded  
5 whatever.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Has the change in  
7 management led to any change in the behavior of your  
8 immediate management? Mr. [REDACTED] been in place as  
9 [REDACTED] now, as [REDACTED] Do you see any  
10 differences in the way he's dealing with you and your  
11 peers?

12 [REDACTED] Different than the previous?

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes. Any changes in  
14 him. He would be at the level between you and senior  
15 management. There's yet another level --

16 [REDACTED] Correct.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- at [REDACTED]  
18 Do you see any effect on him and his decision making,  
19 his interactions with you?

20 [REDACTED] He's -- yes, as far as --

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If you do, just  
22 describe what you see.

23 [REDACTED] I believe now with -- even when  
24 [REDACTED] was a -- he was promoted to [REDACTED] still  
25 under the ([REDACTED])

1 and at this point, [REDACTED] moved from [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED] took over at  
3 some time. [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] I really  
4 can't recall a lot during his time frame where he was  
5 -- it seems like under that regime the [REDACTED]  
6 which my previous experience he was pretty much a head  
7 decision maker on a site.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Your previous  
9 experience at [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED] Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

12 [REDACTED] And from my knowledge of the  
13 industry, right.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

15 [REDACTED] Here even all the way up  
16 through when [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] at Salem,  
17 it's a pretty ineffective position, which is  
18 disheartening because that's -- in my belief, that's  
19 where the decision should be made. And I think that  
20 type of management style was the [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED] management style.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED] worked for [REDACTED]  
24 at that point.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You're shaking  
2 your head.

3 [REDACTED] He was worthless.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Why?  
5 Technically, leadership?

6 [REDACTED]: It was a position that didn't  
7 need to exist.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was -- was he the  
9 [REDACTED] or was somebody else the [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] He was the [REDACTED]  
12 [REDACTED] but you could have eliminated him and just  
13 let Mr. [REDACTED] tell us what he wanted us to do.  
14 There wasn't any reason to have a [REDACTED]  
15 [REDACTED]

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] had that  
17 kind of direct input.

18 [REDACTED]: That's what we all believed,  
19 yes.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you experience  
21 that yourself, personally? We talked a little bit  
22 about --

23 [REDACTED] With [REDACTED]

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: With [REDACTED]

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: With Mr. [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED] Did I experience --

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Direction from  
3 [REDACTED] directly.

4 [REDACTED] I mean via [REDACTED] but I  
5 mean --

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] That's what I was saying,  
8 [REDACTED] might as well -- I mean it was --

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He was a conduit for  
10 [REDACTED] then?

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 (END TAPE 1, SIDE B)

13 (BEGIN TAPE 2, SIDE A)

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're back on.  
15 It's approximately 11:00 a.m.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Mr. [REDACTED] a  
17 couple things I wanted to just go over with you.  
18 Prior to the interview today, were you spoken to by  
19 corporate counsel?

20 [REDACTED] No.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about your  
22 management, do they know you're meeting with us today?  
23 Did you tell your boss that you were being interviewed  
24 by OI today?

25 [REDACTED] No.

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Were you  
2 in any way prepped or counseled on how you should  
3 respond to questions that you might be asked today?

4 [REDACTED] No. The only individual who  
5 knows I'm here is [REDACTED]

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. I mean  
7 this is a voluntary interview, I know you understand  
8 that, but I just wanted to emphasize this is  
9 voluntary. We do appreciate you meeting with us and  
10 spending the time with us.

11 I wanted to go back to go over one thing  
12 and then we'll move forward. We were talking about  
13 some specific issues. This is an issue I wanted to  
14 ask you some questions about. Maybe you'll have some  
15 knowledge of it, maybe you won't. But talking about  
16 dates here, coming out of the Salem 1 spring 2001  
17 outage, spring 2001.

18 [REDACTED] Okay.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay? From my  
20 understanding, the unit was at full power for a very  
21 short time and there was a ~~generator trip~~, ~~turbine~~  
22 ~~trip~~ and ~~reactor trip~~ because there was an issue with,  
23 let's see here, they ~~couldn't~~ bring steam into the  
24 turbine building. ~~It was an electrical issue~~ from my  
25 understanding, that caused this to happen. Do you

1 remember that particular issue? I don't have a lot  
2 more on that, but --

3 [REDACTED] Yes. I remember I was on shift  
4 and it was a generator protection trip.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

6 [REDACTED] We had just reached 100 percent  
7 power that evening after the outage, so we were at 100  
8 percent power for only a few hours and we received a  
9 generator protection trip, automatic reactor trip,  
10 yes. It was right at the end of my shift.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And did you  
12 have to take actions to shut the Plant down or did the  
13 Plant shut itself down?

14 [REDACTED] It was an automatic reactor  
15 trip.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And did  
17 you -- were you on shift the next day too or do you  
18 remember if you were going on leave or going back out  
19 into regular?

20 [REDACTED] I don't recall.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Do  
22 you remember the follow-up of that issue or how it was  
23 handled, how long it took to get the Plant back to  
24 where it needed to be before it could turn on?

25 [REDACTED] Don't remember anything

1 specific about that, Jeff, sorry.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. You've  
3 heard the questions we've asked today and the  
4 discussion we've had regarding other issues. Did you  
5 note or see any problem or disagreement with the way  
6 that issue was resolved in how the Plant was brought  
7 back up to power or when it was brought back up to  
8 power?

9 [REDACTED] I don't recall any issues with  
10 that.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know who  
12 might be able to provide some more information, who  
13 was more directly involved in that particular issue?

14 [REDACTED] I don't recall. Sorry.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.  
16 That's about what I had, the couple areas I wanted to  
17 go over.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. I just wanted  
19 to go back just a little bit on some of your comments  
20 regarding the differences you noted. You particularly  
21 note differences, obviously, with where you worked  
22 before a [REDACTED] Do you have any basis to  
23 compare other stations? Do you have discussions with  
24 [REDACTED] at other stations in terms of what  
25 you've noticed at Salem being different in terms of

1 who's taking the aggressive approach on conservative  
2 decision making? Do you have those discussions with  
3 people that are located elsewhere?

4 [REDACTED] No.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you don't have any  
6 basis to compare how --

7 [REDACTED] Other than what I read in the  
8 industry via INPO.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

10 [REDACTED] The sharing of information  
11 there. I don't actively now discuss or talk to any  
12 other [REDACTED] at other stations. I did for a  
13 while but nothing along these lines.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What about --  
15 just briefly when we were taking a break there, you  
16 made a comment about you deal with more equipment  
17 failure problems at Salem on a routine basis at Salem  
18 than you did at [REDACTED] in about a year is I think the  
19 way you put it, and maybe you could say it more  
20 accurately because I don't want to put words in your  
21 mouth.

22 [REDACTED] The number of equipment issues,  
23 unplanned tech spec entries, load reductions caused by  
24 equipment problems, those type things happen way more  
25 frequently at Salem than happened at [REDACTED]

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What do you think,  
2 what's causing that?

3 [REDACTED] Equipment reliability issues  
4 caused by ineffective maintenance. That's it,  
5 equipment reliability, ineffective maintenance and  
6 engineering resolution of previously identified --

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Corrective  
8 action process?

9 [REDACTED] Corrective actions, back to  
10 that, right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that a problem in  
12 knowledge, in how to fix something? Is that a problem  
13 in resources, having the people and the money to fix  
14 something, or is it a combination of things?

15 [REDACTED] I think it's a combination.  
16 From the rapid turnover of people at ~~Salem~~ that  
17 contributes to it, because some of these issues are  
18 difficult issues that require long-term resolutions,  
19 and we don't seem to be able to really achieve those  
20 long-term solutions because people aren't in place,  
21 senior management's not in place long enough to  
22 maintain a focus on that. So each new senior  
23 leadership team or team that comes in there will have  
24 their own priorities and they'll change, will start  
25 over in some, you know what I mean? I mean if you

1 were to look back during [REDACTED] I remember  
2 reading a 200-page engineering document from a  
3 contract company on [circ water] and their  
4 recommendations. And was that followed up on? No.  
5 So now another team comes in and it's -- it's  
6 continuity and focus, remaining focused on those key  
7 areas. It all stems -- the Corrective Action Program,  
8 like I said before, is in need of improvement, and  
9 it's one of the focus areas of the new leadership team  
10 that's there now. I think [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED] fully realize that unless we get an  
12 effective Corrective Action Program we're going to  
13 continue to struggle.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. If you have no  
15 follow-up on that Jeff --

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- I had an issue I'd  
18 like to discuss. You had pretty much started talking  
19 about this BF19 issue that was a recent outage issue,  
20 October, I think it was, 2003?

21 [REDACTED] Yes. That just occurred. I  
22 came in on night shift for that. The previous night  
23 shift sometime around three or so in the morning there  
24 was an identified problem with, I believe it was at BF13  
25 BF19, one of the four feed reg valves. It brought

1 into question whether the valve would go closed or not  
2 and the valve is required to go closed in an accident.  
3 Automatic closure of this valve occurs during an  
4 accident. So there was a question as to whether to do  
5 that.

6 At approximately three o'clock in the  
7 afternoon, which is probably maybe 12 to 14 hours  
8 after originally identified, the valve was declared  
9 inoperable. With the valve inoperable it put the  
10 Plant in a condition outside of technical  
11 specifications which required a shutdown. And I came  
12 on and performed the shutdown that night.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that -- between  
14 the recognition of where this incident started and the  
15 declaration that it was inoperable --

16 [REDACTED] Yes. That time frame there has  
17 been scrutinized as being inappropriately long, and I  
18 agree. And I believe there were several things that  
19 contributed to that. Number one, it happened at a bad  
20 time. You don't have the full force of your  
21 engineering and support organizations at two or three  
22 in the morning.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] So it's identified and there  
25 were, in my estimate, maybe three possible causes, one

1 of which valve ~~is~~

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For the delay?

3 ~~██████████~~ No.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For the problem  
5 itself.

6 ~~██████████~~ For the problem. Valve  
7 mechanically stuck is the one that would render the  
8 valve inoperable, incapable of performing its safety  
9 function. The others, whether it's a controller or a  
10 positioner or something in the control system would  
11 not necessarily prevent the valve from going closed.  
12 So the crew identified it and there was delay from the  
13 middle of early that morning where people got there at  
14 seven o'clock. Then the engineering expertise  
15 involved wasn't the best, so the troubleshooting that  
16 led to final determination, we ruled out the  
17 positioner, the controller, the I to P converter, we  
18 ruled everything out. It has to be mechanically  
19 stuck, valve inoperable. It was caused by just delays  
20 and inherent delays built into the process, some of  
21 them unavoidable but some of them in this case were  
22 avoidable or maybe could have been done better.

23 If things were happening in parallel, if  
24 the valve is stuck, it's a very difficult thing to do  
25 to shut the Plant down in controlled fashion when that

1 ~~valve is stuck open~~ So during that time they were  
2 doing the troubleshooting to determine the problem,  
3 operators were sent out to the simulator to practice  
4 the shutdown if that became necessary, as it did, with  
5 ~~that valve stuck~~. And that helped tremendously when  
6 it came time. It was a very difficult shutdown  
7 because ~~the valve was indeed stuck~~. Could it have  
8 been more timely, yes. Was that, in my eyes, a big  
9 issue, no. It was a pretty big thing to do to take  
10 the time to properly train it, properly discuss  
11 contingencies. Did they take a little bit too long,  
12 yes, but that's just an efficiency issue. I don't  
13 think that was a safety issue or reluctance on anyone  
14 to ~~call~~ that valve inoperable.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Did you become  
16 aware of anything that indicated there was pressure to  
17 slow down the decision making in that case?

18 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ I wasn't on for the decision.  
19 When I came in at six o'clock that evening, ~~the valve~~  
20 was declared inoperable. We were starting to shut  
21 down and take the unit offline. But in looking back  
22 at what happened and because of all the questions that  
23 have been brought up by operators that were on, "Oh,  
24 it was ~~obviously stuck~~." It wasn't obvious. It was  
25 the appropriate thing to do to troubleshoot the valve.

1 to take the time to train the shutdown. I think that  
2 was handled well. Were there areas to improve in the  
3 efficiency of our ability to troubleshoot and get at  
4 the cause, yes. You always have the Monday morning  
5 quarterbacks who come in and want to question. In  
6 that case, I think things were handled fairly well.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything else on  
8 that? There is an issue. I wanted to go back and I'm  
9 going back to this meeting in the ~~spring~~ of 2002.  
10 There was some information that was reported along the  
11 way indicating that during this meeting -- I know you  
12 said -- you described the meeting as it was  
13 ineffective and that [REDACTED] didn't understand what  
14 you were trying to tell him, what the [REDACTED]  
15 were communicating. At some point in that meeting did  
16 you feel -- were you upset and agitated enough that  
17 you left the meeting?

18 [REDACTED] I'm not sure if that was the  
19 one I left or not.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is there another one?

21 [REDACTED] I have been known to leave  
22 meetings if I think I'm about to say something  
23 inappropriate. I don't know if I left that meeting or  
24 not, I can't recall, but I do recall that I have  
25 gotten up and left meetings.

1                   SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you remember what  
2 the cause of that would have been? And, specifically,  
3 what we're looking at is discussions with senior  
4 management, shift management and enough of a  
5 discrepancy that you felt strongly enough that you  
6 were just going to get out.

7                   [REDACTED] So your question is why did I  
8 get up and leave?

9                   SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you remember what  
10 would have caused you to do that if it wasn't this  
11 meeting or it was another?

12                   [REDACTED] Not specifically. I don't do  
13 it a lot, but, no, I really -- other than just  
14 disagreement with the decisions that are being made.

15                   SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It seems like  
16 frustration is what --

17                   [REDACTED] Right.

18                   SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- we were getting  
19 the picture of. You don't recall it specifically to  
20 that meeting.

21                   [REDACTED] No. Sorry, I do not.

22                   SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you recall  
23 a meeting where you did do that and can you tell us  
24 the reason? Can you recall one of them, one of the  
25 specifics? You said it doesn't happen that often, so

1 do you think you remember something about it?

2 [REDACTED] Not specifically. One's coming  
3 to mind but it seems like the direction that was being  
4 given -- well, it was once again back along the lines  
5 of the operability, how to determine operability was  
6 just contrary to everything I thought was appropriate.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was  
8 providing that --

9 [REDACTED] in that case, in  
10 this meeting. This wasn't the one that you're talking  
11 about in the spring of 2002. I don't really remember  
12 this one.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was the issue,  
14 do you recall?

15 [REDACTED] That's what I was trying to  
16 think. That's why I was hesitant to even mention it,  
17 because I don't remember the specifics.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you place who was  
19 there?

20 [REDACTED]  
21 some of my fellowship managers. I'm not sure if this  
22 had to do with anything along these lines of safety or  
23 anything. It may have just been the more mechanics of  
24 how we do business on shift, things like that, nothing  
25 along the lines of operability. So I don't really

1 recall.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Nothing jumps  
3 back?

4 [REDACTED] No. Just frustration with the  
5 decisions that were being made, and I don't remember  
6 the specifics.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And it might not have  
8 been --

9 [REDACTED] It might not have been --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- related to safety  
11 decisions or operability?

12 [REDACTED] Right. I'm thinking now it was  
13 more like -- more of unrelated stuff with shift  
14 mechanics, of operating the crews' decisions that were  
15 being made.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did it have to do  
17 with discipline actions or --

18 [REDACTED] No.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- grievances?

20 [REDACTED] No.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Nothing like that?

22 [REDACTED] But, yes, I have left meetings.  
23 If someone told you that, I wouldn't dispute it, but  
24 I don't recall that meeting, the 2001 you're talking  
25 about with [REDACTED]

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The spring 2002 j-  
2 [REDACTED] Right.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- in that time  
4 frame? What about lately? Are you experiencing that  
5 level of frustration in recent months?

6 [REDACTED] No.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you have  
8 anything else, Jeff?

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: On that  
10 particular issue? And I think we've covered the ~~BF19~~ I  
11 issue too.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I have one more  
13 before -- I have something.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I have one more too  
15 then.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: About two years  
17 ago do you recall there being an issue with the SJ  
18 check valves 4 and 5 and 12 and 13 leaking, those  
19 valves leaking? I

20 [REDACTED] I remember that, but I was not  
21 on shift for that. I remember there being some  
22 questions as to the operability.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Some people  
24 wanted leak testing done then and there to determine  
25 if there was a problem.

1 [REDACTED] Right. I was -- that must have  
2 been days off. I remember that happening, but I was  
3 not involved directly at all.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you hear about  
5 that from your peers?

6 [REDACTED] I don't know if I heard  
7 anything from my peers. I mean I heard stuff that was  
8 put out at the Plant, but I don't recall anything  
9 controversial maybe that came out of that. I remember  
10 there was a big training thing put out on it  
11 afterwards. Some of the -- just the technical  
12 functions of these valves but nothing during that  
13 decision-making process of the leak rate was excessive  
14 on these valves.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you have  
16 any first hand involvement with that issue while you  
17 were on shift?

18 [REDACTED] No.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. From  
20 what we understand, the issue was, quote, "engineered  
21 away," unquote. Something was done to cut those  
22 valves. I mean I'm not talking physically cut but  
23 take those valves out of being of the importance they  
24 used to be. Maybe, maybe not?

25 [REDACTED] Yes, I don't recall. I know

1 we've changed the system design since that time.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

3 [REDACTED] Because there are valves in  
4 series with them that those valves used to maintained  
5 open all the time. Now they're maintained close

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

7 [REDACTED] We changed the system design.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

9 [REDACTED] But I don't remember anything  
10 specific on that.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did anyone --  
12 do you recall anyone expressing to you frustration  
13 they had with how that issue was handled? If so --

14 [REDACTED] It seems like maybe [REDACTED] or  
15 [REDACTED] or [REDACTED], may have  
16 indicated a lot of pressure came from, I'd say, from  
17 [REDACTED] and that, but it was just heresy, so I  
18 don't -- and I don't know the specifics, but, yes, I  
19 did hear that there was pressure to make inappropriate  
20 decisions and it came from that level, from [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED] and that type. So I know there was some  
22 controversy involved with that happened there, but I  
23 don't know any of the specifics.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Anything more  
25 on that?

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[REDACTED] No.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.  
That's it on that issue.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We touched on  
it earlier, this ~~steam valve~~ I think it's the MS42.  
[REDACTED] Forty-two, yes

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In the September 2002  
time frame.

[REDACTED] Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Our understanding is  
you're the [REDACTED] when the steam leak occurred.  
Can you just sort of walk us through the sequence of  
events on that? What part of the shift did it occur  
in and what happened?

[REDACTED] It was the night shift again.  
We had a planned power reduction on Salem Unit 2 that  
evening for turbine valve testing where we have to  
come down to 45 percent power. It's a routine -- not  
routine, but it's an evolution we perform per  
schedule, per procedures to come down and do this  
test.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was totally  
unrelated to the ~~steam valve?~~

[REDACTED] Totally unrelated to the steam  
valve. So that was the conditions at the night were

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1 we knew we had a planned power reduction for turbine  
2 valve testing to 45 to 50 percent power. [REDACTED]  
3 was on that night as like senior operations.  
4 Sometimes when we do a down power like that or  
5 maneuver the Plant, the planned evolution, we'll have  
6 management oversight, and [REDACTED] was there for  
7 that, serving that function that night, and he was  
8 also [REDACTED]

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's not  
10 uncommon then, if you're doing that kind of power  
11 movement.

12 [REDACTED] If you know you're going to do  
13 it, preplanned, to have someone in management there,  
14 correct.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

16 [REDACTED] So during the load reduction,  
17 I guess as you reduce load some of the pressures felt  
18 on the secondary systems increase, increase in steam  
19 pressures. We had a couple of previously identified  
20 leaks and we were monitoring those as we came down.  
21 As part of our pre-planning for this evolution, we  
22 want to keep an eye on this and this and this.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had been at full  
24 power?

25 [REDACTED] Yes.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

2  So we wanted to keep an eye on  
3 these couple of known leaks out in the Plant, make  
4 sure they don't worsen and stuff. This MS valve was  
5 not one of those, not a known previous leak. As we  
6 came down, a leak on 22 heater drain pump which had  
7 been previously identified got really bad. This is a  
8 pump that's a high energy, high pressure pump in the  
9 secondary plant. It had to be -- so during the load  
10 reduction, the first thing we had to do -- this pump,  
11 basically, was just blowing steam and water out of its  
12 mechanical seal and we took the pump out of service  
13 based on that.

14 I was out in the Plant observing the  
15 amount of leakage from that pump and I was coming back  
16 to the control room when I noticed just a slight drip  
17 from this main steam valve which feeds one of the  
18 steam generator feed pumps. I'm not sure what power  
19 level we were at at the time. So I'm like, oh,  
20 another steam leak, so I went --  was in his  
21 office, which is across the turbine building, so I  
22 walked across the turbine building, went to   
23 office, spoke to him for a moment and said, "You want  
24 to come out and look at this? This is another steam  
25 leak developing." So then we walked from his office

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1 back out to the turbine building and in that short  
2 time the leak had went from just a small wisp of steam  
3 drops of water to a full blown blowing steam out,  
4 probably five- to ten-foot plume at that time.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So how much time was  
6 that?

7 [REDACTED] Very short time.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just minutes?

9 [REDACTED] Like in ten minutes.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] Yes. To walk across the  
12 building, talk to [REDACTED] for a minute and go back out.


13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] So we looked at the leak, I  
15 went back to the control room. That power reduction  
16 was already in progress. [REDACTED] went to get, I think,  
17 Maintenance to look. We had the crew implement a  
18 procedure for a steam leak. It's an abnormal  
19 operating procedure. They briefed it. The leak  
20 continued to worsen. I think I must have gone back  
21 down a couple times and looked at it. It was -- at  
22 that point, in my estimate, you couldn't get to it to  
23 isolate it. In the first, from Maintenance, it came  
24 back -- where it was located on the valve we posed a  
25 question to Maintenance, if we could shut the valve,


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1 would it isolate the leak because it was on that  
2 valve? And Maintenance at first said no. Even if you  
3 could get to it, shutting the valve wouldn't stop the  
4 leak. So at that point we were kind of like there's  
5 no even need to consider trying to get to the valve,  
6 we've got to shut down and perform the actions of the  
7 procedure, which would have made us take the Plant all  
8 the way offline, shut the main steam isolation valves  
9 to divorce the secondary plant to isolate the leak.  
10 And it would have required steaming out the, what we  
11 call the MS10s or the atmospheric steam dumps blowing  
12 steam out to the environment, non-radioactive.


13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Loud, though,  
14 isn't it?

15  Loud. It's not something we do  
16 routinely at all anymore.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Manual dump like  
18 that.

19  Right.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who were you dealing  
21 with with Maintenance? When you say they first said  
22 they -- it sounds like that changes.

23  I forget who the supervisor  
24 was, but a 12-hour maintenance crew is always there  
25 around the clock. I forget who was on that evening.

1 But then I guess they looked at -- Maintenance looked  
2 -- at this point, we're continuing the load reduction,  
3 that's what's required, briefing what we're going to  
4 do as we go further down in power. Maintenance, I  
5 guess, is continuing to look at this. They've gotten  
6 the Engineering duty guy on shift to look at it, and  
7 they come in and say, "Yes, if it's -- if it's on the  
8 bottom of this valve, shutting it will isolate the  
9 leak."

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So now it's a  
11 different thing.

12 [REDACTED] Right. So now shutting it will  
13 isolate the leak, but at that point based on an  
14 assessment of the leak, the valve's up in the overhead  
15 but there is a platform built to it. I was like  
16 there's no way anybody can get to it. The operators  
17 had looked at it obviously at the Plant and nobody was  
18 saying, "Oh, I'll go shut that valve."

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No volunteers?

20 [REDACTED] No volunteers. There were  
21 phone calls made because the Plant's during the load  
22 reduction and that was mentioned previously. I don't  
23 know if I mentioned this phone call or not, but there  
24 were phone calls made, and the decision to shut the  
25 Plant down was not questioned. It was the right

1 decision.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You were moving  
3 down that road.

4 [REDACTED] Yes. Upper management during  
5 the phone conversations --

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: With?

7 [REDACTED] -- with me and [REDACTED]

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

9 [REDACTED] -- a conference call from my  
10 office --

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: With who?

12 [REDACTED] -- with the control room fully  
13 supported removing the unit from line.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that?

15 [REDACTED]  
16 Fully supported removing --

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Both of them were on  
18 the phone?

19 [REDACTED] I know [REDACTED] was. Yes, I  
20 believe [REDACTED] -- was it [REDACTED]  
21 then? I can't remember. I forget who the [REDACTED]  
22 was.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You were  
24 telling them how you're proceeding --

25 [REDACTED] What we're doing, right.

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- and they're  
2 supporting it.

3 [REDACTED] Yes. Because at that point  
4 there was -- even after we had been given the  
5 information that shutting the valve would isolate the  
6 leak --

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

8 [REDACTED] -- at that point, in my mind,  
9 there was no way we were going to get to the valve.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Personal safety

11 --

12 [REDACTED] Right. Personal safety.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- issue at  
14 that point.

15 [REDACTED] So we were actually out in the  
16 -- I was out in the control room. At that point, the  
17 phone call's over, we're out, the crew is holding a  
18 brief on the actions of the abnormal operating  
19 procedure and where that procedure will lead them.

20 I'm standing behind the control room panels. [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED] had been out of the control room and he had  
22 come back in and he came to me and he said, [REDACTED] I

23 think I can isolate the leak. I'm going to go get

24 [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] "I'm going to  
25 go get [REDACTED] and go down and look at it." ~~EX~~ TC

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED] (phonetic), he was  
3 the [REDACTED]. So right in the middle I'm  
4 thinking, gee, you know, what's [REDACTED] meaning, but I  
5 stayed in the control room at that point. Then I  
6 remember another phone call coming in at that point  
7 also that [REDACTED] Ops at Unit CRS took the call and it was [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED] And I talked to [REDACTED] for a minute and then  
9 I told [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I have to go. Plant conditions are  
10 degrading, I need to get off the phone." Got off the  
11 phone and then I left the control room. That was  
12 probably a bad decision on my part, but I didn't know  
13 what [REDACTED] really meant.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is there where you  
15 went?

16 [REDACTED] That's where I went. I went  
17 down to the location of the leak, and I get down there  
18 and the valve is shut and the leak's isolated. [REDACTED]  
19 up -- [REDACTED] at the bottom of the ladder being  
20 a safety watch or whatever. [REDACTED] up on the ladder,  
21 away from the platform, he's accessed, and the valve  
22 is closed and he's got a wrench on it and he's  
23 tightening it down. So the valve is shut. I'm like  
24 talking for a minute, then I go back to the control  
25 room. So at that point that whole -- [REDACTED] actions

1 were questioned. None of the operators thought it was  
2 appropriate what he did.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I have a couple  
4 questions on that. You just said you probably  
5 shouldn't have -- it was a bad move to leave the  
6 control room. Why do you say that?

7 [REDACTED] Well, my place in a -- picture  
8 it this way: I wasn't sure when [REDACTED] said, "Hey, I  
9 think I can isolate the leak, I'm going to get [REDACTED] and  
10 go down," just on the lower level, he was going to go  
11 down to the leak, I wasn't sure if he said he was  
12 going to go isolate the leak, he was going to up there  
13 -- I thought maybe he was just going to go down there  
14 and look at it with [REDACTED] and assess it, then come back  
15 and make a decision. I'm down there and he's closing  
16 the valve. If [REDACTED]  
17 are all down there and we all get taken out by this  
18 steam leak, if it really let's go all together, well,

19 [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Understood.

22 [REDACTED] -- are just gone. But I didn't  
23 know he was going down -- I suspected.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, what could he  
25 do to isolate the leak? What would his options have

1 been? If he says, "I think I can," what comes to  
2 mind?

3 [REDACTED] I wasn't sure if he was going  
4 to get [REDACTED] and go down and just assess it with [REDACTED]

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Like what he was  
6 saying with you.

7 [REDACTED] Say, "Hey, see, I think I can  
8 put this ladder up here and I can get to it on the  
9 other side of this platform and the plume's going out  
10 like this." As the leak got worse, the area around  
11 the valve was actually improving because the steam was  
12 blowing so far out.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. More  
14 pressure.

15 [REDACTED] According to what [REDACTED] said.  
16 Now, I didn't go -- [REDACTED] was assessing it on location  
17 a lot more often than I was. I was in the control  
18 room. What [REDACTED] said is as this thing continued to  
19 get worse, the area accessible to get to the hand  
20 wheel of this valve, which the hand wheel's about this  
21 big, to get to it was actually being cleared as the  
22 steam blew out further.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Narrowed it down.

24 [REDACTED] And it kind of cleared the area  
25 from the hand wheel. So when he said it was going

1 he said, "Continue the brief. I think I can isolate  
2 it," Went and got [REDACTED] and when I got down there it  
3 was isolated. I'm like, okay. But that was  
4 questioned by the operators. And, you know, to be  
5 honest with you, both -- the union took major issue  
6 with that, and I think it was because the union just  
7 doesn't like [REDACTED]

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was because he did  
9 it.

10 [REDACTED] Yes. A lot of times like that  
11 personal safety in that case was a choice. [REDACTED] and  
12 I talk about it a lot. It could have been handled  
13 better. [REDACTED] He's  
14 not going to put himself in harm's way ridiculously,  
15 he's not that kind of guy. But [REDACTED] tried to  
16 implement some stuff that the union doesn't like, and  
17 so the union took issue with it and made a big deal  
18 about it. But either scenario, whether [REDACTED] went up  
19 on that and shut the valve, isolated the leak, or he  
20 didn't, either scenario could be what if to death and  
21 core destruction either way. And that's what they did  
22 afterwards -- well, what if [REDACTED] what if this?

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was he a part of the  
24 phone call that you had with [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED] Yes, he was there.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He was present for  
3 that?

4 [REDACTED] He was present on that.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then this second  
6 call that came in from [REDACTED] you said it  
7 lasted about a minute.

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was the point of  
10 that?

11 [REDACTED] He was asking, trying to  
12 understand, asking specifics, and I was trying to  
13 listen in on the brief that the control room  
14 supervisor was conducting.)

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They were briefing to  
16 shut down.

17 [REDACTED] They were briefing the actions  
18 of the abnormal operating procedure that included  
19 shutting down, right. So I was -- [REDACTED] was a  
20 distraction at that point.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

22 [REDACTED] As he was most of the time he  
23 called in to the control room.)

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But he was trying to  
25 get a better understanding about the leak itself?

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[REDACTED]

Yes. Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: After this other phone call.

[REDACTED]

Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Now, you're saying during that phone call the decision was you were going to shut down and that was supported.

[REDACTED]

Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You were supported in that you were going to have to shut down because it was now a personal safety issue with regard to the leak. Even though it could isolate, it wasn't a --

[REDACTED]

Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You couldn't have done it without shutting down. Okay. So somewhere in between there and your phone call with [REDACTED] then that's when [REDACTED] makes the decision he's going to try and isolate this himself.

[REDACTED]

Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was this -- you've said you had conversations with him. Was this decision made on his own? Did he have some sort of input to that?

[REDACTED]

See, that's why I said earlier that I thought it could have been done -- handled

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1 better by [REDACTED] but, yes, he made it by himself, and  
 2 that was what was inappropriate. I think he could  
 3 have gotten -- we do have a fully staffed fire  
 4 department, fire and safety people there around the  
 5 clock. He could have gotten their assessment, he  
 6 could have maybe gotten some type of personal  
 7 protective gear, he could have gotten the operators to  
 8 help him, but he didn't do any of those things. He  
 9 just made the decision on his own from the field.  
 10 Like I said, what he told me afterwards, as the leak  
 11 actually worsened, the area right around the valve  
 12 hand wheel became accessible. So, yes, that's why I  
 13 say it could have been handled a little better by  
 14 [REDACTED] And, also, he kind of -- he, I'll say, kind of  
 15 removed my authority as a [REDACTED] that night,  
 16 and that wasn't his function for being there. He was  
 17 onsite to be management oversight.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you had made the  
 19 call at this point.

20 [REDACTED] Yes.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You were going to  
 22 shut the unit down. And he knew that.

23 [REDACTED]: Oh, yes.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can I ask you  
 25 a question on this? When he went and closed the

1 valve, had you already entered the abnormal operating  
2 procedure?

3 [REDACTED] Yes, well before that. Right  
4 when we got from initial identification after -- the  
5 abnormal operating procedure was entered.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Did that  
7 -- entering that AOP --

8 [REDACTED] We call them an AB, but, yes.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: AB, all right.  
10 Did that allow for anyone to go do what [REDACTED]  
11 did at that point?

12 [REDACTED] Yes. I mean there are steps,  
13 conditional steps within the AB, that if you can  
14 isolate the leak, you isolate the leak.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were those  
16 steps followed in how he did what he did?

17 [REDACTED] Yes. Yes.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How?

19 [REDACTED] I mean if -- because all it  
20 says is that.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is what? I  
22 don't know what it says.


23 [REDACTED] Isolate the leak. It doesn't  
24 get into -- the procedure is not specific on those --  
25 on details of how to isolate it or what precautions to

1 take or anything like that.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let me ask it  
3 this way: Did that procedure not allow him to do what  
4 he did?

5  No.


6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did it prohibit  
7 him from doing what he did?

8  No.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Him doing what  
10 he did, did the procedure require that that be  
11 reviewed and approved by anyone in the Plant?

12  No.


13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

14  No.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I want to  
16 explore this some. There is the procedure. In the  
17 procedure, from what you told me, there are provisions  
18 allowing someone to go physically close the valve.

19  Correct.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Manually close  
21 it, right?

22  Correct.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But before  
24 someone can do that, are there other procedures that  
25 would need to be followed, steps that would need to be

1 taken?

2 [redacted] Those steps were taken when he  
3 isolated -- by the time he isolated -- you mean  
4 preceding steps in the procedure?

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

6 [redacted] Yes, they were done.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he follow  
8 all the steps he had to follow in that procedure to do  
9 what he did?

10 [redacted] In that procedure, yes.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he violate  
12 any procedure in doing what he did?

13 [redacted] Well, sure. I mean it's not  
14 normal for management individuals to operate equipment  
15 in the Plant.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So what did he  
17 violate procedurally? I'm asking you.

18 [redacted] I mean he probably violated the  
19 collective bargaining agreement with the union, but  
20 this was an emergency condition which probably didn't  
21 even violate that.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about control of  
23 Ops?

24 [redacted]: There may have been some  
25 conduct of operations standards that weren't adhered

Handwritten notes on the right margin, including the word "ARTICLE" and some illegible scribbles.

Handwritten mark resembling the number "70" on the right margin.

Handwritten signature or initials on the right margin.

Handwritten signature or initials at the bottom right of the page.

1 to just on the fact that he didn't communicate what he  
2 was doing well to anyone, you know what I mean? He  
3 didn't --

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not well, he just --  
5 right.

6 [REDACTED] Just went out and did it. He  
7 may have thought he communicated it to me but I did  
8 not -- I mean our normal method of communication  
9 wasn't used, and I was in serious question. That's  
10 why I went down there. The union didn't like the fact  
11 that I went down there, but I didn't go down there to  
12 help him close it, I went down there to see what he  
13 was doing.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And did you authorize  
15 his isolation of the valve in that manner?

16 [REDACTED] No. That's why I say he kind  
17 of diluted my authority as the [REDACTED] that  
18 night because that authority should have come from me  
19 and didn't it, not whatsoever.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did that AB  
21 require that authorization before someone could go and  
22 close the valve?

23 [REDACTED] Sure. I mean that's inherent  
24 in anything in the procedure. [REDACTED] was not a member  
25 of the crew.

MAYBE  
7/23/84  
HGT HAW

1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

2 [REDACTED] Within normal -- he had no  
3 right to be touching anything or directing anything or  
4 doing anything. He was there for management oversight  
5 for the load reduction schedule that night, nothing  
6 else.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you tell us  
8 specifically what he violated then when he did what he  
9 did? Can you point to a procedure? Can you point to  
10 a step?

11 [REDACTED] No. Like I said, I don't think  
12 there's anything in any of the implementing  
13 procedures. It would be more of a standards thing in  
14 accordance with conduct of operations, which is an  
15 administrative procedure.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, you're  
17 supposed to follow them. Those are supposed to be  
18 followed also.

19 [REDACTED] Absolutely. Absolutely. Those  
20 are probably more important. They govern how we use  
21 the implementing procedures.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was [REDACTED]  
23 Did you have one or more than one?

24 [REDACTED]  
25 [REDACTED] on Unit 1 at -- sorry, on Unit 2 during

1 that time.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED] Correct.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How did he take it?  
6 How did he respond to this?

7 [REDACTED] Everyone in the control room at  
8 the time was very glad the leak was isolated. As the  
9 leak worsened and moisture accumulated down on some  
10 switch gear in the vicinity of the leak, we were  
11 receiving alarms in the control room which indicated  
12 possible inability to transfer when we -- if we had to  
13 shut the unit down, no longer would the unit be  
14 supplying its power, it's electrical power.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You were getting  
16 shorts or something in the --

17 [REDACTED] We were getting ground alarms,  
18 and we were getting -- it's called a transfer inhibit  
19 alarm saying the group buses wouldn't transfer to  
20 offsite power once we tripped.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

22 [REDACTED] Or potentially. The control  
23 room crew was very relieved and very glad [REDACTED] did  
24 what he did. From the control room supervisor to the  
25 reactor operators, they were like, "Whew." Because

1 where we were headed -- any my operators told me this.)  
2 Obviously, I've discussed this whole thing (with my  
3 crew, my crew was on.) They said, "Well, the Plant's  
4 designed for natural circulation cooldown if we had  
5 lost all power of the diesels to run." Sure, it's  
6 designed for that and we practiced for it in the  
7 simulator,) and that's the only place I ever hope to do  
8 it is in the simulator.)

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's not where you  
11 want to be.

12 [REDACTED] That's not where you want to  
13 be. That's why I said either scenario, had [REDACTED] not  
14 isolated the leak and we continued, who knows what (we  
15 would have run into.) You could -- what if that whole  
16 scenario, because we would have been shutting down the  
17 Plant very abnormal condition.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How long would it  
19 take? How quickly were you going to be shut down?  
20 You were already down powering for this pre-planned,  
21 but where were you and how long was it going to be  
22 before you were down?

23 [REDACTED]: Well, we were going down) I  
24 think at that point at one percent a minute. So you  
25 figure it's not going to take long to get down because

1 we need to get the Plant offline so that we can close  
2 the main steam isolation valves, because that's the  
3 way the leak is isolated. At that point, though, the  
4 cooling of the reactor in the core and the potential  
5 that there's no non-vital power all could complicate  
6 that, could complicate the actual reactor plant. The  
7 secondary plant, once we shut down and shut the main  
8 steam isolation valve, it's gone.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was the --  
10 [REDACTED] The crew was very -- at the  
11 moment, the crew was very relieved. Now, [REDACTED]  
12 had the same concerns as we discussed here on [REDACTED]  
13 failure to properly communicate what he was doing and  
14 all of that, all those issues.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he have  
16 conversations with [REDACTED] over the direction you  
17 and he were going to take the Plant?

18 [REDACTED] No.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there anything  
20 between [REDACTED] --

21 [REDACTED] No.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- in terms of  
23 authorizations or understandings about what he was  
24 going to do?

25 [REDACTED] did not communicate

1 to [REDACTED] at all.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was [REDACTED]

3 licensed then, do you know?

4 [REDACTED]: Yes.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He was?

6 [REDACTED]: Yes.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So in terms of the  
9 situation you were left to deal with then, it's sort  
10 of mixed. (Your crew) was appreciative because they  
11 didn't have to shut down under those conditions --

12 [REDACTED] My control room crew.)

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: (Your control room  
14 crew, but your control room supervisor --)

15 [REDACTED] My equipment operators) were all

16 --

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The union guys  
18 weren't happy with it.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, the --

20 [REDACTED] The reactor operators are  
21 union.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

23 [REDACTED] And the individuals in the  
24 control room that would have been faced with actual  
25 mechanics of doing this shutdown --

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The control room  
2 crew.)

3 [REDACTED] -- were very relieved. The  
4 equipment operators made a big issue of the whole  
5 thing, went to Employee Concerns -- well, actually, I  
6 think [REDACTED] at the time,  
7 because of the concern expressed by the operators went  
8 to the Employees Concerns group and had an  
9 investigation done. But I honestly believe this was  
10 a case of where the union saw that [REDACTED] had done some  
11 things that weren't strictly by the book in isolating  
12 this leak, and they went for -- made a big issue out  
13 of it.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Because it was him.  
15 [REDACTED] Because it was him, yes. And  
16 it's a big problem, union-management relations, very  
17 big problem in Salem.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But at your  
19 level, you said it was inappropriate also for one  
20 reason because he removed your authority as a [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED] in doing what he did.

22 [REDACTED] I said there were areas for  
23 improvement and that was one of them, right.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And [REDACTED] saw it  
25 the same way. J

1 [REDACTED] Overall I was relieved also  
2 that [REDACTED] isolated the leak.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And [REDACTED] saw it  
4 the same way that you saw it, in that the authority  
5 was removed when he acted that way?

6 [REDACTED] Yes.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What were the other  
8 areas for improvement on that one?

9 (END TAPE 2, SIDE A)

10 (BEGIN TAPE 2, SIDE B)

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We were talking about  
12 other areas to improve on the handling of that issue  
13 by [REDACTED] one being that the authority wasn't  
14 communicated and yours and the CRS' was apparently  
15 removed by his actions.

16 [REDACTED] Right.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What other areas were  
18 there?

19 [REDACTED] He could have had -- he should  
20 have had the situation independently assessed, right,  
21 before he unilaterally made the decision, right, to --  
22 we do have people -- like I said, we do have people  
23 onsite who were Fire and Safety Department who could  
24 have helped him assess the condition locally at the  
25 valve. He could have gotten equipment operator

1 involvement instead of Work Control Center supervisor  
2 involvement. I think after the event and after the  
3 concerns were raised, I think Operations Management  
4 handled it appropriately. Like I said, they initiated  
5 an Employees Concerns investigation to determine the  
6 appropriateness of [REDACTED] actions.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was the outcome  
8 of that? Or how much of that was communicated to you?  
9 [REDACTED] A lot was communicated, and I  
10 think most of those things we're discussing here were  
11 communicated -- were put out following that. In other  
12 words, the actions overall were necessary for the  
13 conditions at the time; however, there were areas for  
14 improvement, as we've talked about. Almost every  
15 transient condition in the Plant you look back on and  
16 you say, "Well, we did good in these areas, but we've  
17 could have done better in these and we move forward  
18 and learn from them" In this case, I don't think  
19 there was anything safety, other than [REDACTED] own  
20 personal safety, which he chose to -- he determined  
21 not to be in jeopardy when he shut the valve.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Would there be some  
23 reason he would select Work Management to go with him  
24 on that -- Work Control to go with him to look at that  
25 as opposed to what you're saying he should have done

1 was an equipment operator?

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or the Fire and  
3 Safety people.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He had [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] who was on shift [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] that night, which is right outside the control  
9 room. And I have no idea why [REDACTED] would have had him  
10 go versus getting an operator, an equipment operator.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware of any  
12 senior management influence on [REDACTED] at that  
13 time that influenced his actions that night?

14 [REDACTED] No, I am not.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he say anything  
16 to you --

17 [REDACTED] No.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- about specifically  
19 why he did what he did?

20 [REDACTED] Oh, yes. He told me -- as  
21 previously talked about, on the conference with senior  
22 management, it was fully supported to shut down the  
23 Plant. I think [REDACTED] after this happened, in  
24 discussing it with [REDACTED] did it because, like I  
25 said, once the leak worsened, the area around the

710

1 valve hand wheel he thought became more accessible and  
2 he was able to do it.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How much time was  
4 there between that conference call that you had and  
5 when he actually went and --

6 [REDACTED] It seemed like the whole event  
7 maybe lasted three or four hours that evening, from  
8 initial identification to isolation. It wasn't a --  
9 didn't take long. But from the phone call to when  
10 [REDACTED] went out maybe a half hour, 45 minutes or so.  
11 Because after the phone call I was out in the control  
12 room, we were continuing to shut down) and -- or  
13 continuing the load reduction. [REDACTED] went back out in  
14 the field and that's when he assessed the situation as  
15 being able to close the valve.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did his doing that,  
17 his manipulating the valve and his removal of your  
18 authority cause you a great deal of angst over the  
19 situation?

20 [REDACTED] Yes. I had a hard time with  
21 that whole evening after in hindsight because -- like  
22 I said, I was relieved that we did not have to proceed  
23 with this shutdown because it was not a good spot to  
24 be in, but I felt like I failed as a [REDACTED]  
25 that evening because when he came to me, when I was

1 sitting there during that brief, and he said what he  
2 told me, "I think I can isolate the leak. I'm going  
3 to go get [REDACTED] and go down," I should have stopped him  
4 right there. And that's where I failed. I should  
5 have said, "Wait, [REDACTED]" If I had any question in my  
6 mind, what's he mean by what he's telling me, I should  
7 have stopped him, but I didn't.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Because you had  
9 enough to question to follow,

10 [REDACTED] But I didn't.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Shortly after you  
12 followed him down to see what he was doing. So you're  
13 thinking that you made a mistake for not pushing him  
14 on what he meant by that.

15 [REDACTED]: Right. Because had it been [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED] who came to me, I would have. I didn't stop  
17 him because he was my boss, and that's where I failed.  
18 That's why I had a hard time with that whole event.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How much of a hard  
20 time did you have? Were you thinking of leaving?

21 [REDACTED] Leaving?

22 (Laughter.)

23 [REDACTED] Sorry, I'm laughing on the  
24 tape. I'm always thinking of leaving. As a result of  
25 that, yes, I thought of leaving -- I thought more so

1 of leaving, either leaving the position or leaving the  
2 Company.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was a pretty  
4 significant event then.

5 [REDACTED] For me.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Had that ever  
7 happened to you before?

8 [REDACTED] No.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Since?

10 [REDACTED] No.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there any kind of  
12 direction that came out to address what he did that  
13 that's going to ensure that you're not faced with that  
14 again, this conduct of Ops breach?

15 [REDACTED] There was a -- like I said,  
16 there were lessons learned put out after the post-  
17 event investigation that covered most of these things,  
18 yes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That said, basically,  
20 that he did what he did, it could have been handled  
21 better, but we don't see a real --

22 [REDACTED] Correct.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- problem there.

24 [REDACTED] Right.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I'm going to take a

1 quick minute a look at my notes, okay, Jeff? Unless  
2 you have something immediately.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. I'll  
4 continue on. ~~FA~~

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Go ahead.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Switching a  
7 little bit here, a couple more general kind of  
8 questions. Have there been occasions where  
9 individuals have brought safety concerns to you  
10 because they didn't want to raise them themselves,  
11 safety concerns, operability concerns --

12 [REDACTED] No. TC

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- decision-  
14 making concerns to you because they were afraid to  
15 bring it up themselves?

16 [REDACTED] No. TC

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Has that  
18 happened?

19 [REDACTED] No. TC

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No?

21 [REDACTED] In my position, thought, that's  
22 why my people are supposed to do, bring them to me. TC

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

24 [REDACTED] Right. TC

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. So do

1 people bring them to you, those types of concerns?

2 [REDACTED] Sure.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And do you then  
4 raise them up and --

5 [REDACTED] If appropriate, if I can't  
6 address them and resolve them myself.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So either you  
8 would address and resolve it and if you couldn't, you  
9 would raise it up the chain of command?

10 [REDACTED] Correct.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have you ever  
12 been reluctant to raise an issue up the chain of  
13 command?

14 [REDACTED] No.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Excuse me?

16 [REDACTED] Me? No.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That wasn't a  
18 real strong no at first. I didn't know if you --

19 [REDACTED] No. On the contrary, I don't  
20 have any problem with voicing my opinion.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You don't have  
22 any problem.

23 [REDACTED] No.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you ever gotten

1 in any trouble for expressing concerns that have been  
2 brought to you, particularly by, we'll break it down,  
3 by the union? That's a --

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Negative  
5 feedback, counseling, coaching?

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Pushback?

7 [REDACTED] (I have a vocal crew.)

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

9 [REDACTED]: And maybe that's a reflection  
10 of me, it probably is. But I would say I probably  
11 have received negative appraisals, performance  
12 appraisals as a result of the way I vocalize concerns.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the way you  
14 vocalize concerns --

15 [REDACTED] Not that I raise those concerns  
16 but the way I raise them.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Can you made  
18 that -- can you define that distinction there? You're  
19 saying it's not that you brought the issues forward,  
20 it's the way you did it.

21 [REDACTED] Yes.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did you do that  
23 was inappropriate?

24 [REDACTED] I get real emotional or --

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you give an

1 example? I mean what are you talking about? A union  
2 issue kind of thing, a safety issue? What would the  
3 issue be? I mean is it overtime, is it something  
4 else?

5 [REDACTED] Any --

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything?

7 [REDACTED] All of the above, yes.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

9 [REDACTED] Whether it's a union issue  
10 personnel issue, a plant issue. Sometimes I don't  
11 agree. Sometimes throughout -- obviously, throughout  
12 this time period there have been many decisions I  
13 don't agree with.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So it's your passion  
15 for the issue that gets you in trouble?

16 [REDACTED] Yes, exactly.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you think of one  
18 where it's shown up in your appraisal?

19 [REDACTED] I don't think specific ones  
20 show up in my appraisal. I think just the general  
21 tone is there.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They're criticizing  
23 your demeanor?

24 [REDACTED] I think I'm a decent [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED] My appraisals don't reflect it. For the

1 most part, they haven't.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How have you  
3 been rated, I mean unsat, meets, exceeds?

4 [REDACTED] I mean my performance appraisal  
5 last year led to pretty much a [REDACTED] for the  
6 year.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why is that? Was  
8 your performance different?

9 [REDACTED] (My crew) had -- I think (my  
10 crew's performance was outstanding in light of the  
11 events they encountered. Not a single human  
12 performance event, not a single -- any of the metrics  
13 by which my performance and the site's performance is  
14 measured, zero tagging events, zero OSHA recordables,  
15 zero unplanned power reductions caused by personal  
16 error, any of those type areas that are in my  
17 appraisal are performance things.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who wrote the  
19 appraisal?

20 [REDACTED]  
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you challenge  
22 that?

23 [REDACTED] It's kind of a catch-22.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

25 [REDACTED] Do you understand? If it says

1 right in your appraisal that you ~~don't~~ agree and that  
2 you're argumentative ~~?~~

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: ~~You're~~ contentious  
4 and you can't be contentious about your performance  
5 appraisal? ~~X~~

6 ~~██████████~~ Guess not. It's a catch-22.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So does that mean  
8 that you didn't argue it?

9 ~~██████████~~ No, I did.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You did?

11 ~~██████████~~ I mildly vocalized my  
12 disappointment and went on.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is he going to  
14 write your appraisal for the calendar year '03?

15 ~~██████████~~ Yes.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have you got  
17 any indication on how it's --

18 ~~██████████~~ I think he's working on it now.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you get --

20 ~~██████████~~ I think -- I don't think all  
21 his comments are unjustified. Maybe I could handle  
22 things better. No, don't get me wrong. We all can,  
23 right, but I don't think my and ~~my~~ crew's performance  
24 warranted that. That's just one area, sure. I can do  
25 better in this but it shouldn't override the whole

1 overall performance appraisal.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And result in [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED] just this one communications area.

4 [REDACTED] Yes. That's my opinion.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What about the  
6 year before that, did you get a raise the year before  
7 that at the level of people at your position?

8 [REDACTED] when [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] the turnover rate of [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED] the whole turnover rate at Salem in the  
11 management ranks was atrocious. We couldn't keep  
12 enough licensed operators. So during [REDACTED]'s tenure  
13 everybody received substantial pay raises, but it was  
14 in an effort to keep people.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It costs a lot  
16 of money to train SROs.

17 [REDACTED] So it's hard to judge because  
18 that year everybody got large pay raises for that  
19 reason.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's interesting that  
21 2002 is the year that you have a number of incidents  
22 that lead you to question Mr. [REDACTED] decision  
23 making and go into a meeting with him and then you  
24 have this incident in September that you object to and  
25 this is 2002 as well, that you reacted to pretty

1 strongly on [REDACTED] actions. Is the connection  
2 in these issues or is it more than that, your  
3 contentiousness?

4 [REDACTED] I'm not sure I understand.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What do you attribute  
6 it to overall? Is the fact that in the same year you  
7 had to call a meeting with [REDACTED] and you've  
8 questioned your [REDACTED] decision within that last three  
9 months of the year, in September, the actions there on  
10 the steam valve leak? Is that what led to the --  
11 you're saying it may be fair, that the way they rated  
12 you may be somewhat accurate but maybe not overall it  
13 should result in what your end result is. Is there  
14 more to what goes on in the year? I mean what other  
15 issues are you getting -- what other issues are you  
16 raising and being seen as contentious over?

17 [REDACTED] I don't know. I'm sure there  
18 were others that are maybe outside the realm of just  
19 safety conscious work environment, but maybe they do  
20 fall in that, how we conduct business in Operations,  
21 things that I don't necessarily agree with the way the  
22 Department and the plants are operating.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Are you raising

24 --

25 [REDACTED] I've tried that. I've tried to

1 improve but I don't hesitate to bring them up. I try  
2 to do it a different way, but I mean I won't -- I was  
3 disappointed with last year's performance. And I'm  
4 pretty self-critical, so --

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Are you making  
6 a discrimination complaint against the Company?

7 [REDACTED]: No.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In how they  
9 rated you?

10 [REDACTED]: No.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about are you  
12 aware of how your peers are evaluated, especially for  
13 2002?

14 [REDACTED]: No.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't know  
16 anything about how they get their raises --

17 [REDACTED]: We don't talk about it.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- their performance  
19 appraisals.

20 [REDACTED]: We don't talk about it.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you have no  
22 comparison from yours versus somebody else who may or  
23 may not raise issues or anything like that.

24 [REDACTED]: Correct.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything else? I

1 just have to check one area that I wanted to go back  
2 to, unless you have anything to add on that.

3 ~~TEATOR~~ I've got a question while  
4 you're looking. Have you ever seen an incident where  
5 corporate management in Newark provided direction and  
6 supervision decision involving plant operability or  
7 plant safety?

8 ~~REDACTED~~ No.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Plant shutdown?

10 ~~REDACTED~~ No.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No?

12 ~~REDACTED~~ No. From corporate? No.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, from  
14 corporate. Do you believe your management is  
15 supportive of a healthy or good safety conscious work  
16 environment, your current management?

17 ~~REDACTED~~ Yes.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about the  
19 prior management, the ~~REDACTED~~ I guess  
20 ~~REDACTED~~ he's no longer there anymore either, right?

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That crew.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As of September, I  
24 think.

25 ~~REDACTED~~ I think they believe they were.

1 Does that make sense? But I don't believe they were.  
2 I think they believed they were.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What were they  
4 measuring themselves by? What would make them believe  
5 that?

6 [REDACTED] That --

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That they believed  
8 they were effective?

9 [REDACTED] Safety conscious work  
10 environment, right?

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Fostering a safety  
12 conscious work environment.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know  
14 what they may have been basing their opinion on,  
15 survey results, things like that?

16 [REDACTED] I don't know.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Don't know?

18 [REDACTED] We did a hell of a lot of  
19 surveys and that kind of stuff. We didn't get many  
20 results from them.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had the surveys  
22 but no results?

23 [REDACTED] A lot of times, yes.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. The annual  
25 surveys, quarterly survey?

1 [REDACTED] These were like the big -- what  
2 company?

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oh, Gallop survey?

4 [REDACTED] Gallop. They had Gallop once.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So they would do a  
6 survey but you didn't get a result.

7 [REDACTED] They didn't follow through on  
8 it, yes. Once they did and once they didn't. It was  
9 a big survey. His days may have been numbered at that  
10 point.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Whose?

12 [REDACTED]  
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, [REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED] okay.

15 [REDACTED] So now [REDACTED] done a survey. We  
16 just did another big survey.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oh, okay. Did you  
18 see results from that?

19 [REDACTED] Not yet. We should.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Too soon?

21 [REDACTED] Too soon, yes. Just finished.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I don't mean for  
23 there to be dead space. Do you want to just take a  
24 minute on here?

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I'll go off the  
2 record. It's about 12:07.

3 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off  
4 the record at 12:07 p.m. and went back on  
5 the record at 12:08 p.m.)

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're back on  
7 about a minute later, 12:08. Do you have any  
8 knowledge of a situation involving a [REDACTED]  
9 (phonetic), is he on your shift?

10 [REDACTED] was on my shift for some  
11 period of time. He's currently off shift in a position  
12 in [REDACTED]

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have any  
14 knowledge or recollection of a situation where he NA'd  
15 a step, I believe it was in a start-up procedure, took  
16 some criticism for that? There was a step that was  
17 NA'd. Do you recall anything about that?

18 [REDACTED] I remember [REDACTED] NA'ing a step in  
19 a surveillance procedure on a service water pump; I  
20 believe.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That could be my  
22 mistake.

23 [REDACTED]: And let me see if I can  
24 remember -- it was actually during an INPO evaluation,  
25 so he was being observed.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Ooh, that was  
2 significant then.

3 [REDACTED] And he NA'd a step -- if this  
4 is what you're referring to, he inappropriately NA'd  
5 a step in a procedure, didn't follow the administrator  
6 guidance for how to do that. If you NA a step in a  
7 procedure that's not a conditional step, there's some  
8 requirements for independent reviews of that NA by  
9 another licensed individual, things like that. And  
10 like I say, he did that during observation during an  
11 INPO evaluation and, yes, [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED]  
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you ever learn of  
14 any reason for why he justified NA'ing the step, was  
15 there some reason for it? Was there something to be  
16 gained by it or something he expressed?

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was it in  
18 training or was it actually --

19 [REDACTED] No, it was in the Plant.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In the Plant,  
21 okay.

22 (Laughter.)

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're laughing.

24 [REDACTED] I'm laughing because of the  
25 whole procedure had been modified to compensate for

1 [equipment deficiency with a leakage past certain  
2 valves in the service water system] and needless to  
3 say from all the discussion on the [service water] the  
4 [service water system] is an important system but it is  
5 a poorly performing system, and the procedure had been  
6 modified to [accommodate leakage past some valves] in  
7 the system so it would still allow the performance of  
8 this [pump performance test]. And I think if he had not  
9 NA'd the procedure, he would have had to terminate the  
10 procedure and could not have performed it. What would  
11 that have meant? We would just have had to  
12 investigate and see why. I don't think there were  
13 any, from a safety perspective, no consequences of his  
14 NA'ing the step.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was the  
16 procedure just not correct?

17 [REDACTED] He didn't wait long enough to  
18 observe [leakage past this valve]

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

20 [REDACTED] And I think the [operators]  
21 involved who were actual equipment operators in the  
22 field and in the control room questioned [REDACTED] -- "You  
23 can't NA that. Well, we need to either do the formal  
24 process of doing an on-the-spot change to the  
25 procedure or we need to stop and get it resolve. We

1 can't just NA that step." And [redacted] kind of overlooked  
 2 their concerns and proceeded. So I think [redacted]  
 3 actions were inappropriate, and I think he was -- I'm  
 4 not sure of the details as to his [redacted]  
 5 [redacted] but he was --

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this a situation  
 7 where [redacted]

8 [redacted]  
 9 [redacted] Yes. He had to --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Give an explanation  
 11 of it? [redacted]

12 [redacted] Yes, he did. [redacted]

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that was part of  
 14 the [redacted] apparently.

15 [redacted] I'm sure it was.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know why  
 18 he's no longer on your shift? Is this --

19 [redacted] No. He rotated off to a -- he  
 20 still maintains his SRO license. I think the latter  
 21 part of this year he's scheduled to rotate back onto  
 22 my crew. It's a rotational assignment in [redacted]

23 [redacted]  
 24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have any  
 25 concerns about that?

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1 [REDACTED] About [REDACTED] No.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So other than this,  
3 do you have any reason to question his abilities, his  
4 decision making?

5 [REDACTED]  
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This incident.

7 [REDACTED] No. I think it was an honest  
8 mistake, not a malicious mistake, which makes all the  
9 difference. I think he honestly learned from it.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] Is he the top performing [REDACTED]  
12 No. He's got some performance issues. No one's  
13 perfect. But he is a safe operator? I think so.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. I'm pretty  
15 much -- I think we've covered the incidents that we  
16 wanted to talk to you about, and pretty much what I'd  
17 like to know is you see the direction that we're going  
18 here, you see the concerns that we're exploring. Is  
19 there something that we're missing asking about that's  
20 of concern to you in terms of the safe operation of  
21 the Plant? Is there anything we haven't covered?

22 [REDACTED] No.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are there any  
24 outstanding issues there that just aren't being  
25 addressed that you think should be?

1 [REDACTED] No. I think you can obviously  
2 discern from this whole conversation there are long-  
3 standing equipment reliability issues that are yet to  
4 be resolved. I will go into work this evening and be  
5 dealing with issues at circ water, just as I did last  
6 year and the year before. Whether this management  
7 team is going to resolve it or not is yet to be seen,  
8 but obviously a plant that has chosen to manage itself  
9 by turning over senior leadership teams frequently and  
10 key positions frequently it's hard to maintain that  
11 long-term focus. So that's why we continue to have  
12 trouble in the continuity required for an effective  
13 Corrective Action Program.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything  
15 else you'd like to add at this point? I'm about to  
16 wrap it up.

17 [REDACTED] No.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Jeff?

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The only thing  
20 I'm going to ask is that you not discuss the specifics  
21 of what we talked about today with your  
22 contemporaries, with your management, because we need  
23 to talk to a number of people and we want to get their  
24 own individual recollections. You're not legally  
25 bound to comply with what we're asking you in this

1 area, but we're going to ask that you don't. So when  
2 we go talk to people we get their honest recollections  
3 of what they remember, what they heard, what they saw  
4 and not getting a group think thing going on.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: More prepared,  
6 rehearsed responses.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. So I'd  
8 ask that you not going into specifics of what we  
9 talked about.


10  I have no desire to discuss  
11 this conversation with anyone. I can assure you of  
12 that.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything else?

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No, I have  
16 nothing else. So thank you.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have I or any other  
18 NRC representative offered you any promises of reward  
19 or threatened you in any manner in exchange for your  
20 information today?

21  No, they haven't.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And we covered that  
23 you don't have anything further to add to the record.  
24 And Jeff asked you earlier you understood you were  
25 here voluntarily.

1 [REDACTED] Yes.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We asked for your  
3 cooperation and you agreed to meet with us, and I  
4 thank you for that, and I thank you for the large  
5 chunk of time you gave us today to help us through  
6 this.

7 [REDACTED] Okay. If you have any  
8 questions in the future, I mean I can -- some of it's  
9 sketchy because it's so much over the past three  
10 years, but if there's any -- I mean I can find  
11 specifics. I apologize, I wasn't prepared to give  
12 them today, but if you have any -- if you need to know  
13 more specifically or things like that, it's a matter  
14 of public record, I can get it.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. We  
16 appreciate that.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Thank you. I  
18 appreciate it. And we'll do that if we have any  
19 further, you know, any follow-up issues on that. But  
20 at this point we can conclude the interview. It's

21 12:17 p.m.

22 (Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the Interview  
23 of [REDACTED] was concluded.)

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of



Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Salem, New Jersey

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Mia Thorp".

Mia Thorp  
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