

Official Transcript of Proceedings
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

Interview of [REDACTED] -7C

Docket Number:

1-2003-051F

Location:

Hope Creek Nuclear Power Station

Date:

Thursday, October 23, 2003

Work Order No.:

NRC-1191

Pages 1-95

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW

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IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.

[REDACTED]

TC

: 1-2003-051F

(CLOSED) :

-----x

Thursday, October 23, 2003

NRC Resident's Office

Salem Hope Creek

The above-entitled interview was conducted

at 2:05 p.m.

BEFORE:

Special Agent EILEEN NEFF

ALSO PRESENT:

Scott Barber, Division of Reactor Products,

NRC Region 1

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 2:05 p.m.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is
4 October 23, 2003. The time is approximately 2:05 p.m.
5 The location is at the NRC Resident's Office at Salem
6 Hope Creek.

7 Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, NRC
8 Region 1, Office of Investigations. Also present is
9 Scott Barber from the Division of Reactor Products,
10 also in Region 1.

11 This interview is with [REDACTED] who is
12 a [REDACTED] at Salem and is also in
13 the position of [REDACTED]. Before going on
14 the record, you had indicated that you understood the
15 nature of the interview today and that we're making --
16 it's an inquiry regarding your assessment of the
17 safety culture here on site and if you had any
18 concerns to note regarding the safety conscious work
19 environment, that there are no particular violations
20 that we're discussing. It's an overall assessment of
21 the safety culture.


22 You also agreed to conduct the interview
23 under oath.

24 [REDACTED] Yes.


25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But prior to going on

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
1 the record, what you raised was a point indicating
2 that recently, and this was in the past year, it was



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10 Your point in raising this issue up front
11 was that you did not want that to be something that
12 was undisclosed that would later appear as though you
13 were biased in any way against the company. My
14 question for you is are you able to provide
15 information at this interview under oath from a
16 factual, truthful manner in regard to the company
17 policies that we'll be asking about, company
18 directives?

19  Absolutely.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At this point, can
21 you raise your right hand?

22  sure.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you swear that the
24 information you provide at this interview is the
25 truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so

1 help you God?

2 [REDACTED] I do.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you. [REDACTED]

4 would you just, if we can spell your last name for the

5 record, it's [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] Correct.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Date of birth and
8 Social Security Number?

9 [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And again your
12 position is [REDACTED] and
13 you had indicated that you were working here since [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED] That's correct.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you always been
17 in the same position?

18 [REDACTED] Yes, I have.


19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And how long have you
20 been a [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And in that role, can
23 you tell us how you function and what is it that you
24 do?

25 [REDACTED] My primary function is to

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and in terms of raising concerns and these concerns would not be particularly pressed by vacation schedules or manpower, but in terms of raising concerns of a safety nature, do you have -- have you had experience with doing that?

[REDACTED] There are a hundred guys in the department, probably 99 percent of them have concerns or claims with procedural guidance, tagging evolution, (Inaudible) performed in the field, working relationships. All that is funnelled through one of

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[REDACTED] The vast majority
I'm (Inaudible) concerns of the company.. It's been
(Inaudible) complain about the company. Usually, it's
me, but sometimes it's one of the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[REDACTED] The vast majority of any kind
of concern concerning the operations of the plant.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. When you do
that, what kind of response do you get?

[REDACTED]: Depending on the supervisors,
it's not (Inaudible), the supervisor as well as the
issue. I've had responses where work was stopped
immediately and concerns were addressed and satisfied
to the other end of the spectrum, got responses like
"leave it" and continue to work. If it's not a safety
issue, continue to work. We'll discuss it at the next
(Inaudible) meeting or the next 12-hour shift meeting,
so responses vary greatly (Inaudible).

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In terms of where you
would consider the safe operation of the plant, have
you ever had to raise a concern and have you ever been
dissatisfied with the response that you got, in that
you were still concerned for the safe operation of the
plant?

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[REDACTED]

Yes, on a few occasions.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: (Inaudible)

[REDACTED]

We'll talk about the one most recently, since it's most fresh in everybody's mind and that was the continued operation of Unit 1 with BF19 (Phonetic), the 24 BF19 stuck open for 15 hours before we could declare a 303 and shut down.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In the past week or so?

[REDACTED]

Yes, within the past week or two. It's a fairly recent event.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What happened?

[REDACTED]

About 3 o'clock in the morning, the BF19 swapped to manual for automatic control in the control room.

MR. BARBER: Do you remember [REDACTED]

(Phonetic)?

[REDACTED]

I have it right here, somewhere. NCO Unit Control Room, tried to take manual control of the BF19 to control level at (Inaudible) generator and it failed to respond, to input, manual input.

MR. BARBER: And the 24 BF19 is the feed reg valve (Phonetic) for the 24 steam generator?

[REDACTED]

Correct.

ALL TC

1 MR. BARBER: And it has a remote control
2 in the control room that could be transferred from
3 automatic to manual?

4 [REDACTED] Yes.

5 MR. BARBER: And that's what you're saying
6 went to manual?

7 [REDACTED] Yes.

8 MR. BARBER: Okay.

9 [REDACTED] Anyway, it failed to respond
10 and it was the opinion of the NCO Unit Control Room at
11 the time, there were three, that the valve was
12 mechanically bound, so it failed to respond to
13 automatic input as well as manual input to the control
14 circuit.

15 The supervision on at the time didn't want
16 to declare that the case because that would put us in
17 a 303 and would require a 1-hour shutdown and I
18 believe a subsequent 6-hour (Inaudible) cool down. So
19 what they did was --

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was they, the
21 supervisors?

22 [REDACTED]: Supervision that particular
23 night was [REDACTED] (Phonetic) was [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED]

25 MR. BARBER: Is [REDACTED] the

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same as the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Yes.

MR. BARBER: Okay, so the terms are used synonymously?

[REDACTED] Yes.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED] And we restructure and names change.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED] I still use those. That's the most recent.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He was the supervisor of the (Inaudible). He was involved. And the immediate supervisor was -- it's a fairly new supervisor and I apologize for not knowing his name off the top of my head. (Inaudible)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you want to go off the record so you can look through your records?

[REDACTED] Yes, a quick break and I'll get you his name.

(Off the record.)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on the

All TC

1 record after a brief break. It's [REDACTED] you've
2 identified was the [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Involved in that. So
5 you were explaining there were -- you had three NCOs
6 who had made the attempt to take this manual control
7 and the valve failed to respond and then they had the
8 opinion that this was, the valve was mechanically
9 bound. At that point now we have a difference of
10 opinion involving the Control Room Supervisor and the
11 Operation Superintendent above him, as well as the

12 [REDACTED] which was [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] Yes. There were two opinions
14 here. The opinions of the NCOs and subsequently the
15 Controls Tech, all were of the opinion that the valve
16 was mechanically stuck. [REDACTED] (Inaudible)
17 supervisors, didn't want to commit to the valve being
18 mechanically stuck. Instead, they chose to pursue a
19 controls failure.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now when you say that
21 they didn't want to commit to that, how do you know
22 that, and why do you say that? Were you personally
23 present?

24 [REDACTED] No, I was not. I was in the
25 field. As a matter of fact, I was the [REDACTED] station at

All TC

1 the BF19 to man relief operator which, as it turns
2 out, was impossible for two reasons. One, the shift
3 misunderstood the operation of the valve and second,
4 that it turned out it was mechanically bound, so even
5 if it was a type of valve that would allow me to
6 manually jack it (Phonetic), it was physically stuck.
7 I was put there.

8 MR. BARBER: Was there any way to
9 mechanically operate -- let's say it was not stuck.
10 Did you have a procedure or with some direction or
11 guidance, was there a method to allow you to do that?

12 [REDACTED] No, the construction of the
13 valve was such that I cannot physically jack that
14 valve shut which is what my purpose was, standing by
15 (Inaudible).

16 MR. BARBER: And the normal method would
17 be some sort of hand wheel presumably, something like
18 that?

19 [REDACTED] There was a hand wheel in the
20 valve that allows you to limit how far the valve can
21 stroke shut because it will allow you to shut it.

22 MR. BARBER: I see.

23 [REDACTED] It has to be done by the
24 control.

25 MR. BARBER: And this is an operated

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valve?

[REDACTED]

Yes.

MR. BARBER: And this is in the failure mode?

[REDACTED]

Yes. It's spring loaded, so it fails to close and that's an error.

MR. BARBER: Okay. Can you comment on what the positioner was doing? Were you the one who reported that it was mechanically bound?

[REDACTED]

No, that was the opinion of the three operators from the control room because it failed to respond to manual input.

MR. BARBER: How would they know that without some information from you?

[REDACTED]

You would see a change in feed flow. You would see a change in the (Inaudible) level and later we did do local verification in the field from the valve position and felt --

MR. BARBER: I guess what I'm asking is when you get in a situation where there's -- you're getting early information and you don't have all the information, you can always have technical differences on what the nature of the problem is.

[REDACTED]

Absolutely.

MR. BARBER: But, for example, had the

1 operators attempted to manually say -- not manually,
2 to remotely, let's use the term "remotely", to
3 remotely stroke the valve either open or shut, using
4 a controller, and they had maybe some indication in
5 the control room that they weren't sure what it meant
6 and they asked you is the positioner doing something?
7 If you saw that the positioner was in fact not moving,
8 or attempting to be, it could in fact have been a
9 control problem, could it not?

10 [REDACTED] Possibly yes, that was
11 possible.

12 MR. BARBER: Okay. All I'm trying to do
13 is understand why they were so quick to rule that out.

14 [REDACTED] I'm not sure how quickly they
15 formed this opinion.

16 MR. BARBER: Okay.

17 [REDACTED] I don't remember what time it
18 was when I first became aware of it. I know that this
19 happened at 3 o'clock in the morning. I remember that
20 after the fact. I was stationed at the valve around
21 5 o'clock initially.

22 MR. BARBER: Five in the morning?

23 [REDACTED] Right. And I went out there
24 anyway, just because I was an interested operator. I
25 was out there probably around 4. So there was

All 7c

1 conflict and discussion at 12 o'clock, approximately
2 an hour before I became aware of the situation.

3 MR. BARBER: I see. Okay.

4 [REDACTED] So I guess it was in that hour
5 that the NCOs came to the conclusion that the valve
6 was mechanically stuck.

7 MR. BARBER: So there was another operator
8 that was out before you?

9 [REDACTED]: The duty operator was there as
10 well.

11 MR. BARBER: I see. Was he there prior to
12 you arriving and was giving them information on the
13 valve performance? Was there any kind of
14 communication to your knowledge?

15 [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] who was up there.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] yes.

19 MR. BARBER: So did he say he was in
20 conversation at the control room or did he give you
21 any indication that would cause you to believe that he
22 had talked to that control room?

23 [REDACTED] No.

24 MR. BARBER: How did you know there was a
25 problem at the valve?

ALL TC

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[REDACTED] Well, the control contacted
[REDACTED] and (Inaudible) the valve. He
was the first one to verify locally (Inaudible) was
trying to open and close the valve. He was the first
one to look at it.

MR. BARBER: Okay. So there was an
operator that was there that was providing some
information back to the control room on what the valve
was doing and they were attempting to move it?

[REDACTED] Yes.

MR. BARBER: It just didn't happen to be
you.

[REDACTED] Correct.

MR. BARBER: I've got you. And the name
again was what?

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

MR. BARBER: [REDACTED] okay.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And did you say that
that was within the first hour of when the problem was
noticed?

[REDACTED]: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So between 3 a.m. and
4 a.m., he's at the site looking at the valve and then
trying to manipulate it?

[REDACTED]: Yes.

All 7C

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

MR. BARBER: Let's go back and pick up your discussion. There's the disagreement with the three operators and you're starting to go to the (Inaudible) supervisor, operation superintendent and what they thought.

Can you carry on from there?

[REDACTED] I got involved when I was paged and [REDACTED] asked me to go to the BF19 and stand by for the following instructions I received from the control room in regards to manual operation. I asked him why and he said it was failing to respond to controller (Inaudible) in the control room and I had a few questions for him so instead of going directly to the valve, I went to the control room to get a little bit of clarification about what is expected of me at the valve itself and in the control room, I spoke with [REDACTED] and that was when they informed me it failed to respond and I was standing by to manually shut the valve or to control (Inaudible) level.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED] It was during that period in the control room that I had an opportunity to speak with the NCOs who let me know that they thought the

1 problem was mechanically bound and that put us in 303
2 -- they were pushing for shutdown.

3 MR. BARBER: Now did they say why they
4 felt they were on 303?

5 [REDACTED] I guess they were relying on
6 training and experience.

7 MR. BARBER: Do you have much knowledge of
8 the tech specs yourself?

9 [REDACTED]: No.

10 MR. BARBER: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] The tech specs are usually
12 passed on to the NCOs or supervisor whenever an issue
13 arises.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so at what
15 point in time is though? Is it before you had the
16 valve at 5 a.m.?

17 MR. BARBER: You said you were that 4
18 because you were -- there's an interest out there
19 before then, right?

20 [REDACTED] Right. I was at the valve,
21 called, looked for and got direction of what my
22 responsibilities would become upon (Inaudible) of the
23 valve (Inaudible). So between 4 and 5 and I was
24 having the discussion with four of the supervisors and
25 the NCOs.

All TC

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Between 4 and 5.

2 Okay. And then what happened?

3 [REDACTED]: The rest of the shift was
4 pretty much uneventful. I remained stationed at the
5 24 BF19, that they were able to control steam
6 generator level by adjusting blowdown, so no control
7 was necessary at the 24 BF19.

8 MR. BARBER: You couldn't have done it
9 anyway.

10 [REDACTED]: I couldn't have done it
11 anyway, but that was all hindsight now. At the time,
12 there was a belief that I could have done something.

13 MR. BARBER: Did you think you could do
14 something?

15 [REDACTED]: Say again?

16 MR. BARBER: Did you think you could do
17 something?

18 [REDACTED]: Yes, I thought I could
19 manually (Inaudible).

20 MR. BARBER: Okay, using the handwheel?

21 [REDACTED]: Yes.

22 MR. BARBER: Okay.

23 [REDACTED]: I was under the same
24 impression.

25 MR. BARBER: Okay.

All TC

1 [REDACTED] So the remainder of the shift
2 was uneventful. We continued to operate, maintain
3 level with blowdown, the (Inaudible) and we all went
4 home. It was the following night when we returned
5 that we commenced (Inaudible) shutdown. I guess it
6 was around somewhere between 3 and 4 o'clock and the
7 next afternoon, after we did all the trouble shooting
8 and attempts to solve the problem that failed and then
9 the company supervision finally agreed that yes, the
10 valve was (Inaudible) and we shut the plant down. But
11 it was about 15 hours later from the initiating event
12 (Inaudible) shutdown, around 1700 the following day.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the company,
14 you're saying company supervision raised it, this
15 mechanical valve?

16 [REDACTED] Yes.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was involved in
18 that?

19 [REDACTED] I wasn't there during the day.
20 I (Inaudible) names, our AOMs, Ops Manager, I'm sure
21 they were involved with the decision (Inaudible).
22 Called the plant manager. I'm sure there's a process.
23 (Inaudible) team was called in, depending on what day
24 of the week it is and what time of the day it is.
25 It's different individuals who respond (Inaudible),

1 different technicians.

2 MR. BARBER: Was there, in fact, a TARP
3 (Phonetic) called out for that?

4 [REDACTED] I never heard that it was, but
5 we were so heavily manned for the Unit 2 outage, we
6 might very well have had all the people necessary to
7 get -- ordinarily a TARP team are operating in both
8 units (Inaudible) and you initiate a TARP team to
9 address a problem. We just simply don't have the
10 manpower. But since we were manned up with everybody
11 here for Unit 2 outage, it's quite possible that the
12 TARP team didn't have to be called in because they
13 were on the site for the Unit 2 outage.

14 MR. BARBER: Okay.

15 [REDACTED] So I don't know if the TARP
16 team --

17 MR. BARBER: Okay.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] (Phonetic).

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or [REDACTED]
22 (Phonetic).

23 So in terms of when the decision was
24 actually made and at what point and who was involved,
25 you don't know, it was at operations management level?

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[REDACTED]

Correct. (Inaudible)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have any further conversation with the NCOs who were involved in that, the initial call where they said they thought it was (Inaudible) valve?

[REDACTED]

For the remainder of that shift, no, I was stationed at the valve. The following night, we asked that since then, yes, we've had conversation.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, who are these people, can you name them?

[REDACTED]

Sure.

[REDACTED]

I'm

going to have to have a second and I can pull these names up.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you need a couple of minutes?

[REDACTED]

Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, we'll take a brief break. It's 2:30.

(Off the record.)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on the record. It's approximately 2:37 p.m. And you said you had the individuals involved.

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[REDACTED]

(Phonetic).

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just like it sounds.

[REDACTED]

Yes.

MR. BARBER: Okay, one thing that I was trying to understand is whenever you have a situation where you have a technical problem, an equipment problem in the plant, you will have differences of opinion and the NRC kind of expects that.

[REDACTED]

Absolutely.

MR. BARBER: That's understandable. One thing I was trying to understand and again, I know you weren't necessarily involved with what went on in the (Inaudible) firsthand, but you did hear it fairly soon after it occurred was although the OS and the term supervisor had a disagreement, I want to just kind of explore --

[REDACTED]

Say that again?

MR. BARBER: A disagreement with the NCOs as far as a course of action.

[REDACTED]

That's right.

All 7c

1 MR. BARBER: To take, I wanted to explore
2 that a little more because if you had any knowledge as
3 to why there was a disagreement because one factor
4 could have been and I'm not going to say it was
5 because I don't know, but one factor could have been
6 we need to figure out if we need to take the action
7 for 303, we need to figure out how to safely shut down
8 the unit, because if the valve is, in fact, can't
9 rebound, this isn't a normal shutdown.

10 7C - [REDACTED] (Inaudible) challenges the
11 normal shutdown (Inaudible).

12 MR. BARBER: And by doing something rash,
13 you could actually make things less safe, than sitting
14 down and stepping back and saying what do we have,
15 maybe they didn't do a good job of articulating it,
16 maybe they couldn't describe the way they felt the way
17 they did, but maybe it was one of these things where
18 they said the plant is in an unusual alignment, it's
19 not in a normal shutdown alignment. We need to think
20 about if we enter 303 what are the repercussions of
21 that are? We have to initiate action within an hour
22 which is what 303 says, but do we know what that
23 action is?

24 You've got an hour to correct your line of
25 condition or take action to bring the plant to hot

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1 standby within six hours or within the next six to hot
2 shutdown or the next 24, cold shutdown. It's very
3 prescriptive and there's no real wiggle room.

4 7C [REDACTED] Right.

5 MR. BARBER: So what I'm trying to
6 understand is, could that have been in the framework
7 of why they didn't want to proceed with entering 303?

8 7C [REDACTED] If it was, it wasn't -- I
9 understand with everything you said and I agree with
10 you 100 percent. Absolutely, there can be differences
11 of opinions and courses of action to take and I
12 realize that for BF19 being stuck, there's no normal
13 shutdown and it adds to the problem.

14 But if they were constantly making the
15 decision that yes, a shutdown was required when the
16 problem was discovered or some short time frame
17 thereafterwards, it wasn't communicated to the crew
18 that the delay was because they were trying to
19 determine the safest course to take to get shutdown.
20 What was related to the crew was they were convinced
21 it was physically stuck. It could have been a control
22 problem and the reason for the delay was they wanted
23 to pursue all of the courses of action to ensure it
24 wasn't a control action before having to say it was
25 stuck.

1 MR. BARBER: Is that really unreasonable
2 though? If they really thought it was controls
3 problem, for whatever reason, would that have been an
4 reasonable course of action?

5 7C [REDACTED] I don't know that I can answer
6 you because of my knowledge of the digital control
7 circuit for the BF19 is very minimum as an [REDACTED] My
8 concern is that the NCOs involved have a very good
9 understanding of the circuit. The controls technician
10 has probably even a better understanding of the
11 circuit and when you have that much knowledge and
12 experience telling you that this is your problem,
13 should you question it? Absolutely. Is there an
14 alternative? Is (Inaudible) control circuit, even
15 though these groups of people are telling you no?
16 Sure, it's a possibility. But I think they deserve --
17 I think their opinion warrants more attention than
18 what they were given.

19 MR. BARBER: Okay.

20 7C [REDACTED] The perception of the crew was
21 their assessment of the situation was way off. It was
22 definitely a controls problem and for the next 15
23 hours that's the direction we were headed. So if at
24 the same time there was some thinking that yes, these
25 guys are right, so we need 15 hours to figure out how

1 to shut down, to get the BF19 shut, that was
2 (Inaudible).

3 MR. BARBER: Okay.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How much time did it
5 take for the NCOs to come to their conclusion that it
6 was a -- that the valve was mechanically bound? What
7 kind of time frames were they dealing with when they
8 came to that?

9 [REDACTED] All I can tell you is that
10 between 3:05 when it happened and the first time I
11 entered the control room between 4 and 5, they were --
12 the NCOs had formed that opinion.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So within the two
14 hours?

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So at 15 hours later,
17 management, Ops management is at the same conclusion,
18 or at least is willing to shut down at that point?

19 [REDACTED] Yes.

20 MR. BARBER: I don't know if the times are
21 exact, but they're close to that. There may have been
22 only 12 hours or 13 hours later. They entered 303 at
23 maybe 4 o'clock and then they have an hour to fix the
24 end of the line condition and then started shutdown.

25 [REDACTED] Right, right.

All 7c

1 MR. BARBER: And I think they did take
2 some time to try to lay out the proper method of
3 shutdown

4 --

5 [REDACTED] Absolutely.

6 MR. BARBER: So it could be done safely,
7 and in fact, they may have -- there may have been some
8 discussions before that about how to do that, prior to
9 entering 303.

10 [REDACTED] I don't have that information.

11 MR. BARBER: Right.

12 [REDACTED] Okay.

13 MR. BARBER: But I understand. I
14 understand your point. Your point was you felt the
15 delay was excessive based on the feedback you got from
16 the NCOs.

17 [REDACTED] Yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Any other concerns
19 related to this particular issue?

20 [REDACTED] To the BF19? Not really, no.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you had indicated
22 that there was more. When we were asking you about
23 concerns, you had regarding the safe operation of the
24 plants, you said I'll start with the most recent.
25 What else?

All 7c

1 -7C [REDACTED] Well, yes, there are others.
2 Individually, the BF19. Yes, it's significant, but if
3 you look at it in conjunction with other concerns and
4 issues, then I think it carries a little more weight
5 than that. I won't say non-conservative decision
6 making, but we'll just call it pushing the envelope,
7 living out there on the edge of conservative decision
8 making to keep the plant on line.

9 It hasn't always been that way. We talked
10 earlier about had I seen an attitude about
11 conservative decision making and staying on line and
12 safety vary over the [REDACTED] I've been
13 here, oh absolutely. I think we've probably gone 360.
14 When I first came here it was the middle of the 1000
15 day outage, where it was the beginning of the 1000 day
16 outage after April 17th.

17 And attitudes changed quite a bit.
18 Conservative decision making was definitely encouraged
19 and taught and we trained that way and it wasn't --
20 people's opinions or assessments of a situation like
21 the NCOs wouldn't have been treated like they were
22 last week, six or seven years ago. Does that make
23 sense?

24 Six or seven years ago, I think our NCOs
25 would have been listened to more and their advice and

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1 their recommendations would have been heeded more than
2 they were two weeks ago. So I wasn't here April 17th.
3 I came in just after that, but I don't know that our
4 attitude or our position is as bad as it was perceived
5 then and that it would have resulted in a 1000-day
6 shutdown, but like I said we're pushing the envelope.
7 I think we're pushing the envelope again.

8 So the BF19 is one, but all these are very
9 recent examples.

10 MR. BARBER: Before we go on too far away
11 from that, did you get any feedback on anything that
12 happened during the day? When you were off-shift, you
13 said you left at 7 in the morning, which is your
14 normal shift end time, came back in and knew the plant
15 was in the midst of shutting down.


16 Did you get any feedback on what occurred
17 during the day as far as how the decision was
18 eventually made to shut the unit down as far as was
19 there any kind of (Inaudible) committee review? Was
20 that, in fact, something that maybe potentially the OS
21 had contacted someone regarding that we wanted to have
22 this reviewed at SORT (Phonetic) before we made a
23 decision on how to progress?

24 What I'm trying to do is I'm trying to get
25 some indication as to any knowledge you may have as to

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
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1 a desire for either additional reviews for
2 engineering, from operations management, from other
3 senior management, would that, to your knowledge, plan
4 -- what happened?

5  I don't know that, no.

6 MR. BARBER: Okay. All right, then I
7 guess we'll move right on.


8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Basically what you're
9 indicating is that you were seeing a change from over
10 a period that was either back six or seven years ago.
11 You had, I think the way you described it was going
12 360 or you were at a point where you see it pushing
13 the envelope regarding conservative decision making.
14 At what point do you see that change coming about and
15 what do you attribute it to?

16  I'm trying to think how long
17 ago it was, how long ago we had our 490-day -- we have
18 a 498-day run a couple days ago. (Inaudible) run
19 (Inaudible). Probably I would say around that period
20 we had the unit flooding a valve and we were
21 performing better than we had in Salem or Hope Creek's
22 history and I think it's just a natural tendency that
23 if things are running well so we stop paying them so
24 much attention, we stop dumping so much money into
25 them because they're running well and so let's just

1 leave them alone and let them run. And I think we
2 became so proud of the long runs we were having for
3 the first time in a long time and the longest run in
4 history that we didn't pay attention to the past like
5 we did and so then we enter a cycle of let material
6 conditions and equipment degrade again and not wanting
7 to admit to that fact or let that be known, but
8 continue to have these great runs and these great
9 capacity factors.

10 So we get there by -- we start
11 encountering problems because of that material
12 condition degrades somewhat, but we had to start
13 making decisions differently to keep the unit up and
14 running, so probably around that -- I would say around
15 that time frame.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Which would be month
17 and year?

18  7C
Probably four years ago. You
19 probably start to see decisions being made differently
20 because there were -- who were not wanting to shut the
21 units down, we wanted to keep them up. We keep having
22 these great long runs, keep capacity factor high. And
23 material conditions continued to fade away, continued
24 to decline, so there were decisions that have to be
25 made to keep the units on line in the face of

1 degrading fan equipment, naturally, become less and
2 less conservative and you move closer and closer
3 toward making poor decisions. That can be expensive.
4 It gives you a chance of making a mistake, not
5 following things like you should. It just
6 (Inaudible).

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have examples
8 of where that might have occurred when the units are
9 kept on line to a point where you would have said it
10 shouldn't have been done that way?

11 [REDACTED] Recently, we started up after
12 the hurricane, this is fairly recent as well. We
13 started up Unit 2 following the hurricane (Inaudible)
14 related to (Inaudible). Starting up, we're bringing
15 up the secondary plant, within the fire range. I'm
16 not sure what power we were at. The [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED] (Phonetic), happened to notice
18 while he was out (Inaudible) on the plant, the main
19 steam isolation valves were shut (Inaudible) NSRs.
20 The turbine zone line rollers were making
21 electricity, but we're dumping cold reheat into them as
22 opposed to our heated advice team we get from the NSRs
23 for that whole cycle.

24 MR. BARBER: You're talking about
25 (Inaudible)?

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[REDACTED] Correct.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED] So [REDACTED] calls the control room and says hey, we're coming up in power. When are we going to open the main steam train of NSRs. We're already dumping steam in the lower pressure turbines and they're like oh shit. It turned out a (Inaudible), a procedure was missed or signed off, that that part of the start up procedure (Inaudible) sign off was completed. It had already opened them. So should we have shut down the unit at that point? I don't know. It depends how seriously you consider loss of configuration control of procedures not being right and in fact, whose been dumping cold reheat into the low pressure turbines.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How did it get signed off, if it was --

[REDACTED] An error. I don't know. I wasn't there. Just in the course of the procedure shuffling in the unit back from a shutdown and it was missed.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did this become some sort of notification where more of an issue --

[REDACTED] It became a notification. I have a copy of it here, somewhere.

1 Other than it becoming -- it became a
2 notification. We backed the unit down in power,
3 un-isolated the MSRs.

4 MR. BARBER: Do you know what
5 approximately the power was when it happened?

6 [REDACTED]: No, I don't. I'm sorry, I
7 don't.

8 MR. BARBER: Do you have the information
9 available?

10 [REDACTED]: I'm not sure if it's in the
11 notification or not. I can look for it real quick.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's take a look at
13 it. We'll go off the record. It's approximately
14 2:55.

15 (Off the record.)

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on the
17 record. You're indicating you just can't find that
18 notification right now. It's about 2:59 p.m.

19 [REDACTED]: I was actually down here that
20 week helping out and it was the week around the 15th
21 of September. (Inaudible) The hurricane was coming,
22 it was like a Thursday night or something. The plant
23 rep. was checking on the (Inaudible) -- it would have
24 been the 16th or 17th.

25 MR. BARBER: Right.

All 7c

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[REDACTED]

I don't know off the top of my head, but I remember it was my shift and we started to turn back from our 7-day.

MR. BARBER: Probably would have been the weekend of September 26th, 27th.

[REDACTED]

No, I'm thinking it was the weekend of the 20th. I'm pretty sure I was here the week of the 15th. I think the hurricane was supposed to arrive near the site on the 18th which was Thursday.

MR. BARBER: You shut down that weekend.

[REDACTED]

And shutdown would have been like the 20th or 21st.

MR. BARBER: Oh, I see. You're saying the actual -- the recent start up -- I got it.

[REDACTED]

When we rolled back in from our 7-day, we were starting up on Friday, the 26th.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED]

That's possible.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So somewhere during that shift --

[REDACTED]

(Inaudible) It was actually (Inaudible) start up. [REDACTED] (Phonetic), valves


were shut, the course of action we followed was we reduced power, reopened the valve and then continued

1 up with the start-up and notification was written and
2 (Inaudible) procedure.


3 MR. BARBER: Do you know what came out of
4 the notification? Had you gotten any information on
5 what the corrective action was for that?

6  No, it was much too soon for
7 that. That takes some time. We're just talking could
8 we roll from that and then just a couple of weeks
9 later, ripe for an outage? So I really don't expect
10 corrective action for that issue probably until some
11 time after the outage.

12 MR. BARBER: All right. Is that an issue?

13  The time it takes to --

14 MR. BARBER: Well, it's not so much the
15 time because -- the time is fixed by your process, but
16 there's also, is there any acknowledgement that
17 there's other opportunities we could make the same
18 mistake and if they're going to occur before the time
19 frame starts? In other words, if you've got 30 days
20 to write an evaluation to address the underlying
21 issue, but what if you're doing another start up
22 within the 30 days?

23  Right.

24 MR. BARBER: Shouldn't that be something
25 against factoring into --

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[REDACTED] Yes.

MR. BARBER: The corrective action process?

[REDACTED] Yes, you're right.

MR. BARBER: I mean even if it's just to roll out and say hey, we had this problem about a month ago where we forgot to line up the MSR (Phonetic) properly and it was a sequencing or we got too busy or whatever you know at that point, just roll it out to the shift so that it's something more attended to.

[REDACTED] You're absolutely right. Something like that should happen, but I don't know that it's happened yet because I haven't heard anything.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED] Like that rolled out in the form of temporary (Inaudible) order or just some feedback on the shift meeting or something like that. I hadn't heard anything rolled out as a corrective action or how we're going to keep that from happening again.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED] Like I said, I really expect it soon.

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MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED] Yes, recognizing the fact that yes, we would be in attend situation before we had that roll out.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who are the operators involved in this?

[REDACTED] In the control room? [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (Phonetic) was in the control room that day. I'm not sure who was in the control room that day.

I can get you that information.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I'm just looking for -- in terms of the notification and people involved. And who's the individual involved in this final?

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (Inaudible).

MR. BARBER: So he was assigned to the (Inaudible)?

[REDACTED] Right.

MR. BARBER: Should he had been signed off on the same shift or (Inaudible)?

[REDACTED] Just based on where we were in the start up and the time of day when it was discovered, because I remember it was late, it was early afternoon. I'm sure I remember that that should

All TC

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have been a sign off that [REDACTED] would have made. It would have been made in the previous shift. We should have been farther along in the start up than we were.

MR. BARBER: And [REDACTED] last name?

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, did you have some further concern on that?

[REDACTED] I just don't -- I just feel like we should have and maybe we did and I'm just not aware of it, but we couldn't have because we came down to power, open the steam (Inaudible) and went right back up again.

I was concerned about the effects of the not reheated steam getting pumped into the lower pressure turbine and (Inaudible). But my knowledge of that is -- an engineer somewhere should be making that determination, but I know we didn't look at that and make a decision on the low pressure turbine bleeding and the effect that might have resulted from dumping the non-reheated low pressure steam into the low pressure turbines. We were down in power. (Inaudible)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You would have expected (Inaudible) assessment of a possible bleeding problem before the start up began?

All 7C

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[REDACTED]

Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's where you --

[REDACTED]

(Inaudible). Is it a safety

(Inaudible), no, it's a company asset concern. Low pressure turbines -- I just (Inaudible) bleeding (Inaudible).

MR. BARBER: It is a configuration control

issue because compliance, there's a (Inaudible) procedures, a step by step requirement for these kinds of procedures and this got signed off and it shouldn't have, so there's an error obviously.

[REDACTED]

As it turns out there was

another issue with the same start up and again it was a main steam issue with the steam dumps, that's probably a controls issue. The steam dumps were operating erratically on the start up and our procedure IOP3 directs us to --

MR. BARBER: This is on the same start up?

[REDACTED]

Yes.

MR. BARBER: So would this -- was this an

earlier problem?

[REDACTED]

Yes.

MR. BARBER: And it occurred before the

MSR problem?

[REDACTED]

Yes.

ALL TC

1 MR. BARBER: And that was on a Friday, the
2 26th, if I remember right?

3 [REDACTED] I want to make sure I get my
4 time and dates -- 9/26.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the same numbers
6 you're indicating, you have a copy of the notification
7 there?

8 [REDACTED] Yes. As well as I have these
9 pages of procedures (Inaudible) also, but (Inaudible).
10 I have it in my pile.

11 Our concern was that steam dumps weren't
12 operating properly on the start up until the NCOs were
13 directed to take manual control of the steam dump and
14 control temperature and pressure that way during the
15 start up, although the IOP tells you that the steam
16 dumps have to be in the automatic for start up. So
17 the fix was it's that delaying the start up a little
18 while to control the opportunity to go look at the
19 control circuit for the steam dumps and determine why
20 they're acting erratically. Instead, the decision is
21 made to put on an on the spot change in the procedure
22 to no longer require you to have to be automatic
23 control, to allow the start up to be manual and we
24 quickly shot two NCOs out of the training center, gave
25 them some quick training on the simulator for starting

1 the manual control because it's never been done
2 before. We haven't been trained that way. Brought
3 the guys back, continued to do the start up manually
4 for cooling off steam dumps.

5 MR. BARBER: Do you happen to know was
6 there a work around entered in the work around log for
7 this?

8 [REDACTED] I don't know. I have a copy
9 of the notification --

10 [END OF TAPE 1, SIDE A; BEGIN TAPE 1, SIDE
11 B.]

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're on Side B.
13 It's approximately 3:06 p.m.

14 Just ask your question again, Scott, in
15 case at the end it might cut off.

16 MR. BARBER: I asked if this was entered
17 the work around log?

18 [REDACTED] Definitely.

19 MR. BARBER: Okay.

20 [REDACTED] I had actually thought of that
21 too.

22 MR. BARBER: I've done inspections of it,
23 so that's why --

24 (Laughter.)

25 It sounds like a classic work around

1 because you had a situation where equipment is
2 supposed to operate and it didn't operate properly and
3 what happened was a procedural one, a work around.

4 [REDACTED] Right, exactly. We quickly
5 tried to (Inaudible) to work with that work around.
6 We changed procedure and continued to (Inaudible).

7 MR. BARBER: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] To me, these are all examples
9 of being more concerned with either keeping the unit
10 on line like the BF19 or get the unit back on line as
11 quickly as we can with the steam isolated SRs
12 (Phonetic) or the steam dump (Phonetic) acting
13 erratically. To me, they're always (Inaudible).

14 I understand we're a business. We're here
15 to make money. We're here to make electricity, but
16 like I said I think we're pushing the envelope.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're offering
18 your examples of pushing the limit, but not
19 conservative.

20 [REDACTED]: Right.

21 MR. BARBER: Actually, this kind of sounds
22 like a production over safety. It may not be nuclear
23 safety, but it's hard to tell.

24 [REDACTED]: Right.

25 MR. BARBER: But it's definitely a

1 production bent to it. Let's keeping continuing with
2 the start-up so we can maintain some schedule and
3 we'll try to do it right by doing the training and
4 (Inaudible) change, but then there's a question about
5 what stand-alone problem would (Inaudible) those?

6 What happened with that as far as --
7 [REDACTED] We continued with start-up
8 manually.

9 MR. BARBER: And then what?
10 [REDACTED] We patted ourselves on the
11 back, good training. And away we went. I don't know
12 what's happened with that since then.

13 MR. BARBER: So you don't know whatever
14 the problem was with that has automatically been
15 fixed?

16 [REDACTED] No, I don't know.

17 MR. BARBER: Do you have any knowledge of
18 the nature, any more details about the nature of the
19 problem?

20 [REDACTED]: Why they were acting
21 erratically?


22 MR. BARBER: No, what that meant. To say
23 they're operating erratically, it means different
24 things to different people. Does it mean that it
25 would pop open and all of a sudden and then close,

1 does it mean they were opening in different sequence?
2 What exactly does that mean? Can you give me any
3 details on that?
4 [REDACTED] I did witness firsthand two
5 different sets of steam dumps, (Inaudible) numbers,
6 steam dump on the west side of the turbine building
7 all the way north; and the steam dump in the middle of
8 the building on the east side. I was the primary
9 communicator during the start-up so I kind of had the
10 freedom to move about, look at the start-up, which is
11 what I usually do. I just happened to be out walking
12 around with all this stuff going on, and I saw the two
13 steam dumps, the two TI drag (Inaudible) stroke and
14 (Inaudible) open, shut, open, shut, open, shut, open,
15 shut, open, shut -- that's how those two out of all
16 the steam dumps were trying to control temperature and
17 pressure (Inaudible). And I questioned them and I
18 showed it to a supervisor and said I'm not steam dump
19 heavy, it's a valve I look at when I'm making rounds
20 for leaks or any obvious problems, but it's
21 controlled, completely from the controller. I really
22 don't know nothing in the (Inaudible) to do with that
23 valve other than it's something to look at and check
24 on a round. But as far as, I don't -- I never operate
25 it myself.


All TC

1 I understand what it does and how it does
2 it and modes of control, but I never am involved with
3 it. So I questioned because I had never seen one of
4 those TC (Inaudible) do that before, cycle, cycle,
5 cycle, cycle, cycle. (Inaudible)

6 MR. BARBER: What was the comment that you
7 got back?

8  It was kind of like, didn't
9 express (Inaudible). So I thought well maybe there
10 was no concern, because that's normal, even though the
11 others weren't doing it. When I had the opportunity,
12 later, I questioned one of the NCOs, not then because
13 it was into the startup. But later, when I had the
14 opportunity to ask an NCO had exactly does the PTI
15 drive (Inaudible). Should I be seeing that? No, you
16 shouldn't see it doing that. I'm not sure what's been
17 done since then.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't recall who
19 the supervisor was that you approached?


20  No, I just happened to catch
21 one out of the corner of my eye. It was one of the
22 Ops supervisors out in the field doing the same thing
23 I was doing, just watching evolution.

24 MR. BARBER: One thing I'm not clear on
25 and maybe you mentioned it earlier, if you did, I

1 apologize, but was there notification written on this
2 (Inaudible), is that what you had in front of you or
3 was it on something, some related --

4  There is a notification
5 outstanding against the cycling of the steam dump and
6 it's related to this notification, but this
7 notification is specifically, this notification is
8 written from the control room and any indications they
9 saw, that it was acting erratic. I don't have --

10 MR. BARBER: Okay, but in your mind is the
11 question you asked about, the CCI drag valve, do you
12 believe that to be covered under the same
13 notification? Is it all part of the quote erratic
14 operation of the steam dumps?

15  Yes.


16 MR. BARBER: Okay. So it's just another
17 symptom or observable indication of the same
18 underlying problem you believe.

19  Right.

20 MR. BARBER: I'm just trying to
21 understand.

22  Okay.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's three issue on
24 the one start-up.

25  The BF19 problem. That was a

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1 different --

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The isolation valve
3 problem, the steam dump and now the one with the
4 erratic movement.

5 [REDACTED]: That was the steam dump.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Two issues, same
7 problem.

8 [REDACTED]: Right. One was observed from
9 the control room and then my observation in the field.

10 MR. BARBER: Okay. That's what we're
11 trying to understand.

12 [REDACTED]: Very good.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And again, you
14 offered the examples of what you were seeing as ways
15 that potentially the site is pushing the envelope and
16 pushing it in terms of conservative decision making,
17 but they're on the edge of that in order to keep the
18 units on line.

19 [REDACTED]: Right.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about anything
21 else along those lines? Is there anything else
22 related to this particular start-up, first of all, are
23 there other incidents you'd like to talk about?

24 [REDACTED]: I think everything else in my
25 pile is hours related.

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For this outage?

[REDACTED] Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It seems that everything here is all very recent. Have you seen this problem, this pushing the envelope prior to this time?

[REDACTED] Yes, but all that stuff is put away and I didn't get a chance to go through it. This is stuff that I had on top of my pile that I haven't looked at and done something with it, so that's why I have it here.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This is a recent pile.

[REDACTED] Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How many times do you think you've noted there's -- going to the edge on this? How many incidents do you have?

[REDACTED] I don't have a good feel for that. It feels like it's more and more lately, like there's more and more scenarios --

MR. BARBER: Lately since you talked about the Unit 2 record run. You said four years ago, 1999, when you say "lately" do you mean in the last year or so?

[REDACTED] Probably in the last year or

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so.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

[REDACTED]

I've seen it more and more frequently.

MR. BARBER: Okay. And can you attribute that to anything? Is there anything, any change that would have occurred in that, whatever you felt like --

[REDACTED]

You know, I don't know how to say it, but [REDACTED] says -- let's go backwards. I'll give you my opinion. [REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] (Phonetic)?

[REDACTED]

(Phonetic). Seemed to

be for the short period of time he was the [REDACTED] and maybe this was just his management style, he seemed to be comfortable staying back, out of the picture which is a good way to maintain a big picture of the department. But he seemed to be content in letting [REDACTED] run things and make these kind of decisions.

I was in a lot of meetings with the three or [REDACTED] and one of the other two. And [REDACTED] never at the meetings had a position or made a decision or took a stand. It was always either [REDACTED] doing that for him. Maybe that's the way he chose to run the department, but [REDACTED] never had anything for us

1 other than I'll look into that and get back to you.

2 So it's an overseeing period and it was
3 kind of like that under [REDACTED] just prior to
4 [REDACTED] (Phonetic) also. [REDACTED] kind of
5 came and went in a short period of time.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This is 2002 some
7 time?

8 [REDACTED] Uh-huh. And [REDACTED] seemed to
9 have the same, I won't say problem, but he seemed to
10 run the department the same way. He seemed to have
11 spent -- he had a lot less involvement than what I
12 remember previous of [REDACTED] like [REDACTED]
13 and (Inaudible) and (Inaudible) in the day to day
14 operation of the department. [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED] seemed to be spending the majority of their
16 time in meetings around, so I don't know if there was
17 a change in upper level management in the same time
18 period that demanded more of their time spent away
19 from the department. We're seeing in the department
20 more of our policies and training and just how we ran
21 the department being left up to our AONs for the first
22 time, as opposed to the Ops Manager dictating their
23 policy. Their time and energy was demanded elsewhere.
24 That's probably (Inaudible). I remember starting to
25 see a lot of these issues come up and a lot of the

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1 decisions going in the direction we're headed now as
2 when many of our AONs first started making those
3 decisions. It appeared to us anyway.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was being pushed?

5 [REDACTED] Right.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At that level.

7 [REDACTED] Right.

8 MR. BARBER: Was there a change in the way
9 [REDACTED] managed? What you describe is sort of
10 engage/disengage style. It sounds like what you're
11 saying is more recently in that relative time frame he
12 was disengaged. What I'm trying to get an
13 understanding of is was there a time when he was very
14 engaged or more engaged --

15 [REDACTED] No, [REDACTED] was never engaged.

16 MR. BARBER: So it was just his style
17 consistently throughout.

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 MR. BARBER: So it wasn't a change in the
20 way he managed?

21 [REDACTED] No. The change I'm referring
22 to is some time between [REDACTED] because

23 [REDACTED] was very disengaged also. So I don't know
24 what might have been changing in upper management
25 around that time frame, [REDACTED] leaving and [REDACTED]

1 arriving. But that seems like when we changed from a
2 very active [REDACTED] to one that -- whose time is
3 spent elsewhere.

4 [REDACTED] was the first one -- he came and
5 went and a lot of guys in the department never even
6 met the guy.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That remote.

8 [REDACTED] He was that removed from the
9 Department.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about from [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED] (Phonetic) position? Did you
12 have any first hand discussions with them on why their
13 decision making is any different in this time frame?

14 [REDACTED] I can't remember when [REDACTED]
15 and [REDACTED] first moved into the position. I know [REDACTED]
16 was an [REDACTED] some time ago. Moved out of [REDACTED] and
17 has just recently come back. [REDACTED] has just moved
18 into that position from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has gone
19 from that [REDACTED] he's come up
20 through the ranks. I can't remember when he moved
21 into that [REDACTED] I think it was during while I was out
22 last year. I think I remember hearing that change in
23 the department when I was out. (Inaudible)

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So for the two of
25 them, you don't have anything to compare it to. It

1 really would have been before seeing a change. It's
2 just they're in a position that seems to be making the
3 decisions that you question at some point, you
4 questioned?

5 [REDACTED] Right.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have we covered what
7 you have to offer for recently now or do you have --
8 [REDACTED] Those three are things that
9 were discussed. That's what I have as far as
10 notifications and concerns recently. Unless you want
11 to go back, unless you want to talk about a sore spot
12 with operational (Inaudible) by supervision.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If it's a concern.

14 [REDACTED]: I'm not sure. I doubt if it's
15 a nuclear safety issue, but [REDACTED] is the one,
16 [REDACTED] is most guilty of this than the other
17 supervisor. [REDACTED] since he became, which (Inaudible),
18 so it's been 10 years out in the field.

19 MR. BARBER: So he knows how to operate
20 the equipment?

21 [REDACTED] Yes.

22 MR. BARBER: Presumably. He understands
23 how the equipment operates?

24 [REDACTED] Yes.

25 MR. BARBER: He knows how to operate it.

1 What you need to do?

2 [REDACTED] Yes. So I don't know if it's
3 been a difficult transition for him into supervision
4 where he's not supposed to be touching equipment now
5 or maybe he misses that. I don't know what the
6 reasoning is, but since he's been a supervisor, he's
7 been written up and grieved for doing work in the
8 field, for manipulating a pressurizer valve and that
9 was probably two and a half, two years ago when he was
10 a supervisor.

11 MR. BARBER: What did he do there?

12 [REDACTED] He operated -- it's a while
13 back. I just remember an occasion where he operated
14 a pressurizer valve. What exactly he did with it, I
15 don't know.

16 MR. BARBER: Meaning from the control room
17 or locally?

18 [REDACTED] Locally, in the field.

19 MR. BARBER: So something had to do with
20 the pressurizer.

21 Do you remember what the nature of the --
22 why he was doing that?

23 [REDACTED] I don't know.

24 MR. BARBER: Did he feel like he wanted
25 someone to do it, and they weren't doing it, so he

1 said I'll just go do it? Or was it he did it as an
2 expedient or don't you recall?

3 [REDACTED] I don't recall.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But he was written
5 up?

6 [REDACTED] Yes. And I could pull that
7 up. I could go --

8 MR. BARBER: That's okay, that's
9 background. I just was trying to explore what your
10 knowledge was.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So at some level it
12 caused a problem because he was documented for doing
13 this?

14 [REDACTED] More recently there was the
15 MS43, the main (Inaudible) to the feed pump. He
16 (Inaudible) in the field (Inaudible). I might have
17 that here somewhere, I'm not sure.

18 Maybe a year ago. I might have that here.
19 What happened there was there was a leak on the main
20 steam valve going to the feed pump on Unit 2 and
21 blowing steam pretty good. I wasn't here that day.
22 All the information is what I received from the guys
23 when I came in. There was a notification written for
24 that one also.

25 There was some decision about would we be

1 better off with the valve open or shut. The nature of
2 the leak, I don't remember exactly what proponent on
3 the valve, it was (Inaudible) or where the leak was,
4 but there was a lot of discussion on whether or not
5 shutting the valve would make the leak worse or just
6 leaving it open was the best way to deal with it.

7 And while all that discussion was going on
8 in the control room, [REDACTED] went out in the field and
9 shut the valve himself. And (Inaudible).

10 MR. BARBER: Did you need (Inaudible)
11 cooperation? What was the status of the unit at that
12 time? Was the unit running or were you hot behind the
13 stops?

14 [REDACTED] We were up and running. But
15 I'm sure, obviously, we had put ourself in a position
16 that we could -- we had to have lower power to allow
17 operation on a single feed pump preparing for -- it
18 leaked for some time before -- the leak just continued
19 to grow and grow and grow and we're talking days. So
20 we had set ourself up for taking some course of action
21 and not having that feed pump and it just got to a
22 point where I guess [REDACTED] finally made the
23 decision for us and about shutting the valve on his
24 own. That was an issue also. That was grieved also.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So the union

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responded to that?

[REDACTED] It was a safety concern raised for that because he just took, went up to a -- if there was a genuine safety concern for that, because here's just an individual, just forget who he is, but here's an individual who just took it upon himself to take a ladder, climb up to a valve that's blowing main steam and then operate the valve with no protection, no (Inaudible), no safety manual, no nothing. So it was a genuine safety concern about that and [REDACTED] (Phonetic) [REDACTED] called [REDACTED] and had a meeting about that. And it was such a safety concern that the Union dropped the 50 grievance about a [REDACTED] because we were more concerned with [REDACTED] attitude about safety and just feeling like it was okay for him to go out and crank a valve shut. It could have been done a lot safer. So that was the big thing that came out of that.

MR. BARBER: Okay. The MS43s, is that the main steam?

[REDACTED] Yes.

MR. BARBER: Main supply. So it's not a -

[REDACTED] Right, it's not like a

1 (Inaudible) supply that you can use for start-up, for
2 rolling the turbine and stuff like that.

3 I guess very recently was the 4
4 (Inaudible) breaker. He tried to -- I am not sure
5 what he was trying to do, but they were having
6 problems with one of our circ. water (Inaudible)
7 breakers and there was a notification written up for
8 it having -- for contacts not being made up when it
9 was racked into position. A bar wasn't rotating like
10 it should have and making enough contacts, make or
11 break or operable. [REDACTED] went out one day and
12 [REDACTED] (Phonetic) was the operator and they were
13 trying to get the contacts made up to make a
14 circulator available and [REDACTED] used -- took like a
15 rail extension bar that you use for pulling the
16 breaker completely out of the cabinet and he was
17 trying wedge it in down beside the breaker, trying to
18 get the breaker to jimmy so that the bar inside the
19 breaker was rolled that last little bit and make that
20 contact up and then they would call the breaker up,
21 the circulator available.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was a situation
23 that was written up?

24 [REDACTED] Yes.

25 MR. BARBER: Is that the trunk operated

1 switch?
2 [REDACTED] What's that?
3 MR. BARBER: Is that the trunk operated
4 switch?
5 [REDACTED] That's what I call it.
6 MR. BARBER: Isn't that the name of the
7 switch that was the permits for the circ. water
8 breaker?
9 [REDACTED] Right.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How recently was that
11 again?
12 [REDACTED] About in the last four months.
13 MR. BARBER: So was he grieved on that
14 also? How was that characterized?
15 [REDACTED] That was just an arbitration.
16 That wasn't grieved.
17 MR. BARBER: Okay.
18 [REDACTED] But the problem with that is
19 you've got your [REDACTED] running around (Inaudible)
20 manipulating equipment. One of our concerns is it's
21 sending the wrong message to those other supervisors,
22 just -- this one they did absolutely nothing about and
23 nobody knows anything about this but myself and my
24 supervisor that was involved and I decided (Inaudible)
25 let it go.

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1 But on the shut down on Unit 2, we were
2 purging the RCDT (Phonetic) after the shutdown,
3 getting ready to tag it out, so we were purging it.
4 A couple of operators in this area (Inaudible) were
5 down at the lower 4 panel, this is where the control
6 (Inaudible). And one of them called me, (Inaudible)
7 called me up and said there's something really strange
8 just happened. I said all right, what have you got?
9 He said we're venting, we're purging the RCDT with
10 nitrogen. I said okay. He said I'm going to set up
11 the procedure where we initiate the first flow of
12 nitrogen in the RCDT and he said we got no flow. And
13 he said we called the control room and said hey, we're
14 having a nitrogen flow in the RCDT and they said they
15 would look into it and get back to us, hang out, we'll
16 check into it and all of a sudden now we have a
17 nitrogen flow. But we never heard from anybody. I'll
18 look into it. So I went and asked him and I found out
19 that [REDACTED]
20 running the evolution took it upon himself --
21 initially, [REDACTED] told me when I questioned him, I said
22 hey, how did you work around -- how did you get the
23 nitrogen problem fixed on your RCDT job? He said I
24 got an INC tech (Phonetic) and I had them adjust the
25 control. It's a regulator valve. He said I got an

1 INC tech to adjust the controller. That's a pretty
2 common problem. You can get an INC tech to do that.
3 I said okay. I said hey, who was the INC tech who
4 adjusted that for you? I was curious how it happened
5 without the guys involved in the evolution knowing
6 what was going on. He said I don't remember who the
7 guy was. That's okay, I'll go down to the shop and
8 ask around, see what they did to the regulator to make
9 it work. It was obviously something that needed to be
10 encompassed in the procedure, so next time we do this,
11 the regulator is adjusted properly. He called me
12 again. Before I got down to the shop he turned to
13 [REDACTED] (Inaudible) got me to
14 ask if we could just talk privately. [REDACTED] had
15 (Inaudible). (Inaudible) so I'm going to tell you.
16 He said I operated the nitrogen valve. I didn't get
17 a INC Tech. I just told the guys that's what happened
18 so nobody would get bent out of shape. I said I
19 appreciated his honesty; (Inaudible) and I let him
20 know.

21 MR. BARBER: I don't understand. Why did
22 he have to even do that to begin with?

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He did it after the
24 call to the control room?

25 [REDACTED] Yes.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He went in when the
2 call came in? -7C

3 [REDACTED] He was informed. He was
4 supervisor. Instead of taking the time to get an INC
5 Tech, which during an outage, I don't know if one was
6 available or not and I don't know if that was an
7 issue, instead of getting an INC tech to do that, he
8 just went out in the field and adjusted the regulator
9 himself.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What procedures
11 weren't -- account for me what he should have been
12 doing in there? I understand he should have had an
13 INC tech, but what were the specific requirements, any
14 kind of

15 --

16 MR. BARBER: To follow up on what Eileen
17 is asking and maybe actually maybe it's just moving
18 back in time. Should the valve, the regulator valve,
19 should it have already been lined up so that when they
20 did the stuff, when the operators did the stuff in the
21 procedure that was called for to do the purge, it
22 should have just went smoothly, or was there, in fact,
23 a step that was missed? I think we're trying to
24 understand.

25 [REDACTED] That I'm not clear on but we -7C

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1 haven't got back to that yet.

2 MR. BARBER: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] We haven't got back to that
4 procedure. It's either one or two things. Either
5 there needs to be a step in the procedure that
6 addresses changing a set point for that regulator for
7 this particular evolution or there's a problem with
8 that controller not maintaining pressure where it
9 should have.

10 MR. BARBER: Okay. So which of the two is
11 it?

12 [REDACTED] I don't know yet. I haven't
13 had a chance to pursue that.

14 MR. BARBER: Okay.

15 [REDACTED] It's one of two.

16 MR. BARBER: So the individual operator
17 valve was (Inaudible)? Okay.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What's his title?

19 [REDACTED] He was a CRS.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He's a control room
21 supervisor?

22 Have you seen that (Inaudible)?

23 [REDACTED] No.

24 MR. BARBER: What would the impact have
25 been, assuming you would have gotten an INC technician

1 to do it? Let's say it would have taken him some time
2 to get a technician. What's lost? Is it time? Is it
3 a time pressure situation?

4 [REDACTED] Uh-huh.

5 MR. BARBER: Was there a hold up in -- I'm
6 trying to figure out where you simply were?

7 [REDACTED] We were purging the RCTD.

8 MR. BARBER: What was the reason you were
9 doing that?

10 [REDACTED] We were getting ready to tag
11 it out for maintenance.

12 MR. BARBER: Okay. So this was a normal
13 maintenance activity?

14 [REDACTED] For the outage, yes.

15 MR. BARBER: Okay. Was this a critical
16 path job?

17 [REDACTED] No. It was just another
18 evolution on the path for the schedule for that shell
19 (Inaudible).

20 MR. BARBER: Okay. So there wasn't
21 necessarily a significant impact if it was delayed for
22 some period of time?

23 [REDACTED] No.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything else on
25 that?

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[REDACTED]

No.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Recent event.

[REDACTED]

Just an example we see

[REDACTED]

giving (Inaudible).

MR. BARBER: So you think there's a

perception that maybe [REDACTED] (Inaudible) saw that

[REDACTED]

does this and it's acceptable, so I'm going to

do it?

[REDACTED]

Right. It has to be. Maybe

it's just me, but if they're recorded three times with

[REDACTED]

as the supervisor and manipulates a component and

granted, we're not privy to any kind of discipline or

action taken for supervisors, that's not our business.

We just trust the company to resolve it. And I

understand that, but I think the guys need to see, the

union guys and the supervisors as well, need to see

something happen about a supervisor that continued to

operate that equipment. If there's no repercussions,

then what's to discourage [REDACTED] from operating a

piece of (Inaudible) equipment (Inaudible)?

MR. BARBER: How do you know there was no

disciplinary action?

[REDACTED]

I'm saying I don't, but the

company won't make us aware of anything happening.

MR. BARBER: Okay.

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[REDACTED]

So you have to ask us to trust that something is. But if something is happening, why does it continue to happen with [REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There are three instances you're saying?

[REDACTED]

Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And there are new instances of somebody who hadn't seen it before.

[REDACTED]

So something is happening and we're not privy to that information, but that's okay, I understand. We're not privy to what other disciplines, how they're handled. But I continue to see the same problem over and over and over. So whatever action is being taken, if any, (Inaudible).

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: These are concerns, the way you pointed it out, you said it may be that they're industrial safety risks, manipulating of the valve.

In terms of safe operations of the plant, maybe not specifically for an individual safety, but for OSHA-type regulations, are you aware of any questionable manipulations in terms of that would be having a nuclear safety effect or an effect on the same operation of the plant?

[REDACTED]

Off the top of my head,

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1 nothing other than what we've already discussed. I'll
2 leave that for somebody else to decide. (Inaudible)

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The incidents where
4 you see the push is toward non-conservative?

5 [REDACTED] Right.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In order to --

7 MR. BARBER: I'd like to go back to
8 something you said earlier and it's more of a process
9 question. Earlier on, in the very beginning, you
10 talked about you had [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] Right.

13 MR. BARBER: You mentioned five shop
14 stewards, and [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED] Right.

16 MR. BARBER: I guess I'm curious to
17 understand why some of these issues don't go through
18 the normal process systems that are available, whether
19 it be notification system or -- there must be other
20 issues. Is there a labeling concern, there's probably
21 some labeling program you could submit changes to? A
22 lot of -- there's a lot of like smaller programs that
23 there's a problem you could use the program to submit
24 changes, procedure changes what have you.

25 [REDACTED] I mean there are problems that

1 are handled that way. They are being utilized, other
2 means than grieving through our shop stewards. But a
3 lot of times the guys come to the shop steward because
4 there's a question about whether or not it's
5 grievable. So they come [REDACTED] because we have a
6 contract and [REDACTED]

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11 Usually, since once they've [REDACTED],
12 [REDACTED] we
13 continue (Inaudible) department, whether we need to or
14 not. (Inaudible)

15 MR. BARBER: So you're acting as their
16 advocate?

17 [REDACTED] More than I have to, yes.
18 It's just the way the relationship has become.

19 MR. BARBER: Do you encourage individuals
20 when they have issues or concerns to -- to use
21 existing processes?

22 [REDACTED] Absolutely. I encourage the
23 guys to go talk to their supervisors and if they're
24 uncomfortable doing that, take one of us with you, but
25 you're the one that raises the issue and discusses it

1 with the supervisor. (Inaudible)

2 MR. BARBER: Do you think that other
3 [REDACTED] for other folks that [REDACTED] for
4 their concerns and issues, do you think they feel free
5 to write a notification on something? Is that part of
6 the process? Do you need to (Inaudible) your
7 supervisor to approve something before you write a
8 notification or can you write it on your own?

9 [REDACTED] We can write it on our own
10 absolutely.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do they typically do
12 that?

13 [REDACTED] Yes. Guys are pretty good on
14 writing notifications.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware of any
16 hesitancy on the part of any of the people that you
17 work with to raise concerns freely through any of
18 these avenues, either -- if it's not coming to [REDACTED]
19 but going to their supervisor, writing notification,
20 going to ECP, anything like that?

21 [REDACTED] Yes, there's a handful of guys
22 out there that have that opinion.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you know what the
24 basis is for it?

25 [REDACTED] Well, my [REDACTED] struck that

1 fear (Inaudible).

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, we talked about
3 that this morning?

4 [REDACTED] Right, and --

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let me just capture
6 it and tell me if I'm accurate, but you were
7 indicating that in [REDACTED] you
8 were routinely bringing issues to [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED] regarding the day
10 to day type of scheduling, I guess, and benefit type
11 of issues, so you would have to kind of hammer some
12 issues out with them.

13 You were indicating before we got on the
14 record before that it came to your knowledge that
15 there was a comment made by [REDACTED] (Phonetic) at
16 the time of [REDACTED] that the basis for that
17 decision, that your [REDACTED] presented
18 itself and [REDACTED] said that they were going to
19 take that action in order to let the union know that
20 management was in charge and it wasn't the union that
21 was in charge and that you were going to be made an
22 example of at that point in time?

23 [REDACTED] Correct.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And this is what this
25 goes back to is that people saw you retaliated against

1 as part of raising regular varied issues on any type
2 of subject?

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything
5 else you want to add to that and am I accurately
6 capturing that? It was one person told you that they
7 had heard [REDACTED] (Phonetic) comment?

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Could we have that
10 individual's name?

11 [REDACTED] Do you have to?

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We can't do an
13 effective probe unless we can evaluate all of the
14 information.

15 [REDACTED] That piece of information came
16 from [REDACTED] (Phonetic).

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED]: Yes. Like I said, I had been
20 involved, our department has been involved with [REDACTED]
21 because [REDACTED] was mediating a lot of our meetings
22 between the new management; how (Inaudible) problems.
23 (Inaudible)

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so the time
25 frame for this would be when the decision was made,

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September/October of last year?

[REDACTED] After my [REDACTED] yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: After your [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Yes.

MR. BARBER: So it was some time in October, presumably, later on in the month, after?

[REDACTED] I don't know. Actually, no.

I got the information from [REDACTED] some time around my [REDACTED] actually.

MR. BARBER: So it was around the May time frame?

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But [REDACTED] was referring to the conversation that [REDACTED] had had with [REDACTED] back in the fall?

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: 2002.

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And can you give me that again, I know I have raised it, but I'd rather have it from you, what you were told.

[REDACTED] I was told that [REDACTED] would use [REDACTED] as an example to the unit that the company has the power, not the unit.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you're telling me

1 that you felt that that had to do with your routinely
2 having to challenge the company and them keeping to
3 the standards that were agreed to?

4 [REDACTED] Yes.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And I guess you
6 really can't say this is just time and hours types of
7 things, it was a variety of issues and you just sort
8 of saw it, the kind of things that you would have to
9 bring to [REDACTED] (Phonetic) attention and [REDACTED].
10 [REDACTED] (Inaudible) attention?

11 [REDACTED] The only thing I ever brought
12 to -- never anything directly to [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
13 (Phonetic), my only discussions with him were
14 surrounding the logistics of moving Salem operations
15 to (Inaudible) schedule, different from the schedule
16 we're working now.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

18 [REDACTED] He would add, he's associated
19 with that. Hours worked, hours off.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Impact on overtime,
21 everything?

22 [REDACTED] Right. All the logistics
23 associated with that, all were issues I tried to work
24 out with [REDACTED] (Phonetic) as well as
25 (Inaudible). There was a roomful of people at these

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meetings.

As far as [REDACTED] (Phonetic), [REDACTED] - I took numerous problems to [REDACTED] and whatever problems got resolved at a lower level, I never had a problem with continuing until I either got the resolution I was looking for or was convinced that it wasn't going to go my way and I would concede. So when I had an issue that wasn't resolved at the lower level and it would eventually get to [REDACTED] was always very open about -- [REDACTED] had a very good open door policy. He always invited myself and [REDACTED] (Phonetic) to his weekly managers meetings so that we would be more informed about where he was taking the company and the ideas he has (Inaudible). So he was always very receptive to our input.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] is sort of being the [REDACTED] on the Hope Creek side?

[REDACTED] Right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[REDACTED] But I don't think it was well received. He was brutally honest, but something about it (Inaudible). I told [REDACTED] up front and (Inaudible) he was okay with that. I don't feel like he really was. (Inaudible)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now the issues that

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you were bringing to [REDACTED] (Phonetic) --

[REDACTED] It could be anything. They were usually plant equipment issues.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

[REDACTED] The first issue I ever took to [REDACTED] (Phonetic) was a scaffolding issue and the issue was the amount of scaffolding remaining in place over Salem. Scaffolding was erected for whatever job, whatever evolution and then it was left and (Inaudible) scaffolding somewhere else. So in our non-outage periods, we had to climb across, through and around scaffolding all over the plant because it was just left in place and never taken down. So we never could get our scaffolding concerns addressed at a lower level, so that was the very first issue I ever took to [REDACTED] It was always stuff like that, that kind of issue, conditions at (Inaudible) Park. Conditions like quality of life issues, like a locker room, (Inaudible) mail boxes for the operators, all those were issues I took to [REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you're indicating that they weren't well received. Were these issues, did you get a response to it? Did the scaffolding come down and the conditions in the locker rooms and so forth?

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[REDACTED]

No. The scaffolding didn't come down. The locker rooms never changed. The mailboxes were never changed. Conditions at (Inaudible) Park were never changed.

MR. BARBER: Was there any acknowledgement or agreement that they would change or was it something like well, we'll look into it and consider it. What kind of response did you get?

[REDACTED]

I hate to say but just a -- what I would expect is just a company middle management response, just -- I hate to be cynical, but just key words, tricky phrases is what I would get.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Meaning you didn't get a commitment and you didn't get a declination to help?

[REDACTED]

I did get commitments.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You did.

[REDACTED]

I did get commitments, but they were never followed through on them. I got commitments.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that's your response, it looked like he was going to do something for you, but it didn't happen?

[REDACTED]

Right. It never kept me from going back later with another issue. I was still

1 persistent. We would just move from one issue to
2 another. I still kept counting it as a problem.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And in these problems
4 that you were bringing in the issues would any of
5 that, do you see any of those issues as falling within
6 the purview of the NRC in terms of regulatory matters?

7 [REDACTED] No. Nothing of that nature.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then when you're
9 saying that it wasn't well received, up until the
10 point where you [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED] that you were in
13 a problem zone here?

14 [REDACTED]: I was kind of caught
15 completely by surprise when the [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED] but at the same time I
17 wasn't only because I don't document or keep things

18 well, so it's just my hearsay, but would [REDACTED] get the
19 shit job, sure. It was always a job, it was an [REDACTED]

20 job, so the fact that I got it, I could see where it
21 could be argued whether it was being given to [REDACTED]

22 because it's an [REDACTED] job, so that's just my opinion.
23 It's never been documented or verbalized or expressed.


24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It seemed like that's
25 what happened to you on a more frequent basis as

1 compared to the [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] Absolutely.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that's what you
4 were tracking in your mind. It's not documented?
5 [REDACTED] Right. But like I said it was
6 never anything that was -- it wasn't an [REDACTED] job.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Anything else?
8 [REDACTED] That continues to this day.
9 [REDACTED] and I both, we're kept at the -- we're kept away
10 from -- take this for an example, the (Inaudible)
11 outage. We were kept away from the outage as much as
12 possible. I'm always given things like (Inaudible).
13 There again, it's a job for an operator, but I get it.
14 The BF19 launch (Phonetic) --
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the significance
16 of that is what, it keeps you in a different area?
17 [REDACTED] Right, it keeps me away from
18 all the evolutions, all the tagging, all the
19 procedures going on. It keeps me occupied,
20 legitimately,
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But on the periphery?
22 [REDACTED] Right. I'll give you an
23 example from yesterday. Yesterday, I came to work at
24 7 o'clock. I was given a list of all the maintenance
25 done on 22 (Inaudible), unit 2 outage. I was told to

1 go walk it down and check for leaks and then
2 (Inaudible). Perfectly good job, an excellent idea.
3 Only the new catter (Phonetic) hadn't been filled and
4 pressurized yet --

5 [END OF TAPE 1, SIDE B; BEGIN TAPE 2, SIDE
6 B.]

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're on Tape 2.
8 It's approximately 3:55 p.m. If you want to just pick
9 up where you were talking about you were walking --
10 you spent a morning walking down something that wasn't
11 pressurized?

12  I spent the morning walking
13 down (Inaudible) looking for leaks that wasn't
14 pressurized at the time. It was a pretty good
15 opportunity to verify that this is work done by
16 contractors. They were being reassembled correctly
17 and there were no discrepancies or problems. So there
18 was some benefit gained from it. But it kept me busy
19 all morning.

20 MR. BARBER: Did you ask about that? I
21 mean did you ask hey, the header is not pressurized
22 yet. Why am I doing this?

23  I didn't know the header
24 wasn't pressurized until I got into the field.

25 MR. BARBER: Oh, okay.

1 [REDACTED] And as I could see the
2 (Inaudible) valve shut and the guy in the field with
3 the (Inaudible) still releasing the vents and drains,
4 you know it's not totally pressurized. I continued
5 with the other job (Inaudible). I did it until about
6 lunch time. Had lunch. After lunch, I was given unit
7 verification (Inaudible).

8 So I did the exact same thing that
9 afternoon that I did that morning, only in the morning
10 it was an inspection for leaks. In the afternoon, it
11 was a verification of the (Inaudible). Busy work.
12 Then the NO work keeps me somewhere. If somebody
13 calls in sick, if a duty guy calls in sick, I get to
14 be (Inaudible). It's not a bad deal. I get turnover
15 pay and I get a duty, but it keeps me busy taking
16 (Inaudible) and tending to the equipment on that duty
17 and it keeps me out of the outage.

18 I've had two (Inaudible) at the beginning
19 of the outage, (Inaudible) notifications. Both of
20 them on tagging issues. I haven't had a job since.
21 Since then they keep me busy doing stuff.

22 MR. BARBER: Did you ask about that? Did
23 you know --

24 [REDACTED] Because like I said, it's just
25 my perception of things and there's nothing -- it's

1 not just keeping me busy, it's stuff that needs to be
2 done, should be done. Does a leak test need to be
3 done on (Inaudible)? Absolutely. But we should have
4 done it, once it was pressurized, not all morning
5 while it was still being released and was being
6 tagged, right?

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this the pattern
8 with any one supervisor or is this across the board
9 with the supervisors?

10 [REDACTED] It's across the board. I
11 don't want to get of the RFP.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: From what you're
13 describing it may be all part of the same issue,
14 looking at whether or not people are able to raise
15 concerns. What that leads me to is in these recent
16 events that you were able to discuss, when you were
17 seeing these problems and let's go back to being at 2
18 start-up when you saw three separate issues that were
19 described involving the mis-sign off in the procedure
20 and you questioned the steam dumps. Are these issues
21 that you raised at that point and I mean are keeping
22 track of notifications or are you asking these
23 questions while you're going through these issues?

24 [REDACTED] I asked these questions and I
25 keep track of the notification.

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You do them both.

[REDACTED] I don't have the best filing system in the world, but --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But you're saying that you're doing both?

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And is this what you're saying is contributing to keeping you on this periphery?

[REDACTED] Yes, that's my perception anyway.

MR. BARBER: You mentioned that [REDACTED] was also treated the same way?

[REDACTED] He gets the same kind of deal.

MR. BARBER: Does he say anything?

[REDACTED] Yes, to me.

MR. BARBER: Does he ever say anything to the supervision?

[REDACTED] I don't know that. I don't.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't what?

[REDACTED] I don't say anything to the supervision about being kept in the periphery.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But on the event that you see them, when you're seeing this pushing that makes you uncomfortable you're raising

1 issues there?

2 [REDACTED] Yes, I don't have a problem
3 raising issues or concerns. I never had, never will.

4 (Inaudible)

5 MR. BARBER: What about some of the others
6 that you advocate for. You talked about a few people
7 that felt uncomfortable about raising issues, but
8 you're not there. Are they going to take their issues
9 to other [REDACTED] or are they just going to clam
10 up?

11 [REDACTED] It goes both ways. I've seen
12 both.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And do the [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] push the way you do?

15 [REDACTED] No. But we're all different.
16 I mean we all have different personalities. We all
17 handle things different. We all see different -- we
18 all see things differently as concerns, although that
19 shouldn't be the case because we're all working at the
20 same standard, right, the same set of guys buying
21 these same procedures. It's just human nature we see
22 things differently. We see some things as problems,
23 some things as not. So another [REDACTED] would push
24 something or not push something that I would or
25 wouldn't. I don't push everything that comes to me.

1 I'll discuss it with another [REDACTED] or one of
2 the senior operators and make a decision. I'll let
3 the guy know it's something we should push or
4 shouldn't push or we should handle it this way or that
5 way or that's okay, that's how things are done, that's
6 okay.

7 A lot of times new guys will ask questions
8 about something they're doing for the first time and
9 they're not sure what it is. And should they go to
10 their supervisor and ask questions? Absolutely, but
11 I'm not going to discourage them from coming to [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] and asking the same
13 question.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In terms of issues
15 that impact the safe operations of the plant, do you
16 think those are issues that are getting raised when
17 they need to?

18 [REDACTED] Yes, I think so, yes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You think so. Can
20 you think of any instances where somebody would say
21 they didn't raise a concern for fear --

22 [REDACTED] A nuclear safety concern?

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

24 [REDACTED] Not off the top of my head,
25 no.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You indicated you
2 also had some other issues akin to what you gave us
3 today, you have another file, I think, right?

4 [REDACTED] I've got a --

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I know you went back
6 to September of 2002 when we started talking about --

7 [REDACTED] There's tagging issues here
8 and procedure issues here, but none of them are really
9 nuclear safety related. Unless you want to give it as
10 an example, I'll try to relate it to how you would
11 respond or how we would handle an issue that might be
12 nuclear safety related, but I would hope (Inaudible).

13 MR. BARBER: Is it your sense that most of
14 the NEOs are frustrated with the way they're treated
15 by their supervisor?


16 [REDACTED] Absolutely, the vast majority.

17 MR. BARBER: Why is that, do you think?

18 [REDACTED]: I think the biggest problem is
19 not being listened to. A lot of the NEOs, there's a
20 lot of knowledge, a lot of background with the
21 department, but unfortunately, I think for the most
22 part, usually NEOs are just thought of as just NEOs.
23 So their input isn't utilized. Like, for example, we
24 hire a lot of Navy nukes here. I was a [REDACTED]
25 coming in. And their backgrounds are grossly under-

1 utilized. It's interesting. All the Navy nukes were
2 brought in at a higher pay step because of our
3 background and we're paid more, but they don't let us
4 do more or provide more input or given more
5 responsibility.

6 MR. BARBER: Is there a presumption that
7 if you do have a better background, more experience,
8 more knowledge, more capability, more talent, that
9 you'll proceed up sooner in the organization? You'll
10 be the next NCO or the next CRS or next Shift Manager
11 or what have you and that's where you get your
12 benefit? Or is it that in some way you see that that
13 background should have been elevated in some way in
14 the NEO ranks?

15  You bring a Navy nuke in here
16 that's operated a power plant, is familiar with a
17 tagging process and testing of equipment and log
18 taking is just basic knowledge of pump logs and how
19 systems operate, interact. A TWR is what we have on
20 the submarines. It's a lot smaller, so they come in
21 with all this background, things -- the pumps here are
22 just bigger. The valves here are a little larger.
23 Things have a slightly different take. You've got a
24 guy with all that knowledge and that background, he's
25 not given any more responsibility, he's not listened

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1 to any more, his advice isn't taken any more than
2 somebody that was hired from Salem High School. We're
3 paid more because of that background, but we're not --
4 I'm saying there's an opportunity there to utilize
5 background of NEOs and that's something that
6 discourages the NEOs. Their recommendations aren't --

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At what level, from
8 what level are they not?

9 [REDACTED] All.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why do you think that
11 is?

12 [REDACTED] I don't know. That's a good
13 question. That's something that frustrates me,
14 anyway. And we've voiced that opinion in many, many
15 meetings.

16 MR. BARBER: Do the NCOs feel the same
17 way?

18 [REDACTED] Yes, they do, but not to the
19 extent of the NEOs, the NRC license carries a lot of
20 weight, so they're listened to more, but I think the
21 (Inaudible) --

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There were three
23 there that you pointed out weren't paid much attention
24 to.

25 [REDACTED] Do you know what? One thing

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1 that's interesting and I don't have the (Inaudible) to
2 be able to sit there and look through an entire work
3 chart, but I would imagine that a number of people
4 that are in higher positions in the organization may,
5 at one time, been NEOs or NCOs or --


6 MR. BARBER: So is it that once they get
7 to a certain level they forget --

8  Absolutely.

9 MR. BARBER: They forget totally that they
10 were ever an NEO or a control room operator and now
11 I'm in management, I'm going to think totally
12 differently and I'm going to treat people totally
13 differently than I would have liked to have been
14 treated when I was in that position?

15  Unfortunately that's the case.
16 Not all the time, but that is the case in some of the
17 supervision that came up through the ranks. They're
18 just too far removed from -- things have changed a
19 lot.

20 MR. BARBER: Is it possible that they're
21 under different pressures or pressures you don't see
22 or understand?

23  Who?

24 MR. BARBER: Has anybody ever confided in
25 you like somebody who has been maybe a long time

1 friend that maybe has moved up ahead of you and said
2 you know, I'm under a lot of pressure. This person
3 told me to do this, this person told me to do that.
4 I know, I understand your point, but we can't do it.
5 Have you ever gotten anything like that?

6 *7C* [REDACTED] Yes, and those guys try to
7 advocate their support of our input, but the people
8 who do do that, the supervisor who do do that aren't
9 at a high enough position to make that happen.

10 Take a CRS that came up through the ranks,
11 went from the field, into the control room and now
12 CRS. There's a handful of them that remember what it
13 was like to be an NEO and they understand our position
14 and our input and they try to push things for us, but
15 at the CRS level they don't have that kind of power or
16 authority. I mean their input is nothing more than
17 input to the OS, to the AOM to the general manager.
18 I mean depending on the issue you have to get to a
19 certain level before that decision can be made on
20 whatever input. So it's very seldom, if ever, at the
21 CRS level.

22 MR. BARBER: So the kinds of things that
23 you must be raising or getting feedback on are they
24 more like high level policy issues? I'm trying to
25 understand. Why would something -- there must be some

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1 things that could be made at various levels of the
2 organization or maybe not. Maybe there's something
3 very different about this station as opposed to other
4 stations where -- are all the decisions made at the
5 general manager or plant manager level or are they --
6 is there some things that the shift can make decisions
7 on on their own?

8 [REDACTED] Maybe this will answer your
9 question, when [REDACTED] was leaving, I asked him
10 why he came, he moved his family here, bought a home,
11 he had a [REDACTED] It was a lot for that
12 individual to make the move to DSE&G for such a short
13 period. It wasn't like he was some single guy hopping
14 from job to job. I mean he had a [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED] a lot of responsibility. So I thought it
16 would take an awful lot for an individual like that to
17 come and go to this area so quickly. So I asked him
18 before he left why are you leaving after making the
19 move and with your family here? He said, [REDACTED] three
20 people run this department and I'm not one of them.
21 I said what do you mean? He said this department is
22 run by (Inaudible), [REDACTED]
23 (Inaudible). He said I will not be [REDACTED] who
24 can't run my own department.

25 So at what level do you have to go to get

1 a decision? Apparently, when [REDACTED] was
2 around, you had to go above the Ops Manager.

3 MR. BARBER: Did that get fed back out to
4 the rest of the department?

5 [REDACTED] I fed it out to the
6 department. I don't know if it was fed out by any
7 other means or by any other --

8 MR. BARBER: So you discussed it with your
9 peers?

10 [REDACTED] Yes.

11 MR. BARBER: And what was their reaction
12 to that?

13 [REDACTED] Not surprised. The guys who
14 had been around saw that.

15 MR. BARBER: So what I think I heard you
16 say was he was the [REDACTED] He was talking
17 about he had no autonomy and that the [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED] Yes.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED] and they were the only ones
24 given "decision making power" in the organization for
25 Operations?

All 7c

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[REDACTED]

Yes.

MR. BARBER: And it was meaningful in any way, I'm guessing.

[REDACTED]

Right, right.

MR. BARBER: Other than very minor things?

[REDACTED]

Right.

MR. BARBER: Did he say why that was or did he give you any -- I mean that's kind of a frustration type comment, but did he say why he felt that was or give you any indication as to why that --

[REDACTED]

No, he didn't.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there any particular event that prompted him cutting off from here in getting that frustrated?

[REDACTED]

I don't remember any one specific event. First thing I think it was just a culmination of beating his head against the wall for so long he finally just saying (Inaudible).

I can't pinpoint a specific event that led him to --

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's a question for him?

[REDACTED]

Right, right.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything further? Let me just go off the record for a second. It's

1 about 4:14.

2 (Off the record.)

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on the
4 record. I should make a point, it's 4:30 p.m.
5 approximately and what you were doing is just
6 reviewing your documentation, at least with what you
7 have brought with you today. If you come across
8 something that you see falls into the line of
9 questioning, that we've completed, then you'll contact
10 me and add that to the record?

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And if we have any
13 further questions, then we'll contact you. One point
14 I wanted to make with you was in regard to your
15 consideration of your [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] I wanted to make sure that you understood the
19 Office of Investigations and the NRC addresses
20 allegations that involve potential violations of the
21 employee protection statute in that if you believed
22 you've raised a concern of a regulatory nature and
23 then having done so you've been retaliated against for
24 doing that, you would make that allegation and I'll
25 give you the appropriate office and number and that's

1 where OI will investigate those potential violations
2 for wrong doing.

3 I just wanted to be sure that you were
4 clear on that. You've also indicated to me at this
5 point that that's not the allegation you're making,
6 but we're leaving it with you that you understand the
7 circumstances if that's the way you want to go, you
8 have the information to do so. That's understood.

9 The other point is in closing have I or
10 any other NRC representative offered you any promises
11 of reward or threatened you in any manner in exchange
12 for your information today?

13 [REDACTED] No.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you appeared
15 here freely and voluntarily?

16 [REDACTED] Yes.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And if you want to
18 cover anything else that we might need at a later time
19 in terms of any incidents that you're just not
20 thinking of right now, at this point we'll close.
21 It's approximately 4:32 p.m. And I thank you for your
22 time.

23 [REDACTED] You're welcome.


24 (Whereupon, at 4:32 p.m., the interview
25 was concluded.)

All TC

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings
before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of



- 7C

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Hope Creek Nuclear Power
Station

were held as herein appears, and that this is the
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