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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

Interview of [REDACTED] - 7C

Docket Number:

1-2003-051F

Location:

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Date:

Friday, January 16, 2004

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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

3 + + + + +

4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

5 INTERVIEW

6 -----x

7 IN THE MATTER OF: :

8 INTERVIEW OF: : Docket No. 1-2003-051F

9 [REDACTED] :

10 (CLOSED) :

11 -----x

12 Friday, January 16, 2004

13
14 PSEG Nuclear

15 Training Center

16 Salem, NJ

17
18 The above-entitled interview was conducted
19 at 12:45 p.m.

20
21 BEFORE:

22 Special Agent EILEEN NEFF

23 Senior Project Engineer SCOTT BARBER

24
25
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

(12:45 p.m.)

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is January the 16th, 2004, the time is approximately 12:45 p.m. Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC Region 1, Office of Investigations. Also present for this interview is Senior Project Engineer Scott Barber with the Division of Reactor Projects, also with Region 1. This interview will take place with [REDACTED] spelled?

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Thank you.

And the subject of the interview is the safety conscious work environment at Hope Creek you experienced being here at Hope Creek. Okay. The location of the interview is at PSEG Nuclear Training Center in Salem, New Jersey.

At this point, what I'd like to do is place you under oath. If you'd raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony that you're about to provide is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

[REDACTED]: I do.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And for the

1 record, your identification, date of birth, social
2 security.

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And your home
address?

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you. And I
told you before we went on the record that you're not
being approached as the subject of any investigation
or any potential wrongdoing. We're talking to you for
your assessment of the work environment. And as part
of that in trying to define it, I was talking to you
about how that would include -- our discussion would
include employees' ability, including your own and
management, ability to raise concerns, the nature of
the concerns that you've witnessed being raised, how
they were handled up the chain of command, what the
response is and people's comfort level with raising,
we'll say specifically, safety concerns. Part of that
might be industrial safety concerns, and part of it
would be nuclear safety concerns, and the focus here
would be the health and safety of the public, nuclear
safety.

1 In addition to that, we're also looking at
2 decision making and what goes into the decision making
3 on the site. Is it conservative, is it appropriate,
4 are you comfortable with what you've been
5 participating in? In that, the environment -- I'll go
6 pretty broad at first. Let me ask if you think -- do
7 you see any strengths to the environment that you're
8 working within. You know, I'm sorry, I'm sorry. Let
9 me back up just a little bit, I'm sorry, because what
10 I did was I skipped ahead to -- I didn't include your
11 experience here. Your education experience, please.

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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So when did you leave
the [REDACTED] and when did you start with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in

1 [REDACTED] and then I went to work for [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] for approximately a year starting in July
3 of that year, [REDACTED]

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what position was
5 that?

6 [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED]

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

12 [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED]

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Hope Creek side?

21 [REDACTED] Hope Creek side.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

23 [REDACTED] And then I went into
24 [REDACTED] and I was in the Hope Creek System
25 [REDACTED] So that would

1 -- and then it was -- trying to think of the year I
2 started -- [REDACTED] It was toward the end of,
3 let's see, I guess it would have been -- yes, I
4 started with [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: ([REDACTED]) through now?

7 [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED]
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED] Correct.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what was your
13 position in [REDACTED] then?

14 [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED]
16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: When was
17 that, in [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] No -- yes, yes. I'm
19 trying to remember the dates here. [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED]
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Pretty good on the
23 dates.

24 [REDACTED] Yes. There's a lot of
25 dates.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: February 1, '99,
2 okay. And you were [REDACTED] then, what, sometime in
3 [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Okay. Who
9 have been your shift supervisors? I know there are
10 OSs or Shift Managers, it's a little different title.

11 [REDACTED] Yes. They just went to
12 a Shift Manager title, I'm not sure when. It's been
13 recent. Up until recently my -- when I started in
14 [REDACTED] it was [REDACTED] and I just
15 transitioned to -- now, that was on [REDACTED] I
16 just transitioned to [REDACTED]
17 So for over [REDACTED] and then from
18 [REDACTED]

19 (phonetic).

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] And right now it's [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED]

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: About a week ago or
24 so?

25 [REDACTED] A week ago we did a crew

1 reorganization, changed the crew complements around.

2 So right now I remained on Charlie shift and [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED]

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. All right.

5 Thank you. I bypassed around and was asking you about

6 your impressions of the work environment on site, and

7 basically what I'd like to ask you in that time frame

8 then let's look at the recent past, since you got to

9 [REDACTED] Have you noted in the work

10 environment any particular strengths or any particular

11 weaknesses?

12 [REDACTED] Relative to?

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The safety conscious

14 work environment and relative to kind of -- along the

15 lines of what I was describing in terms of people's

16 ability to raise concerns and how those concerns are

17 responded to.

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what you see as

20 a comfort level. And that would include you

21 personally, your subordinates as well as your own

22 management chain.

23 [REDACTED] Right. I can only speak
24 for Hope Creek but I've always felt I've never had an
25 issue with personally raising a safety concern or

1 never felt that any one of my crew had an issue with
2 doing something like that. We've talked about being
3 forthcoming with things like that. If you had a
4 question or you had a concern to, like the union guys
5 for example, to raise to management or even myself
6 just to raise it for my supervision. I've never had
7 a real concern about that; always felt pretty free to
8 do that.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You personally?

10 [REDACTED]: Yes. Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about on the
12 part of others? Are you aware of any hesitation on
13 the part of others to raise a concern?

14 [REDACTED] Not really, not really.
15 I don't know of any individuals myself that had issues
16 or concerns like that. I really don't.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you say you
18 talked with your crew about that, when was that?

19 [REDACTED] Well, we would -- one of
20 the things that we do is we have our shift turnover
21 for coming on at nights or coming on in the morning,
22 and we always start off our shift meeting with a
23 safety message and the OS usually leads that. We're
24 open for discussion about that, and he sometimes
25 elaborates on it or we'll do it CRSs, you know, just

1 to -- if he's not there, if he's at a morning meeting
2 or something like that, but that always starts off the
3 turnover meetings at the beginning of the day, always.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that comes up as
5 a matter of a routine type of discussion?

6 [REDACTED] Yes, it does. Yes, it
7 does.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Aren't those
9 messages more industrial safety oriented?

10 [REDACTED] Some are. Yes, they are
11 industrial safety oriented, and I know we have them
12 every day. I know there have been some nuclear
13 related as well, but, correct, they are industrial
14 safety related as well.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you think of any
17 that have been nuclear safety?

18 [REDACTED] Off the top of my head I
19 can't, not really. The industrial does weigh more
20 heavily.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In what areas do you
22 see that?

23 [REDACTED] There's a lot of talk
24 about personal safety. Hand injuries, talk about
25 things like that. We talk about electrical safety a

1 lot, especially with switching activities, cold
2 weather, just those types of things.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

4 [REDACTED]: Ladders, you know, just
5 things come to mind, ladder safety, making sure that
6 -- you know, fall protection, that type of stuff.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Has anyone on your
8 crew ever made you aware that they had a fear of
9 raising a concern, fear -- this would be at your
10 subordinate level -- a basic fear of retaliation or
11 any adverse action might be taken against them for
12 having raised a particular concern?

13 [REDACTED]: Absolutely not.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. That's not
15 been your experience.

16 [REDACTED]: No.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about to your
18 knowledge in terms of your peers at the [REDACTED] level?

19 [REDACTED]: No, none at all.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And what about
21 in your management chain at your OS/AOM in that area?

22 [REDACTED]: No. I've never felt that
23 that was an issue or nobody's ever conveyed that to
24 me, and I've always felt, like I said, free with any
25 of the OS staff that I could freely speak about that.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: How about
2 the follow up to whatever issue you were raising? Do
3 you have a perception that there was reasonable follow
4 up or at least consideration of whatever the issue was
5 before you got an answer? I think a lot of people may
6 say, "Yes, I feel okay about raising an issue," but
7 they have varying degrees of confidence on what will
8 be done about that.

9 7C → [REDACTED] Right. Well, I think as
10 an organization we've gotten better with that through
11 the years. I mean I don't know if you're familiar
12 with our daily turnover sheet but we have an entire
13 section on that devoted to safety concerns, and the
14 problem is identified, there's an owner, there's a due
15 date associated with the item, notification numbers
16 associated with it, which is what we use to identify
17 the problems. That information is on that section of
18 the sheet and what we're doing is like compensatory
19 measures as well till we come to some type of final
20 resolution on certain issues.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Would it be
22 fair to characterize those issues as issues identified
23 by an individual kind of their own? In other words,
24 maybe there's some discussion but they have a concern
25 about something either they see as an indication or

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1 something in the plant, the way something's working?
2 I mean isn't that the way those kinds of things come
3 up?

4 [REDACTED] That's correct.. For
5 example, our diesel generators. We have CO leaks or
6 have had CO leaks in the past and there have been some
7 concerns and issues associated with those problems,
8 and we've addressed those. Engineering's gotten
9 involved, Maintenance has gotten involved, and we have
10 gotten those leaks repaired, and every time we do a
11 diesel run, a normal monthly surveillance run, for
12 example, we'll have Loss Prevention right there
13 monitoring the atmosphere, the breathable atmosphere
14 in the room. And one of the things on another --
15 along the same lines is we'll -- we try and minimize
16 the amount of people in the diesel room on an engine
17 start because unless someone really has to be in there
18 like an engineer to monitor something on initial start
19 that's the type of stuff we cover in pre-job briefs,
20 you know, minimize the people in the room because it
21 is a potentially dangerous time when you're starting
22 a diesel engine.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] But the big thing is, and
25 we've gotten a lot better at it, our pre-job briefs

1 are a lot more thorough and a lot more encompassing
2 from all aspects, not only machine operation but as
3 far as personal safety, lessons learned, OE, talk
4 about communications, things like that, termination
5 points. I mean that is like -- that's what our briefs
6 are all about today.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] They've evolved. They've
9 evolved.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A lot better since
11 when? What time frame are you comparing it to?

12 [REDACTED] Well, I mean like when I
13 first was an [REDACTED] We always did pre-job briefs, but
14 it seems like in the industry there's been, and at
15 Hope Creek, there's been more of an emphasis in the
16 past several years of more thorough pre-job briefs,
17 what needs to be a part of those briefs. And I mean
18 we have gotten better in terms of -- OE was always
19 something that wasn't always discussed but now it's
20 always discussed, making sure we have all the other
21 departments engaged, like I&C will be there for a
22 diesel brief because of instrumentation that they may
23 have to install. We'll have Loss Prevention there for
24 the CO issues, that type of thing.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Let's stay

1 with the diesel for just a minute. You talked about
2 carbon monoxide leaks. How did all of this first come
3 about in your recollection?

4 [REDACTED] Well, I know that -- are
5 you looking specifics?

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, kind of
7 a sequence. Do you remember was there one diesel, one
8 in particular or has it always been a problem? I mean
9 has it been an issue for 20 years or is it a recent
10 issue?

11 [REDACTED] Yes. I don't know that
12 it's always been a problem but there was, and I don't
13 remember the diesel, the particular diesel, but it
14 seemed to be more of an issue than others with regard
15 to, I guess, atmosphere. You know, you walk in a
16 diesel room and with CO in the air your eyes may burn
17 a little bit, but I mean one diesel was really
18 starting to show more signs of that. And one, I
19 think, I'm trying to remember, during the one run
20 there was some guys actually, I think, may have gotten
21 a little sick. I'm not sure of the details because I
22 wasn't there, but there were some concerns associated
23 with that. And that actually was a big -- that was a
24 big deal in our plant because especially from the
25 equipment operator ranks they raised some safety

1 issues associated with that particular diesel, and
2 then from there it just -- the CO issue spread to all
3 the diesels and the sensitivity became a heightened --
4 more of an awareness. We were just more sensitive to
5 it.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Would you
7 say that management at the Station reacted promptly to
8 address the concern? I mean was it one of these
9 things where they realized and acknowledged they had
10 a problem and then within a short period of time took
11 some action to shut the diesel down and get into
12 repair activity to fix it or was there some period of
13 time when there was some compensatory measures taken?
14 Do you have a recollection?

15 [REDACTED] What I'm recalling is
16 that while there were compensatory measures taken, as
17 far as repairs, I know things were included, were
18 looked to be handled, placed in the work week
19 schedule. I know that there were those types of
20 things in place, but I don't remember the exact
21 details. As far as them being timely, I think so.
22 It's all relative.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] I think that management
25 did address them and put compensatory measures in

1 place to ensure the safety of the people.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you
3 recall what the comp measures were at all?

4 [REDACTED] Well, I know that --
5 well, CO2 monitoring for one thing and -- it's been a
6 while and I really don't remember the details.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. All
8 right. That's fine.

9 [REDACTED] I really don't.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: From the operators'
11 standpoint, were they -- what did you hear from them?
12 Were they satisfied with the way the issues were
13 handled there?

14 [REDACTED] Well, the equipment
15 operators I know was a pretty emotional -- and I don't
16 know if that's the best way to describe it. I don't
17 think initially that they felt that. I don't think
18 that they felt that. They still had concerns about
19 being in the room when machines were run for
20 surveillances. That's what I'm remembering. But the
21 incidents that I'm referring to happened on different
22 shifts and I wasn't personally involved in those
23 surveillance runs, and they were on surveillance runs.
24 That's why I really don't have any details on them.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.
2 How about any other -- is there any other issues that
3 stand out one way or the other as far as maybe you did
4 have more involvement or have more knowledge of?

5 7C → [REDACTED] Yes. I know -- I can
6 give you a specific, a recent one, and this is just
7 indicative of what we've been doing recently. I mean
8 we have been fixing a lot of things recently. I mean
9 that -- safety is like the number one priority at the
10 Plant. I believe that. If I didn't believe it, I
11 wouldn't say it.

12 Perfect example, we had a -- we were doing
13 some switching in the yard and it was a one to three
14 breaker. There was a Section 1 disconnect that there
15 was some issues with as far as being able to operate
16 it. It was tough to operate, and it had been
17 historically been harder to operate than the other
18 yard disconnects. And I think on the last time that
19 we switched, which was several weeks ago for some
20 (inaudible) associated with debt, the yard -- one
21 operator actually started to operate that -- open that
22 disconnect and actually had to call on the other guy,
23 the operator, who was there to take over because he
24 physically couldn't continue, and it was in the middle
25 of, from what I understand, drawing the arc as they

1 were opening it up. So that obviously got a lot of
2 attention.

3 And this past weekend the Plant went
4 through a major evolution to prepare that. It was
5 prior to going back and just going back to normal line
6 without repairing that, putting the -- you know,
7 realigning all of our buses, taking out a certain
8 section of the switchyard, 500 KV switchyard, which
9 went over to the -- impacted 13.8 yard. It was huge,
10 and we got fixed. And the only thing I'll say about
11 that, you know, that showed a lot of people a lot of
12 things, I think. You know, it showed me a lot.

13 Now, back in December --

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Specifically, what?

15 7C → [REDACTED] Well, the fact that we
16 would -- we actually had to come down like 60 percent
17 to do that, and, like I said, it was a big evolution
18 in terms of not settling for equipment that was
19 substandard, making sure we're going out to the fix,
20 that type of thing. I mean it's obvious to me that
21 with these forced outages especially that we've had,
22 the amount of things that we've gone out to repair
23 during the forced outage is really upper management
24 saying, "Hey, let's get this stuff fixed. We're not
25 going to settle for this stuff anymore." And I mean

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1 rather than just turning the outage around and take
2 care of the problem that put us there, we're fixing
3 other things too: Going down in cold shutdown, going
4 under drywell, fixing things.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is this is
6 a change or has it always been like this?

7 [REDACTED]: Well, I don't want to say
8 it's always been like this. I mean when there are
9 forced outages, what can be fixed and what's
10 practical, but I think there's more of an emphasis on
11 that, I want to say, within the past six months than
12 I've ever seen, I've ever seen.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is there
14 something that instigate that?

15 [REDACTED]: No. I think that we've
16 just evolved that way, but it's not just all that. I
17 mean we have a new [REDACTED] and
18 he really is -- he drives that stuff from what I've
19 seen so far.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right, but he hasn't
21 been here six months, though, right?

22 [REDACTED]: No, he hasn't. He's been
23 I guess two, three months. But even before [REDACTED] came
24 on we were starting to move that way.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What do you attribute

1 that to?

2 [REDACTED] I think it's just the
3 fact that people are becoming more safety conscious
4 and the operators are not settling for taking
5 equipment back from Maintenance that isn't right or
6 isn't ready to go or it's not fixed. I mean we've
7 done that in the past, we've settled for that type of
8 stuff, and the operators aren't settling for it
9 anymore. I mean notifications are coming left and
10 right on things that are substandard.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I'm just noting some
12 of the words that you're using. It's "recently," "a
13 lot of repairs," "anymore," and "people aren't
14 settling for something like that."

15 [REDACTED] Right.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If they settled for
17 that before, why are they no longer settling for that?
18 Why would you run the power plant so very differently
19 at this point in time?

20 [REDACTED] It's not that we run the
21 power plant differently. A lot of -- I'm not real
22 good with words, and a lot of this stuff is
23 subjective, but what I'm trying to convey is that it's
24 been -- it hasn't been an overnight thing, and it's
25 been a gradual transition. We've evolved into that

1 type of environment. We've gotten more safety
2 conscious aware, and, like I say, guys just aren't
3 putting up with things anymore.

4 I can say this, when I saw the biggest
5 change, and I guess it was about, I'm sure you know
6 about it, I'm sure -- I don't know if it was two years
7 ago, whatever, we had a building operator that was
8 seriously hurt because he was trying to perform a PM
9 on some service for the (inaudible) case out at our
10 service intake structure, and he was out there by
11 himself and he got conked on the head. So I mean that
12 really was the turning point.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For the added
14 emphasis on safety?

15 ^{7C} → [REDACTED] Yes. And that's when the
16 operators put their foot down and said pretty much,
17 "We're not" -- I'm just trying to convey an idea here
18 but, "We're not going to put up with this stuff
19 anymore." And since that time it has just become more
20 and more of a safety conscious work place.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But that's an
22 incident that happened two years ago. So at that
23 point the focus becomes more so on industrial safety.

24 ^{7C} → [REDACTED] Right.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But what you're

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1 pointing to are changes that you've noted in the past
2 six months.

3 7C → [REDACTED] Right. Right. I mean we
4 -- after that incident we moved gradually toward a
5 more -- toward a safety work place mindset type thing,
6 but what I've just seen is just like it's -- like I
7 said, it wasn't an overnight thing, it's just
8 something that's continuing to grow and evolve.
9 That's the best way I can explain it to you.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The senior management
11 changeout in the past, well, March, April, all the way
12 throughout September, I believe, this past year in
13 2003, do you see that having any effect on the changes
14 on site?

15 7C → [REDACTED] Yes, I do. I do. You
16 know, I mean I can't tell you that I always felt that
17 going back to when I started four years ago that -- I
18 mean production has always -- production is part of
19 our business, right? I mean we're in business to make
20 power, and it's -- didn't always felt that safety took
21 a precedence over production early on. Now, when I
22 say that, I mean I always felt that I could raise
23 safety concerns, things like that, but just based on
24 the way that the whole organization worked that wasn't
25 always apparent.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. I have to ask
2 you, what exhibited that to you?

3 [REDACTED] Well, I'm just saying
4 that the work groups were just jampacked with work,
5 they just seemed like they were almost impossible at
6 times to execute, not only the surveillances but the
7 corrective maintenance stuff that would come up. As
8 a [REDACTED] trying to execute the work
9 weeks, I mean it was -- it just seemed at some points
10 that it was just so much, you know?

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And now you went all
12 the way back to '99, I think, but --

13 [REDACTED] Well, 2000.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- are you looking at
15 2000 with your [REDACTED] experience?

16 [REDACTED] Right.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So back in that time
18 frame? And how has that changed in terms of the work
19 weeks?

20 [REDACTED] Well, the work weeks are
21 still packed, but the message we're getting now is
22 that, "Hey, if something's not right, if you can't do
23 a procedure as written, you stop, you've got to get
24 the procedure fixed on a spot change, whatever, or you
25 don't continue until it's right." And we do, we stop,

1 and equipment operators stop. And we take care of
2 procedure changes to continue on or whatever it takes.
3 If something's not safe, we stop.

4 Now, that's not to say that I'm using this
5 six-month reference. This is what I'm remembering
6 most because it's recent, but I mean the message since
7 [REDACTED] had that accident has --

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Two years ago.

9 [REDACTED] Two years ago, has been
10 that, but it's just grown stronger and stronger. It's
11 become more but it --

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is it a difference
13 between where you see the message was there but it
14 wasn't practiced or is it a difference in the buildup?
15 Because what I'm noting here is what you said recently
16 about the KV switchyard issue, 'the recent KV issue.
17 What you pointed out, and I thought it was kind of
18 significant, is that it impressed you because you went
19 to 60 percent power.

20 [REDACTED] Well, no, no. I mean --

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is there something
22 unusual about that?

23 [REDACTED] No, no, there wasn't.
24 I'm just -- no, that is not the point I'm trying to
25 convey.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Okay.

2 7C → [REDACTED] What I'm just saying it
3 was a lot for the organization, not just talking about
4 the 60 percent, but we even -- there's a lot of
5 evolutions to a lot of things that had to happen to
6 put the Plant into lineup to support that repair. And
7 it was the right thing to do because it was a safety
8 issue but we did that. I mean we were transferring 1E
9 buses and non-1E buses to their alternate in-feed for
10 power and there's always risk associated with bus
11 transfers. I mean if something went wrong, we could
12 drop a bus and lose the vital loads on that bus, but
13 I mean that's the extent -- I mean that's where
14 management was willing to go to address this safety
15 concern.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: How long had
17 that existed prior to that? I mean you kind of -- you
18 intimated that it had been a problem for a while, but
19 I mean how long was that?

20 7C → [REDACTED] Yes. I mean not like it
21 was the last time it was operated. I mean it had
22 always been a more difficult disconnect to operate.
23 And I can say this about it: In December -- you know,
24 we've had a number of forced outages here. In
25 December, we had another and there was a notification

1 written on that disconnect at that time, okay, and it
2 wasn't handled at that time, but my understanding of
3 the reason it wasn't was because it was not really
4 brought to management's attention the way that it
5 should have been. Apparently, the groups that look at
6 these notifications or the screening that was done
7 just didn't bring the urgency of it to light.

8 But I have to tell you when the last one
9 was written following the difficulty we had operating
10 the disconnect, I mean that was it, we fixed it. But
11 7C → [REDACTED] (phonetic) just came out this
12 past week of training and was talking about that and
13 he said, "I have to tell you, Management, we were not
14 aware of the significance and we're not sure how that
15 fell through he crack," I'm paraphrasing, "how that
16 December notification did not get elevated to the
17 point that it did this time." But if it had been, it
18 would have been addressed the same way.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in the
20 past where you were indicating that you didn't always
21 get the message that it was safety over production, it
22 was vice-versa, and you mentioned the work week
23 management on that.

24 7C → [REDACTED] Well, not vice-versa. We
25 always got the message but sometimes you say one thing

1 and it just seems that -- and I'm not talking like
2 there were any specific incidents where things
3 happened, I'm just talking in general, the feeling I
4 had, the perception I had was that we -- production
5 was, even though we talked safety we talked a good
6 talk but maybe we didn't walk the walk, and there was
7 always so much emphasis on production. I just don't
8 feel that way any more, that's just the feeling I
9 have.

10 I can't give you any specifics, any 7C
11 details, but it's just that having been a [REDACTED] ←
12 [REDACTED] and worked the work weeks, knowing what the work
13 weeks are like, what it takes to get them done,
14 knowing that safety is our number one priority, still
15 getting that message, it just didn't seem like that
16 things were being addressed or fixed to fix things on
17 a permanent basis. You may fix something but it was
18 like it might show up later, like a month or two later
19 because it wasn't adequately addressed in the repair,
20 that type of stuff. Now, I mean the root causes that
21 the organization's doing to make sure that, hey, we
22 fix something this time, it's not going to happen
23 again. We've had inadequate -- it just didn't seem
24 like things were fully baked as far as bringing these
25 to a final --

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Fix it right?

2 [REDACTED] Right, fix it right. Now
3 we're doing that.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where was the
5 breakdown? I mean where does that go to? If it
6 wasn't getting done before, what's changed?

7 [REDACTED] I don't know.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is it better
9 maintenance? Is it better scheduling? Is it more
10 resources?

11 [REDACTED] Well, the work recently
12 has gotten more sophisticated as far as scheduling, I
13 mean as coordination of activities. We did have some
14 bad maintenance practices in the past, and I can't
15 speak on those details. I just know that from things
16 that had been reworked that there were some issues
17 with maintenance, and there have been attention to
18 detail issues, human performance issues that have
19 occurred, but I think we're working smarter and we're
20 working more focused and we're -- the message that
21 everybody is getting is production is important, it's
22 one piece, but it's not at the expense of safety.
23 That's what I'm getting.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's what you're
25 getting since when?

1 [REDACTED] Like I said, the emphasis
2 -- I've seen it since [REDACTED] got injured and I've seen
3 it grow since that time to the point where it is now.
4 I mean that's the message that everybody's hearing.
5 I mean if somebody in the organization thinks that --
6 I mean if it's not obvious that everybody in the
7 organization -- that we're fixing things -- I mean
8 that we're not fixing things, that's wrong, because
9 we're -- you should look at our track record. I mean
10 we're just -- we're fixing stuff and we're fixing it
11 right.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Going back,
13 oh, I don't know, a year or so, have you ever been
14 involved in situations where maybe there was some
15 repair that was needed or some position you had to
16 move the Plant to effect a repair, have you ever felt
17 like, gee, we really need to do this or we're not
18 dealing with this issue very well? Have you ever been
19 like frustrated or disappointed with what kind of
20 support you've gotten on more of the significant
21 issues that have come up?

22 [REDACTED] I cannot think of any
23 specifics, nothing that really stands out.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You're kind
25 of hinging everything on like something that happened

1 two years ago, and you talk about things being
2 evolutionary, but, sure, along the way there's been
3 various situations that have come up that may be more
4 significant than others that maybe you're involved
5 with or you seen the decision making, you have
6 questions about it. Anything come to mind in that
7 regard where it either went really well or it didn't
8 go well? I mean you've given us examples in the last
9 month or two things that went fairly well. How about
10 things that just didn't really happen the way you
11 thought they should have?

12 7C → [REDACTED] Like I said, I can't
13 think of any specifics going back that far that really
14 stand out that would make that much of an impression
15 on me that think that maybe we shouldn't be doing
16 this. I just can't --

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Well,
18 let me ask you about a couple of things.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let me just ask --

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in terms
22 of -- from what you observed, you questioned if the
23 emphasis was coming from the production side. In
24 terms of operability decisions or procedural
25 compliance, do you recall anything along those lines?

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1 [REDACTED] Not with regard to
2 operability, no, and procedural issues. I can't think
3 of any specifics. I can tell you -- I mean the thing
4 that comes to light with regard to maintenance issues,
5 things like that, would be diesel type things that we
6 talked about. I can think of one going back a little
7 ways, going back probably to last February, okay, that
8 we were doing a diesel run and I guess we were in a --
9 we had actually gone into a diesel outage and there
10 was a -- we didn't get it returned and the diesel back
11 within the window that we wanted and actually went
12 into the 72-hour shutdown action.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this 2003 or --

14 [REDACTED] This is 2003. And I
15 can't remember if it was some type of jacket water
16 leak or not, some type of leak, and we had problems
17 with that leak repair. And, you know, I remember
18 hearing from a couple of the equipment operators said,
19 "Hey, you know, we should end up just shutting this
20 thing down and taking the Plant down." But we ended
21 up going with a CROD, inoperable but degraded type
22 evaluation on the thing. I mean my perception is
23 this: You've got your workers, your union guys,
24 you've got your first-line supervisors, and you've got
25 management, and [REDACTED]

7C 1 [REDACTED] and it's very easy for union guys or for union
2 people to say, "Hey, you know, all this isn't right.
3 Do this, do that," without any thought to the way it
4 impacts other things. And I mean you have to get
5 Engineering involved, you have to get the Maintenance
6 groups involved, I&C, and you have to talk about it,
7 figure out, hey, can we remain operable, can we make
8 a case for this thing being inoperable but degraded
9 without just going -- sure, you might hear some guys
10 saying, "I wish they'd shut this thing down." Based
11 on what?

12 Okay, I understand we have an issue here,
13 right, but you also have some risk with putting a
14 plant through shutdown evolution as well. I mean
15 that's -- shutdowns and startups aren't things that
16 are practiced regularly except for seems like recently
17 and there's risks there. So you're going places you
18 don't -- you really may not be proficient at. Now, we
19 have training before these evolutions every time we do
20 them when they're planned, but to just -- I think it's
21 wrong for guys to -- and guys get emotional about
22 things but to just come out and make statements off
23 the cuff that, "Hey, we just need to shut this thing
24 down and that's it," there's just more to it than
25 that. There's other things to run, other things to consider.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about for you
2 personally? Have you ever been involved -- I'll put
3 it this way, have you ever heard of a call made where
4 it was -- the piece of equipment in question, as you
5 said, can you make it operable but degraded as opposed
6 to declaring it inoperable? Have you ever been
7 involved in a situation like that where you thought
8 that that was really -- there was too much risk, that
9 you were just not comfortable with the call?

10 [REDACTED] No. No. Because when we
11 call something operable but degraded, I mean there is
12 a significant amount of work that supports that
13 determination. I mean these CRODs are -- I mean it's
14 got our input, it's got Engineering's input, and it's
15 not something that's taken lightly. I mean there's a
16 lot that goes into that before we make that call.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So you
18 personally haven't experienced anything that really
19 tested your comfort level with what the call was going
20 to be.

21 [REDACTED] Right.. Right.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That jacket
23 water leak you described, were you actually on shift
24 when --

25 [REDACTED] I was the -- we've had a

1 number of jacket water leaks. I was the ([REDACTED])
2 [REDACTED] I was ([REDACTED]) in the field when we
3 were running it and we just released tags, we ran for
4 a maintenance run to see what it was going to do after
5 the repairs had been made.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: This was the
7 first maintenance run?

8 [REDACTED] Yes. That's what I'm
9 remembering.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] And it was not repaired,
12 so we shut it down, tightened it again, and --

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What were
14 your thoughts? Let's just stop at that point, okay?
15 You acknowledged it wasn't repaired. What was the
16 leakage like? I mean was it more or less the same?

17 [REDACTED] I think it was at least
18 the same. It may have been a little more. I honestly
19 don't remember, it's been a year.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But not
21 fixed.

22 [REDACTED] But not fixed. I mean
23 that was at the end of the day shift and actually the
24 end of my work week, and I left thinking that I was
25 probably going to get a call, we would probably have

1 to shut down because we would not be able to repair
2 the leak. And I think the LCU ran out some time late
3 in the morning --

4 (END TAPE 1, SIDE A)

5 (BEGIN TAPE 1, SIDE B)

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The time is
7 approximately 1:37 p.m. Thank you.

8 7C → [REDACTED] Yes. What ended up
9 happening in that case was I mean Engineering was
10 working on it the entire time and one of the engineers
11 had actually contacted -- I guess got hold of another
12 plant or the vendor, I don't know, it was on the west
13 coast somewhere, and had gotten some feedback on I
14 guess it was the O-ring seal or whatever that -- some
15 type of shaft seal that the way it was supposed to be
16 installed and what it looked like was -- I don't think
17 our Maintenance guys were installing it the correct
18 way. So, like I said, just remembering, just trying
19 to remember what we were doing there. And with that
20 bit of information they reinstalled a new O-ring or
21 shaft seal and I believe, and I'm not certain, I think
22 it was still operable/degraded because there was still
23 some leakage but it was well within the design
24 requirements of the system, makeup capacity of the
25 system. So I personally didn't have a real concern at

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1 that point.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: All right.
3 How about any other type of issues that stand out in
4 your mind? You talked about -- I think one of the
5 very first technical issues we talked about was a
6 carbon monoxide leak on a diesel. We talked about it
7 being fixed and was that done in a forced outage, do
8 you remember, or was that something that was --

9 [REDACTED] I know we had fixed those
10 things online.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
12 [REDACTED] I mean we may have worked
13 on one of those machines during a forced outage but we
14 did that stuff online.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. How
16 about --

17 [REDACTED] I mean you talk about
18 things that frustrate me and frustrate operators. I
19 mean there are things out there that are issues, and
20 I'll give you a couple of examples. This is the best
21 I can come up with. We have an EHC filtering system
22 for our EHC off our main turbine, okay?

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
24 [REDACTED] And I think it's been an
25 issue throughout the industry. We are constantly

1 replacing our filters, our select filters and our fine
2 filters in that system it seems like at a, I want to
3 say, at a frequency that is just not -- should not be.
4 It's a burden in the organization to tag it, to get
5 that portion of that system drained, to replace the
6 filters and get the samples and it's been a problem
7 for, I want to say, a couple of years within
8 Engineering. But it's only been within the past six
9 months that it seems like that we're really changing
10 these things out more than it needs to be. And I know
11 Engineering's been looking at it, it's high on our
12 list of priorities, and we just have not come up with
13 any answers and Engineering has not come up with any
14 answers as to what needs to be done with this problem.
15 It's not that isn't being attacked but it's
16 frustrating.

17 I can tell you one other example that I
18 can cite that's very frustrating for [REDACTED] 7C
19 is our aux boiler systems. We have had numerous trips
20 with our aux boilers, which obviously is a bad thing
21 to happen when it's cold out, and aux boilers are
22 things that you need when you shut down. And the
23 reliability of our aux boilers has been substandard.
24 Another organization has looked at it but that problem
25 has not been addressed. That has not been addressed

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1 adequately.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is that
3 attributed to something in particular?

4 [REDACTED] Well, I don't --

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I mean the
6 trips. I mean if you were to kind of look at a
7 listing of different trips, are they all on about the
8 same kind of problems?

9 [REDACTED] It seems that way. I
10 think a couple years ago they were derated and I think
11 there might be some issues associated with that, but
12 the equipment is -- you know, it's one of those
13 systems where it's not in-plant equipment, it's in the
14 boiler house out there and it doesn't get the
15 attention that it needs to get. And I mean we react
16 every time if there's problems with it, and I know
17 there has been some efforts made in the organization
18 to address that, but they're not where they need to
19 be, they're not where they need to be. And I don't
20 know what it's going to take to get them there.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Does that
22 have a system engineer dedicated to it?

23 [REDACTED] You know, I don't think
24 so. I don't think so. We used to have -- going back
25 to when [REDACTED]

1 frame, we used to have dedicated system engineers and
2 we had system engineers for all those systems, and now
3 we don't have that. We went through a major
4 reorganization in Engineering, I was part of that, and
5 a big piece of that was a lot of -- prior to that all
6 the engineers were dedicated to each station and after
7 that they came up with an engineering organization
8 where engineers were working at both stations and Hope
9 Creek guys over at Salem and Salem vice-versa and that
10 just wasn't working, and it took them a couple years
11 to figure that out, and I think recently they're going
12 back to that type of alignment. But I mean I don't
13 know how you can expect a guy at Hope Creek to work
14 over at Salem when he probably never set foot in the
15 place and handle a control system or something like
16 that. That organization is -- I think they're still
17 finding their way. I mean there's a lot of people
18 that work hard down there, but I don't know if they're
19 understaffed or what but they struggle, they struggle,
20 but they work hard.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Let
22 me ask you about a couple specific technical issues.
23 Back in March of 2003 there was a forced outage. I
24 think it may have been to repair some of the diesel
25 leaks and maybe (inaudible) or something else, and

1 there were some problems coming out of the outage, and
2 you may or may not have been involved in that. One
3 was it had to do with a turbine bypass valve.

4 [REDACTED]
5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

6 [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED]
8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Can you kind
9 of recount what happened and what you thought of that?
10 Why don't you talk about technically what happened and
11 then your impressions afterwards?

12 [REDACTED] Well, let's see, I think
13 we had come down to somewhere between four and eight
14 percent power, and --

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Come down or
16 come up? Were you starting up or --

17 [REDACTED] Well, those were the
18 numbers. We started up and we put the turbine online
19 and then one bypass valve didn't go closed.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] So that happened like on
22 a Friday.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you
24 happen to recollect which bypass valve it was?

25 [REDACTED] I want to say -- you

1 know, I don't. It may have been Number 1. I can't
2 remember.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. You
4 don't remember. Okay. 7C

5 [REDACTED] So that was a Friday
6 night, it was our first night, Friday night, on a
7 weekend night shift, and so the plan was to come back
8 down and fix that bypass valve. So we went to
9 training on that Saturday night and there were some
10 issues with the training. It was a last minute thing
11 that was thrown together. They tried to put together
12 a good plan, but we pretty much had to write a new
13 section of a procedure to handle that evolution. And
14 I remember going through that in the simulator. When
15 we left there I was very uncomfortable with it, and I
16 even stated that during that training period during
17 that night. Because it just wasn't clear how we were
18 going to achieve this even though we had this
19 procedure because, like I said, it was new, it hadn't
20 been performed before, the whole evolution was being
21 handled as an IPTE, infrequently performed test and
22 evolution, and when we left we thought we had a good
23 plan but there were some concerns going through it.
24 It just didn't seem like --

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was the

1 gist of the plan? I mean what was -- were you still
2 at like --

3 [REDACTED] No, we were at power.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Like 15
5 percent or so? When did the bypass valve -- you were
6 putting the turbine on or were you still at like four
7 or five percent?

8 [REDACTED] No. Well, when we put
9 the turbine on it was probably about 15 percent,
10 somewhere around there.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Fifteen.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So it sat there from
13 Friday to Saturday at about 15?

14 [REDACTED] Yes.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then you went
16 into the IPTE training?

17 [REDACTED] Right.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was in that? Who
19 was present for that?

20 [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED]
22 we had -- who else?

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who was the
24 RO?

25 [REDACTED] The RO was not present at

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1 that training. The RO was a training instructor who
2 was standing in. The RO was a guy who was working
3 overtime Sunday night and he was not at that training.
4 I'm trying to think of who else was there?

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is there
6 some reason why that occurred like that? I mean
7 normally if you're doing some sort of brief or
8 training, you'd normally want to have all the
9 principals there.

10 [REDACTED] Yes, you do. Yes, you
11 do. I don't remember what specifically happened
12 there. I really don't. I don't know why -- there was
13 another [REDACTED] there but I can't remember who it was. I
14 don't remember.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I have a list. What
17 shift would this be?

18 [REDACTED] That was on echo shift.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] (phonetic) is
20 an [REDACTED] right? STA --

21 [REDACTED] was --

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] (phonetic)?

23 [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED] but he was not there
25 because he had been pulled off shift for outage

1 preparation. [REDACTED]

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This was echo shift?

3 [REDACTED] Echo shift.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

5 (phonetic)?

6 [REDACTED] was not there that
7 night.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

9 (phonetic)?

10 [REDACTED] I don't
11 think [REDACTED] was in there that night.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You know -- oh, I
13 see, [REDACTED] on a different --

14 [REDACTED] I don't think [REDACTED] was
15 there that night.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- he's on a
17 different shift right now. [REDACTED] in there
18 with [REDACTED] --

19 [REDACTED] Oh, it was [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] was there. [REDACTED] So what we had was we had
21 --

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was he
23 normally on the shift or was he -- because we have
24 something that's fairly recent and people may have
25 moved

1 [REDACTED] Well, [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] both went to the [REDACTED] probably halfway
3 through the year.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

5 [REDACTED] So, yes, [REDACTED] was in
6 there. He was the -- he was on [REDACTED]

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

8 [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED]
10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] So you had those two guys
12 on opposite sides of the horseshoe and --

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was the stand-in
14 for training, the [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED] (phonetic).

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED] And, you
18 know, so we had two ROs, two NCOs, [REDACTED]
19 who he was more or less handling the administrative
20 stuff in the back and he wasn't involved in the
21 command and control. And [REDACTED] was in there, and that
22 was pretty much it for control room complement from
23 what I remember.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who developed that
25 plan?

1 [REDACTED] I think [REDACTED]
2 (phonetic) had a lot of input into it, but I don't
3 know if [REDACTED] was the sole person. But it was SORC'd,
4 it was SORC'd I think Sunday. I mean the Plant was
5 stable sitting there with a bypass valve, the one
6 bypass open, that was not an issue.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Let's not
8 get too far ahead. I want to stay with where we were
9 on Saturday on a little bit. Okay. You said [REDACTED] may
10 have been involved with putting it together. What's
11 the normal is there a procedural requirement that
12 talks about who should be there either at the training
13 evolution or the briefing, and does it talk about the
14 authors and having an involvement with that?

15 [REDACTED] Well, I got to tell you,
16 I'm sure there is but I wasn't involved with that end
17 of it, and I really don't -- I can't comment on that.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, how
19 about your feelings when you were going through it?
20 I mean you said you had some questions about what was
21 being done or the way it was formatted. What were
22 your concerns with the --

23 [REDACTED] I've got to tell you,
24 you're putting me in a tough position here because I'm
25 trying to remember. It was very detailed and very

1 complex --

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] -- and that detail
4 escapes me at this point. There was ways in which we
5 were -- the Plant was critical and we were -- we had
6 to come down on the bypass valves to get down to a
7 certain pressure. I think we had started like at 920
8 and we had to get down to like somewhere down below
9 700 pounds.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So you were
11 trying to move reactor pressure from 920 psig to 700.

12 [REDACTED] With bypass valves while
13 we're critical.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: While you're
15 critical.

16 [REDACTED] Yes.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Had that
18 never been done before?

19 [REDACTED]: I don't think so, not at
20 Hope Creek, as far as I know.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Well,
22 what would you typically do? I mean if you were just
23 doing a routine shutdown or a shutdown for a forced
24 outage or if you had the luxury of time and there was
25 no equipment malfunctions, how would you shut the

1 Plant down?

2 [REDACTED] We'd be at pressure.

3 We'd be at pressure, and then we'd cool down the
4 bypass valves. But we'd be so critical the Plant
5 would already be shut down.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: When in the
7 process do you screen the reactor?

8 [REDACTED] When we come down we take
9 the turbine offline at about 15 percent, 20 to 15
10 percent.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

12 [REDACTED] And then we would --

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you
14 scramble or do you drive the control rods in?

15 [REDACTED]: No, we don't do a soft
16 shutdown.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So --

18 [REDACTED] And then we would
19 depressurize. But, see, now we depressurize -- we're
20 coming down in pressure on bypass valves while we're
21 critical.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

23 [REDACTED]: Okay? And that was the
24 new piece that was put together.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. All

1 right. So that was the part that was different.

2 [REDACTED] Yes.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You're
4 making reactivity adjustments potentially used on
5 bypass valves.

6 [REDACTED] Correct.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] Correct.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: All right.

10 [REDACTED] And then there was some
11 vague guidance in the new procedure that talked about
12 how we were going to manipulate the bypass valves to
13 do that. And pressure shut would be the normal way we
14 would do that. Their option was to use the manual
15 bypass valve jack --

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

17 [REDACTED] -- which was more -- if
18 you're going to use the manual bypass valve jack, then
19 it's a manual operation and you have to stop when you
20 want to stop. If you are doing it with pressure set,
21 you would take your pressure set point down to a
22 certain point, the reactor pressure would get down to
23 that point, and then it would stop automatically,
24 okay? So the procedure gave us the option to use
25 both.

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1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Either or?
2 [REDACTED]: Either or but it also --
3 I'm trying to remember. There was -- we were to
4 maintain our pressure set point above a certain -- at
5 a certain value above what the pressure was. I really
6 -- without looking at it again, I don't remember more
7 than that.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was it
9 something like where you were -- if you used a jack,
10 you had to follow a down pressure set or something
11 like that?

12 [REDACTED]: You follow the down
13 pressure set, right. Right.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So if
15 you were using the jack and pressure, say, just throw
16 a number out, say 850, then you might put pressure set
17 at 860 or 870 or some -- it's not --

18 [REDACTED]: I think it was either set
19 --

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- real far
21 above it.

22 [REDACTED]: -- like 50 pounds above
23 or something like that. That might have been it.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.

25 [REDACTED]: But we didn't really --

1 I don't remember, I don't remember practicing that a
2 whole lot. I think we got some practice at it, but
3 there were questions about that aspect of the
4 evolution that -- I mean there was a lot of
5 frustration in that training -- in those couple hours
6 that Saturday night.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Among the crew that
8 was practicing that?

9 7C → [REDACTED] Yes. Yes.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was it expressed to
11 anybody?

12 7C → [REDACTED] I expressed it. I
13 expressed it to my ([REDACTED]) and the
14 crew in front of everybody, and then we worked through
15 some things. Like you said, I'm 30,000-foot view here
16 because I can't remember the details. We worked
17 through some things and we did some things with the
18 procedure and we felt that we were in a place that was
19 okay or comfortable to actually perform this thing.
20 And as it turns out after the fact, 20/20 hindsight,
21 there were some things that we -- it wasn't fully
22 baked, it wasn't a fully baked plan.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you say you
24 expressed it to ([REDACTED]) that you had concerns and
25 then you worked through it. And you said we got to a

1 point where we were comfortable.

2 [REDACTED] Comfortable is a relative
3 term. I mean we felt that we would not have had an
4 issue accomplishing completing the evolution safely.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did that include you
6 personally? Are you speaking as a team or were you
7 personally satisfied with it?

8 [REDACTED] Well, I can't speak for
9 anybody else. I felt more satisfied than I did when
10 I voiced the concerns I had had. I felt that we were
11 okay to go. I didn't feel great, I felt okay.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What would have made
13 you feel great?

14 [REDACTED] I don't know. I don't
15 know.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall where
17 your discomfort was with --

18 [REDACTED] It was very complex, it
19 was getting into the details of it, and I don't recall
20 those details. I'd have to read through everything
21 again.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Without
23 necessarily going into the details because you may not
24 remember them that well, but what you probably do
25 remember is how you felt at the time and maybe a

1 little bit about why you had some angst. It sounds
2 like you did have some issues with the procedure and
3 you expressed them and then there was some resolution
4 of some sort to try and address where your concerns
5 were. Were you the only one that had concerns? Was
6 there any -- did [REDACTED] say, "Yes, I mean you're right.
7 This doesn't look right," or did any of the ROs,
8 whether it was [REDACTED] did any of
9 those guys say, "Well, gee, this doesn't -- we're
10 having trouble controlling," or was there a lot of
11 back and forth?

12 7C → [REDACTED] All I can tell you there
13 was a lot of discussion amongst the crew about how we
14 were going to do it, and that's all I can really say
15 about it.

16 SR: PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was the
17 spirit of the discussion? Was it, "Yes, let's try and
18 work our way through this. Let's try and get
19 something to work," or was it, "God, this is really
20 bad. We can't believe we got this." What was --

21 7C → [REDACTED] No. No. We tried to
22 work through it. We actually had to be back -- see,
23 we were due -- we were in for night shift that night,
24 Saturday night, and the crew that was on day shift was
25 actually staying over or there had been some other

1 people brought into relieve that crew until we got
2 back. We had to be back by like 11 or 12 midnight.
3 So there was a certain amount of time pressure to come
4 up with this plan to achieve this thing on Sunday nigh
5 t.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So you were
7 on nights, so you were on basically from seven p.m.
8 Saturday night to seven a.m.

9 [REDACTED] Six to six.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I'm sorry,
11 six to six.

12 [REDACTED]: Right.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I mean the
14 shift is seven to seven but you were there early for
15 turnover, right?

16 [REDACTED]: Correct.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

18 [REDACTED]: Right.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So you're
20 on, say, six to six. Okay. So you're out there five,
21 six hours, something like that, or four or five hours
22 working through the procedure.

23 [REDACTED]: Right.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you ever
25 like in the process say, you know, we're doing

1 something that should have already been done? Like
2 what you're describing is more along the lines of
3 validating the procedure, not practicing but --

4 [REDACTED] See, that's the thing.
5 It wasn't a procedure validation and it should have
6 been. We were still hashing things out at that point
7 and that's the best way I can put it without, like I
8 said, remembering all the details. And that's an
9 honest answer. We were still hashing things out,
10 weren't exactly sure at points during that training
11 which way we were going to go. We were looking at
12 several options, and it was not a validation, was not
13 a validation of a procedure, and that's what it should
14 have been.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where was the time
16 pressure coming from?

17 [REDACTED] Well, we had to get back
18 to relieve the shift.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You explained there
20 was a shift relief, right.

21 [REDACTED] And the plan was to -- I
22 mean was to get us in there and practice this thing
23 Saturday so we could take the shift the rest of the
24 night and then it could be SORC'd or approved on
25 Sunday day so it could be performed Sunday night.

1 That was the plan. So the time pressure that I know
2 that we felt was that we had to get through this so we
3 can get back to relieve the other crew at midnight.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Would you be the same
5 crew that was performing it on Sunday night then?

6 [REDACTED] Correct. Right. We were
7 to perform it.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you ever
9 make any kind of statements or do you recall any
10 statements that were something along the lines as,
11 "We're doing a validation and we really need to
12 practice this more. Why don't we tell SORC or
13 management that we need more time, we need to go
14 through this? And instead of trying to SORC it on
15 Sunday day, why don't they just SORC it on Monday and
16 we'll take -- we'll come back in if we have to on
17 Sunday night and go through this again and make sure
18 that we're really training on the procedure and not
19 validating it." Was there any discussion like that?
20 Do you recall anything like that?

21 [REDACTED]: There really wasn't a
22 discussion like that.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It didn't
24 even enter your mind or [REDACTED] mind? Did anybody
25 voice that?

1 [REDACTED] I shouldn't say that
2 there wasn't any discussion on that. I don't remember
3 personally being involved in any discussion like that.
4 There may have been by people on day shift on Sunday.
5 As far as the operators went, there was really no
6 discussion about the fact that we were not going to do
7 it on Sunday night.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No discussion that
9 you were not going to do it.

10 [REDACTED] That we were not going to
11 be doing it.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The question comes in
13 here too, where's [REDACTED] sit on this? Is he in
14 agreement with the crew that you could have been more
15 satisfied with the plan that you had? Was he in
16 agreement with you?

17 [REDACTED] At that time? At that
18 time? Well, he knew -- I mean I was pretty vocal
19 about it, and I mean my exact words at one point I
20 said -- I stopped and I said, "Look," I said, "if we
21 can't figure out what we're going to do," because we
22 had been talking about a lot of different things and
23 I was getting confused and it was not clear to me, and
24 I said, "Look," I said, "if we can't come to some type
25 of resolution on which way we're going to do this, you

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AP 7C

1 can find yourself another [REDACTED] to perform this
2 evolution." I mean it got to that point, and then we
3 worked through it. I mean that's a picture of what
4 happened that night.

5 And with regard to the RO not being there,
6 okay, should have been there, all right, but my
7 impression of what happened that night as far as the
8 people who were there, we had the guy who was going to
9 be on local control, the guy who was going to be
10 pressure control, and the guy who was going to be the
11 reactor operator was going to be inserting rods and
12 doing those types of -- a piece of evolution that
13 didn't require the coordination that was required
14 between local control and pressure control. Whenever
15 we move rods to get to a certain point, that was a
16 dedicated thing, nothing else was going on at that
17 time. That's not to say that he shouldn't have been
18 there, but I think that's what happened as far as not
19 having the RSO guy. And, you know, we did a
20 reactivity brief and all those types of things before
21 when we came in for the evolution, but that would be
22 my only recollection of why he wasn't there.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in terms of where
24 you stood was that what you were originally working
25 with you were dissatisfied to the point where you were

1 suggesting they replace you as [REDACTED] on shift.

2 [REDACTED]: Well, I mean I made an
3 emotional statement. I said --

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Sounds like it got
5 pretty --

6 [REDACTED]: Well, it did. And I told
7 him, I said -- I mean I felt this about it, I said,
8 "Unless we can come to some type of consensus as to
9 what we're doing, we're talking a lot of different
10 things here, you can find someone else to take the
11 watch tomorrow night," because I --

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who did you say that
13 to?

14 [REDACTED]: I said it in the presence
15 of the entire crew, but it was directed to my [REDACTED]

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]: Right.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What's his response
19 on that?

20 [REDACTED]: Well, he didn't really
21 come back with anything. I mean he took a step back
22 and thought about it and we continued to work on it,
23 to work on the plan.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you got to a
25 point where you were, as you described it, more

1 satisfied.

2 [REDACTED] More satisfied, right.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Satisfied enough to

4 --

5 [REDACTED] Satisfied, in my mind, at
6 that time, that we would -- there would really be no
7 doubt that we'd have a successful evolution.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There's something
9 that I guess I'm not understanding.

10 [REDACTED] The thing is is that I
11 can't convey -- where the gap here is the details, and
12 I'm not -- I can't -- like I said, it was very
13 complex.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

15 [REDACTED] I cannot recall the
16 details of this, and that's I think where we're having
17 a disconnect here.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Understood. I wasn't
19 even actually going there. What I'm looking at is I
20 think you described it is that the Plant was stable,
21 around 15 percent or so at this point.

22 [REDACTED] Yes, right.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So where is it -- why
24 is it that the move had to be made on Sunday? If
25 everything's stable and there's no --

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1 [REDACTED] Right.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- rush to do
3 anything, why would it be get it done by Saturday
4 midnight so that you can come in here and perform this
5 on Sunday night?

6 [REDACTED] You know, I don't have
7 real answer for you for that, and I don't know that it
8 needed to be performed Sunday night. I don't know.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did [REDACTED]
10 think it needed to be performed on Sunday night?

11 [REDACTED] I can't speak for [REDACTED]
12 All I know is that it was a priority with [REDACTED] to
13 make sure that we had something to go back with before
14 our time was up, at least something that was -- that
15 looked like it would work and that the crew was
16 satisfied with. That's what I'm remembering. He
17 didn't drive it down our throats, it was just -- I
18 mean [REDACTED] was under pressure too. I mean we're all
19 feeling like we've got to -- we're here to train on
20 this and we are expected to perform this tomorrow
21 night and we need to be ready to split the
22 organization off. That's what we were feeling.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had to come up
24 with something that would work.

25 [REDACTED] Correct. A 70

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did anybody
2 ever offer -- I mean as you described it, there was
3 time pressure. You walk around here and you see all
4 these different human error traps for human
5 performance issues, and that's one of them. Time
6 pressure is always mentioned.

7 7C - [REDACTED] Right.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did anybody
9 offer that and say, "Hey, look, we're falling into a
10 trap here. We need to examine why we have this time
11 pressure and if it's reasonable or not, and do we have
12 other options. Is there some way we can buy time?
13 How do we buy time in this process or how do we get
14 what we need so we feel comfortable, totally
15 comfortable with the evolution and we don't feel like
16 there's a rush to judgment or a rush to try and get
17 this done and we just don't feel like we've adequately
18 aired out all our issues and concerns?"

19 7C - [REDACTED] Well, you're right, there
20 was a lot of that stuff around here, and I mean we
21 covered all that stuff in our brief. That Saturday
22 night when we were in the simulator I mean we were
23 just intent, focused on the evolution at hand. I mean
24 we talked about making sure we had the proper peer
25 checks, proper communication between the pressure

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1 control operator and local control operator during
2 these bypass valve manipulations.

3 So that's what I'm saying, I mean
4 organizationally after this event I mean that had a
5 big impact on our Department, obviously, in the way we
6 do business, and that's why when I sit back six
7 months, six, eight months, whatever, back to the
8 spring, that's when I'm seeing a big change, you know
9 what I mean, in just the way we conduct business. I
10 don't think that that type of thing would happen again
11 where we had a plan that wasn't, for lack of a better
12 term, fully baked. I don't think it would go off the
13 way that it did. I think that those questions would
14 be raised and basically, "Hey, we're not going to do
15 anything here until this thing is right with everybody
16 and there's no question in anybody's mind that this is
17 going to be successful." And I don't think that --
18 you know, and having said that, I don't think that
19 anybody didn't think that we weren't going to be
20 successful back then. I mean we felt coming out of
21 that thing and coming in Sunday night that we were
22 going to be successful. I mean when you look at what
23 happened there I mean there are some issues that --
24 there are some things that you also need to realize we
25 had a plan. When we were bringing pressure down with

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1 the bypass valves when this event happened we had a
2 malfunction at the same time, and that had a big part
3 in it to why things happened. There were things that
4 -- it was a combination of things.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But why would you be
6 in that position then where you say it wouldn't happen
7 now but it would happen then. Now the difference
8 would be that people would speak out about it and
9 raise the concern about not finding yourselves in that
10 position.

11 [REDACTED] Well, because it
12 happened.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Because of the
14 incident.

15 [REDACTED] Because it happened.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You have an example
17 to point to is what you're looking at.

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] in that time frame, did you become aware that
21 he ever expressed to anyone that he had no control
22 over that evolution?

23 [REDACTED] No.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he seem --

25 [REDACTED] Oh, you're talking about

1 that night?

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

3 [REDACTED] I want to make sure I
4 understand your question. Could you ask me again?

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Going into that from
6 that Saturday into --

7 [REDACTED] Going into it.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Going into it did he
9 ever express that he had no control over that
10 particular evolution, that IPTE?

11 [REDACTED] Going into it. No. No.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Coming out of it?

13 [REDACTED] A lot of people were
14 second guessing themselves coming out of it.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what about during
16 the incident?

17 [REDACTED] The first bypass valve
18 problem we had we stopped. We talked about it and we
19 got a consensus among the crew that we were okay to
20 continue. When it happened the second time, when we
21 had the second occurrence and I -- obviously, we had
22 second thoughts at that point as to where we were
23 going to go. So we stopped cold boil and got some
24 other guidance.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That was on

1 Sunday, right?

2 [REDACTED] That was on Sunday night,
3 yes.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

5 [REDACTED] But I --

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he -- go ahead,
7 you finish.

8 [REDACTED] But I got to tell you,
9 after the second time we stopped and we just weren't
10 going to continue because we didn't know -- we needed
11 something else at that point, and --

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Would it be
13 fair to say you felt uncomfortable where the Plant was
14 at that moment?

15 [REDACTED] Not at that moment. I
16 mean the transient that happened happened and it was
17 over.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] It was so quick. And we
20 were watching power. I don't know how much you know
21 about the actual details of the event but we were --
22 we stabilized the Plant, we stabilized the Plant, and
23 we're trained to either stabilize the Plant or take
24 the Plant out, and if the Plant gets away from us,
25 then we take it out. And there's a lot of discussion

1 about -- there's a lot of -- in hindsight, the best
2 thing to do would have been to take the Plant out, in
3 hindsight.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Why do you
5 say that, because it sounds like you felt differently
6 about that at the time. Sounded like you felt
7 comfortable with where things were.

8 7C - [REDACTED] Well, it happened so fast
9 and we were reacting to what we saw. Now, we're in
10 mode 2 now. Our mode switches start off on standby,
11 so our (inaudible) are reduced. So now they're at 15
12 percent as opposed to a higher value where we would be
13 in run, okay?

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.
15 7C - [REDACTED] So we were like at seven
16 percent power and we had the incident with the bypass
17 valve, so pretty much the bypass valves open up, a
18 couple bypass valves, and they start steaming off your
19 level. We lost like I don't know it was eight to ten
20 inches, and the guy in local control or our feedwater,
21 which is automatic, sees that reduction level and we
22 have equipment problems with sticking startup valves.
23 A startup valve pops open and feeds all this cold
24 water in. So now power's coming up and it's happening
25 fast and then we see power coming up, secure that

1 valve, that startup valve's not feeding anymore, power
2 comes up and settles back down. It had gotten up to
3 about 13 point something, so we were watching it and
4 the plan was to take it out at 14 percent. I mean if
5 it got up to 15, the Plant would have went out on its
6 own, that was the scram set point. But we never
7 reached 14 percent and, like I said, it was over as
8 soon as it started. It was very dynamic, it was fast
9 and the Plant was stable and it was over.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That 14
11 percent number, was that something that you had
12 discussed during the -- was it part of the procedure
13 or was that discussed during training or was it
14 actually an on-the-spot decision?

15 7C [REDACTED] No, it was an on-the-spot
16 decision. That was not -- and that was one of the
17 places we fell down. In our pre-job brief we didn't
18 discuss a value with scram set point set down where we
19 should have taken it out, and maybe at that point we
20 would have done something -- we may have said at 13
21 percent during the brief, but when it happened the
22 number was 14 and that's what we were going with. But
23 it's -- I mean it could have happened so fast that we
24 wouldn't have had time to react anyway.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there

1 any repercussions because of the event itself.

2 [REDACTED] In terms of?

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did anything
4 happen to anybody in the aftermath of the event?

5 [REDACTED] Oh, yes. We got taken
6 off of shift and our quals were delimited, and we were
7 out at the training center for a month getting
8 retrained.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The whole crew, [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED] Yes. We lost our quals.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So
13 you lost your qualifications. Was that a temporary --

14 [REDACTED] Yes.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was this
16 something that happened, I don't want to say
17 routinely, but if there was a circumstance that was
18 somewhat similar as far as the significance, was this
19 like a standard thing that would happen? I mean there
20 wasn't anything unique about your crew or your shift.
21 Like some other shift, if they had been involved, the
22 same thing would have happened to them?

23 [REDACTED] As far as losing their
24 quals?

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.

1 [REDACTED] Oh, yes.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] Yes. Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We were talking about
5 before and during the incident you said a lot of
6 people had second guessed it afterwards. Did at any
7 point in time you hear [REDACTED] indicate that he
8 had lost control of the evolution?

9 [REDACTED] During?

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At any point in time,
11 before, during or afterwards?

12 [REDACTED] I had control. Command
13 and control function, the [REDACTED] is
14 in control, and the OS has the oversight, and yet he
15 is ultimately responsible. I didn't feel that we had
16 lost control but it was moving fast, but it was not
17 unmanageable from my perspective. I mean we were
18 ranging up on our M switches, we were in the
19 intermediate range, but the ranges were peer checked
20 and one at a time and we did several manipulations but
21 it was not multiple type things, peer checks not
22 happening, that was never the case, that was never the
23 case. And like I said, power peaked and it came down
24 and it was over.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You said it happened

1 quickly.

2 [REDACTED]: It happened quickly.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But I understand
4 you're the command and control, but did you ever hear
5 [REDACTED] indicate that he had lost control of the
6 evolution at any point, before, in the planning
7 stages, during or after?

8 [REDACTED]: Well, not in the planning
9 stages, and I didn't hear anything during that, but
10 when we're sitting out here having time to think about
11 things he felt that he was not where he needed to be
12 in the control room as far as he was down on the floor
13 and he felt that after we had some discussion about it
14 that he should have been back and that he got too
15 sucked up into it and that that contributed to the
16 event. But I don't -- that's what I heard [REDACTED]
17 allude to. That's not -- I don't know that --

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That he got too close
19 to it?

20 [REDACTED]: Yes.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: While you were going
22 through it. He was at the operator level?

23 [REDACTED]: He was down with the
24 operators, I was behind the operators and he was down
25 there also.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Why did he
2 say that?

3 [REDACTED] I guess he said that
4 there was too much conversation going on or he could
5 not hear the communications down on the floor because
6 I was down on the floor with the operators and he
7 couldn't -- and that's why he said he was down there,
8 I don't know.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I'm not sure
10 I understood that.

11 [REDACTED] Well, see --

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I'm just
13 trying to understand what the point is. Is it that
14 you all were communicating and he just couldn't follow
15 it so he moved down so he could hear it or is it --

16 [REDACTED] That's what he said.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that tended to
19 work against him. He figured that out in hindsight
20 you're saying?

21 [REDACTED] In hindsight, yes. That
22 was his -- that's what his -- that's what he came to
23 a conclusion on.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So if that statement
25 is attributed to him, you think that's what that's

1 about, it was afterward, the statement of, "I had no
2 control over the evolution."

3 [REDACTED] No, no. He never said,
4 "I had no control over the evolution."

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

6 [REDACTED] I'm saying that he felt
7 that it contributed to what happened, the fact that he
8 was down on the floor.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: His physical
10 placement.

11 [REDACTED] His physical placement,
12 yes. He never said that he lost control; no.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: All right.

15 So let's --

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he --

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I'm sorry,
18 go ahead.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were you going to go
20 to a different incident?

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No, I'm
22 staying with it, I just want to move ahead to a little
23 bit more on the training.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: All right.

1 So you were taken off shift and put in some sort of
2 remedial program, is that correct?

3 [REDACTED] Right. And we weren't
4 taken off shift until -- we got off Monday morning and
5 it was St. Patrick's Day. We got off Monday morning
6 and we were supposed to go take the shift again
7 Thursday days.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

9 [REDACTED]: I got a call Wednesday
10 night that we had been taken off shift, so this -- it
11 wasn't an immediate thing. It was something we found
12 out prior to taking the watch the next day.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, I mean
14 that's kind of in the eyes of the beholder, right? I
15 mean you were taken off shift prior to your return to
16 your normal schedule shift duties. And so from an
17 outsider's perspective that's what an outsider would
18 see. Whether it was actually done Sunday night right
19 after this occurred or Wednesday just prior to you
20 returning to shift, from an outsider's perspective it
21 all looks the same because your next scheduled return
22 to shift on this day and you were taken off shift
23 prior to your return to shift.

24 [REDACTED] Well, most of us were.
25 The reactor operator was not.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And why
2 wasn't he taken off?

3 [REDACTED]: Well, he was taken off
4 shift, but he was not taken off at the same time we
5 were. I guess it was an oversight. He came out with
6 us to the training center about a week later, several
7 days later.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
9 [REDACTED]: And he was in remediation
10 with the rest of us.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you say who that
12 was?

13 [REDACTED] (phonetic).
14 He was the gentleman who was in helping us out on
15 Sunday night.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was
18 your -- let's talk maybe a little bit about your first
19 day in the training, first day or two. You're there
20 on Thursday or Friday, you guys are probably talking
21 amongst yourselves. What was the discussion like at
22 that point as far as what would you have done
23 differently, what could you have done differently?
24 Was there something -- did everybody kind of
25 acknowledge, "Yes, we screwed this up, we deserve to

1 get retrained," or was it, "We were just really put in
2 a bad situation," and you felt like victims, you felt
3 like, "Oh, we're just victims of circumstance." What
4 was the sense at that time?

5 [REDACTED] When we were out here?

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes,
7 initially. Right in the first -- either the first
8 couple hours, first day, first two days.

9 [REDACTED] Well, I have to admit it
10 was hard to accept. I mean we felt leaving Monday
11 morning that we did a good job and that -- I can't
12 speak for [REDACTED] I don't think [REDACTED] felt that way,
13 but I was kind of surprised to get the call Wednesday
14 night that I'd been removed from the watch list. I
15 mean just --

16 (END TAPE 1, SIDE B)

17 (BEGIN TAPE 2, SIDE A)

18 [REDACTED] -- don't think any of us
19 felt that we did not do a good job.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] I don't even think [REDACTED]
22 -- [REDACTED] from what I understand, did not feel that
23 way.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did he ever
25 share with you why he felt that way? I mean you said

1 he thought that but did you ever ask him why did he
2 feel that way or did anybody say that and get an
3 explanation?

4 [REDACTED] I guess because we didn't
5 -- when we did stop the first time and even though we
6 discussed it I thought we understood what was
7 happening that we should have got some more input from
8 outside the organization before we continued at that
9 point.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Now, was he
11 involved with that first discussion?

12 [REDACTED] Yes.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So when you
14 say that he said that, does he include himself in the
15 "we?"

16 [REDACTED]: Yes.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I mean as
18 far as the culpability, is he saying, "Yes, I mean I'm
19 part of the crew. I'm there, I should have done this,
20 I should have done that."

21 [REDACTED]: Yes.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I mean it's
23 not like, "The three of you didn't let me know."

24 [REDACTED]: No, no, no, no. He was
25 accountable. He was accountable.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

2 [REDACTED] Yes, it was never an
3 issue. Accountability was never an issue.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.
5 So you guys are feeling kind of -- well, you feel like
6 you handled the Plant fairly well it sounds like.

7 [REDACTED] We felt that we did our
8 job and we felt that we responded the way we were
9 trained. That's honestly what we felt.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So
11 now let's fast forward to Thursday. Thursday you're
12 out in training, you guys are here, you're discussing
13 the issue, probably sharing thoughts, ideas, whatever.
14 Was there any discussion along the lines as, "We
15 really don't understand why we're here, we felt like
16 we did the right thing"?

17 [REDACTED]: Oh, absolutely.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is this a
19 scapegoating situation?

20 [REDACTED] I don't want to say
21 scapegoat. I mean we were all -- like I said, we felt
22 we had responded the way we were trained and we did a
23 good job, and we did not -- it took a couple days, a
24 week before we came to terms with the fact that the
25 operator philosophy is that we should have scrambled

1 the Plant. I mean that's what we were told we should
2 have done.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But yet no
4 one -- that never came up anywhere during the
5 validation or training or -- it sounded like up until
6 the moment the event occurred that had never been
7 discussed, at least I never heard you mention it. Was
8 there any discussion in the training validation that
9 there was a need to have a scram?

10 7C - [REDACTED] I can't -- I don't
11 remember any specific discussion about that only
12 because we were focused on trying to come up with a
13 workable procedure for that plant. I mean we're
14 trying to scram in certain situations.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.
16 7C [REDACTED] And I mean this event
17 could have taken on a couple of different looks. I
18 mean, like I said, power came up fast, we monitored it
19 and were ready to take action and it turned. It could
20 have come up so fast that it took us up before we even
21 had a chance to do anything. But, no, I mean we were
22 ready to scram but we did not -- at the time, we
23 didn't feel that we needed to and we stabilized. I
24 don't --

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What I'm

1 trying to get a sense of -- I'm trying to get a sense
2 of if you felt like that you were in some way dealt
3 with maybe a little bit unfairly because you guys --
4 you were put in a situation where normally you would
5 have to go through a training evolution to train on
6 the procedure, not to validate the procedure, and
7 because you weren't given the opportunity to, quote,
8 "train on the final procedure," --

9 7C [REDACTED] Right.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- a lot of
11 these questions that might have come up didn't come up
12 because in fact you were validating, you were actually
13 rewriting the procedure as you were going.

14 7C [REDACTED] Yes. Well, we did feel
15 that way. I mean that was part of our discussion.
16 There was a lot of discussion about what happened that
17 night of training during that time we were out here,
18 there was a lot of discussion about that. And --yes,
19 yes. I mean -- but I don't want to say we were -- it
20 was just -- you know, I mean we have a lot of pride as
21 [REDACTED] I mean we have a tough job and we do our
22 best, and we just could not -- it was hard to really
23 understand why we were delimited in our quals and --

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you feel
25 set up?

1 [REDACTED] I don't want to say set
2 up. I don't want to say set up, because I was --

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who made the decision
4 to do that?

5 [REDACTED] To do the Plant?

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: To delimit you in
7 your qualifications.

8 [REDACTED] I believe it was -- it
9 could have been our [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] at that time or it could have been
11 discussions that the two of them had, I don't know.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So between [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED] (phonetic)?

14 [REDACTED] Yes. Yes. Somewhere at
15 that level. Or it may have even been higher than
16 that, I don't know. I don't know if it was [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED] (phonetic) or it may have even been [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] I don't know. I don't know where that came
19 from. But I don't want to come off -- believe me, I
20 don't want to come off sounding like I'm griping
21 because that's not what I'm about and that's not what
22 I'm trying to portray here. I'm just trying to answer
23 your questions.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

25 [REDACTED]: But I mean, yes, it's

1 natural. We were out here and we felt that we had
2 operated the way we were trained, and we just had a
3 hard time understanding why we were delimited.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I'm sure if
5 we had asked questions in a different time frame, if
6 it had been like that Thursday or Friday, you might
7 feel totally different than the way you're describing
8 it now because it's (inaudible). And I guess one of
9 the things we're trying to understand in the process
10 is if there's pressures and where the pressures are
11 and where they're coming from.

12 ZC [REDACTED] Right.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And, you
14 know, we talked -- Eileen had mentioned some time
15 pressures and we kind of talked about the sequencing
16 and whether there was an option to put things off.

17 ZC [REDACTED]: Right. Well, I mean I
18 have -- I've got to be honest, you always feel --
19 there's always -- you always feel pressure to, like
20 especially in this case, to -- you know, the
21 organization is coming together to try and work this
22 plant and you want to support the Plant and do what
23 you can do to make it successful, and there was time
24 pressure to get back to the Plant that night, and
25 there was time pressure to come up with a good plan

1 within a certain amount of time, and the organization
2 had decided that it was going to be done on Sunday
3 night. And I don't know how all that was planned out
4 or how that all came into play, but I mean that was
5 the -- I don't know that -- I can't speak for who was
6 making those decisions or what they were thinking but
7 maybe in their mind they felt that, "Okay, we're
8 stable now with this bypass valve, but maybe being
9 here isn't a desirable condition for an extended
10 period of time." I'm sure that played into it. So I
11 don't know what else went into those discussions at
12 that level.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were your
14 interactions limited to [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]: Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And from your
17 understanding, he wanted to move forward from Saturday
18 night to get you to be able to perform this on Sunday.

19 [REDACTED]: Yes.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was where he
21 wanted to go.

22 [REDACTED]: Yes. Yes. And I'm sure
23 [REDACTED] is feeling the same type of thing, that this
24 thing was scheduled to go off Sunday night and we
25 needed to do what we could do to support it.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Let me kind
2 of follow up on what you just said about scheduled to
3 come off. You know, one of the things that we've
4 heard a lot about is competitive pressure with the
5 evolutionary change of the industry and increased cost
6 competition. Nuclear, to be viable, has to -- we have
7 to challenge old paradigms and we have to forge ahead
8 and keep asking why, why, and maybe there's been a
9 little bit of a shift in why something's safe to why
10 can't we do something? Is it your sense that there
11 was some pressure in this instance that may have come
12 from that side of things, that it was a competitive
13 pressure to get the Plant back up sooner, generations
14 --

15 7C [REDACTED] No.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- we're
17 losing an extra day of generation?

18 7C [REDACTED]: No, no. I can honestly
19 tell you it was not that. That was -- I believe that.
20 I believe that it was not a turn the Plant around and
21 get it back up and produce power. I think it was more
22 or less driven by the fact that, okay, this is where
23 we're are, we're stable, but it's not a place that we
24 want to be for an extended period of time. And there
25 are -- like I said, I don't know what those

1 discussions were, but you're at risk too. If you're
2 in a configuration that you would not normally be in
3 and had never been before. So I believe that the best
4 intention was to try and perform an evolution that was
5 going to allow us to correct the problem and put us in
6 a more reliable configuration or condition. I believe
7 that's what it was based on. I don't think it had
8 anything to do with production, absolutely none.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Have you --
10 maybe not in this instance but in other instances have
11 you felt any, what you would call, unnecessary or
12 unusual production pressures where you felt like,
13 okay, there's always going to be some amount of
14 pressure, as you describe it, to keep the Plant up,
15 keep the Plant online, to run the unit as a business,
16 but have you ever been exposed to a situation where
17 you felt like this is crossing the line, this pressure
18 is really unnecessary, we're pushing too hard?

19 7C [REDACTED] If I felt that, I mean I
20 would certainly convey that. In the past, I mean,
21 like I said, just going back to the normal work week
22 activities, production is a huge -- I mean there's a
23 lot to do day in, day out. I don't know if a lot of
24 people realize what it takes to run one of these units
25 on a daily basis. And when I say pressure, let me

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1 speak from a personal standpoint, I don't know if
2 you've ever seen work control in a power plant but
3 basically work control is one guy, you switch off, one
4 week you had the control room, one week you had work
5 control. And that one individual is responsible for
6 everything that happens in that power plant as far as
7 processing the work, everything comes through him.
8 I&C, Mechanical Maintenance, Engineering, everything
9 comes through one guy. And there's a lot of
10 activities that are scheduled and there's a lot of
11 emerging items that come up and that go through one
12 guy, and it's a lot. And then on top of all the
13 scheduled work you've got pre-job briefs that you have
14 to handle. Now that we have more operators qualified
15 we're getting some extra help because we've got an
16 extra SRO on shift to lighten that burden, but it was
17 not like that, it was not like that in my first couple
18 years on shift. So I mean the pressure was -- it was
19 a lot of pressure to make sure you maintained the
20 schedule. But I mean if there was ever an issue with
21 safety or personal safety, that would -- production
22 would not, at least within the past couple years since
23 [REDACTED] incident, would not have caused us to continue
24 to just move on in the face of unsafe conditions,
25 industrial or nuclear.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't feel that.

2 7C [REDACTED] Well, you always feel --
3 I still feel production, we all feel production. I
4 mean it's -- you know, when you turn over to another
5 shift there's still that unspoken thing there that you
6 want to look good for what you turned over, did you
7 guys get the work done today, how's it going to impact
8 us tonight? I mean everybody wants to pull their load
9 or their share. It's there but it's not to the point
10 where it's going to impact safety. It's not, it's
11 not, and I might have had a little bit of a hard time
12 saying that three or four years ago, but I mean
13 there's always pressure there to meet the schedule,
14 there always is. But we're told, I mean [REDACTED] has told
15 us, he said, and he reinforces this constantly, he
16 comes out here every time we have training, "Yes,
17 we're a power plant, we're a nuclear power plant and
18 we're in the business of making electricity. It's a
19 business." But he said at the same time that there's
20 not -- he said, "That is a distant second to safety."
21 He said, "If we cannot complete our work safely and
22 without incident, it's just not -- it's a distant
23 second. It's just not where we're at today."

24 I mean I've seen in a big shift since I've
25 been on shift. I mean I think we're headed in the

1 right direction, I really do. I think our work force
2 mentality, especially within [REDACTED] is that way.
3 Our work management's getting better as far as
4 scheduling activities to make the work weeks go more
5 smoothly. We're getting more support from the rest of
6 the organization. I mean Operations has the best --
7 I think the best concept, the best mind set with
8 regard to that out there, and it's filtering out to
9 the rest of the organization as they deal with us and
10 as they get the word from their managers and as our
11 Ops managers put that word out. But I feel better
12 today than I've felt at any time in [REDACTED] career,
13 honestly.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

15 [REDACTED] There's still issues out
16 there. I mean there's always going to be issues and
17 conflict.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're seeing it as
19 three to four years ago was -- if you were going to
20 chart it, that would have been its lowest point, three
21 to four years ago?

22 [REDACTED] Well, since I've been in
23 [REDACTED], my lowest point since I've been in
24 [REDACTED].

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. When you

1 started.

2 [REDACTED] When I started.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Back when you
4 started.

5 [REDACTED] So I only have that to
6 gauge it, but I think that -- like I said, I just
7 think we've evolved to the point where we're working
8 to where we need to be safety-wise and --

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You see it more or
10 less coming together --

11 [REDACTED] I do. I do.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- in a positive way.

13 [REDACTED] I do. And there's a lot
14 of -- and it's not -- I mean I've been through a lot
15 I mean with this incident in March. I mean that was
16 extremely painful from not only experiencing it
17 firsthand but also the remediation process, not a
18 pleasant experience. And just from what I've
19 experience personally and where I've seen us come and
20 see a shift in the things we're trying to do,
21 especially with our preparation and our briefs and
22 getting more manned up on shift and the safety
23 approach we're taking, I see it as a marked
24 improvement. I think it's going to -- it seems to me
25 like it's going to continue that way. It's not -- I

1 mean it's a culture thing, it's culture, and culture
2 doesn't change overnight, but I can honestly say that
3 I'm seeing that type -- moving in that type of
4 direction.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I need to
6 ask a couple more questions. I hate to keep coming
7 back to the event but I want to ask --

8 [REDACTED]: No, that's fine.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- you some
10 things around that, some other points. There was --
11 and you may not have any awareness of either one of
12 these two things, but I want to find out. Supposedly
13 on Monday there was -- maybe it was Monday or maybe it
14 was actually before you got on, the timing is a little
15 confused, but there was a discussion -- when the
16 turbine bypass valve was originally found to be stuck
17 or determined to be stuck, there was a discussion on
18 the part of senior managers about what to do about it,
19 and it was supposedly between [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] may have been there, maybe even
21 [REDACTED] may have been a couple other people.
22 [REDACTED] may or may not have been there. There
23 was a mix of different folks and the focus of the
24 discussion is what to do about the problem, what is
25 the problem, what's the nature of the problem, is the

1 turbine bypass valve in fact stuck, is it an anomaly,
2 is it in fact we think -- it looks like it's partially
3 open but maybe it's not. Did you ever hear anything
4 about a big debate about what to do with the Plant,
5 where to move the Plant in response to that, the
6 original event that led into --

7 [REDACTED] No. No. Because, like
8 I said, it happened Friday night and then I'm trying
9 to remember what part of Friday night is when we
10 synced the turbine. I guess somewhere 11, midnight
11 time frame thereabouts from what I'm remembering.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] And then the rest of the
14 night we were -- pretty much we weren't going to do
15 anything else, we were stabilized. And, apparently,
16 those discussions went on Saturday day --

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

18 [REDACTED] -- and the decision was
19 made to come up with a plan. We were sleeping during
20 those hours.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you get

22 --

23 [REDACTED] And I got a call, [REDACTED]
24 took the call I guess in the afternoon while I was
25 still sleeping that I needed to report to the training

1 center instead of going right to the Plant.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I see. So
3 when you saw your relief that night was it the same
4 person that was on days or was there an intervening
5 shift?

6 [REDACTED] I think there was an
7 intervening shift because it would have been too long
8 for -- yes

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
10 Because it was just too long a period of time?

11 [REDACTED]: Yes.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there
13 any -- do you recollect any discussion about being
14 some big debate about where to move the Plant, whether
15 to take the unit offline or how to do that? Was that
16 discussed? I mean other than the fact you knew you
17 had to go into training, was there any mention of
18 that, either that day or at some future time?

19 [REDACTED]: You mean when I came back
20 from training that night?

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.
22 Right.

23 [REDACTED] No, not really, because
24 the guys who we ended up relieving that night knew as
25 much as we did from the standpoint that we're going to

1 be going after this thing Sunday night --

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] -- as far as, you know --

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So
5 you don't have much knowledge about what might have
6 been said during the day and whether --

7 [REDACTED] No, but, obviously there
8 was a lot of -- the procedure was developed during
9 Saturday day --

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] -- with the intent --
12 see, my whole impression of the way the thing went
13 down was engaged the people on Saturday, put the plan
14 together, procedure, whatever needed to be done, train
15 on it Saturday night, final approvals, SORC on Sunday
16 day, implementation on Sunday night.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

18 [REDACTED] And that's the way it
19 went down.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.
21 All right. So did you later find out anything more
22 about any of the lead-in discussions? I mean it
23 sounds like you didn't know at the time but was there
24 anything after the fact where you were saying, "Oh,
25 yes, there was a big debate about what to do with the

1 Plant." Did that come up at all?

2 [REDACTED] Not about what to do with
3 Plant, no, not that I was aware of. I think as far as
4 the crew status after that, that that was probably the
5 case.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] It was at a higher level.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. All
9 right.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In terms of the
11 disciplinary actions you're talking about?

12 [REDACTED] Yes.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in terms
15 of throughout any of the incidents that were tied into
16 that, I guess it's the 15th, 16th, 17th, in that time
17 frame? Are you aware of any challenges by senior
18 management on Ops management and the direction they
19 planned to go?

20 [REDACTED] From the time we got off
21 Monday morning until --

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Throughout, from when
23 it started.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: She's
25 talking about -- Eileen's talking about the 15th would

1 have been Saturday, I think. March 15 would have been
2 Saturday.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Sunday would
5 have been the 16th, and then the 17th, as you said,
6 was St. Patrick's Day, it would have been the Monday.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: By that
8 Monday you were off then for a few days until
9 Wednesday?

10 [REDACTED]: We got off Monday
11 morning. We were supposed to come back in Thursday
12 days.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in that time
14 period were you aware of any challenges by senior
15 management or challenges between them and Ops
16 management in terms of the direction that the Plant
17 would be going? Did they challenge questions?

18 [REDACTED] During that time, no. My
19 understanding is the way that this came down was that
20 I guess it was Tuesday, could have been Wednesday,
21 there was some type of SORC or management meeting and
22 [REDACTED] addressed the issue and apparently [REDACTED] was
23 not aware of what had happened, and I guess [REDACTED]
24 questioned it. And that's when it -- I guess the
25 discussion was made about our qualifications and what

1 actually happened that weekend. My impression was
2 that I guess upper management did not fully -- I don't
3 want to say weren't fully aware but did not understand
4 what exactly had happened that weekend. Actually, I
5 don't think [REDACTED] was aware of it at all. So I don't
6 think there was any type of discussions up until that
7 point.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What about
9 decisions being made by Operations in terms of
10 starting up or shutting down to effect this valve
11 repair? Are you aware of any discussion or debate
12 between senior management and Ops management on where
13 they would go with that?

14 [REDACTED] When the valve was still
15 open -- you mean before we shut down. I don't know of
16 any discussions that went on, I really don't. I don't
17 know. I don't know. I had heard that -- just going
18 off second hand, I thought I heard something to the
19 effect that maybe we were going to try and do
20 something online as opposed to shutting down, see if
21 we could effect repairs that way.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where was that coming
23 from?

24 [REDACTED] You know, I don't recall.
25 I just -- in discussions with people at the Plant --

1 I really don't remember. I don't know if I had heard
2 from a represented employee or a mast associate, I
3 really don't remember. But I mean it wasn't -- it was
4 just -- it was probably a mast associate.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Because the
6 discussion would have been about considering whether
7 the repair could have been done online as opposed to
8 shutting down.

9 [REDACTED] Well, I think they were
10 exercising other options, just --

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Considering
12 everything?

13 [REDACTED] Right. Right. I mean
14 that's all I know about it.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who would be a mast
16 associate in a position to discuss that, though?

17 [REDACTED] Well, when you say in a
18 position to discuss it, I mean peers, my peers. I
19 probably heard that from one of my -- [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED] And I really don't -- honestly don't recall who
21 it was or what the details were. And there was no
22 discussion that I had with the individual, I just
23 remember hearing that.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was somebody who
25 was involved in the --

1 [REDACTED] No.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- ongoing decisions
3 in that time frame?

4 [REDACTED] I don't think so, no.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're getting
6 something from somebody --

7 [REDACTED] Second hand.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- second hand from
9 somebody who got it second hand?

10 [REDACTED] Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's what you're
12 saying?

13 [REDACTED] Right. I mean it could
14 have even been someone from Engineering who -- like I
15 said, I don't remember. I could have been someone who
16 was involved from the Engineering standpoint that they
17 were looking at options and maybe it could have been
18 a shift engineer. I really don't remember. I don't
19 think that information was anything that was something
20 that had to be safeguarded or anything like that, just
21 discussions, general discussion.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything
23 more on that?

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No. I want
25 to just back up to the diesel problem, you mentioned

1 the jacket water. I want to ask a couple more follow-
2 up questions on that. You said you were the [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED] --

4 [REDACTED]

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: --

6 [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] Right.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Help me
9 understand what your limitations are as far as when
10 you do that. Can you authorize work?

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Does that
13 have to be run through the control room or can you do
14 it and then just like inform after the fact? How does
15 that work?

16 [REDACTED] Oh, no. No. I had to --
17 everything that goes on I brief the control room.
18 They know everything that come through Work Control.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do they have
20 to sign it or can you sign and that's sufficient?

21 [REDACTED] I sign it but what
22 happens is I mean I will have briefed them on what's
23 happening or what we're going to do prior to doing it,
24 because obviously they are more in tune with what's
25 going on in the Plant operationally. I'm managing

1 work. And if they have any issues in a case like
2 that, then they would tell me and we would not deliver
3 or hold off.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So what's
5 the sequence? Somebody comes through -- let's say
6 that there's a corrective maintenance item, let's use
7 I&C because you're real familiar with it. Some
8 instrument somewhere, let's say parts of it in the
9 control room, parts of it in the field, somebody comes
10 into you and says, "Hey, I want to work on this. It's
11 in the work week schedule. I want to do this. It
12 affects something that may be addressed by tech
13 specs."

14 [REDACTED] Right.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Kind of just
16 in very brief summary form discuss how the sequence of
17 events would go to release the work and who has to be
18 involved at various stages.

19 [REDACTED] Well, what would happen
20 is they would -- right, they would come through Work
21 Control first, and it depends, it would depend on how
22 busy I was in Work Control. Ultimately, it's always
23 going to end up in the control room.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

25 [REDACTED] I mean if I have time,

1 and often I do, I'll look at the work and then I'll go
2 in there with the guy and I'll brief the control room
3 crew --

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

5 [REDACTED] -- or at a minimum CRS --

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] -- and let him know
8 what's going to be -- what activities are going to be
9 taking place, how that would impact him tech spec-wise
10 and we'll have a discussion. And if it's something
11 that is no impact, then he'll okay the guy to do the
12 work. The ultimate approval goes through him. I can
13 -- I mean I approve tags, I sign work on, but the work
14 that I sign on still have to finally be approved by
15 the Control Room Supervisor. And like I said, I'll do
16 that when I'm not tied up with other things. If a guy
17 comes in and needs to perform corrective maintenance
18 on whether it be tech spec or non-tech spec equipment,
19 I mean I may just tell him to go right on in the
20 control room and talk to the CRS directly.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Whose
22 job is it or who is supposed to -- responsibility is
23 it to enter the information in the tech spec action
24 statement log?

25 [REDACTED] The CRS.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

2 [REDACTED] CRS.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I mean do you have
4 any other responsibility other than to brief them? If
5 something does affect the tech spec component and
6 you're the [REDACTED] is that your
7 limitations of your responsibility or do you -- is it
8 also your responsibility for you to enter the
9 information in the log and be fully aware and
10 cognizant of the nature of the work?

11 [REDACTED]: Well, as an example, if
12 a couple containment isolation valves are tagged for
13 -- like motor-operated containment isolation valves
14 are tagged for limited torque PMs or thermal overload
15 type work, right --

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

17 [REDACTED] -- you know, they'll be
18 tagged, Maintenance will do their work and then we
19 have to retest those components. So I mean that work
20 comes (through me) so I know before I let those guys go
21 stroke those valves that I need to ensure that my
22 inboard or whatever the situation may be, outboard
23 containing the isolation valve is closed prior to
24 stroking these valves so that I have isolation.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: In doing

1 that, in understanding the tech specs, do you have any
2 responsibility to evaluate conditions you find as
3 operability issues or potential operability issues?

4 [REDACTED] Oh, sure, sure. I mean
5 I know the work that's coming through.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] The CRS may not know the
8 work. [REDACTED] I'm responsible as he is
9 to ensure that we have compliance with tech specs.
10 But I mean I'll talk to him about that.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

12 [REDACTED] I mean it's -- he is
13 responsible to make sure the LCO gets implemented and
14 the times are tracked and he has a complete
15 understanding of where he's at relative to the tech
16 specs, but I have to communicate that to him in cases
17 like the retest of the containment isolation valves.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] Now, if you have normal
20 NRC surveillances that come in, typically what we did
21 is we'll look at tech specs out at Work Control first
22 and then we'll write it down on the sheets that the C
23 techs use and then they'll bring that information into
24 the control room and it will be looked at a second
25 time.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. All
2 right. Now, with that background, let me go back over
3 the diesel generator issue with the jacket water inner
4 cooler leak. You said you were in [Work Control] that
5 week, if I understood you correctly.

6 [REDACTED] Yes.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And the leak
8 was discovered, what, Sunday or Monday or something
9 like that, and then there was some repair activity
10 that took place during the week and a retest and --

11 [REDACTED] I think --

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was
13 your involvement with that as far as from an
14 operability standpoint? Were you the one going into
15 the control room saying, "This is potentially an
16 operability issue"? How did that --

17 [REDACTED] Well, what it was was --
18 from what I'm remembering is we didn't identify and
19 shut it down. We were in an outage and it was worked
20 and then it was problems coming out of the outage
21 with it. So I had the tag, the initial tag release
22 for the maintenance run and we ran it. I was out in
23 the field with my equipment operator, there was a
24 couple guys out there, and actually there were a lot
25 of people out there, there was Engineering, and that's

1 when we found it.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] So we -- Engineering
4 wanted to -- you know, we shut it down and tagged it
5 and that was my extent of it.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you get
7 involved with any kind of additional assessment of the
8 leak? I mean I think you noted you said that you saw
9 it beforehand and it was leaking a certain amount and
10 then you thought, well, it's about the same or maybe
11 a little bit worse, but, certainly, it didn't stop.

12 [REDACTED] Well, I saw it when we
13 returned it to service on a maintenance run.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

15 [REDACTED] And then I retagged it
16 and then my shift was done.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you in
18 your own mind say, oh, it's still in Op?

19 [REDACTED] Oh, yes. Oh, yes. We
20 didn't have to put it operable.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Was
22 there any discussion on the part of the Engineering or
23 anybody else saying, "Well, we think we were too
24 strict with our first call. Maybe we were too
25 stringent." Did you get involved with any discussions

1 like that?

2 [REDACTED] No. It remained
3 inoperable. There was no question. Because coming
4 out of an outage until it -- the way it typically
5 would happen is that we have a maintenance outage on
6 a diesel, we'll do a maintenance run and do our
7 retesting on that maintenance run. And then we still
8 won't declare it operable. We may declare it
9 available for (inaudible) purposes, but we have to run
10 a surveillance test after that maintenance run and all
11 the retests are done SAT to make sure it passes the
12 surveillance test. Then we'll declare it operable.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. And
14 you said you were off shift? Were you like going out
15 of the sequence then, so you weren't involved with it
16 from then on?

17 [REDACTED] No.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] No.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: All right.

21 Okay.

22 [REDACTED] But when I left we were
23 in the LCO. I think we were in a 12-hour shutdown.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: All right.

25 [REDACTED]: After 12 hours we'd have

1 to shut down.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. I've
3 got a couple more things I wanted to ask about.

4 [REDACTED] Sure.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you need a break,
6 [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]: No, no, I'm fine.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Hope Creek
10 was given a power uprate over the --

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- last year
13 or two or something like that? And you were licensed
14 to create a thermal power change from, what, 3293
15 megawatts thermal --

16 [REDACTED] To 3339.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- 3339. Were you
18 ever involved with a situation where there was a
19 question about what to do when there was a loss of
20 inputs for specific computer monitoring for the -- I
21 think cross flow and maybe --

22 [REDACTED] Sure.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- some
24 other inputs that helped you -- allowed you to go to
25 that new higher power level? Do you recall anything

1 of that nature?

2 [REDACTED] Yes. Yes, I do. Yes, I
3 remember one time we lost our link between our
4 processor computer which monitors thermal limits and
5 provides input from all our heat balance stuff into
6 our (inaudible) computer system.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall when
8 that was?

9 [REDACTED] It had to be, gosh, I
10 guess a year and a half, maybe two years ago. It
11 could have been up to two years ago. And so I mean
12 the things that were lost were -- we even had loss of
13 rod position indication with some of our rods. But we
14 -- and I'm trying to remember, I think cross flow was
15 out. I was in a bad situation because I was the [REDACTED]
16 and I remember the RO was actually got pretty
17 excitable and he said, "I have indications of multiple
18 rods drifting," and that's a tough report to take.
19 And he was pretty excited and I remember saying,
20 "Understand indications of multiple rod drifts." We
21 looked at alternate indications, APRMs, hard wires,
22 which were fine. Turbine first stage pressure,
23 everything was stable and we did not take them all
24 into shutdown because it wasn't warranted, but I mean
25 we verified that we were stabled and then after some

1 discussion we back powered down about a percent or
2 back down to the -- I can't remember if it was we came
3 down to 99 or 98. I don't remember the exact details
4 of it but I've been going through it before.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

6 [REDACTED]: And we have some pretty
7 good guidance now that we didn't have back then in our
8 alarm responses for that type of situation.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Now you say
10 you back powered down 98 or 99. Was that in that
11 event and was there any other events where the actions
12 were different or was it that's just the action you
13 took?

14 [REDACTED]: Well, let me say this:
15 I think my recommendation was, based on what I got
16 from (my operators) was to back the power down.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was the [REDACTED]
18 who was giving you that reading?

19 [REDACTED]: -- oh, gosh, it was
20 a while ago.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Want me to get my
22 list out? What shift would that be?

23 [REDACTED]: Well, he was filling in.
24 It was echo shift but he was -- [REDACTED] -- he was filling
25 in. It wasn't a normal member of the shift?

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED]: No.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

4 (phonetic)?

5 [REDACTED]
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We've got two [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] Right. So this is what
8 we had, we had an initial situation where I got
9 multiple inputs from operators feeling that we should
10 back power down, and we didn't do that initially, we
11 didn't do that, and that caused some consternation.
12 We looked and evaluated and I actually felt that it
13 would be conservative to do that.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where was the
15 consternation when you didn't initially down power?

16 [REDACTED]: With the operators, with
17 the NCOs. And I had talked to [REDACTED] and told
18 him that I wanted to back power down just to be on the
19 conservative side, and he said, "Well, we're going to
20 hold off on that." And there was some discussion.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How did you feel
22 about that?

23 [REDACTED] I wanted to back it down,
24 I wanted to back it down. But then we had some
25 discussion as opposed to just jumping into it and not

1 taking a look at things. Like I said, we looked at
2 other indications, looked at APRMs, we looked at first
3 stage pressure, and because it wasn't done initially
4 guys had some issues with it. I mean it was -- they
5 wanted us to come down and I was with them, and then
6 we talked about it, I talked about it with [REDACTED] and
7 we brought in [REDACTED] (Phonetic) and talked
8 about it a little bit and decided that it wasn't
9 something that we had to do right away.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you agree with
11 that?

12 [REDACTED] After we looked at our
13 other indications, I felt that we were okay with that.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So after you had the
15 discussion with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] --
16 [REDACTED] And [REDACTED] we talked
17 about it, right.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But apparently it
19 still left some consternation you were calling it?

20 [REDACTED] Well, yes. I know [REDACTED]
21 wrote a notification on it, and I remember him writing
22 it. I don't know exactly what it was about other than
23 the fact that -- I don't know what the detail in it
24 other than the fact that I guess he expressed the fact
25 that he felt that we should have come back down power

1 a little bit.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had indicated
3 something changed in the procedures there. What was
4 it that changed?

5 [REDACTED] Yes. I mean if you look
6 at our procedures now, I don't know if it was as a
7 result of that incident or not because this happened
8 a couple times, not just one time. We have additional
9 guidance that we get from Engineering to a situation
10 like that. And it's in our alarm response, and we
11 have additional guidance in, I want to say, IO6, which
12 is our power operation procedures.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How would it be
14 handled? What does it call for now? Do you power
15 down or do you rely on the other partners?

16 [REDACTED] It's lengthy. I think we
17 have an hour before we need to do anything, but don't
18 quote me on that. I mean that's where I'm going off
19 the top of my head. I'd have to look -- that's not an
20 immediate action type of thing, so that's not
21 committed to memory. But I believe there's some time
22 we have to evaluate things before we do anything with
23 power. Because you have to understand too that, sure,
24 you may come down a percent or two but you're moving
25 the Plant at the same time. There is potential issues

1 associated with moving the Plant even though that may
2 sound like a minor adjustment, and it is.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Weren't you
4 in fact coming up at the time, coming up in power when
5 this happened?

6 [REDACTED] No. We were -- to the
7 best of my recollection, we were stable at 100
8 percent. There may have been a different time,
9 because like I said, I know that this has happened a
10 couple of times at least.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. I
12 mean how hard an evolution is it to lower power by
13 one?

14 [REDACTED] Oh, it's very easy, it's
15 very easy, but what you're doing is -- what we'll
16 typically do in that case is just back on a research
17 low.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] And it's nothing more
20 than tapping a button.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

22 [REDACTED] But --

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Let me ask
24 you a question about how you felt at the time. You
25 sounded like the operators had an opinion, they were

1 sharing it with you, they felt like it's conservative,
2 let's just back power down a percent or two. Sounded
3 like your initial thought was, yes, that sounds
4 conservative, let's do that, and then there was --

5 [REDACTED]: Well, this is -- if I had
6 gone off what [REDACTED] -- based on [REDACTED] original report,
7 we would have scrambled the Plant, and that wasn't the
8 right thing to do.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

10 [REDACTED] I mean [REDACTED] was very
11 excitable and I remember -- I distinctly remember
12 going out onto the floor and saying, "Stop a minute,
13 see what we've got," because there weren't any alarms
14 going off or anything like that. Everything appeared
15 to be stable so we looked at our data and basically we
16 were stable. But what I recall about that incident
17 with [REDACTED] was that he had crossed the line in his mind
18 where he was -- you know, this is what was happening
19 and even though he knew we were stable and we weren't
20 really having a problem with rods drifting in, that he
21 was going to stay on this line.

22 I mean I even heard a statement to the
23 effect that, and I'm paraphrasing here, "Just wanted
24 for the record that we made the recommendation that we
25 should back power down." And I mean I didn't come

1 right out and say, "Hey, yes, we need to back power
2 down." My initial thing was assess it and I did
3 assess it, and, like I said, I don't remember the
4 details of what was up with cross flow other than the
5 fact that we had lost a link between our PPC and our
6 (inaudible) and I felt it would have been conservative
7 to come down a percent. And after talking to those
8 guys that would not have hurt us, that would not have
9 hurt us.

10 And I turned around and I told [REDACTED] after
11 I talked to the guys that -- because he wasn't in
12 there initially, he was back in the office back there,
13 and he said, "Hold off on that. Hold off on that."
14 And then there was some discussion there and he got
15 [REDACTED] involved, and then the decision was made not to
16 do that initially, not to come down, back it off right
17 away. And I want to say that that was probably the
18 first time that happened since our cross flow
19 installation, and so it was a place none of us had
20 ever been before, and I'm sure that added to why [REDACTED]
21 was feeling the way he did. But I mean [REDACTED] wasn't the
22 only -- there was another operator and I don't
23 remember his name or who it was that also was in
24 alignment with [REDACTED] as far as backing power down a
25 percent or two.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It sounds
2 like you indicated that his initial report was maybe
3 exaggerated, but I mean he was giving what he saw, it
4 was unfiltered.

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: He'd give
7 you the unfiltered --

8 [REDACTED]: Sure.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: --
10 unadulterated, this is what I have. He had -- like
11 you said, he had some rod positioning indications or
12 loss and --

13 (END TAPE 2, SIDE A)

14 (BEGIN TAPE 2, SIDE B)

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- p.m.,
16 approximately. You described that you kind of prudely
17 evaluated and said, "Okay, let's look at APRMs for
18 multiple indications, we're still at full power, close
19 to full power, look at turbine first stage pressure,
20 you're still at full power.

21 [REDACTED]: Right.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You said,
23 "Okay, well, these indications are inconsistent with
24 rods drifting or there's just --

25 [REDACTED]: Yes. The communication

1 link had gone down is what it was.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
3 Right. But, in turn, you say, well, okay. Well, not
4 withstanding that, at some point there was some
5 acknowledgement that, yes, there was some loss of
6 indication --

7 [REDACTED] Right.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- and maybe
9 some uneasy feeling about staying at right way where
10 you were, a discussion between the ROs and yourself
11 and then you're thinking, yes, maybe it's good to do
12 that. Did you feel --

13 [REDACTED] Well, this is where I was
14 coming from, okay? I mean we didn't do anything to
15 change power, we were riding on happy at 100 percent.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

17 [REDACTED]: And there was no
18 evolutions going on at the time and it was a computer
19 communication issue. Now, we didn't know that
20 initially, okay, but I mean after we assessed it, and
21 there was still data available on our plant process
22 computer, it wasn't that we had lost it all but there
23 was still certain things like first stage pressure was
24 there and the hard wires are totally independent like
25 our APRM indications and we were going off that. But

1 based on that and it was just an indication thing, a
2 computer thing, there was no -- and this is the thing
3 that [REDACTED] talked about, what has changed, nothing has
4 changed. We had a problem with a link between our two
5 computers here and we still have turbine first stage
6 pressure, we still have APRMs and I mean not to say
7 that we weren't going to reduce power at some point
8 but it's not something we needed to do right away. We
9 needed to understand what's going on before we do
10 that. That's where he was coming from.

11 And then, you know, after those
12 discussions, I was okay with it, I was okay with it.
13 I was. I was. But at the same time, initially, when
14 things are happening, it's happening fast and you're
15 getting these kind of reports, and you get a guy who's
16 very excitable, it would have been no harm in backing
17 power down a percent. But we were okay to stay where
18 we were at also.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And [REDACTED]
21 response to that was hold off. You're saying it
22 didn't mean he wasn't going to consider at another
23 point --

24 [REDACTED]: Oh, absolutely.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- he just didn't

1 want to do it at that point in time.

2 [REDACTED] Oh, yes. He never said,
3 "We're not going to do it," he just said, "Just hold
4 off for a minute." And I think that was the right
5 thing to do.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.
7 Let me back up to one other issue, it's a new issue,
8 we haven't talked about it yet. There was a report
9 that we have received regarding some problems with
10 off-gas, off-gas system and having a high flow
11 condition.

12 [REDACTED] Yes.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Were you
14 involved with that at all?

15 [REDACTED] No, that one I wasn't.
16 I know what that's about, though. I don't know
17 whether it would be -- my understanding was that our
18 procedure has a limit of 75 SCFM gas flow, and we
19 typically exceed that when we're going initial vacuum
20 on a condenser, and that is actually an expected
21 condition but it was not in our procedure. Our
22 procedure basically says, or said, that we cannot --
23 we're not supposed to operate above 75 SCFM. And our
24 operators took the hard line on that and said -- and
25 just to give a history on that, a lot had come down

1 recently prior to that about procedural compliance and
2 making sure we follow procedures to the letter and
3 obviously we did not meet that stuff in that procedure
4 that allowed us to continue.

5 And that caused a problem because theory
6 on one hand the Union's perception is that
7 management's telling us to follow procedures. Well,
8 we can't follow the procedure as written and now
9 they're saying, well, just -- we're not going to
10 comply with that step, so to speak. Not in those
11 words, but, okay, we're going to evaluate this and see
12 if this is an expected condition even though the
13 procedure says this. Then maybe we need to get the
14 procedure changed to reflect the fact that this is
15 expected under these conditions. So I guess to make
16 a long story short, we didn't -- we continued
17 operation above 75 SCFM for a period of time, and I
18 guess a number of notifications came out about that
19 from the board operators.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Isn't that
21 kind of a double standard, though?

22 7 C [REDACTED] Sure, it is.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I mean in
24 one respect management pushes, "Follow the procedure,
25 follow the procedure," but yet there's a procedure

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1 that may affect generation --

2 [REDACTED] Sure.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- and the
4 guidance isn't prescriptive, so you say, "Okay, well,
5 we'll just evaluate it."

6 [REDACTED] Sure.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It's kind of
8 a stalling tactic, a delaying tactic.

9 [REDACTED] Well, that's -- you're
10 right, you're right, it is a double standard, and I
11 mean we're making this push to follow our procedures
12 and make sure we have procedure compliance, and
13 there's a lot of things out there, there's probably
14 more things out there that we don't know about yet
15 that we're going to come across and it's going to be
16 the same type of situation, and we're going to have to
17 address them as they come up. But, you're right, the
18 guys' whole point was, "Hey, you're telling us to do
19 this, this is where we're at, and now you're telling
20 us not to comply with a procedural step."

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Could you
22 see how someone might take that as a production over
23 safety issue?

24 [REDACTED] Well, the only thing I
25 would say to that is that I think, and like I said, I

1 wasn't the shift it was on, difficult position to be
2 in. I understand -- I mean if you look at it cut and
3 dry, you're right, it's contradictory. However, those
4 conditions are expected for -- that type of off-gas
5 flow was expected for those conditions. That was not
6 an abnormal situation, and you cannot -- it's very
7 difficult to write a procedure for every single
8 situation that's going to come down the line. So I
9 mean I can understand with the knowledge that, hey,
10 this is not an abnormal condition and, yes, our
11 procedure says this. The flexibility isn't put in the
12 procedure, there's not a note that basically saying
13 under these conditions it's acceptable, but I think
14 what happened out of that was they didn't want to spot
15 change. Said pretty much to that effect.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, you
17 can make a procedure change to allow you to do
18 something. The question becomes whether it's the
19 right thing to do or not.

20 7C [REDACTED]: Right. And I'm not
21 arguing that point. I'm not justifying what was done
22 but I'm just trying to explain my understanding of
23 what happened that day. I mean it's a big deal to --
24 and I'm not talking about production, I'm just talking
25 it is a big deal to take the instruments into shut

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1 down as far as impact to the organization and being
2 online, producing power, that type of thing. And when
3 you know that you're going to be there or that that is
4 just because your procedure doesn't reflect that, it's
5 not like you were in a situation where, okay, I've got
6 this procedural restriction that I'm supposed to
7 operate by and the condition I'm in is not an expected
8 condition.

9 Having said that, it's not all right to
10 say, "Hey, follow your procedures to the letter and
11 when you reach this value continue to operate." It's
12 not all right to say that. And I'll be perfectly
13 honest, I don't know that I would have done anything
14 different than the shift that was on, I don't know
15 that. It's easier to sit back and say, "Yes, okay, it
16 says this, shut the Plant down." If you've got a
17 problem and you're not supposed to be there, that's
18 one thing, shut it down, but if you've seen this
19 condition 100 times before and you know that that
20 condenser is full of air, you're sucking on that thing
21 and you know you're going to pull in excess of that
22 type of off-gas flow.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.

24 7C [REDACTED] You know, it's like,
25 okay, is there non-thinking compliance? I mean is

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1 that what we want to be, just take that to shutdown
2 because --

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No. You
4 want an intelligently comply with the procedures. You
5 described this as if the Plant was starting up. Would
6 the circumstances be different if the Plant was
7 operating at full power and this happened?

8 [REDACTED] But, see, that's what I'm
9 saying. That's what I'm saying. If it was not an
10 expected condition and on full power operation, my
11 off-gas flow is about 75, then you need to shut down
12 or whatever the actions are.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: There
14 weren't any actions. That's the dilemma, there were
15 no recommended actions other than do not, do not
16 operate above 75 SCFM.

17 [REDACTED] Okay. Well --

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: There's no
19 -- that's my point, what do you do? What should the
20 --

21 [REDACTED] Well, do not operate
22 means you take the Plant offline. That's what you
23 would do, right? I mean you have the off-gas --

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Or reduce
25 power or do something to try and get yourself under

1 75. Maybe the answer is take -- lower power from 100
2 to 50. But isn't there some interim measure,
3 somewhere between the two extremes?

4 [REDACTED] Well, actually, we do
5 have an abnormal for, I guess, a condenser vacuum, I
6 believe, and there are some supplemental steps in that
7 abnormal, the right things to do in those type of
8 circumstances.


9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It seems like you can
11 see -- just looking at this situation, you can see
12 both sides, in a way, where you can -- the operator
13 impressions on this might be right in that they're
14 saying, "We did the wrong thing because we didn't
15 comply." Are you aware of any other situations where
16 they might have gotten that message that we're not
17 going to comply because it would involve going
18 offline?


19 [REDACTED]: Who are you talking
20 about, management or union or -- I'm not sure I'm
21 following --

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, any other
23 situations that might have sent one of these mixed --
24 you know, it's a message that's saying -- where you
25 can see some justification for it, "Okay, I understand

1 why you're upset, there's a procedure, but we didn't
2 follow it in this incident." Not that you were on
3 shift or anything but are you aware of any other
4 situations what would be similar to this, that type of
5 decision making?

6  There was a recent
7 situation that talked about feed pump operations at
8 one of our feed pumps, and I don't remember the
9 numbers but it said if you got up to a certain limit
10 on your vibrations and I think it was for actual
11 displacement or actual radial vibration or whatever,
12 that I think you needed to take the feed pump out.
13 And I wasn't on, the feed pump didn't come out and
14 those values were reached, and I think there was a
15 team audit to raise the alarm set point above those
16 values. I don't know the details, I just know that
17 there was a situation where we approached or reached
18 a limit on vibrations associated with the feed pump,
19 and the feed pump, I believe, needed to come out and
20 it didn't come out right away. And I don't know
21 anything other than that.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you know who was
23 on for that, what shift?

24  Yes. You would -- and
25 that's probably the same individual who was on with

1 the off-gas. You want to talk to [REDACTED] very
2 confident, level-headed [REDACTED] and
3 he can give you more detail than I ever could about it
4 because he lived it and it was fairly recently.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, we've
6 gone over a lot of events and a lot of issues and
7 we've probably spanned a large period of time, from
8 very recently to maybe back a year or so, maybe even
9 back prior to that. But thinking back and you kind of
10 mentioned earlier that maybe when you first got
11 licensed things were maybe not as good as they are
12 today. Have you noticed any general trends or
13 anything that in hindsight and reflecting on what was
14 discussed that may have indicated or provided any
15 insight as to why things are so much better now than
16 they were, say, six month ago or a year ago, two years
17 ago, three years ago? Is there something unique or
18 something different about conditions today?

19 [REDACTED]: Well, I know that there
20 was a big emphasis on upgrading the quality of pre-job
21 briefs. I mean that was a big --

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Starting when?

23 [REDACTED]: I want to say going back
24 to last summer.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Summer of 2003.

1 [REDACTED] Three, yes. That's what
2 I'm remembering.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Anything else?

4 [REDACTED] That was a big one. And
5 also about doing a better job on post-job briefs.
6 Now, we still lack there, we're working on that,
7 that's not an easy thing to -- we're getting better
8 there but we're not where we need to be. And that
9 will help us, obviously, when we've got to do a job
10 the next time. I know we've had post-job briefs in
11 the past, a lot of them informal, where the feedback
12 may not have been captured and help us out the next
13 time, but that's one thing we're working on.

14 Just our overall emphasis on safety. I
15 mean we've got now -- we've got a guy named [REDACTED]
16 who was an [REDACTED] and he has been taken off
17 shift and his whole purpose in life is safety and he
18 is our [REDACTED] he's on our [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED] and I mean that's what he does. And I mean
20 I think management felt that strong enough about it to
21 the point where we needed to have a dedicated resource
22 for that. I mean [REDACTED] gets paid a pretty decent
23 salary, like we all do, and that's what he does.

24 We do have on each shift individual guys,
25 shift representatives, safety reps, that attend

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1 meetings occasionally or get feedback e-mail, and they
2 actually discuss that stuff with the crews on shift.
3 And also just what I've seen with [REDACTED] in the
4 past couple months with his not willing to settle for
5 substandard equipment and wanted to make repairs, go
6 the extra mile, if you will, to fix problems for good.
7 And --

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I don't mean to
9 interrupt you --

10 [REDACTED]: That's all right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you want to
12 finish that?

13 [REDACTED]: Well, I just wanted to
14 say that I know one of [REDACTED] big things is he's pretty
15 grounded as far as the rigor in which we're doing our
16 corrective actions now, like the root causes type
17 stuff, making sure that we fix it right. I mean
18 that's what I've seen. I've seen that. And [REDACTED] has
19 only been there a couple months but I've just seen us
20 working toward that even before that, but with [REDACTED]
21 it's just -- it's almost like a step change more so
22 than before.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you pointed that
24 a couple times in terms of you've seen the Plant
25 working toward this what you see as a positive work

1 environment.

2 [REDACTED] Right.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What I'd like to ask,
4 and I hope I don't lose you here because it's going to
5 be a multiple point, stick with me on the question.

6 [REDACTED]: Sure.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We've talked about a
8 couple incidents where you decide -- you were
9 describing it as to be on the conservative side in
10 terms of the power parameters that you did or didn't
11 have back in that incident involving [REDACTED] and
12 we talked about the off-gas situation where you had a
13 procedure that says one thing but were not necessarily
14 going to follow it. And then that feed pump, that
15 recent feed pump issue.

16 You did say, and you pointed out, these
17 are situations that are thrown up to us as look what
18 we've done here.

19 [REDACTED]: Right.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This is evidence of
21 non-conservative decision making. The situation
22 recently with the KV switchyard and the multiple
23 repairs that were done you're showing as evidence of
24 a better mentality toward fixing things right and
25 getting on it more quickly.

1 [REDACTED] Right.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have any
3 evidence of that in the recent past? Do you have any
4 other incidents where you could say the decision could
5 have been more conservative than what you expected?
6 Do you have any other incidents where there was
7 evidence of that before the switchyard fix?

8 [REDACTED]: You mean things similar
9 to things just like the switchyard?

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right, but prior to
11 the switchyard. Can you think of anything that
12 happened in the recent past?

13 [REDACTED]: There's so many things
14 that happened on -- it's just all -- I think --

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just so there's no
16 dead air, I'll go off the record briefly, okay? It's
17 3:24.

18 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
19 the record at 3:24 p.m. and went back on
20 the record at 3:25 p.m.)

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Back on. It's about
22 3:25 p.m.

23 [REDACTED] Yes, we had our refueling
24 outage this past spring, and we had issues with
25 drywell floor drain leakage turning up, and we

1 actually made a decision to come down right before the
2 forced outage to fix that problem. Now, we have
3 procedural guidance on when to take action but we've
4 been conservative in doing those, taking the actions
5 like in this case to come down.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that in that
7 March time frame?

8 [REDACTED] Yes. It was before the
9 forced outage. I mean that was one example. I know
10 that in recent forced outages, especially the December
11 one, that we have, like I said earlier, gone into the
12 drywell and done much more work than we normally would
13 have done.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: December 2003 this
15 happened.

16 [REDACTED] Two thousand three,
17 right. I think that's probably about it for now.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's what comes to
19 mind?

20 [REDACTED] Yes. And not that there
21 aren't more things but I mean it's just -- and like I
22 said, it's just apparent to me, it's obvious to me
23 that we're trying real hard as an organization to
24 effect a positive change here and to make a difference
25 and fix things and to create a more safety conscious

1 environment. And I don't know how else to convey that
2 to you, I live it every day. And there may be more
3 examples here but I just can't recall any at this
4 time, but it's just a feeling I get. And I see
5 things, give you some examples, but a lot of things
6 that we're talking about with regard to this loss of
7 this computer indication, this link, I mean I think
8 that was like two years ago in the -- we've come a
9 long way since then. I haven't been briefed by
10 anybody. I mean I haven't -- my management doesn't
11 even know that I'm here today other than the fact that
12 I questioned them about what was happening. And I
13 mean that's just the way I feel.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're getting your
15 honest assessment.

16 [REDACTED] Yes.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's what we're
18 asking for and that's the expectation under oath.

19 [REDACTED] Right. And I'm giving
20 you everything to the best of my recollection. A lot
21 of these -- the details of a lot of this stuff are
22 fuzzy to me because it's been a year or more or close
23 to a year. What I've seen is with regard to -- and
24 like I said, I was in the union before, and for the
25 most part I mean we have a pretty good rapport with

1 our union people. I get along great with my equipment
2 operators and board operators and you have to have
3 that, but when you have a union there's always a line
4 there and there's always going to be conflict, and I
5 think a lot of times if you haven't been on both sides
6 of the fence, and I have, you don't appreciate what's
7 happening on one side or you may not fully understand
8 what's happening on the other side, and you may make
9 comments that aren't totally founded or based in the
10 knowledge of what's going on. I mean I know -- I
11 don't know what goes on at [REDACTED] level or [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] level, and I know I have opinions of things
13 that maybe they're not justified because I don't know
14 the full story. But just the two sides of the fence
15 that I've been on and seeing some of the things I've
16 seen, I think a lot of the comments are, in part,
17 justified, but a lot of them are made out of
18 frustration and --

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: From the union.

20 [REDACTED] Yes. And may not have
21 the full picture or be totally grounded in fact. But
22 I think if you talk to the union guys, if you talk to
23 every union individual, Operations-wise, and you ask
24 them where they think relative to safety today as to
25 where we were six months ago or a year ago, I think

1 they're going to pretty much convey to you the same
2 thing, maybe with one or two exceptions.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You think they have
4 a general comfort level with that or at least the
5 concerns would be less so today than they would have
6 been maybe a year ago?

7 [REDACTED] I think so, and I think
8 every one to a man feels that they can bring safety
9 issues up and I think they feel empowered to raise
10 those type of issues. I really do. I really do.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Without concern for
12 any type of adverse action?

13 [REDACTED] Absolutely. Absolutely.
14 Actually, what they'll do, especially with regard to
15 safety, is when notifications comes in I mean they'll
16 get screened by SROs and we have ability to decode
17 them with safety coding that alerts other
18 organizations down here at the island and they even
19 have been trained on how to code those notifications.
20 And I mean that stuff all gets a lot of attention
21 these days.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that something
23 new, this coding?

24 [REDACTED] I think within the past
25 six to eight months I want to say, yes. I mean it may

1 have been there in the past but not widely as known.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Emphasized?

3 [REDACTED] Emphasized, yes. And
4 people may not have been aware of the fact it was out
5 there before where now we've had training on it. We
6 all know how to do that. So that's just my general
7 impression.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

9 [REDACTED]: I don't know. That's me.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you want to add
11 anything else?

12 [REDACTED] No, I don't think so.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I'll wrap it up with
14 a few closing questions then. What about you, Scott?

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I'm good.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Have I or any
17 other NRC representative offered you any promises of
18 reward or threatened you in any manner in exchange for
19 your information today?

20 [REDACTED] No.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you appeared
22 freely and voluntarily?

23 [REDACTED]: Yes.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We've pretty
25 much covered and you have nothing else to add to the

1 record?

2 [REDACTED] Nothing else.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Then at this
4 point we'll go off the record. I have to thank you
5 for a significant amount of your time today. Thank
6 you.

7 [REDACTED]: Good. You're welcome.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We went off
9 the record at approximately 3:31, 3:30 p.m. Right now
10 it's about 3:35 and I just wanted to catch that
11 oversight.

12 (Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the Interview of
13 [REDACTED] was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings
before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
in the matter of:


Name of Proceeding: Interview of

[REDACTED]

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Salem, NJ

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original transcript thereof for the file of the United
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Mia Tharp
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