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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

Interview of [REDACTED] 7c

Docket Number:

1-2003-051F

Location:

Salem, New Jersey

Date:

Thursday, January 22, 2004

Work Order No.:

NRC-1295

Pages 1-117

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW

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IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.

~~REDACTED~~ : 1-2003-051F

(CLOSED) TC :
-----x

Thursday, January 22, 2004

Salem Hope Creek Resident's
Office

The above-entitled interview was conducted
at 10:09 a.m.

BEFORE:

Special Agent EILEEN NEFF

Senior Project Engineer SCOTT BARBER

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

10:09 a.m.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: On the record.

Today's date is January 22. The time is approximately 10:09 a.m. Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC Region I, Office of Investigations. Also present from Region I is Senior Project Engineer Scott Barber. This interview is going to be taking place at the Salem Hope Creek Resident's Office in the NOSF Building.

The interview is with [REDACTED] who is currently employed as an [REDACTED] at Hope Creek by PSEG Nuclear. We discussed prior to going on the record that the subject of this interview is our inquiry into the safety conscious work environment at Hope Creek. You have explained that your experience is at the Hope Creek site.

[REDACTED] That is correct.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that will be the subject of our discussion today. Also you indicated that you had no problem providing testimony under oath. At this point, what I would like to do is ask you to raise your right hand.

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WHEREUPON,

[REDACTED]

was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you. Also part of that explanation I gave to you regarding the inquiry was that you are not the subject of any investigation. There is no potential violation associated with the safety conscious work environment. We're looking at you for your assessment and your experience on-site in terms of the work environment.

[REDACTED]: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Understanding that a lot goes into that, we'll break it down a couple of ways. We'll talk about first the kinds of concerns. But before we do that, you have a lot of experience here. You explain that you started in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So before we get into that, let me get some identifying information from you. Your name is spelled traditionally, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]: Your date of birth please.

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Your social security number.

TC

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[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Home address please.

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You have a commute.

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Also now, can we get a brief education history for you?

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

how long were you in that position?

[REDACTED] Four to four and a half years roughly.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was your next position?

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you have been there since [REDACTED] roughly.

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You have uninterrupted held that position since [REDACTED] at

TK

1 Hope Creek.

2 [REDACTED] Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's a good bit of
4 experience there. All of your experience is on-site
5 being in operations. What I would like to do is ask
6 you, based on that, because you have such a good
7 length of time in Hope Creek operations, in terms of
8 the work environment and the issues that I was talking
9 about, what goes into that, and at least what we're
10 focusing on, the safety conscious work environment and
11 people's ability to raise concerns and their comfort
12 level with doing that? That can be both industrial
13 safety but in particular nuclear safety issues.

14 [REDACTED] Right.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you see the
16 environment as having changed at all? I know I am
17 asking you to go back a good way. But maybe a way to
18 look at that is have you seen over time any particular
19 strengths or any particular weaknesses in that?

20 [REDACTED] Well, back when I was an
21 [REDACTED] and originally a [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] I don't think there was a lot of safety
23 concerns. It was a relatively new plant with new
24 equipment. So there wasn't a lot of concerns. So
25 it's hard to judge that.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So your first five
2 years or so.

3 [REDACTED] Right. As the equipment
4 started aging and concerns were being brought up, I
5 think there's always the ability to raise the concern.
6 As far as from where I am, I have never had a problem
7 raising a concern. But as far as actually seeing
8 anything done with some of these concerns, it's not
9 always done.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, are you talking
11 about equipment concerns?

12 [REDACTED] Equipment concerns, also
13 procedure compliance concerns, basic program concerns.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's take a look at
15 that. You are indicating that you are comfortable
16 with that. What about your peers? Do you see that
17 happen? Do you see people hesitate?

18 [REDACTED]: I think most of my peers
19 that are in the union are comfortable with bringing up
20 concerns. But I do know a lot of them are frustrated.
21 A lot of them have the same conception as I do that
22 they have raised a lot of concerns. They have watched
23 it go through the process, and they have seen a lot of
24 things being explained away, almost penciled away to
25 where they are not being addressed.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's talk about in
2 your experience equipment concerns, are you talking
3 about things that aren't functioning the way that they
4 are supposed to? Why can't we get it fixed?

5 [REDACTED] Correct.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Procedural
7 compliance, can you think of issues in that area that
8 you have raised?

9 [REDACTED] One of the ones that I tend
10 to bring up every outage is configuration control and
11 when we get into surveillances. We'll take out a
12 major system like RHR. As we're trying to bring it
13 back, instead of bringing the entire system back at
14 once, they will try to bring it back in stages and do
15 part of surveillances. So you will go out there and
16 you will manipulate manual valves.


17 You might take relays and jumper them out
18 all by surveillance. You'll get so far into the
19 surveillance you'll find out there's something else
20 that's keeping you from finishing the surveillance.
21 So they will just stop. They will take the
22 surveillance. They will take all the equipment that
23 you manipulated and just push it off to the side of
24 the desk and say let's start going this way and work
25 on something entirely different. It never gets picked

1 up until sometimes weeks later.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What would be the
3 point of doing it that way?

4  They think it's more
5 efficient to try to bring it back in pieces, and it
6 never seems to be that way.


7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So how does
8 the surveillance get status then? It's like in
9 process but it's not like you would normally think.
10 Normally you think of surveillance as taking some
11 fixed amount of time and then you are done.

12  Right.


13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You either
14 know if the equipment is operable or inoperable. Most
15 people tend to think of it as online activity.
16 There's always some fixed window of time it has to get
17 done in.

18  Right.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Now, in
20 Opcon 5 or the lower ones, basically refueling Opcons,
21 you are sitting there and you have a lot more time.

22  Right.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Either you
24 don't have to have the system in service at all or if
25 you talk safety systems, maybe you need one out of two

1 or something like that. You have some reduction or
2 redundancy requirements. So is there some tracking
3 LCO that's open for that? How does that get managed?
4  As far as an operability
5 issue, it's never made operable. It's never
6 determined to be operable the whole time that it's
7 either partially tagged out or the surveillance is in
8 process. So as far as an operability issue, it's not
9 an issue. But what you do have is when you manipulate
10 pieces of equipment that are either in the boundary or
11 slightly out of the boundary or a support for that
12 boundary and you never finish it, you start affecting
13 other things. That's where it's not getting picked
14 up.

15 We'll take out the key fill jockey pump
16 for RHR. You'll take it out and while that's out if
17 you want to maintain a portion of the system filled,
18 you'll line up con -- transfer. Now, what will happen
19 is the isolation valves for that tend to leak by. So
20 the whole time you have con -- transfer in there, you
21 fill up the suppression pool. So we start having
22 level concerns with that.

23 Guys in the control room, myself included,
24 will start to tell them we have picked up a half inch
25 this shift and we're picking up a half inch every

1 shift. We keep telling them and telling them. We
2 need to either back out of the surveillance, restore
3 this, take care of the high level. It just goes on
4 deaf ears because there's other outage important
5 things that they work on until we get to the point
6 where we'll take a high level swap on other ACCS
7 equipment.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What's the
9 logic of that? What's the explanation? Is it just to
10 save time on the schedule?


11 [REDACTED] Yes, they try to pack the
12 schedule in to make it as short as possible. They
13 have everything real detailed for a short amount of
14 time. Once you get to a point where you can't go any
15 further with one thing, you can't just sit there.
16 They want to jump onto the next thing.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They'll start
18 something else.

19 [REDACTED] They'll back burner the one
20 and start into the next one to keep the schedule
21 flowing.


22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is it
23 because there's a problem with the pump, let's say?
24 Let's use your example. You talk about ACCS key fill
25 pump or jocky pump. I don't know what the

1 surveillance is but say it's running or testing
2 pressures of flows or something. Is it that you go to
3 do the surveillance and there's a problem identified
4 and you need parts and so what you do is provide an
5 alternate supply until the parts come in? Is that the
6 kind of problem that we're talking about, or is it
7 something else?

8  Most of the time it's
9 actually a schedule problem. You get part way into a
10 surveillance and you will realize that you have an
11 entirely different tag out or clearance that is
12 actually interfering with what you need to do. So a
13 lot of it is a scheduling conflict. You might need a
14 certain indicator to use for the surveillance. Once
15 you get into it, you realize that INC just removed it
16 because they have a calibration to do on it so it's
17 not there. It's usually issues like that.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That you wouldn't be
20 aware of until you are actually on top of the work and
21 you are getting into it.

22  Right.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, but it
24 should be managed. It should be planned so that it's
25 identified. You should know if you are taking --

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And tagged.

2 [REDACTED] Right.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, if you
4 need this meter or this indicator for a surveillance,
5 you either schedule the INC work outside of that or
6 before it. You don't do it at the same time, right?

7 [REDACTED] Right.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So where is the --
9 down there? Is that in any one group or is that a
10 shared maintenance with management?

11 [REDACTED]: That's shared between
12 operations and maintenance.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But if that
14 was for a refueling outage, wouldn't there be a
15 refueling outage group that would do all of that
16 planning?

17 [REDACTED] Yes.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So you have
19 planners that would be responsible for that. It's
20 like one planner may be planning the INC work and he's
21 doing his thing in his own little world. And then
22 somebody else is doing the jockey pump which is
23 mechanical. So you have different people with
24 different focuses planning activities, but they don't
25 ever see if there is an overlap, is that right?

1 [REDACTED] That's kind of how it works.
2 Basically the planners, all they do is they plan up
3 the work orders. They do all the paperwork associated
4 with it. As far as actually planning out the job of
5 what goes where and what you can do --

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: The
7 sequencing.

8 [REDACTED]: The sequencing and what you
9 can do together, you can do this simultaneously with
10 this, or you can't do this one until you do this one
11 first, all of that stuff is done by what they call
12 coordinators. In the work week, it's work week
13 coordinators. You have an operations coordinator
14 which is the lead. Then you have mechanical
15 maintenance, INC maintenance, services. They work
16 together with him. They have meetings all the time to
17 make sure that they look at the schedule of what
18 everybody has scheduled to do department-wise and they
19 make sure there are no conflicts.


20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

21 [REDACTED]: That's the way it's supposed
22 to go anyway.


23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

24 [REDACTED]: It hardly ever works that
25 way.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: In those
2 instances you are describing, which is schedule
3 conflicts-type situations, has there ever been a
4 situation that you are aware of where there's been
5 some consequence? Maybe it's not a tech spec
6 consequence but some other consequence, water on the
7 floor, someone getting hurt, whatever is out there.
8 Was there some adverse consequence because of this
9 inadequate planning or poor planning or what have you?

10  As far as anybody getting
11 hurt, I can't think of any. Like I said, one of the
12 examples I brought up with taurus (PH) levels, a high
13 level on the taurus (PH) is 78 and a half inches. You
14 have an automatic swap of the hipsey (PH) suction
15 valve. It's normally lined up to the CST. On a high
16 level, it will automatically swap to the taurus (PH).
17 It's an automatic function. It's an ESF function
18 which you don't want to happen on its own. You want
19 to control that. We have stood there and watched the
20 taurus (PH) level go up until we have hit the high
21 level and take the swap.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, what
23 kinds of problems does that create? Does that put you
24 in a bad way from the tech spec standpoint?

25 : From tech spec, no, because

1 when you are in shut down Opcon 4 and 5, you are not
2 required to have hipsey (PH) inoperable anyway. So
3 tech spec-wise, it's not that big of an issue.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But what kind of an
5 impact does it have on what you are doing?

6 [REDACTED]: It goes back into
7 configuration control. This thing automatically
8 swaps. We didn't want it to. There's no reason to
9 have the taurus (PH) level up that high. It shouldn't
10 have happened. Now, how do we get back out of it?

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes.

12 [REDACTED]: How do we track how we get
13 back out of it?

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you have
15 any dirty water/clean water problems because of the
16 switch?

17 [REDACTED]: No, in fact, they have been
18 working so hard on keeping the taurus (PH) clean that
19 actually it's gotten to the point that when we do
20 vessel let down coming out of a refueling outage or
21 even taking out different RHR loops we like to drain
22 it back to the suppression pool. The suppression pool
23 is so clean that we actually consider the water that
24 we're draining back into it dirty. It's like I don't
25 want to drain that dirty water into it.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is that
2 right?

3 [REDACTED] So the taurus (PH) quality
4 is actually pretty good.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

6 [REDACTED] Another example I can think
7 of was with a slick surveillance.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

9 [REDACTED] We had the slick system
10 tagged out. We started going in and doing the
11 release. I believe the release got entirely done. So
12 the system was restored to a functional status. But
13 we had to do the pump surveillances for operability.
14 We ran into a problem. I can't remember off the top
15 of my head what it was. I think there was another tag
16 out or something that prevented us from totally
17 restoring it.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: This is in
19 an outage too, right?

20 [REDACTED] This is in an outage.


21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When was this?

22 [REDACTED] I'm thinking this was about
23 three refueling outages ago. I can't remember
24 exactly. So we had gotten into the surveillance and
25 actually started it to a certain point and then just

1 stopped. We got to the restoration and there were
2 parts of it we couldn't do. That surveillance sat. I
3 was part of the group that was working on that. I
4 kept pinging on the supervisors that were running the
5 job. We have to track this. We have to do something
6 with this because we have the system all ready to go
7 but we have things out of configuration. Well, that
8 got pushed off to the side because at the time
9 operability wasn't a concern. We had more time on
10 that.

11 So they got into different work. They got
12 into a different INC surveillances. I think time ran
13 a little short on the INC work. So instead of doing
14 one after the other, they tried to do both of them at
15 the same time and ended up getting an automatic
16 initiation slick.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is that
18 right?

19  Now, because there was
20 portions of it that were isolated, we ended up firing
21 the squib (PH) valve which had to be replaced and we
22 also broke a section of pipe.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You broke
24 some pipe.

25 : Yes.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This was all in that
2 outage three refuels back.

3 [REDACTED]: Yes, I believe it was about
4 three outages ago.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There's something you
6 said there that I just wanted to follow up on. You
7 said "In this instance, operability wasn't a concern.
8 You had more time."

9 [REDACTED]: Right.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How do you mean? In
11 what way?

12 [REDACTED]: In all your operability or
13 your LCOs, limited condition operability, you have
14 certain amounts of time. Or the condition you are in
15 determines whether that system needs to be operable or
16 not. With slick, it's pretty much every mode but I
17 believe we did it a full core off load at that time.
18 So with no fuel in the core, slick was not required to
19 be operable.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so you are not
21 running into a timeframe issue.

22 [REDACTED]: Right.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So what were
25 the surveillances that were being done by ANC? Do you

1 recall?

2 [REDACTED] I believe they were RRCS
3 surveillances. Are you familiar with those?

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Redial
5 Reactivity Control System.

6 [REDACTED] Yes.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, it's
8 Atlas mitigation.

9 [REDACTED] Yes, that's exactly what
10 they are.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So you have
12 to restart pump trip stuff. I'm sure you have slick
13 infeeds and all sorts of other things.

14 [REDACTED] Right.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Redundant scram (PH)
16 functions and things like that, all right.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was a second
18 example that you gave about this particular issue in
19 the scheduling and the problems that it causes. Do
20 you have anymore in there, anything that comes to
21 mind?

22 [REDACTED] Off the top of my head, no.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The first issue that
24 you talked about, was that more recently? It seems
25 like it's ongoing.

1 [REDACTED] Actually, that happens every
2 single outage.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You mean it
4 hasn't been fixed.

5 [REDACTED] No, we do the same thing
6 every single outage. We will get to a point where we
7 take out the jockey pump. The key fill pump isn't
8 taken out for maintenance. It's taken out because of
9 what you do in the surveillance. You don't want to
10 run that pump deadheaded so you will actually isolate
11 the key fill pump.

12 So you take it out of service and you use
13 con -- transfers as an alternate method for key fill.
14 We always run into problems. We always end up leaving
15 the pump out, leaving things out of position,
16 supposedly controlled by a surveillance that we have
17 pushed off to the side of the desk that we'll pick up
18 maybe a week from now, a couple of days from now. And
19 we have taurus (PH) level issues every outage.

20 There's one other one. I believe it's the
21 same outage as the slick problem. We had scram (PH)
22 discharge volume vents and drains tied down, enclosed,
23 gagged. I forget whether it was for fixing the --
24 system. I forget how we got to the point where they
25 were closed and tagged. But we also had a small input

1 into the scram (PH) discharge volume the entire time
2 this was being done.

3 So shift after shift of NCOs as we're
4 tracking this scram (PH) discharge volume level we're
5 seeing levels coming up. We still had the vents and
6 drains tagged. There's no drain path. You are going
7 to get to the point where you could get the rod block.
8 After that, you are going to get the reactor scram
9 (PH). It was brought up by every shift of [REDACTED] for
10 days watching the level come up. We got to the point
11 where we picked up the rod block and all the [REDACTED] were
12 expecting it. We just sat there. They felt a little
13 more sense of urgency to look into doing something
14 about it. But nothing was done about.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you got the rod
16 block.

17 [REDACTED] When we got the rod block.
18 We actually sat there and kept on watching the level
19 come up until we got the scram (PH) on the high scram
20 (PH) discharge volume level. This didn't occur over
21 two days. This occurred over a good seven day period.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And people were
23 raising that as a concern.

24 [REDACTED] Yes.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You are saying this

1 is three outages back. What is a year for this? When
2 was the last refuel?

3 [REDACTED]: I don't remember. I think
4 we had one last spring.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In the March or April
6 timeframe.

7 [REDACTED]: Yes.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So we're going back
9 three years from then, right, around 2000?

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You are on
11 18 month cycles.

12 [REDACTED]: Yes, 18 month cycles, so you
13 are going back at least three, if not six, years from
14 there.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Maybe six years?

16 [REDACTED]: Yes.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That far back? Do
18 you think it was 2000 or pre-2000?

19 [REDACTED]: I think it was pre-2000.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Maybe 1998
21 timeframe.

22 [REDACTED]: Or '99, somewhere in there.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

24 [REDACTED]: And I could be even three
25 years off on that time.

7C

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that something
2 that you have seen happen again, this issue?

3 [REDACTED] The scram (PH) discharge
4 volume?

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes, you said that
6 happened with the same outage as the slick issue.
7 Either one of those two, has that been an issue since?

8 [REDACTED] Not the scram (PH) discharge
9 volume, in fact, not the slick either, no.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But this other one
11 with the levels that rises is recent and recurring.
12 It happened as late as March '03 then.

13 [REDACTED] Right, and I would say that
14 there hasn't been a recurrence of either one of those
15 two because we never got into the same situation.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The tag outs just
17 didn't fall in the same way.

18 [REDACTED] Right, or the problem that
19 got us into that in the first place wasn't there.
20 With the scram (PH) discharge volume, I think the way
21 we got there was there was a cracked weld on an
22 instrument air lock that needed to be repaired. I
23 think that's how we got into that one.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did it get repaired?

25 [REDACTED] It did get repaired.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about any other
2 examples along this line? We were talking about
3 procedural compliance. That's where we got into this.
4 Can you think of anything else?

5 [REDACTED] No.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You threw out another
7 issue when we were talking about the kinds of concerns
8 that were raised. We're talking about your issues
9 basically.

10 [REDACTED] Right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You said I think it
12 was program issues. What do you categorize in there?
13 What kinds of things do you put there?

14 [REDACTED]: Well, the configuration
15 control has been one of the program issues that I have
16 been pushing for years.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So part of what we
18 just discussed was covered in there.

19 [REDACTED] Was one of the program
20 issues. My whole slant on that is - and every time I
21 identified it, I identified it through the corrective
22 action program numerous times - I have always cited
23 examples where we're not following our procedures.
24 We're either stopping it halfway through or we're not
25 implementing an entire procedure which gets us to the

1 restoration.

2 Basically if we just go through and take
3 something start to finish and follow the procedures
4 all the way through, there's not an issue. The way
5 that they finally decided to address that is they came
6 up with a new program which is Shop 103.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you say you
8 raise it through the corrective action process, are
9 you issuing notifications?

10 [REDACTED]: Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How many
12 notifications would you say you have issued over the
13 past three years or so in regard to this type of issue
14 on this configuration?

15 [REDACTED]: Just the configuration
16 control issue or any kind of --

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything that relates
18 to it.

19 [REDACTED]: I'd say in the last three
20 years maybe only three or four.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What kind of response
22 do you get to that? You said there was one that was
23 some sort of a response lately. I just lost the word
24 that you used for it.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Shop 103.

1 [REDACTED] Shop 103, it was a whole new
2 program instead of looking to see why we weren't
3 completing the surveillances, why we weren't running
4 through the entire procedure and addressing it that
5 way. I thought we had procedures in place that would
6 handle the problem. But instead of addressing it that
7 way, they went with implementing a whole new program
8 which is a configuration control program. It's called
9 Shop 103. It's common to Salem and Hope Creek.


10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is that a
11 better program?

12 [REDACTED] No, in fact, I was on a
13 committee initially with the draft on that. I believe
14 that program started from one of my notifications.
15 But it seemed like they drug their feet on it from the
16 beginning. Then there's timelines on when you have to
17 have things closed out and corrective actions in
18 place. If you are going to go over those times, you
19 have to get extensions from department managers, the
20 plant manager, the vice president. They are very
21 difficult to get.

22 So once they got up to running up against
23 a deadline, they crammed in a procedure which I didn't
24 care too much for. There were a lot of people that
25 thought it was lacking a lot of things. At the

1 committee meetings, they basically said we're not
2 going to put in any changes right now because we have
3 a deadline of next week that this has to be
4 implemented. We'll implement it and then we'll put in
5 changes later which for something that's brand new
6 makes no sense. If you want to implement a new
7 program, get it right from the start instead of trying
8 to fix it after you have already implemented it.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You were on this
10 committee initially. You didn't follow it through.
11 It sounded like you didn't remain on it.

12  Once it got to the point
13 where it got issued, there wasn't a committee. I
14 wasn't even on the committee or informed that there
15 was a committee until the tail end of it. So
16 basically when I got involved in it was when we had a
17 draft. I went through the draft and made
18 recommendations. A couple of weeks later we had
19 another meeting and talked about it. That's when I
20 was told that it's too late and that this has to be
21 implemented next week and that we're not going to make
22 any changes.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Has it had any
24 positive effect? You are thinking that this is in
25 response to one of your notifications.

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1 [REDACTED] Yes.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Has there been any?

3 [REDACTED] No, because I don't think an
4 entirely different program addresses the initial
5 problem which is not running things all the way
6 through to the end and not following the procedures
7 and doing the restoration in accordance with what we
8 have. All it is is another administrative tool,
9 another paperwork tool.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Tracking.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Let me ask
12 something. I need to understand what you are talking
13 about in big generalities. What I have seen in the
14 procedures - and correct me if I'm wrong on this - if
15 you are talking about a system procedure, you take any
16 big system that has multiple components to it. Then
17 you have some master overall procedure. But then
18 within that, you have substeps.

19 [REDACTED] Right.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Like how you
21 start a feed pump. It will say do this and then go to
22 this section. Then that section on a feed pump will
23 be just on that activity. Usually if you understand
24 the limitations and you understand what you need to do
25 through that part of the procedure, you can usually go

1 through that. So you don't have to do everything.

2 [REDACTED] Right, that's correct.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Now, what
4 you are describing, I'm getting a vision of something
5 like that but that may not be right. Are you saying
6 that even if they get into a subsection like that they
7 stop in the middle and then exit and then don't come
8 back?

9 [REDACTED] Right, what I'm talking
10 about is you'll get into a subsection and you'll go so
11 far and you'll have a problem.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] You'll have a problem with
14 a step to where you can't complete that. So they
15 address the problem of where you are but just push the
16 procedure off to the side. Sometimes it's okay. You
17 can stop right there. Sometimes you might have to
18 look at where you are and back up a little bit to put
19 it in a better condition. Or you have to look ahead
20 to see once we come back to this where am I. Can I
21 just pick up where I left off or am I going to have to
22 repeat some of these sections? I might have done a
23 fill event up front which I'm slowly losing because
24 I'm sitting in the middle of it. That rarely gets
25 done.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Now, besides
2 the Shop 103 which is a newer procedure, was there
3 something that required some sort of evaluation if
4 this happened? I'm sure there's a procedure that you
5 have that tells you how to follow procedures.

6 [REDACTED] Right.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But usually
8 the focus with those procedures is you have to do this
9 one step by step. This one you can do in any order.
10 If it has bullets, you can mix them.

11 [REDACTED] Right.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It gives you
13 instructions on how to use a procedure. But does that
14 procedure tell you what to do if you get to a certain
15 point and you can't continue?


16 [REDACTED] It does but all it tells you
17 is contact your job supervisor. That's basically all
18 of the instructions that are in that.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: All right,
20 but it doesn't tell you to assess like plant
21 conditions and return or restore the procedure or use
22 the procedure to restore the plant to some known
23 configuration.


24 [REDACTED] It's not worded like that.
25 I don't know the exact words off the top of my head.

1 Basically when you get to a certain step in a
2 procedure where you can't proceed or what you expect
3 to happen didn't happen, you are supposed to restore
4 it to a safe condition or stop the job in a safe
5 condition and then contact your job supervisor.
6 That's basically all the words that are in there.
7 It's up to the job supervisor, whether it be an NIC
8 supervisor or the control room supervisor, to
9 determine where to go from there.


10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And that's
11 where you are saying the process or the station is
12 falling down.

13  Yes.


14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: They are
15 leaving things hanging in a bad way in some instances.

16  Yes.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: From what you are
18 describing, it sounds like this goes back over a good
19 period of time.

20  Yes, many years.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you see it
22 consistently the same? Do you see any improvements in
23 that at all? Or is it just this is the way it works?

24  I think it's pretty much the
25 same. I don't see a lot of improvement.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's obvious that you
2 do write notifications and raise some issues. If you
3 have a concern, you are raising a concern. Am I
4 miscategorizing that?

5 [REDACTED] No, that's correct.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What is your comfort
7 level with that? Has that changed at any point in
8 time?

9 [REDACTED] My comfort level hasn't
10 changed. I never have had a problem with backing down
11 from anything whether I got pressure or not. I never
12 felt pressured. But whether I had gotten any pressure
13 or not, I would continue to raise them.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's the second
15 part of my question. In terms of the responses that
16 you get, do you perceive that as an individual who
17 raises concerns that in any way you are getting any
18 type of an adverse effect, a push back on you for
19 doing that?

20 [REDACTED] I don't think that I have
21 gotten any push back. I know that some of my
22 notifications they are not happy with because I will
23 be specific. I will point out what part of the
24 process broke down, when, basically who was involved
25 with it. I will identify all of that. A lot of

1 people aren't happy with that.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You would think that
3 would be a good thing. You are not giving them some
4 generalized or vague here's an issue I think you
5 should look into. You are saying here's what I see
6 and you are being specific is what you are saying.

7 [REDACTED] Right.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why wouldn't they be
9 happy with that?

10 [REDACTED] Well, a lot of it is when
11 I'm pointing at my control room supervisors or my
12 operations management or the outage control group.
13 When I'm pointing out to them that they are the ones
14 that are causing the problem, that's where the
15 breakdown is.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You are identifying
17 a breakdown more or less by name or position.

18 [REDACTED] Right, by using a position
19 or event or something like that. They look at it like
20 I'm pointing out that they did something wrong. Now,
21 that makes them look bad. So instead of looking at
22 the issue and trying to correct it, they are doing
23 damage control on themselves.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What form does that
25 take? Is that something subtle that you are getting?

1 Is that a vibe that you are getting? Is that a wish
2 you hadn't done that and you are causing me some
3 problems here?

4 [REDACTED] Some of it is subtle. Some
5 of it's vibes I get. Nobody has ever directly come at
6 me and given me a hard time about a notification. But
7 I have gotten the impression. I can't really give
8 specifics on this. I really don't have any proof to
9 back this up. But I think being in the union helps me
10 to where I can identify issues without a lot of fear
11 of retaliation. I have gotten the feeling that my
12 supervisors have caught flack over things that I have
13 brought up basically because they are not controlling
14 me or they are not reeling me in.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who is your
16 [REDACTED] and your [REDACTED] right now?

17 [REDACTED] Right now, that just changed
18 in the last two weeks.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who was it
20 that you are referring to then?

21 [REDACTED]: [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] for a couple of years.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

24 [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do any of the CRSs talk to you about the issues you raise?

[REDACTED] They do. A lot of them are happy that I'm bringing them up, my immediate supervisors. But I have gotten the opinion that they have caught flack over some of the ones that I have brought up..

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who do you think is giving them the flack? Is it at the OS level or is it from higher up?

[REDACTED] I think it's higher up. Sometimes it might have been from an OS. In some cases, it might have been [REDACTED] coming down on the CRSs for something I put in. Other times I think that [REDACTED] has caught flack from the ops manager at the time, the plant manager at the time.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Typically do the OS and the CRS support each other?

[REDACTED]: Not all the time.


SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where do you see them deviate? Where does the rub come if they are not always in the same line of thought?

[REDACTED] A lot of it has to do with the amount of work that's going on at the time. A


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1 normal work week where there's not a lot of equipment
2 out of service and there's not a real heavy schedule,
3 I think they are in line. What happens is when the
4 schedule starts pushing and you start having different
5 items in the schedule pushing up against each other
6 and you start getting more time pressure and time
7 constraints, the CRSs tend to be a little more
8 thorough, a little more conservative whereas the ops
9 managers, as they call them now, tend to push. They
10 come down on the control room supervisors to get
11 things done.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you see an example
13 of that?

14  Every start up that we have
15 done with the exception of the last one. I will tell
16 you the last start up that we just did here last week
17 was not too bad. But previous to that, the start ups
18 that we were doing we were coming out of a refuel
19 outage or a forced outage. You would get so far in
20 the start up and you would end up with equipment
21 problems that weren't addressed when you were shut
22 down. So now you have to find ways of dealing with
23 the equipment problem.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: During the start up.

25  During the start up. It


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
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1 causes delays. You have to jump back and regroup and
2 thing about what effect this is going to have right
3 now and what effect it's going to have later on. It
4 tends to slow down the start up.


5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You are indicating
6 that the most recent one was done better than it had
7 been in the past.

8  I think it was because we
9 had just come out from an outage not too long ago. We
10 had a lot of equipment finally getting fixed so we
11 didn't have as many equipment problems starting up
12 this last outage.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When were the repairs
14 made?

15  Within the last couple of
16 months. I think coming out of the September outage.
17 We had a forced outage in September from the
18 hurricane.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have any
20 reason for why? You are saying it's finally getting
21 fixed. Do you know what that goes to?

22  I think because of coming
23 out of the forced outage in September from the
24 hurricane we started up and there were a lot of us
25 that were pushing back on the start up and saying we

1 are not ready to start up. We have a lot of equipment
2 problems out there. As we're starting up, we would
3 find something new that wasn't working right. We
4 would have problems with different equipment.

5 We would want to put things on hold.
6 Let's not race ahead to try to start up to get to full
7 power. Let's see what this is going to do to us and
8 get things fixed. We ran for less than seven days.
9 I forget what power level we got up to. We never got
10 up to full power. We ended up scrambling (PH) again
11 because of equipment problems. I think it made them
12 look foolish enough to where once we came down there
13 they fixed a few more things.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you
15 recall what the scram (PH) was over after the start up
16 with the hurricane?

17 [REDACTED] It was an E8C leak.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was that
19 something that was identified earlier?


20 [REDACTED] Yes.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It was. I
22 think we knew about the E8C leak. But I don't think
23 we knew it was previously identified.

24 [REDACTED] Yes.


25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So it was

1 previously identified. Was it highlighted as
2 something for cause taking it off-line do you think or
3 was it we can live with it because it's small?

4  It was we can live with it.
5 In fact, the initial scram (PH) from the hurricane, we
6 lost a section of the switch yard because a couple of
7 breakers opened up. All the electric buses have two
8 separate power supplies. It caused everything to swap
9 over to the other side of the switch yard which was
10 okay.

11 One of the buses did not transfer. It did
12 not pick up its alternate power supply. We ended up
13 losing a con -- pump and a recirc pump and we ended up
14 scrambling (PH). Now, the alternate power supply that
15 never picked up was identified as being a problem 12
16 months before that. So the initial scram (PH) never
17 had to happen.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think the word was
19 foolish. They were foolish for where you ended up
20 after those seven days.

21  Right.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's a lessons
23 learned-type of thing. Now, they are paying more
24 attention to what needs to get repaired while you are
25 down.

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1 [REDACTED] They were in that situation.
2 I don't know that I believe they have learned their
3 lesson on that. I don't know that we won't do the
4 same thing again.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: If you were
6 in management's position and you were looking at these
7 issues and you could make changes that would be
8 efficient but would hopefully address some of these
9 things, where would you be looking to make the
10 changes? Is this just a matter of making the outages
11 longer and doing more work? Is it a totally different
12 approach?

13 [REDACTED] There's two problems. One
14 of them is when things are being identified, they are
15 not being scheduled sometimes until two or three years
16 down the road. The in-feed breaker that I'm talking
17 about that failed was identified in either September
18 or October '02. It caused a scram (PH) in September
19 or October '03.

20 It was a situation where it's difficult or
21 sometimes impossible to work on these in-feed breakers
22 unless you are in an outage. Now, during that 12
23 month period, we had a refuel outage and a forced
24 outage. So there's two outage periods where that
25 could have been worked on.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Two opportunities.
2 [REDACTED] Now, I can understand when
3 a problem comes up and you are on-line. You may be
4 able to live with it where you are right now. It may
5 be something you can't work until you are into an
6 outage. But once you go into an outage, especially a
7 power supply, I would think that would be something
8 that you would want to address.


9 There are some other minor things that
10 would be nice to fix but you may not be able to. But
11 there are certain things like a power supply that you
12 would think you would definitely want to fix when you
13 are in an outage. So we had two opportunities to fix
14 it. Because it was scheduled for October 2004, it was
15 never even looked at.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Why is that?
17 Is that a mind set problem? Is it inappropriate
18 priority? Where is that coming from?

19 [REDACTED] That I couldn't tell you.
20 I do not understand how their corrective action
21 program works right now, how their work control
22 program works right now. I don't understand how they
23 schedule things.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: As [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] could you have gone in and changed


1 that to be a forced outage item? I don't even
2 understand who has what authority. If you were
3 working work controls under your "SRO license," could
4 you have done that? Could you have said I want to
5 make this forced outage?

6  He can code it that way.
7 That doesn't necessarily mean it will go that way. He
8 can change on the notification the coding of it. He
9 can change the priority, make it refuel outage, make
10 it forced outage. But it's up to the outage group
11 that determines what gets scoped in, what gets done,
12 what doesn't get done. How that was scoped, I don't
13 know. I do know the initial screening identified that
14 the breaker was closed at the particular time. So it
15 looks like it's an intermittent problem and it can't
16 be worked right now. But it needed to be worked on in
17 outage. I know that was a screen. But as far as --

18 (Tape flip.)

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's approximately
20 10:55 a.m.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So we were
22 just talking about that breaker. The work goes to the
23 outage group. Then they make a decision on how it
24 gets worked or how it gets loaded into the schedule.

25  Right. *TC*

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: In looking
2 at that and thinking about that, is there something in
3 the process -- Let's say if you are the outage group
4 and you knew that there was a problem and you knew the
5 nature of the problem. You would code it properly
6 because you would have enough information.

7 [REDACTED] Right.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You are
9 going to say this is a trip risk or a trip hazard or
10 something like that. Is there something that they are
11 not getting that they need to make that assessment and
12 that judgement to schedule it properly or is it they
13 are overwhelmed? Maybe there's too much work to do or
14 too many items in the schedule. I don't know. Do you
15 have any thoughts on that?

16 [REDACTED] That I don't know either.
17 I don't think that they are overwhelmed. I think the
18 information is there. Why it's coming down the way it
19 is, I don't know. I don't have the answer to that.


20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Could it be
21 a dollar and cents-type of answer, a budgetary
22 problem?

23 [REDACTED] It could be and not
24 necessarily a budget problem but more a time problem.
25 We try to do as little during the refuel outage as we


1 can. We try to do everything on-line. So the big
2 push is to shorten the outage to as short as possible
3 duration and do everything else on-line. So there are
4 a lot of things that gets pitched out of a refuel
5 outage for time constraints.

6 A lot of times it seems like the way they
7 build the schedule they don't start with this is the
8 work that we have to do. They do a rough plan and say
9 this is going to take us 30 days which is way too
10 long. Chop a few things out that you can live with.
11 I realize that there are times you can do that. There
12 are things that don't necessarily have to be done in
13 a particular refuel outage. You can wait 18 months or
14 sometimes three years to fix minor things. But it
15 seems like they build a schedule from a time period
16 out instead of bringing it the other way.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Instead of focusing
18 on what has to get done, they focus on how few days
19 can you get it done.

20  Well, they actually look at
21 it like we want a 16 day outage or we want an 18 day
22 outage.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They'll set the time.

24  It seems like they start it
25 that way and then see what they can fit into it as

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1 opposed to doing it the other way. These are the
2 things that we want to get done. These are the things
3 that we need to get done and work with your times that
4 way. It seems like the outage duration is set ahead
5 of time. And then you have to try to make the work
6 fit into it.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You are speaking from
8 your experiences working under the [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED] Is that where you see that? How do you have
10 knowledge of that?

11 [REDACTED] I see that. Also the NCOs
12 see that because there's a lot of times where the
13 outage duration is talked about and in some cases
14 published two years ahead of time.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What that timeframe
16 will be by 16 or 18 days.

17 [REDACTED] Right.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There's something
19 that I should explain for the record. You were

20 [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED] That's correct.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And later [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED] right?

24 [REDACTED] That is correct.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What year was that?

1 [REDACTED] I believe it was [REDACTED]

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You did not go into
3 an SRO or CRS position.

4 [REDACTED] That's correct. I never
5 took the control room supervisor job.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Your purpose then for
7 going for the license would be what?

8 [REDACTED] Actually I wanted the
9 license. I felt the extra training involved in it
10 would help me do my job. I thought that there was a
11 possibility soon down the road that I would take the
12 control room supervisor job. I would be able to get
13 the license out of the way. I would have a license.
14 Whenever I decided to become a control room
15 supervisor, I wouldn't have to go through a year or
16 year and a half of training and licensing to do that.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There would be no
18 delay.

19 [REDACTED] There wouldn't be a delay.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that opportunity
21 there for you?

22 [REDACTED] Yes, it was.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you did not take
24 it.

25 [REDACTED] I did not take it because at

1 the time I didn't like a lot of the issues that were
2 happening to the control room supervisors.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So what year are you
4 looking at then? [REDACTED] when was the
5 opportunity for you?

6 [REDACTED] When I initially got asked
7 to go to the class, I have no idea when the
8 opportunity was. Typically the whole time that I have
9 worked here when they would have an SRO license class
10 they would try to bring people in off the streets or
11 from other departments. It's what they call instant
12 SROs without a previous license.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] They would bring those into
15 a license class. They always wanted at least two or
16 three NCOs getting an SRO license at the same time.
17 They would spread out the experience, spread out the
18 knowledge to help the instants get their license.
19 What would typically happen is say you had a group of
20 six SRO licenses, two of them being NCOs and four of
21 them being instants, the four instants would get a CRS
22 job right away. The NCOs would end up going back to
23 being NCOs until an opening came up.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there an
25 expectation that when offered the position you would

1 take it? Was that an automatic thing?

2 [REDACTED] No.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

4 [REDACTED] There was not an expectation
5 at that time when I initially went into the class.
6 Like I said, there were a lot of the NCOs that got the
7 SRO license because they wanted the control room
8 supervisor job and they got pushed back to being an
9 NCO in some cases for a couple of years. There's a
10 couple of cases where guys have actually left the
11 company because they never got offered a promotion.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They were waiting
13 around with a license.

14 [REDACTED] Right. Now, in my case,
15 that was pretty much the status quo when I started
16 into the license class. By the time I finished the
17 license class, there was a whole upper management
18 change.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So were you finished
20 in [REDACTED] or did you finish later?

21 [REDACTED] I was finished in [REDACTED]. I
22 had the [REDACTED] Because I was previously
23 licensed, I think my actual license class was only
24 maybe about nine or ten months.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This change in upper

1 management, what affected that?

2 [REDACTED] I saw a lot more, for lack
3 of a better word, hassles being put on the control
4 room supervisors. There was a lot more pressure on
5 them. There was a lot more demands on their time
6 without compensation. There was a lot more
7 accountability.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Around 1996?

9 [REDACTED] About '96, yes. Like I
10 said, that was because of an upper management change.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At what level?

12 [REDACTED] At the vice president level.
13 I think there was a new vice president. That was when
14 [REDACTED] (PH) came in. I think the plant managers
15 on both sides changed. I don't remember whether we
16 changed ops managers at that point or not. But I
17 think we had new ops managers also.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So there was a
19 significant change was all the way.

20 [REDACTED] Yes, all the way around.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So a new [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED] Right.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: With him came the
25 negative change on the CRS position.

1 [REDACTED] Right.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So at that point, you
3 became reluctant. You didn't want it.

4 [REDACTED] Right, that's correct.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who were the
6 plant manager and ops manager? Do you recall?

7 [REDACTED] I believe that the ops
8 manager came from outside. He was a loner. I'm
9 trying to remember his name. He came from PECO from
10 Peach Bottom. Off the top of my head I cannot
11 remember his name.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was he here long?

13 [REDACTED] No, maybe 12 months. It
14 might have been [REDACTED] (PH). I'm not sure.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, I
16 don't remember that name. Is [REDACTED] in there
17 about this same time?

18 [REDACTED] He was in there somewhere.
19 I can't remember where he fit in either. I think he
20 was afterwards.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who was here
22 for a long time that left fairly recently? He was the
23 plant manager who became the VP. Wasn't he a VP or
24 something?

25 [REDACTED] (PH).

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No, not [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] (PH). He was just a manager.

3 [REDACTED] Right.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I just can't
5 think of his name.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're going back to
7 '96.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So it sounds
9 like when [REDACTED] (PH) came in there was a change
10 in approach and change in conduct if you will in the
11 way the control room was being managed. The CRS
12 position didn't look as attractive because of the
13 increased pressures.

14 [REDACTED] Right.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You
16 mentioned compensation. What was that about?

17 [REDACTED]: I think that was about the
18 same time that they took away the overtime for the
19 control room supervisors. Up until this point, they
20 had been paid the same as us. You have a basic 40
21 hour salary. Then anything you work beyond that you
22 get compensated for, time and a half, coming in on
23 your days off.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was that
25 also true for OSS at the time too?

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[REDACTED] Yes.

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So it was both of those positions that got that taken away.

[REDACTED] I think the OSs might have actually lost that a year or two prior to that.

SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, was there any exchange or was there any increase or something? The only reason I'm asking is I'm not so much interested in all of the mechanics but whether there was something to offset it.

[REDACTED] I think when it was done a couple of years prior for the OSs they were all compensated. They were all given a raise and then put on salary. It's like you are going to come in on some of your days off. You are not going to get compensated for it, but your overall salary is basically going to remain the same. The CRSSs weren't done that way. They stayed at basically the same hourly pay and were considered salary.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As NCO.

[REDACTED] No, the CRSSs.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The same hourly pay but no overtime.

[REDACTED] Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So there was no

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1 benefit.

2 [REDACTED] Yes, there was no benefit.
3 And once you figure in the amount of time that they
4 were putting into because like I said there was a lot
5 of turmoil at the time, they were expected to put in
6 60 to 70 hours per week. For a couple of years, the
7 NCOs were making more than the control room
8 supervisors.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I guess under that
10 system if you are not going to be compensated.

11 [REDACTED] Right.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So then they lose
13 people putting in for it. There's no incentive to go
14 to the next level.

15 [REDACTED] Correct, there's been very
16 few NCOs that have tried to go up to the control room
17 supervisor job.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They can't have been
19 very pleased with you for going through the training
20 and then saying I'm not going to go there.

21 [REDACTED] Right, they weren't.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What kind of push or
23 what kind of response did you get to that?

24 [REDACTED] Most of it was with the [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] around the 2000 timeframe.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who was
2 that?

3 [REDACTED]
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So they let you
5 cruise for four years.

6 [REDACTED] Well actually, no, because
7 once I initially got the license, we had gone into a
8 refuel outage.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

10 [REDACTED] So I had taken a temporary
11 upgrade where I was working with the outage group. I
12 was an ops coordinator with the outage group. So I
13 was using my license then.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right, okay.

15 [REDACTED] I went back on shift for
16 less than a month. They were working a new work
17 control program with work weeks and coordinators and
18 myself and there was another [REDACTED] that was SRO licensed
19 but not a supervisor, [REDACTED] that took another
20 temporary upgrade for about 18 months working over in
21 work control getting the whole program getting it
22 started for them.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and did you do
24 some of that yourself too?

25 [REDACTED] Yes, like I said, it was

1 both of us that went over and basically started the
2 work control program for operations.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So in that timeframe,
4 you were using this license.

5 [REDACTED] I was using the license. We
6 were approving tags and everything but not making tech
7 spec recommendations because the only person who
8 actually makes a tech spec call is the on-duty control
9 room supervisor. But as part of our job, we had to
10 always be aware of the tech spec implications of what
11 we wanted to do, how we scheduled things. So we both
12 used the license that entire time. I would say from
13 when I first got the [REDACTED] I used it constantly
14 for almost three years, two to three years.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

16 [REDACTED]: Now, after that time period
17 went back on shift was when [REDACTED] became the
18 [REDACTED] and kept pushing for both of us to take
19 the control room supervisor job.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you ever
21 explain to him why you were never that interested in
22 it?

23 [REDACTED]: Yes, in great length.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was his
25 response to that?

1 [REDACTED] He wasn't happy about it.
2 I basically told him if I listed everything out, all
3 the pros and cons, I said I can give you a list of
4 probably 20 cons right off the top of my head. I said
5 you give me some of the pros. He started talking
6 salary. He thought that the money would be the big
7 issue.

8 Right from the beginning, he realized that
9 I was making more as an ~~(REDACTED)~~ than he could offer me as
10 a control room supervisor. So he lost that argument.
11 But he kept pushing. He actually said quite a few
12 times that it's going to get to the point when we get
13 to training and requal. I have guys that are SRO
14 licensed that are being lent out to INC that are over
15 in work control. It's going to be hard for me to be
16 able to find enough room to requalify you as an SRO
17 and training.

18 So we're basically going to have to push
19 you back to an RO which I almost took to be a threat.
20 You take this job or we're going to take your license
21 away. As it turned out, he kept true to his threat
22 and petitioned to have the license taken away.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that you and the
24 other individual?

25 [REDACTED] Yes.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What is his name?

2

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: When you say
4 "taken away," you just said that it's because we can't
5 afford to put you through requal or whatever. We
6 don't have the space or what have you. We are just
7 going to tell the NRC that we don't need your SRO
8 license but we'll keep your RO. That was the gist of
9 it.

10 [REDACTED] Correct.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: How did you
12 react to that?

13 [REDACTED] I wasn't happy about that.
14 I told him I wanted to keep the license. I felt that
15 I was using it. There was a lot of inexperience at
16 the control room supervisor level because you get to
17 the point where you have a lot of instant SROs coming
18 in without the experience. I felt that I was helping
19 them out with covering their back on tech spec calls,
20 covering their back on different situations to keep
21 all of us out of trouble with my experience and with
22 my license.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Ultimately they
24 didn't want to pay for that back up because you
25 weren't going to go into the CRS position is what it

1 seemed like.

2 [REDACTED] Correct, and I don't think
3 it was a money issue. It seemed like they wanted us
4 to take the supervisor job. I think they wanted to
5 beef up the experience level and wanted us to take the
6 supervisor job. By threatening to take away the SRO
7 license was about the only way that they thought they
8 had an upper hand to do that.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But as far
10 as the consequences to you, was there a negative
11 consequence?

12 [REDACTED] For losing the license?

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, from a
14 pay standpoint.

15 [REDACTED]: It was minor. The
16 difference between a reactor operator license and a
17 senior reactor operator license is 90 cents an hour.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But you get
19 paid overtime and they don't.

20 [REDACTED] Correct, so in the grand
21 scheme of things the 90 cents an hour wasn't that big
22 of an issue.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I would
24 think that actually financially you are better off as
25 an RO based on what you described earlier.

1 [REDACTED] Correct.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And staying
3 at the RO level.

4 [REDACTED] Correct.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Quite a bit
6 better.

7 [REDACTED]: Now, in the last couple of
8 years, they have compensated the control room
9 supervisors a lot better. They still don't get
10 overtime but they have actually brought their salary
11 up enough to where it may be worthwhile.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you see people
13 making that switch because of that?

14 [REDACTED] No.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So it wasn't enough
16 of a factor.

17 [REDACTED] In fact, since 1996, there
18 has been I think three NCOs that have taken the
19 promotion. I'm pretty sure there's only been three,
20 maybe four.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In seven or eight
22 years.

23 [REDACTED]: Yes.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Have you
25 talked to them at all about it? Do they like it? Do

1 they have mixed feelings? What kind of feedback are
2 you getting?

3 [REDACTED] Are you talking about have
4 I talked to operations management?

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No, the
6 three or four people you just mentioned.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who made the switch.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Are you
9 friendly with those folks that you were mentioning?

10 [REDACTED] Yes.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Have you
12 ever talked to them about how they like the job? Is
13 it any better or worse? What's their thoughts on it?

14 [REDACTED] I don't think any of the
15 three are really sorry that they took the promotion.
16 One of the three never actually went on shift. He got
17 an SRO license and is doing basically what I did over
18 in work control as a coordinator. I don't think he
19 has the same pressures that a control room supervisor
20 does. That was the deal he worked out to get the
21 license and take the promotion.

22 Out of all of them, there's only two guys
23 that have taken the actual control room supervisor
24 job. One of them I think is pretty happy with it.
25 The other one, sometimes I wonder but he's not going

1 to come out and say that he's not happy with it. He
2 seems like he's holding his own.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who are the two who
4 made the transition just for our frame of reference?

5

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Before, you made a
7 comment about it seemed that CRS and OS level will be
8 on the same page or tend to support one another when
9 things are normal.

10

 Right.

11

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't have too
13 much equipment out. You don't have too much time
14 pressure.


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 Right.

15

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But the CRS, you
17 described them as more thorough and more conservative.
18 The OS, when there is that schedule pressure, is the
19 one to push.

19

 Correct.

20

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Your description of
22 that relationship, has that been the same since this
23 '96 timeframe? Is that something that you have seen
24 all along the line?

24

25  Since at least '96, yes, and
I think '96 is probably about when it started.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Has it changed in any
2 way since that time?

3 [REDACTED] No.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: More pronounced on
5 one side or the other.

6 [REDACTED] No.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You see it as the
8 same consistent relationship.

9 [REDACTED] Right, there are times that
10 you can tell that the control room supervisor may
11 initially tell you that it's okay with us and just do
12 what we're doing right now. The schedule might have
13 us doing something else. He'll say no, I just want to
14 continue on the path that we're on. We're not going
15 to proceed to this next step because I don't think
16 it's smart.

17 The shift manager will come in or the ops
18 manager sometimes comes in. The next thing you know
19 there's a major shift in what you are doing. You can
20 sense the reluctance from the control room supervisor
21 as he is giving you the redirection. You can tell
22 he's not comfortable with it.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Which is changed at
24 the OS or the OM level.

25 [REDACTED] Yes, and it seems like those

1 guys get run over all the time.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: CRSs?

3  The CRSs.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That's an
5 interesting way to put it. From their point of
6 reference, they should also feel free to raise issues
7 and raise concerns. They may or may not think they
8 are safety concerns. They are just maybe complaint
9 concerns, how to conduct an evolution, how to manage
10 the plant, how to do things in a safe conservative
11 way.

12 In doing that, is there any discussion
13 after the fact? The managers leave or whatever and
14 the guys just sit down and talk and say I'd like to
15 stay where we were but we have to do this because we
16 need to do something based on what the ops manager
17 said or based on what the shift manager said.

18  Yes, and I'm trying to think
19 of how it would go about. A lot of times we'll wait
20 until the shift manager or the ops manager leaves.
21 We'll say something. A lot of times they will just
22 shrug their shoulders or say I know what you are
23 talking about or I know how you feel. But a lot of
24 them are afraid to go into too much detail. I also
25 think that a lot of the supervisors are intimidated to

1 bring up concerns.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What makes you say
3 that?

4 [REDACTED]: Well, this isn't a nuclear
5 safety issue as well as an industrial safety. I had
6 a control room supervisor ask me to write up a
7 notification because he was afraid of the retaliation
8 if he did it.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was the issue?

10 [REDACTED]: The issue was working or
11 doing inspections in electrical cabinets without the
12 proper fire clothing on. The last three years, we
13 instituted a program where any time you are doing
14 anything with electrical work you have flame retardant
15 clothing on. All the union personnel are all issued
16 clothing. In fact, we get an allowance for this
17 clothing.

18 Basically all the supervisors aren't
19 issued the clothing. So it's more like a union/non-
20 union issue. The craft workers are issued the
21 clothing. The supervisors aren't I guess originally
22 based on the premise that they don't do electrical
23 work. They supervise. But any time that you go into
24 an electrical cabinet, you are working around
25 energized equipment whether the only thing you are


1 doing is going in with a flashlight and looking
2 around. You still need the same equipment. All this
3 stuff is identified in our safety manual and in
4 different programs.

5 I know he had vocally brought up a few
6 times the fact that the supervisor should be getting
7 something. Maybe they don't need the entire allowance
8 that we do, but they should be getting something if
9 they are going to be expected to go in and walk down
10 tags or do inspections in electrical cabinets.


11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The CRSs should be
12 issued this.

13  The CRSs, right.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You know he brought
15 it up how?

16  When we would have meetings
17 with our ops manager, he would basically bring up the
18 issue.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What would happen
20 there?

21  They basically said we will
22 look into that. We'll discuss it. Then it just never
23 got any further than that. He actually got to the
24 point where he wanted it written up in a notification
25 because he thought it was a big problem. He was

1 afraid it. He actually asked me to write it up for
2 him.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How long ago does
4 this go back?

5 [REDACTED] I'd say 12 to 18 months ago.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So under [REDACTED]
7 (PH).

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You said he was
10 afraid to because he had to hand it off to you.

11 [REDACTED] Right.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did he tell you
13 at the time?

14 [REDACTED] I forget his exact wording.
15 He was basically talking about the political
16 ramifications if he wrote it up. He knew that if I
17 brought up the concern there wouldn't be any.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As a union guy.

19 [REDACTED] As a union guy, there
20 wouldn't be any effects on me. Whereas if he brought
21 it up and actually put the problem out in writing,
22 there are certain things they could do to him.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He indicated that to
24 you.

25 [REDACTED] Yes.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He actually verbally
2 said that.

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The control room
5 supervisor, [REDACTED] (PH)?

6 [REDACTED] No.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is it one of the
8 three that you were working with consistently?

9 [REDACTED] Yes.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] (PH).

14 [REDACTED] (PH).

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Had you seen that
16 happen before with this individual or with any other
17 CRS where they had that reluctance to push an issue?

18 [REDACTED] With this individual, I know
19 initially he was pretty vocal with issues. A lot of
20 times he, appearance-wise, seemed like he would side
21 with the equipment operators and the nuclear control
22 room operators because he had been a control room
23 operator and a control room supervisor at a different
24 plant before he came down here. So he has a lot of
25 experience.

1 He would see issues that we would bring up
2 and he would know that they were valid issues. He
3 would side with us. Whereas management would down
4 play the issue. So he was always looked at as being
5 on the wrong side. I think he got hammered from his
6 evaluations. I think he's gone a few years without a
7 pay raise. That got to the point where it's starting
8 to hit home. It's starting to hit his wallet. He's
9 starting to tone it down a little bit.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If he supports your
11 issues, that's the end result.

12  Right.


13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are there performance
14 issues tied to that too?

15  No.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is he seen as a good
17 performer?

18  Yes, I think so.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So over time, it's
20 led to instead of supporting you he'll hand off an
21 issue and you front it.

22  Yes.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about the other
24 ones that you have worked with? Do you see that there
25 too? I'm asking about your experience with  and

1 [REDACTED] (PH) .

2 [REDACTED] He hasn't been on our shift
3 for as long as the other two. I think he's been on
4 our shift for a little over a year. So I can't think
5 of any examples where he seemed reluctant to bring up
6 an issue. But I know that I brought up an issue
7 coming out of one of the outages where I didn't think
8 that we were doing enough to get ourselves ready for
9 start up, specifically with exercising control
10 rods. I thought we hit a point where they said
11 we wanted to start up. We're going to do it right
12 now. I don't care whether we're ready or not. We had
13 a lot of problems with the control rods. So [REDACTED]
14 that up. [REDACTED] a lengthy notification and
15 addressed specific issues. [REDACTED] happened to be
16 standing in as the shift manager for the couple of
17 nights that we were doing start up.

18 When I brought it up, there was a lot of
19 feathers ruffled with ops management for doing the
20 start up and not addressing these problems before we
21 started up. So they weren't happy with me. And I got
22 the impression from [REDACTED] that he took some heat over
23 it.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So at the CRS and OS
25 level, they were getting some criticism.

1 [REDACTED] They were getting heat for
2 an issue that I brought up. It's very difficult for
3 them to hit me directly.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What's the
5 goal though behind something like that? If you just
6 step back and look at the circumstance, you are
7 raising some issues about the way you are doing the
8 start up and the need to do certain activities, some
9 sort of a control exercise. Basically you are saying
10 we really need to do this. You are raising it up to
11 management. It's almost a safety issue of sorts. ~~Maybe~~
12 it doesn't cross the threshold. Maybe it's just
13 something that would be a good operating practice-type
14 issue. Then it goes up to the OS and maybe the AOMs
15 and the ops manager. Then they are coming down and
16 saying we really want to move the plant. We really
17 want to get the plant started up. Is it the situation
18 that the CRSs is put a vice and you are pushing on one
19 side and he's pushing on the other and he's getting
20 squished in the middle?

21 [REDACTED] That's exactly what it's
22 like. There's enough of us that have been in the
23 control room and have enough experience that we know
24 certain situations that are good and ones that are
25 uncomfortable. Once we hit our comfort level, we'll

1 start pushing back. Then you have the shift manager
2 who starts pushing down on the CRS.

3 There's been start ups where the outage
4 manager, the ops manager, the assistant ops manager
5 would all be standing in the back of the control room
6 in the shift manager's office. We used to call them
7 the Sopranos. It seemed like every time these guys
8 would come in they would start pushing hard on the
9 CRS.

10 Like I said, we would push back at them to
11 keep things at what we thought was a conservative,
12 comfortable level to keep things under control. So
13 you could definitely feel the tension every time that
14 went on. You could definitely feel like the CRSs were
15 getting squeezed.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you see
17 any of these changes take place after deregulation?
18 That's something that's happened over the last couple
19 of years. The plant has moved from a regulated
20 environment where you dealt with the PUC and you can
21 go after money which was pretty easy to get to fix
22 things, repair things, what have you. Then with
23 deregulation, it's very competitive. You have to
24 watch every penny. You have to maximize generation
25 and these kinds of things, the short outages, the 16

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1 to 18 day outages.

2 [REDACTED] Right.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there
4 any talk at the time when the effects of that first
5 hit the station that this is going to be a radical
6 change for us and we have to change the way we look at
7 operations?

8 [REDACTED] No, it was talked about as
9 being a radical change and how we would do things
10 would be different. But as far as that kind of level,
11 no.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Have you
13 ever been a student or an individual in the audience
14 when there was discussion about this is our generation
15 goals, this is our shareholder value, we're trying to
16 increase it to this, we need this, and we need that?
17 How does that get presented? Who is presenting that?
18 What's the tone?

19 [REDACTED] We used to have all hands
20 meetings with the [REDACTED] (PH) level. I can't
21 remember. They changed the title so many times.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED] I think it's [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] is what the title is called now. In fact,

1 I think that would be what [REDACTED] (PH) is now.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] But a lot of them were at
4 that level.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then you had
6 what, [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] We very rarely interfaced
8 with the [REDACTED]

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That would have been
10 formerly [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] Right, very little interface
12 with them.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you had little
14 contact, little knowledge of interactions at that
15 level from your personal experience.

16 [REDACTED] Right, but when we go out to
17 training, we train pretty much every fifth week.
18 There's so much actual training. There are some weeks
19 where we don't have training, but we are scheduled for
20 training every fifth week. I would say about every
21 other time that we're out at the training center
22 there's usually a section in our schedule called the
23 ops manager update where the ops manager will come in
24 and talk about different issues, talk about what's
25 going on. There will be a question and answer session

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1 as far as what issues do we have.

2 The entire time that [REDACTED] (PH) was
3 the ops manager he basically came out and did a slide
4 show. ~~It was exactly what you are talking about. It~~
5 ~~was all performance indicators. This is our capacity~~
6 factor. This is our generation. This is our costs.
7 That's pretty much what it was. It ran so long that
8 it usually cut down the question and answer session or
9 the opportunity to bring up issues there at the end.
10 It cut it down to almost nothing.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The message that the
12 company reportedly puts out there, safety,
13 reliability, cost, do you see that projected in
14 ~~balance or is that out of balance? Are you hearing~~
15 about safety? Are you hearing about reliability?

16 [REDACTED] Yes, we hear about safety
17 all the time. ~~We have posters all over the place.~~

18 They always talk about it. We have safety messages.
19 But a lot of times I think it's safety is number one
20 as long as it doesn't impact schedule, if it doesn't
21 impact generation. If something has to give, it tends
22 to be on safety. That's the impression that most of
23 us have.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you talk about
25 these schedule pressures and the way the relationship

1 is with the CRS being thorough and conservative and
2 wanting to go in a certain direction but that can be
3 changed for them at the OM and OS level, can you think
4 of any other examples of that where they are going in
5 a conservative direction and that gets reversed or
6 altered for them?

7 [REDACTED] The start ups that we have
8 done. I think we must have done at least a half a
9 dozen start ups in the past 12 months. It hasn't been
10 one of the greatest records for us. Every start up,
11 I always got the impression that they were
12 uncomfortable with how we were proceeding, the pace
13 that we were proceeding.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Too quickly.

15 [REDACTED] Too quickly. Under normal
16 conditions, it wouldn't be bad. If you had a normal
17 start up where everything went the way it was expected
18 to, the pace was good. But once you start running
19 into things like a lot more in leakage in your
20 condenser than you expect or than you should have,
21 there's a problem out there somewhere.

22 You have a leak. It starts affecting your
23 off gas flows. You are worried about losing your off
24 gas train. So you want to slow things down and see if
25 you can figure out what impact is this going to have

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
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1 on us and is there something that we need to address?
2 Well, upper management seems like no, we're good to
3 150 so don't worry about it and just keep on pushing.


4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You are talking about
5 the incident back in March with the start up during
6 the March timeframe with the off gas level.

7  Yes.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you were getting
9 a high reading for where you were.

10  Right, and that was never
11 really addressed. We had a high off gas level. I
12 think we ran for a period of time with the elevated
13 off gas level. Then we ended up shutting down again.
14 I think there was another forced outage after that.
15 The problem just pretty much went away. Now, there
16 was equipment that was realigned during the shut down.
17 Whether something there corrected the problem, I don't
18 know. It was one of those things that seemed to fix
19 itself. Maybe it was swapping air ejectors.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You haven't seen it
21 since.

22  I don't remember the exact
23 configuration. But it's possible that we haven't run
24 with the same air ejector than we did back then.
25 Maybe that problem is still sitting there waiting to

1 come back. I don't know. I don't keep track of what
2 we had in service at the time, whether it's been out
3 of service this entire time. But it was like let's
4 ignore it. Since it went away, it's not a problem.
5 Let's keep on going.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about other
7 instances? Can you think of anything else?

8  Not off the top of my head
9 right now. *TC*

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If something comes up
11 --

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You were
13 talking a little bit about competition and
14 deregulation. Were there any issues that would stick
15 out that would reflect excessive pressures? You said
16 in a broad way that safety is first as long as it
17 doesn't affect generation or production. There's an
18 implication with that statement that there are
19 production pressures and there are generation
20 pressures.

21 Have you ever personally felt or been a
22 witness to a situation other than the ones we
23 previously talked about where you thought this is just
24 pushing too hard? You mentioned something with start
25 ups maybe going a little fast and some other

1 instances. But were there any other things where that
2 stands out in your mind? Like, we're just doing
3 something because it's on the schedule to do it and it
4 makes no sense or things like that.

5  There's a lot of things that
6 I look at on the schedule that don't make sense. It
7 seems like there's surveillances that we have to do at
8 a certain time interval. Maybe they are every 92
9 days. We seem to move them up a lot to where we're
10 doing them more frequently which doesn't make sense.
11 But if that's what they want to do, we can do them
12 every month.

13 Whereas once you get into a piece of
14 equipment that's degraded, a bad leak service water is
15 an example of that where it definitely needs some
16 work, it needs an outage. It needs to be taken out
17 and fixed. Well, a service water outage when you are
18 on-line is very difficult to do. You have a really
19 short time period. So that kind of stuff doesn't get
20 scheduled even in short durations.

21 We seem to be working a lot towards
22 performance indicators as opposed to towards
23 performance. So you look at what your performance
24 indicator is showing you. All right, maybe we're not
25 doing too good at this so we have to tweak it to make

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1 the performance indicator better. The emphasis
2 doesn't seem to be on making the performance better.

3 One of them is the outage time that you
4 track on a piece of equipment. If you have a 72 hour
5 LCO on a piece of equipment and you only take it out
6 for 24 hours, you have well met your LCO. But they
7 keep track of the overall time that it's out. I don't
8 know if it's a 12 month period or a two year period to
9 where maybe you were only out 24 hours of your 72 hour
10 LCO but you were like that this month.

11 Then the following month you took it out
12 for the same period of time. Then a month after that
13 you took it out for the same period of time. So
14 there's a performance indicator that they track the
15 total amount of time the piece of equipment was out.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Maintenance
17 rule.

18 [REDACTED]: That's exactly it. I
19 couldn't remember the name of it.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes,
21 maintenance rule.

22 [REDACTED] Which in some ways is good.
23 But when you get to the point where you are not doing
24 corrective maintenance on equipment because you are
25 already in the yellow for your maintenance rule, now

1 you are starting to manage the performance indicator.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You are reluctant to
3 fix something so it doesn't show up on the maintenance
4 rule.

5 [REDACTED] Right, I don't want to take
6 -- out of service for a three day outage because I'm
7 already into the yellow.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's going to
9 escalate.

10 [REDACTED] For the maintenance rule,
11 it's going to make me look even worse.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you see that
13 that's what is driving how the work gets done.

14 [REDACTED] A lot of it, yes.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Which is
16 interesting because I know the NRC's goal behind that
17 was exactly the opposite.

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You try and
20 get the utilities to acknowledge that there's
21 equipment that doesn't work properly and give
22 attention to things that are on the radar screen of
23 things that aren't doing well. Put more attention in
24 there, more resources, more activities and get the
25 thing working properly.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You are saying it's
2 having the opposite effect.

3  Right, the way the
4 maintenance rule is all written down and in theory
5 makes a lot of sense. But it is definitely having the
6 opposite effect to where that ends up being a
7 performance indicator. It's like my rixy (PH) system
8 is not looking good for the maintenance rule. So I
9 want to do as little outage time on that as I can to
10 bring my maintenance rule time, my outage time down
11 and get me back into a nice looking figure. So they
12 are managing the indicator instead of managing the
13 performance of it.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Interesting.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I wanted to ask you
16 a question. In terms of those examples that we are
17 looking at - and I think you are still thinking about
18 it - on that conservative versus a less conservative
19 push on the CRS level, have you seen instances where
20 the control room crew, the CRS and the NCOs and even
21 including the OS, are taking a position that might be
22 seen as more aggressive?

23 Can you flip that and have either the OS
24 or ops management come back with no, I think you need
25 to be a little more conservative or push back and

1 temper that more conservatively? Can you think of
2 anything along those lines?

3 [REDACTED] No, I can't.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you see it is
5 consistently going the other way.

6 [REDACTED] Going the other way. I
7 could definitely see where it's possible to go the
8 other way, but I can't think of any situation where
9 that has happened.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where it has.

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I want to just go off
13 the record briefly right now. It's approximately
14 11:41 a.m.

15 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
16 the record at 11:41 a.m. and went back on
17 the record at 4:37 p.m.)

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: On the record.
19 Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff. What follows
20 will be a continued interview that was interrupted at
21 approximately 11:40 a.m. on January 22 with [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED]. The time is now approximately 4:37 p.m.
23 What happened was we ran into some scheduling issues.
24 [REDACTED] returned to shift and agreed to come back
25 to complete this interview today.

1 So right now, it's approximately 4:37 p.m.
2 We had been asking about incidents regarding push from
3 senior management in a non-conservative direction.
4 You think you pretty much at that point offered what
5 you could recall. You still think that's the case.
6 You really haven't had an opportunity based on your
7 work on shift you said but right now you have nothing
8 further to add to that.

9 [REDACTED] That's correct.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We were also talking
11 about incidents where there was a push for
12 conservative. Senior management from the OS level and
13 above would be considered more conservative in their
14 thought than the rest of the control room crew. You
15 had no incidents. You couldn't think of any examples
16 of that.

17 [REDACTED]: That is correct.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you still have
19 nothing further to add to that. So what we were going
20 to get into is a couple of issues to ask you about.
21 What is the date of the furthest one out?

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you mean
23 the oldest?

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think most are 2003
25 incidents, right?

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Actually the
2 first one I was going to ask about is two issues
3 combined. It's from the March 2003 timeframe. It's
4 a problem with the turban (PH) bypass valve where
5 there was a forced outage. There was a number of
6 activities that were performed. I think there was
7 some diesel generator exhaust or RHR or some other
8 types of things like that.

9 Then during the start up, after the
10 generator was put on-line, the turban (PH) bypass
11 valves were tried to move in the shut direction. I
12 think a number of them had moved fine, but one of them
13 was held open. It became mechanically bound. That
14 happened over a Friday/Saturday timeframe. Then there
15 was a related problem in the same relative timeframe
16 on a Sunday. It was a reactivity management problem
17 with a slight over power condition.

18 [REDACTED] Right, I remember the
19 circumstances.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Were you
21 involved with either one of those?

22 [REDACTED] No, I can't remember whether
23 I was on a long weekend and off or whether I was in
24 training that week and that would have been my weekend
25 off.

1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

2 [REDACTED]: So I wasn't on shift that
3 weekend either days or nights.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: All right,
5 do you have anything you want to offer on those? Was
6 there anything that you heard?

7 [REDACTED]: No, I wasn't directly
8 involved. Most of what I got on the whole
9 circumstance was talking to some of the operators that
10 were on duty and then reading the tarp (PH) report
11 notification and reading the events on that. That's
12 probably most of my knowledge which is probably the
13 same as what you have.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, the
15 second issue would be there was a problem with the
16 diesel inner-cooler pump having a leak. It was in
17 June 2003. The leak occurred on a Sunday. There was
18 some assessment of the leak. It was determined to be
19 excessive. Then on Monday the diesel was declared
20 inoperable and a 72 hour LCO was entered, repair
21 activities was undertaken, and there were some shims
22 that were installed. Is any of this ringing a bell?

23 [REDACTED]: That specific one is vaguely
24 familiar. A lot of the diesels have had various
25 jacket water leaks either where the flange connections

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1 are or the pumps.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] Various times we have had
4 collection bottles collecting the jacket water leaks
5 off of them.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: For this
7 one, the magnitude was slightly larger and maybe got
8 even worse. It actually resulted in not only
9 exceeding the 72 hour timeframe but getting into the
10 12 hour to hot shut down timeframe.

11 [REDACTED]: Okay, yes, I do remember
12 that.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: There were
14 some significant delays in actually starting the shut
15 down. Do you have any insights to share on that?
16 Were you either on shift or work control?

17 [REDACTED] If I remember, they were
18 trying to get enforcement discretion on that to try to
19 delay the shut down.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have direct
21 involvement in that?


22 [REDACTED]: No, I didn't have any direct
23 involvement. I just vaguely remember that one.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You have good timing.

25 [REDACTED] I have a couple of them that

1 I have missed. I have been lucky.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Those are
3 the main ones. You mentioned an issue with the off
4 gas flow. You threw out some numbers. You threw out
5 150 SCFM. I don't know if you mentioned the spec of
6 75. Did you have any involvement with that issue when
7 that developed?

8  I caught the tail end of the
9 issue. During the initial vacuum pool when the off
10 gas flow was that high, it was recognized to be that
11 high and the NCOs kept questioning that. They were
12 uncomfortable with it knowing that there was a
13 problem. Something was malfunctioning. There was an
14 in leakage either at the steam jet or the condenser
15 itself. They wanted the issue resolved before we went
16 any further.

17 The push was to keep going with the plan.
18 I believe the justification was that the off gas
19 system was originally designed for two plants. And at
20 75 CFM each, it could handle 150, two of them. That's
21 what ops management had determined. I don't know
22 whether they got that from engineering or what they
23 have to back that up. That's what the went with.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you look
25 at any of the paperwork associated with whether there

1 was a notification?

2 [REDACTED]: Yes, there was a
3 notification. In fact, I just had a copy of that that
4 I looked at. I didn't think to bring that with me.
5 I do have a copy of that in my personal stuff.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you have
7 any thoughts on it? You have read it. Did it sound
8 reasonable?

9 [REDACTED]: No, I didn't think it was
10 reasonable. To us, it's a major problem. We
11 typically run anywhere from 30 to 40 cubic feet per
12 minute. When you have it running up around 70, that's
13 high. You have a problem. When it's running up over
14 100 and pushing 150, that's way out of where you
15 normally operate.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Has it ever
17 been up over 100?

18 [REDACTED]: It has been up over 100 but
19 usually for real short time periods. When we swap off
20 gas or swap steam jets, you're running a parallel
21 flow. You are starting to draw down and warm up the
22 incoming one. So there are short periods where it
23 might go up for a short period of time.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where it might even
25 be anticipated.

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1 [REDACTED] Right, usually that's
2 anticipated. And typically it goes up to a magnitude
3 of maybe about 70.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in this
5 situation, there was no explanation for it.

6 [REDACTED] No explanation, that's
7 correct.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What is it
9 today?

10 [REDACTED] Right now, I believe it's
11 running about 40.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, do you
13 consider that normal range?

14 [REDACTED] It's a little high. There's
15 in leakage somewhere but it's not that much. It's a
16 couple CFM so that's not significant for in leakage.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: We'll stay
18 with the off gas in leakage issue for a minute. If
19 this gets raised to management as this is something
20 that we really don't like the explanation here -- It
21 doesn't seem to be well supported. It doesn't seem to
22 be justified and plus it's negating the fact that we
23 really have a physical problem with the condenser.
24 We're getting in leakage from somewhere whether it's
25 through some installed piping or a valve that's

1 leaking or if there's actually a physical problem in
2 the structure where you are getting a gap somewhere or
3 a small hole or whatever. If that kind of issue is
4 raised in that regard, what kind of feedback do you
5 get? Is it we're checking it?

6 [REDACTED] Yes, that's basically what
7 we get. We're checking into it. We have a phone call
8 to engineering. Licensing is taking a look at it.
9 Those are typically the answers. We never get much in
10 the way of a final resolution. Now, the notification
11 for that particular one was submitted as a
12 significance level one notification.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

14 [REDACTED]: I believe it was on the
15 night shift that it was initiated. The corrective
16 action group has a morning meeting where they go over
17 the notification. By the morning, it got downgraded
18 to a level two. Then shortly after that - and I don't
19 know if it was days or a week - it got downgraded to
20 a level three notification.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was in the
22 corrective action group?

23 [REDACTED]: The only name that jumps out
24 at me now is [REDACTED] (PH).

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that a fixed group

1 or does that change?

2 [REDACTED] That's a fixed group. Where
3 something like that would either get upgraded to a two
4 or a one or downgraded from a one or a two, there's a
5 morning managers meeting. So it would actually be the
6 department managers that would have the input into it
7 to downgrade it. So it's not necessarily the people
8 in corrective action. They are the ones that actually
9 do the physical manipulations in the computer that
10 downgrade it and put the explanation in. It would be
11 the managers from the managers meeting that determines
12 that.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Which would be a
14 combination of what, maintenance, engineering,
15 operations?

16 [REDACTED] Operations.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that was reviewed
18 and decided to downgrade it at that level.

19 [REDACTED] Yes.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The notification in
21 this case, who was that written by?

22 [REDACTED] It was written by [REDACTED]
23 (PH).

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The [REDACTED] who raised
25 their concerns about it, do you know who they were?

1 [REDACTED] It was [REDACTED] (PH) who
2 was the [REDACTED].

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: More than him though?

4 [REDACTED]: Yes, and I don't remember
5 who he was on shift with at the time.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, do you have
7 anything further on the off gas?

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No.


9 [REDACTED] Now, as far as the start ups
10 that I brought up, one of the ones in particular I
11 brought up was the September one where we came down
12 from the hurricane. The turn around time on that I
13 thought was quick considering the magnitude of what
14 happened. We lost half the switch yard. The problems
15 that we encountered on the way up, I had a lot of
16 reservations about starting it up.

17 I addressed them to my control room
18 supervisor, the shift manager, and even the new plant
19 manager. I said nobody is convinced me that this
20 plant is ready to start up. Then I gave him specific
21 examples. I felt really uncomfortable coming in that
22 night getting ready to take the reactor critical with
23 a lot of control rod problems.

24 I grabbed the turnover sheet from today.
25 A lot of these problems still exist. We're going to

1 take the reactor critical. At the time, there were
2 five control rods that had excessive withdraw speeds.
3 They engineered those away as not being a problem.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you know
5 how fast they were?

6  The exact speeds, I don't
7 remember. They may not be that bad in a normal
8 situation, but when you are using that control rod to
9 pull a critical and it's withdrawing fast, I'm not
10 comfortable with that. At the same time, some of the
11 nuclear instrumentation was inoperable. One of the
12 four SRMs were inoperable.

13 We actually had two they had a lot of
14 problem with. The Charlie and Delta SRMs have been
15 problems for the last couple of years. They go back
16 and forth on which one is operable and which one is
17 inoperable. In fact, right now I believe the Delta
18 was just declared operable but degraded.

19 But we always seem to find a way to
20 declare enough of the SRMs operable to start up tech
21 spec-wise. But we started up with one SRM inoperable
22 and another one acting erratically. It was giving us
23 short period alarms. We have eight IRMs. Two of
24 those were out.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Which start

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1 up was this, the recent start up?

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: September.

3 [REDACTED] The one in September.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay,
5 September.

6 [REDACTED] We had two of the eight IRMs
7 inoperable. When you get over to the APRMs, the LPRM
8 inputs, we had 16 LPRM inputs to our APRMs inoperable.
9 So tech spec-wise it was all allowable. We had the
10 minimum number of SRMs and the minimum number per
11 channel IRMs. All the APRMs were operable because
12 they had their minimum number of LPRM inputs. But
13 there was a lot of nuclear instrumentation that was
14 inoperable for that start up.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was
16 that attributed to?

17 [REDACTED] They were all various
18 problems. A lot of the NI equipment is old. It's
19 difficult to get parts for them anymore. How they are
20 resolving that issue long-term, I don't know. But the
21 nuclear instrumentation, all of it, LPRMs, SRMs, IRMs,
22 are very difficult to keep operable.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you are at minimum
24 numbers in a number of categories plus five control
25 rods that are withdrawing at excessive speed. TC

1 [REDACTED] Yes.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was the response
3 when you raised that concern? What did you get back?
4 You said you went all the way up to, was it [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Your [REDACTED].

7 [REDACTED] Now, I didn't schedule a
8 meeting with him and go in and talk to him. He
9 happened to be on the night shift observing the start
10 up. I told him that I wasn't comfortable with the
11 start up. There's nobody that has convinced me that
12 the plant is ready to start up.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's go a step at a
14 time. Who did you take it to first and express your
15 concerns to?

16 [REDACTED] It started at the shift
17 turnover meeting. Because of the amount of activities
18 that were going on in the control room, instead of
19 doing individual turnovers first, we all met in the
20 back of the control room and had the off going shift
21 manager give a turnover brief explaining where we were
22 and what we were doing. I brought all of these issues
23 up directly to him.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that?

25 [REDACTED] (PH). But also I

1 believe [REDACTED] (PH) was on. I know he was [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] at the time. I'm not positive whether
3 he was in that night or not. I know I brought it on
4 to [REDACTED] also.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

6 [REDACTED]: But I brought that issue up
7 in the whole group of [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED] as well as the [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED]

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How did they respond
11 to that?

12 [REDACTED]: They responded that they had
13 engineering positions on all of the control rods.
14 They took one of the thermal limits. They decided to
15 take an administrative penalty for the micper (PH) for
16 excessive control rod speeds. So they handled that
17 administratively. As far as the nuclear
18 instrumentation, they just quoted tech specs that we
19 meet our minimum. We had the minimum by tech specs
20 for SRMs and IRMs.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Were those
22 at the minimums, or were those a little higher? Well,
23 the SRMs sound like they were at their minimum.

24 [REDACTED]: SRMs were at their minimum.
25 IRMs were at their minimum. The LPRMs weren't at the

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1 minimum.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So they explained why
4 you were able to handle it with each of these
5 degrading categories.


6  Right.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you been in a
8 position like that before? Have you seen a start up
9 with this much of your instrumentation missing?

10  No, and I don't remember
11 ever doing a start up with control rods with excessive
12 withdrawal speeds. We always do speed time testing.
13 Any ones that were known to be problems or any ACU
14 maintenance or control rod maintenance that we do
15 during a shut down or during a refuel outage we always
16 do speed time testing.

17 The procedure for that actually has us
18 time the insert and withdrawal. It has the
19 specifications for it. We make adjustments based on
20 how they come out. What happened with these was they
21 tried to adjust them and ran out of adjustment. There
22 was no adjustment left on them.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So they were stuck
24 excessive.

25  Right, we're still looking

1 at that. That was five. We're up to seven now.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I think I
3 already asked you this but let me just make sure. On
4 any of these, you don't have any idea what their
5 relative speeds were. I'll tell you the reason I'm
6 asking this. This is an area that I have particular
7 interest in.

8 I actually was involved in one of the
9 original findings back here in '96. But I know that
10 because of that there was some changing of reference
11 points to actually make them more conservative. What
12 I'm curious is if they are characterizing using the
13 more conservative band. It may have actually been
14 acceptable with the old band.

15 [REDACTED] With the newer spec, it's
16 out of that tolerance.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It could be.
18 That's why I was just curious if you knew more about
19 that.

20 [REDACTED]: No, I don't.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, but
22 you make a good point though. You are talking about
23 SRMs. You say you have three operable which is the
24 minimum. Well, one of them is questionable. You have
25 six of eight IRMs and then a number of inputs that are

1 inoperable, APRMs.

2 [REDACTED] Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So what happens next
4 after the briefing where you get an explanation for
5 each of the pieces that you are operating without?
6 What happens next? Is it that you run into [REDACTED] or
7 do you go to another level?

8 [REDACTED] No, I ran into him. He was
9 oncoming. They had operations management doing
10 oversight on day shift and night shift for the start
11 up. [REDACTED] (PH) is the [REDACTED] now.
12 He was the [REDACTED] at the time. He was
13 covering day shift. [REDACTED] was covering the night
14 shift. That was probably his first or second week
15 that he was actually on the job.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I would think, yes.
17 [REDACTED] I expressed to him that I
18 was not comfortable with the start up and that nobody
19 could convince me that the plant was ready to start
20 up. Those are the specific issues I remember. There
21 were a lot of other equipment problems I believe in
22 feed water heaters and there might have been a few
23 others. I don't remember the specifics of those right
24 now. But it was more than just that, the nuclear end
25 of it. There was balance and plan issues that I also

1 had a problem with.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, what was
3 [REDACTED] response to you?

4 [REDACTED] He actually had absolutely
5 none. I really couldn't even gage a change of
6 expression on his face either.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Any action?

8 [REDACTED] No.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You mean all
10 this stuff is still broken.

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Today? This
13 is from September through today.

14 [REDACTED] Like I said, I grabbed this
15 turnover sheet. This is from this morning.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

17 [REDACTED] As far as the nuclear
18 instrumentation, this past start up that we just did,
19 the Charlie and Delta were inoperable again. The
20 Charlie, they figured there's really not a problem
21 with it. We kept getting short period alarms on it,
22 but as far as the SRM count rates, it seemed to be
23 indicating. It seemed to be steady and consistent.
24 They can't explain the short period alarms that we
25 were getting. So they declared that one operable.

1 The Delta right now is considered operable but
2 degraded. There's a operability determination on that
3 one right now.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That's the
5 one for electromagnetic interference.

6 [REDACTED]: Yes, I believe. But out of
7 the initial five excessive withdrawal control rods, we
8 have added two more so we're up to seven on those.
9 All of them with --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So it's the same five
11 plus two.

12 [REDACTED]: Plus two more. All with a
13 inoperability determination against them.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you see it have
15 an effect on the start up at that timeframe? In terms
16 of difficulty, I'm sure there's some monitoring or
17 whatever. But what effect does that have as you go
18 through it or did it have?

19 [REDACTED]: Where we ended up going
20 critical was not one of these control rods. It worked
21 out to where it wasn't a problem.


22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: By chance?

23 [REDACTED]: I think by chance. Some of
24 them were pulled prior to criticality. That is one of
25 the responses that I got when I brought that up during

1 the turnover meeting that I think two or three of them
2 were part of the first two groups of control rods to
3 be withdrawn.

4 So they would have been done prior to
5 criticality. They weren't expected to be a problem.
6 There were a couple other ones that were close to
7 criticality that could have been a problem. As it
8 turned out, we did not go critical on any of these
9 rods.


10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Were those
11 early rods pulled to 48?

12 : Yes.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So they got
14 pulled once or did you have to go around?

15 : No, they will get pulled all
16 the way out to 48 so there's not a whole lot of
17 concern with those.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: All right.

19 : And as far as the speeds
20 themselves, they might not be that far out of the
21 allowable bands. My concern was double-notching. The
22 way the timer cards work, as I'm withdrawing it, there
23 was a good potential to go out an extra notch from
24 where I intended it to which when you are on the
25 approach to criticality and right after criticality

1 can be very difficult to handle.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything else? Any
3 other effects?

4 [REDACTED] No, not that I can think of.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything
6 further on that, Scott?

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No, it
8 sounds like you certainly told the shift. You told
9 [REDACTED] Did anyone get back to you after the fact
10 to acknowledge your concerns?

11 [REDACTED] No.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did they ask
13 you to write up a notification on the issues? Or was
14 it that there were already notifications written?

15 [REDACTED] Typically there's
16 notifications against all of these anyway. On several
17 occasions, I have written up a notification addressing
18 problems that are already identified. You have a
19 problem with this which is not a big deal. This one
20 here by itself isn't a big deal. And this one here by
21 itself isn't a big deal. But nobody is looking at the
22 fact that all three of these problems together are
23 causing a bigger impact.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Wouldn't
25 that be sufficient to warrant writing a notification?

1 Couldn't you have written one to say although these
2 problems individually may not appear to be that
3 significant, in the aggregate, under start up
4 conditions, this is having a significant impact on our
5 confidence in being able to control start up or
6 something? I don't know. Would something like that
7 even get discussed? Is that something you think
8 about?

9 [REDACTED] Yes, that is something that
10 I would think about. Chances are, that night and the
11 next couple of nights I never had the chance to write
12 up the notification. Then once you go a couple of
13 days beyond that, you are up in start up to where it
14 seems like you are way beyond a problem.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You are beyond it.

16 [REDACTED]: Based on some of the other
17 things I have seen, there's probably not going to be
18 a resolution to it. You almost get apathetic to where
19 you feel you are wasting your time.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, that's
21 an insight. If you are getting apathetic, although
22 that's not something we desire, it's an impact of not
23 fixing the problem.

24 [REDACTED] Right, and there's a lot of
25 frustrated operators that have scaled down on writing

1 notifications just for that reason. You start
2 identifying problems. The tracking tool that we use
3 right now, SAP, is very difficult. Once you put in a
4 notification to try and go through and track, all the
5 numbers change.

6 You have to go through different suborders
7 and activities to figure out what happened to it.
8 There's times you could spend a half an hour to do the
9 research trail to figure out where it went. Then you
10 find out that basically your notification got closed
11 out with no corrective action, no activity taken. So
12 you get frustrated.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You start not to put
14 the time in to address these things. It would be seen
15 as a waste is what you are saying.

16 [REDACTED]: Right.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: We're
18 talking about a start up that occurred in September,
19 as you described today, after the plant scram (PH)
20 from the hurricane.

21 [REDACTED]: Right.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Hasn't there
23 been two start ups since then? Wasn't there one in
24 December? There was a forced outage because of a
25 secondary steam leak and some other things. It might

1 have been also for the drywall leakage problem. And
2 then a recent one.

3 [REDACTED]: Yes, there was just one last
4 week.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: There was a
6 problem with a feed pump too but I don't know if it
7 got tied into that. Were these issues still issues
8 during those start ups?

9 [REDACTED]: Yes.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Different
11 people starting up then.

12 [REDACTED]: Right.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did they
14 right notifications on the effect of the aggregate
15 impact of all of the equipment?

16 [REDACTED]: I do not know.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Does it come
18 up in discussion? Do you talk amongst the shifts? Do
19 you say I did the start up and all this stuff was
20 broken and this is really unusual? Why isn't it
21 fixed? Does that kind of stuff come up at all?

22 [REDACTED]: It comes up. Like I said,
23 we're all pretty much in the same boat that we have
24 been identifying things for a long period of time.
25 We're not seeing a resolution on it. We're not seeing

1 fixes.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] Now, I don't believe it was
4 the September start up. It was one after that where
5 I wasn't on shift for the initial criticality. But I
6 think I came in maybe the following shift or two
7 shifts later and ended up being the [REDACTED]
8 I had a lot of problem with stuck control rods. I had
9 brought that up earlier about not taking the time to
10 exercise control rods. [REDACTED] that up. That did get
11 a lot of attention.

12 I know there's some long-term fixes. I
13 know [REDACTED] (PH) is doing corrective actions right
14 now. I know he's working that issue and a lot of
15 other issues. A lot of it is what I'm talking about
16 now as far as we feel that nothing is getting fixed.
17 So he's working that. Now, where he's at with that,
18 I don't know. But I know he's addressing it.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

20 [REDACTED] Whether it's going further
21 beyond him, I don't know. But it does seem since that
22 start up we have spent a lot more time exercising
23 control rods. We have made it clear that if we don't
24 exercise them it's going to cause us problems. Let's
25 take the time to exercise the control rods. So the

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1 last couple of start ups have been smooth from a stuck
2 control rod position because of that. But it took
3 ranting and raving on my part to get it to that.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You said not the
5 start up in September but the one after that.

6 [REDACTED]: The one after that.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So December?

8 [REDACTED]: I know the December one was
9 fairly smooth. The one that we just did last week was
10 fairly smooth as far as stuck rods.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But all this
12 other stuff was still inoperable.

13 [REDACTED]: I think the IRMs we got
14 resolved and some of the LPRMs. The SRMs are still a
15 problem.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: The IRMs are
17 resolved.

18 [REDACTED]: The IRMs are resolved.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: How many
20 LPRMs were there?

21 [REDACTED]: At that start up, there were
22 16. I think we have gotten it down to as low as six.
23 We're back up to about eight or nine right now.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So there's
25 been some progress made.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Could I get a copy of
2 that, [REDACTED] too before you go?

3 [REDACTED] You can have that.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thanks. Do you have
5 anything else on that, Scott?

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have we have covered
8 the incidents as far as what you wanted to bring up?

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I think so.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think we have
11 covered where I was going too.

12 [REDACTED] I do have one thing I wanted
13 to say. You asked me if I had ever been discouraged
14 from writing notifications from management. I will
15 still stick to the fact that I don't think I have
16 personally been discouraged from writing them. The
17 [REDACTED] right now, [REDACTED] (PH), who
18 was the [REDACTED] some of the notifications
19 that I have written have caused him a lot of pain.
20 But even with that, he sent a message through my shift
21 manager to tell me to keep writing them. In that
22 situation at least with him, he has encouraged me.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In what way do you
24 think they cause him pain?

25 [REDACTED]: When I talk about

1 management's failure to address problems and to
2 correct problems.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What you had
4 mentioned earlier.

5 [REDACTED] Yes, stuff like that.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where it puts the
7 break down in that position.

8 [REDACTED] Right, it usually runs up
9 the chain. It might get up to the VP level. Then it
10 comes back down. It's an operations issue. It's an
11 operator that's identifying it so it has to be a
12 problem with operations which means it's the ops
13 manager's fault.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

15 [REDACTED] He has felt pain that way.
16 But even with that, he still encourages me to write
17 the notifications. I don't think that all management
18 discourages notifications.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Has that
20 message been a consistent message?

21 [REDACTED] From [REDACTED] yes.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Since he's
23 been here, it's been --

24 [REDACTED] He's been pretty even keel.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that to you or is

1 that across the board?

2 [REDACTED] I can't say for anybody
3 else. I don't know. I can't say one way or another.

4 I don't know.

5 ~~SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you somebody who~~
6 raises more concerns than the average individual?

7 [REDACTED] I think so.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So he is responding
9 to that to you.

10 [REDACTED] I would say probably myself,

11 [REDACTED] (PH) and [REDACTED] (PH) probably raise
12 more issues than anybody.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and you get
14 ~~positive feedback, continue to do so. You might not~~
15 like the results, but you are getting the feedback to
16 you continue to input.

17 [REDACTED]: Yes, from [REDACTED] I never got
18 that from anybody else. I have gotten that from [REDACTED]

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He's your [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] He's the current [REDACTED] The
21 management chain, the change that we have gone through
22 from control room supervisors to superintendents to
23 managers and VPs, I can't even remember half of their
24 names. That's how fast people cycle through here in
25 the last couple of years.

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: [REDACTED] been fairly
2 constant though, hasn't he?

3 [REDACTED] Yes, he was a [REDACTED]

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He's been around for
5 a bit. How about when [REDACTED] (PH) was here? He
6 didn't leave so long ago. Did you get that kind of
7 reinforcement from him?

8 [REDACTED] No.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you get negative
10 responses from him?

11 [REDACTED] I wouldn't say negative but
12 not positive. I never got positive. That's a real
13 difficult question to answer. I'm not sure.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Nothing stands out in
15 your mind that says I'm encouraging you to continue to
16 do this.

17 [REDACTED] Right.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But you can't
19 remember any kind of adverse actions or negative push
20 back or anything like that.

21 [REDACTED] No.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about at other
23 levels of management? Do you see any concerns there
24 in terms of fostering this particular aspect of a
25 safety conscious work environment, concern raising and

1 handling?

2 [REDACTED] Right now, it's too soon to
3 tell because we have a brand new ops manager and a
4 brand new plant manager and a brand new senior VP of
5 operations.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A whole new
7 structure.

8 [REDACTED] So I can't say.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I would like to ask
10 you in you just sitting here and hearing the kinds of
11 issues that we have been exploring and the direction
12 we're going with this, is there anything that you see
13 that impacts the safe operations of the plant that we
14 either are not discussing, we have missed, or we're
15 not asking you about?

16 [REDACTED] No, in fact, right now, I
17 don't have any specific safety concerns or nuclear
18 safety issues.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

20 [REDACTED] That's one of the questions
21 that [REDACTED] (PH) asked me directly, if I had one.
22 He said if you do just let me know and I will
23 immediately raise that up to the next level.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When was that?

25 [REDACTED] When [REDACTED] the

1 notification up about the control rod problems, the
2 stuck control rods on the start up.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So in the start up
4 between September and December there, that start up.

5  Yes.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: One thing
7 that we talked about a little bit - I don't know if we
8 fully developed it or not - is the deregulated
9 environment causing a lot of this? What kind of
10 impact does that have on the way you run the station
11 and the kinds of questions you ask? In one instance,
12 maybe in the old way of doing things, you would ask is
13 it safe?

14 Now, you may ask something like why can we
15 do that? Challenging the we would never do this
16 before but now we're like this, like what you
17 indicated here with the start up. You have this out
18 of service and that. One thing that we struggle with
19 is whether the pressures are excessive; the production
20 pressures, the pressures for generation. What is your
21 take on that?

22  I think they are. I don't
23 know that they are not self-imposed. The push to get
24 started up on time or early seems to be there. The
25 push to get the full power even without all of the

1 normal equipment that you would need, all the feed
2 pumps in service, seems to be there. I don't know if
3 that's coming from Newark. I don't know if that's
4 coming from the VP. I have no idea where that push is
5 coming from, but it seems to be self-imposed.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, can
7 you recall a time where you felt like it wasn't that
8 way? Obviously deregulation hasn't been around for 20
9 years. It's something that's been relatively recent.
10 You have been an [REDACTED] for a fairly long time. Do
11 you recall a feeling of just a total different
12 operating philosophy and then some very distinct
13 change? Could that distinct change be tied to a
14 management change or tied to deregulation or things of
15 that nature? Does anything stand out in your mind in
16 that respect?

17 [REDACTED] No, and I never saw it
18 happen like an overnight change. It wasn't a drastic,
19 swift change. It was more gradual. It happened the
20 same time deregulation happened. It also happened the
21 first big upper management change out that we had.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In what year?

23 [REDACTED]: It would have been about
24 '96.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This goes back to

1 where you noted the behavioral differences in the CRS
2 and the OS level.

3 [REDACTED] Right, it would be about the
4 same time. That's where the first big upper
5 management change occurred.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think you explained
7 that you have seen it pretty consistent since that
8 time.

9 [REDACTED] Since then, yes.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anything further?

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I just have some
14 closing questions for you. Have I or any other NRC
15 representative offered you any promises of reward or
16 threatened you in any manner in exchange for today's
17 information?

18 [REDACTED] No.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you appeared
20 here freely and voluntarily?


21 [REDACTED] Yes, I have.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything
23 else you would like to add at this point?

24 [REDACTED] No, I don't.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I'll thank you. We

1 have taken a very large piece of your time today.
2 It's approximately 5:20 p.m. I thank you for your
3 time.

4  Okay.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: ^{TC} Thank you for your
6 assistance with this. Off the record.

7 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
8 concluded at 5:20 p.m.)
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