



June 21, 2006

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EA-03-009

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Palisades Nuclear Plant
Docket 50-255
License No. DPR-20

60-Day Report Per First Revised Order EA-03-009

- References: 1) "Issuance of First Revised Order (EA-03-009) Establishing Interim Inspection Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Heads at Pressurized Water Reactors," dated February 20, 2004*
- 2) Letter from NMC to NRC, "Response to Revised Order EA-03-009, 'Issuance of First Revised NRC Order (EA-03-009) Establishing Interim Inspection Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Heads at Pressurized Water Reactors,'" dated March 8, 2004*

By letter dated February 20, 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Order EA-03-009 (Reference 1). By letter dated March 8, 2004, Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) consented to the Order for the Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) (Reference 2).

Section IV.E, of Reference 1, required that inspection results be provided within 60 days after returning the plant to operation after refueling. NMC completed the required inspections during the spring refueling outage, and PNP was returned to service on May 10, 2006. Enclosure 1 provides details of the inspection results.

Summary of Commitments

This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June 21, 2006.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Paul A. Harden", with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Paul A. Harden
Site Vice President, Palisades Nuclear Plant
Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Enclosure (1)

CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC
Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC

ENCLOSURE 1 PNP INSPECTION RESULTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

During the 2004 refueling outage, Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) performed its first nonvisual examination of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head in accordance with Section IV.C(2) of the First Revised Order, EA-03-009, "Issuance of First Revised Order (EA-03-009) Establishing Interim Inspection Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Heads at Pressurized Water Reactors." The inspection of the RPV head penetrations identified two leak path detection indications on penetrations 29 and 30. The two penetrations were repaired during the 2004 refueling outage using the AREVA ID temper bead repair process. As a result, the RPV head was placed into the high susceptibility category per Section IV.B of the revised Order. Therefore, PNP was required to perform examinations per the requirements of Section IV.C.(1) of the revised Order during both the 2004 and the 2006 refueling outages.

PNP was returned to operation from the 2006 refueling outage on May 10, 2006. During the refueling outage, the reactor vessel head and head penetration nozzles were inspected using the techniques of paragraph IV.C.(5)(a) and paragraph IV.C.(5)(b) of the revised Order

2.0 DESCRIPTION OF INSPECTION METHODS

The examinations were performed by qualified AREVA personnel using qualified procedures. The inspection included performing ultrasonic examinations from the inner diameter (ID) of the nozzle, for all 54 of the RPV head penetrations. Additionally, a small portion of the ICI nozzle below the J-groove weld was ultrasonically examined from the outer diameter to ensure that the required examination volume was achieved. The RPV head vent line penetration was also examined by eddy current on the surface of the J-groove weld. The vent line does not extend below the RPV head inside surface. Additionally, the bare metal visual inspection was performed by direct visual examination.

3.0 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL HEAD INSPECTION RESULTS

Bare Metal Visual Exam

A bare metal visual examination was performed of the reactor vessel surface including 360 degrees around each RPV head penetration. This inspection showed no signs of leakage.

Non Visual Examinations

a) CRDM and ICI Penetrations

The ultrasonic examination of the nozzle penetrations was performed to look for evidence of cracking in the nozzle base material. Additionally, the interference fit region of the nozzles was evaluated for evidence of a leak path that might be caused by cracking of the J-groove weld. No cracking or leak path indications were observed.

b) Vent Line Penetration

The RPV head vent line penetration base metal was examined by ultrasonic techniques and the surface of the J-groove weld was examined by eddy current techniques. The vent line does not extend below the RPV head inside surface. No flaw indications were detected during the examinations.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

NMC has complied with the requirements of the First Revised Order for the 2006 refueling outage. Based on the results of the examinations performed during the refueling outage, NMC concluded that the RPV head penetrations that were returned to service were not degraded, and no wastage of the RPV head occurred.