


# Management of Severe Accident Phenomena in the ESBWR Design

Rick Wachowiak  
Engineering Lead for ESBWR PRA  
General Electric

Regulatory Information Conference 2006  
Severe Accident Research  
Session T2BC  
March 7, 2006



# Treatment of Severe Accidents

Severe Accidents in ESBWR are Remote and Speculative

- > Core Damage Frequency  $\square 10^{-8}$  per year
- > Could be treated as Residual Risk

GE Designs for Defense-In-Depth

- > Assessed full complement of severe accident threats
- > Determined and Enhanced ESBWR capabilities

Result:

ESBWR Containment Failure is Physically Unreasonable

# Severe Accident Threats and Failure Modes Resolved in ESBWR Design

## Direct Containment Heating (DCH)

- > No energetic failure of upper drywell
- > No liner failure in upper drywell
- > Fission products contained during potential local failures of lower drywell liner


## Ex-Vessel Explosions (EVE)

- > Pedestal or BiMAC failure can occur only with deep subcooled pools of water in lower drywell
- > ESBWR design resists formation of deep pools (~1% of CDF)


## Basemat Melt Penetration (BMP)

- > BiMAC thermal failure due to burnout, dryout, or penetration is physically unreasonable

# ESBWR Containment Highlights



# GE Introduces the Basemat internal Melt Arrest and Coolability (BiMAC) Device



# Basemat Melt Penetration (BMP)

## Assessment of BiMAC Thermal Failure due to Burnout or Dryout

### Key Bounding Ingredients:

- > Average thermal loads from full-core pools at bounding decay power levels
- > Bounding local peaking of loads from verified CFD calculations
- > Lower bounds of CHF from ULPU pool boiling experiments
- > No flow-stability, or boil-off issues, found using a two-phase flow model that was verified using inclined-channel data from the SULTAN experiments
- > Full floor area coverage—the melt has no other place to go but inside the BiMAC.
- > Confirmatory full scale BiMAC tests during COL stage

**BiMAC Thermal Failure is Physically Unreasonable**

# Average Thermal Loads and Peaking Factors


## BiMAC Thermal Capacity a Function of Melt Pool Height and Resulting Average Heat Fluxes

- ❖ 100% core decay power at ~6 hr into the accident
- ❖ Bounding scenarios
  - $\leq 100$  kW/m<sup>2</sup> downward heat flux
  - $\leq 350$  kW/m<sup>2</sup> sideward heat flux

## Power Split and Peaking Factors from Direct Numerical Simulations

- ❖ Downward peaking: 3.0
- ❖ Sideward Peaking: 1.4


# The Peaking at the Edge of Near-Edge Channels is the most Limiting






# Coolability Limits for BiMAC

Applicability based on similarity of geometries and flow/heating regimes




# Thermal Loads vs Coolability Limits in BiMAC Channels




- ❖ Based on ULPU data
- ❖ Margins to be verified by new experiments at full scale

# BiMAC Operating Range

## Natural Convection in BiMAC



## Thermal Margins for BiMAC



No Flow Instability

No Danger of Dryout

- ❖ Operating range to be optimized through new experiments at full scale

# ESBWR Containment Failure is Physically Unreasonable

## Severe Accidents in ESBWR are Remote and Speculative

- > Core Damage Frequency  $\square 10^{-8}$  per year
- > Could be treated as Residual Risk

## GE Designs for Defense-In-Depth

- > Assessed full complement of severe accident threats
- > Determined and Enhanced ESBWR capabilities
- > Verified by a full ROAAM treatment

NEDO-33201 Section 21 Contains Complete Details of these Analyses