


U.S. EPR Pre-Application Review Meeting: Overview of Generic Technical Specifications

***AREVA NP Inc. and the NRC
May 31, 2006***



Introduction

Sandra M. Sloan
Manager, Regulatory Affairs
New Plants Deployment



Meeting Objectives

- > Provide an overview of plant design criteria and unique design features important to generic Technical Specifications (TS) development**
- > Provide an overview of U.S. EPR generic TS development process**
- > Obtain early NRC feedback associated with the U.S. EPR generic TS development plans**

- > **U.S. EPR plant background (Sloan)**


- > **Plant design criteria and unique design features important to generic TS development (Burzynski)**

- > **U.S. EPR generic TS development process (Sharpe)**


- > **Summary and next steps (Sloan)**

U.S. EPR Plant Summary


- > Evolutionary 4-loop PWR design proven by decades of design, licensing and operating experience
- > Rated power level is 1600 MWe (~4590 MWt)
- > Main components enlarged to increase operating margin in many transients and accidents
- > Four-train safety systems
- > Shield building and steel-lined pre-stressed concrete containment



EPR General Plant Layout




EPR General Plant Layout



U. S. EPR Plant Design Process Overview

- > Systematic process is being applied to prepare the design for U.S. deployment
 - ◆ Olkiluoto 3 (OL3) design under construction in Finland
 - ◆ Conversion to U.S. design codes and standards
 - ◆ Compliance with NRC regulations and QA requirements
- > Address U.S. operating experience
- > Use of AREVA's world-wide experience in design development and standardization
- > On track for December 2007 design certification submittal

EPR Design Conversion




General Overview of the OL3 Site




Lifting of OL3 Containment Liner Cup (1/3)



Lifting of OL3 Containment Liner Cup (2/3)



Lifting of OL3 Containment Liner Cup (3/3)






***U.S. EPR Plant Design Criteria
and Unique Design Features
Important to Generic Technical
Specification Development***

***Mark Burzynski
Regulatory Affairs***

N+2 Design Philosophy for Fluid Systems

- > **Required accident mitigation (N)**
 - ◆ One train injects to mitigate an accident
 - ◆ Injection from a second train is assumed lost due to initiating event
- > **Single failure criterion (N+1)**
 - ◆ A third train is lost to an assumed single failure
- > **U.S. EPR design (N+2)**
 - ◆ A fourth train can be removed from service without affecting safety functions
- > **Examples include the safety injection, emergency feedwater, component cooling water, and essential service water systems**

Typical N+2 Fluid System



**Four independent 100% trains for fluid systems
with each injecting into a single RCS loop**

Safety Systems in Four Redundant Buildings



***Each safety train is independent and located
within a physically separate building***

N+2 Design Philosophy for Ventilation Systems

- > **Required accident mitigation (N)**
 - ◆ **Two trains (2 x 50% capability) required to mitigate an accident**
- > **Single failure criterion (N+1)**
 - ◆ **A third train is lost to an assumed single failure**
- > **U. S. EPR design (N+2)**
 - ◆ **A fourth train can be removed from service without affecting safety functions**
- > **Example systems include main control room air conditioning system and safeguards building controlled area ventilation system**

N+2 Design Philosophy for Electrical System

- > **Required accident mitigation (N)**
 - ◆ One train to power each of the two trains of pumps required to support ECCS injection train
- > **Single failure criterion (N+1)**
 - ◆ A third train is lost due to an assumed single failure
- > **U. S. EPR design (N+2)**
 - ◆ A fourth train can be removed from service without affecting safety functions
 - ◆ Power for instrumentation and containment isolation valves provided via redundant power feeds to the low voltage load centers, which preserve sufficient train independence and separation

N+2 Design Philosophy for Protection (I&C) System

- > **Required protection actuation (N)**
 - ◆ Actuation signals in two channels are required for protective function
- > **Single failure criterion (N+1)**
 - ◆ A third channel is lost to an assumed single failure
- > **U. S. EPR design (N+2)**
 - ◆ A fourth channel can be removed from service without affecting safety functions

Current Plans for Treatment of N+2 Systems in U.S. EPR Generic Technical Specifications

- > LCOs for four train (N+2) systems based on three required safety trains (N+1)**
- > Requirements for a fourth train not planned for inclusion**
- > Reliability and availability of a fourth train to be controlled by Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65)**

N+2 design allows one train to be removed from service without affecting safety functions

Current Plans for Treatment of Severe Accident Mitigation Features

- > **Consistent with treatment of similar systems for operating plants, 'Beyond Design Basis' mitigation features not included in U.S. EPR Generic TS unless specifically required by 10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 4**
 - ◆ **Examples include SBO diesel generators, containment spray system, and extra boration system**


- > **Reliability and availability of severe accident management systems will be controlled by Maintenance Rule**

- > **RTNSS only required for passive designs**

Severe accident management systems not expected to be included in Technical Specifications

Partial Cooldown System for SBLOCA and SGTR

- > N+2 safety-related system
- > Depressurizes SGs to reduce T_{sat} at 180°F/hr
- > Ensures adequate MHSI flow for SBLOCA and SGTR
- > Meets 10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 3




Partial Trip for Operational Transients

- > Symmetric group of rods dropped into core for fast power reductions for plant operational transients where rapid runback is desired to avoid reactor trip**
- > Partial trip function is not safety-related (does not meet 10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 3)**
 - ◆ Instead, impact on actions statements for Criterion 2 parameters (e.g., rod alignment and power distribution) will be assessed**

Reactor Control, Surveillance and Limitation System

- > **Implements automatic functions, manual actions, and monitoring functions to control and limit the reactor and nuclear steam supply system parameters:**
 - ◆ **Core related parameters (i.e., reactor power, power density, reactivity)**
 - ◆ **RCS parameters (i.e., RCS pressure, pressurizer level, RCS temperature, RCS loop level)**
 - ◆ **Nuclear steam supply system parameters (steam generator level)**
- > **RCSL system does not meet 10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 3**
 - ◆ **Instead, RCSL will be used in lieu of specific manual surveillances for criterion 2 parameters in TS Sections 3.1 (Reactivity Control) and 3.2 (Power Distribution)**
 - ◆ **Alternate surveillances will be defined when RCSL is out of service**



***U.S. EPR Generic Technical
Specification
Development Plan***

***Robert Sharpe
Engineering Integration***

Use of Standard Industry Templates

- > **NUREG 1431 Rev. 3.1, *Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants***
 - ◆ **Most appropriate template**
 - ◆ **Largest experience base**
 - ◆ **Most relevant content**
 - ◆ **Modified to reflect U.S. EPR-specific design and analyses**
- > **NUREG 1432 Rev. 3.1, *Standard Technical Specifications for Combustion Engineering Plants (Digital)***
 - ◆ **Digital instrumentation in reactivity control (3.1), power distribution (3.2), and protection instrumentation (3.3)**
- > **Industry Standard Writer's Guide**
 - ◆ **TSTF-GG-05-01, *Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Technical Specifications***

U.S. EPR TS development plan is based on standard industry guidance documents

Current Plans for Use of Industry Experience with ITS

- > **Incorporate additional TSTF travelers approved by NRC that are available six months prior to DCD submittal**
 - ◆ **Correction of errors and ambiguous language**
 - ◆ **Incorporation of operating improvements**
 - ◆ **Resolution of regulatory issues**
 - ◆ **Industry risk-informed TS initiatives**

Development Process

- > **Modify applicable NUREG TS and Bases to be consistent with U.S. EPR design and analyses**
- > **Apply 10 CFR 50.36 criteria to U.S. EPR SSCs/parameters**
 - Safety-related systems generally included
 - Non-safety systems generally not included
- > **Apply existing completion times and surveillance frequencies as applicable**
- > **Incorporate U.S. EPR specific accident analysis and PRA assumptions**
- > **Incorporate applicable approved TSTFs**
- > **Maintain awareness of other ALWR TS reviews**
- > **If we choose to pursue risk based TS, will use methodology in Regulatory Guide 1.177, *An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decision-Making: Technical Specifications***

Supporting Documentation for DCD Chapter 16

- > 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Application Summary**
 - ◆ Description of methodology
 - ◆ Table of results showing U.S. EPR systems and applicable 10 CFR 50.36 criteria and applicable TS reference
 - ◆ Accident and transient analysis review summary
 - Table of results showing analyses and key initial conditions, resulting safety limits, credited mitigation systems, applicable 10 CFR 50.36 criteria and applicable TS reference
- > NUREG Roadmap**
 - ◆ Marked up copies of NUREG templates
 - ◆ Summary justification for each change
- > Bracketed Information Summary**
 - ◆ Table identifying bracketed items, responsibilities for completion, and expected completion milestone

Collaboration on Olkiluoto 3: Supporting Technical Specification Development

- > Areas of current collaboration**
 - ◆ Selection of standard TS NUREG templates
 - ◆ Development of writer's guides
 - ◆ Comparison of screening results using 10 CFR 50.36 criteria
 - ◆ Common development of administrative requirements

- > Areas of future collaboration**
 - ◆ Development of technical requirements for systems

U. S. EPR Technical Specifications are being developed in coordination with OL3 for consistency



Summary and Next Steps

***Sandra M. Sloan
Manager, Regulatory Affairs
New Plants Deployment***

Summary

- > **LCOs for four train (N+2) systems in U.S. EPR Generic TS planned to be based on three required safety trains (N+1)**
 - ◆ **N+2 design allows one train to be removed from service without affecting safety functions**
- > **U. S. EPR Generic TS development plan is based on standard industry guidance documents**
- > **U. S. EPR Generic TS development plan incorporates available TSTF travelers**
- > **Sufficient information will be provided in DCD Chapter 16 and supporting documentation to facilitate NRC review of U.S. EPR Generic Technical Specifications**

Next Steps

> **Next meeting**

- ◆ **June 20 2006: Fire Protection and Train Separation Criteria, Electrical System Design**

U.S. EPR Acronyms

> ACCU	Accumulator
> ALWR	Advanced Light-Water Reactor
> ECCS	Emergency Core Cooling System
> EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
> I&C	Instrumentation and Controls
> IRWST	In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank
> ITS	Improved Technical Specifications
> LHSI	Low Head Safety Injection
> MHSI	Medium Head Safety Injection
> MSRT	Main Steam Relief Train
> MSSV	Main Steam Safety Valve
> PZR	Pressurizer
> RCS	Reactor Coolant System
> RHRS	Residual Heat Removal System
> RTNSS	Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems
> RCSL	Reactor Control, Surveillance and Limitation System
> SBLOCA	Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident
> SBO	Station Blackout
> SGTR	Steam Generator Tube Rupture
> SI	Safety Injection
> STI	Surveillance Test Interval
> TS	Technical Specifications