

FPL Energy Seabrook Station P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 (603) 773-7000

MAY 2 3 2006

Docket No. 50-443 SBK-L-06109

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Seabrook Station Licensee Event Report (LER) 2006-003-00 Voluntary LER for Deficient Hydrostatic Barriers

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 2006-003-00. This is a voluntary LER that reports an event that occurred at Seabrook Station on February 5, 2006.

Should you require further information regarding this matter, please contact Mr. James M. Peschel, Regulatory Programs Manager, at (603) 773-7194.

Very truly yours,

FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC

Gene St. Pierre Site Vice President

cc: S. J. Collins, NRC Region I Administrator
 G. E. Miller, NRC Project Manager, Project Directorate I-2
 G. T. Dentel, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

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ENCLOSURE TO SBK-L-06109

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RC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/200 -2004) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collecting request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (1-5 F52), U. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2055-0001, or by internet and Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2055-0001, or by internet and Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2055-0001, or by internet and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office office office office office										-jøža					
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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)		LER NUMBER (6))
Seabrook Station	0500-0443	YEAR		REVISION NUMBER	2	OF	3
		2006	003	00	-		
17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional	copies of NRC Form :	366A) (17)					
I. Description of Event							
On February 5, 2006 at approximately 0400 protection system [KP] inadvertently actuate Station cable-spreading room [NA]. The ac resulted in a discharge of approximately 10 to the event subsequently discovered water directly below the cable spreading room. Th switchgear room was inspected for damage The presence of water in the switchgear roo is to function as a watertight hydrostatic bar rooms does not have a comprehensive des degraded cable spreading room floor seals	ed one of five fire tuation of the del 00 gallons of wat on the floor of th water was rem and determined om was unexpect rier. The safety- ign tolerance for	protection uge system er to the ca e safety-rel oved and th to be unaff red because related elec water. A su	water deluge s ble spreading i lated "A" train s ne electrical dis ected by the w the design of strical equipment ubsequent inve	ubsystems olated in all room. An o switchgear stribution e ater. the cable s at in the es stigation fo	s in the s bout two operator room lo quipme spreading sential bound a r	Seabro o minu respo ocated nt in th ng root switch numbe	tes, nding ie m floor gear ir of
designed to be watertight.		· · ·					
An evaluation of this event identified the follo	wing root cause:	· •					
 Design basis flood protection requirement included in the penetration seal or conc floor and associated seals were not originate 2. The work control process did not ensure instructions did not clearly identify all break instructions did not clearly identify	rete floor design ginally specified, (positive configu	specificatio designed of ation contro	ons. As a resu r installed as hy ol for cables th	It, the cabl ydrostatic t	e sprea barriers	ding ro	oom
III. Analysis of Event		· . • . •					
Hydrostatic Seal Design and Licensing Basi	1 -	•	·				
Initial investigations following the event focu associated cables [CBL]. These blockout a approximately 4 inches above the floor insic 60 elastomeric material. The steel kick plat interface. Several seals failed initial inspect approximately 8 square inches. Each was a in the actuated zone coverage area with suf locations generally corresponded to wetted cable spreading room and mechanical equi only with a foam material not meeting the hy room floor seals found two unsealed holes is subsequently repaired.	used on large bloc ssemblies extend de a kick plate en te surrounding the tion criteria specific repaired using ap fficient defects to areas in the "A" pment room floor ydrostatic design	I into the 12 closure. The penetration fied in plant proved met permit wate switchgear seals reve requiremer	2" thick concrete hese assemblie on is sealed wit procedures, we thods. There ver er leakage into room. A subse aled five small hts. An inspect	te floor and es are seal h caulking rith a total I vere three the switch equent inve penetration ion of the o	d are bu led with at the c breach SF-60 s gear ro estigations that cable sp	ilt-up BISCC oncrei area o ceals ic om. T on of th were s oreadir	D SF- te floor f bcated heir he ealed
The specification for the wall and floor pene equipment rooms required the design, mate accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Ap Accordingly, the seal materials and installed barrier requirements call for the seals to be originally specified, designed, installed, or in	erial and installation opendix R, and the penetration are hydrostatic barrie	on of the pe e Quality A classified a ers, no docu	enetration seals ssurance requi s ANS safety-r umented evide	to be perf rements in elated item	formed n ANSI I ns. Altho	in N45.2- ough th	1977. 1e
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NRC FORM 366A (1-2001)	۰ .	₽÷ - 1	U.S. NUCL	EAR REGULA	TORY COMMISSION					
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)										
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LE	R NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)					
		YEAR		REVISION NUMBER						
Seabrook Station	0500-0443	2006 -	003 -	00-	3 of 3					
17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co	pies of NRC Form 3	66A) (17)								
A review of structural drawings and specifications revealed that the cable spreading room floor was not designed or constructed with features that would ensure its intended watertight integrity. A review of concrete placement drawings revealed a construction joint above a known leak location. Water could leak through this joint and follow the Q-decking to the wall inside the electrical switchgear room.										
Seal Maintenance and Inspection Procedure	S									
Station procedures were originally developed Technical Requirement 11-4.7.9.5. The insp qualifications of the barriers and seals. An er barrier and seal inspections would also demo as hydrostatic, air, and tornado barrier function defects to remain without repairs while, for hy a watertight seal. Although the procedures th and installation of the fire barrier penetration modifications, the guidance does not conside maintenance and modification inspection attr the hydrostatic barrier function.	ection attributes valuation perform onstrate seal/ban ons. However, t ydrostatic seals, at provide admi seals require a er penetration se	specified in med in 1991 rier integrity he fire seal a these allowanistrative con dedicated wo als in the ca	these proceed concluded th for other safe acceptance of able defects m ntrols for the m ork order for p ble removal s	lures addres at the proce ety-related a riteria allowe nay not be s repair, remo- benetration s steps. In add	esed only fire rated dures used for fire pplications, such ed for certain ufficient to ensure val, modification, seal repairs and dition, the post-					
Safety Consequences										
No consequences resulted from this event and, therefore, the event had no adverse impact on the plant or on the health and safety of the public. The degraded seals did not present a safety hazard and would not have prevented the fulfillment of any safety function. In the event of a fire, the seals will tend to expand as they are subjected to the heat of the fire, improving their effectiveness as a water barrier. The amount of leakage experienced during the deluge actuation was minimal and resulted in no adverse impact on equipment in the essential switchgear room. Further, although the equipment in the essential switchgear room is not designed to be waterproof; a certain amount of protection is provided by the inherent design of the metal enclosures. Most of the enclosures have solid tops with entry by conduit, and most vents, where provided, on the sides of the equipment have small hoods to prevent water intrusion. Vents on the top of inverters have drip shields covering the vents, and equipment mounted on the walls is offset by attachments to unistrut, preventing damage from water trickling down the walls. A fire in the cable spreading room is an extremely unlikely event due to the flame qualification of the cables, the absence of permanent combustibles in this area, and the rigid controls on transient combustible material in this area. From a PRA perspective, this area is one of the lowest risks of any fire areas with regard to fire frequencies. A conservative estimate of the frequency of loss of both buses from a fire deluge is 1E-7/yr. Additionally, there have been hourly fire watches going into the cable spreading room since early 2005.										
IV. Corrective Actions										
The corrective actions taken to address this event include:										
 The deficient seals were repaired. Design changes were developed to up 	pgrade the cab	e spreading	room seals a	ind floor join	ts.					
Planned corrective actions will provide a detailed barrier and seal basis document and revise the administrative controls for maintenance and configuration control of barriers and seals.										
V. Similar Events										
LER 89-010 reported that three piping penetr required hydrostatic seals. The cause of the requirements into field fabrication and installa required hydrostatic seals were installed.	condition was a	ttributed to a	a failure to tra	nsform the s	ealing					

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